Citizens’ evacuation 

map and message 

from Gov. Blanco 

State of Louisiana
77

Emergency Management: 

Louisiana

The Threat

Like its Gulf Coast neighbor states, Louisiana repeatedly fi nds itself the target of tropical 

storms and hurricanes coming ashore from the Gulf of Mexico. Louisiana has the added 

problems of having large tracts of low-lying land that are sinking while sea levels are rising, 

and of being home to a major city that, on average, lies below sea level.

As the Congressional Research Service (CRS) has noted, “New Orleans’ location on the Gulf 

Coast with water on three sides and below-sea-level terrain makes this densely populated 

section of Louisiana highly susceptible to fl ooding from hurricane storm surges” – not to 

mention the risks it faces from river fl ooding and trapped rainwater.1

Th e need to protect New Orleans is old and pressing. And it is getting more severe. Th ree 

researchers presenting at a U.S. Geological Survey conference observed that “Considering the rate of subsidence [sinking soil levels] and the mid-range estimate of sea-level rise 

during the next 100 years (480 millimeters) [about 1.9 inches] the areas of New Orleans and 

vicinity that are presently 1.5 to 3 meters [about 5 to 10 feet] below mean sea level will likely 

be 2.5 to 4.0 meters [about 8 to 13 feet] or more below mean sea level by 2100.”2

 Like other 

researchers, they also note that the New Orleans area’s vulnerability is “aggravated owing 

to fl ood-protection measures and disruption of natural drainageways that reduce sediment 

deposition” that would otherwise compensate for some of the subsidence.3

Th e desire to protect New Orleans is old and powerful. And it continues. French settlers 

in the early 1700s built earthen levees to protect their high-ground settlement from fl ood 

waters rising in the Mississippi River. Aft er Louisiana had passed into American hands in 

1803, a succession of private landowners, local levee boards, and later the Army Corps of 

Engineers (the Corps) added to the protective works.4

 Th e Corps got its fi rst Mississippi 

fl ood-control mandate from Congress in 1850; its authority expanded through major fl oodcontrol legislation of 1936, 1944, and 1950, among others.5

Most of the current hurricane-protection system around the metropolitan New Orleans area 

has been built since 1879 by local sponsors or by the Corps.6

 Th e most intense and protracted 

program of protection, however, was launched aft er the 1965 assault by Hurricane Betsy. 

On the night of September 9, 1965, Hurricane Betsy made landfall near New Orleans, 

driving before it a storm surge of water that easily overran levees and fl ooded more than 

5,000 square miles of land, including densely populated areas in Orleans and St. Bernard 

Parishes, and more rural areas in Plaquemines Parish. Th e hurricane was the worst up to 

that point in Louisiana’s history: it killed 81 people, injured over 17,600, and drove more 

than 250,000 to shelters.7

President Lyndon Johnson visited New Orleans the next day. He praised the work of state 

and local fi rst responders – “Th e agony and the loss of Louisiana would have been far greater 

without the cooperation, eff ective work of the Weather Bureau, the Civil Defense Authorities 

of Louisiana, the Red Cross and other local groups” – then added, “[Y]ou can be sure that the 

federal government’s total resources, with the help of the fi ne Louisiana Delegation, will be 

turned toward helping this state and its citizens fi nd its way back from this tragedy.”8

Chapter 6
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78

Congress responded with the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project 

in the Flood Control Act of 1965. Th e project envisioned a series of control structures, 

fl oodwalls, and levees to provide hurricane protection to areas around Lake Pontchartrain, 

the large lake lying north of New Orleans. Originally expected to be completed in about 

13 years, the project was delayed by technical issues, environmental and legal challenges, 

and some local opposition that ultimately led to design changes. When Hurricane Katrina 

struck, the project included some 125 miles of levees, and the completion date had been 

extended to 2015. Th e drainage-canal fl oodwalls that failed during Katrina, however, were 

complete at that point.9

During the 40 years of construction that followed the Flood Control Act of 1965, a succession of powerful hurricanes – Camille in 1969, Andrew in 1992, Georges in 1998, Isadore 

and Lili in 2002, and Ivan in 2004 – supplied grim reminders of the need to protect the 

Louisiana coast and the low-lying City of New Orleans, and to perfect evacuation plans to 

remove people from the impact areas.

Th e Army Corps of Engineers had built the New Orleans levee system to handle a “standard 

project hurricane” – a notional, hybrid storm that engineers later described, in terms of the 

Saffi r-Simpson scale adopted in 1977, as “equivalent to a fast-moving Category 3 hurricane.”10 On its fi ve-category scale, the National Weather Service (NWS) classifi es Category 

3, 4, and 5 hurricanes as “major,” and the damage from a Category 5 storm as “catastrophic.”11 Compared to the Saffi r-Simpson standards, the Standard Project Hurricane’s winds 

were as fast as a Category 2 hurricane, its storm surge as high as a Category 3, and its central 

atmospheric pressure as low as a Category 4 – hence the rough description as a fast-moving 

Category 3 storm.12

Assessing the protective strength of the New Orleans-area system was complicated by the 

region’s soil subsidence. Th ough the Corps periodically “lift ed” the levees to compensate for 

subsiding soils, the levels of the lift s varied, resulting in a system as vulnerable as its lowest component. A Corps of Engineers fact sheet of 2003, “How Safe is New Orleans from 

Flooding?” took note of these uncertainties about the Lake Pontchartrain project:

Th is level of protection [against a fast-moving Category 3 hurricane] was based 

on the science of storm prediction as it existed in the 1960s. Th e question remains, however, whether this level of protection would be suffi cient to protect 

the city from a category 4 or 5 hurricane today – or even a category 3 storm 

that lingered over the city [i.e., a “slow-moving” storm]. Since the 1960s, New 

Orleans has been sinking – in some areas at the rate of 1⁄2 inch per year. Th e 

distance from the Gulf Coast to New Orleans has also been shrinking. A century ago, a hurricane would have to cross 50 miles of marshland able to reduce 

the storm’s energy; today only half as much.13

By 2003 – 10 years aft er the start of a new cycle of more active hurricane formation in the 

Atlantic – new research suggested that the combination of sinking soil and rising ocean 

water around the Mississippi Delta meant that even some Category 2 storms could produce 

devastating fl oods in the New Orleans area. Director Marc Levitan of the Louisiana State 

University Hurricane Center wrote a paper analyzing the computerized, multi-storm fl ooding projections of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s SLOSH (Sea, 

Lake, and Overland Surges from Hurricanes) program. Examining the mapping results of 

the program, he wrote, 

clearly demonstrates that New Orleans is at signifi cant risk of fl ooding from 

Category 2 and 3 hurricanes. All locations on the West Bank and many points 

on the East Bank could fl ood even in Category 2 intensity storms from certain 
Emergency Management: Louisiana

79

directions ... locations anywhere within Orleans and Jeff erson Parishes can 

experience signifi cant storm surge fl ooding in a Category 3 storm. ... Th e situation deteriorates rapidly if Category 4 and 5 storms are considered. Any single 

storm can easily fl ood broad areas of both parishes to depths over land of 10 

feet or more.14

Th e historic record shows the concern over extreme or catastrophic storms was not idle 

fretting about some remote possibility. Th e National Hurricane Center’s list of “Most 

Intense Hurricanes in the United States, 1851-2004” includes six hurricanes measured or 

estimated as Category 4 or 5 that have struck Louisiana:

Hurricane Andrew 1992 Category 5

Hurricane Camille 1969 Category 5

Hurricane Audrey 1957 Category 4

Unnamed storm 1947 Category 4

Unnamed storm 1915 Category 4

“Last Island” storm 1856 Category 415

Hurricane Betsy, which devastated New Orleans and other Louisiana communities in 1965, 

had reached Category 5 strength while still in the Gulf of Mexico, though it weakened 

before landfall. Hurricane Katrina reached the same strength in 2005, and faced a protective 

system with newly recognized vulnerabilities.

Just as the hurricane-protection system refl ected coordinated eff orts at diff erent levels 

of government, Louisiana’s response capability for disasters like Katrina is vested in an 

emergency-management system that coordinates preventive and remedial actions by local, 

state, and federal governments. As will be seen, that system had defi ciencies in its structure 

and operation.

The State

Louisiana’s Emergency-Management Structure

Louisiana law entrusts the Governor with “overall responsibility for emergency management in the state.” 16 Th e Governor delegated her authority to direct emergency operations 

to the state Adjutant General.17 As in many other states, when Katrina struck, the Adjutant 

General was serving both as director of the state emergency-preparedness offi ce and as 

commander of the National Guard.

Th e state’s lead agency for emergencies is the Governor’s Offi ce of Homeland Security and 

Emergency Preparedness. From 2003 to March 2006 – and therefore during the Katrina 

disaster – it was known as the Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency 

Preparedness (LOHSEP), and will be referred to by that title in this discussion. Since its 

creation in 1950, the agency has been variously assigned to the Department of Public Safety, 

the Military Department, and fi nally the Governor’s Offi ce.18

LOHSEP says it “has managed over 16 Federal Disaster Declarations and has coordinated 

several hundred State Disaster Declarations authorized under the Governor’s signature” 

since 1990.19 Based in Baton Rouge, LOHSEP was directed at the time of Katrina by the 
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80

Adjutant General of the Louisiana National Guard, Major General Bennett C. Landreneau; 

its current Acting Director is Colonel Jeff Smith. 

Allocation of disaster-response responsibilities is governed primarily by the Louisiana Constitution, the Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act, 

and the State Emergency Operations Plan (EOP).

Th e State’s EOP comprises a 21-page “Basic Plan,” four Attachments, 15 Emergency Support Function (ESF) Annexes, and seven Supplements. Its purpose is to “establish the 

policies and structure for state government management of emergencies and disasters.”20 It 

prescribes phases of emergencies and disasters, and assigns responsibilities for actions the 

state will take to provide for the safety and welfare of its citizens.21

Th e general principles underlying the EOP’s allocation of responsibilities exemplify the 

long-standing, federal-system approach to disaster planning. Th e EOP’s “Assumptions” section reads, in part:

5. Th e initial actions of prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response and 

recovery operations are conducted by local government. Local authorities will 

exhaust their resources, and then use mutual aid agreements with volunteer 

groups, the private sector and/or neighboring parishes.

6. State assistance will supplement local eff orts and federal assistance will supplement State and local eff orts when it is clearly demonstrated that it is beyond 

local and State capability to cope with the emergency/disaster.22

Following the template of the National Response Plan (NRP), the EOP identifi es 15 Emergency Support Functions (ESFs), for which 28 state departments, offi ces and agencies have 

primary and/or supporting roles. LOHSEP has primary responsibility for fi ve ESFs; the 

Department of Agriculture and Forestry, the State Police, and the Department of Transportation and Development have responsibility for two; and 10 agencies have a single primary 

responsibility. Th e National Guard is unique in being assigned supporting responsibility for 

all 15 ESFs, but no primary responsibilities.23

While most of those departments and agencies took their responsibilities seriously, as discussed elsewhere in this report, the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development, which acquired primary responsibility for the emergency support function relating 

to evacuation in 2004, did not. Colonel Smith also acknowledged LOHSEP’s shortcomings 

in this area, saying the agency needed to do more to ensure that all entities assigned lead 

responsibilities for emergency support functions are “completely aware of what those responsibilities mean.”24 

Governor Blanco failed to provide suffi cient resources to LOHSEP. However, the inadequacy of LOHSEP’s resources was a chronic issue, known to Louisiana offi cials well before 

Katrina. LOHSEP had a pre-Katrina staff of 43 to 45, some of whom were detailed from 

other offi ces. Only about 15 agency staff had emergency-management leadership experience.25 Depressed pay scales both prevented the agency from hiring experienced candidates 

and led to high turnover. 26 Planning in particular suff ered. When the New Orleans medical 

director sought to put in place memoranda of understanding with Amtrak and other carriers for pre-landfall evacuation in the summer of 2005, LOHSEP was too short-staff ed to 

help fi nalize the plan.27

When Colonel Smith became Acting Deputy Director in late 2004, General Landreneau directed him to undertake a staffi ng study.28 While the resulting study showed that LOHSEP’s 

staffi ng was only about 60 percent of the national average, eff orts to persuade the legislature 
Emergency Management: Louisiana

81

to fund additional positions – which had the support of the Governor’s staff – met with 

little success. 29

LOHSEP was also well aware long before Katrina that its emergency plan was not adequate 

to deal with a catastrophic hurricane, and that it lacked the resources to remedy that inadequacy. It was that very awareness that led to its eff orts beginning in 1999 to secure federal 

assistance in developing a more comprehensive plan (eventually leading to the Hurricane 

Pam exercise).30 Th e extent of that inadequacy only became more apparent as LOHSEP 

wrestled with the overwhelming problems of responding to the devastation of Katrina.

The State Updates its EOP

In addition to the issues that led to the Hurricane Pam exercise, the state and federal agencies addressed other concerns related to evacuation. 

In 2000, the State’s Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness fi nished an update of the state comprehensive emergency operations plan. It included new evacuation and shelter plans produced by the 12 parishes in the Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Task Force. Some parishes, 

such as Jeff erson, updated their plans; some agencies, such as the New Orleans Fire Department, developed new strategies for a catastrophic storm.31

Th is period also exposed the fundamental weakness of the state’s approach to pre-storm 

evacuation of residents without transportation. Under the state’s plan, the National Guard 

was responsible for transportation, but the agency had no buses and intended to parcel out 

its inventory of troop transport trucks to individual parishes as it had always done.32 Th e 

State’s Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, updated in 2000, left the responsibility for pre-storm evacuation with the parishes. “Th e primary means of hurricane evacuation 

will be personal vehicles,” the plan said. “School and municipal buses, government-owned 

vehicles and vehicles provided by volunteer agencies may be used to provide transportation 

for individuals who lack transportation and require assistance in evacuating.”33

Solving the problem involved more than assembling large numbers of buses, as the 1994 

Hurricane Preparedness Study had emphasized. If no building in New Orleans could serve 

as a hurricane shelter, then all vehicles had a much longer drive to reach shelters, which 

infl uences clearance times. 

A month before the start of the 2002 hurricane season, offi cials from the main state and federal agencies responsible for hurricane evacuations in Louisiana met to discuss the Bi-State 

Hurricane Evacuation Study – an event that underscored the challenges of arranging mass 

evacuations in a hurricane-prone region.34 During the meeting, speakers noted that approximately 30 percent of Louisiana residents would evacuate to or through Mississippi in the 

event of a hurricane and that Louisiana wanted to begin using the contrafl ow land-reversal 

process to route residents eastward into Mississippi – an operation that could confl ict with 

Mississippi’s need to evacuate its own at-risk residents and tourists. 35

By the 2002 hurricane season, the state’s preparedness agency had moved into a new Emergency Operations Center in Baton Rouge that would serve as a command center during 

disasters for state and federal offi cials. In May 2002, the FEMA Region VI offi ce produced 

its own “Hurricane Plan for Louisiana” that refl ected the plans that the state and FEMA had 

developed. 

When Katrina struck, Louisiana was in the process of bringing its emergency-management systems into conformance with the National Incident Management System (NIMS).36

Th e NRP incorporates the NIMS. In its April 2005 revision to the State’s EOP,Louisiana 

adopted a “State of Louisiana Incident Management System” (SLIMS), which is supposed to 
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82

use the same fl exible structure as NIMS “to manage all types of incidents, particularly those 

that require the establishment of Incident Command Posts at or near an incident site.” 

However, in Katrina, a local incident-command post was not put into place until the second 

week of the response. In the fi rst week, the state operated under its pre-SLIMS structure, 

with operations managed through the LOHSEP chain of command. 

Colonel Smith and his operations division chief, Colonel William Doran, had diff erent perspectives on the eff ectiveness of incident command at the local level. Colonel Doran believed 

that the diff erences between the incident-command structure envisioned under NIMS and 

Louisiana’s actual practice were minor: “In our case, we still have a chain of command. It’s 

just – it’s set up just a little bit diff erent, but I think in spirit we’re doing incident command.”37

Colonel Smith, on the other hand, saw a need for LOHSEP to educate parishes on incident 

command, and possibly even for legislation to address the issue:

Some parishes do a better job of understanding the ICS system, the NIMS 

structures. Others don’t do as good a job. ... I will tell you that we have some 

that work together great and we have others that hardly speak to each other.38

LOHSEP’s Chief of Operations testifi ed to “holes” in the state plan in several areas, including state control of aviation; transportation and logistics; and prioritizing competing needs 

for emergency assistance. He saw a need for the state to incorporate the kinds of detail 

(“who, what, where, why, and how”) found in military planning. Th e absence of that kind of 

detail made it necessary, in his opinion, to make plans “on the fl y.”39

However, the plan does show some awareness that people lacking vehicles or having mobility problems could require assistance in evacuating. Two annexes to the State’s EOP, the 

Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Evacuation and Sheltering Plan, and the Louisiana Shelter 

Operations Plan, address that issue. 

Th e former was the creation of the Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Task Force. Th e revised 

plan of January 2000 was published by the State’s Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness, and 

lists 12 parish presidents and the mayor of New Orleans as signatories.40 (In accordance 

with the EOP, LOHSEP required the plan to be updated at least once every four years; 

however, the updating due in 2004 did not occur prior to Katrina due to short staffi ng of the 

LOHSEP planning division.)41

Th e “situations” which the plan is designed to address are described in terms very similar 

to the scenario that served as the basis for the Hurricane Pam exercise. Th ey include the 

following:

1. Th e Greater New Orleans Metropolitan Area represents a diffi cult evacuation problem due to the large population and it’s [sic] unique layout.

2. Th is area is located in a fl oodplain much of which lies below sea level ...

3. Tidal surge, associated with a “worst case” Category 3, 4 or 5 Hurricane ... 

could cause a maximum inundation of 20 feet above sea level in some 

parishes ...

4. Th e area is protected by an extensive levee system, but above normal water 

levels and hurricane surge could cause levee overtopping or failures.42

Th e plan also set forth a list of assumptions, including one directed specifi cally at the need 

for buses and other conveyances to evacuate those that lacked personal vehicles, stating:
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83

Th e primary means of hurricane evacuation will be personal vehicles. School 

and municipal buses, government-owned vehicles and vehicles provided by 

volunteer agencies may be used to provide transportation for individuals who 

lack transportation and require assistance in evacuating.43

While the operational sections of the plan lack detail, and place very little responsibility on 

state government, they clearly envision a role for parish governments in evacuating those 

who cannot self-evacuate. Th ose sections divide responsibilities between risk-area parishes 

(in the hurricane strike zone), host-area parishes (parishes outside the strike zone where 

evacuees may be sheltered), and the state. No transportation obligations are imposed on 

host-area parishes. Th e responsibilities on the other two are further grouped by phases, i.e., 

precautionary/voluntary evacuation; recommended evacuation; and mandatory evacuation.

In a precautionary/voluntary evacuation, the Plan states that in risk-area parishes, “Local 

transportation resources should be marshaled and public transportation plans implemented 

as needed.” Th ere are no requirements for the state to marshal transportation resources.

In a recommended evacuation, the Plan directs risk-area parishes to “Mobilize transportation to assist persons who lack transportation or who have mobility problems.” Th e state is 

directed to “Mobilize State transportation resources to aid in the evacuation of people who 

have mobility and/or health problems.”

In mandatory evacuations, the Plan only directs risk-area parishes to “Assist persons with 

mobility limitations to fi nd last resort refuge [and to m]obilize all transportation resources 

and request assistance from the state as needed.” Th e text is unclear whether the resources are 

to be mobilized solely to transport persons with mobility limitations to last-resort refuges, or 

for broader purposes. Th e obligations of the state are even more limited, and no clearer: Th e 

state is to “Direct the evacuation and shelter of persons having mobility limitations, including 

persons in nursing homes, hospitals, group homes and non-institutionalized persons.”44

Part VI of the plan defi nes the role of staging areas and last resort refuges. It contemplates 

that staging areas will be designated, and transportation will be pre-positioned to transport 

people from those areas to shelters until evacuation routes are closed, at which point the 

staging areas “will become Last Resort Refuges.” Once weather conditions permit, rescue 

teams are supposed to transport evacuees from last-resort refuges to designated shelters. 

Th e plan does not specify who has responsibility to transport people from staging areas to 

shelters, either before evacuation routes are closed or aft er they reopen.45 However, state 

offi cials consistently took the position in staff interviews that transporting evacuees was the 

responsibility of parish or local government.46

Th e Shelter Operations Plan is the creation of the Louisiana Shelter Task Force, made up of 

in-land parishes, i.e., parishes likely to receive evacuees from low-lying or coastal parishes 

during a major hurricane.

Th e plan includes a statement regarding transportation that closely resembles language in 

the Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Evacuation and Shelter Plan:

Th e primary means of hurricane evacuation will be personal vehicles. However, school and municipal buses and, where available, specialized vehicles will be 

used to transport those hurricane evacuees who do not have transportation.47

While this part of the plan is silent on the entity expected to provide the buses and vehicles 

to transport people lacking personal vehicles, Part III identifi es local governments in the 

Southeast and Southwest Hurricane Task Forces as being responsible to transport evacuees to shelters. Th e language suggests that the risk-area parishes were already planning 
Chapter 6

84

to provide that transportation (although they evidently failed to follow through on those 

plans). In a subsection labeled “Individual Evacuee” under Section III.B Reception and Care 

– Planning Considerations, it states:

Most evacuees are expected to relocate using their personal vehicles. Local 

governments of the two Hurricane Task Forces (Southeast and Southwest) 

are expected to assist in evacuating those residents who do not own vehicles. 

Evacuating parishes plan to transport these people to reception areas in Sector 

C of the Shelter Area parishes using school and municipal buses, and special 

purpose vehicles.48

Th e Shelter Operations Plan also required nursing homes to maintain emergency plans that 

address evacuation and sheltering of their patients, and their patients are not allowed into 

special-needs shelters “unless the homes’ prearrangements have utterly failed.”49 Nursing 

homes were to contract in advance with commercial carriers for patients, staff , and staff 

families; the plan cautions that ambulance companies may be overwhelmed with demands 

for service in emergencies; and it directs home health-care agencies to assist the patient or 

his caregivers in making transportation arrangements.50

All organizations that provide care to special-needs people, but do not have enough transportation in emergencies, were required to arrange for supplemental transportation. If 

those arrangements failed, they were to notify local OEPs, and the latter are to notify needs 

in excess of their community capacity to LOHSEP. In turn, LOHSEP was required to report 

these needs to the Louisiana National Guard, which in turn was supposed to meet them 

with its own assets or “arrange for supplemental transportation assistance from other state 

agencies, the Federal Government, private businesses, other organizations, and volunteer 

groups.”51

Finally, Katrina revealed a weakness in LOHSEP’s use of Standard Operating Procedures 

(SOP) in managing emergencies. LOHSEP’s SOP describe the staffi ng of the EOC during 

non-emergency situations as well as progressive levels of threatened emergencies; EOC 

organization in emergencies; information handling procedures; responsibilities of the 

principal functional groups; and certain administrative matters. Attached to it are appendices listing the responsibilities of supporting agencies at each level of EOC activation, EOC 

checklists, and forms for recordkeeping and public notifi cation.

Th e Shelter Operations Plan Checklists identify actions to be taken at each stage of EOC 

activation, and provide a place for a LOHSEP to initialize and note the date and time each 

action is completed. Some of the items are administrative, e.g., faxing forms to parishes and 

requesting kitchen support for the EOC, while others relate to key aspects of preparing for 

disaster response. Examples of the latter category are “LOHSEP Executes Evacuation Shelter 

Plan” and “Begin Mandatory Evacuation Procedures.”52

While the checklist could have served as an important tool to identify shortcomings in preparedness, its eff ectiveness in Katrina was limited because LOHSEP had no means to verify 

the accuracy of input data and information. For example, the list included an important 

action item relating to whether nursing homes were prepared to evacuate their patients. 

Specifi cally, it required the “Louisiana Nursing Home Association EOC Liaison [to] call all 

nursing homes and other custodial care organizations in the risk area to insure that they 

are prepared to evacuate their residents.” A LOHSEP offi cial checked this item off as having 

been done even though, as it turned out, preparations for evacuation of nursing homes were 

far from adequate. As he subsequently acknowledged, the representation of the Nursing 

Home Association liaison that he had called nursing homes provided no assurance that the 

calls were eff ective.53
Emergency Management: Louisiana

85

The Parishes

Parish governments, like the state government, oft en underfunded their emergency-management functions, although in degrees that varied between parishes. As Colonel Smith 

testifi ed, the problem was primarily a matter of competing demands on fi nite resources:

In most cases, not in all, the [parish] emergency-management function does 

take a back seat. I mean they’re interested in roads, they’re interested in bridges, they’re interested in infrastructure and they don’t have the fi nal resources 

to deal with all of those things that they have to deal with on a day-to-day 

basis. So the emergency-support functions a lot of times take a back seat due to 

resourcing primarily.54

Local offi cials have also found it increasingly diffi cult to navigate the regulations associated 

with DHS grants for emergency preparedness and homeland security. “You have to be a 

Philadelphia lawyer and a CPA just to interpret the rules and to get the dollars,” according 

to Colonel Smith.55

Orleans Parish

Funding emergency preparedness has clearly not been a priority in Orleans Parish. Terry 

Tullier, who served in the New Orleans Fire Department (NOFD) before becoming Director of the City’s Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness from 2001 through 2004, noted the 

dramatic diff erence in staffi ng of the two organizations. In the NOFD, he said, there were

probably some 830-840 people who would be happy to say, yes sir, and do 

pretty much anything I needed for them to do. And suddenly I was confronted 

with an organization that had three people in it. ... And I very quickly found 

out that this was going to be a real challenge for me to operate within the confi nes of such a small structure.56

Tullier complained to the city administration about the understaffi ng of his offi ce, noting 

that the OEP in neighboring Jeff erson Parish (under Walter Maestri) was far higher. In 

response, Tullier was told “Well, you’re never going to have a dozen people in your shop 

like Walter does over there and just try and do the best you can.”57 Turnover has also been 

a serious problem at the New Orleans’ OEP: Th ere have been fi ve directors since 1993, and 

the position was vacant from December 2004, when Tullier retired, to March 2005, when 

Matthews was appointed.58

Orleans Parish maintains a Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP) that 

stresses the importance of pre-disaster evacuation. Th e plan acknowledges that “Approximately 100,000 citizens of New Orleans do not have means of personal transportation.”59 It 

also says that “Th e safe evacuation of threatened populations when endangered by a major 

catastrophic event is one of the principle [sic] reasons for developing a Comprehensive 

Emergency Management Plan,”60 and it lists identifi cation of at-risk populations and of 

transportation resources as two of the “primary tasks of evacuation planning.”61 While the 

plan assumes that most people will self-evacuate, it appears to envision active government 

involvement in providing transportation when it says that “Th e City of New Orleans will 

utilize all available resources to quickly and safely evacuate threatened areas. ... Special arrangements will be made to evacuate persons unable to transport themselves or who require 

specifi c life saving assistance.”62 It also says that “Transportation will be provided to those 

persons requiring public transportation from the area.”63

Th e plan also includes a list of assigned tasks for various city personnel and agencies including, among others, the mayor, the OEP, and the Regional Transit Authority (RTA). One 
Chapter 6

86

of the RTA tasks is to “Supply transportation as needed in accordance with the current standard operating procedures and to position supervisors and dispatch evacuation buses.”64

While the plan recognizes the mayor’s authority to issue evacuation orders, and specifi cally 

refers to mandatory evacuation, it does not specify how (or whether) such orders will be 

enforced or whether anyone would be excluded from the orders.65 However, the Louisiana 

Shelter Operations Plan, which is also an Appendix to the New Orleans CEMP, states that 

a mandatory evacuation order is “the fi nal, most serious phase of evacuation. Authorities 

will put maximum emphasis on encouraging evacuation and limiting ingress.”66 Th is suggests that the city (and the state) may not have intended that mandatory orders would be 

legally enforced.

Th e NOFD maintains hurricane guidelines that include a provision for last areas of refuge. 

Th ese refuges are facilities which are multi-level, with a center core stairwell and in strategic locations around the city.67 Each of the NOFD’s eight Districts are required to identify 

facilities which meet the pre-requisites for last areas of refuge, confi rm with the facility that 

fi re personnel can be housed there, and reconfi rm that commitment during pre-season 

preparations.68 Th e plan includes multiple last areas of refuge, with some including back-up 

locations, and notes the contact person and phone number for that facility. Th e descriptions 

of each location also note whether the facility includes adequate space to park department 

apparatus.69 Personnel report to these refuges upon decision by the superintendent, which 

will generally occur when winds reach approximately 40 miles per hour prior to landfall.70

Jefferson Parish

As noted above, Jeff erson Parish has committed far more resources to emergency management than Orleans Parish. It has a Director, Walter Maestri, who has served in that position 

for nine years, and 11 permanent staff .71 During times of emergency, the staff swells to more 

than 100.72 Prior to Katrina, the EOC had approximately 80 land lines into the building, 

with two high-capacity T-1 data-transmission lines that connected to all of the offi ce’s data 

systems.73 Th e Parish had its own 800 megahertz system for fi rst responders and public 

works, together with an 800 megahertz system provided by the state.74 Th e Parish had a 911 

call center, with the calls being routed to four operational units – police, fi re, emergency 

medical, or public works.75 Th e Jeff erson Parish Emergency Operations Plan was one of only 

two EOPs in the State of Louisiana that had been offi cially approved by FEMA. Th e other 

was St. Tammany Parish.76

Th e Parish EOP includes detailed provisions addressing the use of municipal buses to 

transport residents without other means of transportation. 77 It also includes measures for 

establishment of a backup EOC in the event of a Category 4 or higher hurricane.78

Plaquemines Parish

Th e Plaquemines Parish Homeland Security Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness has a full-time 

staff of two – a Director, Jesse St. Amant, and his secretary, who also serves as the 911 supervisor.79 Th e offi ce coordinates with the Parish EMS Department to manage the evacuation of the 

Parish’s special needs population.80 EMS monitors the Parish’s special-needs population and 

arranges for their transportation by ambulance to a regional hospital during emergencies.81

Th e Plaquemines Parish Emergency Operations Plan’s Basic Plan directly mirrors the State 

Basic Plan. It is augmented by 20 appendices setting forth organizational charts, government lines of succession, key facilities and workers.82 A transportation annex notes that 

approximately 12 percent of the population could require public transportation for evacuation, and commits the Parish to provide buses and trucks for evacuation, as well as make 

sure that special-needs populations, including inmates, elderly, and the handicapped, all 

have transportation.83
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St. Bernard Parish

Th e St. Bernard Parish Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness also has a 

staff of only two – a director, Larry Ingargiola, and his secretary.84 Th e staff is supplemented 

with about 20 volunteers during emergencies. 85 Parish government has never allowed the 

emergency director to fully open or staff the EOC during a hurricane, including during 

Katrina. 86

Th e St. Bernard Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) also mirrors the State’s EOP and includes 

multiple appendices. Th e evacuation appendix notes the need to address transportation of 

people without personal vehicles, but fails to make provision for that transportation.87

St. Tammany Parish

Th e St. Tammany Parish Offi ce of Emergency Management and Homeland Security is 

staff ed with a director, Dexter Accordo, and two deputy directors.88 Th e Parish EOC is 

unusual for southeast Louisiana in having a state-of-the-art communications system that 

includes a “reverse 911 [system] where you can dial up people by geographic area, and you 

can broadcast an audio message to them, giving them direction of what’s going on.”89 Th e 

EOC also maintains an operations center staff ed by support agencies such as the Louisiana 

National Guard, the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development, the St. 

Tammany Sheriff ’s Department, the Fire Department, and EMS.90 Requests for assistance 

that cannot be met by these agencies are routed to the state as E-Team requests.91

Th e Parish’s Emergency Operations Plan is similar to St. Bernard Parish’s plan in that it 

identifi es evacuation of residents without personal vehicles as an issue, but lacks provisions 

to address it. 92

Federal Involvement

As discussed elsewhere in the Report, the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the 

Army Corps of Engineers have statutory authorization – and appropriations – to assist the 

hurricane planning and response of state and local agencies.93 Many other federal agencies, 

perhaps most notably the U.S. Coast Guard, can get involved early and intensely.

Th ere is no question that eff ective and timely federal assistance in disaster planning and 

response is vital. Local, state, and federal agencies’ response to Hurricane Andrew in 1992 

was widely criticized as poorly coordinated and ineff ective. Th e General Accounting Offi ce 

(GAO, later renamed the Government Accountability Offi ce) concluded later that future 

hurricanes on the scale of Andrew “will quickly outstrip the capacity of all but the federal 

government to respond in the critical fi rst 12 to 24 hours with life-sustaining mass care.”94

On May 18, 1993, nine months aft er Hurricane Andrew and with a new hurricane season 

only two weeks away, National Hurricane Center Director, Robert H. Sheets, Ph.D., testifi ed 

in a U.S. Senate hearing, “Rebuilding FEMA: Preparing for the Next Disaster.” 95

Because of the time it took Andrew to reach the Louisiana coast, authorities had managed 

to evacuate approximately 1.25 million people from the New Orleans metropolitan area. 

Th e process took three days, but offi cials in New Orleans expected 60 to 80 hours warning 

to complete evacuation.96 Sheets knew this was not nearly good enough to prevent mass casualties. “We don’t have the skill, meteorologically speaking, to provide a suffi cient warning 

for those long lead times,” he explained.97

If Hurricane Andrew’s track had shift ed slightly and hit New Orleans directly, the projected 

storm surge into Lake Borgne on the eastern side of the city, and on into Lake Pontchar-
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88

train to the northwest would have overfl owed the levees into New Orleans. “Th e city of New 

Orleans would have gone under 18 to 20 feet of water,” he said.98

Several federal agencies played an important role in the task of improving protections for 

Louisiana.

The Army Corps of Engineers

Th e involvement of the Corps of Engineers refl ected the agency’s long history of dealing 

with the impact of major hurricanes, especially in Louisiana. When Hurricane Betsy fl ooded 

New Orleans in 1965, the Corps was one of the most important federal responders and handled the disaster-assistance missions later transferred to FEMA. 99 Th e Corps designed most 

of the levee system that protected the New Orleans area. By statute, the Corps is authorized 

to assist state and local agencies, upon their request, with disaster preparedness.100 Under 

the Federal Response Plan, FEMA could assign the Corps to conduct search-and-rescue 

missions and supply water, ice, and fuel.101 In the event of severe fl ooding from a hurricane, 

the Corps was responsible for assisting local levee boards in restoring damaged levees and 

in removing fl oodwaters trapped inside them.

Th e relationship between the Corps and local levee boards and agencies was complex and 

not without tension. But in carrying out the dewatering program, the Corps “assumed that 

any emergency response will be fully coordinated with the appropriate levee districts, parish 

drainage departments, and local and state offi cials.” 102

The National Weather Service

Th e National Hurricane Center (NHC) within the National Weather Service (NWS) monitors storms and provides broad-scope advisories on size, track, expected point of landfall, 

height of storm surge, and fl ooding. With its 1996 creation of the Hurricane Liaison Team, 

the NHC also came to serve as a source of situational awareness for emergency managers.103

Phone calls and visits from NWS forecasters who worked in the agency’s four offi ces in 

Louisiana supplement the warnings with specifi c local knowledge.104

Th e NWS was a critical partner with the Corps and FEMA in the Hurricane Evacuation 

Studies process. Th e agency’s scientists provided the storm-surge projections that gave local 

emergency managers guidance on when to order an evacuation, what to evacuate, and where 

it was safe to open shelters. Aft er Hurricane Camille in 1969, the NWS developed the Sea, 

Lake, and Overland Surges from Hurricanes (SLOSH) computer program to estimate the 

surge of an incoming hurricane. Th e SLOSH modeling soft ware could model storm surges 

for hurricanes of many sizes, strengths, and tracks.105 Th e evacuation studies conducted by 

FEMA and the Army Corps of Engineers use the simulated storm surges as a basis.106

The Federal Emergency Management Agency and Hurricane Evacuation Studies

While Louisiana’s Disaster Act affi rmed local and state offi cials’ authority to compel evacuation, safely evacuating more than a million people from the New Orleans area involves a 

complex ballet that ranges over three states and requires the cooperation of dozens of local, 

state, and federal agencies, and the American Red Cross.107

In 1994 this collaboration produced the equivalent of a desk reference for hurricane evacuation decision makers, known as the Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Preparedness Study. It 

established evacuation zones for each parish and provided estimated “clearance times” to 

evacuate each zone based on hurricanes of diff erent sizes, strengths, and forward speeds.108

Th e 1994 study assumed that the levee system “would be subject to overtopping” by storm 

surge from a Category 4 or 5 hurricane, and even by some slow-moving Category 3 hurricanes.109 Th e study showed that no shelter in New Orleans south of Interstate 12 was safe 
Emergency Management: Louisiana

89

from the potential reach of Category 4 or Category 5 storm surge and inundation.110 Th e 

study took note that about 15 percent of New Orleans residents (roughly 75,000 by the 

1994 estimate) had no means of personal transportation, and cautioned, “Th e large number 

of residents reliant on public transportation could create signifi cant problems during an 

evacuation and should be accounted for in the planning process.” 111

Th e 1994 study off ered another caution while explaining the limitations of the SLOSH models of potential hurricane impact:

Th e performance of a levee or fl oodwall depends on many factors (design criteria, construction techniques, maintenance, severity of storm, etc.) and these 

factors cannot be accounted for by the SLOSH model. Th e SLOSH model runs 

performed for the Lake Pontchartrain basin assumed that the levees and fl oodwalls remained intact, even if overtopped. In past storms, such as Hurricane 

Betsy and Hurricane Juan, portions of levees have failed. Th e failure of a levee 

or fl oodwall could signifi cantly increase the extent and degree of fl ooding. 

Emergency-management offi cials should be aware of the potential for a failure 

in the protection and the corresponding impacts.112

Final Warnings

Ten years later, on June 1, 2004, Wilson Shaff er, Ph.D., a SLOSH-model expert, traveled to 

Louisiana to provide an informal briefi ng to parish emergency managers on new SLOSH 

studies that showed a greater number of Category 3 hurricanes would overtop the levees 

in New Orleans.113 In e-mail messages during this period, Brett Herr, the Corps offi cial in 

charge of the Bi-State Hurricane Evacuation Study in New Orleans, said the “new surge 

inundation maps show signifi cant portions of Orleans and Jeff erson Parishes that are susceptible to fl ooding from slow-moving Category 2 and fast Category 3 hurricanes. We had 

previously thought that the city would...fare pretty well for these types of storms. Th e new 

maps will result in signifi cantly longer [evacuation] clearance times for these scenarios.”114

Th e new studies used in the Hurricane Pam exercise of July 2004 provided further pre-Katrina grounds for caution. FEMA and LOHSEP sponsored the exercise for more than 300 

participants, including parish emergency managers, state offi cials, FEMA and NWS representatives, volunteer agencies, and others involved in emergency management. Th e hypothetical Hurricane Pam was posited to be a strong, slow-moving Category 3 storm preceded 

by 20 inches of rain. Th e exercise projected results including over 60,000 deaths, more than 

1 million people evacuated, and 10 to 20 feet of water in New Orleans. Except for the deaths 

fi gure, the Hurricane Pam projections were generally close to the real-life experience of Katrina.115 (See Chapter 8 of this Report for further discussion of the exercise and its results.)

On June 1, 2005, Shaff er returned to Louisiana to present a briefi ng of the latest storm-surge 

estimates for New Orleans. His slide presentation was titled “Hurricanes: Nature’s Weapons of Mass Destruction.” It included a 40-year-old photograph of the severe fl ooding that 

occurred during Hurricane Betsy and a color graphic of fl ooding by a composite of possible 

Category 3 hurricanes. It showed that more Category 3 storms could cause overtopping of 

the levee system than the Army Corps of Engineers had previously stated.116

Another reminder of the deadly potential of hurricanes was given shortly before Katrina’s 

arrival by the Louisiana Water Resources Research Institute at LSU:

If a hurricane approaches New Orleans from any number of tracks from the 

south or southeast, water will be pushed from the Gulf of Mexico into Mississippi Sound, Lake Borgne and Lake Pontchartrain. A FEMA storm surge 

model, NOAA’s SLOSH model, and now ... experimental storm surge models 
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90

based on the most recent levee heights and detailed land elevation data for 

southern Louisiana, have verifi ed that a slow-moving Category 3 hurricane or 

greater of these tracks have the potential to fl ood the New Orleans “bowl.” ...

Recent survey evidence (UNO [University of New Orleans], July 2005) indicates that while many people do feel threatened by Category 4 storms, and will 

evacuate oncoming storms such as Hurricane Ivan (2004), some still do not realize how dangerous even a Category 2 or 3 storm from the right direction can 

be. Because of this they are less likely to evacuate. If you are told by emergency 

offi cials to evacuate any incoming hurricane or even tropical storm, you should 

still go, as early as possible.117 [Emphasis in original]

In August 2005, the NHC updated its chronicle of hurricane activity and highlighted the 

growing potential for catastrophic impact:

Records for the most intense U.S. hurricane in 1935, and the costliest, Andrew 

in 1992, occurred in years which had much below-average hurricane activity. A large death toll in a U.S. hurricane is still possible. ... Continued coastal 

growth and infl ation will almost certainly result in every future major landfalling hurricane (and even weaker hurricanes and tropical storms) replacing one 

of the current costliest hurricanes. ... If warnings are heeded and preparedness 

plans developed, the death toll can be reduced. In the absence of a change of 

attitude, policy, or laws governing building practices (codes and location) near 

the ocean, however, large property losses are inevitable.118

Before the month was out, the soundness of that warning would be apparent.

Flooded New Orleans

U.S. Coast Guard photo
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91

What Were the Emergency-Management Implications of 

Facts About Levees and Hurricanes?

Whether the New Orleans levees and fl oodwalls were in fact built to Category 3 standards 

– much less upgraded to account for sinking soil and rising seas – is an important question. 

But it has limited bearing on judging the reasonableness and adequacy of preparations for 

Katrina.

Th e professional literature on hurricane preparation contained evidence well before Hurricane Katrina that planners would do well to err on the side of caution. A 1990 Army Corps 

of Engineers and FEMA assessment of the relatively low toll of 40 deaths from Hurricane 

Hugo’s strike on the coast of Georgia and the Carolinas in the previous year concluded that:

Much of the success in minimizing loss of life during Hugo can be attributed 

to local directors taking the SLOSH values seriously and evacuating those areas 

that the SLOSH data and associated mapping said would need to be evacuated.

Th e most diffi cult issue regarding Hugo’s hazards characteristics revolved 

around the storms’ reported change from a Category 2 to a Category 4 hurricane in such a short period of time immediately before landfall. Fortunately 

many local directors took action for a Category 3 hurricane and had completed 

evacuation of the coastal barrier islands several hours before landfall. ... Some 

offi cials indicated it may be prudent in some situations to take action for one 

category above that of the threatening hurricane. Th is proved wise on the part 

of local offi cials in Hugo.119

FEMA’s 1994 Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Preparedness Study seconded the advice, citing a Louisiana state agency as one of its sources:

To account for inaccuracies in forecasting the behavior of approaching hurricanes, the National Hurricane Center and the Louisiana Offi ce of Emergency 

Preparedness recommend that public offi cials faced with an eminent [sic] evacuation prepare for the evacuation as if the approaching hurricane will intensify 

one category above the strength forecast for landfall.120

Ten years later, in 2004, two Louisiana State University researchers, John Pine and Hassan 

Mashriqui, off ered the same counsel in a FEMA training session, “Hurricane Storm Surge 

Modeling and Analysis.” Aft er pointing out that “there is always the uncertainty” about 

hurricane intensity at landfall, and uncertainty about its track before landfall, they said:

Th is is why a rule of thumb for emergency managers is to plan for a storm one 

category higher than what is forecast. Th is is a reasonable precaution to help 

minimize the loss of life from hurricanes. ... Th e path and direction of the 

storm can change at any point making the actual area impacted by the storm as 

it makes landfall diffi cult to predict.121

Recent years have given emergency planners more opportunities to prepare for the worst. It is 

generally accepted that an era of more intense Atlantic hurricane activity began in 1995. Th e 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) attributes the activity to naturally occurring cycles in climate patterns near the equator, and says each cycle of “the tropical 

multi-decadal signal” that infl uences storm generation may last 20 to 30 years, or longer.122

During the below-normal hurricane cycle that ran 1970-1994, NOAA reports, “Th e Gulf 

Coast averaged less than one hurricane landfall per season, and the East Coast averaged one 

hurricane landfall every fi ve years. Th is is in sharp contrast to the average of three U.S. hur-
Chapter 6

92

ricane landfalls during very active seasons.” NOAA foresees “many more landfalling tropical storms, hurricanes and major hurricanes in the United States,” with potential impacts 

multiplied by population growth and new construction in coastal areas.123

Whatever the current phase of multi-decadal hurricane variability may be, the NWS has 

pointed out that an element of unpredictability always remains:

No outlook can give certainty as to whether or not a particular locality will be 

impacted by a hurricane in any given year. Residents and government agencies 

of coastal or near-coastal regions should always maintain hurricane preparedness eff orts, regardless of the overall outlook for a given year. ... hurricanespawned disasters can occur even in years with normal (or below normal) 

levels of activity.124

Johns Hopkins University Professor Robert A. Dalrymple, an engineer who represented the 

American Society of Civil Engineers in post-Katrina assessments of the New Orleans levees, 

has recently made the point even more starkly:

Th ere is the possibility of a storm stronger than Katrina. Although a Category 5 

hurricane is perhaps a 500-year event, no one knows when it might occur.125

Of course, Katrina did reach Category 5 status, though it moderated somewhat before landfall. Th e NHC’s 4 p.m. Friday, August 26, Hurricane Discussion Number 14 warned:

Katrina is expected to be moving over the Gulf Loop Current aft er 36 hours ... 

which when combined with decreasing vertical [wind] shear ... should allow 

the hurricane to reach Category Four status before landfall occurs. [Ellipses in 

original.]126

At 10 a.m. Saturday, the NHC warned in Hurricane Advisory Number 17 that “It is not out 

of the question that Katrina could reach category 5 status at some point before landfall.”127

And in fact, by Sunday morning, Katrina’s maximum wind speeds exceeded 170 miles per 

hour; Category 5 is 155 mph or higher. It was not quite as strong as Camille, but much bigger.128 Katrina “made landfall, at the upper end of Category 3 intensity with estimated maximum sustained winds of 110 kt [knots, or about 127 miles per hour], near Buras, Louisiana 

at 1110 UTC [6:10 a.m. CT] 29 August.”129

In other words, with reservations about the ruggedness of New Orleans’ hurricane-protection system already long established, with a historical record of extreme storms, with 

recommendations already in print for a prudent one-category-higher standard for disaster 

planning, with knowledge that a new cycle of more intense hurricane activity was under 

way, with the limits of prediction and the variability of storms understood, and with Katrina 

in the Gulf of Mexico and tagged as early as Friday as a potential Category 4 hurricane, 

offi cials had multiple grounds for anticipating that the coming hurricane could exceed the 

nominal strength of the region’s defenses.

Th e prudence of emergency-management response when an approaching storm threatens 

an area depending on levees is a matter of deep concern beyond Katrina, and beyond Louisiana. It is a national issue, as noted in a recent statement of professional opinion from the 

National Association of State Floodplain Managers:

Levees are only built to a certain level of protection, which will be exceeded at 

some point in the future. Reliance on levees should be an option of last resort. Current levee design and construction standards are inadequate. Levees 

that protect critical facilities, such as hospitals, emergency operations centers, 
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93

police, emergency medical services and fi re stations, major infrastructure and 

large and vulnerable urban centers such as New Orleans must be constructed 

to a higher level of protection than those protecting rural or sparsely populated 

areas. A comprehensive and adequate levee policy would recognize the need 

for these diff erences. Levees in rural areas can utilize the 100 year fl ood (1% 

chance fl ood) level of protection, but only if local land use requirements prevent the area from becoming a highly urbanized area. Existing urban areas and 

critical facilities need protection to at least the 500 year (0.2% chance fl ood, 

and in coastal areas a category 5 hurricane) standard to avoid the catastrophic 

consequences, such as those experienced in the New Orleans area. It is important to recognize that levee failures in the New Orleans area is [sic] simply the 

tip of the iceberg – we have thousands of miles of levees “protecting” large and 

critical urban communities in this nation.130

1 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Protecting New Orleans: From Hurricane Barriers to Floodwalls,” by Nicole T. Carter, Dec. 13, 2005, p. 1.

2 Virginia R. Burkett, David B. Zilkoski, and David A. Hart, “Sea-Level Rise and Subsidence: Implications for Flooding 

in New Orleans, Louisiana,” U.S. Geological Survey Subsidence Interest Group Conference, Nov. 27-29, 2001, p. 63. 

http://www.nwrc.usgs.gov/hurricane/Sea-Level-Rise.pdf. Accessed on Apr. 4, 2006 [hereinaft er Burkett, “Sea-Level Rise 

Subsidence”]. 

3 Burkett, “Sea-Level Rise Subsidence,” p. 63.

4 Michael Grunwald and Susan Glasser, “Th e Slow Drowning of New Orleans,” Th e Washington Post, Oct. 9, 2005, p. 

A01. 

5 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Th e Civil Works Program of the Army Corps of Engineers: A 

Primer, by Nicole T. Carter and Betsy A. Cody, Feb. 3, 2005, pp. 5-6. 

6 Burkett, “Sea-Level Rise Subsidence,” p. 67.

7 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, New Orleans District, Hurricane Betsy, 8-11 September 1965, Aft er Action Report, July 

1966, p. 5. 

8 Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and Museum, University of Texas, “Transcript of audio of President Johnson in New 

Orleans following landfall of Hurricane Betsy, September 10, 1965.” http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/AV.hom/

Hurricane/audio_transcript.htm. Accessed on Apr. 5, 2006.

9 Written Statement of Anu Mittal, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, Government Accountability Offi ce, 

for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Environment and Public Works, hearing on Comprehensive and Integrated Approach 

to meet the Water Resources Needs in the Wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, Nov. 9, 2005, pp. 1, 5. http://www.gao.

gov/new.items/d06244t.pdf. Accessed on Apr. 5, 2006. 

10 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, New Orleans District, “Project Fact Sheet: Lake Pontchartrain, LA. and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project, St. Bernard, Orleans, Jeff erson, and St. Charles Parishes, LA,” May 23, 2005. http://www.mvn.

usace.army.mil/pao/visitor/lkpon1.asp. Accessed on Apr. 5, 2006.

11 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Hurricane Research Division, “How Are Atlantic 

Hurricanes Ranked?” http://www.aoml.noaa.gov/hrd/tcfaq/D1.html. Accessed on Apr. 3, 2006 (“Category 3, 4, and 5 

hurricanes are collectively referred to as major (or intense) hurricanes. Th ese major hurricanes cause over 83% of the 

damage in the USA even though they account for only 21% of tropical cyclone landfalls.”).

12 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, “Frequently Asked Questions.” http://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/IPET_13_Mar_

FAQ_Public.pdf. Accessed on Apr. 26, 2006.

13 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, “How Safe is New Orleans from Flooding?” fact sheet, Sept. 11, 2003. http://www.

usace.army.mil/civilworks/hot_topics/ht_2003/11sep_msy.htm. Accessed on Apr. 5, 2006.

14 Dr. Marc Levitan, “Comparative Analysis of Hurricane Vulnerability in New Orleans and Baton Rouge,” Louisiana 

State University Hurricane Center, Apr. 2003, p. 1. http://www.publichealth.hurricane.lsu.edu/Adobe%20fi les%20for%2

0webpage/LevitanHurrVulnBR&NO.pdf. Accessed on Apr. 5, 2006.

15 National Weather Service, National Hurricane Center, “Th e Most Intense Hurricanes in the United States 1851-

2004,” July 27, 2005. http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pastint.shtml. Accessed on Apr. 5, 2006.

16 Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP), Emergency Operations Plan, Apr. 

2005, Section IV.B, p. 8 [hereinaft er Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan].
Chapter 6

94

17 State of Louisiana, Executive Order KBB 05, Apr. 1, 2005.

18 LOHSEP, “About the Agency,” Mar. 20, 2006. http://www.ohsep.louisiana.gov/agencyrelated/aboutagency.htm. Accessed on Apr. 9, 2006.

19 LOHSEP, “About the Agency,” Mar. 20, 2006. http://www.ohsep.louisiana.gov/agencyrelated/aboutagency.htm. Accessed on Apr. 9, 2006.

20 Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan, Section I, p. 1.

21 Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan, Section I, p. 1. 

22 Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan, Section II, B, pp. 5-6.

23 Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan, Attachment 3.

24 Committee staff interview of Col. Jeff Smith, Louisiana National Guard (Ret.), Acting Deputy Director, Emergency 

Management, LOHSEP, conducted on Jan. 13, 2006, transcript p. 13.

25 Col. Smith interview, Jan. 13, 2006, p. 26; Committee staff interview of Lt. Col. William Doran, Louisiana Air National Guard, Chief, Operations Division, LOHSEP, conducted on Dec. 2, 2005, transcript p. 164.

26 Committee staff interview of Sean Fontenot, former Chief, Preparedness Division, LOHSEP, conducted on Jan. 

10, 2006, transcript p. 124; Committee staff interview of Maj. Gen. Bennett Landreneau, Adjutant General, Louisiana, 

conducted on Jan. 11, 2006, transcript pp. 124-125; Committee staff interview of Terry Ryder, Executive Counsel, Offi ce 

of the Governor, LA, conducted on Jan. 10, 2006, transcript pp. 138-141; Lt. Col. Doran interview, Dec. 2, 2005, pp. 63, 

163; Committee staff interview of Col. Steven Dabadie, former Chief of Staff , Louisiana National Guard, conducted on 

Jan. 12, 2006, transcript p. 45.

27 Lt. Col. Doran interview, Dec. 2, 2005, pp. 191-193.

28 Maj. Gen. Landreneau interview, Jan. 11, 2006, p. 124; Col. Smith interview, Jan. 13, 2006, pp. 23-24.

29 Ryder interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 143.

30 Lt. Col. Doran interview, Dec. 2, 2005, p. 196.

31 Committee staff interview of Capt. Paul Hellmers, Engine 18, Second Platoon, Fift h District, New Orleans Fire 

Department, LA, and Capt. Joe Fincher, Engine 18, Th ird Platoon, Fift h District, New Orleans Fire Department, LA, 

conducted on Nov. 7, 2005, transcript pp. 12-13. Each of the NOFD’s eight Districts is required to identify facilities 

which meet the pre-requisites for a last area refuge, confi rm with the facility that fi re personnel can be housed there, and 

reconfi rm that commitment during pre-season preparations. Source: New Orleans Fire Department, 2005 Hurricane 

Guidelines, p. 2–1; Capt. Hellmers and Capt. Fincher joint interview, Nov. 7, 2005, p. 16. Th e plan includes multiple 

Last Areas of Refuge, with some including back-up locations, and notes the contact person and phone number for that 

facility. Th e descriptions of each location also note whether the facility includes adequate space to park department 

apparatus. Source: New Orleans Fire Department, 2005 Hurricane Guidelines, pp. A2–1 through A6–2. Personnel report 

to these refuges upon decision by the superintendent, which will generally occur when winds reach approximately 40 

miles per hour prior to landfall. Source: Committee staff interview of Charles Parent, Superintendent, New Orleans Fire 

Department, LA, and Bruce Martin, Deputy of Administration, New Orleans Fire Department, LA, conducted on Nov. 

10, 2005, transcript p. 26. In addition to provision of refuges for fi re personnel and equipment, the NOFD guidelines are 

specifi c as to the types of supplies personnel are to bring with them, including toiletries, clothing, a three-day supply of 

water, and three gallons of water. Personnel are also encouraged to bring life jackets and/or boats. Source: New Orleans 

Fire Department, 2005 Hurricane Guidelines, pp. 2–3 through 2–4.

32 Louisiana National Guard, Emergency Procedures Operations Plans for Military Support to Civil Authorities, Oct. 24, 

2001. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 000153. During 2001, the Guard revised its own operating plans in such 

areas of law enforcement in ways that illustrate how its personnel were layered into the ranks of the region’s law enforcement agencies. “Th e concept of this operation provides for a massive joint response 24 hours pre-landfall and 48 hours 

post-landfall of a major hurricane forecasted to strike the Greater New Orleans area,” and outlined the planned distribution of soldiers, helicopters, high profi le trucks, emergency generators, water trailers and other equipment to the Louisiana State Police and local agencies, assigning a total of 420 Guardsmen to the New Orleans Police Department, with 200 

deployed initially at the Superdome, 100 at the Convention Center and 12 at each of eight police district stations.

33 Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan, Supplement 1A, “Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Evacuation and Sheltering 

Plan,” Jan. 2000, p. II-2 [hereinaft er “Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Evacuation and Sheltering Plan”].

34 FEMA, Bi-State Hurricane Evacuation Study, May 2, 2002. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA0058-00001607.

35 FEMA, Bi-State Hurricane Evacuation Study, May 2, 2002, pp. 16-17. 

36 Sean R. Fontenot, e-mail to Arthur W. Adelberg, Senate Committee staff member, Feb. 3, 2006, 11:21 a.m.

37 Lt. Col. Doran interview, Dec. 2, 2005, pp. 143-145.

38 Col. Smith interview, Jan. 13, 2006, pp. 17-19.

39 Lt. Col. Doran interview, Dec. 2, 2005, pp. 147-150.

40 “Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Evacuation and Sheltering Plan,” pp. i-ii.

41 Fontenot interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 115-122.
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42 “Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Evacuation and Sheltering Plan,” p. II-1.

43 “Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Evacuation and Sheltering Plan,” p. II-2.

44 “Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Evacuation and Sheltering Plan,” pp. III-1-6.

45 “Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Evacuation and Sheltering Plan,” p. VI-1.

46 Col. Smith interview, Jan. 13, 2006, p. 185; Maj. Gen. Landreneau interview, Jan. 11, 2006, p. 142.

47 Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan, Supplement 1C, “Louisiana Shelter Operations Plan,” July 2000, p. 9. [hereinaft er “Louisiana Shelter Operations Plan”].

48 “Louisiana Shelter Operations Plan,” p. 11-12 (emphasis added).

49 Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan, “Louisiana Shelter Operations Plan,” Annex X, “Special Needs Plan,” Apr. 

2000, pp. 3-4 [hereinaft er Annex X, “Special Needs Plan”].

50 Annex X, “Special Needs Plan,” p. 8.

51 Annex X, “Special Needs Plan,” pp. 7-8. Presumably the National Guard was assigned this responsibility because of its 

role as the primary responsible agency for transportation at the time the SN Plan was draft ed. Had the plan been updated 

aft er Apr. 2005, when DOTD succeeded the Guard as the primary agency responsible for transportation, presumably the 

plan would have assigned the SN transportation responsibility to DOTD. 

52 Louisiana Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness (LOEP), Standard Operating Procedures, EOC Hurricane/Major Event 

Checklist. Th e version produced to the Committee bears the date 10/24/2005. Th e record is unclear as to whether the 

version includes updates through that date. Committee staff interview of James Ballows, Senior Operations Offi cer, 

LOHSEP, conducted on Jan. 4, 2006, transcript pp. 15-16. 

53 Ballows interview, Jan. 4, 2006, pp. 13-14. 

54 Col. Smith interview, Jan. 13, 2006, p. 19; Lt. Col. Doran interview, Dec. 2, 2005, p. 63 (“Some parishes do a great job, 

others don’t. It’s not standardized”).

55 Col. Smith interview, Jan. 13, 2006, pp. 19-21.

56 Committee staff interview of Terry Tullier, former Deputy Director, New Orleans Fire Department and Director, 

New Orleans Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness, LA, conducted on Nov. 22, 2005, transcript pp. 7-8.

57 Tullier interview, Nov. 22, 2005, pp. 10-11.

58 Tullier interview, Nov. 22, 2005, p. 2; Committee staff interview of Chief Joseph Matthews, Director, New Orleans Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness, LA, conducted on Nov. 23, 2005, transcript p. 152. Directors prior to Terry Tullier and 

Chief Joseph Matthews were Brian Giddings, Robert Eichorn, and Frank Hijuelos. Committee staff interview of Saraya 

Flores-Arias, Executive Assistant to the Director, New Orleans Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness, LA, conducted on 

Dec. 19, 2005, pp. 7-9, 14-15.

59 New Orleans Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness, Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, May 2005, p. 19 [hereinaft er New Orleans CEMP].

60 New Orleans CEMP, p. 12.

61 New Orleans CEMP, p. 12.

62 New Orleans CEMP, p. 14.

63 New Orleans CEMP, p. 14. While the term “persons requiring public transportation” is broad enough to include those 

without personal vehicles, the quoted sentence is followed by the parenthetical “(See Special Needs Transportation, ESF 

1).” Precisely what the parenthetical refers to is unclear, but it raises the question whether the sentence was meant only 

to apply to people with special needs. 

64 New Orleans CEMP, p. 18. While the plan does not expressly defi ne “Standard Operation Procedures” or “SOP,” the 

term apparently refers to the provisions of the plan.

65 New Orleans CEMP, p. 13. 

66 New Orleans CEMP; Annex X, “Special Needs Plan,” p. 4 (emphasis added).

67 Capt. Hellmers and Capt. Fincher interview, Nov. 7, 2005, pp. 12-13.

68 Capt. Hellmers and Capt. Fincher interview, Nov. 7, 2005, p. 16.

69 New Orleans Fire Department, 2005 Hurricane Guidelines, pp. A2–1 through A6–2.

70 Parent and Martin interview, Nov. 10, 2005, p. 26.

71 Committee staff interview of Walter Maestri, Ph.D., Director, Jeff erson Parish Offi ce of Emergency Management, LA, 

conducted on Oct. 25, 2005, transcript pp. 11-12.

72 Maestri interview, Oct. 25, 2005, p. 12.

73 Maestri interview, Oct. 25, 2005, p. 40.

74 Maestri interview, Oct. 25, 2005, p. 40.
Chapter 6

96

75 Maestri interview, Oct. 25, 2005, p. 41.

76 Maestri interview, Oct. 25, 2005, pp. 25-27.

77 Jeff erson Parish Offi ce of Emergency Management, Emergency Operations Plan, Aug. 2002, Annex D, p. 13.

78 Jeff erson Parish, Catastrophic Weather Event (“Doomsday”) Plan. Provided to Committee.

79 Committee staff interview of Jesse St. Amant, Director, Homeland Security Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness, 

Plaquemines Parish, LA, conducted on Nov. 9, 2005, transcript pp. 3, 20-21.

80 St. Amant interview, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 15.

81 St. Amant interview, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 15.

82 Plaquemines Parish, Multi-Hazard Emergency Operations Plan, 2003, Basic Plan Appendices.

83 Plaquemines Parish, Multi-Hazard Emergency Operations Plan, 2003, Annex D, p. 6–1.

84 Committee staff interview of Larry Ingargiola, Director, Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, St. Bernard Parish, LA, conducted on Oct. 26, 2005, transcript p. 8.

85 Ingargiola interview, Oct. 26, 2005, p. 7.

86 Ingargiola interview, Oct. 26, 2005, pp. 13-14.

87 St. Bernard Parish, Emergency Operations Plan, June 2004, Annex D, p. D–2.

88 Committee staff interview of Dexter Accordo, Director, Emergency Management and Homeland Security, St. Tammany Parish, LA, conducted on Nov. 10, 2005, transcript p. 19.

89 Accordo interview, Nov. 10, 2005, p. 47.

90 Accordo interview, Nov. 10, 2005, pp. 64-66.

91 Accordo interview, Nov. 10, 2005, p. 71.

92 St. Tammany Parish, Multi-Hazard Emergency Operation Plan, 2004, Annex D, p. D–54. 

93 Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Preparedness Study, prepared by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, for FEMA Region 

VI, Aug. 2004, p. 1-2 [hereinaft er Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Preparedness Study, 1994] (“Th e study authority for the 

Federal Emergency Management Agency is the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-2881, and the study authority 

for the Corps of Engineers is Section 206 of the Flood Control Act of 1960 (Public Law 86-645). Th ese laws authorize the 

allocation of resources for planning activities related to hurricane preparedness.”). 

94 Testimony of J. Dexter Peach, Assistant Comptroller, General Resources, Community, and Economics, before the 

U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Nuclear Deterrance, Arms Control and Defense Intelligence, hearing on Disaster Management: Recent Disasters Demonstrate the Need to Improve the Nation’s Response 

Strategy, May 25, 1993, p. 16.

95 Testimony of Robert Sheets, Ph.D., Director, National Hurricane Center, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Rebuilding FEMA: Preparing for the Next Disaster, May 18, 1993, p. 45.

96 Ed Rappaport, National Hurricane Center, “Preliminary Report Hurricane Andrew 16 - 28 August, 1992” Dec. 10, 

1993, addendum Feb. 7, 2005 – category 5 upgrade (“It is estimated that 1,250,000 people evacuated from parishes in 

southeastern and south-central Louisiana.”).

97 Sheets, Senate Committee on Governmental Aff airs hearing, May 18, 1993, p. 45.

98 Sheets, Senate Committee on Governmental Aff airs hearing, May 18, 1993, p. 45.

99 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, New Orleans District, Hurricane Betsy, 8-11 September 1965, Aft er Action Report, July 

1966, p. 10.

100 Written Statement of Anu Mittal, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, Government Accountability Offi ce, for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: 

Who’s in Charge of the New Orleans Levees?, Dec. 15, 2005, pp. 1-3.

101 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, New Orleans District, Catastrophic Disaster Response Plan, pp. 12-14. 

102 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, New Orleans District, Un-watering Plan, Greater Metropolitan Area, New Orleans, 

Louisiana, Aug. 18, 2000, p. 1.

103 Written Statement of Max Mayfi eld, Ph.D., Director, Tropical Prediction Center and National Hurricane Center, 

National Weather Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, for the U.S. House, Select Bipartisan 

Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing on What Did Offi cials Know 

About Potential Impact of Katrina? When Did Th ey Know It? And, How Was the Information Conveyed to the Public?, 

Sept. 22, 2005, p. 3.

104 Written Statement of Brig. Gen. David L. Johnson, Assistant Administrator, Weather Services, National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration, for the U.S. House, Committee on Science, hearing on NOAA Hurricane Forecasting, Oct. 

7, 2005.

105 Written Statement of Mayfi eld, House Select Committee hearing, Sept. 22, 2005 pp. 2-3.
Emergency Management: Louisiana

97

106 Written Statement of Mayfi eld, House Select Committee hearing, Sept. 22, 2005 p. 3.

107 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Information on Hurricane Evacuation Studies, p. 8. Provided to Committee. 

108 Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Preparedness Study, 1994, pp. 1–2, 1–14.

109 Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Preparedness Study, 1994, p. 5–2.

110 Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Preparedness Study, 1994, p. 5–2.

111 Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Preparedness Study, 1994, p. 4–6.

112 Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Preparedness Study, 1994, p. 2–37.

113 Committee staff interview of Wilson Shaff er, Ph.D., Chief, Evaluations Branch, National Weather Service, National 

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, conducted on Feb. 24, 2006, transcript pp. 45-46.

114 Brett Herr, e-mail to Jay Baker, Mar. 15, 2006, 12:15 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA0025-0002638.

115 Written Statement of Madhu Beriwal, President and Chief Executive Offi cer, IEM, Inc., for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Preparing for a Catastrophe: Th e Hurricane Pam 

Exercise, Jan. 24, 2006, p. 1. IEM was the main contractor that prepared the exercise for FEMA and LOHSEP.

116 Wilson Shaff er, National Weather Service, “Louisiana’s Vulnerability to Hurricane Storm Surge,” PowerPoint presentation, June 1, 2005. Provided to Committee. 

117 Louisiana Water Resources Research Institute, Louisiana State University, “Would New Orleans Really Flood in a 

Major Hurricane? How is that possible?,” 2005.

http://www.publichealth.hurricane.lsu.edu/convert%20to%20tables/Would%20New%20Orleans%20Really%20Floodtf.

htm. Accessed on Apr. 6, 2006.

118 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Technical Memorandum, “Th e deadliest, costliest, and most 

intense United States tropical cyclones from 1851 to 2004 (and other frequently requested hurricane facts),” Aug. 2005, 

pp. 11-12. http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/NWS-TPC-4.pdf. Accessed on Apr. 9, 2006.

119 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and FEMA, “Hurricane Hugo Assessment, Review of Hurricane Evacuation Studies 

Utilization and Information Dissemination,” Jan. 1990, p. 2–2. http://www3.csc.noaa.gov/hes_docs/postStorm/H_

HUGO_ASSESSMENT_REVIEW_UTILIZATION_INFO_DISSEMINATION.pdf Accessed Apr. 5, 2006.

120 Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Preparedness Study, 1994, p. 2–2.

121 John C. Pine, Hassan Mashriqui, LSU Hurricane Center, “Hurricane Storm Surge Modeling and Analysis,” FEMA 

Course Title: Hazard Mapping and Modeling, Session 10, Nov. 18, 2004, p. 16-14. http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/

downloads/Session%2010%20Hurricanes92004111804.doc. Accessed on Apr. 5, 2006.

122 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “NOAA attributes recent increase in hurricane activity to naturally occurring multi-decadal climate variability,” NOAA Magazine Online, Nov. 29, 2005. http://www.magazine.noaa.

gov/stories/mag184.htm. Accessed on Mar. 8, 2006.

123 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “NOAA attributes recent increase in hurricane activity to naturally occurring multi-decadal climate variability,” NOAA Magazine Online, Nov. 29, 2005. http://www.magazine.noaa.

gov/stories/mag184.htm. Accessed on Mar. 8, 2006.

124 National Weather Service, “Atlantic Hurricane Outlook,” Jan. 28, 2003, p. 2. http://products.weather.gov/PDD/

AHO.pdf. Accessed on Apr. 5, 2006. 

125 Louisiana Coastal Wetlands Conservation and Restoration Task Force, “Interview with Robert A. Dalrymple,” WaterMarks, Number 30, Mar. 2006, p. 14. http://www.lacoast.gov/watermarks/2006-03/watermarks-2006-03.pdf. Accessed 

on Apr. 5, 2006.

126 National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Katrina Forecast Timeline, 2006, p. 3. Provided to Committee [hereinaft er 

NHC Timeline].

127 NHC Timeline.

128 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Climatic Data Center, “Climate of 2005: Summary of 

Hurricane Katrina,” Dec. 29, 2005. http://lwf.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/research/2005/katrina.html#rain. Accessed on 

Apr. 26, 2006.

129 Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel P. Brown, National Hurricane Center, “Tropical Cyclone Report 

Hurricane Katrina 23-30 August 2005,” Dec. 20, 2005, p. 1. http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/TCR-AL122005_Katrina.

pdf#search=’Tropical%20Cyclone%20Report%20Hurricane%20Katrina’. Accessed on Apr. 26, 2006.

130 Association of State Floodplain Managers, Inc., “Hurricanes Katrina & Rita: Using Mitigation to Rebuild a Safer 

Gulf Coast,” Sept. 9, 2005, pp. 4-5. http://www.fl oods.org/PDF/ASFPM_HurricaneKatrina_WhitePaper_090905.pdf. 

Accessed on Apr. 4, 2006.