23690 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 85 / Tuesday, May 4, 2010 / Notices 

1 74 FR 52208 (October 9, 2009). 

2 Incorporated as Title XIII of the Food, 

Conservation and Energy Act of 2008, Public Law 

110–246, 122 Stat. 1624 (June 18, 2008). 

3 7 U.S.C. 1a(29). 

4 74 FR 12178 (Mar. 23, 2009); these rules became 

effective on April 22, 2009. 

this increased oversight and imposes 

obligations on the ECM calculated to 

accomplish this goal. The increased 

oversight engendered by the issuance of 

a SPDC Order increases transparency 

and helps to ensure fair competition 

among ECMs and DCMs trading similar 

products and competing for the same 

business. Moreover, the ECM on which 

the SPDC is traded must assume, with 

respect to that contract, all the 

responsibilities and obligations of a 

registered entity under the CEA and 

Commission regulations. Additionally, 

the ECM must comply with nine core 

principles established by section 2(h)(7) 

of the Act—including the obligation to 

establish position limits and/or 

accountability standards for the SPDC. 

Amendments to section 4(i) of the CEA 

authorize the Commission to require 

large trader reports for SPDCs listed on 

ECMs. These increased ECM 

responsibilities, along with the CFTC’s 

increased regulatory authority, subject 

the ECM’s risk management practices to 

the Commission’s supervision and 

oversight and generally enhance the 

financial integrity of the markets. 

The Commission has concluded that 

the Chicago Climate Exchange’s Carbon 

Financial Instrument contract that is the 

subject of the attached Order is not a 

SPDC; accordingly, the Commission’s 

Order impose no additional costs and 

no additional statutorily or regulatory 

mandated responsibilities on the ECM. 

VIII. Order 

Order Relating to the CCX CFI Contract 

After considering the complete record 

in this matter, including the comment 

letters received in response to its 

request for comments, the Commission 

has determined to issue the following: 

The Commission, pursuant to its 

authority under section 2(h)(7) of the 

Act, hereby determines that the Chicago 

Climate Exchange’s Carbon Financial 

Instrument contract that was submitted 

to the Commission by the Chicago 

Climate Exchange for review on July 1, 

2009 and October 15, 2009 does not, at 

this time, satisfy the statutory or 

regulatory requirements of a significant 

price discovery contract. Consistent 

with this determination, the Chicago 

Climate Exchange is not required at this 

time to comply with section 2(h)(7)(C) 

in connection with the Carbon Financial 

Instrument contract or the Part 36 

regulations applicable to exempt 

commercial markets with significant 

price discovery contracts, and is not 

required to assume the statutory or 

regulatory responsibilities required of 

registered entities with respect to the 

Carbon Financial Instrument contract. 

This order is based upon the 

representations made to the 

Commission by the Chicago Climate 

Exchange in filings dated July 1, 2009 

and October 15, 2009, and other 

supporting material. Any material 

change or omissions in the facts and 

circumstances pursuant to which this 

order is granted might require the 

Commission to reconsider its current 

determination that the Carbon Financial 

Instrument contract is not a significant 

price discovery contract. 

The Commission may, based upon 

information regarding the Carbon 

Financial Instrument contract reviewed 

under this Order that is submitted in 

required reports and filings, issue 

another notice of intent to undertake a 

significant price discovery contract 

determination for these contracts. 

Further, issuance of this Order does not 

affect the Chicago Climate Exchange’s 

continuing obligation to comply with all 

statutory and regulatory requirements 

applicable to 2(h)(3) markets, including 

all reporting requirements found in 

Commission Regulation 36.3. 

Issued in Washington, DC on April 28, 

2010 by the Commission. 

David A. Stawick, 

Secretary of the Commission. 

[FR Doc. 2010–10311 Filed 5–3–10; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE P 

COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING 

COMMISSION 

Order Finding That the NGPL TxOk 

Financial Basis Contract Traded on the 

IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., Does 

Not Perform a Significant Price 

Discovery Function 

AGENCY: Commodity Futures Trading 

Commission 

ACTION: Final Order. 

SUMMARY: On October 9, 2009, the 

Commodity Futures Trading 

Commission (‘‘CFTC’’ or ‘‘Commission’’) 

published for comment in the Federal 

Register 1 a notice of its intent to 

undertake a determination whether the 

NGPL TxOk Financial Basis (‘‘NTO’’) 

contract traded on the 

IntercontinentalExchange, Inc. (‘‘ICE’’), 

an exempt commercial market (‘‘ECM’’) 

under sections 2(h)(3)–(5) of the 

Commodity Exchange Act (‘‘CEA’’ or the 

‘‘Act’’), performs a significant price 

discovery function pursuant to section 

2(h)(7) of the CEA. The Commission 

undertook this review based upon an 

initial evaluation of information and 

data provided by ICE as well as other 

available information. The Commission 

has reviewed the entire record in this 

matter, including all comments 

received, and has determined to issue 

an order finding that the NTO contract 

does not perform a significant price 

discovery function. Authority for this 

action is found in section 2(h)(7) of the 

CEA and Commission rule 36.3(c) 

promulgated thereunder. 

DATES: Effective date: April 28, 2010. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Gregory K. Price, Industry Economist, 

Division of Market Oversight, 

Commodity Futures Trading 

Commission, Three Lafayette Centre, 

1155 21st Street, NW., Washington, DC 

20581. Telephone: (202) 418–5515. Email: gprice@cftc.gov; or Susan Nathan, 

Senior Special Counsel, Division of 

Market Oversight, same address. 

Telephone: (202) 418–5133. E-mail: 

snathan@cftc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Introduction 

The CFTC Reauthorization Act of 

2008 (‘‘Reauthorization Act’’) 2

significantly broadened the CFTC’s 

regulatory authority with respect to 

ECMs by creating, in section 2(h)(7) of 

the CEA, a new regulatory category— 

ECMs on which significant price 

discovery contracts (‘‘SPDCs’’) are 

traded—and treating ECMs in that 

category as registered entities under the 

CEA.3 The legislation authorizes the 

CFTC to designate an agreement, 

contract or transaction as a SPDC if the 

Commission determines, under criteria 

established in section 2(h)(7), that it 

performs a significant price discovery 

function. When the Commission makes 

such a determination, the ECM on 

which the SPDC is traded must assume, 

with respect to that contract, all the 

responsibilities and obligations of a 

registered entity under the Act and 

Commission regulations, and must 

comply with nine core principles 

established by new section 2(h)(7)(C). 

On March 16, 2009, the CFTC 

promulgated final rules implementing 

the provisions of the Reauthorization 

Act.4 As relevant here, rule 36.3 

imposes increased information reporting 

requirements on ECMs to assist the 

Commission in making prompt 

assessments whether particular ECM 

contracts may be SPDCs. In addition to 

filing quarterly reports of its contracts, 

an ECM must notify the Commission 

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5Public Law 110–246 at 13203; Joint Explanatory 

Statement of the Committee of Conference, H.R. 

Rep. No. 110–627, 110 Cong., 2d Sess. 978, 986 

(Conference Committee Report). See also 73 FR 

75888, 75894 (Dec. 12, 2008). 

6For an initial SPDC, ECMs have a grace period 

of 90 calendar days from the issuance of a SPDC 

determination order to submit a written 

demonstration of compliance with the applicable 

core principles. For subsequent SPDCs, ECMs have 

a grace period of 30 calendar days to demonstrate 

core principle compliance. 

7The Commission’s Part 36 rules establish, 

among other things, procedures by which the 

Commission makes and announces its 

determination whether a specific ECM contract 

serves a significant price discovery function. Under 

those procedures, the Commission publishes a 

notice in the Federal Register that it intends to 

undertake a determination whether a specified 

agreement, contract or transaction performs a 

significant price discovery function and to receive 

written data, views and arguments relevant to its 

determination from the ECM and other interested 

persons. 

8 IECA describes itself as an ‘‘association of 

leading manufacturing companies’’ whose 

membership ‘‘represents a diverse set of industries 

including: plastics, cement, paper, food processing, 

brick, chemicals, fertilizer, insulation, steel, glass, 

industrial gases, pharmaceutical, aluminum and 

brewing.’’ WGCEF describes itself as ‘‘a diverse 

group of commercial firms in the domestic energy 

industry whose primary business activity is the 

physical delivery of one or more energy 

commodities to customers, including industrial, 

commercial and residential consumers’’ and whose 

membership consists of ‘‘energy producers, 

marketers and utilities.’’ McGraw-Hill, through its 

division Platts, compiles and calculates monthly 

natural gas price indices from natural gas trade data 

submitted to Platts by energy marketers. Platts 

includes those price indices in its monthly Inside 

FERC’s Gas Market Report (‘‘Inside FERC’’). ICE is 

an exempt commercial market, as noted above. EI 

is an economic consulting firm with offices located 

in Washington, DC, and San Francisco, CA. NGSA 

is an industry association comprised of natural gas 

producers and marketers. FERC is an independent 

federal regulatory agency that, among other things, 

regulates the interstate transmission of natural gas, 

oil and electricity. FIEG describes itself as an 

association of investment and commercial banks 

who are active participants in various sectors of the 

natural gas markets, ‘‘including acting as marketers, 

lenders, underwriters of debt and equity securities, 

and proprietary investors.’’ The comment letters are 

available on the Commission’s Web site: http://

www.cftc.gov/lawandregulation/federalregister/

federalregistercomments/2009/09-021.html. 

9FERC stated that the NTO contract is cash 

settled and does not contemplate the actual 

physical delivery of natural gas. Accordingly, FERC 

expressed the opinion that a determination by the 

Commission that a contract performs a significant 

price discovery function ‘‘would not appear to 

conflict with FERC’s exclusive jurisdiction under 

the Natural Gas Act (NGA) over certain sales of 

natural gas in interstate commerce for resale or with 

its other regulatory responsibilities under the NGA’’ 

and further that, ‘‘FERC staff will continue to 

monitor for any such conflict * * * [and] advise 

the CFTC’’ should any such potential conflict arise. 

CL 07. 

promptly concerning any contract 

traded in reliance on the exemption in 

section 2(h)(3) of the CEA that averaged 

five trades per day or more over the 

most recent calendar quarter, and for 

which the exchange sells its price 

information regarding the contract to 

market participants or industry 

publications, or whose daily closing or 

settlement prices on 95 percent or more 

of the days in the most recent quarter 

were within 2.5 percent of the 

contemporaneously determined closing, 

settlement or other daily price of 

another contract. 

Commission rule 36.3(c)(3) 

established the procedures by which the 

Commission makes and announces its 

determination whether a particular ECM 

contract serves a significant price 

discovery function. Under those 

procedures, the Commission will 

publish notice in the Federal Register 

that it intends to undertake an 

evaluation whether the specified 

agreement, contract or transaction 

performs a significant price discovery 

function and to receive written views, 

data and arguments relevant to its 

determination from the ECM and other 

interested persons. Upon the close of 

the comment period, the Commission 

will consider, among other things, all 

relevant information regarding the 

subject contract and issue an order 

announcing and explaining its 

determination whether or not the 

contract is a SPDC. The issuance of an 

affirmative order signals the 

effectiveness of the Commission’s 

regulatory authorities over an ECM with 

respect to a SPDC; at that time such an 

ECM becomes subject to all provisions 

of the CEA applicable to registered 

entities.5 The issuance of such an order 

also triggers the obligations, 

requirements and timetables prescribed 

in Commission rule 36.3(c)(4).6

II. Notice of Intent To Undertake SPDC 

Determination 

On October 9, 2009, the Commission 

published in the Federal Register notice 

of its intent to undertake a 

determination whether the NTO 

contract performs a significant price 

discovery function and requested 

comment from interested parties.7

Comments were received from 

Industrial Energy Consumers of America 

(‘‘IECA’’), Working Group of Commercial 

Energy Firms (‘‘WGCEF’’), Platts, ICE, 

Economists Incorporated (‘‘EI’’), Natural 

Gas Supply Association (‘‘NGSA’’), 

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 

(‘‘FERC’’) and Financial Institutions 

Energy Group (‘‘FIEG’’).8 The comment 

letters from FERC9 and Platts did not 

directly address the issue of whether or 

not the NTO contract is a SPDC; IECA 

expressed the opinion that the NTO 

contract did perform a significant price 

discovery function; and thus, should be 

subject to the requirements of the core 

principles enumerated in Section 2(h)(7) 

of the Act, but did not elaborate on its 

reasons for saying so or directly address 

any of the criteria. The remaining 

comment letters raised substantive 

issues with respect to the applicability 

of section 2(h)(7) to the NTO contract 

and generally expressed the opinion 

that the NTO contract is not a SPDC 

because it does not meet the material 

price reference, price reference and 

material liquidity criteria for SPDC 

determination. These comments are 

more extensively discussed below, as 

applicable. 

III. Section 2(h)(7) of the CEA 

The Commission is directed by 

section 2(h)(7) of the CEA to consider 

the following criteria in determining a 

contract’s significant price discovery 

function: 

• Price Linkage—the extent to which 

the agreement, contract or transaction 

uses or otherwise relies on a daily or 

final settlement price, or other major 

price parameter, of a contract or 

contracts listed for trading on or subject 

to the rules of a designated contract 

market (‘‘DCM’’) or derivatives 

transaction execution facility (‘‘DTEF’’), 

or a SPDC traded on an electronic 

trading facility, to value a position, 

transfer or convert a position, cash or 

financially settle a position, or close out 

a position. 

• Arbitrage—the extent to which the 

price for the agreement, contract or 

transaction is sufficiently related to the 

price of a contract or contracts listed for 

trading on or subject to the rules of a 

designated DCM or DTEF, or a SPDC 

traded on or subject to the rules of an 

electronic trading facility, so as to 

permit market participants to effectively 

arbitrage between the markets by 

simultaneously maintaining positions or 

executing trades in the contracts on a 

frequent and recurring basis. 

• Material price reference—the extent 

to which, on a frequent and recurring 

basis, bids, offers or transactions in a 

commodity are directly based on, or are 

determined by referencing or 

consulting, the prices generated by 

agreements, contracts or transactions 

being traded or executed on the 

electronic trading facility. 

• Material liquidity—the extent to 

which the volume of agreements, 

contracts or transactions in a 

commodity being traded on the 

electronic trading facility is sufficient to 

have a material effect on other 

agreements, contracts or transactions 

listed for trading on or subject to the 

rules of a DCM, DTEF or electronic 

trading facility operating in reliance on 

the exemption in section 2(h)(3). 

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23692 Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 85 / Tuesday, May 4, 2010 / Notices 

10 In its October 9, 2009, Federal Register release, 

the Commission identified material price reference, 

price linkage and material liquidity as the possible 

criteria for SPDC determination of the NTO 

contract. Arbitrage was not identified as a possible 

criterion. As a result, arbitrage will not be discussed 

further in this document and the associated Order. 

11 17 CFR part 36, Appendix A. 

12Refers to Texas/Oklahoma. 

13The term ‘‘hub’’ refers to a juncture where two 

or more natural gas pipelines are connected. Hubs 

also serve as pricing points for natural gas at the 

particular locations. 

14See http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/ 

natural_gas/feature_articles/2009/ngmarketcenter/ 

ngmarketcenter.pdf. 

15 Kinder Morgan, Inc., is the operator and coowner (20 percent) of NGPL. (Myria Holdings, Inc., 

owns 80 percent of NGPL). See http:// 

www.kne.com/business/gas_pipelines/NGPL//. 

16See http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/ 

natural_gas/feature_articles/2009/ngmarketcenter/ 

ngmarketcenter.pdf. 

Not all criteria must be present to 

support a determination that a 

particular contract performs a 

significant price discovery function, and 

one or more criteria may be inapplicable 

to a particular contract.10 Moreover, the 

statutory language neither prioritizes the 

criteria nor specifies the degree to 

which a SPDC must conform to the 

various criteria. In Guidance issued in 

connection with the Part 36 rules 

governing ECMs with SPDCs, the 

Commission observed that these criteria 

do not lend themselves to a mechanical 

checklist or formulaic analysis. 

Accordingly, the Commission has 

indicated that in making its 

determinations it will consider the 

circumstances under which the 

presence of a particular criterion, or 

combination of criteria, would be 

sufficient to support a SPDC 

determination.11 For example, for 

contracts that are linked to other 

contracts or that may be arbitraged with 

other contracts, the Commission will 

consider whether the price of the 

potential SPDC moves in such harmony 

with the other contract that the two 

markets essentially become 

interchangeable. This co-movement of 

prices would be an indication that 

activity in the contract had reached a 

level sufficient for the contract to 

perform a significant price discovery 

function. In evaluating a contract’s price 

discovery role as a price reference, the 

Commission will consider the extent to 

which, on a frequent and recurring 

basis, bids, offers or transactions are 

directly based on, or are determined by 

referencing, the prices established for 

the contract. 

IV. Findings and Conclusions 

The NGPL TxOk Financial Basis (NTO) 

Contract and the SPDC Indicia 

The NTO contract is cash settled 

based on the difference between the 

bidweek price index for a particular 

calendar month at the Natural Gas 

Pipeline Co. of America’s (‘‘NGPL’s’’) 

TxOk 12 hub, as published in Platts’ 

Inside FERC’s Gas Market Report, and 

the final settlement price of the New 

York Mercantile Exchange’s 

(‘‘NYMEX’s’’) physically-delivered 

Henry Hub natural gas futures contract 

for the same calendar month. The Platts 

bidweek price, which is published 

monthly, is based on a survey of cash 

market traders who voluntarily report to 

Platts data on their fixed-price 

transactions conducted during the last 

five business days of the month for 

physical delivery of natural gas at the 

TxOk hub; such bidweek transactions 

specify the delivery of natural gas on a 

uniform basis throughout the following 

calendar month at the agreed upon rate. 

The Platts bidweek index is published 

on the first business day of the calendar 

month in which the natural gas is to be 

delivered. The size of the TxOk contract 

is 2,500 million British thermal units 

(‘‘mmBtu’’), and the unit of trading is 

any multiple of 2,500 mmBtu. The TxOk 

contract is listed for up to 72 

consecutive calendar months. 

The Henry Hub,13 which is located in 

Erath, Louisiana, is the primary cash 

market trading and distribution center 

for natural gas in the United States. It 

also is the delivery point and pricing 

basis for the NYMEX’s actively traded, 

physically-delivered natural gas futures 

contract, which is the most important 

pricing reference for natural gas in the 

United States. The Henry Hub, which is 

operated by Sabine Pipe Line, LLC, 

serves as a juncture for 13 different 

pipelines. These pipelines bring in 

natural gas from fields in the Gulf Coast 

region and ship it to major consumption 

centers along the East Coast and 

Midwest. The throughput shipping 

capacity of the Henry Hub is 1.8 trillion 

mmBtu per day. 

In addition to the Henry Hub, there 

are a number of other locations where 

natural gas is traded. In 2008, there were 

33 natural gas market centers in North 

America.14 Some of the major trading 

centers include Alberta, Northwest 

Rockies, Southern California border and 

the Houston Ship Channel. For 

locations that are directly connected to 

the Henry Hub by one or more pipelines 

and where there typically is adequate 

shipping capacity, the price at the other 

locations usually directly tracks the 

price at the Henry Hub, adjusted for 

transportation costs. However, at other 

locations that are not directly connected 

to the Henry Hub or where shipping 

capacity is limited, the prices at those 

locations often diverge from the Henry 

Hub price. Furthermore, one local price 

may be significantly different than the 

price at another location even though 

the two markets’ respective distances 

from the Henry Hub are the same. The 

reason for such pricing disparities is 

that a given location may experience 

supply and demand factors that are 

specific to that region, such as 

differences in pipeline shipping 

capacity, unusually high or low demand 

for heating or cooling or supply 

disruptions caused by severe weather. 

As a consequence, local natural gas 

prices can differ from the Henry Hub 

price by more than the cost of shipping 

and such price differences can vary in 

an unpredictable manner. 

NGPL transports natural gas from 

production areas in the Permian Basin 

in Texas and the Gulf of Mexico to 

various demand points northward 

through the Midwest up to Chicago. 

NGPL is one of the largest natural gas 

transportation systems in the United 

States, with over 9,800 miles of 

pipeline. Moreover, NGPL is the largest 

provider of natural gas to the Chicago 

market.15 The TxOk section of the NGPL 

pipeline network is located in Sayre, 

Oklahoma (on the border with Texas), 

and has a large underground natural gas 

storage facility. The NGPL TxOk hub is 

a major natural gas trading center in the 

Gulf region of the U.S. 

As noted, the NTO contract prices 

trading activity at the NGPL TxOk hub. 

The Carthage hub, a natural gas market 

center located in east Texas includes the 

NGPL TxOk hub. The Carthage natural 

gas market center had an estimated 

throughput capacity of 600 million 

cubic feet per day in 2008. Additionally, 

the number of pipeline interconnection 

capacity at the Carthage hub was 11 in 

2008, up from 9 in 2003. The 

interconnection capacity of these 

pipelines in 2008 was 1.7 billion cubic 

feet per day, an increase of 12 percent 

from 2003.16 Finally, as noted, the 

NGPL has an extensive network of about 

9,800 miles of interstate pipelines. The 

NTO hub is far removed from the Henry 

Hub but is directly connected to the 

Henry Hub through interstate pipeline 

connections. 

The local price at the TxOk hub 

typically differs from the price at the 

Henry Hub. Thus, the price of the Henry 

Hub physically-delivered futures 

contract is an imperfect proxy for the 

NTO price. Moreover, exogenous 

factors, such as adverse weather, can 

cause the NTO gas price to differ from 

the Henry Hub price by an amount that 

is more or less than the cost of shipping, 

making the NYMEX Henry Hub futures 

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17Basis contracts denote the difference in the 

price of natural gas at a specified location minus the 

price of natural gas at the Henry Hub. The 

differential can be either a positive or negative 

value. 

18As noted above, the Commission did not find 

an indication of arbitrage in connection with this 

contract; accordingly, that criterion was not 

discussed in reference to the NTO contract. 

19The OTC Gas End of Day dataset includes daily 

settlement prices for natural gas contracts listed for 

all points in North America. 

20http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/ 

@newsroom/documents/file/pr5403- 

07_ecmreport.pdf. 21 17 CFR part 36, Appendix A. 

22As noted above, IECA expressed the opinion 

that the PER contract met the criteria for SPDC 

determination but did not provide its reasoning. 

contract even less precise as a hedging 

tool than desired by market participants. 

Basis contracts 17 allow traders to more 

accurately discover prices at alternative 

locations and hedge price risk that is 

associated with natural gas at such 

locations. In this regard, a position at a 

local price for an alternative location 

can be established by adding the 

appropriate basis swap position to a 

position taken in the NYMEX 

physically-delivered Henry Hub 

contract (or in the NYMEX or ICE Henry 

Hub look-alike contract, which cash 

settle based on the NYMEX physicallydelivered natural gas contract’s final 

settlement price). 

In its October 9, 2009, Federal 

Register notice, the Commission 

identified material price reference, price 

linkage and material liquidity as the 

potential SPDC criteria applicable to the 

NTO contract. Each of these criteria is 

discussed below.18

1. Material Price Reference Criterion 

The Commission’s October 9, 2009, 

Federal Register notice identified 

material price reference as a potential 

basis for a SPDC determination with 

respect to this contract. The 

Commission considered the fact that ICE 

sells its price data to market participants 

in a number of different packages which 

vary in terms of the hubs covered, time 

periods, and whether the data are daily 

only or historical. For example, ICE 

offers the ‘‘Micontient Gas End of Day’’ 

and ‘‘OTC Gas End of Day’’ 19 packages 

with access to all price data or just 

current prices plus a selected number of 

months (i.e., 12, 24, 36 or 48 months) of 

historical data. These two packages 

include price data for the NTO contract. 

The Commission also noted that its 

October 2007 Report on the Oversight of 

Trading on Regulated Futures 

Exchanges and Exempt Commercial 

Markets (‘‘ECM Study’’) 20 found that in 

general, market participants view the 

ICE as a price discovery market for 

certain natural gas contracts. The study 

did not specify which markets 

performed this function; nevertheless, 

the Commission determined that the 

NTO contract, while not mentioned by 

name in the ECM Study, might warrant 

further analysis. 

The Commission will rely on one of 

two sources of evidence—direct or 

indirect—to determine that the price of 

a contract was being used as a material 

price reference and therefore, serving a 

significant price discovery function.21

With respect to direct evidence, the 

Commission will consider the extent to 

which, on a frequent and recurring 

basis, cash market bids, offers or 

transactions are directly based on or 

quoted at a differential to, the prices 

generated on the ECM in question. 

Direct evidence may be established 

when cash market participants are 

quoting bid or offer prices or entering 

into transactions at prices that are set 

either explicitly or implicitly at a 

differential to prices established for the 

contract in question. Cash market prices 

are set explicitly at a differential to the 

section 2(h)(3) contract when, for 

instance, they are quoted in dollars and 

cents above or below the reference 

contract’s price. Cash market prices are 

set implicitly at a differential to a 

section 2(h)(3) contract when, for 

instance, they are arrived at after adding 

to, or subtracting from the section 

2(h)(3) contract, but then quoted or 

reported at a flat price. With respect to 

indirect evidence, the Commission will 

consider the extent to which the price 

of the contract in question is being 

routinely disseminated in widely 

distributed industry publications—or 

offered by the ECM itself for some form 

of remuneration—and consulted on a 

frequent and recurring basis by industry 

participants in pricing cash market 

transactions. 

Following the issuance of the Federal 

Register release, the Commission further 

evaluated the ICE’s data offerings and 

their use by industry participants. 

Although the TxOk hub is a major 

trading center for natural gas in the 

United States and, as noted, ICE sells 

price information for the NTO contract, 

the Commission has found upon further 

evaluation that cash market transactions 

are not being directly based on or 

quoted as a differential to the NTO 

contract nor is that contract routinely 

consulted by industry participants in 

pricing cash market transactions and 

thus does not meet the Commission’s 

Guidance for the material price 

reference criterion. In this regard, the 

NYMEX Henry Hub physically 

delivered natural gas futures contract is 

routinely consulted by industry 

participants in pricing cash market 

transactions at this location. Because the 

TxOk hub is directly connected to the 

Henry Hub, it is not necessary for 

market participants to independently 

refer to the NTO contract for pricing 

natural gas at this location. Thus, the 

NTO contract does not satisfy the direct 

price reference test for existence of 

material price reference. Furthermore, 

the Commission notes that publication 

of the NTO contract’s prices is not 

indirect evidence material price 

reference. The NTO contract’s prices are 

published with those of numerous other 

contracts, which are of more interest to 

market participants. Due to the lack of 

importance of the TxOk hub, the 

Commission has concluded that traders 

likely do not specifically purchase the 

ICE data packages for the NTO 

contract’s prices and do not consult 

such prices on a frequent and recurring 

basis in pricing cash market 

transactions. 

i. Federal Register Comments 

As noted above, WGCEF, ICE, EI, 

NGSA and FIEG addressed the question 

of whether the NTO contract met the 

material price reference criterion for a 

SPDC.22 The commenters argued that 

because the NTO contract is cashsettled, it cannot truly serve as an 

independent ‘‘reference price’’ for 

transactions in natural gas at this 

location. Rather, the commenters argue, 

the underlying cash price series against 

which the ICE NTO contract is settled 

(in this case, the differential between 

the NYMEX last settlement price for a 

particular month and the NGPL’s price 

for the same month for natural gas at 

this location) is the authentic reference 

price and not the ICE contract itself. The 

Commission believes that this 

interpretation of price reference is too 

limiting and believes that a cash-settled 

derivatives contract could meet the 

price reference criterion if market 

participants ‘‘consult on a frequent and 

recurring basis’’ the derivatives contract 

when pricing forward, fixed-price 

commitments or other cash-settled 

derivatives that seek to ‘‘lock in’’ a fixed 

price for some future point in time to 

hedge against adverse price movements. 

ICE also argued that the Commission 

appeared to base the case that the NTO 

contract is potentially a SPDC on a 

disputable assertion. In issuing its 

notice of intent to determine whether 

the NTO contract is a SPDC, the CFTC 

cited a general conclusion in its ECM 

Study ‘‘that certain market participants 

referred to ICE as a price discovery 

market for certain natural gas contracts.’’ 

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23CL 05. 

24CL 02. 25Appendix A to the Part 36 rules. 

26The size of the NYMEX Henry Hub physicallydelivered natural gas futures contract is 10,000 

mmBtu. The NTO contract has a trading unit of 

2,500 mmBtu, which is one-quarter the size of the 

NYMEX Henry Hub contract. 

27Supplemental data subsequently submitted by 

the ICE indicated that block trades are included in 

the on-exchange trades; block trades comprise 59 

percent of all transactions in the NTO contract. 

28As noted above, IECA expressed the opinion 

that the NTO contract met the criteria for SPDC 

determination but did not provide its reasoning. 

ICE states that CFTC’s conclusion is 

‘‘hard to quantify as the ECM report does 

not mention’’ this contract as a potential 

SPDC. ‘‘It is unknown which market 

participants made this statement in 

2007 or the contracts that were 

referenced.’’ In response to the above 

comment, the Commission notes that it 

cited the ECM study’s general finding 

that some ICE natural gas contracts 

appear to be regarded as price discovery 

markets merely as indicia that an 

investigation of certain ICE contracts 

may be warranted. The ECM Study was 

not intended to serve as the sole basis 

for determining whether or not a 

particular contract meets the material 

price reference criterion. 

Both EI 23 and WGCEF 24 stated that 

publication of price data in a package 

format is a weak justification for 

material price reference. These 

commenters argue that market 

participants generally do not purchase 

ICE data sets for one contract’s prices, 

such as those for the NTO contract. 

Instead, traders are interested in the 

settlement prices, so the fact that ICE 

sells the NTO prices as part of a broad 

package is not conclusive evidence that 

market participants are buying the ICE 

data sets because they find the NTO 

prices have substantial value to them. 

As noted above, the Commission notes 

that publication of the NTO contract’s 

prices is not indirect evidence of routine 

dissemination. The NTO contract’s 

prices are published with those of 

numerous other contracts, which are of 

more interest to market participants. 

Due to the lack of importance of the 

TxOk hub, the Commission has 

concluded that traders likely do not 

specifically purchase the ICE data 

packages for the NTO contract’s prices 

and do not consult such prices on a 

frequent and recurring basis in pricing 

cash market transactions. 

ii. Conclusion Regarding Material Price 

Reference 

Based on the above, the Commission 

finds that the NTO contract does not 

meet the material price reference 

criterion because cash market 

transactions are not priced either 

explicitly or implicitly on a frequent 

and recurring basis at a differential to 

the NTO contract’s price (direct 

evidence). Moreover, while the ECM 

sells the NTO contract’s price data to 

market participants, market participants 

likely do not specifically purchase the 

ICE data packages for the NTO 

contract’s prices and do not consult 

such prices on a frequent and recurring 

basis in pricing cash market transactions 

(indirect evidence). 

2. Price Linkage Criterion 

In its October 9, 2009, Federal 

Register notice, the Commission 

identified price linkage as a potential 

basis for a SPDC determination with 

respect to the NTO contract. In this 

regard, the final settlement of the NTO 

contract is based, in part, on the final 

settlement price of the NYMEX’s 

physically-delivered natural gas futures 

contract, where the NYMEX is 

registered with the Commission as a 

DCM. 

The Commission’s Guidance on 

Significant Price Discovery Contracts 25

notes that a ‘‘price-linked contract is a 

contract that relies on a contract traded 

on another trading facility to settle, 

value or otherwise offset the pricelinked contract.’’ Furthermore, the 

Guidance notes that, ‘‘[f]or a linked 

contract, the mere fact that a contract is 

linked to another contract will not be 

sufficient to support a determination 

that a contract performs a significant 

price discovery function. To assess 

whether such a determination is 

warranted, the Commission will 

examine the relationship between 

transaction prices of the linked contract 

and the prices of the referenced 

contract. The Commission believes that 

where material liquidity exists, prices 

for the linked contract would be 

observed to be substantially the same as 

or move substantially in conjunction 

with the prices of the referenced 

contract.’’ Furthermore, the Guidance 

proposes a threshold price relationship 

such that prices of the ECM linked 

contract will fall within a 2.5 percent 

price range for 95 percent of 

contemporaneously determined closing, 

settlement or other daily prices over the 

most recent quarter. Finally, in 

Guidance the Commission stated that it 

would consider a linked contract that 

has a trading volume equivalent to 5 

percent of the volume of trading in the 

contract to which it is linked to have 

sufficient volume to be deemed a SPDC 

(‘‘minimum threshold’’). 

To assess whether the NTO contract 

meets the price linkage criterion, 

Commission staff obtained price data 

from ICE and performed the statistical 

tests cited above. Staff found that, while 

the NTO contract price is determined, in 

part, by the final settlement price of the 

NYMEX physically-delivered natural 

gas futures contract (a DCM contract), 

the imputed TxOk location price 

(derived by adding the NYMEX Henry 

Hub Natural Gas price to the ICE NTO 

basis price) is not within 2.5 percent of 

the settlement price of the 

corresponding NYMEX Henry Hub 

natural gas futures contract on 95 

percent or more of the days. 

Specifically, during the third quarter of 

2009, only 3.3 percent of the NTO 

natural gas prices derived from the ICE 

basis values were within 2.5 percent of 

the daily settlement price of the NYMEX 

Henry Hub futures contract. In addition, 

staff found that the NTO contract fails 

to meet the volume threshold 

requirement. In particular, the total 

trading volume in the NYMEX Natural 

Gas contract during the third quarter of 

2009 was 14,022,963 contracts, with 5 

percent of that number being 701,148 

contracts. Trades on the ICE centralized 

market in the NTO contract during the 

same period were 68,792 contracts 

(equivalent to 17,198 NYMEX contracts, 

given the size difference).26 Thus, 

centralized-market trades in the NTO 

contract amounted to less than the 

minimum volume threshold.27

i. Federal Register Comments 

As noted above, WGCEF, ICE, EI, 

NGSA and FIEG addressed the question 

of whether the NTO contract met the 

price linkage criterion for a SPDC.28

Each of the commenters expressed the 

opinion that the NTO contract did not 

appear to meet the above-discussed 

Commission guidance regarding the 

price relationship and/or the minimum 

volume threshold relative to the DCM 

contract to which the NTO is linked. 

Based on its analysis discussed above, 

the Commission agrees with this 

assessment. 

ii. Conclusion Regarding the Price 

Linkage Criterion 

Based on the above, the Commission 

finds that the NTO contract does not 

meet the price linkage criterion because 

it fails the price relationship and 

volume tests provided for in the 

Commission’s Guidance. 

3. Material Liquidity Criterion 

As noted above, in its October 9, 

2009, Federal Register notice, the 

Commission identified price linkage, 

material price reference, and material 

liquidity as potential criteria for SPDC 

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29 74 FR 52208 (October 9, 2009). 

30Staff has advised the Commission that in its 

experience, a thinly-traded contract is, generally, 

one that has a quarterly trading volume of 100,000 

contracts or less. In this regard, in the third quarter 

of 2009, physical commodity futures contracts with 

trading volume of 100,000 contracts or fewer 

constituted less than one percent of total trading 

volume of all physical commodity futures contracts. 

31 In establishing guidance to illustrate how it 

will evaluate the various criteria, or combinations 

of criteria, when determining whether a contract is 

a SPDC, the Commission made clear that ‘‘material 

liquidity itself would not be sufficient to make a 

determination that a contract is a [SPDC], * * * but 

combined with other factors it can serve as a 

guidepost indicating which contracts are 

functioning as [SPDCs].’’ For the reasons discussed 

above, the Commission has found that the NTO 

contract does not meet either the price linkage or 

material price reference criterion. In light of this 

finding and the Commission’s Guidance cited 

above, there is no need to evaluate further the 

material liquidity criteria since it cannot be used 

alone as a basis for a SPDC determination. 

32As noted above, IECA expressed the opinion 

that the NTO contract met the criteria for SPDC 

determination but did not provide its reasoning. 

33CL 02. 

34CL 04. 

35CL 05. 

36 17 CFR 36, Appendix A. 

37CL 08. 

38CL 06. 

39 73 FR 75892 (December 12, 2008). 

40 In addition, both EI and ICE stated that the 

trades-per-day statistics that it provided to the 

Commission in its quarterly filing and which were 

cited in the Commission’s October 9, 2009, Federal 

Register notice includes 2(h)(1) transactions, which 

were not completed on the electronic trading 

platform and should not be considered in the SPDC 

determination process. The Commission staff asked 

ICE to review the data it sent in its quarterly filings; 

ICE confirmed that the volume data it provided and 

which the Commission cited includes only 

transaction data executed on ICE’s electronic 

trading platform. As noted above, supplemental 

data supplied by ICE confirmed that block trades 

are in addition to the trades that were conducted 

on the electronic platform; block trades comprise 59 

percent of all transactions in the NTO contract. The 

Commission acknowledges that the open interest 

information it provided in its October 9, 2009, 

Federal Register notice includes transactions made 

off the ICE platform. However, once open interest 

is created, there is no way for ICE to differentiate 

between ‘‘on-exchange’’ versus ‘‘off-exchange’’ 

created positions, and all such positions are 

fungible with one another and may be offset in any 

way agreeable to the position holder regardless of 

how the position was initially created. 

determination of the NTO contract. To 

assess whether a contract meets the 

material liquidity criterion, the 

Commission first examines trading 

activity as a general measurement of the 

contract’s size and potential importance. 

If the Commission finds that the 

contract in question meets a threshold 

of trading activity that would render it 

of potential importance, the 

Commission will then perform a 

statistical analysis to measure the effect 

that the prices of the subject contract 

potentially may have on prices for other 

contracts listed on an ECM or a DCM. 

The total number of transactions 

executed on ICE’s electronic platform in 

the NTO contract was 1,083 in the 

second quarter of 2009, resulting in a 

daily average of 16.9 trades. During the 

same period, the NTO contract had a 

total trading volume of 84,432 contracts 

and an average daily trading volume of 

1,319.3 contracts. Moreover, open 

interest as of June 30, 2009, was 70,557 

contracts, which included trades 

executed on ICE’s electronic trading 

platform, as well as trades executed off 

of ICE’s electronic trading platform and 

then brought to ICE for clearing. In this 

regard, ICE does not differentiate 

between open interest created by a 

transaction executed on its trading 

platform and that created by a 

transaction executed off its trading 

platform.29

In a subsequent filing dated 

November 13, 2009, ICE reported that 

total trading volume in the third quarter 

of 2009 was 68,792 contracts (or 1,042 

contracts on a daily basis). In terms of 

number of transactions, 688 trades 

occurred in the third quarter of 2009 

(10.4 trades per day). As of September 

30, 2009, open interest in the NTO 

contract was 97,786 contracts, which 

included trades executed on ICE’s 

electronic trading platform, as well as 

trades executed off of ICE’s electronic 

trading platform and then brought to 

ICE for clearing. 

As indicated above, the average 

number of trades per day in the second 

and third quarters of 2009 was only 

marginally above the minimum 

reporting level (5 trades per day). 

Moreover, trading activity in the NTO 

contract, as characterized by total 

quarterly volume, indicates that the 

NTO contract experiences trading 

activity similar to that of other thinlytraded contracts.30 Thus, the NTO 

contract does not meet a threshold of 

trading activity that would render it of 

potential importance and no additional 

statistical analysis is warranted.31

i. Federal Register Comments 

As noted above, WGCEF, ICE, EI, 

NGSA and FIEG addressed the question 

of whether the NTO contract met the 

material liquidity criterion for a SPDC.32

These commenters stated that the NTO 

contract does not meet the material 

liquidity criterion for SPDC 

determination for a number of reasons. 

WGCEF,33 ICE 34 and EI 35 noted that 

the Commission’s Guidance had posited 

concepts of liquidity that generally 

assumed a fairly constant stream of 

prices throughout the trading day, and 

noted that the relatively low number of 

trades per day in the NTO contract did 

not meet this standard of liquidity. The 

Commission observes that a continuous 

stream of prices would indeed be an 

indication of liquidity for certain 

markets, but the Guidance also notes 

that ‘‘quantifying the levels of 

immediacy and price concession that 

would define material liquidity may 

differ from one market or commodity to 

another.’’ 36

WGCEF, FIEG 37 and NGSA 38 noted 

that the NTO contract represents a 

differential, which does not affect other 

contracts, including the NYMEX Henry 

Hub contract and physical gas contracts. 

FIEG and WGCEF also noted that the 

NTO contract’s trading volume 

represents only a fraction of natural gas 

trading. 

ICE opined that the Commission 

‘‘seems to have adopted a five trade-perday test to determine whether a contract 

is materially liquid. It is worth noting 

that ICE originally suggested that the 

CFTC use a five trades-per-day 

threshold as the basis for an ECM to 

report trade data to the CFTC.’’ 

Furthermore, FIEG cautioned the 

Commission in using a reporting 

threshold as a measure of liquidity. In 

this regard, the Commission adopted a 

five trades-per-day threshold as a 

reporting requirement to enable it to 

‘‘independently be aware of ECM 

contracts that may develop into 

SPDCs’’ 39 rather than solely relying 

upon an ECM on its own to identify any 

such potential SPDCs to the 

Commission. Thus, any contract that 

meets this threshold may be subject to 

scrutiny as a potential SPDC but this 

does not mean that the contract will be 

found to be a SPDC merely because it 

met the reporting threshold. 

ICE and EI proposed that the statistics 

provided by ICE were misinterpreted 

and misapplied by the Commission. In 

particular, ICE stated that the volume 

figures used in the Commission’s 

analysis (cited above) ‘‘include trades 

made in all months of each contract’’ as 

well as in strips of contract months, and 

a ‘‘more appropriate method of 

determining liquidity is to examine the 

activity in a single traded month or strip 

of a given contract.’’ 40 A similar 

argument was made by EI, which 

observed that the five-trades-per-day 

number ‘‘is highly misleading * * * 

because the contracts can be offered for 

as long as 120 months, [thus] the 

average per day for an individual 

contract may be less than 1 per day.’’ 

It is the Commission’s opinion that 

liquidity, as it pertains to the NTO 

contract, is typically a function of 

trading activity in particular lead 

months and, given sufficient liquidity in 

such months, the ICE NTO contract 

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41See 73 FR 75888, 75893 (Dec. 12, 2008). 

42 44 U.S.C. 3507(d). 43 7 U.S.C. 19(a). 

44 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. 

45 66 FR 42256, 42268 (Aug. 10, 2001). 

46 7 U.S.C. 1a(29). 

itself would be considered liquid. In any 

event, in light of the fact that the 

Commission has found that the NTO 

contract does not meet the material 

price reference or price linkage criteria, 

according to the Commission’s 

Guidance, it would be unnecessary to 

evaluate whether the NTO contract 

meets the material liquidity criterion 

since it cannot be used alone for SPDC 

determination. 

ii. Conclusion Regarding Material 

Liquidity 

For the reasons discussed above, the 

Commission has found that the NTO 

contract does not meet the material 

liquidity criterion. 

4. Overall Conclusion 

After considering the entire record in 

this matter, including the comments 

received, the Commission has 

determined that the NTO contract does 

not meet the material price criterion, 

price linkage and material liquidity 

criteria. Thus, the NTO contract does 

not perform a significant price discovery 

function under the criteria established 

in section 2(h)(7) of the CEA. 

Accordingly, the Commission will issue 

the attached Order declaring that the 

NTO contract is not a SPDC. 

Issuance of this Order indicates that 

the Commission does not at this time 

regard ICE as a registered entity in 

connection with its NTO contract.41

Accordingly, with respect to its NTO 

contract, ICE is not required to comply 

with the obligations, requirements and 

timetables prescribed in Commission 

rule 36.3(c)(4) for ECMs with SPDCs. 

However, ICE must continue to comply 

with the applicable reporting 

requirements. 

IV. Related Matters 

a. Paperwork Reduction Act 

The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 

(‘‘PRA’’) 42 imposes certain requirements 

on Federal agencies, including the 

Commission, in connection with their 

conducting or sponsoring any collection 

of information as defined by the PRA. 

Certain provisions of Commission rule 

36.3 impose new regulatory and 

reporting requirements on ECMs, 

resulting in information collection 

requirements within the meaning of the 

PRA. OMB previously has approved and 

assigned OMB control number 3038– 

0060 to this collection of information. 

b. Cost-Benefit Analysis 

Section 15(a) of the CEA 43 requires 

the Commission to consider the costs 

and benefits of its actions before issuing 

an order under the Act. By its terms, 

section 15(a) does not require the 

Commission to quantify the costs and 

benefits of an order or to determine 

whether the benefits of the order 

outweigh its costs; rather, it requires 

that the Commission ‘‘consider’’ the 

costs and benefits of its actions. Section 

15(a) further specifies that the costs and 

benefits shall be evaluated in light of 

five broad areas of market and public 

concern: (1) Protection of market 

participants and the public; (2) 

efficiency, competitiveness and 

financial integrity of futures markets; (3) 

price discovery; (4) sound risk 

management practices; and (5) other 

public interest considerations. The 

Commission may in its discretion give 

greater weight to any one of the five 

enumerated areas and could in its 

discretion determine that, 

notwithstanding its costs, a particular 

order is necessary or appropriate to 

protect the public interest or to 

effectuate any of the provisions or 

accomplish any of the purposes of the 

Act. The Commission has considered 

the costs and benefits in light of the 

specific provisions of section 15(a) of 

the Act and has concluded that the 

Order, required by Congress to 

strengthen federal oversight of exempt 

commercial markets and to prevent 

market manipulation, is necessary and 

appropriate to accomplish the purposes 

of section 2(h)(7) of the Act. 

When a futures contract begins to 

serve a significant price discovery 

function, that contract, and the ECM on 

which it is traded, warrants increased 

oversight to deter and prevent price 

manipulation or other disruptions to 

market integrity, both on the ECM itself 

and in any related futures contracts 

trading on DCMs. An Order fining that 

a particular contract is a SPDC triggers 

this increased oversight and imposes 

obligations on the ECM calculated to 

accomplish this goal. The increased 

oversight engendered by the issue of a 

SPDC Order increases transparency and 

helps to ensure fair competition among 

ECMs and DCMs trading similar 

products and competing for the same 

business. Moreover, the ECM on which 

the SPDC is traded must assume, with 

respect to that contract, all the 

responsibilities and obligations of a 

registered entity under the CEA and 

Commission regulations. Additionally, 

the ECM must comply with nine core 

principles established by section 2(h)(7) 

of the Act—including the obligation to 

establish position limits and/or 

accountability standards for the SPDC. 

Amendments to section 4(i) of the CEA 

authorize the Commission to require 

reports for SPDCs listed on ECMs. These 

increased responsibilities, along with 

the CFTC’s increased regulatory 

authority, subject the ECM’s risk 

management practices to the 

Commission’s supervision and oversight 

and generally enhance the financial 

integrity of the markets. 

The Commission has concluded that 

ICE’s NTO contract, which is the subject 

of the attached Order, is not a SPDC; 

accordingly, the Commission’s Order 

imposes no additional costs and no 

additional statutorily or regulatory 

mandated responsibilities on the ECM. 

c. Regulatory Flexibility Act 

The Regulatory Flexibility Act 

(‘‘RFA’’) 44 requires that agencies 

consider the impact of their rules on 

small businesses. The requirements of 

CEA section 2(h)(7) and the Part 36 

rules affect exempt commercial markets. 

The Commission previously has 

determined that exempt commercial 

markets are not small entities for 

purposes of the RFA.45 Accordingly, the 

Chairman, on behalf of the Commission, 

hereby certifies pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 

605(b) that this Order, taken in 

connection with section 2(h)(7) of the 

Act and the Part 36 rules, will not have 

a significant impact on a substantial 

number of small entities. 

V. Order 

Order Relating to the NGPL TxOk 

Financial Basis Contract 

After considering the complete record 

in this matter, including the comment 

letters received in response to its 

request for comments, the Commission 

has determined to issue the following 

Order: 

The Commission, pursuant to its 

authority under section 2(h)(7) of the 

Act, hereby determines that the NGPL 

TxOk Financial Basis contract, traded 

on the IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., 

does not at this time satisfy the material 

price reference, price linkage and 

material liquidity criteria for significant 

price discovery contracts. Consistent 

with this determination, the 

IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., is not 

considered a registered entity 46 with 

respect to the NTO Financial Basis 

contract and is not subject to the 

provisions of the Commodity Exchange 

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Federal Register / Vol. 75, No. 85 / Tuesday, May 4, 2010 / Notices 23697 

1 74 FR 52196 (October 9, 2009). 

2 Incorporated as Title XIII of the Food, 

Conservation and Energy Act of 2008, Public Law 

110–246, 122 Stat. 1624 (June 18, 2008). 

3 7 U.S.C. 1a(29). 

4 74 FR 12178 (Mar. 23, 2009); these rules became 

effective on April 22, 2009. 

5Public Law 110–246 at 13203; Joint Explanatory 

Statement of the Committee of Conference, H.R. 

Rep. No. 110–627, 110 Cong., 2d Sess. 978, 986 

(Conference Committee Report). See also 73 FR 

75888, 75894 (Dec. 12, 2008). 

6For an initial SPDC, ECMs have a grace period 

of 90 calendar days from the issuance of a SPDC 

determination order to submit a written 

demonstration of compliance with the applicable 

core principles. For subsequent SPDCs, ECMs have 

a grace period of 30 calendar days to demonstrate 

core principle compliance. 

Act applicable to registered entities. 

Further, the obligations, requirements 

and timetables prescribed in 

Commission rule 36.3(c)(4) governing 

core principle compliance by the 

IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., are not 

applicable to the NGPL TxOk Financial 

Basis contract with the issuance of this 

Order. 

This Order is based on the 

representations made to the 

Commission by the 

IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., dated 

July 27, 2009, and November 13, 2009, 

and other supporting material. Any 

material change or omissions in the 

facts and circumstances pursuant to 

which this order is granted might 

require the Commission to reconsider its 

current determination that the NGPL 

TxOk Financial Basis contract is not a 

significant price discovery contract. 

Additionally, to the extent that it 

continues to rely upon the exemption in 

Section 2(h)(3) of the Act, the 

IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., must 

continue to comply with all of the 

applicable requirements of Section 

2(h)(3) and Commission Regulation 

36.3. 

Issued in Washington, DC on April 28, 

2010, by the Commission. 

David A. Stawick, 

Secretary of the Commission. 

[FR Doc. 2010–10308 Filed 5–3–10; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE P 

COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING 

COMMISSION 

Order Finding That the AECO Financial 

Basis Contract Traded on the 

IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., 

Performs a Significant Price Discovery 

Function 

AGENCY: Commodity Futures Trading 

Commission. 

ACTION: Final order. 

SUMMARY: On October 9, 2009, the 

Commodity Futures Trading 

Commission (‘‘CFTC’’ or ‘‘Commission’’) 

published for comment in the Federal 

Register 1 a notice of its intent to 

undertake a determination whether the 

AECO Financial Basis (‘‘AEC’’) contract 

traded on the IntercontinentalExchange, 

Inc. (‘‘ICE’’), an exempt commercial 

market (‘‘ECM’’) under sections 2(h)(3)– 

(5) of the Commodity Exchange Act 

(‘‘CEA’’ or the ‘‘Act’’), performs a 

significant price discovery function 

pursuant to section 2(h)(7) of the CEA. 

The Commission undertook this review 

based upon an initial evaluation of 

information and data provided by ICE as 

well as other available information. The 

Commission has reviewed the entire 

record in this matter, including all 

comments received, and has determined 

to issue an order finding that the AEC 

contract performs a significant price 

discovery function. Authority for this 

action is found in section 2(h)(7) of the 

CEA and Commission rule 36.3(c) 

promulgated thereunder. 

DATES: Effective date: April 28, 2010. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Gregory K. Price, Industry Economist, 

Division of Market Oversight, 

Commodity Futures Trading 

Commission, Three Lafayette Centre, 

1155 21st Street, NW., Washington, DC 

20581. Telephone: (202) 418–5515. Email: gprice@cftc.gov; or Susan Nathan, 

Senior Special Counsel, Division of 

Market Oversight, same address. 

Telephone: (202) 418–5133. E-mail: 

snathan@cftc.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Introduction 

The CFTC Reauthorization Act of 

2008 (‘‘Reauthorization Act’’) 2

significantly broadened the CFTC’s 

regulatory authority with respect to 

ECMs by creating, in section 2(h)(7) of 

the CEA, a new regulatory category— 

ECMs on which significant price 

discovery contracts (‘‘SPDCs’’) are 

traded—and treating ECMs in that 

category as registered entities under the 

CEA.3 The legislation authorizes the 

CFTC to designate an agreement, 

contract or transaction as a SPDC if the 

Commission determines, under criteria 

established in section 2(h)(7), that it 

performs a significant price discovery 

function. When the Commission makes 

such a determination, the ECM on 

which the SPDC is traded must assume, 

with respect to that contract, all the 

responsibilities and obligations of a 

registered entity under the Act and 

Commission regulations, and must 

comply with nine core principles 

established by new section 2(h)(7)(C). 

On March 16, 2009, the CFTC 

promulgated final rules implementing 

the provisions of the Reauthorization 

Act.4 As relevant here, rule 36.3 

imposes increased information reporting 

requirements on ECMs to assist the 

Commission in making prompt 

assessments whether particular ECM 

contracts may be SPDCs. In addition to 

filing quarterly reports of its contracts, 

an ECM must notify the Commission 

promptly concerning any contract 

traded in reliance on the exemption in 

section 2(h)(3) of the CEA that averaged 

five trades per day or more over the 

most recent calendar quarter, and for 

which the exchange sells its price 

information regarding the contract to 

market participants or industry 

publications, or whose daily closing or 

settlement prices on 95 percent or more 

of the days in the most recent quarter 

were within 2.5 percent of the 

contemporaneously determined closing, 

settlement or other daily prices of 

another contract. 

Commission rule 36.3(c)(3) 

established the procedures by which the 

Commission makes and announces its 

determination whether a particular ECM 

contract serves a significant price 

discovery function. Under those 

procedures, the Commission will 

publish notice in the Federal Register 

that it intends to undertake an 

evaluation whether the specified 

agreement, contract or transaction 

performs a significant price discovery 

function and to receive written views, 

data and arguments relevant to its 

determination from the ECM and other 

interested persons. Upon the close of 

the comment period, the Commission 

will consider, among other things, all 

relevant information regarding the 

subject contract and issue an order 

announcing and explaining its 

determination whether or not the 

contract is a SPDC. The issuance of an 

affirmative order signals the 

effectiveness of the Commission’s 

regulatory authorities over an ECM with 

respect to a SPDC; at that time such an 

ECM becomes subject to all provisions 

of the CEA applicable to registered 

entities.5 The issuance of such an order 

also triggers the obligations, 

requirements and timetables prescribed 

in Commission rule 36.3(c)(4).6

II. Notice of Intent To Undertake SPDC 

Determination 

On October 9, 2009, the Commission 

published in the Federal Register notice 

of its intent to undertake a 

determination whether the AEC contract 

performs a significant price discovery 

function and requested comment from 

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