Eyewitness to War

Volume II

The US Army in Operation AL FAJR:

An Oral History

Kendall D. Gott

General Editor

Interviews by

John McCool

Matt M. Matthews

Transcribed by

Colette Kiszka

Jennifer Vedder

Edited by

Jennifer Lindsey

Additional Interviews by

Dr. Christopher K. Ives

 Combat Studies Institute Press

 Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66048
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Eyewitness to war : a US Army oral history of Operation al-Fajr / Kendall D. Gott general 

editor ; interviews by John McCool ... [et al.].

 p. cm.

 1. Fallujah, Battle of, Fallujah, Iraq, 2004. 2. Unifi ed operations (Military science) 3. 

United States. Army--History--21st century. 4. Iraq War, 2003---Personal narratives, 

American. I. Gott, Kendall D. II. McCool, John. III. Series.

DS79.766.F3E93 2006

956.7044’342--dc22

2006035657

Cover photo by SSG Kimberly Snow, National Guard Combat Camerawoman.

CSI Press publications cover a variety of military history topics. The views expressed in this 

CSI Press publication are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Department 

of the Army, or the Department of Defense.

A full list of CSI Press publications, many of them available for downloading, can be found 

at http://www.cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/csi.asp.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800

Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001

ISBN 0-16-077465-9
iii 

Foreword

Eyewitness to War The US Army in Operation AL FAJR: An Oral History is a 

unique publication for the Combat Studies Institute. It is our fi rst publication to 

make exclusive use of oral history. This study is a derivative of the CSI Operational Leadership Experience (OLE) project, a program that collects and archives 

fi rst-person experiences from the Global War on Terror. It can also be considered 

a companion to the recently published CSI Occasional Paper #20: Operation AL 

FAJR: A Study in Army and Marine Corps Joint Operations. Interviews collected 

for the OLE project formed the basis for that occasional paper and were so compelling, we felt a need to publish those interviews in a book series. 

In November 2004, the second battle for Fallujah was a brutal and bloody fi ght 

so characteristic of urban terrain. Under the overall command of the 1st Marine 

Division, four Marine infantry and two US Army battalions (Task Forces 2-2 

Infantry and 2-7 Cavalry) were committed to the streets of Fallujah. At this same 

time, the Army’s 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division formed a cordon to hold and 

isolate the insurgents in the city. Using the fi repower and mobility of the Army’s 

heavy armor and mechanized units to full effect, the Marine Regimental Combat 

Teams were successful in destroying the enemy and securing Fallujah in ten days.

Eyewitness to War interviews span a wide spectrum of participants, from commanders and senior non-commissioned offi cers at all levels to the fi rst-hand 

accounts of combat and combat service support personnel on the battlefi eld. We 

make no claim that this history is a comprehensive work, as these 37 people are 

but a fraction of the thousands who took part in the operation. This is primarily 

an Army oral history, though one of the Marine Regimental Commanders agreed 

to provide his story. The USMC bore the brunt of fi ghting in Fallujah and this 

study does not attempt to overlook their tremendous accomplishments. 

The individuals featured in this work volunteered to work with our staff over 

many months. Their stories are a tremendous testimony to the skill, fl exibility, 

and bravery of the US Army today.

This collection of personal experiences is the raw material history is made of. It 

is a riveting and useful way to study the past. And it is our hope that the insights 

derived from their roles in the second battle for Fallujah will better prepare the 

US Army for tomorrow’s endeavors. CSI – The Past is Prologue!

Timothy R. Reese

Colonel, Armor

Director, Combat Studies Institute

v 

Introduction

The Combat Studies Institute (CSI) was established at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 

in 1979 with the mission to conduct original, interpretive research on historical 

topics pertinent to current doctrinal and operational concerns of the US Army. 

CSI’s further mission is to publish these results in a variety of useful formats and 

to conduct battlefi eld staff rides for the US Army. Today, CSI also assists the US 

Army’s Combined Arms Center in the development and implementation of an 

integrated progressive program of military history instruction. CSI’s mission further includes writing contemporary Army history, overseeing the Frontier Army 

Museum, and serving as the Command History Offi ce for the Combined Arms 

Center.

In 2005, the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) gave CSI 

the mission to conduct oral and videotaped interviews with offi cers who recently 

participated in operations in the Global War on Terrorism, including Operation 

Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The Operational 

Leadership Experiences (OLE) section accomplishes this by arranging these 

interviews and providing transcription, archival support services, and website 

implementation. Digital copies of all interviews are posted on the Combined 

Arms Research Library (CARL) and CSI websites: http://www-cgsc.army.mil/

carl/contentdm/home.htm and http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/csi/.

Since its inception in the summer of 2005, the OLE section has conducted over 

350 interviews of returning veterans. Many offi cers interviewed were conveniently located at Fort Leavenworth as students of the Command and General 

Staff College, the School for Advanced Military Studies, or for one of the PreCommand Courses. However, numerous other offi cers, soldiers, and civilians 

interviewed volunteered from units or posts located all around the world. The 

wide range of experiences and perceptions preserved for posterity is remarkable 

and continues to grow.

Eyewitness to War The US Army in Operation AL FAJR: An Oral History is the 

fi rst series of published interviews by the OLE section. The accounts in this 

book and successive volumes are the experiences of actual participants told in 

their own words. It is history in raw form, recorded for future generations by key 

leaders on the ground and the men and women there to see and hear the events 

unfold. The CSI staff only lightly edited the contents for clarity, to remove the 

occasional use of excessive profanity and the rare injurious personal attack. However, the content and tone describing the operation remain untouched. No classifi ed information was used or included in this book and the opinions expressed by 

the participants are their own.
vi

The bulk of this book consists of Army interviews, which are presented in order 

of rank. Two Marines, one airman, and a journalist are also included and provide 

interesting insight to the cooperation achieved between the services. A glossary 

and index are also included. Volume I provides an overview chapter of the second 

battle of Fallujah, named Operation AL FAJR (Dawn) by the Iraqis. This is a 

modifi ed version of a chapter featured in Breaking the Mold: Tanks in the Cities, 

published by CSI Press in 2006. Matt Matthews authored an additional work of 

great interest in the CSI Occasional Paper #20 Operation AL FAJR: A Study in 

Army and Marine Corps Joint Operations.

My thanks go foremost to the men and women who took the time and effort to be 

interviewed, provide statements, and review the fi nal transcripts. Additionally, the 

fi ne work of the OLE team, namely John McCool, Dr. Chris Ives, Colette Kiszka, 

and Jennifer Vedder who made this work possible by their untiring efforts to 

locate key personnel and to persevere under tight deadlines. High recognition and 

praise also go to Mr. Matt Matthews for identifying, tracking down, and interviewing a signifi cant number of the featured participants. Thanks and appreciation also goes to our editor, Jennifer Lindsey and also to Mike Brooks for his 

fi ne work in designing the cover. Lastly, this project could not have seen fruition 

without the support and sage advice of Colonel Timothy R. Reese and Dr. William G. Robertson.

Kendall D. Gott

Senior Historian

Research and Publication Team
vii 

Contents

Foreword .............................................................................................................iii

Introduction .......................................................................................................... v

Interview Abstracts .............................................................................................. 1

Interviews

Captain James Cobb, Fire Support Offi cer

Task Force 2-2 ............................................................................................... 9

Captain Jeff Emery, 1st Platoon

Alpha Company, Task Force 2-2 ................................................................. 25

Captain Michael S. Erwin, Assistant Intelligence Offi cer

Task Force 2-7 ............................................................................................. 47

Captain Natalie Friel, Assistant S2

Task Force 2-2 ............................................................................................. 57

Captain Peter Glass, Commander 

Charlie Company, 3d Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment .............................. 71

Captain Jeff Jager, Liaison Offi cer

Marine Regimental Combat Team 7 ............................................................ 83

Captain Christopher Lacour, Assistant Fire Support Offi cer

Task Force 2-2 ............................................................................................. 99

Captain Gregory McCrum, Physician Assistant

Task Force 2-2 ........................................................................................... 109

Captain Edward Twaddell III, Alpha Company Commander

Task Force 2-7 ........................................................................................... 125

Captain Coley D. Tyler, Fire Support Offi cer

Task Force 2-7 ........................................................................................... 139

Captain Neil Prakash, Platoon Leader

Alpha Company, 2-63 Armor .................................................................... 147

CSM Major Darrin Bohn

Operations Sergeant Major, Task Force 2-2 .............................................. 167

CSM Timothy L. Mace

Command Sergeant Major Task Force 2-7 ................................................ 185

SGM Peter Smith, First Sergeant

Alpha Company, Task Force 2-2 ............................................................... 195
viii

SFC John Urrutia, Platoon Sergeant

2d Platoon, Alpha Company, Task Force 2-7 ............................................ 211

SSG Jimmy Amyett, 2d Platoon

3d Brigade Reconnaissance Troop, Task Force 2-2 .................................. 227

SSG David Bellavia, Squad Leader

2d Squad, 3d Platoon, Alpha Company, Task Force 2-2 ........................... 241

SSgt Matthew Horgan, USAF Joint Tactical Air Controller

Assigned to 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division .......................................... 277

SGT Wes Smith, Medical Platoon

Assigned to Alpha Company, Task Force 2-2 ........................................... 289

Jane Arraf, CNN Senior Baghdad Correspondent ..................................... 303

Glossary ........................................................................................................... 317
1 

Abstracts

Captain James Cobb, Fire Support Offi cer for Task Force 2-2: Captain Cobb was 

attached to Marine Regimental Combat Team 7 for purposes of this combinedjoint urban assault, he speaks about the artillery-related planning and coordination 

conducted with the Marines, his observer plan and his work in terms of the 

preparation and execution of the initial breach into the city. He also speaks to 

the overall fi re support plan throughout the decisive fi ght. For Cobb, a variety of 

communications issues posed signifi cant challenges and caused no small amount 

of frustration, particularly the order to change COMSEC in the middle of the 

battle. In addition, he discusses embedded reporters, gives his explanation for the 

successful outcome of the battle, and also comments at length on the experience of 

high-intensity combat.

Captain Jeff Emery, 1st Platoon, Alpha Company, Task Force 2-2: As Senior 

Platoon Leader, Captain Emery was in charge of four Bradleys, two tanks and 

two dismounted squads during Operation AL FAJR. In this interview, he discusses 

the role his unit played in its successful prosecution. His duties changed upon 

the company losing both its commander and executive offi cer; tragic and diffi cult 

events, which he discusses in great detail.

Captain Michael S. Erwin, Assistant S2, Task Force 2-7: As the assistant 

intelligence offi cer for 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, Captain Erwin’s 

principal duties during the assault to retake Fallujah were in the intelligence, 

surveillance and reconnaissance realm. Working with Task Force 2-7’s Raven 

unmanned aerial vehicle and coordinating with the Marine UAV effort, Erwin 

focused mainly on Fallujah’s Jolan District and provided real-time information 

on enemy locations and movements to the maneuver forces. In addition, Erwin 

discusses the unique situation in which his Active Duty battalion was attached to a 

National Guard brigade: the 39th Enhanced Separate Brigade out of Arkansas.

Captain Natalie Friel, Assistant S2, Task Force 2-2: Deployed with 2d Battalion, 

2d Infantry Regiment from February 2004 through February 2005, Captain Friel 

served as the battalion assistant intelligence offi cer. While offi cially the AS2 during 

a time of transition for the unit prior to the battle, Friel acted as the primary S2 

and oversaw Task Force 2-2’s intelligence preparation of the battlefi eld. Once the 

operation commenced, she was stationed in the tactical operations center, but would 

go forward to brief commanders in the fi eld on the latest intelligence assessments. 

In this interview, she shares her far-reaching visibility over the entire intelligence 
2

picture, focusing on enemy tactics and capabilities; information gleaned from 

human, signals and imagery intelligence sources. She also discusses experiences 

with US Marine Corps intel offi cers and USMC assets, particularly unmanned 

aerial vehicles; and her overall insights into why the operation was a success.

Captain Peter Glass, Commander of Charlie Company, 3d Battalion, 8th Cavalry 

Regiment: Captain Glass and his company were attached to Marine Regimental 

Combat Team 1 during the battle to retake Fallujah. In this interview, he discusses 

his company’s role, which included securing the Martyrs Cemetery, clearing areas 

of the Jolan District and doing what he calls “mini thunder runs.” The taking of 

company casualties, dealing with mosque fi res, and having his own tank disabled by 

an anti-tank mine are but some of the experiences Glass relates. He also describes 

his unit’s working relationship with the Marines and some of the diffi culties they 

encountered.

Captain Jeff Jager, Liaison Offi cer to the Marine Regimental Combat Team 7: In 

March 2004, Captain Jager joined 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry Regiment at Forward 

Operating Base Normandy in Iraq and, in early November, was sent over to Marine 

Regimental Combat Team 7 as the offi cer in charge of a liaison team. He speaks at 

length about the responsibilities to understand the command and control structure 

of RCT-7, determine their operational plan and targeting process, and to fi nd and 

reconnoiter Task Force 2-2’s attack position. In this interview, Jager also discusses 

communications diffi culties he experienced in dealing with Army and Marine 

systems and the challenges with respect to good situational awareness. Providing 

unique insights into the execution of the operation from the battalion and regimental 

levels and shedding light on a myriad of personnel and task organization issues, 

Jager also talks about embedded reporters and how their remarkable access had 

both positive and negative consequences. 

Captain Christopher Lacour, Assistant Fire Support Offi cer for Task Force 2-2: A 

recent addition to 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry Regiment as the onset of the operation, 

Captain Lacour served as the assistant fi re support offi cer during the fi ght to retake 

Fallujah. A key participant in the pre-mission planning and coordination, Lacour 

discusses the fi re support plan and his liaison role in great detail. In addition, he 

talks about the rules of engagement, relates a number of communications-related 

diffi culties between the Army and Marines. Lacour comments at length on the fi ring 

of two missions using white phosphorous rounds, and describes the challenges of 

coordinating indirect fi res in a city that was a “gigantic, pre-planned, waiting-forthe-invasion maze.” From his vantage point, Lacour had solid visibility on many 
3 

of the key leaders and their decision-making processes from both 2-2 and RCT7, which he shares in this interview. He also touches on the lack of availability 

of Marine air assets and, additionally, for the benefi t of young fi eld artillery 

lieutenants, discusses and evaluates some of the fi re support equipment he used 

during this operation. 

Captain Gregory McCrum, Physician Assistant, Task Force 2-2: A former medic 

with the 82d Airborne Division and a Special Forces-qualifi ed medical sergeant, 

Captain McCrum was assigned to 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry as the battalion PA. He 

discusses his simultaneous provider and command and control responsibilities, as 

well as all aspects of the medical support given to the soldiers of his unit. Among 

the many topics covered are the measures he took to ensure the task force was as 

self-sustaining as possible in terms of medical supplies; the layout, capabilities 

and movements of the forward aid station as well as the non-doctrinal innovations 

employed and the emergency care administered.

Captain Edward Twaddell III, Commander of Alpha Company, Task Force 2-7: 

CPT Twadell was the commander of Alpha Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry 

Regiment, which was attached to Marine RCT-1 for the operation. His interview 

focuses on the role his two platoons of Bradleys and one platoon of tanks played in 

the overall operation, Twaddell discusses pre-mission planning, the initial breach 

into the city, the seizing of company objectives and the unit’s engagement and 

destruction of enemy forces. In this detailed, day-by-day account, he also talks 

at length about his company’s cooperative relationship with Marine Corps units 

and how the taking of casualties affected him and his soldiers. Twaddell relates 

the story of his own command Bradley being penetrated by a rocket-propelled 

grenade, leading to the death of his Iraqi interpreter and the wounding of three 

others. 

Captain Coley D. Tyler, Fire Support Offi cer for Task Force 2-7: Captain Tyler 

served as the fi re support offi cer for 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment which, 

during this decisive urban fi ght, was attached to Marine Regimental Combat 

Team 1. In this interview, Tyler talks at length about his unit’s relationship 

with the Marines, his own perceptions and, indeed, his original misconceptions 

of them. Tyler discusses the operation itself in great detail, including the initial 

reconnaissance in force, his role in observing and calling for fi res, the rules of 

engagement, and his work with unmanned aerial vehicles.

Captain Neil Prakash, Platoon leader, Alpha Company, 2-63 Armor: Captain 

Prakash was in charge of two tanks, two Bradleys and two infantry squads worth 
4

of infantry while his unit was attached to the Brigade Reconnaissance Troop, 

operating with Task Force 2-2 Infantry. Tasked initially with a screen line mission 

that involved “softening the targets, staying static, observing, keeping a low 

profi le and hitting anything that was moving,” Prakash’s platoon soon escalated to 

directly engaging enemy sniper positions that were menacing US forces. Prakash 

recounts the time he was pinned down by a sniper in the middle of a minefi eld 

after his own tank hit and disabled by a mine, as well as a near-fatal friendly fi re 

incident. In addition, he discusses the outstanding logistical support his platoon 

received, his experiences fi ghting in a combined-joint environment, the benefi ts of 

ad hoc task organization, and speaks at length on what he considers the necessity 

of maintaining a vigorous “armor footprint” in any fi ght.

Command Sergeant Major Darrin Bohn, Operations Sergeant Major for Task 

Force 2-2: As the operations sergeant major for 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry Regiment 

CSM Bohn quickly found himself thrust into the role of command sergeant major 

when the battalion’s original CSM was killed early in operation. In this interview, 

Bohn discusses this leadership challenge in great depth and shares his unique 

perspectives into the overall role his heavy mechanized battalion played in this 

decisive battle. He details the emotional lows and highs of the soldiers and the 

unit. In addition, Bohn covers a variety of training and equipment issues, the joint 

aspects of working with Marines and Air Force, and comments at length on the 

enemy forces they faced. 

Command Sergeant Major Timothy L. Mace, Command Sergeant Major for 

Task Force 2-7: CSM Mace joined 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment only fi ve 

weeks before the battle for Fallujah. Occupying a key position in the Bradley of 

Lieutenant Colonel James Rainey, the 2-7 commander, Mace followed the lead 

assault elements into the city. In this interview, he provides a wealth of insight about 

this decisive operation. Speaking at length on the joint aspect, Mace insists that 

all services worked well together as an integrated team. In addition, he discusses 

the impact of taking casualties, his impressions of principal leaders, embedded 

reporters, as well as the Iraqi soldiers who fought with 2-7 and the enemies who 

fought against them.

Sergeant Major Peter Smith, First Sergeant for Alpha Company, Task Force 2-

2: At the time of Operation AL FAJR, Sergeant Major Smith was serving as the 

fi rst sergeant for Alpha Company, 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry Regiment and, in this 

interview, relates his and his unit’s role in this fi ght. The recipient of the Silver 

Star for his actions in this battle, Smith conducted the evacuation of his company 

executive offi cer from the center of an ambush, returned to prepare for another 

fi ght. In an extraordinary move by the battalion commander Smith was placed in 
5 

command of the company for over 18 hours when the commander and XO were 

killed in action. In this interview, he also discusses working with the Marines and 

the problems associated with communications. 

Sergeant First Class John Urrutia, Platoon Sergeant for 2d Platoon, Alpha 

Company, Task Force 2-7: The platoon sergeant for 2d Platoon, Alpha Company, 2d 

Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, Sergeant First Class Urrutia discusses his unit’s 

role in the assault to retake Fallujah. He relates the clearing of Jolan Park, which 

was a key insurgent location. In addition, in this day-by-day account of the fi ght 

from his perspective, Urrutia describes the enemy and coalition tactics, the taking 

of casualties, his working relationship with Marine Corps units, the experience 

of having two Marine engineers attached to his platoon, the extensive captured 

enemy ordnance missions he participated in, and the vehicle-borne improvised 

explosive device factory his platoon secured. 

Staff Sergeant Jimmy Amyett, 2d Platoon, 3d Brigade Reconnaissance Troop: 

During Operation AL FAJR, Staff Sergeant Amyett was the second highest-ranking 

noncommissioned offi cer in 2d Platoon, 3d Brigade Reconnaissance Troop – a 

20-man, four-Humvee unit attached to Task Force 2-2 Infantry. He discusses the 

intense training regimen his platoon went through in preparation for its role in this 

operation and the actions that followed. A signifi cant event is the decisive leaders’ 

reconnaissance that demonstrated the supreme value of the Long Range Advanced 

Scout Surveillance System (LRAS) in identifying and then calling in artillery and 

air strikes against enemy locations and individuals. For the fi rst few days, Amyett 

was one of the principal set of eyes behind the task force’s only LRAS device. Later 

in the battle, Amyett’s platoon was tasked with a variety of dangerous dismounted 

house-to-house clearing duties, during which they encountered weapons caches, 

the enemy’s extensive underground tunnel network, as well as insurgents lying in 

wait. Amyett also speaks to a number of weapons issues.

Staff Sergeant David Bellavia, Squad Leader of 2d Squad, 3d Platoon, Alpha 

Company, Task Force 2-2: Staff Sergeant Bellavia was recommended for the Medal 

of Honor, nominated for the Distinguished Service Cross and received the Silver 

Star for his actions on 10 November 2004 in which he “single handedly saved three 

squads of his platoon that night, risking his own life by allowing them to break 

contact and reorganize. He then entered and cleared an insurgent strong point, 

killing four insurgents and mortally wounding another.” This interview details 

Bellavia’s experiences in the intense room-to-room, at times hand-to-hand, combat 

that characterized that one night in particular. He offers the ultimate on-the-ground 
6

insider’s story of this seminal urban operation. As perceptive and introspective 

as it is raw and action-packed, Bellavia’s account touches on everything from 

doctrinal, training and technology recommendations to his warm recollections of 

his 2-2 comrades.

Staff Sergeant Matthew Horgan, USAF, Tactical Air Control Party specialist 

assigned to 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division: As a US Air Force joint tactical 

air controller (JTAC), Staff Sergeant Horgan was the noncommissioned offi cer in 

charge of the JTAC teams that served with Task Force 2-2 Infantry in this decisive 

urban fi ght. Placed with the Brigade Reconnaissance Troop for the duration of 

the battle, Horgan called in close air support as well as strafi ng missions from a 

variety of platforms, including F-18s, F-16s, F-15s, AC-130s, and Marine Super 

Cobra helicopters. Although he estimated having made requests for 500-pound 

bombs probably once every two hours for a period of 10 days, Horgan only ended 

up getting a total of eight – which he says was a point of frustration. In addition, 

Horgan describes signifi cant communication problems between Army and Marine 

Corps units. 

Sergeant Wes Smith, Medical Platoon, Task Force 2-2: Primarily assigned to 

Alpha Company, 2-2 Infantry, Sergeant Wes “Doc” Smith served in the evacuation 

section of the medical platoon as an evacuation NCO during his February 2004 

to February 2005 deployment in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Smith 

discusses his experiences going in and out of Fallujah time and again to retrieve 

and provide early treatment of battalion casualties. In particular, he talks at length 

about the under-fi re evacuation of the Alpha Company executive offi cer, First 

Lieutenant Edward Iwan, actions for which he himself received the Bronze Star 

with “V” Device. Another tremendous loss for Alpha Company was the death 

of its commander, Captain Sean Sims, which Smith also discusses, as well the 

concomitant psychological impact it had on the company as a whole.

Jane Arraf, CNN Senior Baghdad Correspondent, embedded with Task Force 

2-2: As CNN’s senior Baghdad correspondent, Jane Arraf was embedded with the 

US Army’s 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry Regiment during that unit’s participation in 

Operation AL FAJR. Arraf benefi ted from remarkable access to and cooperation 

from the battalion commander and operations offi cer, and shares her unique 

visibility and frontline, often harrowing experiences during this decisive urban 

fi ght. In addition, she discusses media-military relations at length, the differences 

between working with Army and Marine Corps units, and the relationship between 

news coverage and public support for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. She outlines 
7 

what she considers the best and worst parts of being an embedded reporter in 

a time of war, the latter being “that horrible soul-destroying aspect of seeing so 

much destruction.”

9 

Captain James Cobb

2 June 2006

MM: My name is Matt Mathews (MM), an historian with the Combat Studies 

Institute. Today is 2 June 2006 and I’m interviewing Captain James T. Cobb (JC) 

who, during Operation Phantom Fury, was the fi re support offi cer (FSO) for 2d 

Battalion, 2d Infantry Regiment, or Task Force 2-2. If you could, sir, please give 

me some background on yourself: where you went to school, how you got commissioned, where you were born, that sort of thing. 

JC: I was born in western Tennessee, north of Memphis, and my family moved 

to just outside of New Orleans when I was in middle school. That’s where I fi nished growing up. I went to high school right outside of New Orleans and went to 

the University of New Orleans, which is where I graduated from. When I was a 

senior in high school, I enlisted in the Louisiana National Guard in December 1989 

as a 13B, which is a cannon crew member in the artillery. I stayed in the Guard 

unit until after I graduated college and was commissioned in 1998. I was commissioned fi eld artillery, went to the Offi cer Basic Course (OBC) at Fort Sill, then I 

did a 12-month assignment at the Artillery Training Center as a battery executive 

offi cer (XO). Then I went to III Corps Artillery, in 1-14 Field Artillery where I was 

a battery XO in a multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) unit. Later, I was a battalion fi re direction offi cer (FDO) in the same unit and a fi re control offi cer for the 

brigade, the 214th Fires Brigade now.

MM: Could you talk me through your fi rst introduction to Task Force 2-2 and 

your assignments in that unit up until Operation Phantom Fury? What was going 

on?

JC: I graduated from the Captains Career Course and had an assignment to the 

1st Infantry Division (ID) in Germany. I showed up in Germany in December of 

’02. I was assigned to 1-6 Artillery out of Bamberg and they further assigned me 

to be the FSO for 2-2 in Vilseck, Germany – it’s about a 90 kilometer difference. 

When I got to Vilseck, 2-2 had already deployed to Kosovo for KFOR 4B. In January of ’03, I went to Kosovo and joined up with them. We stayed there until late 

July of ’03. While I was there as the FSO, there really wasn’t a lot of fi re support 

action going on in Kosovo so I was the information operations (IO) offi cer. I was 

also the S5, which is the civil-military operations (CMO) offi cer. That was a pretty 

good learning experience for me. It was a complete stability and support operations (SASO) type mission, non-lethal targeting. We did some artillery training 

missions but we really didn’t focus on it until we got back in Germany and started 

training up for our Iraq rotation. I pretty much had the same job the whole time I 

was in Germany assigned to 2-2. I was the task force FSO, the IO and the CMO.
10

MM: Could you talk me through what you remember when you fi rst arrived 

in Kuwait and everything that happened between then and the start of Operation 

Phantom Fury? Maybe a short history of what you participated in.

JC: Sure. We got to Kuwait and that was just a 30-day suck-ex. It just sucked. 

You’re living in a tent in the desert and you’re just waiting on equipment to come 

in before you head north. I went forward on the torch party – me and two other 

guys from the intelligence (S2) shop. We went up there and met up with the unit we 

were replacing, and then about a week and a half later the main body showed up. 

We did a right seat/left seat ride and then in April the insurgent offensive kicked off 

all across Iraq. We were fi ghting in the Diyala Province pretty thick and Moqtada 

al-Sadr kicked off down in Najaf. They told us to form a task force and we sent 

a battalion-minus down to Najaf. We stayed there for about 25 days just trying to 

secure the area until more forces came in.

MM: Do you remember if you guys worked at all with the Marines while you 

were there during that time period?

JC: I do not remember working with the Marines. I remember working with 

the Hondurans and another Central American contingent that was down there. I 

didn’t work with any Marines, but of course at that time I didn’t get out a whole 

lot. I pretty much stayed on Forward Operating Base (FOB) Duke except for the 

few recons we ran into Najaf. 

MM: Could you talk me through when you fi rst heard that Task Force 2-2 might 

have to participate with the Marines, with Regimental Combat Team 7 (RCT-7), in 

the assault on Fallujah? Could you also talk me through the planning process and 

the role you played in all of that?

JC: Sure. I had just gotten back off of my R&R leave; and any time you leave 

Iraq for any amount of time, everything has changed so I was trying to catch up 

on what was going on in my sector. We got the warning order (WARNO) that 

we might have to go to Fallujah and help the Marines out. Okay, right on. So we 

started working through the imagery and the Marines had a great intel packet that 

they put together – great imagery and targeting. They knew what was going on in 

that town and where the insurgent hangouts and caches were. We were able to start 

wargaming that and, as task force FSO, I’m helping Major John Reynolds, the operations offi cer (S3), work through the targeting, how we’re going to support the 

maneuver, how we’re going to do the breach if we need to. We wargamed that for 

about a week. In the meantime, myself, Major Reynolds and the S2 fl ew to Camp 

Fallujah a couple times to talk to our Marine contingent that we were going to be 

supporting, and I thought that was a good idea. We were not going to be the main 

effort. We were going to be the supporting effort; and any time you’re the supporting effort and you want to do good things and still support the overall plan, you 
11 

have to be self-suffi cient. You’re supporting them for a reason – because they’re 

focusing somewhere else. That being said, every time we asked for information 

about our area, we got it. They had a lot of this stuff already produced so it was 

pretty much off the shelf for them.

MM: When you found out you were going to be the supporting effort, was it 

you or somebody else in your command that recommended you take the Paladins 

with you?

JC: As soon as I found out we were going down there and I asked what the task 

organization was – because I knew we were going to be a supporting effort. I also 

know if you’re a supporting effort, you’re so low on the priority of fi re list that you 

might as well not even be on it, especially if you’re going to do a serious urban 

fi ght that we were looking at. So we asked to take some of our Paladins and I initially asked for a three-gun platoon, which got cut down to a two-gun platoon with 

a fi re direction center (FDC). That really wasn’t what I wanted. I wanted more, but 

a two-gun Paladin platoon with its own FDC is a pretty formidable fi ghting force 

for a battalion; and since they were organic to us, we didn’t have to worry about 

any priority of fi re issues or cross-boundary coordination.

MM: Did you know the men who would be handling those guns? Had you met 

them before?

JC: I didn’t know the gun crews but I knew the platoon leader, the FDO and a 

couple of the non-commissioned offi cers (NCOs) that were working in the FDC.

MM: You were pretty satisfi ed then that once you got into the fi ght these guys 

would be able to put steel on target where you wanted it?

JC: I would have much rather had an opportunity to do some training with 

them because, like it or not, most of what you do in the military is personality 

driven. What does panic sound like in my voice on the radio? When I say I need 

fi re now, I don’t want some PFC on the other line thinking Captain Cobb’s just 

freaking out again and ignore me. That being said, I was fairly comfortable dealing 

with the platoon we had. I would have much rather had more practice with them, 

though.

MM: As Task Force 2-2 goes out to set up in their attack positions on November 7th, could you talk me through what’s happening and what you’re doing? 

What vehicle are you in? Who are you with as they’re getting ready to conduct this 

breach at 1900 on November 8th?

JC: Okay. Can I also talk about what my observer plan was?

MM: Of course.
12

JC: When I got the mission to go down to Fallujah, I already had a short section. I had 20 personnel and I was allowed 33 by the modifi ed table of organization 

and equipment (MTOE). So I’m shorthanded to begin with and then I had to split 

my forces again because I still had the counterfi re mission back at FOB Normandy. 

So I took a handful of soldiers – about 12 – and only one lieutenant: Lieutenant 

Chris Lacour, who by the way is a stud; one of the smartest young offi cers I’ve 

ever worked with. Anyway, I left him back on Camp Fallujah in the tactical operations center (TOC) to do my cross-boundary coordination for me and coordinate 

with higher. I left one soldier with him – PFC Romero – who was another stellar 

soldier. He had actually been injured a few days prior to that in a car wreck and had 

30 stitches in his arm, but he still came down and did a great job. Those two guys 

lived at the radio for 96 hours straight. 

MM: Were you the one that assigned Lieutenant Lacour as the liaison offi cer 

(LNO) before this to stay with the Marines?

JC: When it came up during the planning and I knew I was taking him and 

had a good idea what I was going to do with him, I recommended he go as the 

LNO early to start building those relationships with the people he was going to be 

talking with later. I think that’s always a good idea. I’ve been a liaison before and 

you’re pretty much the redheaded stepchild trying to beg, borrow and steal information and resources, so the sooner you can build those relationships, the better 

off you are. So I recommended him. He probably hates me for it because it sucked, 

but he supported the unit and I think that was a key call there.

MM: Is there anything that happened as you guys went out to set up in the staging area in your tactical command post (TAC) site before doing the breach?

JC: Sure. I had one FST team-minus with Alpha Company (Mech), which 

was Captain Sean Sims’ company, and basically that was an E-6 working as the 

company FSO and he had a radio telephone operator (RTO). I had platoon forward 

observer (FOs) out there with these guys. I had Alpha Tank who showed up with an 

FSO as a lieutenant, but he didn’t have any RTO or any NCOs with him – and he 

ended up getting wounded on the second or third day and was out of action. Then 

I sent Sergeant Raymond Sapp – one of my FOs – with the Brigade Reconnaissance Team (BRT) and I templated an observer location for him, an observation 

point (OP) on the north-south highway north of the cloverleaf where it intersected 

with the rail line. I told him before we left to get out there and start observing, doing your drills, get with the BRT guys and use their Long Range Advanced Scout 

Surveillance System (LRAS) and start lasing some targets. We had the Ground 

Laser Designator System (GLDS) with us but we didn’t have a vehicle to support 

Sergeant Sapp, so he was pretty much piggybacking with somebody else. From 

up there, he was able to confi rm or deny the intel we had, the templated positions, 
13 

and tell us whether or not targets were still good. He actually started engaging the 

enemy observers and rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) teams early with artillery.

MM: This is well before even going to the breach?

JC: Yes, sir. This was early to mid afternoon and it was still daylight, which 

was great because he was able to fi nd these positions in the daylight, lasing them in 

and getting good target data to them. So if we had to shoot them later at night – 

MM: He’s using the BRT’s LRAS to do this?

JC: He had a Viper and Mk-7s with him, which are laser range fi nders that 

give you direction. They’re handheld devices and are pretty good, but they’re very 

sensitive to any type of movement. The LRAS is vehicle-mounted, it has all types 

of great optics on it, and he can observe and lase as well with that thing as probably 

anything else we had in the inventory.

MM: Will that give you a 10 digit grid coordinate?

JC: Yes, sir.

MM: So far, the people I’ve talked to have said that that was just an amazing 

piece of equipment. 

JC: It is and, to tell you the truth, we’d never worked with it before. Fortunately for Sergeant Sapp, he was in a vehicle with a trained crew from the BRT and 

they kind of schooled him up on it. They all took turns lasing targets. As an FO, he 

just needed somebody to lase and get the data for him; he can work the rest of it. 

Once you get the initial data, you can make adjustments, or if you get a fi rst round 

on target you can just call fi re for effect after that. It worked out pretty well.

MM: Was he involved in the mission that came later on when they actually had 

to fi re across the 1-3 Marines’ boundary line over into 1-8 Marines’ area?

JC: He was not. When we had to do that – and you’re talking about the annex 

or the mosque, I think.

MM: Right. It was one of them.

JC: I don’t know where we got that intel. I think it was an unmanned aerial 

vehicle (UAV) from the Marines that saw a bunch of insurgents running in and 

out of this building, using it as a headquarters or a weapons cache. We tried to call 

close air support (CAS) on it but they had trouble identifying the target. It took a 

long time and I don’t know what the problems were; but while we were waiting 

I went ahead and called the mission to the artillery, to our platoon, and had them 

working on the data just in case. When CAS fi nally could do it – and the target 

had been dwelling a long time; and when you do that, you start losing effects. The 

people you want to kill in that target are going to fi lter out, so you have to hit it 

pretty quickly. Lieutenant Colonel Peter Newell looked at me and told me to fi re 
14

the artillery. We had a grid from the UAV but we didn’t have an observer on it, so 

I called BRT and asked them to send somebody down there. I think it was Lieutenant Neil Prakash from the BRT – great kid. He went on to win the Silver Star in 

Ba’qubah later on. He got his tank with his wingman and drove across boundary 

– way behind enemy lines – so he could lase the target, verify the grid and then 

observe for me about 800 meters away. After I was satisfi ed that we had a good 

accurate location – because we’re fi ring next to a mosque and I wanted to limit 

the collateral damage as much as we could. And by the way, CNN had a camera 

stuck about 12 inches away from my head watching me do all this. So, no pressure, 

right? I sent a platoon, a 20 rounds fi re-for-effect mission – which if you had two 

guns shooting and you ask for 20 rounds, that’s 40 rounds of high explosive (HE) 

coming down. I asked for a converging sheaf. Usually when you fi re artillery you 

want to get a large dispersion area and the computer will plot the aim points so 

you can cover more area with your impact and your blast. I asked for a converging 

sheaf which had one aim point for both tubes, so it would be more accurate and I 

would have less dispersion of the rounds. The lieutenant called back and told me 

we had multiple target hits, building’s been hit multiple times, there’s dust and it’s 

smoking. But there were still some people moving so he asked to repeat the mission, we shot it again, and after that we had no more problems out of that building. 

I think that was around November 9th. We weren’t sleeping a whole lot. The fi rst 

three days sort of all blended together there. 

MM: Can you talk me through your actions as the breaching operation was 

preparing to kick off?

JC: Sergeant Sapp was on that great OP earlier and he was able to confi rm or 

deny some target houses. We also adjusted our smoke; and the way you do that is 

by shooting HE in fi rst and then you can record the last data. Then we shoot the 

smoke on the last target information we had and the smoke is right where you 

want it. So it saves us time when we were actually going to do the breach. We had 

always planned on shooting smoke on the breach because, for a doctrinal breach, 

we use the abbreviation SOSRA: suppress, obscure, secure, reduce and assault. So 

the fi rst two – suppress and secure – are pretty much the artillery and the maneuver 

forces suppressing any enemy positions; then artillery obscures the breach so the 

bad guys don’t know what we’re doing. So we had always planned on shooting 

smoke into the breach and I had three targets planned for that. We adjusted the fi rst 

one in, which was outside of town but between the railroad and the fi rst houses. 

From there, from the observer, we were just going to add to the target, add to the 

range, so we could move that smoke out and leapfrog it back until we had it where 

we wanted it. Since Sergeant Sapp had observed these targets early and had confi rmed the intelligence, we also planned on shooting some of those known enemy 

locations with our 120 millimeter mortars so we could suppress those or destroy 
15 

them so they couldn’t fi re on our tanks and Bradleys as they were going through 

the breach.

MM: These 120s that you mentioned, were they co-located back with your 

Paladins?

JC: No. Actually, the 120 mortars don’t have the range that a Paladin does so 

they stayed on the east side of the berm most of the time, but they were right up 

there with us. I think initially they were co-located with Captain Fred Dente’s element out there in the attack position and then we jumped them a little further south 

so we could cover more of the city. We jumped them a few times. They did great 

work.

MM: What vehicle were you in and who were you with as the battle is progressing and the breach goes through? Can you give me some sense of how you 

got your communications system set up and who you were talking to and that sort 

of thing?

JC: I was operating out of an M1114 Humvee. The driver and the gunner were 

two of my observers who were part of my crew from back at Normandy. We had 

all been together since Kosovo, and that’s an extremely long time for a group of 

soldiers to be together. Private James Peterson and Private First Class Nick Brzeski 

– great heroes. The other person in the truck was the S2, Captain Ray Pemberton, 

who was a recent addition to the team. I also had an Air Force joint tactical air 

controller (JTAC). As far as comms devices, I had two single channel ground to 

air radio systems (SINCGARS); one had a power amp so I could talk long range, 

and I also had a Blue Force Tracker. The JTAC had his whole comms suite, but 

since he didn’t have his own vehicle he was pretty much man-packing all that stuff. 

When we would stop somewhere, he would run up the hill, set up his long whip 

and try to talk to aircraft, and that probably wasn’t the best way of doing business, 

but there you go.

MM: Did you have any problems communicating with the Marines? Apparently they were using some sort of chat system during this fi ght. Were you able to 

talk to them and were they able to get you on the line? How did that work?

JC: If you’re talking about mIRC Chat, which was like a chat room on the 

computer, Lieutenant Lacour had that whole system wired tight back at the TOC 

on Camp Fallujah. He could mIRC Chat with those guys both laterally across to 

our adjacent units and up to higher and could send that information to me over the 

radio. I think they had good commo over that system and would push any info to 

us over Blue Force Tracker or the radio. If they had problems with that system, 

they must have ensured that we didn’t see them where we were. That was sign of 

good staff work.
16

MM: He would just send that to you over the standard FM?

JC: Yes. And I had my own fi re support net, so the only thing that was on that 

was fi re missions or anything fi re support related. I was also monitoring the battalion command net, but I was co-located with the S3 so I really didn’t need to 

monitor the command net. I could bounce back and forth to other nets on that other 

radio – that was my short range radio, though.

MM: So there wasn’t any problem for you guys. I have heard other people 

telling me how diffi cult it was to talk to the Marines because of the mIRC Chat 

system. That doesn’t appear to be a problem for your light TAC out there.

JC: Well, it wasn’t for me because my commo always works. One of the things 

an FSO prides himself on is that he’s always able to talk. When a fi re supporter 

can’t talk to anybody that means he’s not doing anything. Sergeant First Class 

William “Billy” Hight, my platoon sergeant at the time, he started beating into the 

soldiers from day one to take care of their comms equipment, because it will take 

care of them. So we were parked right next to the S3’s truck and we could talk back 

to the TOC and hear him clean, and the S3 couldn’t. He would have problems. So 

we’d go over there and school the young soldiers on how to maintain that commo 

equipment and that’s basically all it was. The S3 had a pickup team as far as who 

his crew was. They rotated the battle captain in and out. His driver wasn’t his historical driver. He was working out of a different truck. For me, I had one crew and 

we had always worked together, so that was easy for me.

MM: Do remember having any diffi culty with communications security 

(COMSEC) and fi lls and getting new load sets? Do you remember having any diffi culty prior to the complex ambush that took place where Lieutenant Edward Iwan 

was killed, having to go back or the S3 having to go back and get a new load set?

JC: I remember thinking it was the craziest and most idiotic thing I had ever 

heard of – changing COMSEC in the middle of the fi ght – unless of course COMSEC has been compromised; and I never heard of a report that said COMSEC was 

compromised. To me, it seemed like it was one of those standard, “We change 

COMSEC every Wednesday no matter what, so let’s change COMSEC.” “Well 

you know what guys? I’m kind of busy right now.” I wasn’t going to change COMSEC until everybody had the COMSEC available because if I do, I can’t talk to 

anybody who still has the old fi ll. There are ways to work around it; you just have 

to think through it.

MM: Can you talk me through as the task force goes through the breach, what 

you recall up until this complex ambush that takes place a few days later?

JC: The funniest thing I remember was that my driver and I were bouncing all 

over the place driving under blackout with night observation devices (NODs) on. 
17 

I had to tell him that he was probably the worst night driver I had ever seen – and 

he said, “Hey, sir, this is the fi rst time I’ve ever driven with NODs on, give me a 

break.” That was something I really didn’t need to hear right then. We executed 

the suppression of the enemy positions with our 120s. We were shooting the white 

phosphorous (WP) in and the fi re support plan was on track, just like I planned it. 

Quite frankly, I was surprised because I know a plan never survives fi rst contact, 

but so far mine had. We were adjusting the smoke and doing what we wanted to. 

The mortars actually stopped fi ring the known targets and we were just waiting 

for targets of opportunity. Again, Sergeant Sapp down at the cloverleaf was spotting these bad guys popping up and moving around and he was able to bring some 

mortar fi re on them. I remember the mine-clearing line charge (MCLC) going in 

and that was just an awesome sight. When it detonated, you could see the improvised explosive devices (IEDs) kicking off into the sky and exploding. It looked 

like fi reworks from where we were. Then things settled down and the actual heavy 

lifting of the breach went in. I remember Alpha Tank and Alpha Mech getting in 

in good order, but the Iraqi Army had a diffi cult time getting their trucks over the 

rail lines. The heavy tracked vehicles had eroded all the dirt that was supporting 

it, so when the Iraqi trucks went over they were just bottoming out on the rails. 

We ended up blowing those rails, and somewhere in there is when Sergeant Major 

Steve Faulkenburg was killed while guiding the Iraqi Army to their positions, because it was night and they couldn’t see without NODs. When I heard about it, it 

was such a shock; but at least for my guys and me it steeled our determination to 

get on with the fi ght and make them pay. We moved the TAC a couple times and 

ended up on top of the highway, looking down into the city about 500 meters away 

from the cloverleaf where the BRT was set up. We’re north of the cloverleaf and 

Alpha Tank and Alpha Mech are working through town hitting their objectives, 

clearing buildings. Actually, we didn’t fi re a lot of artillery into town at that time 

just because we couldn’t see the targets. We were fi ghting in a city and we couldn’t 

see that far away. Every time one of my observers would go to a roof to try and 

establish an OP, the units they were supporting would tell them to get down and get 

back because they had to move on, so it was just a fast paced event and they didn’t 

have time to establish OPs. The few times they did try to establish one, they’d get 

shot at, so it was probably not the best place to conduct an indirect fi refi ght. So we 

let the guns and my observers rest. Now, Sergeant Sapp was shooting because from 

where he was, he could see all the way down from east to west on Phase Line Fran. 

He was able to see insurgents moving back and forth across the road, and if they 

stopped he could call a fi re mission on them. I think he put a priority target down 

there at one point, but I don’t remember. I think around 0400, visibility dropped 

down to pretty low and we were hitting a lull in the fi ght. Major Reynolds wanted 

me to focus more of my fi re down Phase Line Fran to try to interdict any of those 

guys running across. Sergeant Sapp was down there and said he didn’t have any 
18

targets. So since we knew there were IEDs on the other road and they were in the 

obstacles, why don’t you target a couple of the obstacles down there on Phase Line 

Fran. When the Iraqi Army had left the area, they had left all their HESCO bastions 

full of dirt there at the checkpoint and the insurgents took them over. They ended 

up putting IEDs in them, so if you were to drive through the checkpoint and you 

have to slow down anyway, they could detonate the IEDs. So Sergeant Sapp fi red 

a couple of them and it detonated the IEDs, and that worked out pretty good. We 

started shooting linear targets up and down Phase Line Fran in our sector to try 

and clear out some of the IEDs, so when our guys eventually got down there they 

wouldn’t have to deal with them as much. It worked pretty well.

MM: The sun comes up on the morning of 9 November and basically Task 

Force 2-2 is at Fran. Did you think you would have been able to get down there 

that quick? Was there any sort of consternation? It was my understanding that the 

Marines in 1-3 are still up at their own line of departure (LD). Do you recall anything about that?

JC: I don’t know the details of why they were still that far up north, but quite 

frankly I knew we would get to Phase Line Fran by sunrise. We were supposed to 

be in a less heavily defended area so there weren’t supposed to be as many fi ghters. 

Also, we had mechanized units; we move faster. I thought it was a fairly safe bet 

that we’d get there by sunrise. Intuitively, I knew we’d be ahead of the Marines. I 

knew their plan was to do a detailed clearing of what I thought was each house that 

was an enemy fi ghting position. What I didn’t know until later was that they were 

doing a detailed clearing of each building. That takes a long time and uses a lot of 

manpower. As far as 1-3 not being able to get their breach in, I didn’t know about 

that. I just knew they had requested to use our breach lane and send some forces 

through there. I don’t know why. It didn’t matter to us at that time because we were 

done with the breach lane. We were sending forces back across the berm to our logistics point so they could get ammo and fuel and stuff like that, so I didn’t care.

MM: So you’re all at Phase Line Fran. Can you talk me through the rest of the 

operation as you go south through the rest of the city?

JC: Okay. As far as the artillerymen, we had a target package for the stuff south 

of Phase Line Fran, but it wasn’t very robust. I think most of the effort had been on 

the fi rst couple phases – breach and get into the northern sector. So me and Lacour 

over the radio fi nalized that fi re plan so when we did actually go south we could 

support with artillery fi re, and I think we did a pretty good job. But it was diffi cult 

to observe down in that area because the tall industrial buildings limited your observation. I had Sergeant Sapp confi rming and denying some targets down there 

and he could see the exposed buildings, but once you get past the screen of them, 

he couldn’t tell much. The UAV helped out. We sent the Raven over there a couple 
19 

times targeting some stuff. Then we fought through the industrial area, came back 

up to Fran and then, the next day, we turned around and went back through it. 

When the Marines fi nally caught up, we pushed back down south and were fi ghting through that residential area to the south – and that was pretty hard fi ghting. 

They had prepared some positions and kill zones and ambush sites. I don’t know 

all the details of Iwan getting killed, but I know he got killed down there as well 

as Sean Sims. I carry some guilt about Sean because I had been pressuring his 

observer team – Sergeant Sean O’Brien – to get up on high ground on some of 

those buildings and occupy an OP and start lasing some targets for us. I think they 

were jumping his command post (CP) to a new building and were using the same 

building to establish an OP. So when he got killed, two of my soldiers were following right behind him into the door; and I think the JTAC that was with him got 

wounded in that engagement too. 

MM: So all three of these guys just went into this building, turned left, and the 

bad guys were in there and got them?

JC: I never did get all the gory details because I really didn’t want them. All I 

know is that Sergeant O’Brien was the third or fourth guy walking into the building behind Captain Sims and he said all hell broke loose. He actually got separated 

from everybody else for about 30 to 40 minutes. He was pinned down somewhere. 

So I was freaking out. One of my best friends had been killed, my JTAC was 

wounded, and I can’t fi nd two of my guys. Holy smokes! What is going on up 

there? That rocked me a little bit. I had lost Iwan the day prior – who was a great 

guy and one of my friends – and then I lose Sean the next day and two of my guys 

are missing. That was a bad couple days for me.

MM: Had you known Captain Sims on prior assignments?

JC: Just from being in 2-2. I think we met in Kosovo when he came down. He 

was working as a plans offi cer in the S3 shop and he just had a great personality. 

As soon as you met him and he gave you his grin, you liked him. I don’t know 

anybody who had a bad thing to say about Sean, ever. He was a great guy and a 

hard worker.

MM: Let’s jump forward to 13 November and Task Force 2-2 had gone back 

up to do a hot rearm and refuel and then they were going to come back down and 

do a passage of lines with 1-8 Marines over in the west. Do you recall any special 

coordination that had to be done artillery-wise with the Marines to accomplish 

this?

JC: I think that was the mission we planned when we were at the potato factory 

– and that was the fi rst time I had had any real sleep since two days prior to kicking 

it off, so it’s all kind of fuzzy.
20

MM: I was just wondering if there was anything special you needed to do in 

that instance. It just seems to me that that was a pretty complicated maneuver to do 

a passage of lines with the 1-8 and I didn’t know if it required any special activities 

from the FSO or not.

JC: It probably did, but I can’t remember right now. I think that’s also when 

Sergeant First Class Hight fi nally got back from Germany. He’d been detained 

by the MPs in Germany because they wanted him to testify in a court martial and 

we’re screaming at him to get back to Iraq. Finally, someone called General John 

Batiste and asked what he wanted to do with this guy. “Get his butt to the fi ght.”

MM: That’s what I’ve heard from interviewing Major Erik Krivda and some of 

the others. All these days just blend into each other. Are there any other big events 

you can remember or are there any solid lessons learned that you’d like younger 

offi cers to know?

JC: From the whole fi ght and the entire rotation, I was just amazed and astounded and in awe of the amount of random violence that happens in combat. You 

watch the movies and you think there’s a lot of violence and a lot of bad things happening; but until you’re actually standing there, smoking and joking and talking 

to your guys and then the world starts to explode around you for no reason, that’s 

diffi cult to prepare for. The second thing is that combat is a come-as-you-are event. 

You’re either trained or you’re not; but when you get there, it’s too late to fi gure it 

out. One of the things Sergeant First Class Hight and I did when we were back at 

Normandy – under Lieutenant Colonel Newel’s direction – was to keep training on 

fi re support tasks and keep working on our fi re missions. This did a couple things. 

It kept the guns we had at Normandy in practice and us in practice in case we had 

to do something. I think at least every other week we’d go out for four or fi ve hours 

and shoot indirect artillery into our impact area. We had an impact area there so it 

was a good training environment. We worked danger close missions up there and 

any range control manual or safety regulation in the world would have de-certifi ed 

me in a heartbeat for some of the stuff we did up there. It was safe training and 

no one got hurt, but it was realistic and it worked out pretty well. I had observers 

who were confi dent enough to adjust rounds into about 150 meters of their position which, if you think about that in a city environment – that’s about two streets. 

They have rounds impacting a block or two blocks away and they’re walking them 

in and feeling pretty confi dent about it. They had the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs). We used Blue Force Tracker with the imagery program so we could 

actually see which building our guys were in and which building they were targeting, so if something had happened to them – if they were getting shot at and they 

couldn’t observe the rounds – we could help them out with the imagery we had 

available. It was right there in my laptop.
21 

MM: So you give a big thumbs up to the Blue Force Tracker?

JC: Yes and no. The sending of messages was good. Captain Natalie Friel, who 

was the S2 back at the TOC, could type of a quick intel summary and fi re it out to 

everybody, and it worked well. I think we tried to send a couple overlays through 

Blue Force Tracker and it failed miserably – too much bandwidth, I think. But as 

a planning tool, Major Reynolds and I could sit there and look at the imagery and 

move it around and plot locations, just like using a paper map but I could do more 

stuff to it. It was actually more current than the photo imagery we had in our hands. 

Blue Force Tracker was a good planning tool.

MM: During the course of this operation, did you ever have to use any of the 

Marine towed 155s or call for any Marine indirect fi re to help you out?

JC: I think we did a couple times. When our guns had to go down for maintenance or something, Lacour coordinated to get some coverage from the Marine 

guns. When that big underground bunker complex was found deep down south 

and they wanted us to try to pound it with artillery to break its back, I think we 

used some Marine artillery for that. We used about 150 rounds for that and, in my 

opinion, it was a waste of time, but higher headquarters wanted it done so we shot 

it. Unless it was planned, it was extremely diffi cult for us to get the responsiveness 

from the Marines; and I understand that because they had their own priority of fi res 

they had to contend with, which is why we brought our own Paladins. 

MM: What about Marine air and CAS? Were they very responsive to your 

needs?

JC: The Keyhole CAS airspace deconfl iction concept worked pretty well. I 

think it would have worked better if we had had time to rehearse it in a training environment instead of actually on the objective. The way the concept was supposed 

to work is that the CAS is stacked up somewhere else and it comes in through a 

small piece of air that we don’t fi re any artillery or mortars into. They come in 

and do their run and then they pull back out. The way it’s supposed to work is you 

don’t turn off the artillery or the mortars except in the airspace that the bird is fl ying. Well, in actuality, we had to shut down all the artillery for a portion of time, 

at least in the beginning stages, because people weren’t confi dent that the artillery 

wouldn’t fi re through that airspace. Where I’m from and the training we did, that 

was standard – you don’t shoot through an airspace coordination area (ACA), but 

we didn’t do it. A couple times we had to shut down all the artillery to let CAS 

come in, but it actually worked out pretty good for the guns because they needed a 

break. We were just smoking them.

MM: Speaking of which, didn’t you at one point almost go black on your 120 

millimeter rounds?
22

JC: We almost went black on 120, 155. We were down to about 20 rounds of 

155 at one point and about 50 or 60 of 120 millimeter mortars.

MM: Did you guys actually shoot more 155 with those two Paladins than the 

Marines shot with a whole battery?

JC: I have no idea. I just know we shot close to 1,000 rounds of 155 – but that 

included HE and the WP and all that stuff. We shot a lot and, actually, I won 100 

bucks off of that too, because the battery FDO bet me that we wouldn’t shoot over 

100 rounds. Yeah, I won.

MM: Is there anything else you want to leave us with?

JC: I think we were successful and I don’t think anybody can argue that. We 

were successful for a couple reasons. One was that we had a team that had been 

together for almost two years straight – since Kosovo. We had done a lot of training together and we had lived together. We were in our eighth or ninth month of 

the deployment at this point and we knew how to conduct a combat operation. That 

being said, I think the capstone training event we did in Germany before we left 

– the mission readiness exercise (MRX) at the Combat Maneuver Training Center 

(CMTC) – did not prepare us for this fi ght. I think that prepared us more for SASO 

and small unit patrolling and stuff like that. The training events that prepared us 

for this fi ght were each individual leader’s training experiences throughout their 

entire careers. I was doing stuff there that I did at the National Training Center 

(NTC) as a lieutenant. Sergeant First Class Hight was doing the same stuff there 

that he had done as a young E-6 at Fort Polk. Lieutenant Colonel Newell, who had 

been in the Ranger Regiment and had done all these great training events, he knew 

how he wanted to do the fi ght. Major Reynolds had deployed as a lieutenant to 

Somalia with 10th Mountain Division. He had done stuff like this before. All the 

senior guys had done things like this before, so we were able to fall back on that. 

It wasn’t the recent training we had done; it was that we are all products of our 

experiences, and I think we all had the experience and the training level we needed 

to go be successful in this.

MM: What were your perceptions of working with the Marines? 

JC: I liked working with them and I’m going to give you the reason why. It 

sounds extremely simplistic, but it’s the way I feel. Since we were their supporting 

effort and we weren’t a Marine unit, they pretty much gave us our area, validated 

our plan when we briefed it, and said, “Okay, good luck. Go out there and fi ght 

your fi ght.” Colonel Craig Tucker, the RCT-7 commander, would come down and 

check us out every couple days during the fi ght and he had nothing but good things 

to say. I don’t think he ever came down there and told us we were doing something 

wrong or that he wanted us to do something different. We had our left and right 

boundaries; we stayed within them. I liked it, but I like autonomous missions. I 
23 

like it when they just give me a mission and some resources and then go forth and 

execute.

MM: I could be wrong on this, but it seems like you guys do in fact start out 

as the supporting attack of the supporting attack. However, I would safely say that 

by the morning of November 9th, you’re clearly no longer the supporting attack. 

It seems to me that you guys were actually leading the show for RCT-7. Do you 

have any views on that?

JC: I would agree with that, but the objectives we were given weren’t the 

high profi le objectives like the main effort got. The main effort was in the middle 

of town, they had a very diffi cult sector to go through, and they needed to be the 

main effort. I don’t even want to speculate, if they had put 2-2 Infantry in the main 

sector, how we would have done. It would have been a completely different fi ght. 

Yeah, we were ahead, but I don’t think anybody in 2-2 ever said they needed to 

make us the main effort now. I think we were all completely satisfi ed with our own 

little piece of battlespace and just go through there and kick ass, take names and 

do our job.

MM: What were your observations on the enemy in general? What were your 

views on the foreign fi ghters and the insurgents?

JC: The foreign fi ghters were pretty good. I think later on when they established those kill zones down south, it was obvious they had some level of training. 

The guys further up north on the fi rst night, we pretty much killed them early with 

overwhelming fi repower. I was behind the tanks and the Bradleys and the artillery 

going in, and I was awestruck. No way on Earth would I have wanted to be on 

the receiving end of all that. You can’t imagine what it’s like to be a dismounted 

insurgent with an AK-47 or a RPG and a couple mags of ammunition looking at a 

tank. Hell, I’d quit, but they kept coming at it. They were more brave than smart 

sometimes, and I’m okay with that as long as we kill them. We killed a lot of bad 

guys and I’m okay with that, because I know they would have just as easily killed 

me if they had had the opportunity.

MM: 2-2 had an overabundance of media with them for some reason. What 

were your observations of all the media types being with Task Force 2-2?

JC: Initially I was pretty hesitant about them because that was how I was 

brought up: don’t trust the media types because they’re going to cast you in a bad 

light if given the opportunity. After I got to know them, though, they made an honest, concentrated effort to get to know us and become friendly; and I think part of 

their motivation was that the friendlier they are to us, the more we’ll open up and 

give them the good intel, and that’s okay. I think generally they stayed out of our 

way as much as they could and still get their job done. I liked most of them. Scott 
24

Rutter from Fox News was a great guy. Jane Arraf and her crew from CNN were 

good as well. She almost got killed a couple times.

MM: Have you read her interview that we have online?

JC: No, not yet.

MM: When you get a chance you should. I think you’ll really like that.

JC: I liked all those guys, except for the guy who took pictures of Sean Sims’ 

body and then sold them on the Internet. I never met him, but that guy’s really 

lucky he got pulled out after that because he probably would have met with an 

unfortunate accident in the combat zone. Alpha Company loved their commander 

– and to disgrace him like that? I’m not going to say somebody would have capped 

him, but he would not have had a good time. There are a lot of emotions in a fi ght 

like that and, once again, everything is personality driven.

MM: I think that just about covers everything. Thank you for your time.
25 

Captain Jeff Emery 17 July 2006

MM: My name is Matt Matthews (MM) and I’m an historian at the Combat 

Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Today is 17 July 2006 and I’m 

interviewing Captain Jeff Emery (JE) who, at the time of the Battle of Fallujah 

– Operation Phantom Fury – was a platoon leader and executive offi cer (XO) for 

Alpha Company, 2-2 Infantry. Let me start out by saying that this is an unclassifi ed 

interview, so if we get into anything that’s classifi ed, just tell me you can’t talk 

about it and we’ll move on. I want to start off with some background on you, where 

you were born, where you grew up, and how you received your commission.

JE: Sure. I grew up and went to high school in northern New Jersey, then went 

to the University of Delaware for college where I did ROTC for four years and got 

commissioned on 1 June 2004. From there, I went into the infantry down at Fort 

Benning, Georgia, and spent a year there going through all the schools – Basic 

Course, Mechanized Leader, Airborne, Ranger – and then went to Germany. My 

fi rst duty assignment was the Big Red One, Hohenfels, Germany, with 2-2 Infantry. 

I started out as a platoon leader in Alpha Company, 2-2.

MM: Can you talk me through what you did prior to going to Iraq, what your 

unit was involved in?

JE: When I got there they were just returning from Kosovo, so we were kind of 

going through refi t operations where we were trying to plus-up manning, receive 

any type of new weapons and equipment, get familiarized with that. Pretty much 

immediately, we went into small arms and Bradley gunnery, all the way up through 

Table 12 – we did a whole gunnery rotation. Aside from the Brads, we put a lot of 

concentration on small arms marksmanship, close quarters fi ghting, and military 

operations on urban terrain (MOUT) training, urban warfare fi ghting. We also 

worked with explosives for room entry techniques and to blow breaches. The 

biggest training event we did was a fi eld problem rotation, 30 days at Hohenfels – a 

bunch of platoon and company exercises, kind of like mission readiness exercise 

(MRE) training – to prepare us for all the types of missions we’d face in Iraq: react 

to improvised explosive devices (IEDs), squad/platoon attacks, enter building/

clear room, that kind of stuff.

MM: You were the 1st Platoon leader, correct?

JE: Yes, 1st Platoon, Alpha Company.

MM: Could you also give me some background, before you get to Iraq, on who 

the company commander was, the executive offi cer (XO), and if there were any 

changes in leadership?
26

JE: When I got there, Captain Doug Walter was the company commander, 

Peter Smith was the company fi rst sergeant and First Lieutenant Jeff Jager was the 

XO. By the time we deployed to Iraq, First Lieutenant Cole Namken became the 

XO and Jeff Jager went up to the battalion and was the assistant operations offi cer 

(AS3) there. And then right as we deployed – and I’m talking like three days before 

we fl ew – they replaced Captain Walter with Captain Sean Sims, because Captain 

Walter – when he came back from Kosovo – was pretty sick and the colonel made 

the decision that he wasn’t going to deploy with the task force, although he did 

deploy several months later.

MM: So Lieutenant Edward Iwan wasn’t the XO at this point?

JE: No, Iwan deployed as the mortar platoon leader.

MM: He eventually becomes the XO after the unit’s already been in Iraq.

JE: Yes.

MM: Okay, so tell me about your arrival in Iraq and any incidents that occurred 

up until Phantom Fury, what went on and any changes in Alpha Company.

JE: We fi rst deployed to Kuwait, did a three-week train up there and headed 

to Iraq in the fi rst week of March – did a replacement with guys from 4th Infantry 

Division and started doing patrols in our area, which was Muqdadiyah, about 45 

kilometers northeast of Baghdad. As far as highlights, 8 and 9 April 2004 was 

our fi rst major contact when there was a large push of insurgents in the city of 

Muqdadiyah, so we engaged in back-to-back fi ghting, street fi ghting for two days. 

They were probably six hours of continuous fi ghting per day. At that point in time, 

An Najaf was fl aring up and we – after fi ghting those two days back to back – got 

the call that they were taking our task force down to An Najaf. We were stationed 

there, based out of Forward Operating Base (FOB) Duke, which was just in the 

desert. I think we were there for close to three weeks. We didn’t do a whole lot; 

we were just basically the show of force. I think only one of our units actually 

went into the city of Najaf, more or less to just take Colonel Dana Pittard and set 

up security for him. Most of our time down there was spent doing security patrols 

outside the city, getting a sense for what the local population was feeling towards 

us, and making sure no one else was getting in. After we returned from that, there 

weren’t too many other highlights. We got back in May. Just in terms of what was 

going on in Alpha Company, we got back from An Najaf in mid May and I was hit 

with an IED on one of my patrols. I was actually evacuated back to Germany, spent 

six weeks out of Iraq, and then came right back and ended up retaking 1st Platoon. 

They didn’t replace me. The big change in the company, however, came while I 

was hurt. Cole Namken, our XO, on one of his patrols a Humvee fl ipped on his 

leg and he was evacuated back to Germany too. When that happened, that’s when 

Ed Iwan moved from the mortar platoon to became the Alpha Company XO, First 
27 

Lieutenant Chris Walls – the 3d Platoon leader – moved to take the mortar platoon, 

and First Lieutenant Joaquin Meno took 3d Platoon. 

MM: As you discuss the platoon leaders, could we go over the task organization 

for Alpha Company? Were those three pure Bradley platoons at this time?

JE: No. The way it was organized, you had a headquarters element, which was 

the commanding offi cer (CO), the XO and the fi rst sergeant in two Bradleys and 

a ‘113. You had three line platoons. 1st and 3d Platoons were Bradley-pure and 

2d Platoon was a slice from the 82d Engineers, so we actually had an engineer 

platoon task organized to our unit for the entire year’s deployment in Iraq. When 

we deployed, we had four platoons, which is pretty uncommon; but we sliced out 

two in infantry platoons to different units and we received one back, being the 

engineers.

MM: What did those engineers have in terms of equipment?

JE: They showed up with pretty much the regular modifi ed table of organization 

and equipment (MTOE). I think they were a 20-something man platoon, maybe 24, 

26. They had either four or six ‘113s, two ACEs, a M548 and a C-truck, and then 

they had a lot of demolition equipment for breaches, obstacle reductions and so 

forth.

MM: They didn’t have a mine-clearing line charge (MCLC) with them, did 

they?

JE: I don’t think we were given MCLCs at Fallujah. 

MM: Tell me about when you fi rst found out or had an inkling that you might 

be sent to support Operation Phantom Fury.

JE: I believe there was talk in October and, at fi rst, people were saying it 

wasn’t going to happen – then it was on and off. Finally, we were going but then 

it was just a matter of when. Once we were defi nitely going, our task force pulled 

all the maneuver units that were going to Fallujah and they stopped patrolling, just 

kind of training up and getting plused-up on all our supplies – ammo, food, any 

type of equipment we needed, swapping out vehicles to ensure we had the best 

stuff to go fi ght. I’d say there were at least four days where we were defi nitely 

going, and then the next morning when we woke up we found we were not going 

after all. It was right after the US presidential election, right after George W. Bush 

won – I think it was the next day or two days later that we got the call that we were 

going to Fallujah. Basically we just assembled at FOB Normandy, loaded up on the 

heavy equipment transporters (HETs), drove down to Warhorse, refueled there, got 

a quick refi t, and then continued the road march down to Fallujah.

MM: Once you get down to Camp Fallujah, did you encounter any problems 

working with the Marines, any interaction with them? 
28

JE: We didn’t have too much interaction with Marines. We got there fi rst and 

they had an area already sectioned off for us. There were some Marine units in our 

area but not too many. 

MM: Let’s start when you guys rolled up Route Michigan and go into your 

staging area prior to the attack. Were there any incidents you recall or anything 

you want to talk about?

JE: I don’t recall too much. The Brigade Reconnaissance Troop (BRT) had 

gone in the night before and they were calling a lot of indirect fi res and we rolled in 

and set up. I think we might have changed our position one time but once we were 

set in our assembly area we didn’t move until we were actually attacking into the 

city. I think we were there for quite some time and the leaders had gone up to the 

berm right on the highway just looking to see where they were going to be headed 

at night; and while that was going on, BRT was calling indirect fi re and we were 

watching what they were doing and witnessing some of the effects.

MM: Did you go on this visual daylight reconnaissance?

JE: I did. We tried to send all the leaders up there – the colonel, the platoon 

leaders, company commanders – and maybe if you were lucky a few squad leaders, 

just to see the route we were going to take up to the berm and go over the highway. 

For the engineer guys, it was mainly to try and pinpoint the breach during the 

day. 

MM: Can you talk me through what you recall happened on the night of your 

movement from the attack positions into the line of departure (LD) and going 

through the breach?

JE: Sure. The attack positions – we just moved into an assembly area fi rst 

and then we moved into an attack position right before we crossed the berm. My 

platoon was nearside security of the breach so we jumped out in front of Alpha 

Company, led them in, set up nearside security and started fi ring into the town at 

targets of opportunity. The commander came up once we had our nearside security 

set, put some eyes on the area and called up the engineer platoon. They came up, 

set the breach and blew the MCLC, marked the lane, swept for mines and did 

everything pretty much textbook. They opened a great breach lane and once that 

was completed, 3d Platoon went right through the breach. I think when they were 

going through they hit some mines, but the reason was that the Bradleys that got 

hit went outside of the breach lane and they felt some effects from some kind of 

an explosive.

MM: Did it take out their Bradleys?

JE: No, there was no damage whatsoever.

MM: When you say 3d Platoon, we’re still talking about the Bradleys, right?
29 

JE: Yeah. 2d Platoon was the only engineer platoon. Everybody else was pretty 

much Bradleys.

MM: What platoon was the attached armor platoon that was with you guys?

JE: We had a platoon from Bravo Company, 1-63 Armor.

MM: Did you guys call them 3d Platoon?

JE: We called them 4th Platoon. And they were actually split: the commander 

gave two tanks to me in 1st Platoon and two tanks to First Lieutenant Meno in 3d 

Platoon, and we used them as point men to lead us through since they had the 

heavier armor and more fi repower. They could go through and clear any types of 

obstacles rather than having the engineers reduce them.

MM: So to clear this up in my mind, you have 1st Platoon Bradleys, 3d 

Platoon Bradleys, 4th Platoon is your tanks and really the engineers had no platoon 

designation?

JE: No, they were 2d Platoon and they were riding in ‘113s. Once we got to 

Fallujah , we split 4th Platoon. I got a section of tanks and 3d Platoon got a section 

of tanks so, in essence, I was in charge of four Bradleys, two tanks and then I had 

my two dismounted squads, and 3d Platoon looked identical to me.

MM: Your actual 2d Platoon, Alpha Company, 2-2, was sent over to Alpha 

Company, 2-63, is that correct?

JE: No. Our 2d Platoon, Alpha Company, 2-2, was sent to the 82d Engineers. 

Our 4th Platoon, Alpha Company, 2-2, was sent to the BRT. The way we deployed 

was that our 2d Platoon deployed with the 82d Engineers and 4th Platoon deployed 

with the BRT to support their brigade. When we went to Fallujah, the BRT received 

a section of Bradleys from 4th Platoon and the other section of Bradleys went to 

Alpha Company, 2-63. First Lieutenant Gregory and his wingman went with 

Captain Paul Fowler in 2-63 and Sergeant First Class Lanpher and his wingman 

went with Captain Kirk Mayfi eld who was the BRT commander. I believe the BRT 

also received a section of tanks from 2-63. I believe First Lieutenant Neil Prakash 

was with BRT the whole time in Fallujah and he was under Mayfi eld.

MM: The MCLC fi res at about 1915. Could you talk me through what happened 

from there?

JE: The lane was cleared and 3d Platoon rolled right through. They immediately 

started clearing houses and everyone else was still on the far side of the breach. So 

they immediately gained a foothold into the city, and once they were set they held 

their position. There was one house they were supposed to go into and they decided 

against it because they thought the house was rigged to blow up, so they jumped 

to the next one and called back to the company commander. I don’t remember if 

he went fi rst or if I did, but I just remember that I pushed my platoon through and 
30

we continued going down to our fi rst objective. We ended up overshooting it and 

just cleared back to it, so we probably cleared back about three or four houses. 

The most resistance we received was sporadic gunfi re. We were using our thermal 

sights to spot the enemy and placing effective fi res for them. Once we were set, 

they pushed 3d Platoon through us and they jumped to their objective; and then 

once they were set, we jumped up to Objective Wolf and this was when daylight 

was starting to break. Up until then, we were looking at very minimal resistance. 

We reduced some obstacles on the way to our second objective, Wolf, which was a 

school. We were going to set up a hasty defense there and conduct a tactical pause 

to refi t but it didn’t quite work out, because once daylight hit and we were trying 

to get set up we started taking pretty heavy fi re. The sun had come up, the enemy 

knew where we were and was focusing in on all of us.

MM: Is this when you were approaching Phase Line Fran, also known as 

Highway 10?

JE: Right, but we were still not quite there yet. We were 200 to 400 meters 

shy 

MM: It looks like it may have been Phase Line Linda maybe.

JE: Yeah, that may have been it. So we were held there for awhile and 

encountered a lot of small arms fi re. I don’t remember a lot of rocket-propelled 

grenades (RPGs) being shot. I remember a lot of small arms sniper fi re, machine 

gun fi re and sporadic gunfi re, and we were pretty much shooting from the windows 

at where we saw or heard gunfi re coming from.

MM: Were most of your guys still in the Brads?

JE: No, we were all dismounted at this time because we had dismounted to 

clear Objective Wolf, the school. Once we did that, we set up shop there because 

that was going to be our fi rst refi t; and then as that was happening, that was when 

we started taking a lot of fi re. We went up to the rooftop and, while we weren’t 

pinned down, we took heavy fi re up there as well. So anyway, we popped smoke, 

got off the rooftop, went back inside the building and just kind of fi red from the 

windows. We used the Bradleys to surround our position and suppress the enemy.

MM: Were you calling in a lot of indirect fi re at this time?

JE: I wasn’t calling in any and I don’t know if the Alpha Company commander, 

Captain Sean Sims, was. I’m sure he must have been talking to the colonel to fi nd 

out what his plans were. There was a lot of on-the-ground fi ghting, but mostly 

shooting from the windows at targets. That went on for a couple hours and we 

fi nally got the call that 2-63 was already down on Phase Line Fran. The original 

thought was that we were going to go house to house all the way down to Phase 

Line Fran – and this is probably where the story will start to confl ict because, up 

until then, everybody was on the same page and now this is when what you wanted 
31 

to have happen didn’t. What I was told by my commander was that we were behind 

schedule and the colonel wanted us down at Phase Line Fran ASAP.

MM: You’re of the opinion that they were in a hurry to get down to Phase Line 

Fran?

JE: Well, that’s what happened. It’s not my opinion; it’s a fact. We were in 

Objective Wolf – and I know this from my platoon and it had to be the same 

for Alpha Company. The commander said that this had gone on long enough and 

we’ve been there too long, so we mounted up and did a bounding overwatch all 

the way down to Phase Line Fran. It was basically a mounted movement from 

Objective Wolf to Phase Line Fran. The original plan was to clear house to house 

to Fran, but that is not what happened.

MM: So you kind of had a separate mission because, when you guys crossed 

the LD, it was get to Fran as fast as possible but also clear all the houses?

JE: Right. Our mission was get to Fran, control and clear it, and open it up 

for logistical purposes. Initially the plan was to have a mounted movement to 

Objective Wolf and then a house-to-house clearance from Linda to Fran. And then 

really, we went into the city not knowing if we were going further than Phase 

Line Fran because we knew that next was the industrial area and then the Queens 

District: that was 2-2’s lane. We had the eastern side of the city and that was what 

we had. So we knew it was LD, mounted movement up to Phase Line Linda, hit 

our objectives, refi t, and then house-to-house clearance from Phase Line Linda to 

Phase Line Fran. Once we got to Fran, we were to reconsolidate, refi t, and then 

wait for guidance because we didn’t even know if we were going past Phase Line 

Fran. I don’t know if Captain Sims made the call or if the colonel just said to get 

to Phase Line Fran now. All I know is what Captain Sims told us, which was that 

we were doing a mounted movement from Phase Line Fran because we need to 

get up there because everybody else was waiting on us, so that’s what we did. 

We conducted a bounding overwatch movement to Phase Line Fran. When we hit 

Phase Line Fran, it was chaotic and disorganized for at least 20 minutes. We were 

on the highway and now we were exposed to everything.

MM: Were you taking fi re from across the south side of the highway?

JE: Yes, and that was the problem. That’s when I remember the RPGs fl ying left 

and right. I remember counting RPGs impacting buildings where we had troops. 

We got up there, took some fi re, dropped off dismounts in the buildings and cleared 

so they could get a foothold and get in the fi ght too. And once that happened, RPGs 

were just being launched from the south side of Highway 10 and they were fairly 

accurate. They were actually impacting the buildings where we had dismounted 

troops and were impacting pretty close to the vehicles. That’s where it was kind 

of chaotic until we fi nally got a plan together to get some more dispersion and get 
32

everyone up there on line and shooting in sync as opposed to just a couple vehicles 

up there just doing their own thing. Once everyone was up there and we got some 

dispersion and everyone was moving around, it got better. We were drawing a lot 

of fi re from that south side because no one had crossed over there yet.

MM: When you’re sitting on Highway 10, you were up a ways, so did the 

enemy in the buildings have a good angle on you?

JE: Yes, they had good standoff distance. They could still feel effects from 

our weapons but they certainly had enough distance and cover to where they 

could take pretty well aimed shots at our vehicles that were just sitting up on the 

highway. Once we got up there, it was kind of confusing because 2-63 was too 

far to the east so everyone was shifted over and we started doing some relief in 

place; and once we got everyone back in their original assigned lanes, that’s when 

we captured that diversion and got guys set up in better observation points (OPs) 

and better fi ghting positions. We just kind of hunkered ourselves in and fortifi ed 

our positions and that’s when we started to really use our indirect fi re assets. Once 

that started happening, the enemy attacks started calming down. Once we hit Fran, 

even the colonel wanted us to come up and do something with CNN just to show 

our progress, and initially they had to call that off because it wasn’t secure enough 

to do that. I’m not sure when the decision came to go further south, because after 

we secured Fran we stared doing clean up or search-and-attack missions back up 

into the northern part of Fallujah. We started having the engineer platoon clear the 

major roads and they started clearing Fran of all IEDs from phase line to phase 

line. And then whatever that route was that went to the easternmost part of the city 

– I don’t remember the name – but they started clearing that.

MM: Was it Phase Line Dan?

JE: Yeah, maybe. Their main job was to become the bomb squad, to clear from 

phase line to phase line all the IEDs on the route; and once they fi nished that, they 

leapfrogged back and did Fran. For 1st and 3d Platoons, our major mission became 

going back and doing search-and-attack missions from the south all the way back 

up to the LD. We got down there so fast and had that part where we didn’t do 

house to house, we went mounted, so we had to backtrack and clear all that up. 

1st Platoon didn’t encounter a lot of heavy resistance: the caches we found were 

minimal, small contacts, sporadic gunfi re, a lot of empty houses. 3d Platoon had 

the most resistance doing that. I don’t know if it was that day or the next night, but 

that was when Staff Sergeant David Bellavia and 3d Platoon encountered heavy 

resistance in a house they entered. This is the action that Bellavia was nominated 

for the Medal of Honor. 

MM: Where did this happen?

JE: On the north side of Phase Line Fran.
33 

MM: Were you told anything about the Marines running behind schedule or 

anything like that?

JE: I initially assumed the Marines were ahead of schedule, but I think once we 

got to Phase Line Fran was when we realized that it was just our units that were up 

there. The Marines hadn’t made it yet. We starting hearing that the Marines were 

moving kind of slow, they’re dismounting the whole way, and that’s when we were 

doing those search-and-attack missions and waiting for the Marines. We spent two 

nights on Fran, and both of those days and nights were spent doing search-andattack missions all the way back.

MM: Do you recall whose call signs were Tango 5, Tango 6 or Tango 36?

JE: It sounds like those were Terminators, because we were the only Ts out 

there. You had 2-63 who were the Avengers, the BRT were all Phantoms – 

MM: Alpha Company was all Terminators, correct?

JE: Right. I was Terminator 16 and then there was Terminator 26 and so on. So 

if they were saying Tango, they were probably talking about us.

MM: Was Sims Terminator 6?

JE: Yes. Then we had the 2-2 scouts in there but they were Stalker and the 

mortarmen were Thunder, so it’s possible that you could have some mortars in 

there.

MM: Terminator 5 was the XO?

JE: Yes. That was Ed Iwan, and then Terminator 7 was First Sergeant Smith. If 

you see any other Ts that don’t sound like a Bradley platoon and they’re doing a lot 

of call for fi re, that’s probably the mortarmen. They were Thunder 6.

MM: You said you were at Fran for about 48 hours to rest and refi t?

JE: Yes, but we were also doing search-and-attack missions back up into 

the city. One of those nights was when Bellavia and 3d Platoon had that heavy 

resistance, and I think it was also the night where we ended up calling a joint direct 

attack munitions (JDAM) on a building we had already pushed through. We had 

been fi ghting around this other building but we couldn’t really get into it because 

they had barricaded everything – and this is when the scouts took some casualties. 

No one died but they had about three 2-2 scouts get shot based on just trying to 

enter this one house. We tried to help them out and I guess Captain Sims was trying 

to push more guys into this house. We tried to draw them out with psychological 

warfare and we had psychological operations (PSYOP) up there playing the theme 

song from the movie Team America: World Police and all types of heavy metal 

stuff, just trying to piss them off and get them to make a mistake so we could get 

in there. We tried to shoot them with our main guns and they were still in there 

so we ended up backing everybody up, pulling everybody up to Phase Line Fran, 
34

calling in the JDAMs, and we eventually destroyed the building like that. I think 

the next morning was when we started to push south and that’s when we set up in 

the industrial area.

MM: Talk me through the fi ght south of Fran.

JE: The industrial area – I believe we were told it was going to be more of a 

mounted fi ght. We ended up going back in the industrial area a lot of times after 

the fi ght in the north was done. We rolled into the industrial area and did a lot 

of mounted land navigation, a lot of mounted movement, minimal dismounting 

through the industrial area. I would say we didn’t dismount at all while we were 

there; if we did at all it was very minimal. It was a pretty quick movement from 

Phase Line Fran through the industrial area to the border of the Queens District. 

MM: The night you guys crossed the LD and did the breach, what was the 

weather like?

JE: I don’t remember too much. I don’t think it rained, and I don’t think it 

rained once while we were in Fallujah. It was pretty decent because it got almost 

chilly the nights we were in Fallujah. We actually had pretty decent weather all the 

way through. I remember it being pretty cool at night.

MM: Can you take me through the fi ght south of Fran up until the complex 

ambush that killed Lieutenant Iwan?

JE: There was talk of fi ring another MCLC. I think there was talk of that once 

we got through the industrial part. There was a large linear danger area with very 

open terrain, very uneven, and to go through it at night with the Bradleys would 

have been chaos to try, with the night vision, to see all those holes in the ground. 

We probably would have gotten some vehicles stuck. The plan wound up being a 

large show of force just north of the Queens District and we weren’t even allowed 

to fi re for quite some time. We were feeling the effects of the enemy weapons 

and we couldn’t return fi re; and then we almost had an on line end of exercise 

(ENDEX) of ammunition once the colonel felt like he wanted to return fi re. The 

plan was to show force in hopes of drawing the enemy into our range; and once 

he was ready and was satisfi ed that he’d drawn them out of hiding, that’s when 

he gave the command to open fi re and we started using the TOW missiles and the 

indirect. We did all that and it was almost like one element at a time. Because we 

all took the same route, a single-fi le line, and we fi nally went out and around this 

whole danger area, skirted it, and then came back into position. So basically we 

had to go out and around, come back in and get lined up again in our lanes.

MM: The date now is 12 November and you guys have been fi ghting all night. 

At 0600 that morning you fi nd yourself in this position. Are you personally involved 

in this complex ambush that takes place where Lieutenant Iwan is killed?
35 

JE: Yes. In this complex ambush, at this time we were down by Phase Line 

Jenna and were close to Phase Line Isabelle. I think we actually attacked too far 

and then we came back; and I think the initial thought was we were going to be 

done fi ghting in the morning, but then we get the call saying we’re going to keep 

pushing. So we push further south and I’m not sure exactly where Ed was killed, 

but what happened was the whole company was fi ghting different battles at the 

time Ed was killed. Each element was of our company was being engaged by 

a different enemy. What made things even more diffi cult was that Captain Sean 

Sims was dismounted, which made it hard for the platoons to communicate with 

him and vice visa. He’s in some pretty heavy contact, taking a lot of fi re and is 

fi ghting the fi ght personally now. This led to the company fi ghting as separate 

elements instead of as a unifi ed company. At this time, 3d Platoon was taking some 

heavy RPG fi re and Lieutenant Iwan’s Bradley was right in the middle of things. I 

didn’t actually witness him being shot, but the next thing I know an RPG hit him. 

I think it came from the southwest and struck him right in the plate. It hit part of 

the Bradley right up top where the commander is – a piece of metal right in front 

of where the commander’s head would stick out. It dented that, blew through him 

and damaged his commander’s hatch.

MM: Was his vehicle Alpha 55?

JE: Yes. It was a tan Bradley, one of the old ones.

MM: Is there anything else you can tell me about this incident? I guess First 

Sergeant Smith went up there and got Lieutenant Iwan off the Bradley?

JE: I can tell you what I know. His gunner reports that he was hurt pretty bad 

and Terminator 6 is back up on the net trying to get someone from Terminator 5, 

not knowing he’d been hit because he kept saying, “Terminator 5, Terminator 5!” 

And his gunner said something to the effect of, “He’s hurt” or “He’s been hit” or 

something like that, and added that it was really bad. I know the colonel was up 

there out of his Bradley with Ed and I know Sergeant Dove jumped out of his 

vehicle and was yelling, “XO! XO!” First Sergeant Smith was in the vehicle with 

Sergeant Dove, but I don’t know what his actions were. I don’t know who actually 

dragged Ed out of the commander’s hatch; I don’t know who actually put him in 

the vehicle; but I do know he was evacuated in the fi rst sergeant’s ‘113. The fi rst 

sergeant went back but I’m not sure who he went with – and they were taking RPG 

fi re on that evac. I did hear that one RPG hit their .50 cal and damaged it. At this 

point, we were kind of all down in this big open area, the far side was all buildings, 

and we were getting shot at from all directions. Ed had already been evacuated 

and we were still fi ghting; and at some point we were told to pull back. There was 

a tank there that had thrown tracks so we had to fi rst bring a mechanic forward to 

fi x them as we were getting shot at. Once that’s done, that’s when everyone fi nally 

consolidated back up to Phase Line Isabelle.
36

MM: So you get back up there, consolidate on Isabelle and, at this time, Alpha 

2-2 – you guys are on the far eastern part of the city when you reconsolidate. Talk 

me through what happened after you reconsolidated.

JE: We reconsolidated and switched lanes. The colonel’s new plan was that 

since we encountered so much resistance, he wanted to do a whole other waituntil-it-gets-dark, do a whole other attack at night and go as far as he could into the 

Queens District and hold there.

MM: It does look like the two companies switch.

JE: Yeah. Alpha 2-63 fl ips over to where we just attacked and then we go to 

where they were. We had that eastern fl ank and then you had the scouts way out 

in the boonies over on the far side. We went down – and that’s when they decided 

we were going to use another MCLC, another deliberate attack with the breach, 

to fi re a MCLC as a shock effect. This was around the time when we got advice 

that told us to shoot everyone twice. Like, if you see someone on the ground and 

they’re not dead yet, then shoot them again because we had reports that they were 

faking death. We were told that if they weren’t dead, we needed to kill them. Don’t 

assume they’re dead. Unless they were surrendering – if they were on the ground 

and moving around, there were reports that they were faking it and they may have 

grenades under them or they’d shoot you. So the engineers fi red the MCLC and we 

started our second organized attack into the Queens District. The platoons attacked 

simultaneously just giving reports back to the commander and we didn’t wind up 

clearing too far because we kept fi nding cache after cache after cache of weapons, 

so we couldn’t really wait for the engineers to come and blow them up. That’s what 

we were doing at fi rst but, then, it was taking so long that we ended up blowing 

up a lot of it ourselves. The intent was for us to get a lot farther into the city that 

night, but we probably didn’t even wind up going 1,000 meters past where we 

LD’d from Phase Line Isabelle. In every house we searched, we just kept coming 

up with mortar rounds or automatic weapons, and that’s where we got a bunch of 

enemy kills. We went in, they were still in there, and we were actually shooting 

them in the building. We were fi nding weapons, body armor, explosives, and we 

were just fi nding paperwork and all that kind of stuff. We had to secure it to some 

degree – whether it was consolidating it in one room, mark it, write everything 

down, record it, and then just move on and deal with it later. That’s what was going 

on. After the initial attack, we didn’t encounter that much resistance at all.

MM: So you guys do the consolidation and there’s an attack planned for 13 

November. Can you talk me through the death of Captain Sims?

JE: Night comes and they were getting pretty drained. And so by midnight, 

wherever they were at, they fi nished what they were doing, hunkered down, set up 

security, and they all went to sleep because the next day he knew he was planning 

on going from wherever we stopped that night all the way through house to house 
37 

to the limit of advance (LOA). That was his plan. We stopped and the next morning 

came and we got the call to come back to Phase Line Isabelle, refuel and refi t. 

We had all the dismounts basically retracing their steps last night going over all 

those caches and making sure we disposed of all of them and brought them all up. 

The next morning we found a bunch more because it was daylight, we could see 

a lot better, and we were in a search mode. At this time my platoon was tasked to 

take CNN around, show them the cache sites and do some interviews, and I can 

only imagine 3d Platoon was doing a similar search-type mission. While this is 

going on, Captain Sims moves up until he was on line with the lead element of the 

company. I had two Bradleys up there but no dismounts, 3d Platoon was up there, 

and that’s when he decides to get on the ground himself because he wants to get 

to a rooftop. He wants to get a better vantage, see the rest of the city and pick out 

his attack lanes. At this time, my platoon, the dismounts, are still going through all 

our cache sites. About 1030 he told us to wrap it up with CNN and get them out of 

there, so we dropped them off. Then I take one squad of dismounts in my section 

of Brads, drop them off, and tell them go into a building, clear it again, set up and 

then wait for another squad. I go back up and pick up the second squad and, when I 

get there, I noticed that my squad hadn’t cleared the building. I told them I needed 

them to clear the building and they said there were a bunch of headquarters guys 

on the ground that had a bunch of casualties and they didn’t know where the CO 

was. So Sergeant First Class Kimball says, “Give me the casualties right now and 

I’ll evac them.” So the fi rst thing we do is drag the headquarters casualties onto 

two of my Bradleys. Sergeant First Class Kimball and Sergeant Galvez (ph) put the 

casualties in the Bradleys and they take off back to the forward aid station (FAS).

MM: Was First Sergeant Smith with them while this was going on?

JE: I don’t know where he is during this. I can, however, tell you where he 

was not – and that was anywhere near me for that fi ght. While that was going on, 

Sergeant Richie (ph) and Sergeant Alvey (ph) get on the ground and I told them 

to clear from here to the east to look for the CO because we didn’t know where he 

was. They had to go clear the buildings in this manner because the headquarters 

dismounts did not know which building he was in. I told them that, as soon as I 

reported our situation, I would get on the ground and join them. Sergeant Richie 

(ph) was one of the senior squad leaders and probably one of the best and smartest 

guys in the battalion, and I knew he could handle the task of moving a squad-plus 

through a couple buildings. So I send him out and report up saying there were two 

casualties from the headquarters element. I told them where I was located, that the 

CO was missing, and that we were clearing west to east looking for him. I get a call 

from my squad leader saying they were getting shot at and that they were taking 

some heavy resistance – getting shot at and having grenades thrown at them out of 

windows. To my south, the BRT was clearing from east to west with the 2-2 scouts 

– they were coming across. To my left, I had another section of BRT or Alpha 2-63 
38

with tanks, and we were all packed in there and it was way too tight. There were 

way too many people in that one small area. So I pulled up all the way to Captain 

Mayfi eld and Lieutenant Namken and said, “We don’t know where our CO is.” I 

told them that whatever they were doing, do it, and that I wasn’t going to get in 

their way and wasn’t going any further south of where I was right then. But I told 

them I needed to fi nd the rest of the company. I had guys hurt, guys shot, and the 

commander was missing so I was trying to let those other units know why I was 

there because I knew they were looking at me wondering why I was in their way.

MM: Were you the XO for Alpha Company by this point?

JE: Not really. When Ed died, Sergeant First Class Ryan – who was part 

of the S3 shop – commanded that Bradley, so he became essentially the CO’s 

wingman. As far as the XO duties, I really hadn’t started taking over. He had 

not been dead that long and I think the commander, Captain Sims, just wanted to 

leave me commanding my platoon, that he and the fi rst sergeant could just pick 

up the XO’s duties because Ed was just doing a lot of reporting and gathering 

reports and keeping track of supplies. I think the commander and the fi rst sergeant 

fi gured they could just tag team that and then when they needed extra help they 

would have thrown stuff to me. As Captain Doug Walter came, I started picking 

up XO duties then, but it didn’t happen before because we were just busy fi ghting. 

So anyway, we stay and fi ght and I get a report saying they found the CO, they 

secured the building and they told me he was dead. So I got on the ground and 

told them I wasn’t going to call it up until I see him because I didn’t want any 

confusion. I run into the building, see that he’s dead, made sure we got everyone 

and that the building was secure. I said to go to the Bradleys and get a stretcher 

– and we only ended up having white body bags. I said there was no way we were 

putting the commander in a fucking white clear body bag so I told them to get a 

stretcher and a blanket, cover him up and put him in the back of my Bradley. I 

said, “I don’t know where the f------ fi rst sergeant is and we have to get him out of 

here and reconsolidate.” I told my squad leaders to account for everyone in Alpha 

Company, to let me know when they had a positive headcount and get everyone 

on the ground. I went back to my track, reported the KIA and gave our current 

SITREP. I told them I had the commander but he was KIA, and said we’re putting 

him in my Bradley and bringing the rest of Alpha Company back to Phase Line 

Isabelle once we had 100 percent accountability. It was unfortunate because we 

already had six guys in my Bradley already. We had reporters and camera guys and 

were really crammed in there, and we had to put the commander in the Bradley 

and everyone had to pile in and try not to step on him as they got in there. We just 

threw as many people as we could from headquarters into my Bradley too so we 

could get them back to reconsolidate. So we get back to Phase Line Isabelle and 

everyone gets out of the Bradley. This is when the fi rst sergeant is up on the rooftop 

trying to call for fi re in the direction where the CO was killed. The colonel asks 
39 

me for the grid where the CO was killed because he wants to drop a JDAM on that 

building, so I give it to him and they drop a bomb. After that, the colonel wanted 

to attack right now south to the LOA from Phase Line Isabelle and he wanted to 

know when I could have the company ready. I told him I could have the company 

ready in about 30 or 45 minutes, and we pulled the leaders into this little courtyard. 

We were debating on what our plan was going to be. At this time the fi rst sergeant 

joined us and stated that we were not going to dismount and that he was going to 

ride in the commander’s Bradley. I was pretty sure Lieutenant Colonel Newell 

wanted us to dismount and clear house to house, but the senior NCO was dead 

set on not dismounting. I decided to go along with his plan rather than argue with 

the senior enlisted guy in the company minutes after the CO was killed. (Looking 

back on my decision, however, I should not have accepted that plan and instead 

insisted that we dismount). I told them I was going to go between 1st Platoon and 

2d Platoon and we’re going to go down the western fl ank, and 3d Platoon and the 

headquarters element will go down the eastern fl ank and that’s how we’re going 

to attack through to the LOA. First Sergeant Smith jumped in the commander’s 

Bradley – so it was his Bradley, 3d Platoon and the XO’s Bradley – and then my 

side was my whole platoon and then 2d Platoon behind me. We ended up calling 

this attack “Rolling Thunder” and we were basically doing bounding overwatch 

on two fl anks and shooting anything in the middle while we were calling fi re just 

ahead of us. We were calling a lot of indirect fi re and close air support (CAS) right 

on top of us and were just walking it down. 

MM: Let’s go back to when Captain Sims was killed. Did Lieutenant Colonel 

Newel put out any word that said First Sergeant Smith was the new company 

commander?

JE: No. If anything, I was in charge then because when I got out of that Bradley, 

Sergeant First Class Ryan said the colonel wanted to speak to me. He asked for me 

and told me the plan. No one came down there. It wasn’t like he came down and 

gave me a face to face. No one came down and asked what I needed or anything 

like that. It was just a radio transmission, very simple and to the point, and we were 

going to continue to attack to the LOA. He wanted to know how long it would take 

for me to get the company ready. I said 30 to 45 minutes – “Let me just talk to the 

leaders and I’ll get back to you.”

MM: I was just going off the unit after-action review (AAR) where it says, 

“Following the evacuation of wounded, First Sergeant Smith and First Lieutenant 

Emery meet with task force commander at the tactical command post (TAC) to 

discuss Alpha Company’s ability to meet an LD time.”

JE: No, it was a radio call that was given to me. The fi rst sergeant was up on 

the roof calling fi re where he thought the commander was killed, but he didn’t 

know because he wasn’t there. He was still generally calling it in the right spot 
40

but he wasn’t there. I talked to the colonel, told him 30 to 45 minutes, and then 

once we got everyone there, the fi rst sergeant came down and we decided on no 

dismounting. Once we pushed through to the LOA, we took a left turn, drove back 

up to where the colonel had his TAC set up and met there. That’s the fi rst time 

we got out and saw the colonel. He asked how it went and we said it went pretty 

smooth; we were talking, everything was in sync, and there was no problem. Then 

we got the call to help out the Marines, go in their sector and do the same thing, 

and the fi rst sergeant’s big thing was he wanted to do it before it got dark. So we 

were rushing to get everything set and get over there, and we meet the Marines and 

they give us some bullshit about how we can’t go through their defenses because 

they’re set up, they have their colonel down there, and they aren’t letting anyone 

through. We were trying to tell them we were coming to help them and they still 

wouldn’t let anyone through. We ended up taking this roundabout way that took 

us an extra 35 to 45 minutes to get into position. So we line up the same way – 3d 

Platoon, headquarters, me and then 2d Platoon – and we’re trying to get this off 

before dark. We fi nally get together and I had Sergeant Larid calling for fi re, but 

what I told him to do he didn’t understand. I wasn’t on the ground with him because 

I stayed in the Bradley to be able to talk to battalion, company and the platoons. 

I was trying to give him adjustments and he didn’t understand where I wanted it. 

So he stops calling for fi re and First Sergeant Smith ended up taking over calling 

for fi re. He’s trying to call for fi re and it takes us forever to adjust fi res on – and if 

you want to hear this story you should talk to Lieutenant Chris Walls. He can tell 

you what happened because he was listening to the fi re commands coming across 

the net by First Sergeant Smith and could enlighten you on how “good” they were. 

We fi nally get the fi res where we want them and start pushing through. We were so 

far ahead of the Marines and we ended up taking a lot of contact from our western 

side because there’s no one up there but the enemy, because the Marines are so 

far behind. Then it gets dark and visibility is pretty limited. The road had lot of 

obstacles in the way and a lot of debris, then we end up getting a tank stuck in a 

ditch. We didn’t even get to fi nish that mission or anything because we got halfway 

down to the LOA and the colonel said that’s it, recover the tank and bring everyone 

back. He said we weren’t going to continue. At this point, we ended up coming 

back, the fi rst sergeant was leading everyone out, and then he and his vehicle just 

took off. His two-man element was gone. The fi rst sergeant was our guide and 

he probably didn’t realize we were so far behind him, because we were pulling 

a tank and you can only go 10 miles an hour. He just took off so we actually had 

to call ahead, he had to stop and wait for us, and it was very slow moving all the 

way back. We went to see the colonel, he gave us a 24-hour breather, and that next 

whole day was a wash. I don’t think we sent out any missions or anything. We had 

Major General John Batiste come down and we fi gured out what we needed. The 

fi rst sergeant realized that the best thing for the company was to ask for Captain 
41 

Doug Walter to retake the company. I know the colonel asked General Batiste to 

get him back and have him lead the company. I wasn’t really involved with that 

decision at all. I think the fi rst sergeant talked to the colonel and I don’t know what 

the hell he said to him; but the next thing you know, Lieutenant Colonel Newell is 

talking to the general. 

MM: They actually managed to get Captain Walter back in 24 hours or so?

JE: Captain Walter was working for brigade with the Iraqi Army and they 

basically just picked him up. I wasn’t there when he got there. We ended up running 

two missions. We ran one mission with 3d Platoon, some kind of reconnaissance 

mission in the city, because I knew the next day we were defi nitely attacking 

through the city. 3d Platoon went up there and then, later on that night, my platoon 

went down there and spent the night in the city. We were the only element from 

Alpha Company that was in the city. We knew what lane we were going to be in 

and were basically the key for the company. We went in the night before, cleared 

the buildings, set up a hasty defense and secured a foothold, and then that’s where 

we spent that night. Sometime that night, Captain Walter showed up. The next 

morning, we were going to go at 0630 or 0700 and we were waiting for the indirect 

fi res to hit in the southern part of the city. Captain Walter called us and asked where 

we were. He told us what he wanted to do and we got everyone set up. He came 

in, put the platoons in order, and he fought the company as if he never left. He had 

my platoon in the middle, 3d Platoon to the left and then 2d Platoon to the right; 

and as we fought down, this is when I started doing some extra duties. I was in 

the middle and I was up front, so he was having me report the status of 2d and 3d 

Platoons – because I was the senior platoon leader and he also had no XO. I would 

tell him how many buildings we’ve cleared, where we were sitting and that I was 

secure. I would let him know the status of 2d and 3d Platoons and where they were 

located. He gave the order for 3d Platoon to hold and for 2d Platoon to bound up to 

3d Platoon and then that’s how we were doing it. It was basically him and I doing 

it. He was doing it but he was using my eyes to move the company. When Captain 

Walter got there, that was the house-to-house fi ght. We went through every single 

house down to the LOA, and when we hit the LOA we established a command 

center. We found a good house with good fi elds of fi re, good security, and he 

basically came up to me and said we were going to use the house I found as the 

company tactical operations center (TOC). After that, we did some more searchand-attack missions. We got to the LOA and attacked backwards, but it wasn’t so 

much attack as it was search and attack, looking for caches.

MM: On 19 or 20 November you guys did a battle handoff and headed home, 

correct?

JE: Yes. We got to go back to the base and had to rotate some platoons back 

to the base, but we did a handover with the Iraqi Army fi rst and then we bounded 
42

back to Phase Line Fran and spend a day or two going through the industrial area. 

We probably spent three days going through every part of the industrial area, 

breaking open every lock, opening every shop up and tearing stuff apart. We found 

a lot of IED factories and a lot of anti-aircraft weapons, machine guns, missiles 

and mortars – you name it, we found it. We basically were blowing up ordnance 

because, by now, the fi ghting was done; and at some point in time, Lieutenant 

Colonel Newell wanted to turn his lane over to the Marines completely done. So 

he fi gured that since we’d cleared it, searched it and gotten rid of everything in it 

that shouldn’t be there, he could hand it over to the Marines and we could go home, 

and that’s what he did. The Marines came in, we showed them the area, and then 

we pulled out, went to Camp Fallujah and that was it.

MM: Could you give me a brief assessment of some of the following 

individuals? What did you think of Lieutenant Iwan?

JE: Probably the best XO in terms of really understanding what an XO’s job 

is and doing just an XO’s job – not trying to be a platoon leader and not trying 

to assume more of an authority role than he had. He used to be a mechanic when 

he was enlisted so he understood vehicle maintenance very well; he understood 

what it took to keep vehicles running and how to keep the company in the fi ght 

from a logistical standpoint. He was very smart when it came to that. He was very 

organized and knew how to keep his reports straight. He always was asking you 

for reports and always at the right time. He wouldn’t interrupt you during a fi ght 

and ask if you needed water. He knew when the time was right, he knew what you 

would be low on and he was very good at getting you stuff you needed. Whenever 

you had a question and you weren’t going to the CO, you went to Ed and he knew 

the answer.

MM: How long was he enlisted for and on Active Duty?

JE: I don’t know if it was Reserves or Active Duty but he was enlisted as a 

mechanic for a while. Like I said, he was the best XO in terms of knowing his job 

and doing it. He was great. You didn’t have to worry about him. You knew he was 

going to get it done. 

MM: What about Captain Sims?

JE: He was probably one of the smartest men I’ve met in the Army – offi cer 

and enlisted. He was very intelligent and, from an offi cer standpoint, he understood 

doctrine to a T and probably knew it better than anyone. He knew what he was 

supposed to do and what the books said. He was just a good person, had heart. He 

wasn’t the type who was going to bend the rules or cut corners. He believed in his 

mission and took care of soldiers to the best of his ability. Any mission he got, he 

believed in it and wasn’t going to pawn it off on anyone else. He would say it was 

our mission and we would do it the best we could. He was probably the calmest 
43 

man in any situation you could ever meet in your life. He never raised his voice 

– and he never had to. He was able to remain calm no matter who was looking over 

his shoulder. He was in the spotlight a lot with the colonel; and even when stuff 

wasn’t going right, he was always calm and wanted to fi gure out what the problem 

was and fi nd a logical solution – and that’s what he did.

MM: What about Captain Walter? Were there any similarities between him 

and Captain Sims?

JE: Yes. Captain Sims was a gadget guy. He loved them. Any new gadget he 

had to have. That was his thing. But he always was thinking out of the box, too. 

If we were doing a recon and we didn’t have the equipment, he’d have us take his 

digital camera, do a drive by, put it on a 90-second video, fi lm the whole strip, and 

then go examine it later. He could always fi nd a way to get stuff done and that was 

great. He was putting his own personal camera for use in a tactical aspect: taking 

footage of targets we’re going to do. They were both 101st Airborne Division guys 

so they had similar light fi ghter backgrounds. As far as Captain Walter – if you’re 

going to combat, there really is no other person you’d want to go with than this 

guy, because he really is a soldier’s leader and a soldier’s warrior. He’s a warrior 

himself and he wasn’t going to back down from anyone. He’s going to use common 

sense and he’s going to put the best guys in the job. He doesn’t care about seniority; 

that stuff doesn’t matter to him. He’s going to pick the best guy for the job. He has 

no problem making a corporal a squad leader if that corporal is better than a staff 

sergeant. He was a no-quit guy; there was absolutely no quitting. He was not going 

to fail and he was not going to quit. He couldn’t originally deploy to Iraq because 

he was sick. He was on a diet of vegetables because he couldn’t eat anything else; 

it made him sick. There are plenty of guys in the Army who did everything they 

could not to deploy and here this guy did everything in his power to get healthy and 

then begged to come down, took a job that absolutely sucked in Iraq just to be there 

with the unit, and then retook his old company from his best friend. He took them 

through Fallujah with no casualties and then took the rest of the company home. 

If you’re going to measure an offi cer, that’s the guy you measure him against. You 

should ask yourself, “How do I measure up to Captain Walter?” That’s the type of 

guy he is.

MM: What about the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Pete Newell?

JE: He’s not the most charismatic guy in the world, he doesn’t have the greatest 

personality and he’s probably not going to really inspire you with these great Lou 

Holtz-type pep talks. But he understands his job, he understands how to fi ght a 

battalion, and he understands what it takes and how much force he needed to let 

his battalion use. He pretty much took the gloves off when we went to Fallujah. He 

knew we were trying to establish a rapport with the people in Muqdadiyah and get 

on their good side, so he understood when he had to hold us back. But in Fallujah 
44

he knew it was a real fi ght and he knew what that meant. For him to take the gloves 

off, tell us it was our fi ght, that we were going to win it, just to give us the freedom 

to do what we had to do on the battlefi eld – the fact that he understood that and 

allowed us to do that was great. That was the type of leader he was. The only real 

negative hit on him was that he’s a little vain and doesn’t like to be told he’s wrong. 

In the AAR of the Battle of Fallujah, he stated that he didn’t fail to do anything. For 

example, he insisted that a task force rehearsal of the breach site was conducted, 

when in fact it was not. He was defi nitely in the spotlight; he put himself on CNN 

and was with those reporters all the time. 

MM: What about your battalion S3, Major John Reynolds?

JE: He’s a real intelligent guy and has a lot of degrees. He’s a guy who seems 

like he spent a lot of time in staff positions. He was very philosophical and he’s 

got these theories and plans, but when it comes down to using common sense and 

just executing, that’s a different story. When you’re on the ground, in combat, the 

main thing is: can you get it done? He’s a smart guy and he understands doctrine; 

he could recite it, he could write it, but when it was time to execute....

MM: I greatly appreciate this. Is there anything else you’d like to leave us with 

that we didn’t cover?

JE: Yes, I would like to address a few things. First is, the leaders of this fi ght 

who had to make on-the-spot decisions every day that eventually led to the fi nal 

outcome of the battle. The Battle of Fallujah was a squad leader and platoon leader 

fi ght, company commander at the most. The plan was very simple: start in the 

north and attack south until you run out of city. If it were not for the company 

commanders talking to each other on a regular basis, there would have been a lot 

more fratricide. They did an outstanding job of knowing where their counterparts 

were and directing their fi res in the appropriate lanes. Next is, the guys who were 

really fi ghting and making decisions the most were the platoon leaders on the 

ground and their squad leaders. And last is, the soldiers who did everything they 

were told: kicked in every door, searched every little dark corner. The platoon and 

squad leaders really had to make those decisions about what was going to get a 

guy hurt, what was going to get someone killed, and what will keep them safe and 

still get the mission done. The guys on the ground almost did it fl awless. In a battle 

like Fallujah or any time it’s a house-to-house dismounted street fi ght, you really 

have to give the credit to the guys on the ground the whole fi ght, because they’re 

the ones who are really taking the brunt of it. This brings me to my next point: the 

awards given out for Fallujah. The Silver Star is one of the highest awards given 

out to soldiers in combat; but in the case of the Battle of Fallujah, it seemed as if 

it was given out to senior leadership for simply doing their jobs. The only offi cer 

who deserved the Silver Star in the Battle of Fallujah was Captain Sean Sims on 

the basis that he gave his life for his country and put himself in harm’s way for the 
45 

safety of his men. My intention here is not to bad mouth anybody, just to point out 

how quick we are to reward leadership to further enhance their careers, while we 

forget about the ones who are the real heroes: the soldiers.

MM: Once again, I want to thank you very much for your time.

47 

Captain Michael S. Erwin

19 April 2006

MM: My name is Matt Matthews [MM] and I’m an historian for the Combat 

Studies Institute. Today is 19 April 2006 and I’m interviewing Captain Michael S. 

Erwin [ME] who was the assistant intelligence offi cer (AS2) for 2d Battalion, 7th 

Cavalry Regiment (2-7 CAV) during Operation Phantom Fury. Could you please 

give me some information on your background – where you were born, where you 

went to school, how you got commissioned and the assignments you had in the 

Army prior to Phantom Fury?

ME: I was born in Syracuse, New York, in 1979. I went to Christian Brothers 

Academy High School and from there I received an appointment to go to West 

Point. I graduated West Point in 2002 and was one of around 30 cadets who picked 

military intelligence (MI) for their branch. A big reason for that was because three 

weeks before we had to pick our branches was when September 11th happened, 

and I knew MI was something that was going to be important to our nation’s security for many years to come. I came out to Fort Huachuca, learned how to be an 

intelligence offi cer, and really the only assignment I ever had was AS2 and then 

S2 for 2-7 CAV, which later became 1-12 CAV upon redeployment from Operation 

IRAQI FREEDOM II (OIF).

MM: Can you talk me through when you fi rst arrived in 2-7 CAV and the deployment of the unit to Iraq?

ME: I got there as a young second lieutenant and I had about 16 months experience as an AS2 back at Fort Hood before I actually deployed. Our big train-up 

was at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) at Fort Polk, Louisiana. We 

went there for a training mission in November and December of 2003, just about 

three months before we deployed, and they did a really good job of simulating 

what the scenario would be like over in Iraq. That was our fi rst real taste of how 

we were going to have to run convoys and prepare to predict where you think the 

enemy might attack. That really was just the ramp-up to deploy. We sent all of our 

equipment over to Kuwait on the ships.

MM: Where did you go after you left Kuwait and what was 2-7’s assignment 

prior to Phantom Fury?

ME: We made the convoy up north and our location was at Camp Taji, which 

was one of the old main bases for Saddam Hussein’s Republican Guard. He actually had two divisions of his Republican Guard there, the Medina Division being 

one of them at Camp Taji. Our area of operations was going to be a rural area north 

of Baghdad. We were the fi rst Active Duty battalion to ever be directly attached to 

a National Guard brigade. Although organically we were part of 3d Brigade, 1st 
48

Cavalry Division, we were attached the 39th Enhanced Separate Brigade out of 

Arkansas, so that was unique in itself. We’d always trained with units back at Fort 

Hood, but now we were going to be working with a brigade of National Guard 

that we did not really interact and train with until four to fi ve months before the 

deployment.

MM: Did you have a pretty good working relationship with those guys?

ME: As with all relationships when it was new, there were some things we had 

to work out, but I think they really appreciated the fact that we brought a lot of Active Duty experience. More importantly, we had guys who were well trained in operating the M1 Abrams tank and the M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle, two of the most 

dominant maneuver vehicles on the battlefi eld today, so that was really helpful to 

the overall brigade mission. April 2004 was a very hectic time in Iraq. Fallujah was 

heating up for the Marines, and Sadr City and Najaf and Karbala with the radical 

Shi’a. So right when we got there – and no one thinks it was coincidence that this 

was during the main exchange between OIF I troops and OIF II troops. They kind 

of timed it and planned a time to make their uprising.

MM: Did you have to go to Najaf when they had the uprising?

ME: The uprising that I spoke of, that was the fi rst one. After that, what they 

thought was put down in May, it turned out that it started back up in late July. The 

second time that Najaf became a hot spot was in August 2004. What happened 

there, when things got heated up, was that 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment (1-

5 CAV) – which was the division ready reaction force – got sent there and it was 

realized that we were going to need more combat power to handle that mission. 

At that point, III Corps, who was controlling the theater, decided that 2-7 would 

go. This was a result of the fact that we did not have an area in Baghdad. We were 

north of Baghdad, and I say that because Baghdad was the focus of so much of 

the media and government. If they were going to pull a unit out of Baghdad, that 

would have a bigger effect in terms of how the Iraqi people were to perceive the 

whole situation. So they moved us because we were north in a rural area, and they 

had a unit come in and take our place temporarily. We went down there and it was 

really a big preamble to Operation Phantom Fury, because that was where our unit 

demonstrated its confi dence and its ability to work with the Marines – and also its 

ability to destroy the enemy in support of the Marines’ mission. It gave our guys 

on the ground the experience and the confi dence so that when Phantom Fury came 

around, it wasn’t our fi rst time going into a city where the enemy held a lot of the 

buildings and knew the terrain.

MM: When you got there in August, had you personally had any experience 

working with the Marines? Did you work with them pretty closely in August?
49 

ME: No one in our unit, at least that I know of, had worked with them in the 

past. I was on the advanced party with Major Tim Karcher – the battalion operations offi cer (S3) – and a couple of the assistant guys in the plans shop. We got 

there at 0300 and started going to work right away trying to fi gure out what they 

wanted us to do. Right off the bat, we had a pretty close relationship working with 

them, especially Major Karcher. He came down there as the voice for Lieutenant 

Colonel James Rainey, our battalion commander, saying we would do whatever 

they needed us to do, and I think that really played a big role in it. There was no 

us showing up and expecting a certain mission or a certain role. We just showed 

up there and knew we were there to help them. We knew they had a tough fi ght 

going on, so we were there to support them however we could. This helped with 

the Marines’ perception of us as fi ghters; and once they gave us one of the tougher 

missions down there, it gave us the experience and we could prove we could continue to work for them and continue to support their mission.

MM: When did you fi rst hear that you might have to go to Fallujah and might 

be assigned to help the Marines once again?

ME: After we got back from Najaf in September, we had heard some word 

– and even just in open sources there was a lot of speculating that since things had 

gone so well down in Najaf, it was time for coalition forces to go in and take Fallujah back, to enable those people to have the opportunity to vote in the upcoming 

elections. We did not get the offi cial word until the day I came back from leave 

in mid-October. We were told to start preparing to fi ght in Fallujah. Lieutenant 

Colonel Rainey actually had gone all the way over to Camp Fallujah to meet up 

with the Marines, to get an idea of what the mission was going to be and what they 

were going to ask Task Force 2-7 to do. The difference between this and the battle 

for Najaf was that, in Najaf, we showed up and the fi ght was already going on. 

There was no plan to take the city back. We were only fi ghting because Moqtada 

al-Sadr’s militia forced us to. This was very different because the planning process 

was several months long. Coalition forces had not been allowed in there since 

April, so the Marines had been fl ying their unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) over 

the city for months, gaining intelligence on where the enemy liked to be. It was a 

much bigger mission in terms of the number of forces we were going to use, and 

also in terms of the planning process that went into it. Unlike Najaf, this was a well 

planned, well thought out and orchestrated mission.

MM: Did you make several trips with Major Karcher to go link up with the 

Marine intelligence people? How did that work?

ME: I actually did not make the trips. My boss, the primary intelligence offi cer, 

Captain David Gray, he went out there a couple days early before the rest of the 

main body, but no one else did. What did happen was Lieutenant Colonel Rainey 
50

and Captain Gray had linked up with their intelligence section and basically put us 

in touch with them. Remember, we still had operations going on in the Camp Taji 

area, so we had to make sure our guys were accomplishing the mission there. So it 

wasn’t like we could just totally shut down operations there and focus on Fallujah. 

I was the night shift guy, so I really had a lot of time to do a lot of the preparation 

for the fi ght, because that was when things tended to be a lot quieter. I had all the 

emails and telephone numbers of all the intelligence offi cers back at Camp Fallujah, and I worked pretty closely with them to get an idea of the type of fi ght they 

expected, where the enemy suspected locations were, where the suspected cache 

sites were and improvised explosive devices (IED) making locations and things of 

that nature. So I started working closely with them, helping to paint the picture for 

our task force before we even left Camp Taji for Camp Fallujah.

MM: Did you fi nd that there were some big challenges in urban intelligence 

collection that maybe you had not been involved with before – other than in Najaf?

ME: One of the big differences between Fallujah and Najaf was the quality 

of the fi ghters they had. But in terms of the situation, they were both very similar 

terrain. There were very dense urban areas with not very many high buildings. But 

another big difference this time was that no coalition forces had been in there for 

over six months, so the enemy had a lot longer time to build up – and more than 

that, they were more experienced fi ghters. They had a lot of foreign fi ghters who 

really knew how to set up sniper locations and call for indirect fi re and things like 

that.

MM: Talk me through from the beginning of the fi ght on November 8th. Where 

were you? What was your location? As the fi ght progressed, what was going on 

with the intelligence section?

ME: We rolled out of Camp Fallujah to a location about two clicks north of 

the city where the Marines, 2-7 and 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry Regiment (2-2) had 

decided the general area of operations would be – and that was because the direction of the attack was going to be from the north to the south into the city. We set 

up our tactical operations center (TOC), got all of our communications up, and got 

all of our tracking – our radios and such. The big thing we did was, as soon as we 

could, we got out task force UAV up in the air. It was called the task force’s Raven. 

It was still relatively new in theater when we were there and it was something that 

paid dividends for us in this fi ght. When we were back at Taji, we had had a lot of 

issues with it because it was a line of sight UAV. However, before our unit had even 

crossed the line of departure to push into the city, we had the support of the Marine 

UAVs fl ying over, letting us know where some enemies were being spotted. But 

more than that, we also had our own task force Raven and that was really my role. 
51 

I was the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) leader. We basically 

compared where we thought the enemy were with the routes that our companies 

were going to take. Once we crossed the train tracks into the city, the tank company 

would take what we thought was the most fortifi ed enemy route, because the tanks 

are the most resilient and have the most fi repower. So as soon as we fl ew that Raven, we were able to see the grid and were able to call our 120 millimeter mortar 

section that was standing by less than 500 meters away. We relayed those positions 

into those guys and, within a minute, we had rounds on target. Now, if that didn’t 

kill some of the enemy at that time, it certainly moved them and let them know that 

somehow we knew where they were. This was a pretty key piece of real-time intelligence. We were able to help save soldiers lives by determining where the enemy 

was before we got there, instead of spotting them with our eyes.

MM: Did you have any problems deconfl icting these Ravens with the Marines? The folks in 2-2 said the Marines were on their frequency and caused a 

couple of these things to crash.

ME: That’s a good point. We did have some issues with that; however, we 

worked a lot of those issues out in the days leading up to the fi ght. There was a 

few times where we had gotten on a particular frequency thinking the Marines 

wouldn’t be there, but sometimes the frequencies would cross over and that would 

cause us to either lose track of it for a while or actually have it lost. An interesting 

thing about the Raven was that the enemy knew we were fl ying these over their 

heads, and one of our Ravens actually came back with bullet holes in it. Believe it 

or not, it actually made it – and for a small plane that was pretty impressive. I just 

say that because it was an indicator of how many enemies were down there and 

how aware they were of what was going on above them. 

MM: Did the Marines have you concentrating over the Jolan District with your 

Ravens?

ME: Our ISR plan was essentially where we knew we were going to go. Lieutenant Colonel Rainey, Major Karcher and Major Scott Jackson – the leadership in 

our task force – had pretty much outlined to the offi cers and the senior noncommissioned offi cers (NCOs) in the TOC what the plan was. Essentially, their guidance 

to us was that they wanted as much reconnaissance one to two kilometers ahead of 

where our unit was. So once our unit hit the train tracks, he wanted us looking one 

to two kilometers past that and to start to paint the picture for the units who were 

advancing south. We did that through the Ravens, and we also did that through one 

of the Marine UAVs – the Scan Eagle. We had a terminal for that in our TOC. So 

we’d have one of our soldiers in the intelligence shop monitoring that system. We 

really had two different UAV platforms going at the same time. That being said, 

that was a Marine above-regimental asset. We were defi nitely not the priority for 
52

that. Once we breached the city and led the way in, we no longer became the priority for that, so Lieutenant Colonel Rainey wanted us focusing as much as we could 

on the Jolan District. If you look on a map, you can see how the Jolan District was 

set up as a potential enemy strong point or a location where the enemy could fall 

back to with prepositioned weapons caches. That was also something that intelligence reports had indicated to the Marines. The Marines had passed down to us a 

lot of intelligence reports; and one of the things they had told us was that, according to their intel, the Jolan District was going to be one of the places where a lot of 

the foreign fi ghters were going to make their last stand. That began to concern us 

greatly once we found out that we could potentially run into upwards of 300 to 400 

fi ghters in one condensed area, if that intelligence was going to be accurate.

MM: Did the difference in tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) and systems cause any delays in intel sharing between you and the Marines?

ME: Not really, because the big thing was that we had a good working relationship before we even got there. Also, once we got to Camp Fallujah on November 

1st, we had about six or seven days there to be synching our systems with the 

Marines – and that was one of the things I attribute to great leadership at our task 

force level. They ensured we got as much face time and communications with the 

Marines before we even left Camp Fallujah. We did have differences in UAV platforms and that was something we worked out, but really our systems were synched 

pretty well. We’d use the regular FM radio to put out intelligence reports, letting 

everyone know what we’d seen in the last couple hours – and that would go up to 

Regimental Combat Team 1 (RCT-1), since that’s who we were attached to. We 

were also the lead unit for them, so we wanted to make sure they knew where we 

encountered resistance and where we didn’t, because that would really help them 

as their Marines were basically going to follow Task Force 2-7 several hours after 

we pushed through. We called these battle update briefs (BUBs), where we would 

pass that information on. We would also get intelligence from our soldiers out 

there in the tanks and Bradleys: they would pass it back to us and we would pass 

it up to higher.

MM: Were you and Captain Gray pretty much co-located during the entire 

fi ght?

ME: Yes. Our intelligence shop was located right there at the TOC. I would 

usually be up the hill, about 100 meters away, working with the Raven.

MM: Who was in the TOC during the most of the fi ght besides the intel section?

ME: We had our task force logistics offi cer (S4) who was in charge of coordinating for any ammo, food and water. That was Captain Sheldon Morris. We also 

had our signals offi cer (S6), Captain John Ontko, and he was the guy in charge of 
53 

making sure our TOC could talk to all of our units on the front line. That was a 

bigger issue as we pushed further and further south and got further away from our 

jump TOC location. We had Major Jackson, who was our task force executive offi cer (XO). He was the guy who coordinated everything and put all of the pieces of 

the puzzle together, coordinating between our S2 section and the fi re support guys. 

Another key player was Captain Coley Tyler and his shop of fi re support guys. He 

and Major Jackson worked closely with our S2 shop and the mortar section to call 

for mortar fi re. We also had attached to us an Air Force liaison offi cer who was 

the direct link to the fast movers up in the sky, to call for fi re, and also the AC-130 

gunship, which attacked hostiles and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices 

(VBIEDs) ahead of our other units, so we used those guys quite frequently. It was 

really a team effort there to make everything go.

MM: Did you have any problem with communications since the Army was on 

FM and the Marines were using tactical satellite (TACSAT) and mIRC Chat?

ME: That was defi nitely one of the things that proved that sometimes we just 

do things differently than the Marines, and one of the ways was in attack aviation. 

They have the Cobra and we have the Apache. Army soldiers are very comfortable 

calling in the Apaches and the Marines are not, and vice versa. The Marines rely 

heavily on TACSAT radio and mIRC Chat – we did not have the ability to establish 

much of a secret Internet protocol router network (SIPRNET) out there due to our 

location and how quickly we had to set up. So there were defi nitely issues talking on the radios between the Marines and us, just due to the fact that we really, 

almost unfailingly, use FM – and the fi rst time I experienced TACSAT was down 

in Najaf. Although it was a bit of a challenge, it was nothing we were not able to 

work through.

MM: Can you talk me through some of the lessons learned that you’d want to 

get out there and let some of the younger soldiers know about?

ME: One of the big things we learned was that there is a very big difference 

between an urban fi ght and the rural fi ght we had out there at Taji. A very different kind of intelligence preparation of the battlefi eld (IPB) needs to be done, and 

Lieutenant Colonel Rainey had a great idea about how to deal with it. He came up 

with a system, for example, so he knew how wide or narrow the roads were – because that right there impacts whether tanks should go down this road or whether 

it’s better for Humvees. So one of the key lessons learned is that armored forces do 

perform very well in combat in the cities. Well, before Najaf, we were under the 

impression that the best way to fi ght the urban fi ght was with dismounted soldiers 

and going building to building. But the big lesson we learned was that armor does 

a better job at it because they have more fi repower and better vision capabilities on 

their vehicles. You also need to understand the difference between the urban fi ght 
54

and whatever else you may do. I think we learned about teamwork working with 

the Marines. I think a lot of people were under the impression that it was going 

to be hard for an Army unit to work with the Marines, with their different radio 

communications, different attack aviation assets, and different sizes in companies 

– lots of little things. But the thing we learned was the importance of establishing 

a good working relationship and a good rapport. Going back to the battle of Najaf where we went in saying we were there to help: taking that kind of approach 

and attitude made a really big difference in our ability to help them out. Also, we 

learned the importance of the UAVs from the intelligence side of the house.

MM: So you give a big thumbs up to the Ravens and the Marine UAV assets 

as well?

ME: Absolutely. We did have problems with the Raven in Taji and other places, but in Fallujah and Najaf, they performed very well. It was defi nitely a learning 

point. Really, it was the fi rst time that I got to see the future of MI actually taking 

place at the present time. That is, if you’re able to work those UAVs and prepare 

them and have a good route for them, you can really see how they can save lives 

by sending real-time pictures of the battlefi eld to your soldiers and your commander. We were able to keep people informed about what was going on one or 

two kilometers ahead of them, and I think that made a difference in terms of our 

soldiers being prepared. It wasn’t just, “Hey, I think the enemy might be here.” 

We were able to say, “We know where the enemy is.” We were able to pick up the 

Jolan District and calm our worries a little bit that it was going to be a place for 

300 terrorists to fall back to. We were able to see that there was some movement 

there, but not a whole lot.

MM: By the end of the fi ght, did the enemy forces pretty much match what 

you guys had templated them to look like? Also, did you feel there were in fact a 

lot of foreign fi ghters there?

ME: Absolutely. When we got there, it was actually one of their snipers that 

caused one of our soldiers to be killed in action and several others to be wounded 

and taken out of the fi ght. We knew there were foreign fi ghters from numerous 

countries who were in Fallujah, and they fought just the way we thought they 

would. They had numerous chances to leave the city and they continued to turn 

those chances down; they stayed there and they fought. One of the key things 

about this fi ght was that we’d templated that the enemy was going to put up a lot 

of resistance in the northern part of the city. That fi rst day of fi ghting, we thought, 

was going to be the most intense. It turned out that after all the air strikes and traumatizing close air support (CAS) that led the way, a lot of these guys said, “Hey, 

we don’t want to be a part of this initial fi ght,” especially once they saw all these 

tanks and Bradleys. Some of them were under the impression that it was going 
55 

to be a lot of Marine dismounts that were going to come walking from the north 

down to the south. Well, once they saw a lot of Bradleys and tanks and all the fi re 

power that comes with them, a lot of them pushed south and basically retreated. 

I’m not sure if it was out of shock or if it was out of hope that we really weren’t 

going to push all the way through to the south. I don’t know what their reasons 

were, but they left and pushed south. That’s why the initial 24 to 36 hours of the 

fi ght, while intense, were not the most intense hours of the fi ght. It wasn’t really 

until we pushed to the southern part of the city where we started to see that a lot of 

these guys had come there to take up their last-stand positions. These guys could 

have turned themselves in numerous times, but they stayed and fought until the 

end. They were as bold as fi ring at Marines as the Marines were coming in to clear 

a building, when they basically knew they were dead. These guys were defi nitely 

hardened fi ghters.

MM: Did you have any contact with the media at all? Were there embedded 

reporters with you guys?

ME: Yes. Some of the bigger media went with the Marines, and that was just 

natural because it was their area of operation, their fi ght, and we were just supporting them. So we were content letting the majority of the media go with the Marines. We did, however, have some smaller time reporters. We had a guy from the 

Chicago Tribune and a couple other smaller publications. They spent a lot of time 

in the TOC just following the battle, asking questions of the S4, the fi re support 

offi cer, and our section – trying to get a feel for what was going on. 

MM: Is there anything else you’d like to tell me?

ME: It’s interesting to see that there haven’t been any fi ghts like Najaf or Fallujah since we’ve been there. The battle of Fallujah was the last time we had to 

go in and take a city down, so it was really interesting to be a part of, especially 

with the whole situation in Iraq and trying to get those guys some stability and get 

them back on their feet. I think taking back Fallujah was a big step. Of course, the 

enemy just went north to Mosul and other locations throughout Iraq, but we did 

go in there and were very successful in what we had to do. It just goes to show 

that, yes, there were insurgents there and they did have some success in day-to-day 

operations. But when it came to the real fi ght, it just demonstrated the unbelievable, overwhelming capability that our armed forces have when we combine Air 

Force, Marines and Army, when we’re on the same page, and when we’re working 

together. It goes to show that we are still that dominant when we have to go head 

to head with someone.

MM: It could very well be one of the most successful joint operations of all 

time.
56

ME: Absolutely. I would think it’s got to be up there, just because it was so 

well orchestrated between the three branches of service and because it was a known 

enemy stronghold. They had months and months to fortify; and for us to go in there 

and do the mission we did, I think that speaks volumes for how well we are able to 

pull off joint operations.

MM: Did you see the interview I did with Colonel Michael Shupp, the commander of RCT-1? He thinks you guys walk on water.

ME: It was a mutual feeling. Being able to go ahead of them in our armored 

vehicles and set the battlefi eld up for his Marines. That was something no one can 

take away from us, when you’ve got commanders in other units saying they could 

not have completed their mission if it wasn’t for 2-7 CAV. That’s something you 

look back on and you’ll never forget.
57 

Captain Natalie Friel

28 July 2006

JM: My name is John McCool (JM) and I’m with the Operational Leadership 

Experiences Project at the Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 

I’m interviewing Captain Natalie Friel (NF) on her experiences during Operation 

Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and specifi cally we’ll be focusing on her role in Operation 

Phantom Fury. Today’s date 28 July 2006 and this is an unclassifi ed telephone interview. Before we begin, Natalie, if you feel at any time we’re entering classifi ed 

territory, please couch your response in terms that avoid revealing any classifi ed 

information. And if classifi cation requirements prevent you from responding, simply say you’re not able to answer. Could we start by you giving me some background on your military career and maybe also where you grew up, how you got 

commissioned, things like that?

NF: Okay. I grew up in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and went to the United States 

Military Academy at West Point for my commissioning source. My fi rst assignment was in Germany with 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, and one year into 

that assignment I deployed to Kosovo for about nine months. Five months after we 

returned from Kosovo, we all deployed together to Iraq and initially I started off 

in Ba’qubah with 3d Brigade headquarters. About three months into my deployment – around June 2004 – I was assigned to Task Force 2-2 Infantry which was in 

Muqdadiyah, Iraq, and that was our area of operations (AO). Task Force 2-2 was 

a mechanized infantry task force and was utilized on several occasions throughout 

our one-year deployment in Iraq to assist in other areas that seemed to have a surging insurgency population. Task Force 2-2 deployed to Najaf initially in April; we, 

of course, assisted in Fallujah in November; and then part our unit assisted in Mosul in January 2005. We were jumping around several times during our tour there.

JM: For the record, what was the period of time for your deployment?

NF: We were deployed from February 2004 to February 2005.

JM: What was the specifi c duty position you held in November 2004?

NF: I was the battalion assistant intelligence offi cer (AS2). When we got our 

order to go to Fallujah, there was no primary battalion S2 so I was fi lling that role 

at the time. About two days before our actual movement to Fallujah, we received 

another intelligence offi cer – a more senior captain than me who came in to be the 

primary battalion intelligence offi cer – but for the entire intelligence preparation 

of the battlefi eld (IPB) portion of it and previous to that battle, I had been acting 

as the primary S2.

JM: What happened to the original S2?
58

NF: It was a time of transition for the unit and he was taking command in 

Ba’qubah for one of the direct support intelligence companies. He was in transition 

going to do that and, at the time, he was also on R&R leave.

JM: So you become the acting S2 and, all of a sudden, this warning order 

comes down for this major operation. What’s going through your mind? What are 

your concerns?

NF: It was kind of a big intelligence gap in my mind because I had been very 

focused on our sector and didn’t know exactly how to get the information about 

this other sector. First of all, it wasn’t even an Army unit, it wasn’t in my division, 

and it wasn’t something I could reach out and touch very easily. Immediately upon 

getting our mission order, we did get to go do a reconnaissance of Fallujah and met 

with their intelligence section and with the commander we would be falling under 

for Marine Regimental Combat Team 7 (RCT-7).

JM: How did that recon go? And could you also talk a little bit about how 2-2 

was integrated with the Marines and your relationship with them?

NF: That recon went very well and I was received very well by the Marine 

Corps intelligence staff. They really gave me a whirlwind tour of the big picture of 

what was going on in Fallujah, brought me up to a map and showed me all the key 

insurgent strongholds and who all the key players were that we would be looking 

for. They couldn’t really give me an in depth discussion of what our sector would 

be because, at the time, that was still in fl ux. The Marine Corps was still trying to 

decide how they wanted to use this mechanized infantry task force in the fi ght. 

He also gave me a number of CDs that had an enormous amount of information. 

I think it was about 10 CDs worth of imagery, intelligence reports, graphics and 

assessments of all of Fallujah – so they really had a good package to give us and 

they had a great terrain team. At that time, the terrain team provided us with some 

imagery of the area as well.

JM: Who were you principally interacting with, who was your counterpart?

NF: I don’t remember his name but it was the RCT-7 S2. He was a major.

JM: Colonel Craig Tucker was the regimental commander, correct?

NF: Yes.

JM: Was he around? Did you have any interaction with him?

NF: He was around and gave our entire staff a briefi ng but I didn’t really interact with him personally.

JM: So you were generally pleased with the intelligence the Marine Corps had 

already devised?
59 

NF: Yes, I was very impressed. They were very sharp and seemed to have a 

good picture of things. They were really showing me the bottom line of everything 

I wanted to see.

JM: What immediately struck you as you were beginning to process these 10 

CDs worth of stuff? What were the major things you took back with you to 2-2?

NF: We took those CDs back with us to our unit as well, but just seeing the fact 

that they had vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) factories, they 

had IED factories and pictures of these kinds of locations – that really struck me. 

There were also suspected hostage locations, places where US and other nationalities had been taken hostage. All those things we see on the news with people being 

taken hostage, it was happening in Fallujah. So that struck me as the importance of 

this operation. Hearing names like Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and Omar Hadid being 

thrown around – those were major players in the insurgency in Iraq and a lot of 

their hangouts and places where they met were within Fallujah. It was also interesting to see that many of the mosques were identifi ed as hostile and as meeting 

locations. That to me was an escalation of what we were used to in our own sector. 

What was interesting to see was all the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) coverage 

they were able to provide us with, because we weren’t used to having that level 

of support in our own sector in Muqdadiyah. They just had some great UAV feeds 

showing daisy-chained IEDs that the insurgents were setting up and showing all 

their defensive positions they had created. Looking at all the pictures, you could 

see that this was just not a city where people were living normally. It was defi nitely 

a fortifi ed zone with huge speed bumps everywhere and concrete barriers along the 

roads. They had been preparing a long time for us to attack.

JM: With reference to the UAVs and the Marine Corps, were they using those 

Shadows?

NF: No, we had a Shadow at our brigade level in Ba’qubah. Our battalion 

didn’t have a Shadow. The Marines had two different UAVs: I think they had a 

Pioneer and a Scan Eagle. Because they had all this corps and division support all 

focused on Fallujah, they also had Predator and IGNAT, which can provide some 

really good coverage. We just weren’t used to seeing that level of detail.

JM: In terms of this whole IPB process, was there anything you thought could 

have gone better? Any resources or assets you wished you’d had?

NF: I wish that the specifi c mission for 2-2 had been better defi ned sooner because, for awhile, the Marines were only going to use 2-2 as an outside force just 

sitting on the edges of the city on the southeast corner.

JM: Basically doing a cordon?
60

NF: Yeah, and just trying to catch insurgents who would be fl ooding out of the 

city. They wanted the Marines to be going from north to south and pushing people 

and then we would be catching them coming southeast. Then our mission changed 

to be going from north to south starting in the Askari District, which is the northeastern most corner of Fallujah, and that stands for the “military district.” I think 

overall the Marines underestimated how quickly we would be able to do that, because a mechanized task force can move a lot faster than dismounts. We’re not going to be distracted by things blowing up at us because we have a little more armor 

to protect us. I think there was also a difference in opinion in terms of how in depth 

they wanted us to be clearing things during the initial sweeps. We got the message 

that they wanted us to get down to Highway 10 – Phase Line Fran – as quickly as 

possible, but I think their forces were actually clearing every single house as they 

were going. I think our forces, on the other hand, were only clearing the houses we 

received contact from and then we continued on. That might have been why the 

Marines were a lot slower than us as well. We had this follow-on mission that no 

one really talked about, which was to continue moving south past Highway 10, so I 

had focused my intelligence effort on the Askari District and the industrial districts 

which were just south of Highway 10. I didn’t really focus on the Shuhada District, 

which was even further south, and I hadn’t done this because I didn’t realize we 

would be going that far, so that had been unclear. I wish I’d known more about and 

had prepared better for that Shuhada District because we got there so quickly that 

there wasn’t a lot of time to collect information about it.

JM: How long would you say you planned for this limited mission until you 

got word that it was going to be much more involved?

NF: I think before we got to Fallujah we had about two weeks to do IPB and 

just give an in depth enemy course of action. We focused that on the industrial 

district and the Askari District. We looked at the information about Shuhada but 

there was less information available about that and I didn’t push for more because 

I didn’t realize we would be going that far south.

JM: Do you feel the mission that 2-2 eventually did get was the best use of the 

task force and the best way of complementing the Marine forces?

NF: I think it was. We were given a diffi cult enough mission and we were 

defi nitely well used. I think it was an adequate mission for us, but that’s not really 

my call.

JM: What kind of intelligence did you have on the enemy before the fi ght and 

what was your assessment of them? Were they going to be formidable? What were 

their capabilities?

NF: We did present the enemy as very different and very unlike the enemy 

we were used to facing in Muqdadiyah. The message we sent was that there were 
61 

foreign fi ghters and insurgents who had been preparing for this fi ght since probably April, so they had many months to prepare their defensive positions. We had 

been given the impression from the intelligence that the majority of the civilian 

population had left the city and particularly so in the sector we were going to be 

in, which was the military and industrial district – and the industrial district was 

warehouses and things, so we didn’t expect to fi nd any residents there anyway. Just 

based on the pictures and the intelligence reporting we had, it really just looked 

like a warehouse for bombs and terrorist activity. So the message was that this 

enemy was more intense and better trained than any of the enemy that we were 

used to facing.

JM: You mentioned the UAV coverage, but was there also any human intelligence (HUMINT) you all were relying on that you thought was good, bad or 

otherwise? 

NF: There wasn’t a lot of HUMINT. Part of the problem was that because the 

city had been occupied by insurgents and there wasn’t a US presence in the city 

– like in most of our other cities in Iraq – it’s hard to get HUMINT sources in there 

to get information. We did have a few reports but it wasn’t as well developed of a 

HUMINT area as some of our other cities in Iraq.

JM: I guess I was wondering how you were able to distinguish between foreign fi ghters and guys who were actual Iraqis.

NF: We could get that from some HUMINT sources, so we had a picture of 

that from HUMINT as well as signals intelligence (SIGINT).

JM: In some of our previous correspondence, you mentioned this issue of the 

insurgent training ground. Could you expand on this?

NF: When I got the picture that our forces were going to go down into the 

Shuhada District as kind of a second wave mission, an on-order mission to move 

south, and that that would be our sector, I started to look back through information 

the Marines had initially provided me with and there really wasn’t as much information about Shuhada as there had been about Askari and the industrial district. 

So I tried to fi gure out where I could get some more information about that and 

asked the Marines at their headquarters where I could get some more information 

about Shuhada. They gave me a point of contact in another Army unit that had 

been on the outskirts of the southeast of Fallujah before we had started Operation 

Phantom Fury. They had pulled out of that area because they would have been in 

the line of fi re once the operation started, but they had been doing some feints into 

the southeast corner of Fallujah; and their role was to make the insurgents think we 

were coming from the southeast instead of from the north. They had never actually 

gone into Shuhada but they had been engaging them and probing at them from the 

southeast, so they were able to give me some information and some intelligence 
62

that they’d gathered from their time there. They showed me all the points they had 

received fi re from, gave me some imagery they had and some intelligence they 

were able to collect. One thing they told me – and I believe it was from HUMINT 

– was that there was kind of a gap in between the end of the industrial district in 

the south and the start of Shuhada further south, and there was this vacant area 

that didn’t have any houses in it. They said they believed it had been used as an 

insurgent training ground. They also said the insurgents were creating foxholes 

on the outskirts of the city, which we started to call spider holes that they were 

using to pop out of, but we didn’t realize the extent of this spider hole and tunnel 

network they had created down south until our forces were actually on the ground. 

Obviously with them moving a lot underground, the UAVs had not been picking 

up really anything down there. While our forces were still up north in Askari and 

the industrial district, we were watching the Predator one day and it picked up a 

truck driving around down there. We believe it had weapons in the back and was 

stopping at houses, dropping weapons off and then going to another house, dropping more weapons off.

JM: Like a delivery truck.

NF: Yeah, it was a delivery truck; and since in the tactical operations center 

(TOC) we were part of the deep fi ght, we actually targeted that truck with our own 

artillery. None of our forces were down there to be observers, so the observer was 

the Predator that was following this truck. Our fi rst tries were pretty far off, but 

eventually we were able to get that truck with our artillery and that was really the 

only thing we saw as a sign of life down there.

JM: Talk me through the kickoff of the battle when they blow the breach and 

cross the berm. Where are you located at this time and what are you seeing?

NF: I was in the TOC which was on Camp Fallujah, and we could hear the 

battle from there but we couldn’t really see anything at that point. We were just 

monitoring radio traffi c and I believe they had to change their plan in terms of the 

breach and just use one breach point. I think they had planned to use two and they 

went to one – but I could be wrong about that.

JM: Didn’t the Marines have some trouble with their breach?

NF: Yes, that’s what it was. The Marines had trouble with theirs so they had 

to come use ours. It went very quickly. We had been concerned because a couple 

days before the actual battle we had received some more updated UAV feeds that 

showed all these tires they had laid out on the roads and more defensive positions 

up on the northeast corner. We believe they were going to set those tires on fi re and 

try to create a huge smoke obstacle, but I don’t think they ever did that and there 

wasn’t really anything to slow down this huge task force that was coming through 

the breach. They passed that quite quickly. There were certain areas we thought 
63 

were going to slow our own forces down but it didn’t end up slowing them down 

at all.

JM: Where was the S2 at this time?

NF: He was with the tactical command post (TAC), and the TAC consisted of 

the operations offi cer (S3), the battalion commander and the sergeant major and 

their Bradleys. The S2 didn’t have his own vehicle so he was in the fi re support 

offi cer’s (FSO’s) vehicle. That situation should have been improved because he 

didn’t have access to a radio and I guess he thought at the time he would be sharing 

with the FSO. But the FSO was extremely engaged at the time in calling for fi re, 

working with the mortars and the TOC and the artillery, so that radio was absolutely occupied. He didn’t really have any good access to anything other than listening 

to the FSO’s radio. In terms of intelligence information, I was receiving the SIGINT and HUMINT and UAV traffi c from the Marines in the TOC, so I found that 

it was hard to try and interrupt on the radio to provide any kind of updates because 

we were really only using one net – the command net. That’s what we were monitoring in order to monitor the fi ght. There was no operations & intelligence (O&I) 

net and there should have been, so that could have been improved as well. I started 

using the Blue Force Tracker to send out messages and intelligence updates; and I 

could only send out a couple sentences so it had to be a quick update. If there was 

anything time sensitive I had to report, I would cut into the command net, tell the 

battalion commander and let him do with that what he wanted.

JM: Could you take me through the battle itself and tell me from your perspective what the major events and turning points were?

NF: It was pretty quick to get from the breach down to Highway 10. The real 

hardship for us was the fact that, during the breach, we lost our command sergeant 

major – Steve Faulkenburg – so that was obviously a tough thing to have happen. 

Sergeant Major Darrin Bohn took over as the command sergeant major and we 

got to Highway 10 within 48 hours. There were a couple mosques and suspected 

insurgent houses that our forces were supposed to check out along the way and 

they did that and didn’t fi nd anything there. There was a hospital we had suspected 

the insurgents were using as a meeting place or maybe as their own hospital, but 

there was no one there. They did receive a lot of enemy contact and cleared those 

buildings but I didn’t get the impression that that was really the most diffi cult 

part of the fi ght for us. We continued down through the industrial district. I can’t 

remember what the timeline was in terms of what day it was in the fi ght that this 

happened, but I don’t think they received hardly any enemy contact when they 

went through the industrial district, which was a surprise because we thought there 

would be at least some insurgents down there. Then the Marines wanted us to go 

back up and re-clear every single house in the Askari District, so I think one of 
64

our tank companies was attached to one of the Marine companies and they went 

back and cleared house by house. We were then given our on-order mission to 

continue down through the Shuhada District; and at that point, I was scrambling 

trying to pull together a good picture of that sector. I went out to meet with all the 

commanders and the staff and brought them new imagery showing the southern 

sector, because we didn’t even have any imagery of that sector to start with. I gave 

them the best intelligence update I could at that time, and that was the fi rst time 

they had heard an enemy course of action on that district or had even seen what 

it looked like on imagery. I know we started off our movement down to that area 

with another white phosphorous (WP) blast just as we had started off up north with 

the breach.

JM: What was the purpose of the WP?

NF: It was to give us some cover and concealment. We felt like the top northeast corners of both Askari and the Shuhada Districts were going to be hot spots 

because of the intelligence we had. We knew those were fortifi ed positions and 

UAVs had seen activity there, as well as anti-aircraft weapons. Going down into 

Shuhada, we had to cross that open fi eld so we didn’t really have a lot of concealment there. We wanted to clear out that area as we were crossing the insurgent 

training ground area.

JM: At this point, was there anything surprising you about the enemy, their 

capabilities or their effectiveness as a fi ghting force?

NF: Yeah. I felt like this was the big turning point in the battle for the Marines 

as well as the Army. We didn’t know about this extensive tunnel network they had 

down there or all these spider holes they had created, so they were able to repopulate or go back into a house after we’d cleared it. They could reappear in that house 

because they had a spider hole or a tunnel from another house back into it, so that 

was really smart on their part. There was no way we could clear all these houses 

without getting rid of that tunnel network and I know that, whenever our guys 

would fi nd one of these holes, they would drop a grenade down there – but they 

were still able to sneak around us using that system. Our guys were able to fi nd 

several dead fi ghters whom either they killed or had been killed by the artillery or 

the bombing that had occurred before they went down there. They found several 

foreign passports and that confi rmed to us that these were foreign fi ghters. People 

from Jordan and Syria – defi nitely a confi rmation that we weren’t just dealing with 

Iraqi local fi ghters.

JM: Were they more skilled, more fanatical? What did you perceive as the 

major differences between foreign fi ghters and Iraqi fi ghters?

NF: Just that they were probably more prepared to die – more of the suicide 

mentality – which was not common for the Iraqi fi ghters who were not suicidal for 
65 

the most part. Most of the people who were blowing themselves up in Iraq were 

from somewhere else – at least that’s my perception. They were from Egypt, from 

Jordan, etc., and they were bringing the radical, fundamentalist Islam into Iraq. I 

knew they were probably able to inspire some of the more hardcore Iraqi insurgents to go along with them but, for the most part, Iraq did not have a fundamentalist mentality to it.

JM: You mentioned briefi ng commanders on the ground.

NF: Yeah. There were a few times I went out with Major Erik Krivda, who was 

the S3 in the TOC, to talk to the commanders and just provide an update to them 

or give them a course of action, either enemy or friendly. They were so tired that 

they didn’t have time to do that out there and they didn’t have access to what we 

had access to in the TOC.

JM: Now, is this a normal AS2 job or is this something the S2 would normally 

do?

NF: It should be what the S2 is doing and usually the assistant is out in the 

TAC tracking the battle.

JM: So basically the roles were reversed.

NF: Yes, and that was probably because I had been part of the two reconnaissance missions out with the Marines and just part of the whole IPB. Captain Ray 

Pemberton came in at the last minute and didn’t have a lot of time to get his feet 

wet.

JM: Were you pretty comfortable in this role of going out and briefi ng?

NF: I was, but I did feel as though there was a gap I was receiving in terms of 

battle tracking because the TAC was able to track enemy KIA and exact events that 

were occurring, and sometimes we missed those because we could only listen to 

the command net. A lot of that they were getting from company nets and tracking 

things that way. In terms of the whole battle tracking process, I think I only got 

about 50 percent of what was going on. So really, all I could feed them was my 

general assessment of what was going to happen in the future based on this intelligence I was receiving that they weren’t getting.

JM: How well do you feel the information you received tracked with what was 

occurring?

NF: I feel that the S2’s job is more to be looking into the future and not refl ecting into the past, so I felt like I was doing a good job of giving them something 

to work with in terms of what I thought was going to happen in the future. But 

in terms of being able to capture in the TOC what had happened in the past, we 

weren’t able to clean that up until after the fi ght. We got together with the battle 
66

trackers in the TOC and got all the information they’d captured and started plotting it for ourselves. We really only needed that to say how many total enemy were 

killed and where they all were.

JM: While the battle was going on, did you have any communication with the 

Marines?

NF: Yes. There were several times I went over to their area and we were both 

located on Camp Fallujah so that made it easy. I went over there to get new imagery and new information from them. Most of the time I was chatting with them on 

Microsoft chat, which was their big thing.

JM: Was this the mIRC Chat?

NF: No, the mIRC Chat we used to talk to the Air Force really, for the close air 

support (CAS) and the Predator and IGNAT feed because they controlled that.

JM: How would you assess the Marines’ intelligence info during the battle? 

NF: I think they were getting better information because they all had these Microsoft chat things down to a lower level, and so their TAC on the ground was able 

to be Microsoft chatting spot reports back to their TOC. I felt like they were getting 

a more up to date feed as far as spot reports. I could see everything that was going 

on on the Microsoft chat and that was a good way for me to get the big picture.

JM: How would you characterize the whole joint-ness of this operation?

NF: I felt very welcomed, part of the fi ght and really one team with the Marines – and the Air Force was never a problem. We had some Air Force soldiers 

on the ground with our commanders who were assisting to call in the CAS. The 

Marines provided us with several intelligence teams to try and help integrate us 

into their systems. One was a counterintelligence team that did some interrogations 

whenever we did have prisoners and they were doing document exploitation whenever we found documents. We also had a small SIGINT team that was providing 

that kind of support. The only area where I felt where we weren’t treated as equals 

was with the Marine UAV support, and it was probably because their forces were 

able to Microsoft chat into the Marine TOC and let them know what contact they 

were receiving, that they needed the UAV to come and look around in a specifi c 

area. For us, it was just me trying to Microsoft chat to them and asking if we could 

see in front of us or behind us. I could only get the Marines to bring their UAV over 

to our sector whenever we were in some serious contact. I felt like we were only 

getting about 10 percent of the time with UAV coverage so that wasn’t adequate in 

my mind, especially when they had UAVs up 24 hours a day.

JM: Were you able to get any worthwhile information from the interrogations 

of these enemy prisoners? Were they able to fi lter anything back to you?
67 

NF: No, not really. I think they were able to pass it on to the S2 on the ground, 

but I wasn’t getting it. I don’t know of anything actionable they got out of it.

JM: What would you say was your overall assessment of this fi ght and the 

quality of the intel you saw?

NF: Overall in terms the imagery and the SIGINT, it was a lot more support 

than we were ever used to receiving. The HUMINT was a little sparse and that was 

just a factor of they hadn’t been able to develop sources very well. It takes awhile 

to develop that kind of HUMINT relationship. Just the imagery and the UAV coverage were incredible and, for this type of fi ght, that was really the most important 

ones we could have had. Just to be able to see all the defensive positions they set 

up, the location of weapons on tops of roofs, seeing people set up daisy-chained 

IEDs or vehicles that were rigged to explode – we could see all of that through 

UAV feeds.

JM: What were some of the unique intelligence challenges of this being an 

urban operation?

NF: It was just a lot closer together of an area. It really was a small area we 

were dealing with and we were used to dealing with miles and miles. It’s a big city 

but it was really just a compact fi ght, so there were so many details in each little 

road. It was hard that we could never say that a particular area was cleared or safe 

because they were always being repopulated. Even though initially when we went 

from north to south in the city – you could say everything is open game and the 

enemy could be anywhere – but you still didn’t feel like things were cleared even 

when we had passed through that area, so I think it kind of got hazier as we went 

along. There was a new technique the insurgents started to use down south that I 

never anticipated them using – and really this is something they could only do in 

an urban environment and was something of a suicidal technique. They were setting up defensive positions right inside the house, so whoever came through the 

front door would be just be blasted from multiple directions by machine gun fi re or 

rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). That was how one of our company commanders was killed and I know that’s how a number of the Marines were killed.

JM: Are you talking about Captain Sean Sims?

NF: Yes. I know Staff Sergeant Jason Laser, one of our scouts, was shot in the 

neck that way as well. Our guys are used to being able to go into a little stack, the 

fi rst person busts into the room and they start shooting; but it was that initial person 

going through the door who wasn’t going to make it with this technique the enemy 

was using. So our forces started to respond to that by shooting a tank round or a 

Bradley round through the door of a house before they would go in. I don’t think 

the Marines did that and, from monitoring their Microsoft chat, I kept seeing more 

and more Marine casualties occurring from this same technique.
68

JM: I understand that a lot of times 2-2 would just drop the building all together with artillery?

NF: Yeah, if we knew for sure that it was infested; but if we didn’t know they 

were still shooting a round through the house.

JM: Could you share any impressions you may have of some of the key players you worked with like, Lieutenant Colonel Pete Newell or some of his battalion 

staff?

NF: About 72 hours into the fi ght, I think everybody who was out there in 

the battle – Lieutenant Colonel Newell, Major John Reynolds, Captain Sims and 

the other company commanders – hadn’t slept that whole time and they were just 

smoked. I had been going down for about two or three hours every night and the 

same for Major Krivda, so we at least had some semblance of being able to think 

still. So whenever we got our second and third on-order missions – going down to 

the industrial district and continue into Shuhada – he and I were doing what a full 

staff should be doing, which was coming up with the op order, coming up with a 

plan, IPB and imagery, and then going out to the TOC and delivering that. Those 

guys were defi nitely heroes in my mind for what they did: 72 hours of constant 

fi ghting and being in a battle that whole time. Captain Sims and Captain Doug 

Walter really stick out in my mind as does First Sergeant Peter Smith, fi rst sergeant 

for Alpha Company. When Captain Sims and Lieutenant Ed Iwan, his executive 

offi cer (XO), were both killed, Smith really had to be the XO, the commander 

and the fi rst sergeant for about 24 hours while still in a fi ght, which was a lot to 

ask of someone. Captain Walter was pulled from brigade staff. He used to be the 

Alpha Company commander before Captain Sims and he was pulled down from 

Ba’qubah and went right into the fi ght. I think that was one of the best decisions 

Lieutenant Colonel Newell could have made because they really needed someone 

like him – someone they were comfortable with after what that company had gone 

through.

JM: We’ve actually interviewed Doug Walter and Peter Smith as well, and one 

of the things we’re interested in is this whole issue of when they lost both the XO 

and Alpha Company commander and when Smith effectively becomes the commander for awhile. Is that your understanding?

NF: He was. I remember there being some confusion about lines of fi re at 

this point of the fi ght down in the Shuhada District, and there was some danger 

of fratricide, but that was the point when Lieutenant Colonel Newell made a good 

decision to pull them back. I think he dropped some CAS at that point to clear it 

out a little better and also got Captain Walter down there to be the company commander.

JM: Did you ever have any interaction with Major (Dr.) Lisa DeWitt?
69 

NF: Not during the battle. She was in a different area where the casualties, the 

medics, the maintenance and the Headquarters Company were all located. That 

was where my husband Jamey was as well.

JM: He was the battalion maintenance offi cer (BMO), right?

NF: Right, and he ended up being kind of the casualty evacuation offi cer as 

well because no one was really playing that role. He had to go back and forth a 

lot to pick up parts and keep things going with the maintenance, but he ended up 

bringing back several of the KIAs too.

JM: In summary, how would you account for the successful prosecution of this 

fi ght? What were some of the major factors that went into it?

NF: I think one of the biggest factors was Lieutenant Colonel Newell’s clarifi cation of what the rules of engagement (ROE) were and the fact that he allowed 

our commanders – based on the intelligence we had received – that if they saw a 

vehicle just sitting on the side of the street with no one in it, assume it’s a VBIED 

and shoot it so it doesn’t blow us up when we get closer. He also allowed commanders to shoot a round through houses before they went in later on in the battle. 

Those decisions were really important and things I don’t think the Marines were 

doing the same. I think those kinds of decisions on his part really saved our lives. 

I would say the speed of movement we were able to use was a major factor in our 

success as well. Defi nitely the armor helped, and that was something the Marines 

could have used. The great amount of imagery and intelligence we received before 

going into the fi ght was huge. Knowing where there were going to be obstacles and 

where the tanks and Bradleys were going to have to go around or take a different 

route – that was critical information.

JM: Are there any other individuals we haven’t mentioned whom you think 

deserve some special recognition for their actions in this operation?

NF: I wasn’t close enough to the fi ght to be privy to particular key players. I 

know who the key players were in the leadership but there were defi nitely some 

real heroes who were squad leaders and platoon sergeants like Staff Sergeant David Bellavia. He was a real hero in the fi ght.

JM: Were there any challenges you faced being a female offi cer in an infantry 

battalion?

NF: No, not really. I thought maybe the decision to not send me out into the 

TAC had been made because I was a female, but Lieutenant Colonel Newell wasn’t 

that way and I think I was better off being where I was in the fi ght, having access 

to the secure internet protocol router network (SIPRNET), the non-secure internet 

protocol router network (NIPRNET), the imagery and all the intelligence feeds. 

I was getting hundreds emails all the time with reports to sift through, so I think 
70

that’s where I needed to be. The Marines were surprised that we had a female in 

that role but it didn’t bother them in any way to work with me. Lieutenant Colonel 

Newell is a very out-of-the-box-thinking guy and if he feels like someone is going 

to be an asset to his unit, he doesn’t care whether they’re a female or not. I think 

the same thing applied to Major DeWitt being the surgeon for our unit. He knew 

she was an expert with trauma with all her experience in emergency rooms and 

probably the best and most experienced surgeon the brigade had, so that what’s 

drove his decision making.

JM: Are there any other issues from the intelligence perspective about this 

fi ght that you’d like to highlight or other points you’d like to make?

NF: No, I don’t think so.

JM: Well, thank you very much for your time today and for your service as 

well. It’s greatly appreciated.
71 

Captain Peter Glass

29 March 2006

MM: My name is Matt Matthews [MM] and I work for the Combat Studies 

Institute at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. I’m interviewing Captain Peter Glass [PG] 

who was the commander for Charlie Company, 3-8 [3d Battalion, 8th Cavalry 

Regiment (Armor)] during Operation Phantom Fury. This is an unclassifi ed interview. Why don’t you start out by giving me your full name and a little background 

on where you grew up, where you went to school, how you got commissioned and 

your assignments prior to Operation Phantom Fury.

PG: My name is Captain Peter Glass. I grew up with a military background. 

My father was in the military for 29 and a half years. I lived all over. I was born 

in Schaumburg, Illinois. I went to college at the Citadel and that’s where I got 

my commission through ROTC. My fi rst duty assignment was at Fort Stewart, 

Georgia, where I was an infantry rifl e platoon leader, a battalion adjutant and an 

infantry rifl e executive offi cer. After that, I went to the Advanced Course, CAS3 

[Combined Arms Service and Support School]. Then I went to Fort Bragg, North 

Carolina, where I was part of the XVIII Airborne Corps, and deployed to Afghanistan. I came back from Afghanistan and went to Fort Hood, Texas, and took over 

an armor company. Between coming home from Afghanistan and going to Fort 

Hood, I did a branch transfer to the armor branch and was selected for company 

command after being at Fort Hood for about three months. I took command of 

Charlie Company, 3-8. 

MM: Can you give me some background starting when you took over Charlie 

Company, 3-8 and when you were sent to Iraq? Did you go to Iraq with the company?

PG: Yes, sir. I took over command about two months before we went to Fort 

Polk to participate in JRTC [Joint Readiness Training Center] as the MRE/MRX 

[Mission Rehearsal Exercise] that they were doing at Fort Polk. I took command 

of the company on November 7, 2003, and deployed the company to Fort Polk. 

Came back from Fort Polk after conducting the MRE/MRX and then went to Iraq. 

I think we left for Iraq around March 17, 2004. I was cross-attached to 2-7 CAV 

[2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment] for the duration of the deployment. We actually went to JRTC with 2-7 CAV, conducted our training together, and we were 

with them the entire time through Iraq. We were stationed at Taji, Iraq, and then 

we were called upon to go to Najaf and then Fallujah. I got wounded on February 

6, 2005 – 

MM: In the Najaf operation?
72

PG: No, I got wounded while conducting a patrol in the Taji area. Then after 

that, I came home on February 17th and the company remained there until about 

March 12th when they pulled out.

MM: When you were in Najaf, were you actually working pretty closely with 

the Marines during that fi ght?

PG: Actually, not really. I didn’t see the Marines until the fi nal push when they 

started going in the inner circle. We worked kind of as a task force. It was just 2-7 

CAV that operated in the south and then I believe it was 1-5 CAV that operated in 

the north. The Marines came in with the 36th Commandos to actually go in within 

300 meters of the Imam Ali Mosque to start securing the northwestern corner and 

the buildings in there.

MM: The Marines thought you guys did a bang up job, from what I understand. You defi nitely got the Marines’ attention. Can you talk me through when 

you fi rst found out that you might be attached to Regimental Combat Team 1 and 

would have to participate in Operation Phantom Fury?

PG: We found out probably about a week before the operation was to commence, so it was probably around November 1st. Of course, we’d heard about it 

in the press and weren’t anticipating the Marines were going to specifi cally say, 

“Hey, we want the guys that were with us in Najaf.” We were elated to fi nd out that 

they thought so highly of us, that we had performed so well in Najaf that they had 

basically requested 2-7 CAV. That was what we were told. We weren’t told that 

they said, “Hey, Army, we need a mechanized infantry battalion with armor assets 

to come help us.” They basically asked for us by name. We received word around 

the 29th of October and left around the 1st of November to go out towards Fallujah 

and start intermingling with the Marines, getting under their planning process.

MM: Did you drive your track vehicles?

PG: Yes, sir. We drove them from Taji, Iraq, which is about 30 miles north of 

Baghdad, down through Baghdad. We skirted the northern portion of Baghdad and 

then we drove all the way out to Fallujah. 

MM: So we’re talking about 200 kilometers?

PG: Yes, sir. It wasn’t just my company that we had with us. We had additional HHC [Headquarters and Headquarters Company] assets and we had about 

25 Strykers from another unit that came with us at the last minute. They fell in on 

our serial; and since I was the company commander, they gave me the mission of 

being the serial commander with my XO and my fi rst sergeant. We all convoyed 

down there. It was about 14 tanks – you’re looking at about 35 to 40 vehicles in 

that serial.
73 

MM: Can you describe what the situation was when you rolled into Camp 

Fallujah and how you linked up with the Marines? Did you do any prior planning 

before this?

PG: Yes, sir. We rolled in and they already had tents set up for us. We parked 

our tanks right next to these tents. The motor pool was right there so we could go 

do services and get our equipment ready to go into Fallujah. At this time, the battalion staff was incorporated with the Marine Corps. So we had Major [Tim] Karcher, 

the S3, and Major [Scott] Jackson working with those guys while we were getting 

our company set and into the tents. Later on in the planning process, when they 

were getting ready to do their combined arms rehearsal, is actually when we sat 

down with the Marines and saw the big picture of what was going on in Fallujah. 

We’d been working in conjunction. The battalion staff was doing their own planning process and we kind of had a read of what was going to be expected of us. 

When we went to the combined arms rehearsal, we didn’t really have a speaking 

part because it was with Colonel [Michael] Shupp and Lieutenant Colonel [James] 

Rainey was doing the speaking. We were just sitting in the back going over in our 

mind what we were supposed to do, what RCT-7 was going to do, and what the 

whole 1st Marine Division was doing in the theater of operations, as well as the 

other 1st CAV assets that were there and anybody else that had been attached to 

the Marines for this operation. So that was the fi rst time we had actually sat down 

and did a combined arms rehearsal – and that was kind of just on the map. Later 

on that day and into the early next day, we did a combined arms rehearsal in our 

vehicles of the breach lane. We went up early on, did a recon and identifi ed the 

train tracks to the north of Fallujah. Those train tracks presented a serious obstacle 

for vehicles that have suspension – mainly my tanks. If we had gone up against 

those, we would have broken several road wheels making the mission inoperable. 

So the Marines went in and conducted a breach of the tracks, bulldozed them and 

opened a lane.

MM: That was right over the top of that railroad station and the railroad 

tracks?

PG: Yes, sir: the train station to the north. All those train tracks, we breached 

it to the west side of the train station. If you’re looking at your map right now, 

you can see where they all come together. That’s where they breached them, and I 

think it was about eight railroad tracks. That whole area south of the railroad tracks 

and north of the town was a suspected anti-tank, anti-personnel minefi eld. So we 

conducted a deliberate breach of that with our tanks. My fi rst platoon was in the 

lead under Lieutenant Thompson. They went in fi rst with the tank plow to push any 

mines that might be left behind and then proofed the lane with the roller.
74

MM: Was your company task organized? Did you have to give up a tank platoon and get a Bradley platoon or were you pure armor?

PG: No, sir. We had an infantry platoon. Lieutenant Benjamin Polanco was our 

infantry platoon leader. 

MM: Where did he come from?

PG: Alpha Company, 2-7.

MM: You gave up an armor platoon that went to Alpha 2-7?

PG: Yes, sir. I gave up Lieutenant Matthew Wojcik, 3d Platoon, Charlie Company, 3-8 that went to Alpha 2-7.

MM: What happens after you get through the breach and into the next 48 

hours?

PG: Before we entered the breach, there was a large air campaign that took 

out strategic targets, obviously oblivious to the company. We didn’t receive any 

fi re going through the breach. We actually thought we would. We turned up Phase 

Line April and headed due east up April. Came into Phase Line Henry, which runs 

north/south, and that was the boundary between RCT-1 and RCT-7. We were the 

furthest fl anking. 

MM: Any key events during the fi rst 48 hours after the breach? Were you under a lot of indirect and direct fi re? 

PG: We were held up at Phase Line Donna while we were waiting for Alpha 

Company and the rest of the Marines to move through. Alpha Company, 2-7 CAV 

was to secure the Jolan Park area and then the Marines were going to come through 

and clear that out. They cleared that sector in the fi rst 24 to 48 hours. We were 

taking sporadic small arms and RPGs [Rocket-Propelled Grenades]. We didn’t receive any mortars. We did see a lot of IEDs [Improvised Explosive Devices] and 

stuff like that, but they were not detonated against us. We just saw them on the 

road. We engaged those IEDs with our .50 cal and coax just to neutralize them, 

because in that operation we couldn’t afford the time to wait for EOD [Explosive 

Ordnance Disposal] to come out there. So once Alpha Company got in and secured 

Jolan, we kind of moved in unison with Alpha Company, securing their fl ank, and 

we moved all the way up to Phase Line Fran. We were held there while the Marines 

were dealing with securing the Jolan area and rooting out all the insurgents. That’s 

when they started doing that deliberate clearance, going house to house and room 

to room, and making sure they cleared. I would say within 36 hours, I had to go to 

the Martyrs Cemetery and secure that as my objective. That was supposed to be 

the endpoint and that was supposed to be the end of Operation Phantom Fury. We 

were going to secure that and they were going to continue to clear out the Jolan 

District. We got in there and received some small arms fi re. Basically everything 
75 

was south of Phase Line Fran. If you look at what we refer to as the “pizza slice,” 

Phase Line Fran is where – 

MM: Isn’t Phase Line Fran, Highway 10?

PG: Yes, I believe it is. It seemed like the larger concentration of enemy forces 

were down in that area south of Fran. South of Fran and into our battlespace, we 

received sporadic sniper fi re, mortar rounds and RPGs. It didn’t look like they had 

a defi ned defense. It looked like their defense got more elaborate as we pushed 

south. When I secured that, I put a platoon in the west, a platoon in the east and 

the infantry platoon had the inner cordon. They cleared all those schoolhouses in 

that area.

MM: By the 10th of November, you have gotten onto Highway 10 and headed 

west towards the bridges. Could you talk me through that?

PG: We went down under cover of darkness. From our experience in Najaf, we 

knew that the enemy didn’t fi ght at night. They tended to hunker down and gather 

themselves and rest. So we used the cover of darkness to get behind their lines, and 

we got in there and we drove to the west. We didn’t get all the way to the bridge. 

We hunkered down and held that area. Now, Alpha Company had a follow-on mission. After they secured the Jolan Park and the Marines had cleared all the buildings and done their actions on the objective, they actually went down and secured 

a foothold on the east side of the bridge across from the hospital. They secured that 

area and then the Marines went across and secured that. The company commander 

for that was Captain [Edward] Twaddell. The report I got was that that bridge was 

just covered with multiple IEDs. They were prepared to blow that in the event that 

that was our direction of attack. We had intel that the enemy believed we would 

not come from the north through the Jolan District, and that we were going to come 

from the south and head up to the north. That’s what they thought. We found this 

evidence later on when we pushed all the way to the southern portion of Fallujah. 

Some of their fi ghting positions were oriented south.

MM: Up to this point, have you taken any casualties? 

PG: We had several guys that received wounds from RPGs. The early morning 

of the 12th, they had actually hit the glass on the tank, shattered the glass around 

the cupola, and wounded the tank commander, Staff Sergeant Anibal Reyes. The 

gunner, Sergeant Jonathan B. Shields, was also wounded and he caught a fl ash 

burn from the RPG. It had actually shot through the glass and embedded behind 

the tank commander, so it missed him by inches.

MM: When you’re talking small arms fi re, you’re also including RPG-7s?
76

PG: Yes. RPG-7s and RPG-14s. I don’t know exactly what they were. I’m sure 

you’ve read reports. I’m sure most of them are classifi ed as far as the penetration 

we received.

MM: Captain Twaddell was saying that after his Bradley was hit, one of the 

tanks behind him blew up, which were his words. That must have been from your 

tank platoon and, still to this day, nobody seems to know what did that.

PG: Yes.

MM: Was there anybody wounded in that tank behind Twaddell.

PG: Yes. I believe it was a mortar round that may have hit the tops of the tanks. 

They also had some top-down RPG shots onto the tanks, and the RPG actually 

penetrated from the loader’s hatch and into the small part of the penetrator – not 

the RPG itself, but the penetrator went into the loader’s station and injured Specialist Brian Svendsen. He actually received two Purple Hearts during Fallujah.

MM: So when that tank caught on fi re, were you able to salvage that at all?

PG: Yes, sir. That tank rolled right back out. The reason it caught on fi re, besides the RPG and the small arms, they actually hit one of the thermite grenades 

and melted the grenade launcher on the tank. 

MM: After Alpha Company took the bridges and you received a change of 

mission to go south of Highway 10, can you talk me through what happens next?

PG: Yes. We were given the mission to continue to clear the Jolan District. At 

that point, it was my understanding that the task force’s mission was to secure the 

main highway between RCT-7 and RCT-1, which was Phase Line Henry. As you 

can see, Iraqi towns are square boxes and they’re made up with north, south, east 

and west running streets. When we received the follow-on mission, if you follow 

on the map – Phase Line Fran and Phase Line Grace. We split up and I had a tank 

platoon cover four lanes in the west, a tank platoon cover four north/south roads in 

the east, and my infantry platoon in the center. So we were platoons on line heading from Phase Line Fran to Phase Line Grace, and we went in and tried to identify 

insurgent positions and caches. We didn’t do any room-to-room clearing but we 

could identify them through our optics and stuff like that. Any vehicles we saw 

– intelligence suggested that those vehicles were suspected VBIEDs [Vehicle Born 

Improvised Explosive Device], because that’s where the majority of the VBIEDs 

in the Baghdad area of operations were coming from – from Fallujah. So any fi xed 

fi ghting positions we could identify – places with sand bags around windows and 

on buildings, any fortifi cations, and any cache we could identify we engaged. We 

continued to push down to Phase Line Grace and all the way down south to Phase 

Line Isabella and Phase Line Jenna in that same fashion.
77 

MM: As you’re coming down Route Henry, one of my maps shows your company veering off with three big arrows to the west from Henry. Are these individual 

platoons that you’re sending out?

PG: At this time, this was my company on line moving from Phase Line Fran 

to Grace. We hit Grace and continue to bound south to Phase Line Heather. Everybody bounded in unison, on line, by platoon, by company to Phase Line Heather 

and we continued on. Obviously, it took a little bit of time to maneuver through 

the narrow streets; and sometimes we couldn’t fi nd how to get through because 

the road wasn’t clear enough, so we would have to back up and fi nd another way 

through. Then the follow-on portion – the Marines would come through and clear 

every house between Phase Line Fran and Phase Line Grace with their dismounted 

forces to ensure we got out all the insurgents and fi ghting positions. They seemed 

to take fewer casualties when we went ahead of them with our tanks, so they wanted to continue this momentum. If you look on the map, there is a big empty fi eld 

in the vicinity of Phase Line Jenna right along Phase Line Henry. There’s a building there that we established our command post at, and that mosque was a defi nite 

enemy mosque. There were several caches in there. When we started coming down 

that way, we took multiple RPG rounds, small arms, IEDs; and it’s diffi cult when 

you’re buttoned up in a tank to differentiate between an IED explosion and a RPG, 

unless you get out after the fact and check the battle damage. But our tanks had 

taken so much battle damage: an RPG that blows up next to a road wheel looks the 

same as an IED, so we weren’t able to tell. But we knew we took a heavy volume 

of fi re from that mosque, and they were clearly fi ring from the mosque minaret at 

us with RPGs. So we backed up, engaged the mosque minaret; and once that was 

secure, we halted. It took us 24 to 48 hours to get there. We moved in there and 

held that piece of terrain through the rest of the fi ght. There was a house there and 

that was kind of our command post for the company. The tanks were holding key 

intersections. So I had from that intersection across from the mosque all the way up 

to Phase Line Fran, and we held each of those intersections with a tank section.

MM: Were there times while you were doing that that the Marines called and 

asked for help from a tank?

PG: Yes. After we held that area for a while, we were doing a lot of night runs. 

Before we actually moved towards that mosque, I had spoken to Lieutenant Colonel Rainey and said, “Sir, these guys aren’t fi ghting at night. I’d like to do some 

mini thunder runs.” We called them “mini” because obviously we can’t replace 

the 3d ID and the great work they did. We did that in the night and we didn’t get 

any enemy contact. It was like there was nobody out there. They were all hiding. I 

asked if we could do it during the day. Well, we did it during one day and my lead 

tank platoon fi red so many main gun rounds that I had to rotate them back to get 

more ammunition from our forward support company. I put the Bradleys that were 
78

trailing behind them on Phase Line Henry to continue to the fi ght, because we were 

taking such a large volume of fi re from that area near the mosque.

MM: When you went back to resupply your tanks, did you have to go back 

north up Henry out to the north side of the city to do that?

PG: Yes. If you’re looking at a Fallujah map, there is this “S” curve that we had 

to drive around and that was where the battalion TOC [Tactical Operations Center] 

was. They would push the ammo and fuel down past this embankment there so we 

could get back into the fi ght as soon as possible. But yes, we had to drive all the 

way back through the breach, get our resupply, and then go back down south.

MM: Who was fi ring indirect fi re for you? Was it an Army outfi t?

PG: Yes. I had a company fi re support offi cer who was assigned to our company and he was calling in the 120 millimeter mortars. I only fi red one mission 

with the mortars on a known sniper position. It was a building and that pretty much 

rendered the sniper ineffective. So that was the only fi re mission I had. They were 

always prepared to fi re for us, we just didn’t use them. I used a lot of the air assets 

we had. We worked with Lieutenant Colonel Ron Lewis. He’s out at Fort Irwin 

at NTC [National Training Center] right now, but we worked with him in Najaf 

and in Taji. They had our frequencies because they were a 1st CAV element, so 

we worked with them. Since they knew us from Taji, they dropped down to our 

company push and we would actually talk to Army Apaches. They would come in 

and do gun runs and fi re Hellfi res into buildings that we weren’t having effects on 

with our 120s.

MM: Can you talk me through to 20 November when you withdrew and maybe any other incidents that happened between there and the 20th?

PG: Yes. I’d like to talk about the casualties we suffered. Remember I was 

talking about Staff Sergeant Reyes, the tank commander that got hit by a RPG, the 

gunner that got a fl ash burn and the loader who took some shrapnel as well. Because of our battalion aid station and because we were on the move, I put our company command post/aid station with Alpha Company’s CP, because they were in a 

holding pattern waiting for us to continue moving south. That tank crew made the 

smart choice to try and go to the battalion aid station. As they were going through 

the breach, the tank fl ipped and rolled. By this time, my company fi rst sergeant had 

actually linked up with Staff Sergeant Reyes at the site of the breach point. That 

was our alternate plan. They transferred the casualties. Staff Sergeant Reyes had 

gotten off and Specialist Edwin Modeste had gotten off and they were cross-loaded. Sergeant Jonathan Shields had actually taken over as tank commander. He was 

the gunner, and even though he was wounded, he realized that the tank had to get 

back because it wasn’t functioning properly. It took shrapnel to the main gun and 

they were worried about penetration on the sleeve of the main gun. As they were 
79 

taking it back, they fell into a deep hole on the side of the road that no one knew 

about. The tank actually rolled and fl ipped and instantly killed Sergeant Shields. It 

rolled on top of him and crushed him. Specialist Troy Caicedo was the driver of the 

tank at the time. He survived, but Sergeant Shields didn’t make it. We didn’t take 

any other casualties from my company other than him. We continued the mission. 

We stayed in that area and operated out of our CP. Using those grid squares, we’d 

go in and clear the streets and avenues of approach, engaging fi xed and fortifi ed 

positions with our main guns, as well as houses that were obviously fortifi ed. And 

we had great effects. The Marines were going into buildings and fi nding lots of 

stuff. I got one report that they found six enemy KIA [Killed in Action]. They had 

weapons and a cache in there, but they were all embedded with concrete in their 

bodies from the 120s. So we called these “mini” gun runs. Similar to what the helicopters would do – kind of circling around a target, engaging fi xed positions. Then 

the Marines would come through. My tank got taken out by an anti-tank mine, 

probably around November 17th or 18th.

MM: When you say it was taken out, did it just blow the track?

PG: It blew the track off, blew the road wheels off. It actually penetrated behind the loader and the ammo well of the tank. We didn’t receive any secondary 

explosions, but there was a hole in there.

MM: Were you wounded again on this?

PG: No, sir. It lifted the tank up, knocked out the communications. My XO had 

to come up there, hook up to our tank. Specialist Alvin Holloway got out, hooked 

up the tank, and we drove off. Evac’d that tank and I jumped on another tank with 

the rest of my crew. I gave my 1st Platoon some down time because they had taken 

that casualty. We continued to push and went past the city all the way out to the 

farm country where we identifi ed a two-story house that had sand bags in it that 

was oriented south. We engaged that with main guns and destroyed that building. 

Then we pulled up to that building and waited. That was our fi nal set. The Marines 

would call and ask to clear certain grids. They would give me a box to go clear and 

I would assign a platoon. We would clear those grids and then the Marines would 

come through and clear each of those buildings. 

MM: When I interviewed Colonel Shupp on Saturday, he just thinks you guys 

walked on water. Can you tell me what it was like working with the Marines? Did 

you have any problems? I know Captain Twaddell told me that there were a few 

incidents when Marines had stumbled in and he didn’t know they were out there.

PG: The problem with working with the Marines is that there’s no common 

operating picture. What I mean by that is we have FBCB2 [Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below]; we’re able to see ourselves and see where our forces 
80

are arrayed on the battlefi eld. They don’t have that. I think they use something else, 

but it’s not compatible.

MM: What about Blue Force Tracker?

PG: I didn’t notice any Blue Force Trackers on any of their vehicles. I know 

that our Humvees all had them, so we were able to know our location. But I’d have 

to call up to the battalion TOC every night to fi nd out what units were on my left 

and right, because I was on the border of both RCT-1 and RCT-7. I wanted to make 

sure there weren’t any Marines on my left and right. There were a couple incidents 

where my guys were securing a corner and they saw some Marines run across the 

street falling back from small arms fi re. They wanted to go over there and help 

them, but I told them that they can’t just run over there and do that. It’s a totally 

different brigade-sized element. To cross somebody’s battlespace, we had to get 

permission and coordinate that kind of stuff. Luckily they didn’t, because they saw 

the tanks pull up and then they fi red at the buildings that the Marines were taking 

some heavy small arms fi re from. I don’t know what their capabilities were. I know 

that the Army has FBCB2 and Blue Force Tracker and that’s the way we track the 

battlefi eld. I had to call the battalion TOC to fi nd out where they were placed on 

the battlefi eld, other than using the eyes that we had and the scopes that we had. I 

really didn’t like doing that, because then you had a weapon pointed at them if you 

were using your scope and it kind of made me nervous.

MM: Colonel Shupp said he was amazed at what the tanks could do and what 

the 120 millimeter mortars could do, and he said that the medic tracks saved countless lives of his Marines.

PG: Yes. We actually had two Marine engineers with us. They got injured 

and we got them out of there. Being a tank company and with an infantry platoon 

attached to me, all my seats were taken. We had the loader seats available on the 

tank, and I wanted to get them into the fi ght. I thought they brought another asset 

to us we didn’t have, other capabilities we could bear down on the enemy. They 

were actually both wounded within the fi rst fi ve to six days. 

MM: Were they in the tank when this happened?

PG: Yes. We didn’t have any infantry casualties when they were dismounted. 

It seemed like the majority of the casualties came from RPGs and small arms fi re, 

more so the RPGs fi red at us when we maneuvered.

MM: When these two Marine engineers were injured, was everybody buttoned 

up and it was just something hitting the tank?

PG: There were times when they were maneuvering back to get fuel and stuff 

like that. We have a heavy fuel load and have to go back every four hours and get 

fuel. So we had a section going back and, basically, once they passed coalition 
81 

force lines, they would roll open hatched – and they were actually open hatched 

and they caught shrapnel. Not a direct bullet or anything like that. I know you 

probably want some other names and such.

MM: I’d like to identify the S1, the S2, the S3, the S4 and the battalion maintenance offi cer. I haven’t been able to identify those individuals and get their 

emails.

PG: The S1 is out of the Army. The S2, I can get you all that stuff. Have you 

talked to Lieutenant Colonel Rainey?

MM: I have not been able to track him down. And, quite frankly, I have just 

now gotten into the 2-7, because I started out with 2-2. Now I’m trying to put together the full picture of 2-7 and get that organized. I am missing the staff guys. 

I’ve got all the key commanders and I interviewed Tim Karcher. He gave me some 

good stuff and he’s apparently heading back to Iraq at some point soon. Is there 

anything else you’d like to throw out there on how you think this mission went?

PG: There were a couple times when it got hairy and there were a couple close 

calls with blue on blue, or fratricide, just because the common operating picture 

between the Army and the Marines is not there. I think if the coalition forces are 

going to continue to do operations like this, we need to have a broad spectrum 

where everybody shares the same stuff, has the same picture and has the same 

FBCB2, Blue Force Tracker, so we can continue to do operations and function like 

this. I think that’s really it.

MM: Thank you very much.

83 

Captain Jeff Jager

17 May 2006

MM: My name is Matt Matthews and I work for the Combat Studies Institute 

at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Today is 17 May 2006 and I’m interviewing Captain 

Jeff Jager (JJ) who served as a lieutenant in 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry Regiment, or 

Task Force 2-2, during Operation Phantom Fury, and he was also a liaison offi cer 

(LNO) to Regimental Combat Team 7 (RCT-7) during this time. Could you please 

give me some background on yourself, where you were born, how you got commissioned and the assignments you had prior to Operation Phantom Fury?

JJ: Sure. My name is Captain Jeff Jager. I’m from a small town in western 

Michigan. I was commissioned out of West Point in the class of 2000 and, from 

there, I went to Fort Benning for the Infantry Offi cer Basic Course (IOBC). After 

that, I went to Ranger School and a couple other schools and then I went off to 

2-2 Infantry in Vilseck, Germany, where I spent just under four years. With 2-2, I 

served as a rifl e platoon leader in Alpha Company. I was a battalion mortar platoon 

leader. I was the executive offi cer (XO) for Alpha 2-2 and then I moved to the battalion operations shop (S3) where I served in a myriad of different duty positions 

in the 15 months or so I was there.

MM: Could you give me some background on what you were doing when you 

fi rst arrived in Iraq and the events leading up to Operation Phantom Fury?

JJ: I arrived in Iraq about three weeks after the rest of the battalion. I joined 

them in Kuwait about two weeks after they deployed. I attended the Special Forces 

Assessment and Selection (SFAS) in January 2004 and then I came back to 2-2 

as I withdrew from training, from SFAS, and was ready to permanent change of 

station (PCS) to Fort Benning to attend the Infantry Captains Career Course. I had 

a [inaudible] slot and everything lined up. There was no stop move/stop loss on 

my part because I was still in the SFAS program, but my unit deployed me to Iraq 

and I went. In Kuwait, I spent about three weeks pushing forward the battalion’s 

equipment that was left behind and didn’t go forward on the ground assault convoy. There were transportation issues and we needed to push our tracks and other 

vehicles forward, so I was an infantry offi cer in charge (OIC) for that event. Then 

I joined 2-2 in early March of ’04 at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Normandy, 

Iraq. When I arrived there, I spent about six weeks without a real job. I was the 

special projects offi cer and the “Hey you” guy for the S3 shop. There was a bunch 

of captains in the S3 shop and there was not a lot that I did for about the fi rst four 

weeks. The battalion received a [inaudible] mission to go down to Najaf in April 

and I became a battle captain. When I returned, I continued those duties as the 
84

senior battle captain and then I began change of command inventories for Charlie 

2-2.

MM: When you went down to Najaf, did you work with the Marines at all?

JJ: I read in some of the other interviews you did that we may have interacted 

with the Marine Corps in Najaf but, to my knowledge, no. It was entirely an Army 

experience. 3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division (ID) was the brigade headquarters, 

2-2 had a battalion-minus, and then there were two other battalions – one Stryker 

battalion and one light infantry battalion out of Hawaii. These battalions were under 3d Brigade’s control for the initial part of that operation. I don’t remember any 

Marine interaction.

MM: When did you fi rst get an indication that something might be happening 

in Fallujah and Task Force 2-2 might get that mission?

JJ: I think it was at the beginning of October 2004 when I, as a battle captain, 

fi rst started hearing the concept that we might deploy to Fallujah under the Marine 

Corps. It wasn’t anything offi cial; it was all word of mouth and email traffi c. There 

were no offi cial orders or anything. We didn’t receive offi cial orders until quite 

late into the process. We conducted a lunch meeting that really served as our fi rst 

reconnaissance or briefi ng from RCT-7 at the beginning of October. That was the 

fi rst time we went down; and that was when the battalion commander and staff, 

along with some brigade planners and logistics offi cers, went to RCT-7 headquarters in western Iraq and received a briefi ng from Colonel Craig Tucker and his S3 

on what they were looking at for Fallujah.

MM: It’s my understanding that, at some point, you traveled down to Camp 

Fallujah with the brigade commander and Major John Reynolds, the Task Force 

2-2 S3, for some sort of link up with RCT-7. Is this true?

JJ: We fi rst went to RCT-7 headquarters for the initial meeting in early October 

and it was probably two or three weeks after that when things were pretty fl uid and 

we didn’t really know what was going on. We kind of had the feeling that we were 

going to end up going and, as soon as we got the initial warning order – and I’m 

really not even sure if it was offi cial or if the task organization had even become 

effective. But we started receiving email traffi c from RCT-7 that we were going to 

be fi ghting with them, so the battalion began the parallel planning process.

MM: You were actually left there as an LNO, correct?

JJ: Yes. I’d been given the warning order in early October that I would probably be the LNO that deployed. Colonel Tucker actually requested that we send a 

planner to assist with the integration of our capabilities, which we held off on for a 

while because we didn’t know when we were going to go. As soon as the battalion 

commander and the S3 felt we were really going to do it, that was when they left 
85 

me behind at Camp Baharia to serve as LNO. That was the end of October. Around 

the 27th or 28th of October, the task force conducted another recon and, this time, 

they went to Camp Fallujah. Camp Baharia sits just north of Camp Fallujah; it’s 

pretty much connected and that’s where the RCT-7 headquarters was. That was the 

meeting where Colonel Dana Pittard, Lieutenant Colonel Peter Newell, Major Ken 

Adgie – the battalion staff – conducted a meeting with the RCT-7 staff. Colonel 

Tucker chaired that meeting. After that is when I remained behind with three other 

individuals to serve as a liaison team.

MM: Were you the only LNO left there?

JJ: No. I was the OIC of the liaison team. For 2-2, we deployed myself, Lieutenant Chris Lacour – who was the fi re support offi cer (FSO) under Captain James 

Cobb, who was the OIC of the fi re support element. But he mostly served in a civil 

affairs (S5) capacity through Iraq until we went to places like Najaf and Fallujah 

where he took over as the FSO. So Chris was the OIC of the lethal fi res cell. We 

also had an intel specialist and Captain Jeff Beauchamp, who was one of the senior 

battle captains at brigade. He deployed as the brigade LNO to RCT-7 and really 

helped out a lot with transmitting information to brigade to keep them situationally 

aware.

MM: What were your impressions initially when you were there performing 

these liaison missions with the Marines? Did you get an understanding of the operational plan at that time?

JJ: Before I deployed, Major Reynolds had given me some very specifi c tasks 

to accomplish as an LNO. The fi rst one was to understand the command and control structure of RCT-7: how they talk, how they reported, what they did. The 

second one was to fi gure out their operational plan. The third one was to fi gure 

out how they used their targeting process to prosecute targets. The fourth was to 

fi nd and recon the task force attack position. The fi fth and fi nal one was to fi nd 

and recon the battalion living area and where the tactical operations center (TOC) 

was going to be located. So I had an idea of what I needed to do as an LNO. When 

I fi rst arrived, we almost immediately began plugging into the RCT-7 command 

and control structure, trying to understand what they did. The way we were able 

to do that was through three techniques. The fi rst was that RCT-7 conducted twoa-day battle update briefs chaired by Colonel Tucker, where the last 12 hours of 

operations were briefed in pretty excruciating detail, and then the next 24 and 48 

hours were briefed as well. Those two-a-day meetings really read me into the current operations that RCT-7 executed – and they executed quite a bit of preparatory 

fi res weeks out from when we actually conducted the attack, to mitigate the number of enemy in Fallujah. The second technique that helped a lot was that RCT7 executed a once-daily targeting meeting. During the meeting, RCT-7 intel and 
86

fi re support sections briefed Colonel Tucker with what battle damage they caused 

over the last 24 hours through close air support (CAS) and indirect fi res, and then 

recommended targets for the next 24 hours. Through this process, we were able to 

see what they were doing as far as targeting the enemy in the RCT-7 sector prior 

to the attack.

MM: Were these targeting missions also targeting Task Force 2-2’s area as 

well?

JJ: Let me talk about the other two mediums that helped me understand the 

operational plan as well, and then I’ll address that question. The other two mediums were interaction with the RCT-7 S3 and future plans offi cer, two lieutenant 

colonels. When we established our LNO section, they put us in the operations 

tent, which is where the S3 and the future operations offi cer worked out of, so we 

were able to personally interact with them to explain what were the capabilities 

of 2-2 and understand what they needed us to do and what their expectations of 

an Army mechanized infantry battalion were. Those mediums were the ones that 

allowed us to get a situational awareness of not only the operations that RCT-7 

conducted prior to the attack on Fallujah, but what their plan was for the attack. 

To address your question of whether they were targeting 2-2’s sector initially – no, 

they weren’t. In my mind, the RCT-7 plan initially was for 2-2 to establish blocking positions in the southeast section of the city. But that mission eventually went 

to another Army element, which gave RCT-7 the ability to use 2-2 in the attack 

rather than in a blocking position. RCT-7 had initially planned to bypass the eastern part of their sector. Initial intel sort of said that the eastern portion was less 

heavily populated with enemy and can probably be bypassed, allowing the Marine 

Corps’ two organic battalions to focus on the more densely populated enemy areas 

and then come back and clean up the eastern part of the city. So in those fi rst few 

targeting meetings we realized, between Lieutenant Lacour and the intel specialist, 

that they weren’t targeting anything in our sector. From that meeting, we sat down 

afterwards and said we knew there were enemy there. Lieutenant Lacour and the 

intel specialist developed a fi re support matrix requesting the servicing of targets in 

2-2’s sector, which RCT-7 began to fi re. I don’t have the data on what targets they 

actually fi red or what the battle damage was.

MM: Did they start fi ring missions for you?

JJ: Yes, they did. We weren’t the main effort for the RCT, but because they 

were focused on the more densely populated areas of their sector, they had not considered fi ring in our area. But as soon as we developed that fi re support plan and 

integrated that into the RCT-7 plan, they began servicing targets in 2-2’s sector. I 

think that really reduced the enemy’s presence. 

MM: Were you reporting back every day to Major Reynolds?
87 

JJ: At the end of every day, we would either call or send an email, or both send 

an email and call. Usually send the email and then call to verify receipt. Captain 

Tom Mitchell was the battle captain and he and I shared battle captain duties – 12 

on and 12 off – and then I deployed, so he and Captain Cameron Dow took over my 

position back at FOB Normandy when I left. It took us a couple days to establish 

any kind of email connectivity with battalion, so the fi rst couple days I was there 

were all telephone conversations where I listed the lessons learned, the operational 

intelligence, and fi re support routes for Major Reynolds to disseminate amongst 

the staff and commanders. There was frustration initially in how the Army and 

Marine systems didn’t talk easily together. We had four secure internet protocol 

router (SIPR) computers between members of the LNO team, and all of us had our 

own, but RCT-7 was operating pretty austerely. They weren’t at their home base 

camp; they just had their organic commo equipment so they were very limited in 

the number of drops they could give us. They gave us one SIPR drop and it took 

a couple days to get our computers confi gured so we could talk on their SIPR line 

back to 2-2 or any Army element. It wasn’t like we could just take our computer, 

unplug it from our SIPR drop, plug it into the Marine Corps SIPR drop and have it 

work. The RCT-7 commo guys – the signal offi cer himself was the guy who fi nally 

got us connectivity on our computer. We also had the same sort of problems with 

telephones. Initially, we couldn’t dial an Army number from the Marine Corps 

phone at all. It took a couple days but, eventually, the RCT-7 signal guys were able 

to fi gure out how to let us call back to FOB Normandy, but they could only give us 

one line that they could confi gure that way. They had to use all the others to talk 

to their chain of command. So the number we got, we established as the 2-2 TOC. 

But to call anybody else, like brigade or any other Army phone number, we had 

to go back through Germany, to a switchboard in Germany, to have them patch us 

into the Army network, which limited our ability but at least we were still able to 

communicate.

MM: I get the impression that, during this time, you guys are sending a lot of 

information back to the S3. Do you know what he was doing with all this information? Was he forwarding it to the task force commander, Lieutenant Colonel 

Newell, who, it’s my understanding, was on leave during this time?

JJ: I’m not sure what overall impact his being on leave had on us. I can only talk 

from personal experience. I wasn’t real read up on LNO integration but I looked at 

FM 5-01.12, which is Joint Task Force LNO Integration. Had I read that document 

prior to deploying, I would have known what I needed to do as an LNO; and part 

of that is knowing my battalion commander’s intent and specifi c tasks for me as the 

LNO. I didn’t have that because the battalion commander was on leave, so the XO 

and S3 were pulling double duty there. I had some good guidance from the S3 on 

what to execute, but that was the S3’s guidance and not the battalion commander’s. 
88

The entire time I was in Fallujah, I was operating off the S3’s guidance, which 

wasn’t the same as what the battalion commander’s guidance would be given how 

things changed after the battalion commander got in the loop when he arrived back 

on the ground. I’m not sure what happened to the information I sent back via SIPR 

email to the S3. I know most of it didn’t go to the people it should have gone to. 

Tom Mitchell sent me a note when I told him I was writing a monograph about my 

LNO experience. He was a battle captain back at FOB Normandy. He would know 

I had called and verifi ed that Major Reynolds got the notes I was sending. Tom 

commented that there wasn’t good dissemination of what information I was sending back. The stuff I was sending back was mostly in regard to the current Fallujah 

set – what RCT-7 was doing to set the conditions, what the intel picture said about 

what the enemy was doing inside, how RCT-7 was targeting our sector, what we 

experienced when we were there, and what lessons we learned.

MM: You said in your previous email to me that you actually stood up on 

5 November and were going to brief the 1st Marine Division (MARDIV) commander, General Richard Natonski, on what you believed was the course of action. 

Did that somehow change?

JJ: Going back to the military decision-making process (MDMP), the fi rst part 

is receipt of the mission; and when I left FOB Normandy at the end of October, we 

conducted a modifi ed MDMP at the battalion level. I say modifi ed because without 

the battalion commander’s input, it’s kind of hard to do an MDMP properly, so it 

was modifi ed. I knew the plan for what the S3 had put together because I was a 

battle captain and in the area when he was developing it. I knew what he wanted 

to do, and part of my job as the LNO is to go to these rock drills and rehearsals 

and brief 2-2’s part of the RCT-7 plan. Around the 3d or 4th of November, when 

Lieutenant Colonel Newell got back, there was a fi nal division-level rehearsal for 

the operation and the Task Force 2-2 staff. The commander and the company commanders were required for the rehearsal and getting them from FOB Normandy to 

Camp Fallujah was hard, so they didn’t arrive in time to start the division rehearsal. 

I was prepared to brief the plan, as I knew it from the S3, in the division rehearsal. I 

had actually been briefi ng for about fi ve minutes when the task force arrived to the 

rehearsal. Major Reynolds allowed me to continue until he realized that I hadn’t 

been briefed on the new plan and then he stopped me and started the brief over. I 

wasn’t back at FOB Normandy so I don’t know what exactly happened. I know 

this was the fi rst time the company commanders had seen the battalion commander’s course of action. Major Reynolds briefed it to the division commander during 

the rehearsal and then, afterwards, Lieutenant Colonel Newel and the company 

commanders took a knee around the digital imagery blow up of Task Force 2-2’s 

sector. Lieutenant Colonel Newell gave them their task and purpose and what the 

concept of the operation was, what the course of action was. It differed pretty 
89 

signifi cantly from what I had been briefi ng. I wasn’t at FOB Normandy so I’m 

not sure at what point the S3 was able to establish SIPR connectivity and send his 

plan back to the battalion commander. Apparently, Lieutenant Colonel Newell was 

able to review the S3’s plan while back in Germany, but he wasn’t able to infl uence it until he came back to Iraq, to FOB Normandy. It’s my understanding that 

once Lieutenant Colonel Newell returned to FOB Normandy, the staff stayed up 

all night conducting an MDMP, based on the colonel’s directed course of action, 

and produced a new course of action, which is what Major Reynolds briefed in the 

division rehearsal the following day. Then Lieutenant Colonel Newell briefed the 

company commanders after the rehearsal.

MM: One of your jobs as the LNO was also to go and fi nd potential attack 

positions for Task Force 2-2. Can you tell me a little bit more about that?

JJ: One of the directed tasks Major Reynolds gave me before I left was to fi nd 

where our attack position was, recon it, and make sure it’s what we need. Doing a 

map recon was fairly easy. Route Mobile, which runs north to south past Fallujah 

on the eastern side of the town, sits on a large earthen berm which provides cover 

and concealment from direct fi re from the city of Fallujah. The Marines were planning on establishing their attack positions to the far side of that berm. The future 

operations offi cer for RCT-7 said we had two or three choices. We could go north, 

south or east and establish our attack positions there. The map recon was easy, but 

actually conducting the reconnaissance proved a little more diffi cult based on the 

fact that I had no transportation assets myself and RCT-7 was pretty busy executing their preparations for combat. It was pretty hard to coordinate a ride up to see 

the attack position, and also given the fact that the enemy threat in that area was 

pretty high. I tried for a couple days to coordinate an event with staff sections of 

RCT-7 and just couldn’t make it happen. So, on the 2d of November at the evening 

battle update brief, I briefed that as 2-2’s outstanding issue and said I really had to 

get up there to see the attack position. A couple hours later, Colonel Tucker stopped 

me and said, “Look, the personal security detachment and I are going on a battlefi eld circulation patrol tomorrow. We’re going up that way so I want you to come 

with us and I’ll get you in to see the attack position.” So the next morning, Captain 

Beauchamp and I joined Colonel Tucker’s battlefi eld circulation patrol and went 

on a combat patrol with them to the attack position. We started off at Camp Fallujah and went north along the military bypass and went to the attack position. It 

was exactly what we needed for a battalion mechanized task force: huge two to 

three square kilometers of open desert covered by a large earthen berm. Vulnerable 

to indirect fi re, as it was only about 500 meters from the eastern edge of Fallujah, 

but it was the best location we could have. There were two Marine battalions in 

RCT-7 that had their attack positions farther to the north of Fallujah, but that made 

sense because their sectors were further west, so we were okay to go east more 
90

than north and establish our attack position there. I rode in Colonel Tucker’s command light armored vehicle (LAV), which allowed me to stand up in the back and 

see everything while we were driving down the road. Going on this recon proved 

helpful later in the operation.

MM: When Lieutenant Colonel Newell and Major Reynolds arrived, did they 

issue an operations order?

JJ: Let me back up real quick. After we identifi ed the attack position, Colonel 

Tucker decided he wanted to show me Fallujah, so we headed south over Route 

Mobile past Fallujah. By doing that, I was able to identify our sector completely. 

I was able to decide, just by visible inspection, that the railroad track north of Fallujah, which we had thought was going to be a pretty major obstacle, wasn’t going to cause that much challenge for us. The railroad track was on a berm maybe 

three to four feet high, and a tank or Bradley could easily drive over it without any 

breaching at all.

MM: Let me get this straight. There was a railroad track on a berm, not a separate railroad track and a berm?

JJ: From my visual inspection there wasn’t. I’ll never forget it because, right 

after this, it was the fi rst fi refi ght I’d ever been in. We had been operating under 

the assumption that the eastern part of Fallujah was a shantytown. The overhead 

imagery sort of indicated that the buildings were more sparsely laid out and there 

didn’t seem to be that much intel on sightings of enemy or reports of enemy in that 

area. But as soon as we passed the railroad track, we started taking fi re – rocket 

propelled grenades (RPGs), machine gun and small arms fi re. In the after-action 

report (AAR), the chief warrant offi cer in charge of the colonel’s patrol estimated 

that between a section and a platoon of insurgents had ambushed us there. There 

were some unity-of-command issues because Colonel Tucker knew it wasn’t his 

sector at that time. It belonged to somebody else, they hadn’t cut it to RCT-7, and 

the warrant offi cer wanted to stay and destroy the enemy by calling in CAS and 

indirect fi res. So we stayed on Route Mobile and got shot at for about two minutes 

while the two of them worked it out, and then they lost commo with the lead vehicle. As soon as everybody got their ducks in a row, we started heading out. That 

event said to me that the eastern portion of Fallujah wasn’t exactly a shantytown. 

The buildings were of the same construction as the interior box, which are more 

heavily populated with buildings, but here they were just more sparsely laid out. 

There was defi nitely enemy presence there. They put a pretty good ambush on us.

MM: Did you have a hand in the fi nal operations order that was published?

JJ: It’s my personal belief that we never published a fi nal operations order. 

We had an extensive rehearsal – a two-and-a-half to three-hour rehearsal – where 

everybody knew what they were doing. We also had a pretty extensive back brief 
91 

after the rehearsal where the company commanders, in detail, back briefed their 

plan to the battalion commander. I think the back brief morphed into an op order. It 

was a very good back brief, but I don’t believe there was a fi nal op order or a fi nal 

warning order that was published to the company commanders. The back brief and 

rehearsals were good techniques to make sure everybody knew what they were 

doing; but as far as an operations order published based on the colonel’s directed 

course of action, I don’t remember that happening.

MM: Can you tell me about what happened when Task Force 2-2 realized that 

the Marines were using this SIPRNET chat that went out even to their forward 

locations?

JJ: Yes, I would defi nitely like to talk about that. Part of my tasking from Major 

Reynolds was to fi nd out how RCT-7 talked and conducted command and control. 

I was able to fi gure out that they used chat to communicate from battalion to RCT. 

I don’t know what they used for battalion command and control, but their primary 

means of communication at the RCT level was SIPR chat. I understood that in the 

TOC by way of interaction with their watch offi cers and their battle staff. That’s 

how they conducted operations. I didn’t understand that they had the ability to position that asset forward in a tactical command post (TAC) or a forward command 

and control element, but that’s what they had. I’m not sure what system it was or 

how they did it, but the RCT-7 FM command net was a pretty quiet net. We were 

pretty much the only people that talked on it, because the RCT conducted command and control over chat. It was very effective and we eventually had the ability 

to do that in our TOC at Camp Fallujah, where the battle captain and Major Erik 

Krivda were able to maintain situational awareness of what was going on across 

the RCT. But we didn’t have that ability forward with us. I think that’s one of the 

things that, had I recognized that fact earlier, it would have paid huge dividends 

for us in the fi ght. I wasn’t aware of this, but I read in your interviews with Lieutenant Colonel Newell and Major Reynolds that they said a lot of their situational 

awareness came from the direct downlink that their media had, from the television 

stations covering the event. That just indicates to me that we didn’t have very 

good situational awareness at the RCT level. We couldn’t monitor what the other 

battalions were telling the RCT because they didn’t call them on the FM net; they 

told them on SIPR chat. We had the ability to monitor that SIPR chat back at our 

TOC in Fallujah, but the only effective system we had to transmit messages from 

the TOC at Camp Fallujah to the TAC – which is where the colonel and the S3 

were forward – was the Blue Force Tracker. This is a good system but slow. It’s 

not an interactive chat program where I type something, somebody acknowledges 

and then asks for further details like a conversation. It’s chat versus email, so it’s 

slower. Even though our TOC and TAC were only separated by less than 10 kilometers, we had almost no FM communication between them. There was something 
92

that caused the radios not to work very well. The TOC had situational awareness 

at the RCT level but I would say the TAC didn’t have it as good as it should have, 

had I fi gured out that we needed that SIPR chat system forward. 

MM: Could the folks in the TAC actually pick up the FM radio and get RCT-7 

on the phone?

JJ: Yes. When we wanted to talk to RCT-7, they answered.

MM: So there was somebody there monitoring the FM radio?

JJ: Right. They had an FM radio, and that’s how Colonel Tucker fi gured out 

where Lieutenant Colonel Newell was during the fi ght and was able to come and 

see us every day during the fi ght. It was a quiet net and we only reported the signifi cant events we had. I think the way we reported to the RCT over FM, they had 

a good understanding of what we were doing, but we didn’t have a good grasp on 

what they were doing. Tom Mitchell and I switched out every few days. I did the 

fi rst 72 hours and Tom did the next 48 and we switched back and forth about every 

two days after that. As the glorifi ed radio/telephone operator (RTO) in the back 

of the S3’s Humvee, I didn’t know what was going on with the Marine battalion 

adjacent to us as well as we should have. The guys in the TOC did, because they 

were on SIPR chat and knew what was happening.

MM: Were you guys aware of the problems with the breach that 3d Battalion, 

1st Marine Regiment (3/1) had getting into the city?

JJ: The events after we crossed the line of departure (LD) are very confusing 

to me. Once the battalion arrived and I ceased being an LNO and started being a 

battle captain, I became more of a glorifi ed RTO. We had Blue Force Tracker, two 

FM radios, the high frequency (HF) radio. We had the driver, the S3, me, a gunner 

and an interpreter. There was no RTO there, so I became the RTO. I have all my 

original notes of what happened from the second we LD’d until I left 72 hours later. We could recreate these notes and look at them and be able to see what I wrote 

down when I was on the radio, but the exact sequence of events from LD until 

mission complete have morphed a little bit in my mind, based on different people’s 

perceptions of events after the fact. After we got back from Fallujah, I became the 

operational writer for what happened in Fallujah. I took my notes, which covered 

the fi rst 72 hours and then every other 48 hours after that. I took Tom Mitchell’s 

notes, which did the same thing when he was the TAC OIC. I took the DA Form 

1594 from the TOC – where the RTO and the battle NCO, under the supervision 

of Tom and myself, under Captain Krivda – I took those three documents, typed 

them up and made a minute-by-minute and sometimes a second-by-second log of 

what happened sequentially based on our notes. That became about a 35 to 40 page 

document that walks from LD to the end of the operation based on the notes taken 
93 

at the time. Initially, I think that was a pretty solid document but I haven’t seen it 

in two years and I don’t know what happened to it.

MM: I actually have a copy of that here.

JJ: When it was initially produced, it was a very accurate minute-by-minute 

compilation, a digital copy of the handwritten notes we took. I have the notes 

right in front of me here. I’m not sure, though, that that document is as accurate 

as it once was, based on different people’s perceptions of what may or may not 

have happened. But to answer your breach question, the Marines to our west were 

having trouble breaching. They did use our breach for their tank platoon and their 

medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) vehicles. We knew they were having problems 

breaching, but it didn’t become evident to us until they called and asked us if they 

could use our breach, which they did and continued to do, which was fi ne. There 

was no real fatal funnel there at the breach because of that. It was just a simple 

event as they bypassed us and went about their business.

MM: Can you give me your opinion and your overall assessment of Task Force 

2-2 in this operation?

JJ: I’d actually like to address some other things, if you don’t mind.

MM: Sure.

JJ: From some of these other interviews I’ve read – and I’ve got them all sitting right here in front of me – I just want to go through and address some of these 

things from my perspective. In the end, you’re going to write an article and you’re 

going to have to pick which side of the story you choose to believe. Let’s start 

with Major, now Lieutenant Colonel, Reynolds’ interview. He talks about an Air 

Force-published grid box system for the Fallujah area of operations (AO), which 

existed. However, he states that we initially developed that and then the Air Force 

took it and produced it. I think it already existed prior to us building ours. When we 

got to Fallujah, we realized they had a better system than we did so we went with 

theirs. That document was great. It was overhead imagery with a grid box system 

for the entire city of Fallujah and it’s what we used for command and control and 

reporting purposes. Major Reynolds seems to think that it started with us and then 

transformed into an Air Force product, but I’m pretty sure it started with the Air 

Force and ours just wasn’t as good as theirs. Major Reynolds makes a statement on 

page eight of his interview that says, “Unfortunately, Jeff didn’t get to see much, 

due to his position inside the LAV.” He’s talking about Colonel Tucker and me 

when we went to recon the attack position assembly area. I know we’ve already 

discussed this, but that’s simply a factual untruth and I wanted to point that out. 

Major Reynolds and Lieutenant Colonel Newell both talk about the fact that we 

were enemy-oriented in Fallujah, where we wanted to destroy organized resistance 

instead of getting to a certain point on the map. But both of them also say that we 
94

wanted to get to Fran, which is Highway 10 running east/west across the middle 

of Fallujah, as fast as possible. It has always been my opinion that we were terrain-oriented instead of enemy-oriented, that our march objective was Phase Line 

Fran, not the destroying of organized resistance in our sector. This was evident 

by the fact that Marines backfi lled us and, then, even our own tank company had 

to go back and destroy organized resistance in the sector we had fought through 

on the fi rst day. We did get to Fran and that was important to open up that line of 

communications between Camp Fallujah and the city of Fallujah for resupply and 

MEDEVAC; but it does neglect the fact that we left organized resistance behind us 

– resistance that we had to go mop up later. Major Reynolds talks about how when 

Lieutenant Colonel Newell returned from block leave, we changed the course of 

action slightly. Actually, the course of action changed pretty much completely, 

going from two points of breach to one. Instead of having two companies conduct 

their own breach, having a battalion conduct a breach. That’s a pretty signifi cant 

change for a company commander, 72 hours prior to execution, to be told, “You’re 

a support by fi re,” versus, “You’re now a breach element.” That was what Lieutenant Colonel Newell described to them when he briefed them after the division rehearsal. There are a few points in here where it talks about the loss of Ravens – our 

company-level unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) – because somebody was on the 

frequency that we thought we were on. It’s my understanding that the Air Force, 

Marine Corps and the Navy had Prowlers in the air that scramble frequencies. Has 

anybody else mentioned that to you?

MM: No, they have not.

JJ: That was my understanding of why every time we went to launch a Raven it 

fell out of the sky, which makes sense. If you can’t talk to it over a radio, you’re not 

going to be able to control it. Major John Petkosek, who became the battalion XO, 

came down to Fallujah for about three or four days at the end of the fi ght. He was 

brought in to improve the maintenance and logistical capability of the battalion, 

according to Major Reynolds. I think he neglects to mention the fact that Captain 

Jamie Friel and Captain Fred Dente, along with Eric Krivda, had been executing 

logistical operations that more than capably supported the battalion through the 

fi ght and continued to do so once Major Petkosek arrived. Those guys deserve a 

lot of credit for keeping companies in the fi ght. If something was broke, Friel and 

Dente got it fi xed. If we needed supplies, Krivda was on the phone and they came 

in. From reading the interviews, it comes out like we needed help in getting our 

stuff fi xed and getting the logistics squared away, but I don’t really think Major 

Petkosek did a heck of a lot to change any of that. He spent the fi rst three days 

in Fallujah at the TAC completely separated from any logistical element while 

Friel and Dente continued to fi ght the fi ght. I wanted to address that, because he 

doesn’t give any credit to Friel, Dente and Krivda for making the logistics happen 
95 

– and that’s who did it. Lieutenant Colonel Newell talks about when Captain Doug 

Walter came down to take command of Alpha Company, that he was defi nitely the 

right guy for the job, being a prior company commander before Captain Sean Sims 

took over. He really was the only one that could have stepped in and had any sort 

of legitimacy with the men at that point. Just reading the few interviews I’ve read, 

I would say Krivda’s is probably the most accurate and most benefi cial. He was in 

the TOC the entire time unless he was running special missions forward to bring 

people or emergency supplies forward, which he did quite often. But he was back 

at the TOC so he had some separation from the events to really understand what 

was going on. He talks about the fact that a Knight Ridder photographer photographed Sean Sims’ body and got it out in the press. That was a point of frustration 

for all of us: the access the press had to what we were doing and the limited amount 

of supervision they had. Within hours of Sean being dead, his photo was on the 

Internet. Knight Ridder is the largest newspaper conglomerate in the Unites States, 

so it was pretty powerful to have their photographer sending things like that out. 

That was just indicative of our relationship with the reporters and media personnel. 

Major Krivda talks a lot about how we had so many of them, and I think that really 

played a role as far as getting our story out. Having CNN and Fox News embedded 

with us – and Scott Rutter went live as we crossed the LD and told the whole country what was going on. That really got the story out, but there’s a fi ne line between 

when media access becomes too much versus too little. I think this incident with 

the photographer is indicative of the fact that they probably had too much. 

MM: Did you get a chance to read the Jane Arraf interview?

JJ: No. I don’t have a good opinion of CNN, so I’m not real interested in what 

she has to say. If it’s worth reading then I might check it out. Something else Major 

Krivda talks about is the staff and, in Major Reynolds’ interview, he talks about 

how 2-2 had deployed to Najaf in April, we had all done this kind of thing before, 

it was just another out-of-sector mission. 2-2 did do quite a few out-of-sector missions. There was Najaf, Fallujah, Charlie Company went to Mosul for the elections. But there’s a signifi cant difference between saying 2-2 did it and saying the 

staff did it. Just so somebody says it, the fact is that the staff changed pretty considerably in the month or so after we got back from Najaf, so I’m just going to walk 

you down the task organization of the 2-2 staff. When we deployed to Iraq, here’s 

what the staff looked like. The battalion commander was Lieutenant Colonel Newell and that stayed the same throughout. The personnel offi cer (S1) was Captain 

Brian Ducote; he’d been in 2-2 for several years and had been the S1 for a while. 

The intelligence offi cer (S2) was Captain Rich MacDonald; he’d been with 2-2 for 

about two years at that point. The S3 was Major Jeff LaFace; he’d been in position 

since just after Kosovo, so he’d been around for about a year. Captain Adam Reese 

and Tom Mitchell were the two battle captains in the S3 shop. I joined the S3 shop 
96

kind of late in the ball game, right when I got to Iraq. The logistics offi cer (S4) was 

Jaime Friel and, like Ducote, he had been around for a while and had done a bunch 

of jobs. He took the S4 job in Kosovo, so he’d been in position for well over a year 

at this point. The S5/FSO was Tom Cobb, and he stayed in position throughout 

our tour in Iraq. He was actually the S5 all the way back through Kosovo so he’d 

been a member of the staff for a long time; and he was actually probably the senior 

member of the staff as far as time on staff goes. Major Adgie was the battalion XO 

at that point. It was a pretty seasoned staff when we went into Najaf, so people had 

been in position for a long time; they knew the systems, they knew how things 

worked, and they knew how to do their staff work. Captain Krivda talks about it in 

his interview, how 2-2 didn’t have a staff standard operating procedure (SOP) or a 

planning SOP, or even a tactical SOP for that matter. But the staff had been in position for well over a year. They worked well together, they knew what they were 

doing and, led by Major Adgie as the XO, they were able to make things happen 

and get things done and plan and execute missions. But take a look six months later 

when we went to Fallujah: the only people that were the same were me, Mitchell 

and Tom Cobb. The entire staff had changed. The S1 was Captain Kamil Stalzkoper, who was a company XO and then took over as S1 after Najaf. The S2 was a 

guy named Captain Pemberton; he was brand new to the unit. And then Captain 

Natalie Friel joined us at this point as well. She pretty much served as the S2, even 

though she was junior to Pemberton, just because she had some continuity with the 

unit and knew what was going on. She became the S2. The S3, Major Reynolds, 

came to the battalion in July or August, so he had only been around about a month 

when we started planning for Fallujah. Captain Mitchell and I were still in the S3 

shop, but Adam Reese had taken command of Charlie Company, so the senior 

battle captain was now Mitchell and that made a difference. The S4 was Captain 

Johnny Fortenberry, who had been previously the support platoon leader; and both 

Johnny and Kamil were both still fi rst lieutenants at this point. Tom Cobb, again, 

was the S5/FSO and the XO was Major Petkosek. You can see the difference in the 

experience level of the staff when we went to Fallujah and how long the staff had 

worked together as a unit. Pretty much, Fallujah was the fi rst event that the staff 

had done together, and I think that showed in the MDMP we conducted for Fallujah and the MDMPs we conducted during Fallujah. Lieutenant Colonel Reynolds 

talks about it in his interview where, at the end of each day of fi ghting, we would 

pull the staff together and come up with a plan for the next day. That happened, but 

it was more just telling people where to go and what to do. It wasn’t actually an 

MDMP. It was a modifi ed MDMP; it wasn’t a real MDMP. Just from being a battle 

captain and a TAC OIC, there were several times when I thought we’d be briefi ng 

an op order and, as it turned out, we just kind of briefed, “Hey, this is what we’re 

doing tomorrow,” and not a very detailed plan several times. Did you talk to any of 

the company commanders, Kirk Mayfi eld, Paul Fowler –?
97 

MM: They’re on my list. They sent me a fairly detailed history, but I do want 

to interview them at some point.

JJ: I don’t know if they’ll mention it or not, but I know of one incident later 

in the operation when we were doing a detailed clearing of the southern section 

of our sector. After an op order, Doug and Kirk on the ground were like, “Hey, 

what are we doing here? All right, you go this way, I’ll go this way.” I think the 

staff’s inexperience really put the onus on the company commanders to execute the 

commander’s intent versus understand what the plan really was. They knew what 

needed to happen, but without their leadership and abilities things would have 

been a lot different. I think, for the most part, the company commanders probably 

would have been just as well off without a battalion headquarters.

MM: Yes, I believe Major (Dr.) Lisa DeWitt made a statement in her interview 

about how the battle was won by the company commanders.

JJ: As it should be. The company commanders, the platoon leaders and the 

squad leaders are who are fi ghting the fi ght. If you want to get a good insight on 

how the battle actually went, you should talk to a guy like Staff Sergeant David 

Bellevia – who’s now out of the Army and who was one of the squad leaders in 

Alpha Company – or some of the platoon leaders.

MM: Isn’t he up for a Medal of Honor?

JJ: I know he did some very amazing things that he deserves to be recognized 

for, but I don’t know what the fi nal result of that will be. He basically saved his 

platoon, cleared a house by himself, and killed a bunch of bad guys in between. 

If you ever go beyond your focus on the joint aspect, guys like him are the guys 

you should talk to. I have a different perspective than Lieutenant Colonel Reynolds and Lieutenant Colonel Newell have. Those squad leaders probably have the 

perspective of what really happened on the ground, them and the platoon leaders. 

Guys like First Lieutenant Jeff Emery and First Lieutenant Juan Meno from Alpha 

Company and the engineer platoon leader, Second Lieutenant (now First Lieutenant) Shawn Gniazdowski. He was attached to us the whole time in Iraq; he was a 

platoon in Alpha Company. He was the breach man. Just for a different perspective of what happened. The company commanders defi nitely fought the fi ght and 

controlled the fi ght. I felt, as a battle captain in the TAC, that I was just kind of 

taking notes and the company commanders were executing their missions as given 

the way they saw fi t. Maybe that’s how it’s supposed to work, but I didn’t think the 

command and control of the battalion was really that effective.

MM: Do you have any information about when Captain Mayfi eld’s company 

actually took charge for a while and did the battle handoff with Alpha Company?
98

JJ: No. I wasn’t present at that time. I do know it happened and it was a pretty 

awesome thing for him to do, but I wasn’t there and I don’t know exactly what 

was said. What I’ve read in your interviews, that’s how I understood the situation 

as well.

MM: Is there anything else you want to tell me about the operation?

JJ: No, but if you have further questions, feel free to send me a note. 

MM: Well, thank you so much for your time.
99 

Captain Christopher Lacour

15 May 2006

MM: My name is Matt Matthews (MM) and I work for the Combat Studies 

Institute at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Today is 15 May 2006 and I’m interviewing 

Captain Christopher Lacour (CL) who was the assistant fi re support offi cer (FSO) 

for 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry Regiment, or Task Force 2-2, during Operation Phantom Fury. If you could, please give me some background on where you were born, 

how you got commissioned, assignments that you had prior to going to Iraq.

CL: I was born in Raceland, Louisiana. I went to school at the University of 

Alabama and was an ROTC commissionee. I graduated in 2002 and went over to 

Oklahoma for a while and then, after completing the Offi cer Basic Course (OBC), 

I shipped out to Germany. I was a fi re direction offi cer for the 1st Battalion, 6th 

Field Artillery (FA) Regiment, Charlie Battery, for about 15 months. I was a platoon leader for 1-6 FA, 2d Platoon, Charlie Battery, for about 18 months and then 

I shifted over to 2-2 Infantry.

MM: Could you talk me through how you ended up at 2-2 Infantry and what 

you were doing prior to Operation Phantom Fury?

CL: I was actually a recent addition to 2-2 right before the operation. I was a 

platoon leader in Ba’qubah for eight months when we were doing combat operations there. 1-6 FA rotates its lieutenants through different positions and usually 

we’re attached to infantry. Ordinarily, your fi rst assignment is as the FSO and then 

you go to the one unit. Lance McGill and I were on the reverse schedule of that so 

I would go be a fi re direction offi cer fi rst and then an FSO, so it was just my time 

to rotate out. I had been a platoon leader for almost 15 months and they wanted to 

rotate everybody through. The burnout rate was pretty high and they wanted to get 

a lot of guys combat experience. 

MM: You were in 3d Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 1st Infantry Division (ID) 

under Colonel Dana Pittard and, of course, Lieutenant Colonel Pete Newell commanded 2-2. How was it working with those two individuals?

CL: I didn’t meet Lieutenant Colonel Newel until I’d been in Fallujah for two 

weeks, and he said about three words to me. He asked me where I got my cup of 

coffee and that I needed to rustle him up a cup. For the most part, that was all the 

interaction I had with the man aside from assigning targets. I worked primarily 

with Captain Erik Krivda in the rear, Captain James Cobb and whatever Marine 

element we needed to work with to get the job done. 

MM: When did you fi rst fi nd out that 2-2 might be assigned to this operation 

and how did the planning aspect of this go?
100

CL: I originally found out when walking back after playing football, when I 

was still a platoon leader, and I joked to one of my operations offi cers and asked 

him if he had any information about fi re support stuff because I was really unfamiliar with it. I did it at OBC but I hadn’t really practiced it, and he said I might really 

want to get good at it. I kind of made a Fallujah joke and he didn’t laugh; he just 

looked at me really seriously so I said, “Oh, okay.” Basically, Captain Cobb was 

doing the initial planning and the reason I was selected was because he needed a 

senior FSO on the ground there. I hadn’t really integrated into any job in 2-2 yet. I 

was very new. Everybody else continued with the same schedule they were doing 

and they would be hurting for information operations (IO) a little bit. I could easily 

be put in that position. The reason Lance McGill wasn’t chosen was because he was 

doing a bunch of fi nancial work for them. So they just picked me; actually, I sort 

of volunteered. Anyway, I sat in on all the planning meetings. Captain Cobb was 

all excited and they all had this initial planning for Fallujah. Lieutenant Colonel 

Newell was still on R&R so Major John Reynolds drafted the initial plan, which 

was consequently completely scrapped – but the basic concept didn’t change. We 

attacked from the north, we pushed through to Phase Line Fran, and then we make 

it up as we go after that – that was apparently the order of the day. Obviously, that 

had to happen because we had no idea what the Marines needed or what was going 

on on the ground. So during the initial planning stages, I remember sitting around 

with the sergeant major who was killed in action and the ops sergeant major who 

became the sergeant major for 2-2 – both really amazing guys. I can remember 

sitting around with Major Reynolds, Dr. Lisa DeWitt, Captain Jeff Jager, Krivda 

– basically the staff for 2-2. Major Reynolds was running the show as the S3 while 

Lieutenant Colonel Newell was away. So anyway, they put us all on a helicopter 

– Jeff Jager, Major Ken Adgie, who was the brigade S3, myself and I think one or 

two other people. They fl ew us into Fallujah, we got picked up, met the Marine 

commander and talked about the initial vague plans. We said we would refi ne it 

whenever Lieutenant Colonel Newell came back. They left Jeff and me there, we 

started integrating with the Marines, and everybody else went home.

MM: How long were you guys there doing the planning?

CL: About two weeks.

MM: Could you talk me through what happened there and what was your 

opinion of working with the Marines during this timeframe?

CL: They were really great to work with and it was great to experience that. 

We met the Regimental Combat Team 7 (RCT-7) commander, Colonel Craig Tucker, and he was absolutely fantastic as far as planning and tactical competence and 

running meetings. Jeff and I would try to coordinate with 2-2. We did have some 

Internet problems because the Marines and the Army use a different secure internet 
101 

protocol router network (SIPRNET) and, let’s face it, we just weren’t the priority 

for the Marine Division (MARDIV). We worked it as best we could and the intelligence (S2) shop was really willing to integrate with us. Integrating with the fi re 

support assets was pretty easy because the joint training the Marines and the Army 

go through makes it a lot easier because we all speak the same language, at least 

as far as cannon artillery goes. As far as air assets, they integrated me as best they 

could, but the Marines use pilots as their air liaison offi cers (ALOs) and the Army 

is just not built for that. We don’t have that capability. So I learned the air support 

plan but there was nobody from the Air Force who could actually integrate with us 

and, honestly, the Air Force doesn’t really know how to integrate. The senior enlisted guys that call for fi re with the airplanes are not really that effective because 

they aren’t planning on a battalion and brigade level. If they were there with me, 

I imagine they could. It’s probably not that big of a switch for those guys, but I 

don’t think the brigade had that ability. Well, we never really used air. I think we 

used it twice – shot off a Predator or a Shadow. It would have been nice to have 

an ALO there to work through how to integrate with Marine air and the Air Force. 

Jeff and I sat in on the planning meetings every night. We went to about 30 different briefi ngs and Jeff would try to get an updated plan for what they wanted. Major 

Reynolds was trying, but when Lieutenant Colonel Newell came back he changed 

the entire plan. Jeff Jager actually knows more about what units were coming from 

brigade. The only interaction I had with Colonel Pittard – except for my time as 

a platoon leader, which was interesting – was asking for two howitzers. I asked 

Major Reynolds for that and I don’t remember him pushing for it, but that’s not his 

job technically; it was more mine. I pushed for it, the colonel said he was going to 

send down two howitzers, and that was the best thing he could have done.

MM: These two that you’re talking about, are these the two Paladins that were 

actually used for the operation?

CL: Yes.

MM: So you were the one who fi rst mentioned that they would be a good thing 

to have?

CL: Yes. I don’t want to take credit for something that I didn’t do, but I’m 

pretty sure I asked for indirect fi re support assets.

MM: Right, because you knew that you guys were going to be the supporting 

effort and would probably need some of your own artillery because the Marines 

wouldn’t have those assets.

CL: We were actually the last priority. I think it was the Black Jack Brigade 

that was doing the cordon, and actually I think they had a higher priority than us. 

We were the lowest of the low and I knew it was going to take over 35 minutes to 

get any sort of indirect fi re support asset. The Marines don’t have organic 120s, so 
102

the resupply of the 120 would have to come from 3d Brigade and that’s tough to 

do, but they did a great job and pushed out a lot of ammunition for us.

MM: When you and Captain Jager were planning over this two week period, 

were you in contact every day with the Major Reynolds?

CL: He never talked to me. He just let us do our thing. He’s not an artillery 

expert and, frankly, I don’t think the way the infantry trains, say, at the National 

Training Center (NTC) ever prepares them for how effective artillery really is, so 

they don’t really think in terms of cannon shells. They think in terms of stabbing 

and shooting and blowing things up with direct fi re. They employ mortars but they 

didn’t really understand it at the battalion or brigade level. And I was making it 

up as I was going along because it was a very unique situation and we were just 

adapting. 

MM: Could you talk me through what happened once the operation is getting 

ready to begin, right before the breach and you guys are set up in your tactical operations center (TOC)? Can you tell me how the TOC was set up and if there were 

any communications problems in talking to 2-2 or to the Marines?

CL: I think Captain Krivda set up the TOC and it was amazingly effective, not 

to mention that 1st ID had amazing communications equipment. We had Predator 

feed access, which is usually a brigade or division level asset, pushed down to us 

at the battalion level. We had SIPR and NIPR. At Camp Fallujah, they expanded 

out so we were literally sleeping and working in a bombed-out old barracks building that hadn’t been destroyed like the ammunition bunkers next to it. There was 

shrapnel and half exploded illumination rounds all over the place. We used this 

building, set up generators, our TOCs and our ‘577s, and we worked in a big horseshoe. So, if the closed part of the horseshoe is on the right hand side and the open 

part is on the left, on the bottom part of the horseshoe was where FA was. I had 

two computers, two radios and a printer; and then to my right the S3 station had 

a radio operator, a battle captain and then across from me was the S2 section. The 

room adjacent was where the personnel (S1) and logistics (S4) sections were working; and that actually worked out very well because they were working casualty 

evacuation and things like that. That kept our focus on the battle and not on who 

was getting wounded. We just slept on cots. The nice thing was that the Marines 

and I integrated our systems together, so we had what we called “combat chat,” 

which was basically Microsoft Chat. I know Captain Krivda was reporting up to 

RCT-7 and, if he needed, to MARDIV on Microsoft Chat. Captain Natalie Friel at 

the time was monitoring from brigade to MARDIV intelligence channels and I was 

monitoring MARDIV fi re support nets. So I had the Internet, I had the RCT-7 net, 

the MARDIV net, and I think there were a couple more. You could pull down from 

a thousand different channels; it was incredibly effective. I was the only person re-
103 

ally talking because Captain Cobb really only had communications with us. He did 

not have communications with RCT-7 and his Humvee just wasn’t equipped for it. 

There was no way they could talk to him. So that made it really effective although 

it was really diffi cult, too, because I didn’t have a lot of manpower. It was me and a 

really great specialist who happened to get hurt on the convoy ride up there. He put 

his weapon out the window and somebody passed and it hit him in the arm. We had 

communications with RCT-7 for some air requests, but I was working through the 

fi res net. For counterfi re, it was me or my specialist clearing the area where they 

wanted the counterfi re. We had to do ammunition requests initially through them, 

but then that started going through the S4. The only communications problem we 

had was only really when we were setting it up. It took about two days and that’s 

just because the systems are a little bit different. The Marines provided us with 

some commo guys; they came in and fi xed everything and it worked really well. 

We did have some generator issues, which in Iraq are nothing new, but they were 

pretty critical. From day one to day four, they were fi ne; and then by day fi ve, they 

started going out. When they would go down, we could be out of the fi ght for like 

six hours.

MM: Because of generator problems?

CL: Yes, because there just was no power. It was a slow time, though. Had it 

been during the breach, it would have been just brutal. The nice thing about what 

we were doing was that we were almost organized as a howitzer battery as far as 

task organization goes. It’s something the Army, I think, should do. Having two 

Paladins attached to a battalion – you don’t get mass, but nobody really uses that 

anymore unless you’re fi ghting the Soviets. Even in a high-intensity confl ict, you 

could still mass if the battalion needed to because the battalion is still tapped into 

the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems (AFATDS). But being direct 

support from battalion straight to the guns – I don’t know if any major or lieutenant 

colonel FSO is going to be very keen on it because they’re out of the battle. But 

as far as being good for soldiers, it’s fantastic as long as the FSOs have planned in 

advance what the criteria are going to be and how to measure the forward line of 

troops (FLOT). The nice thing about Fallujah was that it was stationary, completely locked down, and we had a very good idea of where troops were. The Marines 

were able to communicate no-fi re areas to us via the Microsoft Chat. They had 

places throughout the city, certain areas they didn’t want bombed, and they could 

either ship it to our AFATDS or they could just send it to me and I’d built it in on 

FalconView. Not only did I have access to the no-fi re areas for planning purposes, 

the guns had it as well, so it was an amazing system. It was probably the only effective thing that AFATDS did over there.

MM: Going back to the planning, do you recall anything the Marines put out 

about rules of engagement (ROE)?
104

CL: Yes. When I was working with RCT, this judge advocate general (JAG) 

there was in communications with MARDIV and I’m assuming the MARDIV guy 

was in communications with Central Command (CENTCOM). They were able to 

modify the ROE. I remember him saying that every vehicle that was moving was 

considered a car bomb. But as far as artillery level planning and air strikes, there 

were a couple buildings over there that were “protected”; but quite frankly, if we 

were getting shot at from a mosque or a minaret, it was an enemy structure at that 

point. It’s against the Geneva Conventions to use protected sites for attacks. If you 

are, it’s no longer protected and it was well known that that was occurring down 

there. People were shooting out of minarets and out of schools, they were holding 

families hostage. The ROE was very loose.

MM: Who came up with the “shake and bake” mission? Was that something 

new or something the Marines had done before?

CL: The “shake and bake” has been around since white phosphorous was invented. On a doctrinal level, to destroy a fuel depot you send in 155 VT, which 

means a high-explosive, variable-time fuse – so it explodes, punctures the fuel 

containers, and then you send in white phosphorous to destroy it. The initial “shake 

and bake” that I think the generals had their hands on wasn’t a “shake and bake” 

at all; it was a screening mission for the initial breach. We were shooting low and 

most people don’t screen over cities, but that area needed to be screened legitimately and needed to be screened with heat as well. [inaudible] had thermal but 

they had night vision, and I remember talking to a Navy SEAL or a Marine recon 

guy who said they snuck up to clear the berm on the northern part of the city. In 

pushing forward, they didn’t have NVGs and they didn’t have black chem lights; 

and so just as an experiment, they would break an infrared chem light and they 

started taking direct fi re from the rooftops. It was pretty well known that at least 

some of the insurgents had Russian-made night vision, so the screening was necessary. I also remember that after we got hit at the second ambush area – and I 

can tell you what it looked like on maps and satellite imagery but I can’t tell you 

what it looked like on the ground. Anyway, [inaudible] wanted to obscure the area 

because they were taking a tremendous amount of fi re. We didn’t have any feltwedge white phosphorous left. The difference is, felt-wedge white phosphorous is 

airburst and it comes down like party streamers. The only other white phosphorous 

we had left was ground burst and that explodes like a regular high explosive on the 

ground. Then it kicks up a bunch of phosphorous to obscure and also sets things on 

fi re so it adds a smoke screen effect. We realized we had a large bunker complex, 

so initially we were fi ring – and what I heard on the radio transmission and what 

they told me was that we were obscuring the second crossing of the linear danger 

area. Full tactics, [inaudible] in a danger area and conduct a breach, suppress and 

secure. So we were obscuring it and there just happened to be people in spider 
105 

holes because the entire city was a gigantic, preplanned, waiting-for-the-invasion 

maze. And so whenever we pushed through, we simply shot white phosphorous as 

an obscurant; and then we decided to follow that up with VT in case anybody was 

fi ring at us from spider holes. We only fi red two white phosphorous missions.

MM: I guess the whole white phosphorous thing becomes a big deal later on 

and so everybody always asks about it in the 2-2 sector.

CL: What supposedly happened was the Italian media came out with a prepared propaganda video, and I watched it when the State Department did an inquiry. The real problem occurred when the State Department fi rst said that we 

don’t use white phosphorous in battle – but of course we do. So nobody in the 

State Department had any clue and they didn’t ask anybody in the Army who had 

any clue, so they issued a statement and then people are starting to wonder. It was 

really, once again, the State Department doing an “awesome” job of running the 

military show. They just didn’t understand. On top of that, I don’t know what expert these guys interviewed, but he called it “Whiskey Pete” and nobody calls it 

that. It’s “Willy Pete.” I don’t know who this guy was, saying we killed civilians. 

There were no civilians there.

MM: Can you talk me through the good, the bad and the ugly of working with 

the Marines in your opinion?

CL: Sure. The biggest downside I saw was the availability of Marine air for 

2-2 Infantry and for any Army unit, and it’s not because the Marines are trying 

to snuff us out. One of the things I requested, which I don’t think the RCT could 

have supported it – but had we had a Marine ALO attached to our TOC, we could 

have gotten air in a much faster manner. We had maybe fi ve air missions, with the 

exception of the two gunships that were fl oating around at night who our Air Force 

guys could actually communicate with if we had priority. Not having somebody 

who was actually tapped into the system, who knows people in the system and 

how it functions, that made air not an option for us unless it was something big. 

It was never responsive. It took us a minimum of 30 to 40 minutes to get air assets, and we had to come into the system through the fringes. I would request air 

through fi res who turned over their shoulder and talked to the ALO, but he never 

really talked to me – and I’m low priority and I don’t really understand the terms 

he’s using. The Air Force guy on the ground isn’t at all tapped into the system; he 

may have met with the ALO once or twice. It’s one thing to actually talk to Marine 

air; it’s another thing to get cleared to request that the air come in. That was my 

biggest concern. If they really want to increase the availability of air and really 

make it more combined arms, they’re really going to have to push an ALO to battalion level, just like they do to all the other battalions. If we didn’t have those two 

howitzers there, we would have never had any indirect fi re support except for 120 
106

mortars – which may have to happen, but I don’t see why. There’s no reason to 

hold back assets if you have them.

MM: If you would have needed it, could the Marines have fi red their towed 

155s for you guys?

CL: They did once. They did a sweep in the zone in the southern part of the 

city after we discovered a large bunker complex, which was like 128 shells over a 

500 by 500 meter area, and it worked out okay but I never saw the effects. Captain 

Cobb said it did. It wasn’t exactly the most effective, but it did defi nitely suppress 

it. We had a very large varied bunker complex, but the problem is that a 155 penetrates about six to 10 inches in the ground so we would need something heavier. 

For the most part, Marine artillery is okay and they do a great job for the Marines, 

but the towed 155 is not as responsive, slower, and not as accurate as a Paladin. 

It can’t be. A Paladin is a self-correcting weapons system, it gauges its muzzle 

velocity, it knows exactly where it’s located. A towed 155 doesn’t have the same 

capabilities and a Paladin clearly is responsive. They’re air mobile. As far as the 

mechanized site, they’re not exactly the highest speed. We could request missions 

for them; the problem was getting clearance of fi res. With two attached cannons, 

our sensor-to-shooter time was maybe 30 seconds. To clear a Marine mission, it 

would have to go fi rst to me, then to the Marines, the fi re support cell for brigade 

and then, if that got approved – there was actually not a whole lot of organization 

in the artillery world. Usually you have centralized command and control and here 

we didn’t, because counterfi re was run by the Black Jack Brigade. So there were 

six Paladins next to our two Paladins and we never talked. I don’t know who they 

were. I met them once, asked if we could set up in their area and they let us, but 

we didn’t share ammunition or mission. They did strict counterfi re and we did 

stuff attached to our assets. That was my question: If we have multiple counterfi re 

missions, who gets priority of fi re? Who gets priority of counterfi re? A lot of the 

answers I got were, “We don’t know.” There were a lot of maneuver assets but 

there was no centralized artillery asset, which worked out well for us. But as far 

as the Marine artillery organization went, you could tell it was really ancillary; it 

really wasn’t their primary focus.

MM: Is there anything else you feel is very important to get out there to young 

offi cers in the FA community in relation to this fi ght?

CL: The battery computer system (BCS) was a fantastic piece of equipment. 

Learn how to work your AFATDS. It works well at battalion and higher level, and 

maybe even at platoon level. All this nice digital fi re support equipment they gave 

us – we didn’t have to use any of it. We used nothing but voice. By the time you 

plug in an electronic mission, you could have already done two. In addition to that, 

between Microsoft Chat and FalconView, that’s all you need to run a battle now. 
107 

FalconView is the best tool and I think young lieutenants need to fi gure out how to 

use it really effectively – how to set up an area they consider no-fi re. That’s about 

it.

MM: Well, that’s super and I want to thank you for doing this interview.

109 

Captain Gregory McCrum

28 July 2006

JM: My name is John McCool (JM) and I’m with the Operational Leadership 

Experiences Project at the Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 

I’m interviewing Captain Gregory McCrum (GM) on his experiences in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and specifi cally Operation Phantom Fury in Fallujah, 

November 2004. Today’s date is 28 July 2006 and this is an unclassifi ed interview. 

Before we begin, Greg, if you feel at any time we’re entering classifi ed territory, 

please couch your response in terms that avoid revealing any classifi ed information. And if classifi cation requirements prevent you from responding, simply say 

you’re not able to answer. For the record, Captain McCrum is currently stationed 

in the Philippines and we’re doing a telephone interview. Could you please start by 

giving me some background on yourself: where you were born, where you grew 

up, how you got commissioned, things like that?

GM: I was born in Weymouth, Massachusetts, on 5 February 1971. My father 

was a Department of Defense contractor so we moved a lot during my formative 

years growing up in Pennsylvania, Ohio and ultimately ending up in Aiken, South 

Carolina. I came in the military in January 1990 as a medic with the South Carolina 

National Guard. I transitioned to be an infantryman and in January 1992 enlisted in 

the regular Army as a medic with the 82d Airborne Division, serving with Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), 1st Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment. I spent four years with the 82d, went through the Special Forces 

(SF) Qualifi cation Course in 1994 and became a qualifi ed SF medical sergeant in 

February 1996. I served with Alpha Company, 3d Battalion, 7th Special Forces 

Group (SFG) until April 2000 when I attended the Inter-service Physician Assistant (PA) Program at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, and was commissioned through 

Offi cer Candidate School (OCS) in May 2002. I went to the Medical Offi cer Basic 

Course at Fort Sam Houston in July of the same year and reported to HHC, 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry Regiment in Vilseck, Germany, in October 2002 until I left that 

assignment in August 2005. I’m currently serving as the Group PA for 1st SFG, 

Fort Lewis, Washington, with my current assignment being deployed overseas as 

the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P) surgeon.

JM: Could you walk me through how you and 2-2 Infantry found your way to 

Iraq and how you fi rst got alerted to the fact that there might be a joint operation 

launched in Fallujah?

GM: We received our deployment order for Iraq the day we redeployed from 

Kosovo, so it was about 24 July 2003 after a nine-month deployment to Kosovo. 

We had gotten in the night before and I opened up the Stars and Stripes the next 
110

day and got the deployment order for going to Iraq about six months later. We deployed to Kuwait on 13 February 2004 and stayed in Kuwait until 6 March 2004 

when we did the road march from Camp New York, Kuwait, north through Baghdad and ultimately going to Forward Operating Base (FOB) Normandy outside 

of Muqdadiyah, Iraq. We arrived there on 7 March and got initial indications for 

operations in Fallujah around early October 2004. We got the warning order from 

division that said to plan for contingency operations and being sliced off to the 1st 

Marine Division (MARDIV) in Fallujah. It had yet to be determined what time we 

were going to be deploying but we started making preparatory movements towards 

splitting our operations or moving our operations completely over to Fallujah.

JM: What was your specifi c duty position at this time?

GM: I was the battalion PA for 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry. That was my assignment and that’s where I had stayed for most of my career at that point as a commissioned offi cer, so I was the battalion medical offi cer for all intents and purposes. 

During that planning phase, Lieutenant Christopher Carlson, my Medical Service 

Corps (MSC) offi cer, who basically co-headed with me in 2-2 Infantry, did some of 

the initial planning in anticipation for the operation. We didn’t anticipate the operation going off until after Ramadan 2004 so Chris took his mid-tour leave and that’s 

actually when they decided to ramp up operations and send us to Fallujah. I guess 

at that point I was doing both medical platoon leader and battalion PA duties.

JM: Can you talk about who made up and how large the 2-2 medical team 

was?

GM: When we actually deployed to Kuwait we had 39 medics, MSC offi -

cer, myself and a Professional Offi cer Filler Information System (PROFIS) doctor 

from Bamberg, Germany, at the time. We had a grand total of 42 individuals.

JM: Major (Dr.) Lisa DeWitt was not the original 2-2 surgeon, is that correct?

GM: That is correct. Captain Alan Fields was our original PROFIS provider 

who was sent to us while we were in Germany. He did the initial train up at the 

Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) in Hohenfels, Germany, and deployed 

with us to Kuwait. Unfortunately, he had circumstances regarding his medical credentialing that precluded him from having a continued service with 2-2 Infantry.

JM: When did Dr. DeWitt eventually join 2-2?

GM: She joined us on 2 April 2004.

JM: Can you tell me a little bit about her?

GM: How much time do we have? Lisa was an absolutely phenomenal asset to 

us in 2-2 Infantry. Unfortunately, the previous PROFIS provider had just had four 

years of medical school, one year of an internship and really had been thrown into 
111 

a situation that he wasn’t adequately prepared for. Really just getting into the world 

of trauma and not really being experienced with those types of injuries, he wasn’t 

in the best place in terms of his medical career. Bringing Lisa onto our team and 

into 2-2 was actually a huge value-added benefi t for us considering the 14 years of 

emergency medicine experience she had – and fortunately our personalities complemented each other well. We could work together well and could seemingly read 

each other’s minds when we were running trauma cases. We could be on the same 

sheet of music and, without really asking for something, could have all the tools 

and the knowledge base we needed to save as many lives as possible.

JM: You mentioned that you initially thought the operation was going to kick 

off after Ramadan but obviously that didn’t in fact end up happening. How did that 

impact your planning? Did that have any positive or negative effects on it?

GM: Right. I didn’t really take the Ramadan holiday or festivities into account 

for any phase of our operation or our operational planning.

JM: Could you talk me through the planning phase itself? Did you feel you had 

adequate supplies and resources?

GM: Fortunately I had an absolutely phenomenal medical platoon to augment 

what we were doing. FOB Normandy was really in an austere location compared 

to some of the other locations. We were roughly an hour by ground – 20 or 25 

minutes by air evacuation – from any other higher medical assets and our logistics 

lines were relatively long comparatively around Iraq. Knowing that, we kept a 

large amount of Class VIII medical stockage right there on hand at FOB Normandy 

so if we had logistics problems getting things out of Qatar or Balad, we could be 

self-sustaining for an extended period of time. When we saw the operation upcoming, we knew we had enough stockage up there to run split medical operations: 

operations forward in Fallujah as well as sustain operations on FOB Normandy 

with minimal impact as far as Class VIII medical supplies go.

JM: Were there any special preparations you had to go through in getting ready 

for Operation Phantom Fury?

GM: Not so much as far as training. We did do an initial evaluation and site 

recon with the US Marine Corps when our advanced party left out of FOB Normandy in October and drove to Camp Fallujah to interface with our Marine counterparts, seeing what assets we could actually draw from on Camp Fallujah. It was 

during that initial site survey when I fi nally got to see Camp Fallujah, link up with 

the Bravo Surgical hospital that was co-located there and see, logistically, how 

they would best be able to facilitate our resupply or getting us additional supplies 

or anything we may need. As it turned out, they weren’t truly set up to really logistically support anybody but themselves. The Class VIII supply warehouse was 

located in Camp Taqaddum, which was 30 minutes west of Camp Fallujah. There 
112

really weren’t any Class VIII warehouses or stockages on Camp Fallujah that were 

going to be able to sustain our operation that we could draw from. So in the initial 

planning phase of the operation, we said we would take with us two weeks’ worth 

of supplies in our organic medical equipment sets, or MES chests, as well as an additional fi ve-ton vehicle with approximately two more weeks of supplies enabling 

us to self-sustaining for a period of about one month. That was probably one of 

the key things that drove our planning there, so we could be a little bit more selfsustaining during the operation and wouldn’t have to rely on long logistical lines 

from Balad Airfi eld out to Camp Fallujah. That was about an hour and a half to two 

hours fl ight time, and drive time was probably closer to eight or 12 hours, so that 

was probably one of the key things that went into a lot of our planning: ensuring 

we had the proper equipment in suffi cient quantities for the upcoming operation 

in Fallujah.

JM: Could you talk generally about your integration with the Marine unit 

there? Were there any interoperability issues? Did they treat you okay?

GM: Fortunately we all had the one-team, one-fi ght concept and we got along 

well with our Marine counterparts. I actually felt bad for a lot of the Marines 

because they had to procure a lot of their own equipment. They aren’t given the 

same equipment that the Army is. We got along fi ne, albeit they didn’t have a lot 

of logistical support they could offer us as far as the medical side of the house. I 

did talk with the 7th Regimental Combat Team (RCT-7) surgeon who was on FOB 

Baharia and tried to get read in on the overall operational plan for what the Marine 

contingency was between 1st MARDIV, 7th RCT and 5th RCT. I was told the general concept of medical support was that they were co-locating 7th and 5th RCTs’ 

aid stations north of Fallujah about fi ve or six kilometers up on Main Supply Route 

Mobile (MSR) that was going to the north. They did not have the formal plan for 

execution on how they were going to advance the medical support closer into 

the city as the fi ght progressed farther into the city, so from their established aid 

stations, they weren’t moving forward and progressing at the speed of the battle. 

Therefore, their logistical and medical evacuation lines were actually extending as 

the battle progressed, versus tightening up and getting shorter. 

JM: Was there any talk about you treating Marines or were you just going to 

be treating soldiers from 2-2? 

GM: I was prepared to treat any and all forces, both US and coalition alike, 

that were organic to our task force – in addition to should any other units bring 

casualties to our aid station. I was fully prepared to go ahead and execute that 

particular mission, but at no point did that become necessary. At one point we did 

have some Marine casualties who were in our task force as well as some airmen 

who had been wounded during the battle, but they were organic to us and we actu-
113 

ally didn’t take care of casualties from outside our task force. We weren’t called on 

during the mission to execute that.

JM: Could you describe for me the setup and layout of your aid station? Also, 

what were your capabilities?

GM: We went in quite heavy as far as the medical complement goes for this 

operation. We had all the supporting companies: Alpha Company, 2-2 Infantry; 

Alpha Company, 1-63 Armor; the Brigade Reconnaissance Troop (BRT); as well 

as a large complement of HHC, 2-2 Infantry as a large component of the ground 

force for that assault. We took our M577 as our main treatment track which would 

have a complement of nine trauma chests, three sick call chests and two additional 

surgery sets that would be part of that vehicle, as well as litter stands, litters and all 

the command and control (C2). We had a redundancy of C2. We put two C2 radios 

in that track as well as two C2 radios in the M998 C2 vehicle. We took two M113 

tracked ambulances, two M997 ambulances that had been up-armored, as well as 

the M923 fi ve-ton as being part of the overall complement of the aid station. Each 

company that deployed within the battlespace of the city had an M113 tracked 

ambulance with it. Therefore, we had an armored vehicle that was forward for 

evacuation of casualties and we elected to use the tracked ambulances just due to 

their high maneuverability over rubble as well as their armored capabilities. Once 

we employed the aid station, we would position the tracked vehicle in line with 

the C2 vehicle that would be next to that on the right side and the fi ve-ton would 

be on the other side of the treatment track. As we lowered the ramp, we had a standard operating procedure (SOP) that the chests were numbered, they would come 

out in a particular order and be set up in a particular order. Everybody knew what 

equipment was in what chest and it went progressively down the line. The airway 

chests would be fi rst, followed by circulation and IVs and then surgical supplies 

and whatnot. The back of the track would be opened up and then there would be 

two litters on each side of the MES chests that were opened up behind the track. 

The tracked and wheeled ambulances would be on one side of the MES chest and 

that was basically the evacuation line. The other side of the chest would be a set 

of orange cones that would have our immediate, delayed and minimal casualties, 

and the expectant cone would be moved off a distance out of sight and ear shot 

away from the aid station. On the evacuation line, there were also urgent priority 

and routine cones to categorize patients prior to loading into the ambulances as 

we would progress them back to Bravo Surgical on Camp Fallujah. At night, we 

would mark the aid station with chem lights on top of one of our antenna masts. 

We did have a tactical operations center (TOC) extension, which was rolled up on 

the back of the track for use that enabled us to use white lights for patient care and 

give us a semi-controlled environment protecting us from dust and wind. We could 

be out of the elements and use a little bit more white light without feeling we were 
114

compromising the mission. Our medical capabilities largely focused on trauma 

resuscitation and advanced trauma management. We had the ability to perform 

limited invasive procedures to stabilize patients, including endo-tracheal intubation, surgical airways and chest tubes. A lot of what we do medically in forward aid 

stations is the initial evaluation and stabilization of casualties so that the patients 

are able to survive the transport to a higher level of medical care where assets exist 

to provide surgical intervention and patient hold capabilities. 

JM: Was there anything that was particularly unique about your preparations 

or setup for this mission, something you did but wouldn’t normally do?

GM: We broke with traditional doctrine in that we took both providers from 

the overall task force to Fallujah. That’s why we fi ght better than our enemies: we 

don’t adhere to our own doctrine. Traditionally, as per doctrine, you would have a 

main aid station established at a particular location and then you would facilitate 

sending out a forward aid station. We did this numerous times during our year in 

Iraq, where Lisa DeWitt would be manning the main aid station and I would man 

the forward aid station for a battalion or company-sized operation. Due to the 

intensity and the size of this operation, we actually requested a backfi ll provider 

from our forward support battalion to come up and provide that support at FOB 

Normandy. We took both providers with us into the city and that also allowed us, 

if necessary, to put a provider in the city to be with a particular element. We had 

that option, albeit we did not employ it during the operation. Another unique point 

about this operation was that as a heavy mechanized infantry battalion we had 

a total complement of six M113s within the city. Additionally we also had two 

wheeled ambulances and they were not a normal addition to the modifi ed table of 

organization and equipment (MTOE). We actually acquired three of these vehicles 

while we were in Kuwait and Iraq. It offered us a huge benefi t as far as speed of 

evacuation and movement of assets around the battlefi eld that we wouldn’t traditionally have had.

JM: Can you pick up the story with what happens as the units blow the breach, 

cross the berm and combat commences? Where are you at this time and what are 

you seeing?

GM: There were three phases of the operation. We had the previous night – 6 

November – where we proceeded to go north out of Camp Fallujah on what was 

a feint operation to get an overall feeling of what the enemy reaction might be to 

moving a large force and positioning north and northeast of the city, so we moved 

out with about 50 percent of what would be our normal execution strength for 

this operation. I took all my key leaders and Lisa as well. We departed the camp 

and took the exact same route we ended up executing the mission on. Therefore, 

drivers and some of the key leaders had an idea of the route they were going to be 
115 

taking and some of the terrain they would be seeing once they were operational on 

the ground. During the feint operation, we established the aid station on the possibility we’d have casualties. We were not in the exact position we occupied on 

D-Day but we did see some of the overall lay of the land. We brought those key 

leaders back, did the fi nal mission briefs, pre-combat checks (PCCs) and pre-combat inspections (PCIs) for all men and equipment – weapons – let everybody else 

get some sleep that night and then the next day we went and executed. We took the 

same route and moved north. It was a little bit more unique in that we ended up 

doing more of a daylight move in that particular portion of the mission. We ended 

up occupying our fi rst logistics resupply point (LRP), which was LRP 1. We occupied that battlespace by force and were roughly 1,200 meters away from what 

was going to be the breach for 2-2 Infantry. We established the aid station, set up 

the MES chests and monitored radio traffi c; and unfortunately we had to move that 

operation within an hour or an hour and a half of being established due to incoming 

mortar fi re on LRP 1. During that movement north along the MSR, it appeared that 

the enemy identifi ed our overall position, had some observation on our location, 

called in 82 millimeter mortars in relative close proximity to us and we incurred 

one minor casualty. The company commander was Captain Fred Dente, and he and 

I decided to move the forward logistical element and the aid station to a different 

location. We jumped about 750 meters away from the initial LRP and reestablished 

the aid station there where we remained most of the day until about 1930 – right 

about the time of dusk – after which we jumped back to a location in the vicinity 

to where we had established for LRP 1, about 1,000 meters away from the breach 

point. Closer into the elevated berm that was offered by the MSR Mobile to provide us with a little more cover from direct fi re as well as direct observation from 

the enemy. This was LRP 3. I believe it was around 2100 to 2200 when the Army 

and Marine elements started using 155 millimeter artillery and our own 120 millimeter mortar platoon started engaging targets in the city to soften up the initial 

breach point on the northern side of the city. Bradleys and M1s that were with us 

on the eastern side of the berm started moving into their battle positions just north 

of the berm. The D9 armored bulldozers took mine clearing line charges (MCLCs) 

– which were the anti-mine devices with C4 attached to rockets – got those into 

position and then they started about a two-and-a-half to three-hour artillery barrage 

and smoke screen. That was a signifi cant life-changing event you could say. The 

sheer power and intensity that goes into that type of confl ict is something truly to 

be awed. I don’t think you can go through something like that and really think of 

the 4th of July the same way again. It just pales in comparison.

JM: I think it was Jane Arraf who was saying she thought the world was coming to an end when all that kicked off.
116

GM: I would defi nitely say that it was hell’s fury being unleashed. I don’t 

think I would go to the point of saying it was the end of the world, but we were 

defi nitely putting some scunion down on the enemy at that particular point. About 

2330 or so, they got the order to bring the MCLCs up and put those into position. 

We had been observing the artillery and preparatory fi res from our vehicles, which 

certainly put a lot of reverberation into your chest. We were pretty close and you 

could defi nitely feel a lot of the shockwaves all the way back to where our vehicles 

were. The order came to button up because they were going to fi re the MCLC into 

the city to open up that breach point, everybody did, and it was a very, very large 

explosion. I wouldn’t call it the equivalent to the mother of all bombs, but it was 

defi nitely a signifi cant blast they used in that breach. Once the MCLC went off, 

elements of 2-2 started to move through the northern breach into the city.

JM: You mentioned you were coming under some indirect fi re. What kind of 

security did you have at the aid station?

GM: At all our LRPs, the medics’ duties were to man radios and make sure 

they were ready for casualties. We gained all our organic security from the logistics 

support element that was with us, which came from our support platoon as well as 

our maintenance platoon, so they had the M88s – the tank recovery vehicles – .50 

cal machine guns, anti-tank rockets. Everybody had their individual weapons, the 

support platoon had their crew-served and their squad automatic weapons (SAWs) 

mounted on their heavy expanded mobility tactical trucks (HEMTTs), and the HHC 

company commander had his command vehicle with a .50 cal mounted on it.

JM: It’s my understanding that the fi rst casualty you guys had was an Iraqi 

soldier who shot himself in the foot.

GM: Actually he was the second casualty. The fi rst casualty was the gunner 

for the HHC commander’s vehicle. The vehicle took a mortar round about two or 

three meters in front of the vehicle and he took some shrapnel in his fi ngers, so we 

stitched him up at LRP 1 prior to jumping to LRP 2. Once we were at LRP 2, the 

Iraqis brought over an Iraqi offi cer – I think a lieutenant – who had a self-infl icted 

gunshot wound to the foot. We did his initial treatment and the Iraqi Intervention 

Force (IIF) that was with us as part of the task force had a doctor, an ambulance 

and a couple medics. They ended up taking that soldier to the hospital.

JM: What was your assessment of the Iraqi soldiers? What kind of interaction 

did you have with them?

GM: We didn’t have a lot initially. Their key leaders were briefed on the concept of the operation during the battalion’s rock drill and I don’t remember seeing 

them again until we were outside of the city. When we were at LRP 1 they did 

some initial staging next to us. I think everybody has that sense of nervous feeling 
117 

or pre-mission jitters, but they seemed motivated and were organized. We actually 

didn’t have a lot of interaction with them at the time. 

JM: Was the fi rst major casualty you received Command Sergeant Major Steven Faulkenburg?

GM: Yes.

JM: Could you talk me through what happened when they brought him in?

GM: I believe it was about a few minutes after midnight, I was up on the radio 

monitoring the command net and the initial call for a casualty came up on the radio. They said they’d received a casualty somewhere in the northern portion of the 

city just west of the breach and that they’d evacuated him into the medic track and 

were progressing him back to the aid station. About a minute or two after that, they 

said he was not conscious. They did give his call sign of being Ramrod 7 – which 

was Steven’s call sign at the time – and about two or three minutes after that they 

informed us they were performing CPR en route. They arrived at the aid station 

about seven or eight minutes after we received that initial call saying he was being 

evacuated out of the city.

JM: Was there anything you guys could do for him?

GM: The track pulled up to the aid station, I jumped into the back of the track 

and Steven was on a litter on the fl oor with an ashen appearance. We quickly removed him from the track, brought him into the aid station and up onto the litter 

stands. The medics started to go to work and do what they were trained to do: taking the clothes off, getting ready to start IVs and getting ready to do endo-tracheal 

intubation. Lisa was there ready for that, to receive the casualty. When we took 

his helmet off, we saw he had sustained a gunshot wound above his left eye with 

exposed brain matter and tissue and there was no respiratory effort. We hooked 

him up to the EKG and he didn’t have any cardiac activity or signs of life. Unfortunately, he wasn’t a patient we could save.

JM: Was that a pretty standard SOP? You would meet the casualties initially 

and then take them back to Lisa?

GM: Right. We had established that I was doing most of the C2 as well as the 

provider portion of this mission, and I would receive the radio call and fi nd out 

when and how many casualties were coming. I’d meet the vehicle with the casualties in it and do the initial triage there at the triage area; and depending on how 

many casualties, I would either come over with the casualty or continue to triage. 

If we had multiple casualties then Lisa would be working one and I’d be working 

the other. If we had one casualty then we’d both be working that particular individual jointly. 

JM: Are you guys in full body armor at this time?
118

GM: This particular portion we were. They had just blown the breach and we 

were in the full kit.

JM: Can you tell me a little bit about the 17 or so IIF soldiers that were wounded?

GM: This was the next morning about 0700 – and this is a guesstimate because 

I can’t tell you how much sleep I did get. I can, however, tell you how much I 

didn’t get. Anyway, it was about 0700 and I was still up on the radio. I got the initial call that one of the individuals from Alpha Company had taken some shrapnel 

to the groin and was on his way back into the aid station. We received him at the 

aid station and he had some shrapnel wounds to the genitalia and the upper thighs. 

We were in the process of treating him when the IIF drove up with this large truck 

with an open back and proceeded to drop off at least 14 casualties on our doorstep without any advance notice. We dove into that, but we didn’t have that many 

medics with us at the time. We had four medics who came with the aid station and 

then each ambulance had a driver and a medic with it, so we had about 14 of us 

at the time to treat these casualties. I was doing the initial triage and assessment. 

The medics were on the radio, doing treatment and trying to get an overall grasp 

of the situation. That was a lot of patients to drop on our doorstep at any one given 

time, but it went extremely well. There were no Iraqi casualties that were in a great 

chance of dying; these were individuals who would have survived regardless of 

our care. The emotionally signifi cant incident, however, in the process of treating 

all these individuals and getting them categorized so we can evacuate them out 

occurred about 30 minutes into the treatment: that’s when we started taking mortar 

and rocket fi re into our location. We identifi ed that it was coming from the east of 

our location, from these granaries that were about 25 to 30 kilometers away. We 

were taking large 107 and 122 rockets and mortar fi re, which tends to be an emotionally signifi cant event.

JM: You had to shield the patients yourselves, right, because obviously you 

had to take their armor off?

GM: Right. I think at a certain point we might have had our Kevlar and body 

armor off. We were close to the end of treating all these patients, categorizing them 

and fi guring out how we were going to evacuate them and what their ultimate disposition was. Not one of the brightest moves I’ve ever made in my day, but I was 

standing on the ramp of the treatment track on the radio, with the battalion net in 

one ear and Bravo Surgical in the other ear. I’m informing Bravo Surgical what 

I have coming when I started to hear the fi rst rocket come in. It just sounds like 

a freight train and the louder it gets the closer it is, so it was really a disconcerting thought. The medics started to get that uneasy feeling and were ready to start 

taking cover. I was standing on the back of the track, I take the hand mike out of 
119 

my mouth for a second and yell for them to cover their patients, and it was one of 

those really cool things to see. All that training that was ingrained in them over the 

years they were doing medicine, they immediately stopped whatever they were 

doing and dove on all their patients to keep them from being further injured, which 

I thought was huge and I couldn’t help but smile. In retrospect, as I’m standing on 

the back of the track yelling instructions in the middle of mortar and rocket fi re, it 

probably wasn’t the brightest move in the world. I guess hindsight is 20/20.

JM: Another US casualty you guys had was Staff Sergeant Todd Cornell, is 

that correct?

GM: While we were receiving mortar and rocket fi re another vehicle drove 

up; and during a brief lull of getting rocketed and mortared, we were trying to 

package and load these patients up as fast as possible to get them into all the ambulances and evacuated back to Camp Fallujah. We ended up receiving four more 

IIF patients there at our location as well as three KIAs that had occurred in the city, 

two of which were Iraqis and one was Staff Sergeant Cornell. We received those 

patients the exact same time we were packaging up the other patients, so we put 

those additional casualties into the two ambulances and took them back to Camp 

Fallujah. We were prepping the aid station to be jumped because we wanted to get 

out of our location because, obviously, it had been fi xed by mortar and rocket fi re. 

We took the two Iraqi angels we had and Staff Sergeant Cornell down with us to 

the next LRP and ended up jumping the aid station. In fact, I think that was the 

fastest we’d ever broken it down and gotten rolling: it took us about four or fi ve 

minutes. We took the KIAs with us to what would become known as LRP 4, which 

was located at the cloverleaf.

JM: I wanted to ask you a couple things about Alpha Company. They obviously lost their executive offi cer (XO), Lieutenant Ed Iwan, and then their company 

commander, Captain Sean Sims, shortly thereafter. Can you tell me a little about 

that and whether you had any visibility over Alpha Company in general after they 

suffered these tremendous losses?

GM: I’ll tell you, that was a bad day. That was probably one of the truly bad 

days that really breaks your heart. It started out early in the morning as a relatively 

clear day and I think right about 0700 it was like somebody hit an alarm switch 

and all hell broke loose. It seemed like every weapon that could be fi red in the 

city was being fi red, which is when Ed got hit. The initial call that came back said 

he had been hit and they were driving him back to the aid station. Staff Sergeant 

Albert Harris was my senior medic for Alpha Company for that particular phase of 

the operation and he was bringing him back. He said Ed was in pretty bad shape. 

We received him into the aid station, did his initial triage and put him on the litter 

stand to do the resuscitation. We took off his body armor and his clothes and tried 
120

to get the initial IVs and everything on board. Lisa was doing the airway and I 

was doing the chest and abdomen and some of the other injuries he had incurred. 

Unfortunately when we took his body armor and his desert camoufl age uniform 

(DCU) top off, he had large gaping pelvis and inter-abdominal injuries that we 

were trying to address. It was almost a complete transection of the thorax. During 

the initial phase of treating him, we found a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) tailfi n that was still lodged within Ed. We called explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) 

over, which was located close to our position, just to determine whether or not the 

munition was still live. We were a little bit concerned because the insurgents don’t 

always pull all the pins or truly prepare munitions for detonation, so therefore it 

might still be a live munition and might put our aid station and crews at increased 

risk. Fortunately, EOD was able to determine it was just the residual tailfi n and 

we were able to evacuate him with it still in place. It was not causing any further 

abdominal injury. Lisa went back to Camp Fallujah during that particular evacuation leaving me in the city and she came back about an hour and a half or so later. I 

would defi nitely say his death hurt morale. Ed and I had been lieutenants together 

and I remember the day Ed got to the battalion when we were in Kosovo. Ed had 

had almost as many years in service as I did – being prior service – and seeing this 

really hurts morale a bit. The same thing when Sean was hit the next day. What 

do you say when you know somebody’s wife and kids? It takes an emotional toll, 

and you don’t get to process that information while you’re in a battlespace. You 

just have to lock it away, throw it somewhere else and think about it later when 

you get back out. At the same time Ed was hit and we were evacuating him back, 

Sergeant James Matteson was killed. Sergeant First Class Daniel Bumbaugh was 

hit, Specialist Byung Yang who was one of our medics was hit, as well as one other 

individual from the scout platoon. The same RPG that killed Sergeant Matteson 

wounded all the other individuals who were in that vehicle. The next thing I know, 

we ended up getting all the soldiers from that vehicle at my position while Lisa was 

back at Camp Fallujah. I looked right, looked left, asked where Specialist Yang 

was and they all said he was still in the city and that he was injured. I was like, 

“Well, why is he still in the city?” He wasn’t willing to leave his platoon without 

a medic for any phase of the operation even though he had been wounded in the 

hand. He treated these individuals, evacuated them to me and he wasn’t leaving 

the city until he had a medic to replace him. So I looked to one of my medics, Specialist Moore, and told him to get on the next vehicle going into the city, replace 

him and get him back out – and that’s exactly what he did. We ended up incurring 

numerous casualties that particular morning. You just don’t have time to process 

the injuries and the deaths and those types of things. You have to just say “Okay, 

roger” and move on. Certainly the loss of friends and key leaders had an emotional 

impact on both Alpha Company and across the battalion. Everybody deals with 
121 

these losses in their own unique way and uses different coping mechanisms in 

dealing with grief. 

JM: You said Lisa went back to Camp Fallujah. This was when she accompanied Lieutenant Iwan’s body?

GM: Well, don’t confuse this. This wasn’t Ed’s body; this was Ed. He was still 

alive. We stabilized him to the best of our ability at the aid station. He had been intubated, we put the paralytics on board and he was still alive. He had IVs on board 

and we were trying to bring his blood pressure up. We had treated all his abdominal 

wounds and stopped all his major bleeding. The pieces of Ed might not have all 

been there but, in my mind, he was still alive when we got him to Camp Fallujah. 

He did make it to the operating room but unfortunately didn’t survive surgery on 

the table. But up to that point he was still alive.

JM: This whole issue of civilians in the city – did you guys ever see any of 

those or other non-combatants?

GM: I actually didn’t see any of what I would consider non-combatants in the 

city. I didn’t see any or hear of any. There was a particular phase of the operation 

– I think it was the fi rst night we moved into LRP 4 where the task force had collected up about 20 or 22 individuals within the city. These were all military-age 

males who had been found who didn’t have weapons with them at the time and they 

came back and were being interviewed by the interrogators and intelligence people 

to fi nd out what their overall role was. I did the initial medical evaluation because 

they all had bizarre injuries which weren’t normally incurred in combat: more like 

from being locked up in a room or being beaten with sticks and wires and other 

forms of abuse. I didn’t fi nd out what their overall disposition was. I was more 

inclined to think they were probably individuals who, at one point or another, had 

taken up arms with the insurgency and after getting hit with artillery barrages or 

coming up against our assault into the city, they decided it wasn’t something they 

wanted to be doing and left. We did have those individuals and they were treated 

well within their rights as individuals, but I didn’t see any women or children. We 

did have six insurgents come through the aid station for care of different gunshot 

and shrapnel wounds. We did have contingency plans for the treatment and evacuation of civilians off the battlefi eld. We planned on utilizing the Jordanian hospital 

located approximately four kilometers east of Fallujah to receive patients; however 

we didn’t have any civilians in our sector. 

JM: From your perspective as the PA, can you give an overall assessment of 

the medical support provided and the operation in general?

GM: As far as medical support from 1st MARDIV, I didn’t receive much. The 

level of support I received was from Bravo Surgical who received all our combat 

casualties and they were treated well. There could have been better patient follow-
122

up or care there, but I understand they were a busy unit trying to return as many 

soldiers and Marines to the fi ght as possible. They were a great value-added benefi t 

to the treatment of our casualties and I’m truly grateful for that. As far as what, 

if any, medical or logistical support I got from 1st MARDIV – we were really on 

our own. We weren’t really brought into the overall plan or offered any medical 

evacuation (MEDEVAC) assets. They didn’t bring any air assets devoted solely 

to MEDEVAC and our location and proximity to the city really precluded them 

from being willing to give us any type of air evac. When we were set up at LRP 

4, we were 400 meters away from the city and they weren’t willing to commit 

any aircraft for MEDEVAC. Fortunately, though, our evacuation lines were relatively short, averaging probably 15 minutes per run. What medical support I had I 

brought with me, with the exception of Bravo Surgical.

JM: When you say 15 minutes, you’re talking by ground?

GM: That’s correct. 

JM: You did not have any air evac capabilities at all?

GM: That’s true. I wasn’t authorized the use of air.

JM: Were there any major lessons learned you have from this operation that 

you think you’ll carry forward with you in your military career?

GM: I think I use them every day. I think there were quite a few. Logistically 

how I plan for particular operations – especially the more sustained combat operations and how I posture myself logistically probably have a lot to do with it, being 

a little bit more self-sustainable. I have nothing but high praise for the medics and 

individuals I had in the task force for being as highly trained as they were. I’m a 

little bit biased because I did all their training, but I had nine months in Kosovo 

working seven days a week during that deployment where you could see the smoke 

on the horizon and hear the war drums beating, so I had a captive training audience 

for nine months and medical training is not usually an important thing in the infantry world. But because I had this captive audience for nine months, we utilized that 

time to train medics for war. We trained mass casualty situations, evacuation drills, 

litter carries, doing trauma patients, going through trauma drills – and that paid me 

back in spades 100 times over during my time in Iraq. When we redeployed from 

Kosovo and got to Germany, they told us we were going to Iraq in six months – and 

medical training takes an immediate back seat because gunnery and everything 

else becomes a big priority for the infantry. But my medics were already trained 

at that point. We went through a brief period where we did some crew drills and 

night driving. We set up and took down the aid station repeatedly, doing sequential 

jumps, but our medical training at that phase was complete; and by the time we 

did the CMTC rotation in Hohenfels, they were already running like a well-oiled 

machine that made our rotation there go very easily. Then that just perpetuated the 
123 

whole time we were in Iraq. They only got better with time as they got exposed to 

more combat injuries and trauma patients. They only got better and they truly did 

amazing things while they were in Iraq. I took a lot of med planning things with 

me. I’m not at liberty to discuss some of the operations we’re doing here in the 

Philippines, but I use my logistical med planning on a daily basis and a lot of those 

tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) I use here have been refi ned. I think you 

have to learn from some of your mistakes, learn from some of your successes, take 

away what works and scrap what doesn’t and move on. I learned quite a bit there 

and I think a lot of my medics did as well.

JM: What were some of the challenges unique to this being an urban operation?

GM: There are probably a hundred different things. With urban combat, you’re 

looking 360 degrees the whole time, and not just on ground level but also up in the 

structures above you. It’s a three-dimensional fi ght that continually moves. It’s a 

very dynamic and fl uid environment. There were so many different components 

to that particular battle – between indirect and direct fi re – that I almost don’t 

know where to begin to answer that question. The logistical portion was certainly 

diffi cult. We were thinking about committing an armored asset into the city, not 

wanting to commit a wheeled ambulance into the city just due to the amount of 

shrapnel and rubble in the streets, not being able to get out through certain evac 

routes because we couldn’t negotiate the rubble or tires being an issue – being 

fl attened by pieces of shrapnel or something else. We just took a lot of things into 

consideration for that operation, came up with a plan and, fortunately, I think it was 

well executed. We didn’t lose any medics or medical vehicles within that operation 

and we did everything within our power to treat every one of those individuals that 

we had there in Fallujah. The overall success of the patients we ended up treating: 

we unfortunately incurred the fi ve casualties with Staff Sergeant Cornell who were 

KIA and then 74 other individuals above that who had been wounded but made 

it back. Yet while our overall casualty numbers comparatively were low, you still 

hate to lose good friends in combat.

JM: We’ve mentioned a number of individuals but are there any others we 

haven’t mentioned that you think deserve special recognition for their service in 

this operation?

GM: I think every medic within Task Force 2-2 Infantry. I will always and 

forever tout the individuals I took with me to Fallujah, but I’m equally grateful to 

those I did not take with me who ended up staying back on FOB Normandy and 

ended up taking the fi ght to the enemy back in Muqdadiyah. It was the exact same 

job doing the exact same mission just in a different location, and that job was every 

bit as important for the rest of the task force that didn’t deploy and still continued 
124

operations back in our own sector. I can’t speak highly enough of all the individuals I had in that task force. I had some of the fi nest Americans I’ve ever known as 

far as the medics who were with me. I will truly forever be grateful to my driver 

and medic, Specialist Luke Millikin, for keeping me alive more than once. Specialist Byung Yang, Lisa DeWitt – and she didn’t have to do that. I almost felt like I 

had to cajole her and every 90 days or so I would say, “You want to stay longer, 

right?” I think she was just playing me along because she had planned on staying 

all along; she would just make me beg every so often. 

JM: Once she got her motorcycle her mind was made up, right?

GM: That was a pretty happy day. When she got her motorcycle, she committed. She was there for the long haul. Other individuals who were there: Lieutenant Chris Carlson, Staff Sergeant Esteban Alvarado, Staff Sergeant Albert Harris, 

Sergeant Wes Smith – I could list every single individual I had in that task force 

who were just outstanding people in every sense of the word. They did absolutely 

amazing things.

JM: Are there any other issues we didn’t bring up about this particular operation that you’d like to talk about or other points you’d like to make?

GM: None I can think of off the top of my head. You have a copy of the paper 

I wrote after the operation, correct?

JM: Yes, I do.

GM: I think individuals could probably draw a lot of information from that 

paper as well. I can’t think of anything I could add to this interview.

JM: Are there any assessments you might have of the battalion staff – Lieutenant Colonel Pete Newell or any of his guys up there?

GM: Honestly I think the battalion staff was certainly infl uenced by Lieutenant 

Colonel Newell and they were very competent and led us to a successful operation. 

I think I will actually give credit as well to Lieutenant Colonel Ken Adgie who 

was the battalion operations offi cer (S3) for an extended period of time – 2002 

through 2003 – and who also served as the battalion XO. He had a bigger infl uence 

in forming the battalion staff and his infl uence had a big impact on this task force 

being as successful as it was. Not to take anything away from Lieutenant Colonel 

Newell or Major John Reynolds, but I think Ken Adgie had a signifi cant impact in 

the overall mentoring of the 2-2 staff offi cers that stayed with the task force and 

in the actual methodical process of how they thought and successfully executed 

combat operations.

JM: Okay, thank you very much for your time today and for your service as 

well. It’s greatly appreciated.
125 

Captain Edward Twaddell III

28 February 2006

MM: My name is Matt Mathews (MM) and I’m an historian with the Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. I’m telephonically interviewing 

Captain Edward Twaddell III (ET). Today’s date is 28 February 2006. This is an 

unclassifi ed interview. Before we begin, I’d like to say if you feel, at any time, we 

are entering classifi ed territory, please couch your response in terms that avoid revealing any classifi ed information or simply say you’re not able to answer. I’d like 

to start out with what your background militarily is and something about where 

you went to school, how you were commissioned, that sort of thing.

ET: I was commissioned out of the United States Military Academy, Class of 

’97, in May of ’97. My fi rst assignment was the 1st Battalion, 502d Infantry Regiment at Fort Campbell, with the 101st Airborne Division. I deployed with them to 

the Multi-National Force and Observers mission in the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt 

for six months. I went to the Captains Career Course. I went on to Fort Hood where 

I served in the brigade operations (S3) shop, 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, 

then moved down to the S3 shop in 2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment (2-7 CAV), 

where I served as the assistant S3 until I took over command of Alpha Company, 

2-7 CAV, on the 6th of November of 2003.

MM: For the record, could you give me your full name?

ET: Edward Samuel Twaddell III.

MM: Okay, excellent. Now could you briefl y describe how Alpha Company 

2-7, and Task Force 2-7 in general, were committed to Fallujah – when you fi rst 

found out about the mission, what you did to prepare for it?

ET: Throughout our tour in Iraq, 2-7 was cross-attached to the 39th Enhanced 

Separate Brigade (ESB), Arkansas National Guard. We were posted at Taji, approximately 25 miles north of Baghdad. In August of ’04, I guess we were fi lling a 

rotation as the theater response force or the theater quick reaction force (QRF), or 

something to that effect. The whole issue with Moqtada al-Sadr began to develop 

and 2-7 was cross-attached then, I think, to the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit 

(MEU), who had a responsibility for An Najaf. So we loaded all of our vehicles on 

heavy equipment transporters (HETs) and convoyed to An Najaf, not far from the 

11th MEU. We gained a good reputation there with the Marines and – as I’ve been 

told, although I don’t know for sure – when it looked like Operation Phantom Fury 

was going to kick off into a much more a direct confl ict, as opposed to the lowlevel type of fi ghting that had been going on, the Marines asked for 2-7 by name. 

So I think there was some bit of reputation that went on with that. Taji and the area 

surrounding Taji was an economy of force mission for the 1st Cavalry Division. 
126

Therefore, when the theater commander called for movement of a battalion, it was 

easier to pull 2-7 out of that area rather than, say, a committed battalion in central 

Baghdad and move them across the theater to whatever contingency operation had 

arisen. Is that what you’re looking for?

MM: Yes, that’s perfect. When you announced this to your men, how did they 

respond? Were they pretty enthusiastic about this mission?

ET: Yeah, they were. We were very proud that we had done as well as we had 

in Najaf in August. Alpha Company specifi cally had had two new lieutenants come 

into the company, joining us literally as we pulled out of Najaf, and they met us 

at the forward operating base (FOB) where we were hanging our hat until we redeployed to Taji. So, they were kind of new guys in the mix and wanted to prove 

themselves. 

MM: Were these the 1st and 2d Platoon leaders? And if you recall their names, 

could state those for me please?

ET: It was 1st and 2d Platoon. 1st Platoon was led by First Lieutenant, now 

First Lieutenant (promotable), Daniel Kilgore, and 2d platoon was led by now First 

Lieutenant (promotable) Michael Duran.

MM: And do you recall the name of the platoon leader for 3d Platoon, Charlie 

3-8?

ET: First Lieutenant Matt Wojcik.

MM: Okay, great. Could you just talk me through, from day one, the entire 

scope of the operation for Phantom Fury, from when you guys did the breach until 

you withdrew from Fallujah?

ET: Are you talking from notifi cation of mission –?

MM: Yeah, why don’t we start there and just take it right up to November 8th. 

Just talk me through the whole mission and what you recall, what went right, what 

went wrong. I’m also trying to specifi cally come up with some ideas on your joint 

operations, on what you thought went well with the Marines, what you thought 

didn’t go well. A lot of people I’ve been interviewing seem to be shocked that the 

Marines didn’t have hardly any equipment, I guess is how most of them put it. So 

I was just interested in your observations on that, too.

ET: I’ve got a journal that I kept here, so I’m kind of fl ipping through trying 

to refresh my memory. Okay, we arrived at Camp Fallujah on the 3d of November. 

We left Taji at about 0430 on the 3d of November and then we drove. We didn’t 

HET our vehicles to Fallujah; we just drove the tracks all the way there.

MM: So you took the Bradleys all the way there. How many kilometers was 

that?
127 

ET: I don’t recall off the top of my head.

MM: Do you have an approximate fi gure?

ET: I know we drove south from Taji along the main supply route (MSR) into 

Baghdad and then moved west into Al Anbar Province along Route Huskies.

MM: Did you experience any improvised explosive devices (IEDs) along the 

way?

ET: We did have an IED detonate behind us, between my serial and the last 

serial, but other than that we didn’t have any issues.

MM: Now speaking of the serial, you had your company. Was Charlie Company 2-7 with you?

ET: Captain Pete Glass had serial one; he was the Charlie Company commander with 3d Battalion, 8th Cavalry Regiment (3-8). Serial two was Captain 

Jake Brown, Bravo Company, 215th Forward Support Battalion. I had serial three. 

I guess that leaves Captain Chris Brooke with Charlie 2-7 in serial four, but I might 

be mistaken on the order of march.

MM: Can you briefl y take me through your arrival at what I guess Marines 

were calling Camp Fallujah, and how you linked in with the Marines and the prior 

planning for the operation?

ET: One of the lessons that came out of Najaf was the requirement for good 

tie-in once the warning orders had been given at that battalion, brigade, regimental 

level. Our reception to Camp Fallujah and our tie-in with the Marines seemed to 

go a lot smoother than it had in Najaf. So my assumption is that folks took the lessons learned from Najaf and applied them and did a lot of good cross-talk before 

we even left Taji to link in with the Marines. We had the quartering party already 

at Camp Fallujah that had established motor pool and established where our billets 

were going to be. When we arrived, it seemed to be pretty quick. We pulled right 

in, dropped the ramps, and said, “Okay, Alpha Company, here’s your portion of the 

motor pool; do your maintenance and get the men settled in.”

MM: Did you guys do any chalk walks or any planning with the Marines?

ET: Not at my level. I’m sure Major Tim Karcher, who was the battalion S3, 

Lieutenant Colonel Jim Rainey, and probably the battalion executive offi cer (XO), 

Major Scott Jackson, did.

MM: I’m going to be interviewing Major Karcher tomorrow, so that’ll be super. Okay, can you talk me through, then, the plan? Let’s say November 8th, you 

guys do the breach, and just take it from there.

ET: We actually got all lined up on the 7th. We left our assembly area and 

moved into the task force support area (TFSA) which served as our assault posi-
128

tion, on the 7th. That was on the north side of the city. The time for crossing the 

line of departure (LD) was set for 0300 on the 8th.

MM: Was Task Force 2-7 the fi rst to breach or was it simultaneous with the 

Marines?

ET: The Marines actually set the breach and were supposed open a lane, and 

then 2-7 was supposed to be the initial battalion through the breach and into the 

city. 

MM: Did the Marines use the mine clearing line charge (MCLC) for this 

breach?

ET: We were pretty close and, as you’re well aware, MCLCs will make a big 

boom. I don’t recall hearing it detonate. I’m not saying they didn’t use it. I did not 

hear a MCLC go off, but then again, maybe it went off and I wasn’t paying attention or maybe I confused it with an aircraft strike or something like that.

MM: Was it 3d Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment (3-1) that did the breach that 

your company went through?

ET: Let me see here –

MM: I can fi nd that out from Karcher. But after they blow the breach, it was 

Charlie 3-8 and then Alpha 2-7 and Charlie 2-7. Is that –?

ET: Yes. We moved south through the breach to a road that ran east-west along 

the north side of the city. Charlie 3-8 was fi rst in the order of movement; they had 

the easternmost position. Our fi nal assault position on that road from east to west 

was going to look like Charlie 3-8, Alpha 2-7 and then Charlie 2-7.

MM: In the initial phase of this operation, were you basically driving for Phase 

Line Fran, which would be Highway 10? Or just talk me through what you thought 

the scheme of maneuver was.

ET: I want to say it was Phase Line Fran, but we had to give up all our graphics 

when we came back, so –

MM: And that’s what I’m dealing with right now. I really don’t have solid 

graphics on 2-7. I’m hoping to get those. Now I do have solid overlays with phase 

lines from 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry Regiment (2-2), and I’m just assuming that 

they just extend west. I’m assuming everybody pretty much was on same sheet of 

music here.

ET: Yeah, 2-2 was immediately to our east; we were to their west. I believe 

you’re right. I think we had either 3-1 or 1-3 Marines. I remember the regimental 

designation as being 3d Marine Regiment, 5th Regimental Combat Team (RCT), 

and I want to say 7th RCT was in there somewhere, but I’m not sure where precisely they were.
129 

MM: Why don’t you just talk me through what you remember of the fi ght once 

you got into the city, what went right and what went wrong.

ET: Once we came through the breach and got lined up on that east-west running road on the north side of the city, Alpha Company had the mission of being 

the point of the wedge, so to speak, as the task force pushed south. Once we seized 

our initial objective, which was the Jolan Park, or Objective Pennsylvania, we 

were to pretty much serve as an anchor and allow Charlie 3-8 (to our east) to march 

further south, begin to pivot to the east, and then end up directly south of us. So, 

we were to serve as a pivot point; and once Alpha 2-7 and Charlie 3-8 were set, 3-1 

Marines was supposed to follow us through the breach. We were supposed to clear 

from north to south. Because the Marines weren’t a mechanized force, our purpose 

was to allow them to move unhindered down south and then pass them forward 

through our lines to continue to press the enemy to the east. So, to recap, we were 

to seize Objective Pennsylvania. Once we had Objective Pennsylvania, we were to 

pass 3-1 Marines through us and allow them to continue south of us and then they 

were going to move off. Similar to Charlie 3-8, they were to swing to the east and 

continue a detailed clearance of their objective.

MM: So, did the Marines stay right on your tail for most of this operation? Or, 

because they had to clear all the buildings, were they kind of lagging behind?

ET: They were defi nitely lagging behind. Because they were a light force, I do 

not think that their planners understood how quickly 2-7 CAV was able to move 

as a mechanized force. A mechanized force has the ability to clear, but not in the 

detail that a dismounted light force does. So, when we pushed through the breach, 

I got the impression that the Marines expected we would be fi ghting for a good 

three or four hours. We encountered very light resistance throughout the night. Just 

a couple folks would come out and try to fi re off a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) 

or an AK-47 or something like that.

MM: Did your company take any casualties that fi rst night?

ET: That fi rst night, no. As light started to come up on the morning of the 8th, 

we started taking a lot of mortar rounds. I don’t know whether to say the enemy 

was not willing to fi ght at night, through lack of discipline, or they realized that we 

had technology that they couldn’t beat, in the form of our night vision and thermal 

capabilities. Maybe their thought was: “Well, let’s wait. Let’s take that advantage 

away from the Americans and fi ght during the day when we’re on slightly better 

footing.”

MM: Was the mortar fi re you were receiving accurate at all?

ET: There was a big water tower on Objective Pennsylvania that the enemy 

was able to use as a reference point off of which they could adjust fi re, and I’m 
130

sure they had observers that were able to walk rounds in once we were on the objective.

MM: In the northern part of the city there, were you given any sort of decent 

intelligence on who you might expect to fi nd? Were these former Fallujah Brigade 

members or insurgents or foreign fi ghters? What did you think you were going to 

encounter?

ET: The intelligence we received suggested that the majority of fi ghters in 

Fallujah were former military, although there was an element of foreign fi ghters 

there. But there seemed to be a split between the foreign fi ghters and the locals, so 

to speak, of the Fallujah area. There was a question, and I don’t think it was ever 

answered, as to the motivation of the enemy. The locals from the city, according to 

one theory, were just like, “Look, just get out of our city and go home, go away,” 

whereas the foreign fi ghters were much more into killing Americans, the jihad, that 

kind of thing. Whether that was ever confi rmed, I don’t know. That was something 

that was fl oated out there as a theory, but again, as a company commander, I wasn’t 

really concerned as to why they were shooting at my guys. My concern was: seize 

my objective, kill the enemy and get where I need to go.

MM: Did the intel help at all? 2-2 sent me a couple slides where they thought 

people were at, but someone told me that that basically went out the window as 

soon as they came in the city. Intel wasn’t really able to place these guys for certain 

anywhere, was it?

ET: We templated a very dispersed threat rather than concentrations. We assumed that the enemy would rely heavily on snipers, forward observers, rocket 

attacks and direct fi re attacks, and would not try to go toe-to-toe with us. Instead, 

they’d allow us to pass, fi re us up from behind with RPGs and anti-tank weapons, 

use IEDs, vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) – things he had 

that could counter the protection that our armor provided us. That being said, there 

were several folks that tried to go stand out in the middle of the street with an AK47 and face down a Bradley. It ended badly for them.

MM: Now I’ve got here that Alpha 2-7, you reached Objective Pennsylvania. 

Alpha 2-7 passes 3-1 Marines. On the 9th at 1800 hours we’ve got shaping operations. We’ve got Charlie 3-8 arrives on Objective Virginia. Anything you can recall 

up until that point?

ET: We had very light contact throughout the night, until such time as the light 

started coming up. As we cleared through and secured Objective Pennsylvania, 

we found a large cache of some rockets, mortar shells, C-4, a large VBIED, which 

we consolidated. Eventually we were tasked to leave Pennsylvania and we blew 

all that when we left. But we had passed 3-1 Marines through us by the time that 

occurred.
131 

MM: I have Alpha 2-7 arrives on Objective Kentucky, Ohio. Does that make 

any sense? And I’ve got the date on that as the 10th, 0900 hours.

ET: Yes. The night of the 9th, I received a fragmentary order (FRAGO) to 

move back to the task force support area on the morning of the 10th to receive 

another mission. So we pulled out on the 10th, received the mission, pulled off of 

Pennsylvania on the 10th and received orders to conduct reconnaissance of Objectives Kentucky and Ohio, which are the two bridges that cross the Euphrates River 

on the western side of the old city. We conducted recons of Kentucky in the south 

without incident; no demolitions that we could see. I learned later that, evidently, 

IEDs had been rigged by digging them into the asphalt and either melting tires or 

putting asphalt on top of them. So I had explicit instructions not to go onto the 

bridges but to conduct a visual reconnaissance of the bridges. When we conducted 

that, we didn’t see anything. But again, without going up onto the bridges, we just 

didn’t know. I learned later, when they opened those things up, that, yes, in fact, 

they did fi nd several IEDs buried in the bridge itself.

MM: So you basically secured Objectives Kentucky and Ohio and then, at 

2100 hours that night, according to my sheet, you get a change of mission. Is that 

the FRAGO that sent you further south into the city?

ET: Yeah, we reconned Kentucky and moved north along Route Kevin to Ohio 

and conducted reconnaissance there. We came nose-to-nose with a Marine company; they were fi ghting from east to west and we were coming right up into their 

area from the south. So we did our recon as quickly as we could and got out of 

their hair, and then we pulled back south to Kentucky and set up a perimeter that 

we held until morning. And the following morning, I guess that’d be the 11th, I 

got instructed to pull back again to the task force support area. We spent the day 

refi tting in preparation for another mission, which would become the movement to 

contact that Charlie 3-8 led. That would be the night of the 11th.

MM: Okay. I have here on one of my notes that on the 12th at 0900 there was 

heavy contact, and that appears to be Charlie 2-7 and Alpha 2-7. Could you explain 

what happened then?

ET: Yeah, I’ll just read it right out of my diary here: “After spending the day 

planning, we moved out with Cougar (i.e., Charlie 3-8) in front of us on the night 

of the 11th. The mission was to continue pressing the enemy south of Phase Line 

Jenna. Cougar was to work one phase line ahead of us. We were to secure Route 

Henry south so that they, Cougar, didn’t get cut off. We moved through the night, 

bounding one phase line ahead at a time with minimal contact. We were all incredibly tired and staying alert was diffi cult. As dawn broke on the morning of the 12th, 

we, Alpha 2-7, found ourselves arrayed from Phase Line Donna to Phase Line Isabel with about a section of Bradleys or tanks on each major intersection. Again, as 
132

the sun came up, the enemy came out to fi ght. We began taking intense mortar and 

RPG fi re. I received orders from battalion to consolidate south of Phase Line Isabel in order to get out of the way of an air strike that was coming in. As our forces 

became more concentrated – Cougar was working down south, Phase Line Jenna 

– the mortar fi re intensifi ed. Ghost 5, Major Scott Jackson, instructed me to take 

charge of the Cougar element – Captain Glass was refueling/rearming with half of 

his force at the task force support area – until Cougar 6, Captain Glass, returned to 

the battlefi eld.” So at that time I found myself in command of my company plus 

half of Charlie 3-8.

MM: Was Captain Glass wounded at that time?

ET: No. 

MM: Now, can you just basically continue the story from there? I guess this 

was 0900 hours on the 12th. 

ET: I made the decision right there to maneuver this company-plus on the 

enemy rather than sit there and take mortar fi re. Move on the enemy while we 

were waiting on the air strike, rather than sit stationary and eat mortars for the next 

unknown period of time.

MM: Were the mortars causing any casualties at this time?

ET: No, they weren’t, but it was a matter of time before we had a direct hit on 

a track. I fi gured it was just bad for morale to sit there buttoned up and waiting for 

a direct hit. So Ghost 5, Major Jackson, said, “Hey, you’re the man. Go.”

MM: Now, Major Jackson, what was his position at this time?

ET: He was the battalion XO. I believe he’s the deputy brigade commander for 

3d Brigade now. 

MM: You have this heavy contact and you move forward. Does the air strike 

eventually come in?

ET: I believe it did. Let me fi nd my place here: “I decided to extend along 

Phase Line Isabel to Route Isaac and attack south to Jenna.” So I had everybody 

all curled up on Route Henry. Rather than sit there all bunched up like that, my 

intent was to extend to the west and attack south to Phase Line Jenna. I fi gured this 

would keep us moving, make it more diffi cult for the enemy to call mortars on us 

while, at the same time, putting pressure on the enemy, allowing us to kill him with 

direct fi re. 2d Platoon was on the west, 3d Platoon, Charlie 3-8 was in the middle, 

1st Platoon in the east. Between 1st Platoon and Route Henry, Lieutenant Mike 

Throckmorton, who was the XO for Charlie 3-8, which set up what was available 

from Charlie 3-8, do the same thing as Alpha 2-7. So, from west to east as we 

pushed out from Isabel to Isaac, you had the 2d Platoon, Alpha 2-7, 3d Platoon, 
133 

Charlie 3-8, 1st Platoon, Alpha 2-7, and then whatever elements of Charlie 3-8, 

between 1st Platoon, Alpha 2-7, and Route Henry.

MM: As you started moving out as you were taking mortar fi re, did you start 

taking direct fi re?

ET: Yes, we did, as we began moving in the position on Isabel. I had mistakenly called Route Isaac “Route Jacob” in my instructions to Lieutenant Michael 

Duran, 2d Platoon leader, and as a result he was moving too far. I changed my 

instructions to him, got him pulling back. It was at that point, as I was changing 

those instructions to him, that my track got hit from behind.

MM: Is this the incident where your interpreter was killed? 

ET: Yes, although he wasn’t my interpreter. I had a tactical PSYOP team (TPT) 

attached to me for the fi ght and the interpreter was attached to them. So I had him 

available to me but he wasn’t my interpreter, if that makes any sense.

MM: Who was in your track when this occurred?

ET: Staff Sergeant Doug Queen was my gunner. Private First Class Richard 

Cohlmeyer was the driver. Sergeant Brian Newman was the TPT team leader. Specialist Rankin, Sergeant Delhotal, as well the linguist we all called Izzy.

MM: My understanding is that this RPG came through the back gate of the 

Bradley?

ET: Yeah, it punched through the ramp.

MM: It came right through the ramp. Who else was wounded? I know the interpreter was killed. Was there anybody inside wounded?

ET: Sergeant Newman lost his left arm, just below the shoulder. Rankin and 

Delhotel took some small shrapnel injuries and Izzy was killed outright.

MM: Did you just consider this to be somebody got a lucky shot off?

ET: No, as we talked about it, as I continued to look at the hole in the ramp, it 

wasn’t an RPG-7. It had some kind of penetrator. I’m not as up to speed as I should 

be on the various models of RPGs, but as you look at the back of the Bradley from 

the outside, there are the two M-231 gun ports. The RPG penetrated below the 

right hand gun port, sheared off Sergeant Newman’s arm, passed right through 

Izzy, passed underneath the screen for the Force XXI Battle Command, Brigadeand-Below (FBCB2) system, and penetrated the turret through the turret shield. 

We had the turret slewed, I want to say to the 2 o’clock or 3 o’clock position. The 

penetrator passed through the turret shield into the ammo ready box and detonated 

a couple of high explosive (HE) rounds. How Sergeant Queen and I didn’t catch 

any shrapnel, I have no clue.
134

MM: That’s an incredible story. So you’re convinced that that was not an 

RPG-7. You think it was some other kind of RPG or some other kind of anti-tank 

weapon?

ET: We found an awful lot of boosters for RPGs, to give them more kick. We 

had the reactive armor on the Brads to counter the more modern RPGs out there, 

but the ramp doesn’t have those reactive armor tiles on it. If you looked at the 

ramp, the hole was – you could maybe fi t a fi nger and a half into the hole. There 

was not a scorch mark on it that would indicate an explosion outside, so my guess 

is that there was a booster that pushed the penetrator through the vehicle. 

MM: This event actually takes place on the 13th, is that correct?

ET: No, on the 12th, as we’re moving everybody along Isabel to Route Isaac.

MM: And this is around the 0900 timeframe?

ET: That sounds about right. I’ve lost track of time.

MM: Can you tell me what happened after this incident, just talk me through 

the rest of the fi ght?

ET: Let me back up a little: “We began moving into position on Isabel. I realized I had mistakenly referred to Route Isaac as Route Jacob and 2d Platoon was 

moving too far to the west. Sergeant Queen, my gunner, was directing PFC Cohlmeyer, my driver, into position behind 3d Platoon, Charlie 3-8. As I looked down 

at my map to get oriented so that I could get 2d Platoon pulled back to Isaac, I saw 

a fl ash between my knees, the turret was fi lled with smoke, and I realized we had 

been hit. As we lurched to a stop, Sergeant Queen asked me if I was good to go. 

I didn’t feel any pain and answered, ‘Yes.’ He was out of the turret checking on 

Cohlmeyer.... I called up Captain Hank Wiley, who was my XO, and told him we 

were hit. I passed as much info as I had, which was that we had two urgent casualties, one routine and one killed in action (KIA). I crawled out of the turret and hit 

the ground. As I got on the ground, Sergeant Calvin Smalley pulled up behind me. 

Sergeant Smalley was the platoon sergeant for 1st Platoon and was directing the 

fi res of dismounts in all directions. Scott ‘Doc’ Cogil was on the ground treating 

Sergeant Newman.”

MM: Were you still taking pretty intense fi re at this time?

ET: No. We were shooting every which way, but I don’t remember hearing 

rounds around me. So I think they shot, realized they had a successful hit, and then 

moved out before we could bring direct fi re onto their position.

MM: Okay, now can you talk me through all the way up to the 20th. From my 

notes here, you have some heavy contact at 0900 on the 13th.
135 

ET: Let’s see: “Under suppressive fi re from the Brads and dismounts, we got 

Newman and Delhotel onto Alpha 1-1 and got them back to the aid station. Policed 

up our gear, got it back in the Brads. Sergeant Smalley’s Bradley had been hit, 

too, and was leaking oil. They got everything moved and back to the TFSA. When 

we closed on the TFSA, everyone headed right for the rearming/refueling point. I 

stopped in the medic’s tent, unloaded Izzy’s body. We spent the next couple hours 

getting the Brads and tanks straight, more bullets and more gas, etc. Cleaning out 

my track. About 1600, I sent 2d Platoon back. I went with them in the XO’s track. 

Stayed out on Route Henry until 0230. On the 13th, came back in, swapped out 

with 1st Platoon and the XO.” So I came back, handed the XO’s track back to him, 

and I crashed about 0430. I got up about 10:00 on the morning on the 13th, I think. 

I don’t think your timeline is correct. About 11:30, that’s what I have here. Again, 

I don’t know precisely what the time was. “About 11:30, 1st Platoon is still out 

with the XO, came into contact. Staff Sergeant Santillana’s squad had chased an 

insurgent that they had seen running across an alley into a building. They seized a 

foothold in the courtyard, prepped the entrance with a grenade, and kicked in the 

door. Reports were that between 10 and 20 insurgents were waiting for them. Sergeant Abdelwahab was on point. He was immediately hit in the right leg and left 

arm. Specialist Howard was the number-two man. He grabbed “Abe,” dragged him 

back. Simultaneously, the squad started taking fi re from a sniper positioned across 

the street. Specialist Jose Velez sprayed the window across the street with a squad 

automatic weapon (SAW), stopped in the open to reload and was shot just below 

the neck in the right shoulder. Grenades came out of the original target house and 

exploded, wounding Sergeant Bristol, Specialist Goodin and Specialist Benny Alicea. Somehow they got everyone back in the Brads and began casualty evacuation 

(CASEVAC) back to the TFSA. I met them at the aid station where Captain Kevin 

Burnham and the rest of the battalion medics were waiting. Captain Burnham was 

one of the physician’s assistants (PAs). By the time I got in the tent, Abe and Howard were stabilized and Alicea, Bristol and Goodin were outside. Their wounds 

were relatively minor. Sergeant Bristol was the least hurt of the bunch. I walked 

around to the side of the tent and talked with Goodin for a bit. Saw some activity 

behind the tent; walked behind it to see what was happening. The medics were carrying a body bag. That’s when I was informed that Specialist Velez had been killed. 

He was the SAW gunner.” I just circulated between the remaining casualties. Sergeant Santillana, the squad leader, he was unwounded completely. I’ve never seen 

anybody feel as guilty, I think, about that. He loved his men, and I think he felt like 

he should be lying there in the medical tent with them.

MM: What happened after this? Were you forced to get right back into the 

fi ght?

ET: Yes, we did go back into the fi ght.
136

MM: I’ve got a big block on my notes here that says, basically, from 0700 on 

the 14th to 17 November, Charlie 3-8 attacks in support of 3-1 Marines, and I just 

have a complete blank on Alpha 2-7.

ET: We rolled back out, but we swapped. As I said, Charlie 3-8 had pivoted and 

come to the west and they were south of us. Up until that point, we were arrayed 

from south to north: Charlie 3-8, Alpha 2-7, Charlie 2-7. Once this happened, it 

took a lot of guys out of the fi ght. We fl ip-fl opped and Alpha 2-7 pulled back and 

Charlie 2-7 pushed forward. Charlie 3-8 remained at the tip.

MM: As you’re progressing south here, did you fi nd that the resistance became 

greater from the enemy? The 2-2 folks were telling me that there were some foreign fi ghters in their area on the southeast.

ET: The initial take was you had the two elements: you had the foreign fi ghters 

and you had the former military folks in the city of Fallujah. There in the Martyrs 

District, that was the area where my Brad got hit and where Specialist Velez was 

killed I heard reports, not necessarily confi rmed, of interpreters identifying enemy 

KIAs: “Hey, he’s a Syrian, he’s from Russia, he’s Lebanese, he’s Saudi.” I would 

be lying if I said that I could tell everybody apart.

MM: In the last days of the mission, were you guys pretty much working in 

conjunction with the Marines in clearing out the last buildings?

ET: No, we were very frustrated. I was very frustrated. Morale was pretty low 

after Velez died and the other six troops were pretty seriously injured. It was two 

hard days there that we were down vehicles; we were down some good troops. 

Everybody did get back in the saddle and they did great and wonderful things. But, 

all of a sudden, we’re pulled back. Very minimal contact after the 13th. It seemed 

that we were much more of a route security force while the Marines continued on 

with the fi ght.

MM: Did they pull 3-8 back? Were they in the same boat?

ET: It seemed that 3-8 was also being held back. Pete Glass, he was an amazing commander. He was all about taking the fi ght to the enemy and we were all 

frustrated. Again, I’m not privy to what was going on at the regimental level or 

above that, but we all felt: we’ve got a mechanized task force that is sitting still. 

Meanwhile, we’re listening to radio reports and hearing about great Marines getting hurt, not through any fault of their own, but they didn’t have the protection 

afforded by armored vehicles. They’re a light force. So we were very frustrated. 

It appeared that the whole force was not using the assets available to accomplish 

the mission.

MM: It’s my understanding that the Marines really only had about a platoon of 

their own tanks, I guess, in each battalion.
137 

ET: I don’t know enough about how they were organized. 

MM: So, in general, what was your observation of working with the Marines 

during this time period? Good, bad, ugly?

ET: They’re all great Americans. I was amazed by their tenacity and ferocity in 

the fi ght, and the abilities of their noncommissioned offi cers (NCOs) to get things 

done. Overall, though, including Najaf, I was not impressed with their planning 

processes. When we went to the regimental rock drill, it seemed that it turned into 

a wargame session rather than the rehearsal it was supposed to be. Again, I’m just 

a company commander, and there are a lot of guys out there with a lot more brainpower than I have. But that’s what I got from that regimental rock drill. I did not 

feel that there was good adjacent-unit coordination or communication between the 

Marines and units that they were working around. There’s more than one occasion 

I can think of where I got calls from my platoon leaders: “Hey, Apache 6, is there 

anyone around you?” or “Anyone supposed to be around us?” “No.” “Because 

I’ve got guys with weapons walking in the open one block to my east.” “Okay, 

well, keep an eye on them.” “Oh, they must be Marines because I can make out 

their Kevlar (helmets) and they’re with a tank.” They were doing the WWII squadwalking-behind-a-tank kind of thing.

MM: With their telephone, I guess, on the back. 

ET: I don’t know how they were communicating to the crew. I can’t say no one 

knew where those guys were, but they were moving through our area of operations 

and nobody bothered to tell me they were going to be there. I was very concerned 

about fratricide as a result of poor adjacent-unit coordination.

MM: Well, that’s signifi cant.

ET: They didn’t bother to call up and say, “Hey, Apache, I got two tanks and 

two squads moving south along this route, going to pass through your area of operations (AO). But just for your information, that’s where we’re going to be. We 

should be there about 1830 and we should be gone by 1900.” “Roger that, man, no 

worries. You have a mission you have to do; I’ve got to guard the road. I got it.” 

MM: When I talked to Major Karcher, he wanted to know if I’d read Bing 

West’s No True Glory book. He said, “If you want to fi nd out what really didn’t 

happen, read that book.” Have you read the book?

ET: I have not, sir, no.

MM: Okay, because the Army’s hardly mentioned in it at all, so – 

ET: Yes, sir. I might have to get it, but I got so pissed off reading a couple 

pages. I was like, “This is crap.”
138

MM: There’s one page in there that says the Marines specifi cally requested 

Task Force 2-7. But other than that, they’re pretty much overlooked. One more 

quick question on logistics: Did the Marines provide you with ammo, fuel, that sort 

of thing, or did you pretty much have to get that yourself?

ET: We got all our stuff from Captain Brown and his forward support company.

MM: And you’re not sure where he was drawing that from?

ET: Major Jackson, the XO, and Captain Brown would probably be the guys 

to talk to about that. 

MM: Are you still in contact with your platoon leaders during this fi ght?

ET: I keep in contact with Lieutenant Kilgore. I send an email message to 

Lieutenant Duran every so often, but I don’t hear back from him.

MM: Because if you are in contact with any of them and if they want to shoot 

their story my way, that’d be super. We’re trying to get all the information we possibly can on this. Any NCOs, anybody.

ET: Well, it happens, believe or not, that you’ve got my old fi rst sergeant and 

you’ve got my platoon sergeant right there in Leavenworth with you.

MM: You’ve got to be kidding me.

ET: I’m not bullshitting you, man.

MM: Okay, let me get these names. 

ET: You have formerly First Sergeant, now Master Sergeant, Steven Vigil and, 

unless he’s been promoted, Sergeant First Class John Urrutia.

MM: And they’re permanently stationed here at Leavenworth? 

ET: Yes, they’re part of the Battle Command Training Program

MM: Oh, really? I worked over there for 16 years. I was with the World Class 

OPFOR over there. Well, look, this answers all the major questions I have, but I’m 

sure that I’m going to be picking your brain as I start writing this. I’ll probably be 

emailing you quite a bit to see if this is right or if this makes sense.

ET: Yes, sir.

MM: Well, is there anything else that you want to leave me with?

ET: Lieutenant Kilgore and Lieutenant Duran are still in – well, 2-7 was refl agged 1-12 about the time I was leaving, but they’re still down there.

MM: Okay, I will make contact with them. Thank you very much.
139 

Captain Coley D. Tyler 

20 April 2006

MM: My name is Matt Matthews [MM] and I’m an historian with the Combat 

Studies Institute. Today is Thursday, April 20, 2006, and I’m interviewing Captain 

Coley D. Tyler [CT], who was the fi re support offi cer, FSO, for 2-7 CAV [2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment] during Operation Phantom Fury. Could you just 

give me some background on where you were born, where you went to school, 

how you got your commission?

CT: Yes, sir. I was born in Macon, Georgia, on February 6, 1978. Shortly thereafter, my father and I moved to Franklin, North Carolina, which is in the western 

half, in the mountains. I grew up there and went to high school there at Franklin 

High School. I was an all-around athlete. I played soccer, I wrestled and ran track. 

After high school, I applied to West Point and was accepted. I then spent 1996 to 

2000 at West Point and graduated in May, commissioned in fi eld artillery. Shortly 

thereafter, I went to the Offi cer Basic course at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, followed that 

up with Ranger School, and then ended up at Fort Hood, Texas, with the 2d Battalion, 82d Field Artillery Regiment, 3d Brigade. 

MM: Could you talk me through your arrival in Iraq and how you linked up 

with 2-7 CAV?

CT: Not a problem, sir. When we fi rst deployed to Iraq, I was the battalion 

intelligence offi cer for 2-82. The FSO for 2-7 at the time, it was his time to come 

up for command. So in September of 2004, I moved up to Taji where 2-7 was stationed with the 39th ESB [Enhanced Separate Brigade]. I took over from him and 

he came back to 2-82 and took command of our headquarters battery. That’s how I 

ended up in 2-7 in September of 2004. 

MM: Do you recall when you fi rst heard about the mission that might be coming up and when you fi rst linked up with the Marines and started to coordinate, do 

some planning for this operation?

CT: I heard of 2-7 previously with their operations in Najaf, and I knew that 

was where I was headed. Just keeping up as the intelligence offi cer, I knew things 

in Fallujah were bad and there was talk of a possible military operation. When I 

got to 2-7, I actually heard the rumors that since we had worked with the Marines 

previously, we would be the ones called if there was an operation. But at the same 

time, there was the presidential election going on and nobody was really sure if 

that would have an impact: would we go prior to the election, would we go after 

the election, or would we even go at all? We didn’t have direct liaison authorized 

with the Marines offi cially, but they would give us information just to help us get 

into the mindset if we were called to work with them. They were getting the same 
140

type of rumors on their end too, that if they did do this, we would be one of the 

Army battalions that would be attached to them. A lot of it was rumors until maybe 

a week before we really started conducting operations.

MM: What do you recall of meeting the Marines for the fi rst time and starting 

to really get into the nitty-gritty of planning this thing?

CT: Honestly, before I actually worked with Marines, I think I probably had 

the regular, stereotypical idea of what Marines were: not necessarily the brightest, 

that the Army was always better and smarter. However, I found the Marines were 

extremely intelligent, have a lot of common sense, and I actually enjoyed the way 

they ran their operation, almost more so than the Army. It was very refreshing to 

work with somebody outside the Army, but still in the U.S. Armed Forces. I have 

a newfound respect for Marines, and I thought of myself as being sort of a Marine 

after that. They really brought us in and treated us like their own. I really enjoyed 

working with them. I found them to be very, very good soldiers.

MM: Excellent. Let’s start maybe 8 November. The Marines have blown the 

breach on the western side of the train station. Just tell me what you did, what you 

remember, starting from there, and let’s take it all the way down to when you guys 

capture the Jolan District.

CT: Okay. Actually, can I start with maybe a few days previous, because –

MM: Certainly, yes.

CT: We actually sent a recon by force. I can’t remember the exact day, but several days prior to the same breach location just north of the train station. I was just 

trying to get an idea of how tough it was going to be to breach and get into the city. 

We went in with about a company size, with one of my fi re support guys, the air 

liaison offi cer [ALO] and myself, and we basically got into a little bit of a skirmish 

there at the train station in part of the city where we were going to breach. I called a 

lot of indirect fi re on what we thought were suspected minefi elds in front of where 

we wanted to breach. I was trying to get that destroyed with fi re so the engineers 

wouldn’t be forced to deal with that when they actually did the breach.

MM: Who fi red that mission for you and what kinds of rounds were these?

CT: It was Mike Battery 414 and it was regular 155 millimeter high explosive 

rounds. That was the fi re support part of that and, of course, the tanks and Bradleys 

got into a little bit of a skirmish with their weapons systems. Then they withdrew 

and it looked as good a place as any to breach. Right before the breach happened, 

all the pre-planned targets had been reconned with UAVs [Unmanned Aerial Vehicles], and that sort of intelligence gathering had been going on for months previous. Within our rules of engagement, we engaged as many targets as possible to 

soften up the front four roads so, once we did the breach and got into the fi rst few 
141 

blocks, it wouldn’t be so hard to get into and actually get a foothold, and not have 

to be stuck outside the city. A lot of that was controlled at the RCT, or regimental 

combat team, level with the UAVs and the other Marine regiments, because they 

were prepped right outside the city and we were rolling through them, through the 

breach, into the city. They were controlling a lot of that, basically softening up the 

fi rst few blocks.

MM: Were you using any of your 120 millimeter mortars at that time?

CT: We used our mortars and also the Marines used our mortars quite a bit. All 

the fi res were talking on the same net: Marines and Army. Of course, the Marines 

only had 60 millimeter mortars and 81s. So anytime 2-7 wasn’t using our 120s, we 

just passed them over to the Marines and let them shoot. We ended up, through the 

course of two weeks, fi ring almost 1,000 rounds.

MM: When the Marines wanted to use the 120s, was it a Marine FSO that was 

calling in those missions?

CT: Yes.

MM: So you just handed them over to –

CT: Just handed them over.

MM: That’s super; that some joint-ness there.

CT: Yes, sir. And honestly, it was as simple as one of them coming up and asking, “Hey, can we use your 120s, we’re kind of in a bind?” And we’d say, “Yeah 

sure, go ahead and take them.” They had their freq’, so they’d talk straight to the 

mortars. It worked out really, really well.

MM: Where was the 155 battery located that you were also using?

CT: They were at Camp Fallujah, probably about 20 kilometers away from 

where we were, I guess.

MM: Talk me up to when you guys fi ght to take the Jolan District.

CT: Of course, all the buildings were numbered. All the maps were the same 

so, if you’re talking to pilots, talking to guys on the ground, everybody has the 

same graphics; everybody knows exactly what you’re talking about. A lot of times 

that does not happen. Everybody was using the same phase lines, and since we 

were fi rst in, we were able to control the coordinated fi re line. We’d keep it two 

CFLs in front of us. As soon as they rolled in, I was using the UAVs, looking about 

two kilometers in front of them, looking for deep targets, using the 155s, air with 

the ALO, and engaging targets up there. Then because of the city, the company 

FSOs that were actually on the ground with the maneuver units, it was very hard 

for them to see anything much more than about 1,000 to 1,500 meters, if you were 

lucky. So a lot of times, they would fi rst use the 155s if they could. If it was a 
142

little too close or they didn’t feel quite comfortable using those at fi rst, they’d go 

straight to the mortars, talk directly next to them – and we were walking mortar 

rounds in on armor troops probably within 70 meters.

MM: So you were doing some danger close –

CT: Defi nitely, especially with the 120s. Now the 155s, I think probably the 

closest we ever got was about 600 to 700 meters away. A lot of times, the company 

FSO would see something and it’d be a little too hard for 120s or he wanted to 

engage it fi rst with 155s, so they would just back up a little bit. I’d take the UAV, 

if we had it, look at the target and engage it myself with the 155s, and then get the 

assessment from the company FSO. After the volley was over, we’d pull back up 

and see what the battle damage assessment was. If we needed to reengage it, pull 

back; and if it was good, they’d move forward. That’s the way it worked, that kind 

of systematic moving forward and reengaging the deep targets and the close ones 

with a combination of mortars and 155s.

MM: Now, the UAV that you were using, was that your own Raven or was that 

a Marine UAV? 

CT: It was a Marine UAV and I think the Army calls it a Shadow. It was an 

intermediate UAV; it wasn’t the Predator that has the Hellfi res on it and whatnot. 

The Marines gave us the equipment to have a feed into our assembly area, right 

north of the train station. We could actually sit there in the TOC [Tactical Operations Center] and watch.

MM: So the TOC was actually seeing this and relaying that to you? Could you 

actually –?

CT: I was actually looking at it on the screen.

MM: From the TOC location. You could see it from your track?

CT: Yes, sir. We were too far outside the city; we were north of the train station. But with the UAV feed, I could see everything. It turned out to be a very effective way of observing and calling for fi res.

MM: Were you co-located with the TOC most of the time? Or did you, at some 

point, have to go into the city?

CT: I went into the city on one big occasion. After things had calmed down, 

we had pushed south of the major highway that goes through. I think we called it 

MSR [Main Supply Route] Mobile. It goes through and it’s a four-lane highway. 

Once our guys had pushed past that, the ALO and I went into the northern part to 

assess what we’d been doing over the past several days up to a week. In the city 

during the fi ght was all my company FSOs. The main fi re support element stayed 

right outside north of the train station, and a lot of that mainly for the fact that it 
143 

was so hard to actually see in the city. We were doing and calling more missions 

from outside with the UAVs than would have ever been possible. The support we 

were able to give them was much better from right outside the city.

MM: The RCT commander, Colonel Michael Shupp, just raved about the 120s. 

He thought they were the greatest thing since sliced bread. 

CT: I think they’re amazing. They’re extremely quick and you can walk them 

in very close. They’re amazing weapons and they worked very well for us. I’m really glad we could help the Marines out and let them use them.

MM: Did the RCT put out any rules of engagement before the operations started where you can’t use this, you can use that, that sort of thing?

CT: Yes, sir. The ROE is and always will be very restrictive, and that was 

exactly the case for this operation. It was a good thing to have, but it also tied 

our hands. Conventional warfare, a lot of times, you just think you can watch the 

target, you’ve got intelligence on it, so you can just fi re. Well, we couldn’t shoot 

anything without having notice of positive identifi cation. That made a lot of our 

planned targets not really planned targets anymore.

MM: How did that work? If you identifi ed something, did you have to go to the 

task force commander and then he’d have to go to somebody?

CT: My task force commander was in the city basically the whole time. I had a 

lawyer that was attached to our battalion and he stayed with me and the ALO during the whole operation. Anytime we had any doubts about it, the lawyer was right 

there to either confi rm, “Yes, this falls within the ROE, you can do this,” or, “You 

might want to wait, see how things unfold before you do it.” So, we had the lawyer 

watching the same UAV feed, hearing the same radio traffi c. And he actually was 

a prior fi eld artillery offi cer.

MM: Oh, that’s super.

CT: He knew exactly what was going on; he understood how things worked. 

He was a tremendous help for us because we never had any fears about whether we 

were doing something wrong.

MM: That seems completely different to what was going on over in the east 

side of the city where there was some controversy about the white phosphorus 

rounds that were used over there. 

CT: Right.

MM: Did your chain of command tell you guys that you couldn’t use those?

CT: It never was brought up. There was never an instance where I felt, or really 

anybody else felt, that we needed to use anything different. We never had any instances where we probably wanted to use something else, so we never had to deal 
144

with that. I’m fully confi dent that if that had been the case, it would have worked 

out just fi ne; it would have been employed properly.

MM: Is there anything that sticks out in your mind, any big lessons learned 

that you want the soldiers out there to know about? Anything in this operation that 

worked really well or didn’t work well?

CT: I don’t know about the Marines, but we’re a digital Army although we 

really didn’t use it. We still used voice. I don’t know if that’s because I’m personally more comfortable doing that. On my end, we used voice; my company FSOs 

used voice. I think a lot of it, being in that type of environment, they didn’t have 

the time to send digital messages. They could carry on with what they were doing 

while talking into the microphone and get the information back to us. So we didn’t 

use digital, and I don’t know if that’s a bad thing or a good thing.

MM: When you handed off the 120s occasionally to the Marines, were they 

talking to those folks at that time?

CT: Yes.

MM: Okay, so it wasn’t a digital thing with the 120s?

CT: No, no, it was straight voice. We did voice for everything. Like I said, I 

don’t know if that’s a good thing or a bad thing, but that’s the way we did it and 

it worked well. Even with a lot of different assets, it can work, but that’s up to 

somebody else to decide if that was a good or bad thing. I guess one of the biggest lessons I learned from a fi eld artillery, fi re support standpoint was the use of 

UAVs. They make a huge difference. It’s an aerial observer that can totally change 

the way the battlefi eld looks. At fi rst, I was kind of leery of calling for fi re that 

way because I’d never heard of that before. We had used UAVs to look around and 

then the guy on the ground calls it. I ended up calling more missions than I’d ever 

dreamed of. I fi gured myself to be the guy who cleared the fi res in the traditional 

sense and monitored what my company FSOs were doing. I never really thought I 

would get that hands-on into a battle like that. But myself and my ALO called more 

missions, talked more pilots onto targets than I would have ever dreamed – and 

it was the technology we have that made that all possible. It really helped out the 

company FSOs, too, who were only able to concentrate and see a block or two in 

front of them. I think if we didn’t have that type of thing, the assets we brought 

to the fi ght – fi eld artillery, fi re support and air – probably would have been much 

more limited. 

MM: My understanding is that, at one point during the fi ght, you guys actually 

went black on 120 millimeter ammo. Was everybody surprised you had shot that 

much?
145 

CT: Yes, extremely surprised. The platoon sergeant for the mortar platoon, 

after we were all done and they were counting up how many rounds, he said: “I’ve 

never shot this many rounds in my career.” He’d shot more rounds in a week or 

two than he had ever shot previously. Close air support was easy to use, coming 

from an Army background. CAS is not integrated into fi re support like it is in the 

Marines. But the way they have it set up, it was extremely easy.

MM: What about Army aviation assets, did you have to call for any of those?

CT: We did, but they were all integrated with the Marines’ fi xed-wings and the 

Cobras. The way they had it set up with the different stacks around the city, when 

you needed air, they would come out from one of the stacks and they pushed your 

freq’ – and we did that all over chat. Chat the air guys at the RCT, I’d say, “Hey, 

guys, I need air.” Then, before you know it, “Okay, you’re getting some air pushed 

to you and this is what it is.” Before you know it, they’re up on your freq’, coming 

from somewhere. You never had to wait for it because it was all stacked real nice, 

and then you just went through the process of talking them onto the target, doing 

reconnaissance, whatever you needed them to do. And a lot of times, you get a feed 

from what they’re looking at as well.

MM: Is there anything else that stands out in particular from this operation? 

Was there anything you thought maybe didn’t go as well? Were there any problems 

that need to be addressed in the near future?

CT: I think specifi cally, for this information, we had two calls-for-fi re nets 

when we started out. One was for battalion FSOs to talk to the RCT and then 

there was another one for company FSOs to do their calls for fi res. They were 

supposed to monitor their calls for fi re and approve it on the other net to the RCT. 

What ended up happening was everybody was on the same net doing everything. 

Sometimes it got crowded; too many folks were trying to do different things at the 

same time. Sometimes you just had to decide that, “Okay, I’m just going to use my 

mortars for now, and then when I get a chance to get in there, I’ll do my thing.” 

Because of ROE, clearance of fi re sometimes could take a really long time. That 

was because the ROE was so restrictive; that’s just the way it is. A lot of times, you 

can use other means.

MM: Did you get any sort of indication, by the time the battle was over, of how 

many foreign fi ghters and insurgents you guys had actually killed?

CT: There were numbers thrown around, not specifi cally for fi re support or 

direct fi re. But I think by the time we were pulled out, there were maybe 1,500 total 

enemy casualties. Honestly, I don’t think too many people were concentrating on 

a body count. If it was clear that the Marines were able to do what they needed to 

do because we did our jobs, that was good enough for us.

MM: Well, I appreciate all your help on this. Thank you very much.

147 

Captain Neil Prakash

20 October 2006

JM: My name is John McCool (JM) and I’m with the Operational Leadership 

Experiences Project at the Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 

I’m interviewing Captain Neil Prakash (NP) on his experiences in Operation Iraqi 

Freedom (OIF), specifi cally Operation Phantom Fury/Al-Fajr in November 2004. 

Today’s date is 20 October 2006 and this is an unclassifi ed interview. Before we 

begin, Neil, if you feel at any time we’re entering classifi ed territory, please couch 

your response in terms that avoid revealing any classifi ed information; and if 

classifi cation requirements prevent you from responding, simply say you’re not 

able to answer. Can you give me a little background on yourself to start out with? 

How did you get commissioned, where did you grow up, what have your duty 

assignments been and where have you deployed in the past?

NP: Sure. My commissioning source was Johns Hopkins University ROTC. I’d 

done Boys State in high school so there was a piece of the military that appealed to 

me before I even got to college, so when I got there I decided to sign up for ROTC. 

My parents had mixed feelings about it because they thought I was going to college 

to be doctor, but I sold them on the idea that maybe I could be a doctor in the Army. 

By the end of my junior year, though, I’d seen my fi rst tank and decided right 

then and there that I was going to be an armor offi cer. At that point, I was already 

contracted so there was no way I was getting out of that and there was nothing my 

parents could do. Once they saw what I was doing and how much I liked it, they 

were very supportive; and once they saw my Ranger graduation, which was the 

biggest military thing they’d ever seen, they were really hooked after that. After 

that, I went to Fort Knox in January ’03 and then went to Ranger School in the 

summer of ’03. My fi rst assignment was Vilseck, Germany, with 3d Brigade, 1st 

Infantry Division, specifi cally 2-63 Armor. I arrived there on 3 October and took 

over 1st Platoon. As soon as I got there we were prepping for gunnery. We did a 

Hohenfels rotation – like a mission readiness exercise (MRX) for OIF – and then 

we deployed in February. When I got back from Iraq, my wife was at Fort Hood 

with 4th Infantry Division and getting ready to deploy. Since my unit in Germany 

was getting ready to deactivate, I was trying to get a job at 4th Infantry Division 

so I could redeploy with her. I managed to do that with the help of a lot of people. 

I secured a job with 2-8 Infantry. Incidentally, 2-8 is the very unit that 2-2 relieved 

back in Ba’qubah, so everything has come full circle.

JM: For the record, Captain Prakash is currently back in Iraq and I’m talking to 

him today from Forward Operating Base (FOB) Kalsu, is that correct?

NP: That’s right. I’m with 2d Brigade, 4th Infantry, with 2-8 Infantry, which 

they’re now calling a combined arms battalion. I’m serving with Alpha Company, 
148

which is a mech infantry company, and I’m currently the company executive 

offi cer (XO).

JM: Can you talk to me a little bit about what you were doing in Iraq prior to 

Phantom Fury kicking off?

NP: To be honest, I was on two weeks of R&R when the company actually 

left Ba’qubah to go to Fallujah. Prior to that, it was September and October and 

the next big thing on our plate was the elections in January. At the time, as a tank 

platoon leader, I spent about half of my time doing main supply route (MSR) 

patrols, route clearance, where we’d go out in two tank sections. We’d just patrol 

the MSRs looking for improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and we also served as 

the quick reaction force (QRF) outside of the wire. The one thing about OIF II was 

the shortage of troops. One of the best and worst things 2-63 and probably all the 

other units had to do was micromanage at a battalion level in order to maximize the 

economy of force out there. When you’re dealing with two-thirds of the troops that 

were there in OIF I, it really doesn’t pay to have two separate tank sections operating 

in two different areas doing route clearance. If you’re a battalion operations offi cer 

(S3), you always make sure there is a tank section from any given company at any 

given time – yeah, we’re going out the gate every three hours, but at least there are 

two tanks outside the wire every three hours in a 24-hour period. At the time there 

was a lot of that going on. About half of my time was spent on my tanks rolling out 

two or three times a day. The other half was spent on Humvees with my platoon 

and we were doing a lot of fi xed site security at the Joint Communications Center 

(JCC) with the Iraqi Army. In OIF II, there was a major shortage on armor and 

troops, so one week we were on tanks and the next week we were on Humvees, 

and then we’d give up the Humvees and jump on M113s. Every week it was either 

tanks, Humvees or 113s because our tank company only had four trucks so there 

weren’t enough to go around. We were doing a lot fi xed site security and MSR 

security. Presence patrol is a taboo phrase, but there were a lot of what you’d call 

presence patrols going on. If you’re not taking contact and you’re not actively 

searching out targets in a raid, that’s a presence patrol. At that time, September had 

just gone by and 2d Brigade had just made a big hit with the operation in Samarra, 

which was like the mini-Fallujah. Are you familiar with that?

JM: Are you talking about Operation Baton Rouge?

NP: Yes. It was really just all of us watching and hearing from our buddies in 

2d Brigade and just licking our chops.

JM: When did you fi rst get word that your platoon might be participating in 

what became Operation Phantom Fury?

NP: We got word in October. I remember because our sister tank company, 

Charlie, had gone to Najaf twice. They went in April and in June and we were 
149 

pretty jealous. We kept asking, “Why aren’t we going?” The bottom line was they 

sent the company that didn’t have an area of operations (AO) in a major populous 

region. We had an AO in the city of Khalis and we had to hold that down. But of 

course we still thought that was crap and we wanted them to send us. In October, 

though, they told us that they were going to send a battalion task force to Fallujah. 

At the time, none of the platoon leaders or platoon sergeants had gone on leave 

and I was getting ready to go on R&R. My commander said that, if this happens, 

it will probably happen when I’m on R&R, so I was like, “Screw it. Screw R&R. 

Let’s do this thing.” We were pretty amped up about it. There were a lot of politics 

surrounding the events, though, because it was obviously an election year. You had 

the 2004 elections and you also had Ramadan in November. I ended up going on 

leave on 17 October. By this time, my commander had said for me to go ahead and 

go because he said I’d be back in time, since he was now thinking the Fallujah thing 

wouldn’t kick off until after Ramadan. So I went home on leave for two weeks and 

every single day all they’re talking about on the news is Fallujah. Twenty-four 

hours a day that’s all I see on the news. Anyway, about two days before I was 

supposed to return, I get an email from Captain (then Lieutenant) Chris Boggiano, 

who was then in Iraq on FOB Warhorse. He said, “Neil, I hear we’re getting a tank 

section from Alpha 2-63. I hope it’s your section.” Well, I went home saying I 

didn’t want to watch the news or read emails from Iraq or anything. I just wanted 

to be on vacation. But I wrote back and asked him what the hell he was talking 

about. He said, “Dude, we’re going to Fallujah in three days.” I was like, “This is 

bullcrap! I’m still here at home. You can’t leave without me.” So I sent an email to 

my commander and said, “You’re not leaving for Fallujah without me, are you?” 

and he said, “Not if you get your ass back here in time.” What I didn’t realize was 

that I could have just gone to the airport with an open-ended ticket, got on a plane 

and I could have made it on time. I didn’t know I could do that, though, and my 

commander didn’t say anything about it so I didn’t leave until 2 November. That 

was Election Day and I left Syracuse at 0600. By the time I got back to Iraq it was 

4 November and they said my unit had already left for Fallujah. I was told to get 

to FOB Scunion and they would take care of me, so I went over there and they 

told me I had three hours to pack my bags. My platoon sergeant had left me a map 

under my pillow and they had already packed some of my shit for me, so I grabbed 

it and the bird came and picked us up three hours later. It was me, a sergeant and a 

couple privates who all were returning from R&R. 

JM: Tell me about the process of getting integrated with the Brigade 

Reconnaissance Troop (BRT).

NP: That’s funny because I was actually worried about integrating in general. 

I got on the ground at Camp Fallujah and was dragging my duffl e bag towards the 

living area when I saw some of my guys. I gave them a couple high fi ves and said 

it was good to see them. Everyone was racked out because, the night before, they 
150

did a huge task force rehearsal. I, on the other hand, had been drinking beers and 

partying and staying out late for the last two weeks, and now I’m supposed to lead 

these guys. The Army is so decentralized now that a section leader or a platoon 

sergeant can lead a platoon or section into combat, so these guys were ready to go 

with or without me. But how do you step right in without skipping a beat? I went 

in and talked to my gunner fi rst. I had to wake him up since he had been out until 

four in the morning. He told me how we were task organized. We had two tanks. 

They cut me and my wingman off from my platoon sergeant. They kept his section 

organic to our Alpha tank company and brought me and my wingman over to the 

BRT. They took a pure infantry platoon of four Bradleys from the BRT, cut them 

in half, and sent two Brads to join my tank platoon sergeant in Alpha Company 

– my company – so now I have an infantry platoon sergeant, two Brads, two tanks 

and two squads worth of infantry. That was my fi rst time working with infantry 

and Brads in combat and it turned out to be the best combination ever. As a matter 

of fact, I’m using it right now with my infantry company. I have a tank platoon 

attached to us. I just split the tanks and infantry in half and mix them up. Integration 

was funny. The infantry guys were pretty cool. As far as the BRT itself, there was 

no issue of integrating. My best friend in the unit there was Chris Boggiano. He 

had been in my tank company with me, and when he left he went to the BRT so it 

was like seeing an old friend. I was able to mix right in there with those guys and 

there was no issue at all.

JM: How were you going to be employed? How did you fi t into the task force 

plan once you got there and got read in?

NP: When I fi rst got read in on the initial plan, the idea was that the BRT was 

to screen line and soften the targets right off the bat. That was the simple piece. The 

BRT could handle that without much maneuvering and without much brainpower.

JM: This was using the Long Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System 

(LRAS) and things like that?

NP: Yes, along with the standard calls for fi re. Being with the 4th ID now, 

I’ve realized that there are a lot of fun toys these guys have that we didn’t have 

in Germany, like these commander’s integrated thermal viewers (CITVs) and the 

improved Bradley acquisition subsystem (IBAS) that gives you a range as well as 

a 10-digit grid. Out there it was just LRAS that would give you a 10-digit grid, 

or if you’re on a tank it was just laze the target and add the meters to your grid. 

But that was it. Soften the targets, stay static, observe, keep a low profi le and hit 

anything that’s moving. That was the initial part. Just from the briefi ng, though, it 

appeared after day one that we were just going to wing it. The way they were going 

to use me in the BRT was as an armor platform, as the element that could reach 

out and touch somebody. Otherwise it was just Humvee platoons and slightly more 

armored Bradleys comprising the BRT. Boggiano made a lot of money using the 
151 

LRAS and we could back up what we saw with the tanks and the 25 millimeter. 

What I didn’t expect were the Marines at MSR Mobile and that initial screen line. 

From 0800 to 1900 the Marines were in Humvees shooting at buildings with M16s 

and I was like, “What are you doing, guy?” They said they were receiving enemy 

small arms from these houses facing MSR Mobile. We wanted them to just sit back 

and plug their ears. We were hitting these buildings we were taking small arms 

fi re from with our main guns. The initial plan for the fi rst half of the city was, as 

the entire task force moved north to south, the BRT and my tanks would bound 

from the northern part of the city all the way along MSR Mobile until we got to 

Phase Line Fran. What we learned out there was that, when you look at imagery, it 

may look dense, but when you’re on the ground there’s not much to it. There is no 

bounding because an entire tank platoon can secure two to four clicks on a straight 

highway overlooking a city in the low ground. It’s pretty ridiculous how much you 

can screen line. There was no bounding per se.

JM: Had you operated in urban areas before with tanks or was this the fi rst 

time?

NP: This was great because I had been in the Battle of Ba’qubah on 24 June.

JM: This was the battle you received the Silver Star for?

NP: Yes, but that was a platoon thing. There was nothing I did that really 

warranted that. It was just being caught in the middle of a hell storm, shooting 

everything around you and your platoon was doing likewise. The thing about 

Ba’qubah was that it was fast and they hit you hard from the front, the back, the 

alleys, the windows and the rooftops with rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). I 

saw some dedication in Fallujah where some guys had some balls, but I’ve never 

seen anything like Ba’qubah where guys were sprinting up to your tank trying 

to lob grenades into your hatches. There were guys 40 meters away who would 

run up to the tanks, square up their shoulders even with our tanks, put that RPG 

on their shoulder and try to fi re it at you. I haven’t seen anything like that since. 

In a tank, you really have tunnel vision if you’re in the hatch. You really have 

to be out. Even though you get chastised for it, you have to be out because your 

gunner has tunnel vision. The other thing is that the enemy really takes advantage 

of your fl anks when you’re in the alleys, which is why the BRT was screen lining 

on MSR Mobile. We were anticipating it to be a turkey shoot if it was going to 

be anything like Ba’qubah. If we’d known then what we know now, we should 

have engaged targets from the fl anks as my element made the main assault into 

Ba’qubah, then move that fl ank screening element southward parallel to our main 

assault movement. However, we had neither the time nor the forces to do that 

then. Ba’qubah caught us by surprise and it was really a movement-to-contact 

mission. The BRT was set up on MSR Mobile and we were able to hit targets as 

they moved from north to south retreating from the division’s northern advance. 
152

What I noticed was that there wasn’t much enemy fi ghting and there wasn’t much 

enemy movement or any type of exfi l from north to south as the task force cleared. 

I know this because we sat there from 1900 on 8 November all the way to 0600 the 

next day. We sat on MSR Mobile looking for targets to hit and there really weren’t 

any. I don’t fully understand where they were or what was going on. I fi gured other 

units must have been in a total fi refi ght but I didn’t see any of the enemy targets. 

I’ve read Staff Sergeant David Bellavia’s and other accounts so I know there was 

enemy out there, but they must have stood in place and died because they weren’t 

egressing in any way that we could see on the ground.

JM: At what point did you move off this mission and go forward into the 

city?

NP: At around 0500 we were sitting on the intersection of Phase Lines Fran 

and Mobile, which is a cloverleaf. We were sitting there and what we discovered 

was that the Army moved a hell of a lot faster than the Marines, because we were 

armor and mech. They had to catch up. We had city blocks divided up into Army, 

Marine, Army, Marine from east to west. All the Army units had now reached the 

halfway point along Phase Line Fran, but the Marines were still back up there. 

The bad guys were going to go left or right where the Army had already passed 

them and gone south. Why stay in front and face the Marines when you can just 

scurry left or right since it was unoccupied? We were sitting there at the cloverleaf 

looking due west into the city. The plan originally was to get to Fran and open that 

up as the line of communication because we were going to want to push fuel, chow 

and all our combat service support assets through there. That went out the window 

real quick and we ended up doing the logistical resupply point (LRP) on the safe 

side of the cloverleaf. Are you familiar with where the LRP was?

JM: Yes, I am.

NP: It was good and I was glad it was like that. It would have been a bad idea to 

bring logistics in there. So anyway, we get down to the cloverleaf and got our fi rst 

taste of going into the city. When you’re going into an area you’re unfamiliar with, 

you should always let the tanks go fi rst, then the Brads and then the Humvees. In 

this case, though, the Humvees went fi rst and they started getting shot up by sniper 

fi re. There were a couple scattered buildings as well as these barriers. There was 

concertina wire, HESCOs, bunkers and all this stuff the Marines and the entire 

coalition had previously put in there for themselves and the Iraqi Army, yet the city 

had not been patrolled for six months. No one had been there since 9 April when 

the Marines got hit really hard trying that ground assault they did to go after the 

Blackwater guys who got killed. So from April until November, the intel we had 

said there was no patrolling going on in the city, no maintaining of a presence at all. 

All these bunkers were either ready to explode, they were full of IEDs and or they 

were enemy strongholds, so we were just lighting them all up with the main guns. 
153 

After that, though, as the dismounts were trying to go forward, the Humvees were 

getting shot at. Captain Kirk Mayfi eld, the BRT commander, seemed really pissed 

off because he was getting sniped. Captain Boggiano had told me previously that 

Captain Mayfi eld had spent 16 years in light infantry. He hadn’t messed with tanks 

too much so I would probably get free reign. It’s great when you’re a tank attached 

to the light because they really want to use you, but often times they don’t know 

how. However, when the bullets start fl ying, it’s just no holds barred and the gloves 

come off and all that good stuff. So he starts getting sniped and I call him on the 

net as we’re moving down towards Fran. He’s telling me about taking sniper fi re 

and he’s just pointing at houses and saying, “Shoot that shit!” so we just unloaded 

main gun rounds on all these houses he thinks he’s taking sniper fi re from. This 

was day two, 9 November. 

JM: So basically you’re using the tank main gun as an anti-sniper weapon?

NP: We used it for everything. On 8 November at 0800 when the fi rst mortar 

round landed, Captain Mayfi eld told me to get up there on the high ground, on the 

berm. Just between me and my wingman, we went through 45 rounds in the fi rst 

hour in Fallujah. This is before the task force even staged, let alone crossed the 

line of departure (LD) at 1900. You sometimes wonder what the appropriate use 

of force is, but Fallujah was just a joke as far as the amount of force we could use. 

There seemed to be no limit on main gun or .50 cal, so we were hitting every house 

we were taking contact from with main gun rounds. Why show them mercy, you 

know what I mean?

JM: Sure. Did you have any visibility on Marine units that were operating in 

this area? I assume they were not fi ring too many main gun rounds into buildings. 

They were doing a lot of dismounted clearing, weren’t they?

NP: Yes. They were mostly dismounted. In fact, very rarely did I see Marine 

tanks. I think I saw them twice during the whole operation. The Marines were either 

not caught up to us, or if they did they were so far out of our sector that anything 

we engaged with direct fi re didn’t affect them. The only time the Marines came 

into play was with that fi re mission that I’m sure Captain Boggiano told you about. 

That was where we called for fi re on that building next to the mosque and ended up 

killing like 70 guys. I think that was 9 November as well. The fi rst day going into 

the city we were starting to probe these buildings and getting sniper fi re from them. 

Honestly at this point, it was really platoons operating independently, sort of, but 

with the commander’s guidance. After awhile, though, that disappeared and it was 

really just platoons working together and everything was a react to contact. We 

did some probing and with the tanks you feel pretty safe. You kind of have to stick 

your neck out there when you’re in the tank. I don’t know who Captain Mayfi eld 

was talking to as far as what guidance he was getting. All I know is that he had his 

issues to deal with right there in that AO and that’s what we were dealing with. 
154

JM: Aside from the snipers, what sorts of enemy contact were you seeing? What 

was the nature of the enemy and what was your assessment of his capabilities?

NP: At this point I was pretty disappointed at their lack of aggression. The 

snipers were good. We’re all high up on the cloverleaf a good couple hundred 

meters away from the city, so you can’t see them but you can hear the crack and 

that was the sound of the bullet round hitting your tank. You’re looking around 

and you can see dust kick up around your turret. The periscopes on the hatches are 

shattering because they’re getting shot at. You’re looking around, hollering at the 

scouts and asking them what’s going on and they had no idea. We really didn’t see 

anybody. There was maybe one guy we did see. The scouts saw him fi rst and they 

lit up the house with Mk-19. Then I got there and, just for good measure, we put 

a few main gun rounds into the house. Captain Boggiano wanted to fi re my tank 

so I let him climb up there and put a main gun round on the house. For my part, 

I wanted to shoot an AT4 so I got off the tank and he gave me one of his AT4s to 

shoot at the house. The contact at this point on the morning of 9 November was 

very limited. It seemed that we really advanced faster than the enemy expected and 

they were falling back to regroup. They weren’t ready yet to stand toe to toe. That’s 

what it seemed like on our end. Days later, when we got south of Isabella or Jenna, 

that was when we actually had guys going toe to toe with us.

JM: Can you talk to me about any signifi cant or memorable events that occurred 

throughout that period of time?

NP: Are you familiar with the fi re mission and how ridiculous that was?

JM: Was that when the near-fratricide incident occurred?

NP: No, that was later on.

JM: Chris told me about that.

NP: That’s a good one. That’s actually one of my favorites because it was just 

hilarious. What I’m talking about now, though, was on 9 November. It was the 

morning of day two. We were in the city about two clicks in from the cloverleaf, 

west on Fran. My two tanks are sitting there and there are two Bradleys in front of 

me. I noticed the “Bada Bing” stripper girl logo on the side – you know, like the 

strip club from The Sopranos – and I recognized it as Captain (then Lieutenant) 

Jeff Emery’s Bradley. I fi gured we’d move up and go talk to him, so we drove 

up another click into the city. We pull up and see a sergeant in the hatch and I 

ask where Lieutenant Emery is. He said he was on the ground with the squads 

running around doing his light infantry stuff, so I told my wingman to pull back 

with me because my buddy wasn’t there. So we pulled back and, as we did, with 

the Bradleys still in front of us, my gunner sees three to fi ve guys running south 

to north across Fran and go into a building about two and a half clicks away. They 

all had RPGs and AKs. I couldn’t believe it so I bent down to look and, sure as 
155 

shit, there were three to fi ve more guys who did the same thing. So I raced back up 

to the Bradleys, told them about the guys and asked them why they didn’t shoot 

them. They said they didn’t see them. So we shot a few main gun rounds in that 

direction but the window we had to shoot them was short, although we knew where 

they were going. I told my gunner to keep observing, I called it up to the executive 

offi cer (XO), Phantom 5, he says, “Roger, got it,” and sends it up to Phantom 6. 

He told us to continue to observe and report. Well, an hour goes by and I believe 

Captain Boggiano suggested, “Hey, see if you can call for fi re on this,” so I called 

it up and asked if we could get fi re. They asked for the grid and I said it was near 

a mosque, to which they responded that it was going to require a lot of approval 

and that I had to be absolutely sure about the grid before they would fi re. At that 

moment my gunner said, “You know, sir, I don’t know if this is such a good idea. 

They’re asking you for a 10-digit grid and there’s a mosque there. I don’t want 

to see you fry.” What happened was, back in the Battle of Ba’qubah, one of the 

vehicles my platoon engaged ended up having a woman in it and the investigating 

offi cers tried to blame my platoon for killing a family of eight, even though the car 

only had two people up front and one or two people in the back. They tried to say 

it was a family of eight in this little four-door Kia. Nobody was found negligent 

or liable in any way, but my gunner was still concerned about 15-6 investigations. 

He said, “I don’t think you should call this. What if you go down for this?” So I 

began thinking to myself: “We have this whole city cordoned. These guys have 

no place to go. They’re just running into a building and we’ll just get these guys 

eventually.” But as soon as I started thinking this, Captain Boggiano gets on the 

net and says, “My LRAS is seeing the same thing as you.” I said, “You know 

what? Screw it.” He said, “I will vouch for anything you say you see down there, 

because I see it too.” What we ended up doing then was lazing it and I got a range 

of 2,490 meters, which I added to my map where I was and got my own personal 

10-digit grid off that. I send that up to Boggiano and told him there was a minaret 

with a blue cap – and there were like fi ve to 10 mosques all along this road. So he 

lazed what he thought was it, but he was off. Then he lazed the next the one and 

that wasn’t it either. His grid was different than mine. The last grid he told me was 

only 300 meters off and I thought, “Perfect.” These bad guys were going into a 

building and that building was in front of a mosque, so I told my gunner to laze the 

minaret that Boggiano just lazed and, sure enough, it was 300 meters back behind 

the building I was looking at. Now I was sure we were both looking at the same 

thing and I have a 10-digit grid from him now that confi rms it. At that moment, 

there were guys running out of this building and they were pouring diesel fuel into 

the streets and then lit it on fi re. This sent giant fl ames into the sky in front of this 

mosque. Captain Boggiano called me and said, “I’ll give you an eight-digit grid 

off the LRAS. The guys on the fi res net, though, are going to ask you for a 10-digit 

grid, so just add zeroes as the fi fth and tenth digits in your eight-digit number and 
156

I’ll back you up.” I said, “I’m with you, because I know what I’m seeing.” The 

fi res guys asked me if I was absolutely sure about what I was seeing and I said, 

“Roger.” Captain Boggiano, being the scout that he was, had called for fi re a lot 

but this was my fi rst time, so he kept talking me through what to do. I called the 

fi re guy – I think it was Ramrod 18 – and told him what I saw. I gave him the 

distance, the grid and the direction and told him to fi re just one round. I told him 

the degrees were 267 but he asked me to give it to him in mils. I was like, “Ah 

shit! I don’t know what it is in mils.” All I knew was that there are 6400 mils in a 

damn circle and 4800 is 270 degrees, so 4700 must be 267, just eyeballing it. He 

said, “Roger, one round. Observe effects.” So one round comes in and there was 

this guy out pouring diesel on the fl ames – and that one round landed right on top 

of his head. I was screaming, “Holy shit, that was right on target! Fire for effect! 

Fire for effect!” He said, “Roger, 20 rounds. Observe effects.” Everyone on our net 

was like, “Holy shit!” You know, we were supposed to have this big, huge, famous 

barrage that was going to be the breach into the city on the LD, but it was a joke. 

That was like 100 rounds spread out over three hours, something like one round 

every 30 seconds. We were thinking, “That’s the gayest barrage ever.” These 20 

rounds, though, were amazing.

JM: These 20 rounds – they were from the Paladins?

NP: Yes. These were from the Paladins back at Camp Fallujah. I know we only 

brought two Paladins so I assume the Marines were helping us with this, but I don’t 

know. All I know is that they fi red 20 rounds and I watched them all hit. Some hit 

the building and some hit just south of it, but every explosion that went off, it was 

like a volcano: three to fi ve guys shot up like they’d come out of a geyser – and 

they were perfectly still, not waving or fanning their arms or anything. They were 

already dead as they were going airborne and blossoming out. Actually, I think 

there were bodies associated with about fi ve to 10 of the explosions, but right off 

the bat that was like 30 to 50 guys that we killed. I gave them the numbers and 

Ramrod 18 was fi red up and said to call for a repeat mission if we needed it again. 

I was looking at this place and it was just smoldering. There are very few times that 

I’ve ever felt sorry for the enemy, but this time they just got slaughtered. I don’t 

know why I said this, but I said, “Repeat, 10 rounds.” Right before this, a guy came 

out of the building, out of the gray smoke, and he’s holding his stomach, dragging 

his AK by the sling, and he’s gagging and retching; and just then, these 10 more 

rounds land right on top of his head. It was the funniest thing I’ve ever seen and 

I couldn’t believe it. By the way, there were rounds hitting this seven-story hotel 

off to the left and the London Telegraph was there right behind me taking great 

pictures, seeing my two tanks just hammering this building with main guns. When 

the artillery hits that, Boggiano said one of his LRAS guys watched an insurgent 

on the seventh story rooftop just get launched off the hotel. My gunner also sees 

a guy get blown off the seventh story, but this guy hit the ground so hard that he 
157 

bounced up about two stories off the asphalt. It was the most insane, surreal thing 

I’d ever seen, just watching these bodies fl y. They looked like dolls. So anyway, 

we get the word that we’d done a great job, the building was destroyed, and the 

battle damage assessment (BDA) was 30 to 50 guys. There was a Major Johnson 

there who was the public affairs offi cer. Apparently he was running around looking 

for me and I was wondering what was going on. So I fi nally fi nd him and he asked 

if I minded if someone from the London Telegraph talked to me. I asked what 

the big deal was. He said, “Do you know what happened?” I said, “No.” He said, 

“That fi re mission you called took out Omar Hadid.” I said, “Who the hell is he?” 

He said he was the second in command to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and was left in 

charge when Zarqawi left. They said that it was a great success. He then said the 

intel guys did their BDA and thought possibly 72 guys were killed. The London 

Telegraph guy said, “You need to tell me what you saw.” I’m very paranoid about 

speaking with the media and getting myself in trouble, plus I didn’t want to look 

like a warmonger either. I didn’t want to look like I was bragging or anything. I 

was trying to keep it sterile, so I turned to Major Johnson and asked, “Can I tell this 

guy about the crazy shit I saw?” He said, “Sure, tell him everything you saw. This 

was a huge success. Tell him about the bodies and everything you saw.” I said, “All 

right.” So I told him everything I just told you, that this was the craziest shit I had 

ever seen, that it was awesome and that it was a great success. So that was a good 

day. Did Captain Boggiano tell you about when he was caught in the fi refi ght on 11 

November, where he got pinned down and called for my tanks to fi re?

JM: He did, but maybe you can tell me about it from your perspective.

NP: It’s less cool, though, from my perspective because we were just lobbing 

rounds. There was the easternmost road that fi rst goes diagonally and then hooks 

and goes straight due south once it reaches the halfway point of the city. We were 

south of Phase Line Fran by a few hundred meters. Captain Mayfi eld told Boggiano 

to go down south to the southern part of the city because we were probably going 

to hit it in the next few days. He wanted Boggiano to recon it and stay out there 

out in the sand about two clicks from the city, so he went out there. We were just 

hanging around bored. Everything was quiet. All of a sudden, though, we hear 

that Outlaw 1 is on the net, he’s in contact. I told Sergeant Terry, “If we just punch 

through this factory wall in front of us, we could probably see due south.” So we 

punch through and see the four gun trucks out there. There’s dust and dirt kicking 

up everywhere and I’m trying to get a situation report. I can see where Boggiano 

is shooting into the houses, which were a couple hundred meters in front of him, 

and Terry and I just started lobbing HEAT rounds into one of the houses. So then 

we called and asked if that was the house he was taking contact from and he said, 

“Hell yeah! Can you do that to every house you see?” There were about four to six 

houses in this open desert area that he was actually going to use to screen the city 

and we just started lobbing HEAT rounds. Boggiano described it as these big, long 
158

laser beams coming down on these houses. HEAT rounds arc very high because 

they’re so heavy and we’re lobbing rounds about 1,300 meters into these houses 

and successfully just blowing them out. He’s looking at the houses from east to 

west and he sees the rounds enter from north and they just blow everything out the 

backside of the houses. He was so excited. When you’re a tanker, there’s nothing 

better than just blowing shit away with direct fi re and being able to relieve others 

from whatever hell they’re going through. We just had a good time. We didn’t 

know how bad it was until later on when he described all that to me.

JM: I understand at one point that your tank hit a mine.

NP: Yes, that was around 12 November. On 11 November was when Lieutenant 

Edward Iwan was killed and the 12th was when Captain Sean Sims was killed. Is 

that correct?

JM: Yes, that’s right.

NP: On 12 November we started the mission around 0700. We were now in the 

last click or so of the city, just clearing out the dug-in guys. This was where it was 

going to get bad. The infantry was going house to house and street to street, and if 

you were looking at the southern part of the city, we were on the east side of the 

city out in the dirt and 2-2 Infantry was in front of us. We heard on the net about 

Terminator 6 and what was going on. We were kind of confused because we were 

just sitting there letting the infantry do their fi ght. It was our job as the BRT to stay 

on the outskirts and just screen. All of a sudden, we hear that Terminator 6 isn’t 

on the net, nobody knows where he is, and that’s when Lieutenant Colonel Peter 

Newell, the task force commander, made the decision to pull everyone back and 

have the BRT just wipe the last click of the city down with artillery. I was pumped 

because I was told I was going to be the one to get to do it, and that Lieutenant 

Colonel Newell wanted me to fi re for effect, left 50, fi re for effect, left 50, fi re for 

effect, and basically do that until there were no more houses to blow up. That’s 

like the coolest thing ever. I was a 24-year-old lieutenant and I got to level a city 

with artillery.

JM: Christmas and your birthday all in one.

NP: Yeah, it’s better than all of those. So I backed up in the desert about 300 or 

400 meters. What I didn’t know was that my actual organic company commander, 

Captain Paul Fowler, was still in contact in the city, so I had to continue to wait for 

the green light to go. While we were waiting with my wingman next to me and the 

Bradleys pushing down to the south, all of a sudden some rounds land about 100 

to 200 meters in front of me. Meanwhile, Captain Boggiano is behind me with his 

Humvees doing his screen lining. He was looking due west into the city with me to 

his front about 1,000 meters. Anyway, I called up and reported that two rounds just 

landed in front of me. He said, “Roger. Avenger 6 is still in contact. He’s calling 
159 

for fi re.” I said, “Got it.” It was friendly. At that point, another two rounds come 

walking towards me, this time about 75 to 100 meters out. I called and said, “The 

rounds are actually coming closer.” He said, “Roger, I’ll call them up on their net. 

Meanwhile, you get the hell out of there.” I said, “Got it.” I told Mewborn to back 

it up and, just as I said that, a round exploded right in front of my tank. My loader 

and I were sitting up on the turret with our butts on the hatches and I’m looking 

backwards and start screaming, “Go back, go back!” He fl oors it and we go in 

reverse, and I’m just waiting for the next round to hit us. All of a sudden, the whole 

left side of the tank explodes, the tank goes up a little, and both my loader and I 

fall into the hatches. So I’m on the turret fl oor, my feet are on my gunner and I’m 

reaching for the hand mike to tell them I’m okay, which I was fi nally able to do. I 

was cussing up a storm thinking we’d just been hit by friendly artillery. I get on the 

ground and look in front of me and my tank isn’t even facing west anymore; it’s 

facing north. The whole left side of the track had been blown off. I walk around 

the track and call my wingman forward. He tied his ratchet strap from his gun tube 

to the track. He was tying to lift the track up to try and drag it back to the tank so 

we can line it back up and fi x it. At this moment, the recovery has already started, 

an M88 is about to come out to my location and then my wingman calls me over 

and says, “Hey sir, what the hell is this?” I walked over to him and there was 

a giant, yellow-beige doggie dish-sized disk under the track and there were two 

more under the track that he hadn’t even raised yet. I was like, “That’s a f------ tank 

mine!” He kicks it, the top pops off and you can see the explosives underneath 

and the pressure plate. He was like, “Holy shit!” I said, “Man, that’s a tank mine. 

I think we’re in a minefi eld!” My wingman starts screaming for everyone to get 

on their tanks right now. All the soldiers jump on their tanks and he realizes he has 

to do a mine plow job, so he kicks his gunner and his loader off his tank. He said, 

“It’s not a safe mission. I’ll just do this with me and my driver.” His loader and his 

gunner went to me and my whole four-man crew was standing on our tank on the 

turret. He drives off and I see the M88 coming towards us, so I sprint towards the 

88 and tell them to stop because we’re in a minefi eld. He asked what they were 

supposed to do. I told him the mine plow was coming and it was going to plow a 

lane to the 88 and then a lane from the 88 to me and we could tow this thing out of 

here. I run back to my tank and am now standing on top of the tank with my fi ve 

other guys. All of sudden, a sniper starts shooting at us. We were like, “Oh shit!” 

So we all get down and run to the east side of the tank and we’re all crouched down 

hiding from the sniper. Sergeant Terry is coming back at us now and he’s plowing 

the lane with the 88 in tow behind him. I look at him and he’s screaming at us but I 

can’t hear him over the plow. His face was red, he had this cigarette in his hand and 

he was spitting from his mouth he was screaming so hard. He was just bright red 

screaming. Then, as he was almost right on top of us, he said, “Get the f--- away 

from the tank! You never stand in front of a tank when it’s plowing a minefi eld!” 
160

Sure enough, mines are coming up from the soil and luckily none of us got blown 

up. We run around to the west side of the tank and we’re hiding there as Terry was 

coming up on the east side of the tank. We were standing there waiting for mines 

to explode on our right hand side, and all of a sudden bullets start cracking around 

the tank skirt all around us as we’re crouched by the tank. We were like, “Oh crap. 

We forgot about the sniper.” Now the six of us are all crammed into the turret of 

our tank, which holds three. We were sitting there and we were like, “This is f---

--- ridiculous. Only in Fallujah and only in Iraq would you be pinned down by a 

sniper in the middle of a minefi eld. When would you ever think that would happen 

to you?” It was just the funniest thing. I mean, throw me a bone here. That was 

pretty wild. I know Boggiano pretty much thought we had exploded and died.

JM: How would you overall assess the role your platoon played and maybe the 

BRT in general? Do you think you were employed the best way you could have 

been? Were there ways you think you could have been better used?

NP: No, I don’t think so. The way Captain Mayfi eld used us was great. I can’t 

imagine it being done any way else. There were two things that went on. First of 

all, he pretty much gave me free reign. I think that was more the nature of combat, 

though, than the choice he had. Second of all, ask anyone from 1st ID or any of the 

tankers from Fallujah: this shit is easy when your orders are to kill everything in 

front of you and when you’re limitless on fuel and ammo. Food and sleep? Don’t 

worry about it. That’s what we live for. I had that liberty and, as a light infantry 

company commander, Captain Mayfi eld had two tanks at his disposal. That’s huge. 

After 12 November, the BRT became the main effort for 2-2. The tanks always 

led, the Bradleys were behind us – and we used the Bradleys like taxis, which was 

awesome. They came in behind, dropped ramp, brought infantry and then went 

back. The other great thing about the tanks when you’re moving is that the tanks 

are always where the front line troops are in the BRT. The scouts were clearing 

houses and we were never behind them. We were always equal with them or in 

front of them, so you always knew your front line trace. There was a lot of friendly 

fi re going on, though. My infantry platoon sergeant actually was shot at by his own 

platoon leader with 25 millimeter. I don’t know if you heard that story.

JM: No, I didn’t.

NP: On 10 November, we were getting ready to do a big push into the southern 

part of the city. As we were holding and waiting for the green light to go, Alpha 

Company 2-63 – the armor company that I came from – came parading right 

through our lane in front of us because their lane had been choked off. They cut in 

front of us and pushed down and then went back to the west, now they were back 

in their lane. We fi gured they knew where we were, so we pushed forward to get 

even with them. As we do this, we see a giant rocket that looked like one of those 

boosters from the Space Shuttle and it was sitting on an eight-foot berm pointing 
161 

due east and slightly up. It wasn’t wired to anything; it just stood alone. We called 

up and asked Legion 7 if he could go around us, go in front of that thing, hook up 

behind it and just shoot it with the 25 millimeter. He does and he shoots the thing 

and we were hoping it would just explode. Instead, he sets off the primer and that 

thing just launches into the sky. It went off like a Space Shuttle rocket. It takes off 

with bright orange fl ames and I was like, “Oh my God. That thing just went due 

east and Boggiano is out there.” I get on the radio and call him and ask if a rocket 

just impacted out there. He said he was good and I was like, “Thank God.” All of 

a sudden, 25 millimeter rounds start blowing up against the back of my platoon 

sergeant’s Bradley and it was coming from his west. We realized it was Alpha 

Company’s Bradleys – the ones that came from the BRT - that were shooting at 

us. I tell my loader to switch to the Avenger net and I say, “Cease fi re! Cease 

fi re! You’re shooting friendly troops.” The platoon sergeant over there gets on the 

radio and says, “Negative. We’re not shooting friendly troops.” I was like, “Who 

was just shooting due east with 25 millimeter right now, because you just hit us.” 

My fi rst sergeant gets on the net and says, “We were engaging an RPG team that 

just launched an RPG.” I said, “Negative, you were shooting us. We just set off a 

rocket.” I said to my loader, “Get me off this f------ net.” I was so pissed off. But 

you can’t get angry. If you think an RPG just got launched to your right, your fi rst 

instinct is to engage. They knew we were there yet they still engaged, but that’s the 

fog of war that no amount of technology can ever eliminate. I don’t care what the 

Pentagon says. That’s just the nature of it and you just have to accept it. Thank God 

we were in armored vehicles.

JM: How do you think you were supported by the task force in terms of 

logistics?

NP: I just got back from Diwaniyah and the Army has a new policy where it’s 

like “whack-a-mole.” I’m sure you’ve heard the term; it’s sort of trendy to use but 

it’s serious. In southern Iraq right now, there are no coalition forces other than a 

few of the military training teams (MTTs). So they sent this battalion task force, 

my company included, to go whack down these uprisings. It’s great, but when 

you hammer these guys they squirt to other cities. Diwaniyah was the “whack-amole” thing; we had no maps or anything. It was just rush your ass off to another 

city where insurgents are fl aring up with no imagery, maps, or preparation. But in 

Fallujah, let me tell you, logistically it was great. The maps were great and I had all 

the fuel and ammo I needed. I heard the rumors that we went black on ammo but 

everybody in theater was rushing to bring us ammo. I needed an IGV cable and this 

infantry battalion maintenance offi cer, who doesn’t even know what it is, writes 

it down and gets it to me within 18 hours. That’s unheard of. Logistically, the 

support for the Battle for Fallujah was just awesome and that’s how it’s supposed 

to be. When the troops are there and are getting ready to do their mission, the maps 

should already be there and you should start prepositioning the ammo. I’ll say one 
162

thing, though: nobody thought we’d go through that much ammo. I don’t know 

why that is. I think it was because nothing like Fallujah had happened before. I 

wasn’t with 3d ID in the beginning when they took Baghdad, but this was just a 

shoot fest. Logistically they did great. At no point was I conserving ammo and I 

think that’s how you have to operate. The Army is supposed to be effective, not 

effi cient. It’s a war machine, not a business.

JM: During this operation, did you have any interaction with any of the Iraqi 

units that were taking part?

NP: I only had two experiences with the Iraqis and they were really funny. 

One was at the very beginning. It occurred on the evening of 7 November, I think, 

when we did the walk-through rehearsal with everyone. The Regimental Combat 

Team 7 (RCT-7) commander was there, Lieutenant Colonel Newell was there, 

as were all the company commanders and platoon leaders. First off, the Marine 

colonel gave a speech that was pretty cool. Then Lieutenant Colonel Newel gets 

up and gives a pump-up speech that was good too. He said things like, “This is 

the closest you’ll ever come to a battle between good and evil.” It really fi red me 

up. Then, though, this Iraqi colonel from the Kurd battalion gets up there and he 

starts talking in Arabic. The interpreter is interpreting every couple of sentences 

for him, but he starts getting more and more emotional and starts talking faster and 

faster in Arabic. As he keeps talking faster, he’s not giving the interpreter a break 

and he’s just going on and on. At one point, the interpreter actually taps him on 

the shoulder to stop him but he just swats the interpreter’s hand away. He’s got 

his fi nger pointed in the air, he’s screaming and yelling, and then he fi nishes and 

just storms off. We’re all sitting there and the interpreter didn’t know what to do. 

Captain Boggiano said, “You know, I don’t know what that guy just said, but I’m 

fi red up!” It was the funniest shit ever. This guy was really emotional about it. It 

was great seeing leaders show some passion so we were all fi red up. The Iraqis 

were clearly some pretty intense dudes and I think they were pretty fearless. On 

9 November I remember them rolling up behind me and they did that blooming 

onion thing where they shoot in every which direction. Thank God we were in 

our tanks because we took a little contact from the hospital and they just shot 

everything. They don’t really duck and cover. I had very little contact with them, 

though. As the BRT, we didn’t have counterparts or have to hold hands with any 

Iraqis. Our task was just to be the forward element and be the reserve when 2-2 

and 2-63 got tired.

JM: You mentioned the Marines a couple times. Do you have any other thoughts 

about the whole joint aspect of this operation?

NP: When you talk about adjacent unit coordination, I had to physically drive 

my tank over, get on the ground, link up with this Marine major and tell him where 

I was and where he was on the map. I told him he needed to halt his move because 
163 

we’re going to move west. This was on 13 November and we were just sitting there 

lighting stuff up. This was when the BRT became the main effort for 2-2 Infantry, 

and 2-2 had been the main effort for the whole eastern side to include the Marines. 

This was several days into the battle and the Marines were taking just horrible 

casualties. They only had 7.62 and 5.56, those weird shoulder fi red rockets and that 

was it. I don’t ever remember hearing or seeing the main guns go off on their tanks. 

From what I understand, the Marines used their tanks like pillboxes where the tank 

is just this weapons platform that the infantry can maneuver around. We ended up 

taking a lot of their AO and it got to the point where Phantom 6 was telling me to 

go make linkup with the Marines, who ended up being about a click away. I had 

to go out and fi nd this guy, and they used something called mIRC Chat. They gave 

us FM frequencies but they never monitored them. As far as coordination goes, it 

was diffi cult. 

JM: Do you have any general lessons learned comments about the Battle of 

Fallujah and what it accomplished?

NP: Back at FOB Normandy, Lieutenant Colonel Newell got up there and said, 

“What we do here with the after-action review (AAR) is very important. We are 

rewriting the books at the schoolhouse for the urban fi ght with an armored force.” 

I was like, “Hell yeah!” People were saying that the age of tanks was over. In 2001, 

I was told when I was a cadet not to branch armor because tanks were going the 

way of the dinosaurs. I was convinced after the Battle of Fallujah, though, that we 

had proven that tanks and Brads can go anywhere. There was a point when I was 

going straight into the city and ran into these residential houses where I couldn’t 

turn left or right, and I see Lieutenant Emery in his Bradley in a courtyard – and 

the courtyard is just slightly bigger than his Bradley. He saw me, did a 270-degree 

turn and got out of my way. I couldn’t back up and I couldn’t turn because of where 

the enemy and friendly forces were, but he was able to get out of my way. There’s 

nowhere a tank or a Bradley can’t go. The great thing about the city is that there 

are no canals. Cities are built on the fl at desert. The area I’m in now makes it hard 

for movement, but down in the city tanks and Bradleys can go anywhere. I don’t 

care what anybody says. So if I would say anything, it would be to not reduce the 

footprint of armor in any fi ght. We already know that tanks do great in open terrain. 

That’s a given. But you don’t want to reduce your footprint in the cities by taking 

away the armor. The enemy is getting more sophisticated with the explosively 

formed penetrators (EFPs) and the RPG-29s, and you can’t beat the tank for crew 

survivability. As far as coordination was concerned, I think the reason we had 

enemy to our rear at the beginning was that the Marines couldn’t keep up. Clearly 

right off the bat you have to do a better job of maintaining your front line trace. 

We did it great at the organic Army level, but at the joint task force level with 

the Marines we did a bad job of that. There has to be a better way. The Marines 

don’t have tanks like we do, so how do you keep up with tanks and Brads? I don’t 
164

know what the answer is. Do you slow the tanks down? If you do, you will lose 

the momentum that the tanks and Bradleys bring to the table. Right off the bat the 

Army should have spearheaded that. Even though it was a Marine AO, the Army 

should have taken charge and the Marines could have held and secured it. That’s 

what infantry does best. They hold. 

JM: Another thing I meant to ask you was: what kind of visibility did you have 

over the initial breach itself?

NP: All I knew was that it was going to be dangerous as hell and I was expecting 

a lot of friendly casualties. All we were told was that it was heavily defended and 

we were going to get tanks stuck in the trash and the scrap metal. I just had a 

feeling that we were going to lose a lot of people and I thought the BRT was going 

to be killing a lot of squirters. The death of Sergeant Major Steve Faulkenburg 

was a shocker. I don’t understand how that happened. When we heard about it, 

everybody was kind of confused. Other than that casualty, though, things were a 

lot less violent than we thought they were going to be. We spent 10 hours dropping 

artillery on that city. What we realized was that you can get very close to your own 

artillery and you can basically drop artillery on top of yourself and still live. That’s 

what we learned from the screen line.

JM: Are there any other parting thoughts you have about this battle or anything 

you might pass on to someone who’s going to be a tank platoon leader in an urban 

environment?

NP: I have to say that I fell into a lucky bunch. My peers were people like 

Captain Boggiano and I had the latitude from my commander. My platoon was 

great. You asked about being cross-attached. I brought that up to my battalion 

commander back in Ba’qubah. I told my colonel how great it was to be crossattached and said we should do this more often. He said, “You don’t need to do that. 

There’s no need to stay permanently task organized. How quickly did I split you up 

and then send you to the infantry and how well did you do?” I said, “We did real 

well.” He said, “Did you have any practice or any training?” I said, “No.” That’s 

the one lesson. It’s all about fundamentals and it’s all about building blocks. You 

need to stay pure, you need to train with tankers and you need to maintain those 

skills. There’s no use spending my time learning everything the infantry is doing. I 

know they’re pushing for that, saying everyone is an infantryman fi rst; everyone’s 

a rifl eman fi rst. Negative. They have military occupational specialties (MOSs) for 

that. You can either have me as a tanker, doing that as well as I do, or you can 

have me as a grunt. But if you have me doing both, I’m not going to do either one 

as well as I would if I was just dedicated to one. On the spot task organization is 

the way to go. It’s your tank company and you live and die by your tanks. When 

you’re doing gunnery, that’s when you learn those basic skills, fundamentals and 

instincts and you reduce your reaction time. When you put a tank section with an 
165 

infantry section, it just seems more fl uid because infantry will do what they do 

best and armor brings its fi repower and survivability to the table right off the bat. 

I will say, though, that there has to be an innate level of competence that’s built in 

with that leadership, and having guys as competent as Captain Boggiano on my 

left fl ank is huge.

JM: Thank you so much for your time today, Neil. It’s greatly appreciated.

167 

Command Sergeant Major Darrin Bohn

20 July 2006

CI: My name is Dr. Christopher Ives (CI) with the Operational Leadership 

Experiences Project at the Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 

Today’s date is 20 July 2006 and I’m interviewing Command Sergeant Major Darrin Bohn (DB) at Fort Benning, Georgia, telephonically about his experiences in 

the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and specifi cally his experiences during Operation Phantom Fury. If at any time we start to move into an area that is classifi ed 

or sensitive and you’re uncomfortable with your ability to sanitize your answer, 

just let me know that’s something we can’t discuss. Sergeant Major, would you 

state your full name and your current duty position and post?

DB: My name is Command Sergeant Major Darrin J. Bohn and I’m currently 

the 11th Regiment sergeant major at Fort Benning, Georgia. My rank and duty position during Operation Phantom Fury was the operations sergeant major and, about 

10 or 15 minutes into the fi ght when Command Sergeant Major Steve Faulkenburg 

was killed, I assumed duties as the command sergeant major.

CI: When the fi ght started and in preparation for the fi ght, you were the ops 

sergeant major for Task Force 2-2?

DB: Yes.

CI: How long had you been in that duty position?

DB: I arrived there in July 2002.

CI: So you deployed with the battalion?

DB: Yes, I did. We deployed to Kosovo for nine months, returned and did our 

train up for Iraq. I deployed to Iraq as the operations sergeant major and Faulkenburg was the command sergeant major.

CI: So you and he had served together for quite some time at that point?

DB: I’d say about a year and a half at that point.

CI: Who was the battalion operations offi cer (S3)?

DB: Our battalion S3 during Phantom Fury was Major John Reynolds.

CI: How was the battalion task force S3 shop organized for combat?

DB: We had a light tactical command post (TAC) and a heavy TAC. The light 

TAC consisted of four Humvees with the S3, a couple battle captains, the fi re support element, a security element and an Air Force enlisted tactical air controller 

(ETAC). The heavy TAC was two Bradleys and it consisted of myself and Head-
168

quarters 33 with a lieutenant/battle captain and Lieutenant Colonel Pete Newell 

and his Bradley. Headquarters 66 was just himself, his gunner and his driver.

CI: Where was the ground liaison offi cer from the Air Force and where was the 

fi re support coordinator?

DB: They were in the light TAC with the S3.

CI: Was there a tactical operations center (TOC) as well?

DB: The TOC was back at Camp Fallujah where we were with the Marines. 

It was about 20 miles outside of the city and that consisted of the intelligence offi cer (S2) rear, Captain Natalie Friel, some more fi re support guys, and some of 

the battle staff back there who were tracking the larger battle, which included the 

logistics offi cer (S4).

CI: Was this normally how 2-2 confi gured for a fi ght or did you decide to structure the command post (CP) organization this way?

DB: We went on some of the local missions around the Diyala Province, mainly Muqdadiyah, where we were stationed at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Normandy and there would be a mixture sometimes of the light and heavy TAC. It just 

depended on the mood or the mission requirements for how we would confi gure 

and go out.

CI: Were you involved in the planning of the joint operation with the Marines?

DB: I wasn’t really involved with that. It was mainly just our task force specifi c, what we were going to do and how we were going to conduct the mission. I 

was not involved in the big picture with the joint task force.

CI: When did you get the warning order (WARNO)?

DB: Those dates are kind of foggy after all this time. I want to say about 15 

days before we were going to leave FOB Normandy to go to Fallujah.

CI: So as far as you were concerned, your battle started when you deployed 

from the FOB.

DB: We experienced quite a few contacts with our convoy on our way there to 

Camp Fallujah. We stayed there about three days to fi nalize the plan and do some 

rehearsals. We went on a feint the night before we went in. 

CI: Let’s talk about some of those troop leadership procedures (TLPs) and 

prep for battle activities at Camp Fallujah. You close on Camp Fallujah – you had 

to fi ght your way down there basically, redistribute ammo, and make sure everybody is fueled up and such. Did you issue a fragmentary order (FRAGO) at that 

time based on an update of the tactical situation?
169 

DB: We did issue a FRAGO on what we were going to do in Fallujah. When 

we left FOB Normandy, we did an order to get to Fallujah safely and then fi nalized 

the plan when we got to Fallujah. We did a huge rock drill before the rehearsals and 

that paid big dividends for us.

CI: Was it pretty much an Army only rock drill with the company commanders?

Db: It was. It was company commanders and I want to say we went down to 

the platoon sergeant level. We also had the Iraqi Intervention Force (IIF) there with 

the Iraqi battalion commander and his company commanders, to include the major 

who was the liaison for that group.

CI: You didn’t mention any Marines. Were they involved in this rock drill?

DB: We had an attachment that was more of a sensitive site exploitation (SSE), 

kind of a human intelligence (HUMINT) team that was with us. We had no real 

Marine fi ghting force.

CI: What about a liaison element for command and control and things of that 

nature?

DB: No.

CI: Going back to the Iraqis for a second, did you cross attach any liaison offi cers (LNOs) with the Iraqis?

DB: No. The major in charge of the IIF had a contingent of noncommissioned 

offi cers (NCOs) that assisted him and he was on our radio frequency so we talked 

to him quite a bit. They were actually part of the fi ght for us. The major commanded and controlled for us and relayed his orders to the IIF battalion commander, so 

he was like another maneuver element.

CI: His subordinates were embedded in the force structure of the Iraqi battalion to help facilitate that. What other attachments did 2-2 have from the brigade? 

Was there an engineer slice or things of that nature?

DB: We had already had an engineer platoon attached to us in Alpha Company’s task organization so we had just brought them with us. We had those guys 

from the beginning so they were an integral part of Alpha Company.

CI: What sort of capability did they bring? Did they have bulldozers?

DB: We actually had a mine clearing line charge (MCLCs) and a couple recharges. The Marines did give us a bulldozer at the beginning to help with the 

breach and we had the Scan Eyes – the little computer with the drone that we fl ew 

around.

CI: The Ravens?
170

DB: We had a couple Ravens that were just part of our organic task force in 

the S2 shop. I don’t recall anything else. We did have a 155 battery of Paladins that 

was just totally for us that our brigade attached to us for the fi ght.

CI: Going back to the prep for combat and the TLPs, did any issues arise during the couple days you were at Camp Fallujah before moving to your assembly 

areas (AAs) that needed to be addressed in terms of command and control?

DB: Brigade actually sent down an LNO that was inside the Marine place who 

did some overhead cover for us, but I don’t recall any sort of command and control 

issues.

CI: Were there any communications or computer issues? Did you guys go 

ahead and wicker up the radio network structure for your FMs? Did the Marines 

have Blue Force Tracker?

DB: They did have Blue Force Tracker and I don’t recall any communication 

issues at all. The TOC at Camp Fallujah had a pretty big radio and sometimes it 

was a little sketchy talking to those guys because it was 25 miles away; but we had 

direct contact and we were always monitoring Regimental Combat Team (RCT) 

7’s frequency and the battalion commander talked to him frequently about our 

progress.

CI: Do you recall any issues with the battalion task force keeping up with the 

companies?

DB: No, not at all. The light TAC tracked it pretty well and the colonel and I 

were with the maneuver element, so we pretty much had a good idea on where the 

companies were and our friendly forward positions. I thought the battle tracking 

was done very well.

CI: From the way you just described that, I think I have a better appreciation 

for the rationale for the light and heavy TAC now. With your track and the battalion 

commander’s track, you can move to the sound of the guns, so to speak, because 

you’re armored.

DB: There were a couple times that the colonel and I found ourselves in front 

of the company so we had to go back. We were being a little bit overzealous. As 

the ops sergeant major, it was kind of strange because with my background, now 

being in a Bradley, you don’t see that very often.

CI: You guys are given the ability to go to where the battle is without worrying 

about the thin skins and you can put those guys somewhere else. Walk me through 

the movement up to the AAs and the breach.
171 

DB: The night before, I called it a feint but we reconned the route, did the same 

route we were going to take during the fi ght when we did the breach, and literally 

went up and ID’d the breach.

CI: Did you do this with organic elements?

DB: Actually it was the whole battalion task force that moved up and identifi ed 

their AAs and their assault positions. We actually even tweaked the 155s where 

they would fi re the smoke and everything else so we actually fi red artillery that 

night as well.

CI: To get registered as well as assist in the deception?

DB: Yeah. I think it was a pretty good deception.

CI: What happened after you crossed the line of departure (LD)?

DB: We crossed the LD and Team Tank, which was Alpha 1-63 or 2-63, went 

up with the Abrams – Faulkenburg in tow with Alpha Company. They fi red the 

MCLC and established a foothold into the breach. We sent the company through 

with the tanks to secure the objective right inside the breach and then moved Alpha Company up and basically started the leapfrog. The other Marines got bogged 

down in their breach and some of their systems may have failed, but when it’s all 

said and done I believe the majority of the Marines used our breach to gain a foothold into the city and move up to their sector.

CI: Did that bring about any command and control issues? This was during the 

hours of darkness, correct?

DB: Right, it was during the hours of darkness but it really didn’t cause any 

problems. We moved a lot faster than those guys because we were all mechanized 

whereas they had some of their tracks, but they were mainly dismounted. We were 

already pretty much into the city – at least a kilometer or so – where they could go 

through and sneak around and get to where they needed to go.

CI: How are the mech companies using their tanks?

DB: They’re basically just going down the street and clearing a path for Alpha 

Company to come in and follow on and have their dismounted infantry clear building to building.

CI: What sort of resistance are they meeting?

DB: When we fi rst entered the city it was kind of a light resistance, and I want 

to say it was the remnants of the Fallujah Brigade because we really didn’t get into 

a huge fi ght until we crossed Main Supply Route (MSR) Michigan a couple days 

later. That was the main MSR that ran through the city of Fallujah.
172

CI: By daylight of the fi rst day, is the whole battalion task force through the 

breach and into the city?

DB: It is.

CI: Did you coil up at daylight or did you keep moving?

DB: We still went through and cleared. The majority of the fi ghting was really 

at dusk and right at dawn. They took to the cover and hid during the day and in the 

middle of the night because they didn’t have any advantage. There was sporadic 

gunfi re from the beginning until we left, but the bottom line was that the enemy 

didn’t really focus themselves on us until the early morning. Right when it was 

transitioning between night observation devices (NODs) and light is really when a 

lot of our big fi ghts and engagements took place, and then at night right after dark. 

They may have eaten, had a full belly and decided to kick it off. We used the day 

to refi t, refuel and rearm and get a little rest.

CI: I’ve seen references to hot refueling and rearming. Did the battalion S4 

push a logistics package (LOGPAC) forward?

DB: The battalion maintenance offi cer (BMO), Captain Jamey Friel, he and 

his motor pool guys along with Captain Johnny Fortenberry who was the S4 – they 

were both shit hot, both those young captains. The S4 was an armor guy, Friel was 

an infantry guy and both were junior captains who hadn’t been to their captain’s 

career course yet, just doing phenomenal work keeping everything refueled and 

rearmed. They would bring it forward and we would fall back, get refueled and 

rearmed, and go right back to the fi ght.

CI: I’m assuming with a mech task force like this that your support is all heavy 

expanded mobility tactical truck (HEMTT) uploaded?

DB: It was.

CI: So they could move in that sort of terrain once the task force has gone 

through.

DB: Yep, and then of course the motor pool guys have their ‘113s that would 

pull security for those guys.

CI: Did the task force keep the ‘88s – the recovery vehicles – forward?

DB: They did keep a couple forward and each company had one as well, so 

they would have their own company thing so they would move the ‘88 up to recover a vehicle if needed. But surprisingly enough, I think we only had to do one real 

deliberate recovery on a tank. The rest of the vehicles held up pretty well minus a 

couple strapping a tow bar on a Bradley and pulling them back a little bit. For the 

most part, the motor pool guys really kept our stuff up to snuff.
173 

CI: Back to the enemy resistance. Did it seem like there were individual fi ghters coming at the task force? Were there squads, organized platoons?

DB: I think it was more groups, maybe squad-sized or three-man teams. I don’t 

recall a large sized element until we crossed MSR Michigan into the industrial 

area where we lost Lieutenant Ed Iwan and Sergeant James Matteson. We got ambushed up there by the mosque where we found the building that had the big mural 

on the wall that connected Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and the rest of Al-Qaeda.

CI: What day was this?

DB: I think it was day three.

CI: Is this the same ambush where foreign fi ghters were popping up out of 

spider holes?

DB: You’re absolutely right. 

CI: This is principally rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) to initiate?

DB: RPGs and small arms. When we got ambushed in that one spot – and we 

really got caught in a gaggle for some unknown reason. It was a perfect kill sack 

for the enemy and how we ended up in it was a fl uke. There were a lot of folks in 

this area and there seemed to be RPGs coming from everywhere.

CI: Which element of the task force moved into this kill sack?

DB: It was actually Alpha Company to the right side and then the tanks were 

on the left; and somehow the colonel and I ended up in the middle of the two task 

forces and we were kind of coming up on the side. I can’t remember the phase line 

names, but we were just clearing up through the city and we stopped in this area. 

It was an open area and, hindsight being 20/20, it looked like a pretty damn good 

area for the enemy to hit us and that’s exactly what they did.

CI: The fi rst couple days of the battle seem to be characterized as the task force 

having the initiative. At any time did the initiative cross over to the enemy?

DB: Even when we got ambushed that day, they may have gotten one on us 

but I don’t think they ever gained the initiative and put us on the defensive. We did 

fall back and regroup, and there was artillery and we dropped a couple 500-pound 

bombs on that area before we went back in, but I don’t think we ever lost the initiative or the advantage to the enemy.

CI: Did Alpha Company fall back or did the battalion fall back?

DB: It was the battalion that fell back to the previous phase line and we started 

calling in artillery – the 155s that did a phenomenal job for us, to include the fi re 

support guys. They dropped a lot of 155 rounds and a couple 500-pound bombs on 
174

what we thought was the suspected enemy stronghold with the little trenches going 

underneath the walls.

CI: For your close air support (CAS), did you utilize the Marine Air Ground 

Task Force (MAGTAF) or was this Air Force support?

DB: This was Air Force guys calling it in. The funny thing was that we had 

one Air Force guy attached to us and we started using the Air Force a lot to drop 

bombs; and at the end of the fi ght, we had at least four to six Air Force guys with 

us hoping to be able to call the last mission because we seemed to be the only ones 

out there using them and dropping bombs on our objective area.

CI: Do you think there may have been two air tasking orders (ATOs) then, one 

for the MAGTAF based on their organic air support and then a separate one for the 

joint forces air component commander?

DB: I always thought there was just the Air Force one. I wasn’t aware of any 

of the Marines fl ying. They did have the Cobras fl ying around, but they were up 

pretty high. I don’t recall any Navy ETACs calling in any CAS. It was just the Air 

Force guys we worked with and we didn’t fi lter into the Marine sector that much. 

The RCT-7 commander made it a point to come see us at least once a day to talk 

about our future ops and the big picture and what he wanted from us.

CI: Operationally, was there any integration with the Marines? You mentioned 

they were principally light. Did they draw on the resources of the mech companies 

to help cut, so to speak?

DB: I want to say that day three and so on we would send a platoon over there 

to help clear some of their objective areas, so we actually went there and assisted 

them a couple different times on some hot spots.

CI: Would you say that mission emerged as opposed to being part of the original plan?

DB: It emerged because of our speed and mobility. We were at least a day ahead 

of them when it came to those guys fi ghting from building to building. I don’t really know how much resistance they had down there, but I know that fi ghting from 

street to street as a light guy is pretty time consuming and very tiresome.

CI: Did this open up any seams and create an opportunity for the enemy?

DB: It may have, but we had the IIF following behind us doing some SSE and 

securing some of the key terrain features around the mosque, some intersections 

and some key buildings, so I don’t believe anything fi ltered in behind us, but we 

would go through the city and then pull back. We called them gun runs. We would 

run down the street and try to receive fi re to eliminate the pockets of resistance 

and then fall back to our company CPs and our battalion CP. The Marines were 
175 

just a little behind us because they weren’t as quick as us and they didn’t have as 

much fi repower, so I don’t want to say we caused some problems. If anything, we 

drove the majority of the enemy to their side of the city because, with some of the 

intercepts we received, the enemy was saying they were just getting the shit beat 

of them on this side of the town. We’d hear them saying they hit a tank and then 

another would just appear. They said it was a no-win situation for them, so they 

were saying they should get out while they can. A lot of the fi ghters may have fl ed 

through the Marine sector out of the city up by the lake and got out.

CI: The pace of operations is very different between the Army sector and the 

Marine sector, it appears.

DB: Yes, but it was never any problem for us shooting on their side. We had 

some restricted fi re lines that we didn’t want to cross and we actually chased a 

few guys over into their sector. I recall a mission of our Long-Range Advanced 

Scout Surveillance System (LRAS) up on top of the railroad, seeing some insurgents moving into the mosque in the Marine sector. They actually went back and 

lazed the target for the bomb to hit that part of the area where we killed a bunch 

of insurgents that weren’t in our sector, because we were just further ahead of the 

Marines. I don’t want to say there was a problem. There was no fratricide I was 

aware of with the Marines, either them shooting up behind us or us shooting across 

into their sector.

CI: With an Army pure task force – or when 2-2 is operating as a subordinate 

element of the brigade combat team (BCT) and everybody has Blue Force Tracker, 

everybody’s on the same radio nets, you’ve established your fi re support coordination lines and whatnot – it’s a little different with a joint or combined operation. 

Did any extraordinary or unusual control measures have to be put into place?

DB: No, I can’t recall any at all. I can’t speak for the Marines and what they 

were doing, but we knew where they were at and their forward momentum either 

from the light TAC or from the colonel and me monitoring the RCT frequency. I 

don’t recall any issues whatsoever when it came to fi re control measures.

CI: You mentioned that when the command sergeant major was killed, the battalion commander had you switch hats.

DB: He did, but I don’t think my role changed at all. We were in the middle of 

the fi ght. Faulkenburg was kind of the liaison with the tank company and he was 

supposed to pass the IIF through the tank company to their objective. I was in the 

heavy TAC with the colonel and, although it happened right inside the breach – I 

want to say seven to 20 minutes into the battle – I don’t think it really changed the 

way my role was throughout the fi ght. I would go visit and try to instill confi dence 

in the guys whether I was a master sergeant or the command sergeant major. It 

didn’t matter.
176

CI: Plus, you’re another set of eyes for the colonel.

DB: Right. I could tell him how the men were doing. I was dual-hatted but I 

didn’t think my role or anything else had to change during that fi ght at all.

CI: Tell me what happens after this.

DB: I know we fell back and pretty much bombed it for the day with artillery. 

We went back through that night and it was pretty much towards the end of the 

town through the industrial area. We had set up our battalion TAC back behind 

the two companies and, that night, we went back and forth through the city where 

we were ambushed looking for people to shoot at us, threw in some pot shots and 

ran through the city to make sure we had cleared everything. When we got shot 

at, we would shoot artillery if possible, shoot the big guns on the Bradleys, and 

then dismount the soldiers to go and clear and eliminate the resistance. We did that 

throughout the night and, the following day, we went through and did some assessing. We would drive up and secure a position and have the guys get out and do 

some clearing. The tank company had two tank platoons and a motorized platoon 

with the scouts that we had.

CI: Your organic battalion scouts. Were they under armor or were they in 

Humvees?

DB: They were in Humvees.

CI: How would you characterize the most effective enemy resistance? Was it 

precision shooting, RPGs?

DB: It was RPGs.

CI: Any evidence the enemy had trained with these?

DB: Even in Afghanistan I was surprised that a guy couldn’t shoot a rifl e but, 

at a full sprint, he can shoot an RPG and pretty much hit what he’s aiming at. 

Maybe it’s like how some Americans put footballs in babies’ cribs – maybe they 

put RPGs in theirs. They were pretty good with those.

CI: What about improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and mines?

DB: There weren’t that many of them. If you recall, the Marines did a feint 

awhile back on the east side of the city and had a lot of those 2.75 millimeter rockets all lined up and daisy-chained to fi re from the city out to the main MSR. They 

had a pretty elaborate system in our sector of IEDs and rockets that were all command detonated and rigged to go off. They had a couple land mines set up at key 

parts of the roads but they were surface laid as a decoy or put under some trash, 

so there were land mines out there and some mortars. We found that they would 

throw a brick with a rope outside a building and that acted either as a rally point 
177 

or a weapons cache. Every place that we’d see these bricks outside the wall we’d 

either fi nd a small weapons cache or some enemy personnel.

CI: How much indirect fi re was the enemy using?

DB: They had a few rockets during the initial phase where they somehow were 

seeing where we had the casualty collection point and our other assets, like where 

we had the 120 millimeter mortars set up and they received rockets sometimes 

– and mainly it was the 60 millimeter mortars. I remember getting mortared at 

MSR Michigan waiting to go across, just fi ve or six rounds, and then it would stop 

and then it would pick back up. Mortars weren’t that effective and I only recall 

mortars being shot two or three different times. Some of the other folks, like the 

combat service support assets we had, did get rocketed for the fi rst three days. It 

wasn’t very effective but you could certainly say they were coming in.

CI: Do you think something that might have facilitated them as a target was 

that they weren’t moving as aggressively?

DB: They weren’t moving at all. They were on the other side of the road and 

somehow the enemy could see where they were and they were just lobbing pot 

shots at them.

CI: How was morale down in the companies?

DB: Morale was great. I hate to use Sergeant Major Faulkenburg’s death – up 

until then, people were getting shot at, don’t get me wrong, but I think it really 

woke people up when he got killed because, hey, if the sergeant major can get 

killed, this is some serious shit and they realized they had to get focused. Not that 

the guys weren’t focused before then, but it kind of put everybody into the mindset 

that there was no coming back from this. And of course Alpha Company lost their 

executive offi cer (XO), Ed Iwan, and their company commander, Captain Sean 

Sims – and with a great American, First Sergeant Peter Smith, taking charge of that 

company. I even had to move my assistant operations guy to be the Alpha Company XO for a day or two until we got it all fi gured out with Captain Doug Walter 

coming from FOB Warhorse to take over the company. The morale was always 

good with the guys. They were fi ghting hard and winning and there were a couple 

times when it probably sunk in when they were sitting around doing nothing. But 

they were pretty busy and I thought morale was high all the time.

CI: Were there any issues with casualty evacuation or getting logistics pushed 

up to the companies?

DB: No, absolutely not. For some reason all that stuff worked fl awlessly.

CI: I’m assuming it went according to doctrine with the fi rst sergeants pulling 

that stuff up.
178

DB: Yes, the fi rst sergeants would pull it up, and sometimes the XO would go 

back and pull it up depending on the situation and where we were at in the battle. 

We worked a lot of that stuff before we went to Fallujah, because every time we’d 

do a company or a two-company raid or cordon and search, we’d always push the 

assets up forward. It wasn’t a strange thing for the ‘88s to roll out the gate, set some 

stuff up – whether for the enemy prisoner of war (EPW) collection point or to supply water or fuel. It was never a strange thing or a huge muscle movement to get 

those guys up, because they were always in the fi ght from the beginning when we 

crossed the border into Iraq.

CI: Was it routine at the company level to send a platoon or a Bradley back to 

bring the LOGPAC up?

DB: The fi rst sergeant would bring it up with his ‘88 and a couple ‘113s, but 

mainly we didn’t bring those assets too far forward. Platoons would break contact 

at a time and go back to the somewhat safe area to refi t and rearm; and what was 

good about Camp Fallujah being 20 miles away is that we were actually getting hot 

chow mermited to the back. So the men, for the most part, were eating an A ration 

for breakfast and at dinner so we had a pretty good mechanism going. I’m not sure 

what the Marines were eating, but I know our logisticians were taking pretty good 

care of us.

CI: Were there any Class V issues, any problems moving ammo?

DB: We had a few issues with the 155 rounds. The Marines helped us out 

a little bit when we were in a pinch and, of course, they pushed some up from 

FOB Warhorse that actually were sent because General David Petraeus said people 

needed to get their heads out of their asses and send these guys some 155 rounds. 

We were probably critically low but we really didn’t know it, although it all seemed 

to work out in the end.

CI: Clearly somebody thought the battalion was going to need that artillery or 

they wouldn’t have been part of the task force, but the rates of consumption were 

higher than expected?

DB: Our two guns fi red over 1,000 rounds, whereas the Marines had a battalion and they didn’t even come close to what we were shooting. I don’t know 

why that was. Maybe because they were light and they were running around, and 

when you have a bunch of light guys running around it’s kind of hard to keep your 

forward trace going. We really used artillery a lot and we also used our 120 millimeter mortars a lot as well.

CI: Let’s go back to your organic mortars. Did the battalion commander keep 

pretty close control of those? How were the mortars used during the battle?
179 

DB: The mortars were employed as a platoon and they basically put the stopgap between the 155s and the 120s. I don’t know if that artillery battery that came 

with us was the very best, but there never really was a lag time when it came to a 

call for fi re mission. The mortars fi red about 700 120 millimeter rounds and those 

guys were mainly sending them on top of the rooftops and in some of the courtyards, whereas we focused the 155s somewhat on the buildings.

CI: I assume with a Bradley-based task force and the accessibility of thermal 

imaging and everybody has their NODs that you probably didn’t shoot a lot of illumination, is that correct?

DB: Right. We did shoot some deep into the city but the Marines were a big fan 

of the illumination. I do remember seeing a lot of it but not from us as much.

CI: How was the battalion intel section able to keep up with the fi ght or, more 

importantly, help the battalion command team and the companies anticipate challenges hours out?

DB: Our S2 in the light TAC with Major Reynolds would do a lot of battle 

tracking and try to fi nd out what was going on, but I think the real work horse was 

Natalie Friel back at Camp Fallujah tapping into some of these national assets and 

pushing them forward to us. She had control of a Predator and actually fi red a Hellfi re missile from Camp Fallujah to where we were running through the objective 

area, where she had seen some folks running around. She was running back and 

forth to the Marine TOC, tapping into some of the national assets, feeding them 

to the S2 guy and to the battalion commander so we could have a better and bigger picture of what was going on around us – the movements, some of the voice 

intercepts and so on. Both those two worked very well together with Captain Friel. 

It was a husband and wife team, by the way. Captain Jamey Friel was our BMO 

and Captain Natalie Friel was in the infantry battalion with us as one of our intel 

offi cers, which was kind of strange having a female captain in an infantry battalion 

but it worked out very good.

CI: Is it commonplace now for women to be in infantry battalions?

DB: I don’t think so. I’ve been in the Army for 23 years and that’s the fi rst time 

I’ve ever had a female attached to an infantry battalion. We’ve had a couple medics, but never a female who was in the infantry battalion and deeply integrated into 

the planning and execution process. I don’t want to sound like a male chauvinist 

jackass, but she was that smart and was immediately respected by the other guys 

for her knowledge and her know-how. It really didn’t seem to matter. 

CI: Intel was not only able to follow the battle but able to help anticipate and 

participate in the battle. Were there any communications issues? It sounds like you 

had connectivity pretty well.
180

DB: We did, and we had that system called Scan Eyes or whatever it was that 

we received right before we left. I really wasn’t familiar with it, it really didn’t 

work all that well for us, and our radios were sometimes a little sketchy from the 

city of Fallujah to Camp Fallujah, but other than that we worked through it.

CI: Let’s go back to the battle narrative. We are up to day fi ve and the battalion is continuing to keep pressure on the insurgents adjacent to the Marine sector. 

How did the nature of the battle change after the battalion fought through Alpha 

Company’s ambush?

DB: The last couple days after the ambush and after we had fi nished clearing 

our section of the city, we sent a platoon over to help the Marines out until they fi nished up, and mainly we just went into more detailed searches of the buildings. We 

went through and did some SSE on some of the hot spots where we got hit pretty 

hard to try and gather some intel. The IIF was helpful in doing a lot of SSE, picking up some of the dead bodies and consolidating those guys so folks could pick 

them up. They also found a lot of documents. I don’t really know what they were 

but people kept saying they were important so we kept pushing them up. Some of 

the civilians started coming out – and where they were hiding I have no idea – but 

a lot of them had freshly shaved faces and said they were here just guarding their 

homes and such, so that was kind of suspect. We did a lot of mop-up operations. If 

the guy really didn’t look like he was going on, we would let him go to the mosque 

where they were getting a lot the civilians together; but if he looked sketchy or 

looked like he had been in a fi ght or was freshly shaved, then we would call the 

IIF, control him, and then turn him over for interrogation. The last couple days of 

the op were mainly just a mop-up/SSE operation.

CI: Did Task Force 2-2 have anybody attached to them at that point to assist 

with exploitation or interrogation or things of that nature?

DB: That small Marine contingent we had with us – about four guys – they went 

around and did some tactical questioning of some guys, but there really wasn’t a 

lot that came out of that to my knowledge. We found a classroom that had an easel 

and a bunch of chairs with information that taught them how to shoot down helicopters and stuff like that. We also found a vehicle-borne IED factory. It was full 

of explosives. They had a green Chevy Suburban van that traced its origins back to 

Texas, but it was in there and the seats were gutted out, but it kind of looked like 

a contract vehicle that some of the civilian contractors were riding around in. We 

pushed some pictures up and stuff but no one actually came down to look at it to 

see what we found. There was a vice up there with a barrel in it, so it was a place 

where they were clearly up to no good – and that was in the industrial sector.

CI: At what is now the tail end of the battle, did the Marines come and relieve 

you in place? How did the battle handover go?
181 

DB: They just spread out throughout the city and strong-pointed it. Some other 

follow-on forces came in and picked up some traffi c control points. I want to say 

that when the 82d Airborne Division had gone to Fallujah for the fi rst time, they 

had set up right outside MSR Michigan right at the overpass where the railhead 

ran through, and basically they just called us up on the radio and told us they had 

control of our sector. I want to say that a couple company commanders linked up 

with each other and shared some thoughts, and then we broke contact, went back 

to Camp Fallujah, and the Marines took over the whole city.

CI: What happened after that?

DB: There were a couple days back at Camp Fallujah to get cleaned up and 

wait for the HEMTTs to pick us up and take us back to FOB Normandy. 

CI: Was there an after-action review (AAR) conducted?

DB: We did do an AAR internally but there wasn’t anything real huge with 7th 

Army Training Command (ATC) that we were attached to.

CI: How was the movement back to the FOB?

DB: It was pretty uneventful. A couple HEMTTs breaking down and stuff like 

that and a couple wrong turns – pretty much standard operating procedure (SOP) 

going back. 

CI: What stands out in your mind as the most positive surprise you saw during 

the prep or the conduct of the battle?

DB: I don’t think it was a surprise but the soldiers were just outstanding. When 

they were asked to do something, regardless of the plan, those damn kids would 

pick anything up and make it look like a genius put it together. Those guys were 

just awesome, from the platoon sergeants on down and with the company commanders and platoon leaders inspiring the men to do great and wonderful things. 

Those guys never gave up, always had a positive attitude and brought it to the enemy 24 hours a day for the fi rst three days. They were just non stop – kicking ass 

and taking names. They never doubted it or questioned it, they just kept on going. 

There were a few guys who stand out in my mind and those guys just get you up 

in the morning and make you proud to be part of an organization. Some of those 

things will never be known by anybody but were just absolutely amazing.

CI: What percentage of your subordinate leaders were Ranger qualifi ed?

DB: We actually didn’t have very many Ranger qualifi ed NCOs at all. When 

Faulkenburg and I fi rst got there, there were only three of us in the whole battalion. 

We had set up a little program and sent a few guys, but I would say when it was 

all said and done – enlisted-wise – there were probably six of us. It was a mechanized outfi t and I always had my reservations about going mechanized, but those 
182

guys just need good leadership. No one wants to go to work and be a dirtbag and 

fail at what they’re doing – and with good leadership and guidance, those guys 

shined. Lieutenant Colonel Newell and I, and Sergeant Major Faulkenburg in the 

beginning, really put a good comprehensive plan together before we left for Iraq. 

We knew it was going to be a ground fi ght, we knew there was going to be a lot 

of room clearing, and we knew the man with the rifl e was going to win the battle, 

so we did a lot of close quarters battle (CQB) and close quarters marksmanship 

(CQM). With my background, I even ran a leadership program through the soldiers 

in the brigade that came to Vilseck. We ran them through a quick two-day CQB 

and CQM to get the other two or three battalions up to snuff where we were at. I 

still have guys coming up to me and saying they thought it was horse shit that they 

had to go through the courses in Vilseck but, that said, they wanted me to know 

that it also saved their lives and other soldiers’ lives as well.

CI: Did you have any trouble getting the assets to do that?

DB: We had absolutely zero problems getting assets. Some of the close quarter 

optics and some of the M45 machine gun optics we didn’t get until we got to Kuwait, so a lot of the guys weren’t very familiar with some of the guns we eventually 

got before we crossed the border. But they knew how to shoot, they knew how to 

do a magazine change and they knew how to enter and clear a room. The only thing 

I really had heartburn about was when we were in Kuwait and we went through 

the Military Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI) thing. They had a memorandum 

of instruction (MOI) they had to teach that everybody had to go through and check 

the block – call it cover your ass. I don’t know what it really was, but they were 

very infl exible on teaching military operations on urban terrain (MOUT). For example, a lot of those guys are ex-special ops and they were teaching the four-man 

stack with the guy going into the room and being a fl yer, whereas I knew that our 

technique, expertise and training didn’t allow us to send a fl yer. I taught the strong 

wall technique so the soldiers knew when they entered and cleared a room that 

everyone in front of them was enemy and we didn’t have a fl yer going up. They 

were insistent that they teach that and I just thought they should really fall under 

the battalion’s plan and maybe reinforce what we were doing up until then. I was 

pretty pissed off about that whole thing.

CI: Was there any opportunity to provide feedback?

DB: No. They said they had an MOI they had to do and they appreciated what 

we were saying, but that was what they were being paid to do and they didn’t care 

what we thought. This was what their MOI said they had to teach us before we 

crossed the border. I’m a soldier and I’ve been a leader for a while. I see that it’s 

my responsibility to teach my men how to fi ght and win in combat and I didn’t really want to rely on a bunch of retired civilians to strengthen what my guys and I 

already knew. I took a little offense to it.
183 

CI: You mentioned the close combat optics. I’m assuming there were issues in 

getting the laser target designators and white lights –?

DB: No, we did a pretty good job buying some fl ashlights. We got a lot of 

PQ2s and the older PAC4s before we left Germany and then got another big stash 

as the rapid fi elding initiative (RFI) issue before we crossed the border. We ran a 

small arms master gunner course before we left where we had some guys come 

over and teach us how to use these.

CI: Who was your target audience?

DB: Team leaders and above. We made a couple platoon master trainers and 

they were pretty profi cient at that before we crossed the border.

CI: Did you have access to ranges and the time to do that in Kuwait?

DB: We did have some ranges in Kuwait, but where the guys really paid big 

dividends was just running off some engineer tape in the fi eld and doing some dry 

fi re techniques, some magazine changes, and just getting their squad and platoon 

SOPs down for entering and clearing a room. Udairi had a great match site out 

there with cameras and the guys ran that very professionally. They were there to 

assist us but only when asked would they provide it, which was kind of nice. We 

basically took the tank company we had attached us at the time, and I focused on 

them because they were weaker than Alpha and Charlie, which were pure infantry.

CI: Did you end up with a mix of the ACOGs and the Aimpoints?

DB: We did have a mix of the ACOGs and the M68s.

CI: Did that work out for you?

DB: It did. We had the weapons quality with the ACOG and maybe a couple 

other [inaudible], and some of the shots that were really long were with the ACOG. 

It was a pretty good mixture.

CI: What about on the crew-served weapons?

DB: We had PQ2s and the M145 machine gun optics. The only thing I would’ve 

liked to have changed was the quadrant sight for the Mk-19 and, of course, the PQ2 

on the .50 cal was a little rough and broke a lot and didn’t hold its zero. So I just 

fell back to my Ranger battalion days with the guns [inaudible] and stuff like that, 

the quadrant sight for the Mk-19 to get that fi rst and second round hit in lieu of 

trying to walk it in. With the AIM1 with the quadrant sight at night and, of course, 

the AIM1 with the .50 cal is a lot better as well.

CI: Those are authorized items, right?
184

DB: In a mechanized table of organization and equipment (TOE), you’d be 

surprised what’s authorized and what isn’t. We’re still drawing M16A4s, whereas 

clearly the M4 is the way to go.

CI: You do give up a distance capability but – 

DB: Well, in a city fi ght, distance really isn’t that big of a deal. The compactness of the M4 really comes into play; and then you have the coax and the 25 on 

the Bradleys for your distance shots, plus we had the 240s as well. So I think we 

had that covered.

CI: When you guys got back to the States, could you tell if the infantry was 

going to stay with the M16A4 or were they going to a mix with the carbines?

DB: I think the Army is going to go with the carbines, but I’m not really in that 

big picture. My personal belief is that the carbine is the way to go.

CI: What was the most negative surprise you had from the move down from 

the FOB to Camp Fallujah, into the city and back out?

DB: I don’t want to call it negative but there’s always confusion when you’re 

dealing with those corps assets when it comes to getting the HEMTTs – when 

they’re going to show up, how many are you going to have – and then the quality 

of people who are going to come. When you’re sitting in the back of that Bradley, 

riding back, there’s always a big what-if and concern of what was going to happen. 

It was mainly just the support and getting back and then, of course, the information getting to the soldier level of when we’re leaving – but that’s been a problem 

throughout the Army for 231 years. There were really no big surprises. Just the unknowing of when you’re going to leave, when the assets are going to show up and 

what assets are you going to have. You have the plan and then, of course, it always 

turns into a FRAGO of who you have and where you’re going.

CI: Is there anything else you can think of that you’d like to get on the record 

in regards to leadership or TLPs or about the nature of the fi ght?

DB: No, not really. Not ever being in a mechanized assignment and not knowing a lot about the Bradley, I learned to really love that machine, to include the 

tanks in an urban fi ght. I always thought that, as an Airborne Ranger, it was a 

bunch of guys running up and door kicking, but when you have that tank and Bradley in support, it gives you a sense of comfort knowing somebody is there watching your ass. That’s a pretty big gun to reach out and put a hurting on somebody. I 

think it’s a big morale boost for the guys who are on the ground and, if they get in 

trouble, knowing those big assets can get you in and out of that area when it turns 

ugly. They’re just a phone call away and there’s not a whole lot that’s going to stop 

them from getting there to get you.

CI: Thank you for your time.
185 

Command Sergeant Major Timothy L. Mace

19 April 2006

MM: Why don’t you go ahead and give me some background on yourself, like 

where you were born, where you went to school, your Army career up until Operation Phantom Fury started. Any assignments you may have had.

TM: All right, sir. My name is Command Sergeant Major Timothy Lee Mace. 

I was born in 1960 in St. Louis, Missouri. I entered the Army in June 1978, right 

out of high school, basic training, infantry AIT [Advance Individual Training], 

then jump school. My fi rst assignment was in Italy as a paratrooper, second assignment was Fort Campbell, Kentucky. I did some time in the infantry there, then air 

assault school instructor for about two years. I went to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 

for a straight shot of six years at the 82d Airborne Division. I became a drill sergeant and basically varied assignments. Training base, went to Korea, back to the 

training base, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, basic training. I went to the Sergeants 

Major Academy, went back to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, back here to the basic 

training brigade. Then I got activated to go and take over 2-7 CAV [2d Battalion, 

7th Cavalry Regiment] about halfway through their tour, so I arrived in country 

in late September 2004. About fi ve weeks later, my battalion was involved in the 

battle of Fallujah.

MM: Why don’t you talk me through when you fi rst found out that the Marines 

were going to use you guys and go into Fallujah.

TM: Well, a little bit of background. The battalion had fought in An Najaf in 

August 2004, so they had worked with the Marines before on a joint operation. As 

a matter of fact, part of the reason why 2-7 got selected was how well they worked 

with the Marines. They complemented the Marines with the assets the cavalry 

had. About the second week I was there, in Taji, I started hearing rumblings about 

we were going to go back to Fallujah and we’ve been selected. We started laying 

the groundwork. I went there myself with the S3 [operations offi cer], Major Tim 

Karcher, and the advance party just started getting the lay of the land at Camp Fallujah. Up to that point, the battalion had no experience in Anbar Province to my 

knowledge. So we went there, met our counterparts with the Marines, came back 

and they started planning. It wasn’t certain they were going to have an operation. 

They didn’t know when, perhaps in the upcoming future, but be prepared. About 

the last week of October, we were there on another reconnaissance and it started 

looking more and more like it was going to happen. We actually went down there 

for a planning conference. The day we got back was the day the battalion was 

alerted to load out, go to Camp Fallujah and prepare for future operations. We had 

a full-time fi ght on our hands at Taji, so it was a busy time for all.
186

MM: What was your impression of the Marines when you showed up? Did 

they treat you okay?

TM: Excellent. The Marines were extremely professional and I was very 

impressed with the 1st Marine Regiment, 1st Marine Division. The regimental 

command sergeant major welcomed me right off the bat. “Whatever your soldiers 

need, Camp Fallujah is open to you. If you ain’t got it, you let me know and you’ll 

get it.” The Marine offi cers and staff offi cers, from the commander on down, just 

excellent to work with. No difference between the Marines and the Army as far as 

having common purpose, common direction, know what we had to do. 

MM: How’d you personally prepare your soldiers for this action? In my opinion, this is the fi ght of the war right here. Did you have to do anything special to 

prepare them for this?

TM: No, actually not at all. The soldiers were battle hardened by Najaf, and 

that had nothing to do with Tim Mace. That was Lieutenant Colonel Jim Rainey 

and his guys. We had a couple new commanders, a couple changes in command, 

but they were in the brigade, so they were familiar with the people and the fi ght 

and everything like that. We had only received maybe one or two groups of replacements by the time I had arrived there, so we’re talking about less that a dozen 

new soldiers – and a couple of those were combat experienced at another time 

and place. The soldiers were prepared for the fi ght and Najaf made them that way. 

What they were doing in Fallujah was basically Najaf on a more vicious scale. The 

soldiers continued their mission in Taji, patrolling, up until the time they folded in, 

prepped their vehicles and we loaded out. There was no time for any train up, other 

than when we got to Fallujah and actually started getting the battle plan.

MM: And you actually drove your vehicles to Camp Fallujah, is that correct?

TM: Some we drove and we moved others by HETs [Heavy Equipment Transporters], as I recall.

MM: Could you basically just talk me through your part in the initial Marine 

planning for the operation and up until November 8th, when they blow the breach 

and you guys go through?

TM: Our primary battle staff was involved in every regimental meeting of the 

two Marine battalions, 3-1 and 3-5. We were just another maneuver battalion under 

the 1st Regiment’s planning process. That was mainly the offi cer battle staff NCO; 

they were doing that stuff, getting the orders. I will tell you there were no three 

fi ner offi cers in the entire theater for this fi ght than Lieutenant Colonel Rainey, Major Scott Jackson and Major Tim Karcher. All these guys are Jedi Knights, meaning graduates of SAMS [School of Advanced Military Studies], and they were 

actually making sure that what people were doing was doctrinally correct and was 
187 

resourced accordingly. We were just impressed to hear these guys. A little terminology back and forth: the Marines want us to do this, but what we should be doing 

is, that sort of thing. Whenever our guys had input like that, it was well received. 

The Marines said, “This is what we want you to do. Army: execute.” Our offi cers 

took over and had a plan that looked good to me.

MM: Okay, the Marines blow the breach on the west of the train station. Talk 

me through the fi rst day or two of the fi ght there as you guys head toward the Jolan 

District.

TM: We hurt them as best we could, and it was a pretty grand scale operation. 

I’m normally a foot soldier, airborne infantry. It was my fi rst time in a mechanized 

force, so it was awesome to see how big of a scale this thing was, and just how 

much room you suck up trying to maneuver cavalry units. We rehearsed it on a 

smaller scale so everybody could get an idea of who was where and what they were 

doing. The preparation for the battle, we had Air Force, Army artillery, Marine 

artillery, everybody else prepping the battlefi eld. We led with our armor and they 

were going to do the plows and proof the lane, stuff like that. Charlie Company, 

3-8 CAV, led by Captain Peter Glass, they were actually going to be the fi rst ones 

in, lead with the M1s and then the Bradleys behind. From that point, I was with 

my battalion commander in his command Bradley, a two-man team: the S3 in one 

and the colonel in the other one. We were just following the lead assault elements 

through. Of course, the time schedule didn’t survive initial contact. We anticipated, 

I think, somewhere around 2100, but the Army did not cross into the city until after 

midnight, 0100, something like that.

MM: So that puts you into November 9th.

TM: The operation started on the 8th, but by the time we were physically engaged with the enemy in their backyard, it was early morning on the 9th. 

MM: Did you guys take a lot of fi re as you were going in there initially, driving 

toward the Jolan District?

TM: I was not really on the net in the back of the commander’s Bradley. What 

was happening to the lead elements, the commander and his primary staff could 

probably tell you much better that I could. I don’t remember a heck of a lot of 

resistance or hearing anything like that. I do know that the commander and Major 

Karcher knew there was enemy out there taking shots. Major Karcher’s Bradley 

actually creamed the guy that was lining Lieutenant Colonel Rainey’s Bradley, our 

Bradley, up for an RPG [Rocket-Propelled Grenade] shot. So there was resistance 

out there, but the intensity, I really can’t speak to.

MM: Is there anything that stands out in your mind during that initial 48 hours 

period? Any stories you’d like to get out there to folks?
188

TM: I’ve been in the Army 26 years and you always hear how good the Army 

is at executing, but it was awesome to see how everything followed the plan that 

Lieutenant Colonel Rainey and the Marines had laid out. It was a professional operation. When you have professionals with good equipment and good support who 

work well together going against a bunch of raggedly little muj’, you’re going to 

win. Everybody knew they were going to fi ght, and I’m not disparaging the enemy. 

They’re brave in their own right, but they were just amateurs fi ghting professionals 

– and the professionals had the better toys.

MM: Did you end up at the bridge at some point?

TM: The battalion did, I physically did not. We had one company, either Alpha 

or Charlie, I’m not sure. It had gone over to the east end and secured that. I physically did not get to the bridge myself. 

MM: Does anything stand out in your mind from when you guys get down to 

Highway 10, Phase Line Fran, the main highway that runs through the center of 

town? From there, up until I think you guys leave around the 20th of November 

– anything stand out in your mind on the second phase of the operation?

TM: We knew we were going to get where we were going to go, the question 

was just how long was it going to take us and how bad were we going to be hurt. 

After that, it was, “Okay, hold what you got.” Then the Marines said, “Okay, we 

got them.” We anticipated we’d continue to push all the way through that part of 

the city, we just didn’t know when that was going to happen. We got to our initial 

objectives rather rapidly, all things considered. Then it was sit, consolidate, hold 

what you got, let the Marines do their thing. It was never safe in Fallujah, but it was 

not as bad as we thought it was going to be. And as things keep piling on, it was 

just natural: you have them on the run so let’s do some exploitation, let’s continue 

on. At that point, there was whole lot of waiting for the other shoe to drop. The 

colonel and I were in the city every day with the soldiers.

MM: Did you have any problems with combat service support operations?

TM: No. First of all, the battalion planned where they located the task force 

support area. It was close enough to be responsive, but they only took contact a 

couple of times, direct contact. It was only four kilometers, I think, north of the 

train station. So it was ideally positioned: access to the highway, access to the city, 

but not close enough that the enemy could really hurt us. Now, the support elements: excellent, just excellent. The tanks and Bradleys would come in daily battle 

damaged, black on fuel, black on whatever else. Whatever they had to do, they got 

the vehicles back in the fi ght quickly. I don’t recall any vehicle being deadlined 

back there for very long, so the support element was excellent.

MM: Did the Marines provide you guys with chow or did you handle that 

yourself?
189 

TM: Camp Fallujah pushed out one hot meal a day on most days, our guys 

would. It was prepared by the civilians working for the Marines on Fallujah. KBR 

[Kellogg, Brown and Root]. Our guys were getting the chow, our support element, 

and they were pushing it up to us nightly for the most part. That would be at the 

task force support area. They would also push forward to the train station, link up 

with the line guys, and push their chow to them. It was as good as can be expected 

in a fi erce battle.

MM: A lot of the Marines I’ve been interviewing are extremely impressed by 

the 120 millimeter mortar that the Army had. Did you get to see that in action?

TM: The mortar platoon actually doubled as the commander’s personal security detachment. They were going with the commander at the same time they were 

manning the guns. They went through a massive, I want to say, 750 or 850 rounds. 

They had to call for emergency resupply from 1st CAV because they were using 

so much. Because of the stuff we had, the 120 millimeters on the Abrams and the 

Bradleys and stuff like that, our mortars actually fi red more missions in direct 

support of the Marines than they did of us. It was very impressive and they were 

ready. When you’re getting a little bit of sleep at three o’clock in the morning and 

the mortars are fi ring, that wakes you up. They were only maybe 100 meters away 

from where our TOC [Tactical Operations Center] was. So it seemed like those 

boys didn’t get any sleep for three weeks. They were constantly fi ring. 

MM: The Marines were really impressed with the 120, the ones I’ve interviewed so far. As the battalion sergeant major, how did you handle your KIAs? 

You had Sergeant Jonathan Shields that was killed and Specialist Jose Velez. How 

did you handle that?

TM: In the Gulf War, fortunately, as a platoon sergeant, I never had a KIA, 

never lost a kid. Jon Shields was the fi rst one I ever lost. I think it was November 

12th around 2300 hours, Friday night, we got the call from TOC. Myself and Major Karcher actually went forward. It was an initial report, we got a fl ipped over 

tank, possible casualty, whatever else. We got there, the tank was inverted down. It 

was laying upside down at the bottom of the ravine and the rear deck area was actually on fi re. Our PA [Physician’s Assistant] was there, myself and Major Karcher. 

Major Karcher had to crawl underneath the tank to see if anyone was under there. 

He couldn’t tell anything, so we had to wait until the FSC [Forward Support Company] guys came and righted the tank. Once they did, Sergeant Shields was on the 

ground. Myself, Major Karcher and a couple of the guys carried him off. The PA 

pronounced him dead at that point. It’s rough. I’m not callus, unemotional, but it’s 

not a surprise either. This is war, kids get hurt. The next day was war because we 

heard the gunfi ght happening. Myself and the commander and everybody was back 

at the TOC when this thing broke out. Not too long later, evac came in and we had 
190

guys wounded. They took Velez back behind; he was dead too. At the time, though, 

maybe it’s easier when you’re in a pretty intense fi ght, because you really don’t 

have time to dwell on it. Afterwards, though, those are rougher. 

MM: Did you know Command Sergeant Major Steve Faulkenburg over in 2-

2? They were fi ghting over in the east side of the city.

TM: I knew the name, and I think I went to the academy with him, if I’m not 

mistaken, but not a close friendship.

MM: Because he was killed the fi rst night of the fi ght over in their sector. Is 

there anything else that you’d like young soldiers to know or young NCOs from 

your experience being in this fi ght?

TM: The rivalry crap between the Marines, the Air Force, Navy – that stuff 

doesn’t survive the fi rst bullet. Everybody we worked with – the SEALs, the Air 

Force, tac air guys, the Marines, my counterparts, sergeants major in the Marines 

– it was almost like an automatic friendship. Great admiration for all the services, 

and that’s doctrine; that’s how we fi ght. It’s easy on a battlefi eld when everyone is 

working towards the same thing. The soldiers were very impressive and I think a lot 

of that had to do with An Najaf. You’re probably going to survive, but it’s luck of 

the draw, so you might as well just put it out of your mind because you don’t know. 

I did see one kid, one of the new guys that came in. A few days into the fi ght, we 

were downtown at one of the mosques and the colonel and the PSD and I ran into 

a little bit of fi re getting to the mosque. The Marines and our guys were out there. 

Well, I saw this kid barf; he was looking like, “Oh my God.” But the PFCs, the 

specialists, the E-5s and the lieutenants, that’s the strength of the Army. All of our 

training and just leading people right paid off in that battle. I have great admiration 

for the Marines. They took the brunt of casualties because they were dismounted 

and clearing the stuff. We were under armor, we blew through and overwhelmed 

the enemy, so we were more well protected. Those guys had the hard job of going 

door to door, fl oor to fl oor. When I was talking to one of my counterparts at the 

train station, their aid station took fi re a few times. There were several times daily 

right there, getting pounded, but you know, Marines are Marines: they’re going to 

do the damn job. Very impressive. So all in all, how we train, our good leaders, 

good soldiers, and a good mission we believe in – and that’s the thing. Everybody 

knew these guys we’re fi ghting are not good people. They’re just bad people, and 

every time you pulled the trigger, the world got a little bit better.

MM: Did somebody forward you the interview I did with Colonel Michael 

Shupp, the commander of Regimental Combat Team 1?

TM: No, sir, I’d love to see it.
191 

MM: Yeah, I will send that to you today, it’s really good. He thinks 2-7 walks 

on water and I think you’ll really like it. It’s a great interview.

TM: Good commander. Right off the bat, he just told you, “We’re going to 

win!” Whenever Lieutenant Colonel Rainey and his staff came up, we saw him in 

the town daily, along with General [Richard] Natonski. The big boys actually got 

their feet dirty; they weren’t hanging back moving stuff on a board. 

MM: That’s what I hear a lot of. You have the division commander and the 

regimental combat team commander and they seem to be out there seeing what’s 

actually going on. 

TM: The 1st Marine Division sergeant major came to see us every day at our 

TOC; and when we weren’t at the TOC and we were in town, then you’d see him 

in the town. All the leaders were getting dirty. The III Corps commander and the III 

Corps sergeant major, they came to see us the day before the battle kicked off. Everybody supported but nobody micromanaged. Nobody was trying to grab a hunk 

of the battle. Everybody deferred to the Marines. Our Army chain of command, the 

commanding general, came to see us, so did the division CSM and General [Peter] 

Chiarelli. “Whatever you guys need, don’t worry about. If the Marines can’t give 

it to you, we will.” Great support.

MM: How did you guys work the press? Did you guys have a bunch of embedded reporters with you?

TM: We had three that accompanied us in. They weren’t in the commander’s 

Bradley; they were with the S3. One of the guys actually got hit with mortar fragments when we were downtown that fi rst full day, on the 9th. Full access. We 

didn’t have any problems with them. Velez’s death hit them hard, because the day 

or two before they were with that squad. So, they knew Velez, they knew the squad 

leader, they knew the guys. And the next day or so, one’s dead and the rest are 

wounded, so it hit them personally.

MM: Earlier this morning, I was reading through the Chicago Tribune and 

Matthew McAllester, one of the reporters, has a great quote from you saying, “I 

feel for anybody who bought real estate here the past year.”

TM: [Laughter] Yeah, those poor guys. If you had a house in Fallujah, you 

think Saddam’s gone, life’s going to be good, and the next thing you know.... 

MM: So you had no real problems working with the press or anything? 

TM: I never tried to be a spokesman for the Army. I answered the questions, 

but the offi cers and commanders are much more well versed. But these guys could 

see for themselves that there’s no dog and pony show. We’re in combat, this is what 

we do. I got an email from my wife: “You ought to see what they write about this 

Marine who killed this guy or whatever else.” To my personal knowledge, nobody 
192

did anything wrong, not the Americans. None of my guys did, and Lieutenant 

Colonel Rainey would not have tolerated it. But none of us would; we’re not barbarians. It was a hard fi ght, it really was, and there was no mercy. You fi red on us, 

you were getting lambasted. But if they were out of the fi ght, then they were out 

of the fi ght. 

MM: Did you see any civilians running around? My understanding is that the 

city was pretty well denuded of civilians. I talked to a couple people that said they 

saw some here and there, but basically that city was pretty empty of civilians.

TM: Well, going into it, we were told that the only people there, for the most 

part, were there because they wanted to fi ght. Of course, there are always exceptions. But they were looking forward to it. Well, good, we’re going to bring it on. 

See if you can handle it. The third or fourth day, we were downtown. As a matter of 

fact, I believe the 1st Marine Division commanding general. We were at a mosque, 

a site we had cleared and secured – and actually the Iraqi Army was in that area at 

the same time. You have the Marine two-star, you have the regimental commander, 

you have my battalion commander, everyone has their CSMs there, and they were 

meeting in the courtyard of this mosque. Here comes the word that the Iraqi Army 

was actually escorting a whole bunch of civilians – about 30 or 40 old people, a 

couple of military age – they were escorting them out of the city from south to 

north. We immediately secured the area because nobody’s stupid. If they fi nd out 

that a Marine general and Army and Marine commanders were there, they would 

try to take them out. We were just, “You’re not coming near our commanders.” 

That is the only time I personally saw civilians who weren’t fi ghting.

MM: The Iraqi Army troops were actually taking them out of the city. Did you 

form any kind of impression on how well the Iraqi troops did for you?

TM: The morning of the 9th, they were coming into the city from the train 

station. Now, the area they were coming into was already secured by the Marines; 

we’d already punched through. These clowns started fi ring and maneuvering to 

enter the city. Our interpreter, a Kurdish guy, is yelling at them. I didn’t see any 

bad things about the Iraqis. I didn’t witness them in combat so I can’t speak on how 

effective they were. But from my experience, what I’ve been reading, that was the 

embryonic stage of the Iraqi Army getting involved. I heard nothing bad about the 

Iraqis as far as not doing their job. And they were given a pretty easy mission. I 

think somebody smarter than me said, “Okay, get them in there, put an Iraqi face 

on it, but don’t let the battle hinge on them because things could go to pot in a 

heartbeat.” Given the baby-step mission to secure what the Army and Marines had 

already taken, I think they did well.

MM: How did your fi rst sergeants do in all the various companies you were 

controlling?
193 

TM: The fi rst sergeants were, generally speaking, excellent. Nobody hung out 

at the rear, and that’s the expectation. A lot of fi rst sergeants: “Well, I’ll stay back 

here or I’ll just go in the fi rst day.” Well, if the battalion commander and the CSM 

are going in, you’re going in too. That’s that. Across the board, I saw and heard 

of no hesitancy whatsoever on anybody’s part. Nobody tried to stay in the rear, 

nobody tried to stay in the building. Everybody that was in the fi ght, they were in 

the fi ght.

MM: Do you recall right off the bat what your PA’s name was or the task force 

surgeon?

TM: Gosh, no, I’m terrible with names. I can picture this guy and he would 

kill me if he ever found out that I forgot his name, but I do not remember. I’d have 

to look up a roster.

MM: I’m eventually going to track them down too. Obviously, they did a bang 

up job for you guys.

TM: They did. As a matter of fact, we pushed part of our aid station forward, 

co-located with the Marines. We sent our surgeon forward and whatever else. At 

the train station, the Marines set up their aid station. They were taking more casualties than we were. The commander wanted to make our guys more responsive 

and he said, “Okay, let’s help out the Marines.” So we pushed part of our medics 

forward. I don’t even know if they treated any Army right there at that Marine aid 

station, but they treated a heck of a lot of Marines; so again, more interoperability. 

Marine casualties are Americans, so we pushed our guys forward. The surgeons 

did super; all the medics were super. 

MM: Well, that’s what the regimental commander was telling me on an interview. He said that your guys saved a lot of Marine lives by putting his wounded 

guys on your armored vehicles and getting them back to the aid station.

TM: I have no doubt that it happened, but I don’t recall if, say, Charlie Company pulled fi ve Marines out. If they did, that does not surprise me. I’m sure it 

happened, but I just don’t recall it. I do know that once they got to the aid station, 

whoever was manning it, Army or Marines, the kid got treated.

MM: Is there anything else you’d like to get out there?

TM: Every so often I read Al Jazeera, and I remember reading some of these 

articles about how it was barbaric and we were killing every civilians in sight – and 

that was a damn lie. It never happened. Propaganda, yeah, I know how it works 

and everything else, but there are people that actually believe it. Okay, well, I was 

there. And I’m telling you that except for those unarmed combatants – and they 

were left alone, escorted out of the city, protected – anybody else in that doggone 

city that died, they needed to die. I read that there was a lot of unnecessary dam-
194

age, but there were a lot of buildings that were untouched. As a matter of fact, a 

majority of the buildings were untouched, as I recall. Maybe a little bit of superfl uous damage, a piece of shrapnel or whatever else. But widespread destruction? 

That did not happen. Now, having said that, if a building contained the enemy, it 

was lambasted; it was leveled. JDAMs, direct fi re from the tanks, whatever – they 

brought the wrath of God onto it. 

MM: One of your NCOs, Sergeant First Class John Urrutia, I interviewed him. 

He said that when they got down by the southern bridge down there, they even 

went into a house and grabbed a few Zs; but when they left, they made sure everything was put back right where it was.

TM: Yes, John’s a good man. Our guys did that. They took over the houses 

because it was protection from fi re, but they didn’t break things. A lot of the houses 

were already torn up by the enemy. But as far as tearing stuff up, our guys were 

either raised better than that or led better than that, or it was a combination of both. 

NCOs don’t allow that kind of stuff to happen and neither do the offi cers. They 

didn’t break things. Lieutenant Colonel Rainey set the standard right off the bat. 

We’re not here to sink to their level, we’re better than that, and the guys generally 

behaved, accordingly. I was very impressed.

MM: I’m going to be interviewing Lieutenant Colonel Rainey at one o’clock. 

I will, for sure –

TM: If you would pass on that the sergeant major was so impressed with his 

doggone leadership, caring for soldiers. He was aggressive but not foolhardy or 

reckless. I wouldn’t want to fi ght him. You can pass that on, kind of as a compliment. I don’t want to look like a cheese dick or anything.

MM: [Laughter] I will let him know. Well, look, I will more than likely, at 

some point, be emailing you back with a few other questions as I start to write this 

thing.

TM: Can you tell me if I was a lot of help for what you’re trying to do?

MM: You were a great help, this is fantastic, because I want to make sure 

we hear from everybody. I’m even going to interview your chaplain, Jonathan 

Fowler.

TM: Well, he’s down at Fort Jackson right now, good man. He was always, 

“Can I go into the city for a couple of days?” “Chaplain, I know you want to, but 

right now, we’ve only got one chaplain. We need to take care of you.” And then a 

couple days later when he went in, it was: “You stick with me; nothing’s going to 

happen to you.” He wanted to go in with the assault element; he wanted to be with 

the soldiers; he thought that was his job. And that was his job but, “Chaplain, come 

on now, easy tiger.”

MM: Well, look, I greatly appreciate this. Thank you.
195 

Sergeant Major Peter Smith 

6 June 2006

MM: My name is Matt Matthews and I’m an historian with the Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Today is 6 June 2006. I’m interviewing 

Sergeant Major Peter Smith (PS) who at the time of Operation Phantom Fury was 

the fi rst sergeant for Alpha Company, 2-2 Infantry. Could you please state you full 

name, where you were born and the circumstances under which you joined the 

Army?

PS: My name is Peter Lee Smith, I was born in Nuremberg, Germany, and I’m 

originally from Germany. I joined the Army in Nuremberg. I’m an infantry soldier, 

I have 16 years of service right now and I’m holding the position of sergeant major.

MM: Can you talk me through your career path up until you became the fi rst 

sergeant for Alpha Company?

PS: I joined the Army in September 1989. I completed basic training and advanced individual training (AIT) in Fort Benning, Georgia. I was reassigned to 

Germany upon completion of AIT and they sent me to Baumholder. I was there 

with the 4-12 Infantry. I was stationed there for three years and upon completion 

of that tour I got orders to go to Fort Benning, Georgia, and Kelly Hill – a rapid deployment unit. I stayed there for three years and volunteered for the drill sergeant 

assignment, moved from Kelly Hill to Sand Hill in Fort Benning. I was a drill 

sergeant for two years. Upon completion of that, I received orders bringing me to 

Vilseck, Germany, and I was stationed in 2-2 for seven years. I got there as a sergeant fi rst class. I did the platoon sergeant thing for three years and was given the 

opportunity to be the ops sergeant major for the operations (S3) shop. I did that for 

one year. I got picked up as a master sergeant and took over Alpha Company 2-2.

MM: When you took over Alpha, were they still in Kosovo or were you guys 

back in Germany?

PS: We were in Germany getting ready to go to Kosovo for the second time. 

I went to Kosovo the fi rst time for nine months as a platoon sergeant with Bravo 

Company 2-2, came out on the fi rst sergeant list while I was working in the S3 

shop, and took over fi rst sergeant around June, just in time to go back to Kosovo 

for another eight-month deployment.

MM: Could you talk me through what happened when your unit arrived in 

Iraq, who the leaders were in the company, and maybe take me all the way to right 

before Operation Phantom Fury kicks off?
196

PS: The special thing about this is that we came back from Kosovo around 

July 26th and found out the very next day that we had to prepare to go to Iraq. So 

our 30 days leave got cut down to 14 days and extensive training took place; we 

trained for four to fi ve months in preparation for that Iraq deployment. We went to 

Iraq in February. We stayed in Kuwait for about two and a half weeks waiting for 

our equipment and, as soon as it docked, we downloaded it and headed north to 

Iraq. The sector we occupied was the Diyala sector. The brigade was at Warhorse 

and Task Force 2-2 was at Camp Normandy. Once at Normandy we did combat 

patrols, route clearances, and we reacted to information we got from people that 

came up to the front gate or the contacts we made in sector. We deployed to An 

Najaf and stayed there for approximately 14 days and did some missions there, had 

a big fi refi ght in Ba’qubah and smaller fi refi ghts around that area. Then in October 

we received orders to prepare to go to Fallujah with Task Force 2-2.

MM: Was Captain Sean Sims your company commander at this time?

PS: Yes. During the whole preparation to go to Iraq, the company commander 

was Captain Doug Walter and he took us through our whole gunnery and the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) rotation all the way up to the day we were 

going to deploy to Iraq. Due to a medical problem Captain Walter had at that time, 

he was unable to deploy with us. I think he found out like a day or two prior that 

the doctor would not let him deploy with us and explained the eating habits he had 

to do in order to get rid of the problem. So out the door we got the new company 

commander, Captain Sims. The day of our deployment they told us that Captain 

Sims was going to take us down there.

MM: Had Sims been in the battalion up until this point?

PS: Not in the battalion. Captain Sims was at brigade. He worked with Captain 

Walter up there and he and Captain Walter were like best friends. They worked in 

the S3 shop at brigade or something like that. They knew each other very well, but 

the company and I didn’t know him very well prior to him coming to the company 

on the day of departure.

MM: What were your impressions of him when he showed up?

PS: At the very beginning there was no impression at all because of the timeline we were under. Everybody was packing up and we were sitting up in the gym 

getting ready to get on the buses going to Frankfurt so we could leave. It was a 

non-factor at that time and it didn’t really kick in until we got to Kuwait and we 

started talking and went over things. At the very beginning, everybody had a mission they had to do and we were more focused on getting out of there than on the 

new company commander at that time.
197 

MM: Was Lieutenant Edward Iwan the executive offi cer (XO) during this time 

as well?

PS: Yes. Lieutenant Iwan came at the very beginning of our deployment. There 

was another guy that had prepped us and ordered all the stuff prior to us going. He 

set us up for success and Lieutenant Iwan stepped in and became the new XO.

MM: Do you recall if Iwan was actually in the battalion or did he come from 

somewhere else?

PS: He was in the battalion and I know he was a platoon leader with Charlie 

Company at one point and then he went to battalion. I think he was a mortar platoon leader and then he came to assume the XO position.

MM: Could you talk me through the fi rst time you heard rumors that the Marines were going to use you down in Fallujah and maybe what happened with those 

rumors and what you did to specifi cally prepare for this mission?

PS: Everything was rumor control at the beginning. They were saying – and 

we saw it on CNN and Fox News – that there were things going on in Fallujah. 

They were talking about an Army force going down there and then the rumors got 

confi rmed that 2-2 was sending a task force to go down there. At that time we had 

two infantry companies in 2-2 – Alpha and Charlie Companies – and we did not 

know who was going. Both companies prepared for the mission, but it wasn’t said 

what company was going to go. Once we found out it was Alpha Company, the 

preparation for Fallujah was actually not that extensive. We were prepping all the 

time. There was gunnery going on and small arms qualifi cation going on on a daily 

basis on the forward operating base (FOB). The only thing that was maybe a little 

more extensive was maintenance on the vehicles and getting ready to do the road 

march down to Fallujah. In Alpha Company itself, I had two infantry platoons and 

an engineer platoon that were going with us. They brought a tank company in that 

was going with us, some headquarters elements – but Alpha Company was the 

main effort for the mission.

MM: What happened as you went up to your attack positions and on the night 

the breach went in, up until your company breaches to the northeast of Fallujah?

PS: We road marched down to Fallujah; our Bradleys were put on lowboys and 

driven down there. We went into Camp Fallujah. On the way down there we were 

hit by a couple improvised explosive devices (IEDs) but nothing spectacular, and 

we didn’t have any casualties at that time. We occupied a tent city at Camp Fallujah and stayed there for about a week prepping the vehicles and conducting troop 

leading procedures (TLPs). The individual soldiers were getting ready while key 

leadership went on recons to the outskirts of Fallujah itself.
198

MM: Did you have any interaction with the Marines during this time and, if so, 

what were your observations?

PS: There was a Marine general in charge of the whole operation. The task 

force command post (CP) was not set up where the tent city was; it was actually 

about two miles away in some buildings that were shut down. The company-level 

interaction with the Marines was non-existent at this time; it was all task force and 

higher. We did a couple rehearsals and Marine soldiers and leadership were there 

giving us guidance on what the whole plan was, but interaction on the company 

level or lower with the Marines at this time didn’t exist.

MM: Could you talk me through when you actually move out to your attack 

positions and what happened with the breach?

PS: After sitting there for a couple days, we got the word that we actually were 

going to do the mission, so we staged the vehicles. Also adjacent to Task Force 

2-2 was an Iraqi National Guard (ING) unit, and they were lined up with us right 

there at the motor park. We got orders to move out. It was barley dark when we 

moved to the northeastern side of Fallujah. When you look at Fallujah there’s a 

highway that goes around it and that highway actually sits up about 10 to 15 feet 

higher than the surrounding ground level. We were on the far side and we couldn’t 

see into the city at this time. We set up our tactical assembly area there, walked up 

onto the highway and then you actually realized how huge Fallujah was. Until you 

saw it you couldn’t realize what a large urban operation this would be. We identifi ed where we were going to do the breach and there was also a railroad track that 

went around Fallujah. At that portion where we were at, there were roads going in 

but the leadership determined we weren’t going to use those because it looked like 

they were heavily mined, so they picked a spot across the railroad tracks and we 

called in artillery fi re prior to going down there. There were heavy artillery attacks 

going into place and we waited until it got dark; and between 2200 and 2300 the 

actual breach started. The breach was put in and the engineers went in and cut the 

railroad tracks. A couple IEDs went off in the vicinity of the breach, but there were 

no casualties. Once the breach was in, it was marked and we moved through the 

breach with the tanks and Bradleys. I was still on the far side of the breach with the 

maintenance and the medics.

MM: Can you explain to me what type of vehicle you were in and who was 

with you?

PS: At this point I was in a ‘113 and I had another ‘113 with me that had my 

mechanics. The additional ‘113 held my medics and I had an ‘88 with me for any 

kind of recovery mission that had to take place. The company pushes through and 

they set up near and far side security on the other side. The breach is going well 

and there was sporadic gunfi re coming from the inside, but the enemy had no night 
199 

sight capability and there were no aimed shots at this time. This was when we had 

our fi rst casualty – Command Sergeant Major Steve Faulkenburg. His mission during this operation was to bring the ING through the breach, due to the fact that they 

weren’t that familiar with our marking system. When it was clear on the other side, 

he went through with his Humvee and waited on the other side, and the movement 

was probably 150 to 200 meters from the breach site to where he was. He started 

leading them through and the ING were sitting on fl atbed trucks that were twowheel drive. There were about 20 to 30 guys on each one of these. They got stuck 

on this side of the breach because there was sand, so they couldn’t go through the 

breach. Sergeant Major Faulkenburg wanted to come back through, probably to 

fi nd out what was going on and what was keeping them from coming across the 

breach. He exited that vehicle and wanted to ground guide the vehicle to turn it 

around and, at that time, the driver and the gunner of that Humvee couldn’t see him 

anymore. It was dark and then they identifi ed his body close to the Humvee. We 

actually don’t know where the bullet came from, but I doubt it was a well aimed 

shot due to the night sight capabilities and what was taking place. It was pitch dark 

at that time.

MM: What was the reaction in your company to the sergeant major’s death?

PS: What happened was that it came across the net, but not across the command net or company net. There was a special net set aside for things like this, that 

just certain leadership monitors to call up casualty reports and things like that. At 

that time, instead of calling these casualties killed in action (KIA), the task force 

came up with the code word “angel.” It came across the net that we had our fi rst 

angel and it kind of struck me hard. It probably wouldn’t have struck me that hard 

if we had just said KIA like we did during the entire train up. There were problems 

between the two elements that were talking and one of them kept saying, “Repeat 

all after,” and so they said we had our fi rst angel a couple times. The way we identifi ed him was by the last four digits of his social security number and his initials. So 

they said his last four and the initials were Steve Faulkenburg’s, so S. F., and then 

they said his rank. At that time, I knew who it was, it struck me hard and I went 

in to go help evacuate him. He was already on the vehicle and then we took him 

through the breach and brought him on the other side where the forward aid station 

was located. At that time, it sunk in that this was for real. If hadn’t sunk in yet, it 

defi nitely did after that radio conversation.

MM: Could you talk me through what happens after you get through the breach 

and with the fi ghting all the way down to Phase Line Fran?

PS: There were key positions they wanted us to hold so the units all pushed 

forward with our elements. The fi ghting wasn’t too heavy at that time and a lot 

of this was because of the non-existent enemy night sight capability. But we still 
200

called in artillery and there was sporadic gunfi re shooting at us so we returned with 

small arms, 25 millimeter and 120 rounds out of the tank. The positions that the 

battalion commander wanted us to occupy were actually seized pretty quickly, and 

the real fi ghting didn’t start until it started getting light. What I liked about working 

with the Marines was how simple the plan was. The entire city of Fallujah was set 

up like a chessboard. There were different blocks and each block was numbered. 

So we knew where our left and right limits were and what the blocks were that 

they wanted us to start clearing. We were clearing from north to south and all the 

orders we received were very specifi c as far as where they wanted us to go. The 

order would say, “We want you to clear block 23 and 24.” That was about all the 

guidance we got at the time and, to tell you the truth, we didn’t need any more than 

that because the soldiers knew what they were doing and so did the leadership. So 

we just cleared those blocks, took out any enemy that was there, destroyed them, 

and just called up and reported when we were done.

MM: How were your soldiers performing as you got heavier into the battle?

PS: It was outstanding. It was very impressive to see the soldiers in action. The 

fi rst three or four days there was hardly any sleeping. Everybody had rings around 

their eyes and nobody got a break until about day three or four. If you look at Fallujah, you can jump from one building to the next. They’re all two to three story 

buildings and they have these big walls that go around the buildings so you can’t 

look into any of the yards from the outside. There was fi ghting from street to street 

and house to house and clearing from room to room. Everything went well. The 

plan before we put any dismounts on the ground or in the buildings was to use our 

120s on the Abrams or our 25 millimeters on the Bradleys. If we got shot at from 

a certain building, we’d bring the Bradleys up there and engage the buildings with 

them. At the very end, that’s when we’d drop the dismounts and they’d move into 

the buildings. This was the way we trained. Looking at the size of the streets and 

the housing areas we had to clear, nothing prior to us going to Iraq could have prepared us for that. Every military operations on urban terrain (MOUT) site I trained 

on – if we were lucky, we had 15 or 20 houses and we had the whole company 

to clear those, or maybe even the task force to clear a built up area like that. In 

Iraq, we were clearing 80 to 100 houses a day with a platoon or a company-sized 

element. The tactics the fi eld manuals (FMs) preach is for us to go into a two or 

three story house with a company, and that just doesn’t happen because you have 

eight people and that’s your mission. You can’t leave a soldier in every room. If 

anything, we would leave a soldier at the main entrance while the rest of the guys 

cleared the remaining building. What actually made it dangerous was once you 

cleared that building, how do you secure it so you don’t have enemy forces coming in the back and reoccupying them? Did that happen? I would assume it did, but 
201 

once the building was cleared we’d bring the Bradleys on line and go to the next 

building. We took the risk of leaving those buildings abandoned at that time.

MM: It’s my understanding that the morning after the breach, Task Force 2-2 

is down on Phase Line Fran and the Marines are still at their line of departure (LD) 

– the Marines on your fl ank. Do you recall that being any kind of problem for your 

company? 

PS: What I got out of the radio conversations was that the Marines had a hard 

time getting into the city and it was kind of easy for us due to the equipment we 

had. I was told that some of the Marine forces used our breach to get into their 

battle positions.

MM: That’s a fact. They did. They had to take their MEDEVACs out and bring 

tanks in through the 2-2 breach.

PS: That’s what I was told. We made pretty fast progress going up to Fran 

and, at that time, we came to a tactical halt. We had to go back and re-clear buildings we already had and sectors we already had. They did not tell us why we were 

doing it. Some of the leadership knew the mech units were going too fast for the 

dismounted elements – i.e. the Marines – but it’s not that we were any better; it 

was just the equipment we brought to the fi ght compared to the Marines. They had 

wheels and they had the light armored vehicles (LAVs), but I don’t think they had 

as much fi repower as we did. The area we were fi ghting in was full of houses and 

then we hit the industrial area. I don’t know what the area looked like that they 

were fi ghting in at this time.

MM: Do you recall having any problems with communications security 

(COMSEC), as far as getting new fi lls and load sets for your radios?

PS: The fi lls for us in Task Force 2-2 were not bad. I had commo with everybody at every time. We had a good commo platform set up and I could talk to 

everybody. The communications problems we had throughout the entire 12 months 

revolved around the fact that, as a normal infantry platoon, the modifi ed table of 

organization and equipment (MTOE) tells you that you have nine single-channel 

ground to air radio systems (SINCGARS). What happens there is that you have 

two per lead vehicle. The lieutenant has two and the platoon sergeant has two, the 

two wingmen each have one, and that leaves three radios for the dismounts. And 

that’s if none of the radios are down – and nobody guarantees that either. On the 

other side, you also get eight additional Humvees to that platoon with no radios 

and no comms. Now you have to determine what kind of operation this was going 

to be. Was it going to be Bradley or was it going to be Humvee? So you have to 

take everything out of the Bradleys and put it in the Humvees or vice versa. Once 

again, you should have two for your command vehicles, and now you don’t have 

enough radios to go around in those Humvees – and we haven’t even talked about 
202

dismounts at this point. Those are the commo problems we had. If we didn’t have 

amplifi ers to go into those Humvees, you weren’t going to talk to anybody once 

you got out the front gate. You could talk from one Humvee to the next, but you 

can’t talk to the rear. Those problems existed the whole 12 months we were there. 

I’m assuming it’s been resolved by now. On top of this, you also need two radios to 

run your tactical operations center (TOC). We got some radios from battalion, but 

defi nitely not enough. Once we were down there, the communications inside the 

task force were pretty good. Talking to the Marines to our right fl ank was diffi cult 

or non-existent. 

MM: Why do you think that was?

PS: On the company level, I knew there were Marines on my righthand fl ank 

and I could see some of them, but I didn’t know what unit they were or what their 

call sign was. I didn’t even know if our radios were able to talk to their radios. I 

think we had different equipment. Let’s put it this way – during the whole entire 

fi ght down there, I was not able to talk to units outside of Task Force 2-2 except for 

somebody that worked for us. I was able to talk to the Air Force at one time when 

I put in a call for close air support (CAS). The roads went from north to south and 

east to west and we owned one road and he owned another. You just got on the 

ground and talked to the ground commander that was to your right fl ank and told 

them what was going on and what you were doing, asked them what they were doing. That was the way we communicated with them.

MM: Were you in the vicinity on the morning of 12 November when the complex ambush took place that killed Lieutenant Iwan?

PS: Yes.

MM: Could you talk to me about that?

PS: We were attacking from north to south and were in a more open area where 

we stopped at. We moved forward and came to a tactical halt, and the battalion 

commander came in with his wingman and there were news reporters there as 

well. We found spider holes there and the media was checking out the situation. I 

was parked back to the rear with the medics and my maintenance guys and people 

were on the ground talking. Lieutenant Iwan was up in the Bradley standing in the 

turret and was about to move his Bradley out of the way. To his north, one of the 

insurgents came up with a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) and shot at the Bradley 

from about 80 meters away. The RPG didn’t hit the Bradley; it hit Lieutenant Iwan 

in the midsection and didn’t explode. Lieutenant Iwan fell back into the turret and 

then all hell broke loose. We then engaged 360 degrees. Small arms fi re was coming and RPGs were fi red at us and we started engaging back. The medic moved 

forward and I parked my ‘113 in the line of sight between where the RPG was fi red 

and Lieutenant Iwan’s Bradley. I got out of the ‘113 and went into the Bradley and 
203 

pulled Lieutenant Iwan back. He was still alive at this time and you could see the 

fi ns of the RPG still in his stomach. What went on around me, I really don’t know. I 

just know there were rounds impacting and a tank was burning somewhere. We did 

fi rst aid and got him as quickly as possible into my medic ‘113. We closed hatch 

and drove out the same way we came in. On the way out, an RPG hit my .50 cal 

and knocked it off. I could barely hang onto it.

MM: Were you up in the turret of the ‘113 when that happened?

PS: Yes. I was behind the .50 cal fi ring our way out. I was leading the medic 

back out to the forward aid station and there was quite a bit of a drive back out. We 

were engaged the entire time with small arms and RPGs.

MM: You’re in your ‘113 and your medic track is following behind you?

PS: Yes. Our troop hatch was open on the ‘113 so it was all open behind me. A 

piece of the RPG ricocheted off the .50 cal, went into the troop compartment and 

ricocheted back there. Luckily it didn’t hit anybody. It was maybe 10 to 15 inches 

long and a two and a half inch around piece of metal that was just glowing hot. In 

the back, I had Sergeant Dove, an interpreter, and my driver up front. Luckily nobody got hit – I don’t know how. Some of our equipment got burned. I don’t know 

how many people were standing out there shooting. We just fl oored it and made it 

out of there as quickly as possible. We made it out to the aid station, downloaded 

Lieutenant Iwan at this time. The medics took care of him and we went back to the 

fi ght to see if there were any other casualties. 

MM: Did the RPG that hit your .50 pretty much just take it out?

PS: I had to get my .50 cal replaced and it was taken out, but I didn’t get that 

until after the operation was over. Luckily it didn’t hit anybody in the back. I don’t 

know how it didn’t hit anybody, but it just didn’t.

MM: When you drove back to the complex ambush site, what was going on 

when you got back?

PS: The fi refi ght was almost over. People were pulling out and dispersing at 

this time. I think they recovered the tank that was burning and there was mass confusion going on. We were occupying defensive positions at that time.

MM: It’s my understanding at that time that Lieutenant Colonel Peter Newell 

actually pulled everybody back about a phase line or two to get everybody reorganized.

PS: The reporters got pulled back to make sure they were safe. What orders 

Lieutenant Colonel Newell actually gave, I don’t know. We set up defensive positions just a little to the rear, but not too far. 
204

MM: The next morning rolls around after this complex ambush and Sean Sims 

is killed. Were you there when that occurred?

PS: At night, the way we operated was that we stopped at a certain area and 

occupied a stronghold – and that doesn’t mean that the sun goes down and we all 

go admin. We accomplished the mission that was given and we go to a certain 

sector that we clear. We put our security out, operations are still going on until we 

accomplish the end state, and then we take over these safe houses. We pick houses 

that have good features – maybe three or four stories. We set the Bradleys on the 

outside and we occupy that house. The tops of these houses are fl at and they have 

walls around them that are chest level high; it’s like a fort. So we put people on top 

and we get our guards out and the Bradleys are positioned. Every platoon takes one 

of those houses and then we talk about what’s going to happen the next morning. 

So when the next morning rolls around, we get refi tted and we get fuel and ammo 

and come back. That’s a 30 to 40 minute max turnaround. Then we get the order 

for us to start to attack and clear south again. Captain Sims and his security force – 

Specialist Seaford, Corporal Beretto (ph), an Air Force observer and a sniper team 

as well – they move a little bit further and ask the platoon he was with whether the 

house he sees in front of him was occupied last night. They say it was occupied 

by the Brigade Reconnaissance Team (BRT) or something like that, so he sets the 

sniper in position and Corporal Beretto (ph) is up there with the sniper team at this 

time. Captain Sims takes his security team and goes into this building. They do the 

four-man stack and walk in just to doublecheck that it was not occupied.

MM: So they were just going to check it again? They weren’t going to go up 

to the roof or anything?

PS: I think they wanted to go up. I wasn’t there at that time. I was a little bit 

behind them, but what I’m assuming is that they wanted to occupy that house 

because it was another house that was picked by a platoon to occupy. I guess he 

wanted to observe and see what was further down south. They went into the house 

the way we were trained and, at some point, they were engaged in that house. Captain Sims was killed, Specialist Seaford was shot and the Air Force non-commissioned offi cer (NCO) was shot as well. They were screaming and yelling. Corporal 

Beretto (ph) from the house next door came down and went into the house himself 

and pulled Specialist Seaford out, pulled the Air Force guy out and identifi ed that 

Captain Sims was shot. The nearby platoon came over and helped clear that house. 

I don’t know if they killed the insurgents in there or not. I don’t know if there were 

any bodies found in there or not.

MM: Do you even know how many insurgents were in there?
205 

PS: No. There was more than one in there, but there was a lot of confusion 

and a lot of screaming so I don’t think a positive number of enemy forces could be 

identifi ed in the house.

MM: Were the two that were wounded with him wounded seriously or could 

they return to duty?

PS: They were not life threatening. Both of them were still conscious and both 

of them were able to talk, but I think Specialist Seaford got his second Purple Heart 

at that time. After the Air Force guy was evacuated, I never saw him again.

MM: Talk me through what happened next. Your XO is killed and, less than 24 

hours later, you lose the company commander. What happens at this point?

PS: At this point, we were still on our recon missions so the platoons had not 

yet left the positions that they occupied. Our new XO was Lieutenant Jeff Emery 

who was the 1st Platoon leader 24 hours earlier. He and I link up and go to the 

outskirts of town – where the tactical command post (TAC) was set up – to link up 

with Lieutenant Colonel Newell and get further guidance. When we get there, they 

already knew what happened from listening on the radio. We were given the mission to continue on with the attack and report Readiness Condition 1 (REDCON-1) 

as soon as possible. The attack took place around 1200 so that gave us about 45 

minutes to get ready after the evacuation took place. We got those missions and 

there was no operations order because the city was like a chessboard; we were just 

given numbers for what we needed to be clearing. We went back to the safe house 

where the headquarters section was in and I went on top of the roof. I called in 

some fi re missions to prep the objective. Before I left battalion, I talked to Captain 

James Cobb who was with the colonel and made coordination with him about what 

I wanted to do, where I wanted to go and where I wanted to call artillery.

MM: When you went up there to report to Lieutenant Colonel Newell at this 

time, it’s my understanding that he actually made you the company commander. 

Is that correct?

PS: Yes, sort of. I was doing most of the talking and the lieutenant was there 

– and technically he outranked me. But he has like two years in the service while 

I’m the most experienced guy on the ground.

MM: So it was kind of an unspoken thing. Everybody knows that you’re really 

the company commander now?

PS: Yes – defi nitely at battalion I think that was the impression. When we 

came back to the company, I went on top of the roof and called in fi re missions to 

prep the objective. I fi nished that and went downstairs. Inside the compound of the 

building we were in, I had the four lieutenants there and they were all around a map 

discussing what actions to take next. The platoon sergeants were there and some 
206

squad leaders, section leaders and even maybe some team leaders as well. It was 

pretty crowded and they weren’t arguing about what we were going to do next, but 

they weren’t exactly all on the same sheet of music when I came downstairs. So 

I walked over to them, told them that the good idea bus stops here and told them 

what we were going to do. It was more important to me to show the junior leaders 

that we knew what we were doing and that everybody had confi dence, so I basically took over, told everybody to shut up and gave them the plan. I told Lieutenant 

Emery – since he was the XO – to stay on company and platoon frequency and for 

him to go with his platoon. I was on company and battalion, so he would report to 

me, I would report to higher and I’ll call in any kind of fi re missions we need. We 

occupied two roads. We had two platoons on each and we said we would dismount 

when necessary to clear buildings and for everyone to give me REDCON-1 when 

they’re ready. We did that and I called in to Captain Cobb and told him we needed 

a fi re mission at this specifi c grid. To shoot an azimuth on the Bradley takes less 

than a second to get a 10 digit grid and I adjusted fi re off that. The plan was for the 

left section to move out 100 meters and then come to a stop, then the right section 

moves out 100 meters and stops. They report to me and I call in an artillery barrage 

to our front. Once the artillery is over, I give a cease fi re and we just leapfrog back 

and forth. The dismounts are in between the Bradleys and clearing the buildings 

when we go down there.

MM: So, you’re basically commanding this company. Talk me through what 

happens up until when you guys fi nally leave Fallujah.

PS: During this attack, I was informed by squad leaders on the ground like Sergeant Joseph Bellavia that they identifi ed 10 insurgents going into this big warehouse building, so we came to a stop and got a grid for this building. I called back 

to battalion and told them we needed fi re support for this building and he said they 

would send us CAS and that that unit will drop down to my freq and talk to me. I 

was thinking to myself that if this actually works it will be awesome. To all astonishment, I actually talked to someone in an airplane above. When you do the train 

up, you’re simulating that you’re talking to somebody but there’s really nobody 

answering you. This guy actually dropped down to my freq and talked to me and 

I was like, “Holy crap! What’s going on here? This stuff really works.” That was 

probably the most impressive thing that happened during this operation. I talk to 

this guy and I tell him what we saw. We gave him a grid but he can’t really see it, 

so we have these command pointer things and we lase the target for him. He sees it 

and the next thing we know, there’s a big explosion and the building is just rubble. 

We moved forward and put dismounts on the ground that were able to identify 50 

to 60 corpses in there. It was very successful. All our other engagements during 

this were small arms, anywhere from three feet to 75 meters max. I don’t think 

anybody engaged anyone with small arms over 300 meters. All the fi re missions 
207 

you called in were all danger close. So everything was danger close – and what 

made it diffi cult was that we had units to our left and right fl ank, especially to our 

right, that we weren’t in communication with. So the fi re we called in had to be 

very precise.

MM: Would you fi re those danger close missions only when you were in 

your vehicle, or would you sometimes have to do that when you had dismounted 

guys?

PS: It was both. It depended on where you were. Usually the Bradleys were 

forward of the dismounts, and the dismounts had the Bradleys in eyesight when I 

called these fi re missions in. They knew they were coming because there was a lot 

of talk, but of course there was a risk every time we called a fi re mission, so it was 

very important that we knew where to call it in. Captain Cobb was phenomenal 

with it. Once the fi rst fi re mission came in, I adjusted off that; and everybody was 

still in the vehicles at this time so we just added 100 meters to each shot and kept 

doing fi re for effect. It was executed like it was straight of the book. It was like 

rolling thunder coming in. It was phenomenal.

MM: Were you actually using a Long Range Advanced Scout Surveillance 

System (LRAS) to get your 10 digit grids?

PS: In the Bradley we have a precision lightweight GPS receiver (PLGR) and 

a laser range fi re. The only thing you do is put the crosshairs of the Bradley onto 

the building, you hit the button and it tells you what the 10 digit grid is. To tell you 

the truth, the forward observer (FO) up there was a non-factor. We didn’t need him. 

Before the Bradley, we’d dismount and send the FO on top of a roof with a security 

force. This takes time and the targets of opportunity go away, so it was way quicker 

to shoot an azimuth with the Bradleys and call it in.

MM: As this fi ght goes on, tell me how you handled MEDEVAC for your Alpha Company guys. Did you have to do that or did your medic track take care of 

most of those folks?

PS: The medic track didn’t go anywhere without me, and it wasn’t that they 

weren’t capable of doing it. It was a security issue. He doesn’t have any fi repower 

and I have the .50 cal up front and there is an ADA with a .50 cal. I’m doing most 

of the land navigation on this and battle tracking, going where everybody is.

MM: How many wounded did you have in Alpha Company that you had to 

evacuate back to your fi eld hospital?

PS: I think we had about three or four. Of course we had the two with Captain 

Sims, but that was only one evac mission. It wasn’t that many. We had people with 

smaller wounds that didn’t get evacuated. They went to the safe house, realized 

they were bleeding and the doc was able to patch them up right there. We had 
208

enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) that we evacuated and a couple enemy casualties 

– nobody that was killed – but some wounded guys, I brought them back as well. 

That night after Captain Sims died – the morning and the afternoon fi ght continued 

and we went to a certain phase line and we had another mission that night. For 

that mission, they actually moved us further to our right fl ank over to where the 

Marines were and we were supposed to clear some stuff over there. There was a 

little confusion there in that we had some head shed guys come out – not from Task 

Force 2-2, but somewhere else. We had to alter our movement plan to get around 

these elements.

MM: This was the actual attack where you guys did a passage of lines through 

1-8 Marines and took over their sector?

PS: Yes. It wasn’t out of our sector. We shifted further to the west and I wasn’t 

told why we were moving over there. They just told us to go clear the sectors, so 

we picked the route. The only reason I knew it was because we came up to the 

headquarters section and I was trying to signal them to tell them I needed to get 

through with my Bradleys. They said nobody was coming through because somebody wanted to observe something, so we had to fi nd an alternate route around 

them to get into position. That caused a little bit of a problem because I actually 

had to go off the road and in between buildings. I wasn’t too happy about it, but 

we made it happen.

MM: You were still technically commanding the company at this time, correct?

PS: Yes.

MM: That must have been a very complicated maneuver.

PS: Yes. What was good too is that we didn’t use maps; we used pictures from 

above so we were working off the actual picture that was taken of the area a couple 

days prior. It was pretty accurate. So we maneuvered around these guys in the dark 

and we got into position and started attacking south again. At this time, enemy fi re 

hit us and one of our tanks kind of rolled off the road and broke a track. I went and 

found out where he was; and once the enemy saw we were having diffi culties, we 

started getting shot at from every side with RPGs and small arms. We decided we 

weren’t going to leave the tank there so we started the recovery mission.

MM: Did you bring the M88 down to get the tank?

PS: I didn’t have an ‘88 with us, but Lieutenant Emery was talking to higher 

headquarters to get an ‘88, and then the confusion was how were we going to get 

that ‘88 over to where we were. They said they could fi nd it, but we sat there waiting until Lieutenant Colonel Newell got involved. He was a bit upset about it, so 

I got on the radio and asked for a grid where the ‘88 was and said I would go pick 
209 

him up. I got the grid and went back and maneuvered the ‘113 to link up with this 

‘88 that was a couple clicks away. We linked up, came back and were able to do the 

recovery mission. We had people on the ground and everybody was getting shot at. 

This whole recovery took about six or seven hours.

MM: Was the tank pretty heavily damaged by the RPGs?

PS: No. Unless they have those armor-piercing RPGs, they just bounce off the 

tanks.

MM: So you just knocked a road wheel off or something?

PS: Yes. It didn’t happen from the RPGs; it happened from going off into the 

ditch. The scary thing was that during all this we were getting engaged and, like I 

said, it took about six or seven hours but we did it and moved forward. There were 

some roadblocks in the way and then we occupied our phase lines.

MM: Is there anything else you can remember about this operation that you’d 

like brand new fi rst sergeants to know? Any lessons learned?

PS: Not just with this operation, but everybody should have it in their mind 

frame that lots of stuff happens and you could be put into situations where you’re 

in charge. Even if you’re not all the way up front, you have to be battle tracking 

and you have to be ready to take over. The most important thing is to know where 

you are, being able to maneuver on foot and in the vehicle, call for fi re missions 

and make sure they are precise and that you use the correct terminology, be able to 

spit out some mortars. Did I know if everything I was doing was correct? No, but I 

looked at the situation and came up with the best course of action I could; we went 

with it and luckily it turned out to be right. The stuff that was important in garrison was not so important while we were down there, while other stuff you kind of 

overlook while in garrison became very important down there. The tolerance level 

for me in some areas became zero when I came back. A good one was physical 

fi tness. That was key. We aren’t talking two minutes of sit ups and two minutes of 

push ups and a two-mile run. You’re leaping from roof to roof, trying to get into 

buildings – so saying someone is an outstanding soldier but he just has a shortfall 

when it comes to physical fi tness is unacceptable. If somebody can’t hang physically then he endangers the rest of the squad or unit. We shouldn’t be overlooking 

these things. Sometimes you have to cut people from the team to make the team 

stronger; at least then you have quality people who can get the mission done. You 

take calculated risks, you do what is right and you execute the way you plan. When 

you’re training, a lot of leaders focus on the big missions – CMTC, NTC and stuff 

like that. You never see one of those getting canceled. But we go back to the expert 

infantryman badge (EIB) where we learn basic soldiering. It’s easier to take that 

off your calendar than one of those other big events, and why is that? Because a lot 

of peoples’ evaluations are depending on those big events, while the smaller stuff 
210

gets overlooked. In Iraq, everything depends on how your soldiers execute the mission. You can have the best plan, the best resources, the best of everything, but if 

your soldiers don’t know their individual tasks, you aren’t going to be successful. 

They’re the ones going into the room, clearing the room, and they’re the ones ultimately killing the enemy – not your plan. I think that’s what we need to get back 

to and it seems like we are getting away from that nowadays. It seems like these 

big CMTC and NTC rotations are getting more attention. You go and do these big 

qualifi cation exercises and what do you see while you’re there? You see hatches 

up and the tank commander (TC) standing up so he can get a good view. Well, you 

aren’t going to be doing that in Iraq. The hatches are clam-shelled and you can only 

see so much, but we don’t train that way. Down there shouldn’t be the time to fi gure out that your view is very limited compared to what you see at home – and we 

took casualties down there during the year for these exact things: people standing 

up and observing. Of course when you have any enemy whose main fi repower is 

small arms, what’s he going to do? He’s going to shoot at that guy who’s standing 

up in the turret. He can’t destroy the Bradley, but he can get that guy. I don’t want 

to say that was the thing with Lieutenant Iwan, because they shot an RPG at him 

and what’s the possibility of an RPG hitting an individual soldier? We don’t train 

that way and those are the learning points I bring back. When we train or when we 

shoot a gunnery or do a Table 12 or a dismount, you need to do it exactly the way 

you’re told. Not what’s convenient for you so you get the perfect score and all that. 

I’d rather have somebody go down a Table 12 and only meet the standard but do 

everything the way you would fi ght in reality, instead of exceeding the standard but 

using techniques you would never use in combat when somebody’s fi ring at you.

MM: Thank you so much for your time.
211 

Sergeant First Class John Urrutia

14 March 2006

MM: Why don’t you go ahead and give us your full name and some background information on yourself. Then we’ll focus on what you did up to operations 

in Fallujah in November ’04 and what your position was during the fi ght in Alpha 

Company, 2-7 CAV [2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment].

JU: I’m Sergeant First Class John Domingo Urrutia. Currently I work at BCTP 

[Battle Command Training Program], but prior to that and prior to Iraq, basically 

I have a background in light infantry. I’d never been mechanized before I got to 

Fort Hood. I just came off of drill sergeant status and PCS’d [Permanent Change of 

Station] to Fort Hood. Prior to going to Fort Hood, I went through three months of 

Bradley training – since I’d never been mechanized before. Prior to going to Iraq, 

we obviously were into another transition to the M2A3 Bradley and also we went 

through our fi rst JRTC [Joint Readiness Training Center] rotation with the Iraq insurgent background. I was a platoon sergeant at the time while we were in Fallujah 

for 2d Platoon, Alpha, 2-7, which was with Operation Phantom Fury.

MM: Where were you born and where did you grow up?

JU: I was born in Dodge City, Kansas. I was raised in Garden City, Kansas, up 

through high school, and I went to college at Northeastern Oklahoma, in Miami, 

Oklahoma. Joined the military in 1990. I went to basic training at Fort Benning 

and spent a year in the 2d Ranger Battalion. Other than that, I was at Fort Carson. 

I was in Hawaii. I was at Fort Campbell, in Korea, at Fort Benning and Fort Hood, 

and now here at Fort Leavenworth.

MM: I’ve talked to Captain [Edward] Twaddell and, as a matter of fact, he’s 

the one that recommended I give you a call because we’re trying to get everyone 

identifi ed that was in this fi ght with 2-7 and 2-2 over on the other side. Could you 

just talk me through what you remember of getting the initial orders to go into Fallujah, how that worked and how you guys prepared for the initial assault – which I 

believe was on the night of 8 November?

JU: Right. Let’s start from when we were still at Camp Taji. A lot of people 

were under the impression that we had a couple days to prepare to move out. 

You’re talking about a whole battalion-minus moving from Camp Taji all the way 

to Camp Fallujah forward. We still conducted patrols up until 2200 the night before we moved, which would have been the 4th of November. I had a Bradley that 

had fl ipped over on that last patrol, so we had to go recover it, bring it back up, 

fi x what was wrong with it and then sometime that morning we moved out. It was 

pretty amazing that we had less than 48 hours to pack all of our stuff, get ready to 

go, load up all our vehicles, load up ammo – the ammo that we thought we weren’t 
212

going to be able to get – load up and then move out. For the convoy to Fallujah, we 

sent our vehicles on lowboys. We sent our crews – basically three men per vehicle 

– on the vehicle itself while they were riding on the lowboys, in case they made 

contact and so forth. Moving into Iraq from Kuwait, we didn’t send anybody, so 

then we ended up waiting three months for our vehicles because the convoy had 

gotten hit. This time, though, we had put some bodies on there. Our dismount 

squad leaders and the rest of the platoon, we ended air assaulting into Camp Fallujah. Getting on some birds and going down to the airfi eld. Myself and my squad 

leaders and platoon leader – he rode with the vehicle.

MM: What was the platoon leader’s name?

JU: First Lieutenant Michael Duran. He’s currently the brigade specialty platoon leader. Once we got to Camp Fallujah, where we were based out of, we got 

the order. I don’t know if you knew that we were also in Operation Pacifi c Thrust, 

which was Najaf. What made it easier for us were the maps that we received, down 

to the detail. Are you familiar with FBCB2 [Force XXI Battle Command, Brigadeand-Below]?

MM: Yes.

JU: We had those on our FBCB2 where we numbered and alphabetized the 

streets, basically. Once we received the orders, it was pretty clear that the tanks 

– which was Charlie, 3-8 – were going to go ahead and do the initial breach of the 

train station, across the railroad tracks. Obviously, we were going from north to 

south when we went in. My platoon was attached to Charlie, 3-8, so we were the 

fi rst Bradley platoon in after the tanks had cleared.

MM: So they sent the fi rst two tank platoons through and then you followed?

JU: Roger. That’s the train station – so basically here’s where 3-8 breached the 

train station and then tanks continued to move along the far left, which would have 

been the far east of the sector, with our platoon being the point for the Bradleys. I 

had another platoon from Charlie, 2-7 that was attached to us also. That was Lieutenant Palanco.

MM: How did it go that fi rst night? Did you guys take a lot of enemy fi re?

JU: Initially, when we were briefed about this, the insurgents had plenty of 

time to build up. We were running into a lot of IEDs [Improvised Explosive Devices] or a lot of obstacles along the roads, but when we crossed that railroad track 

and got on this main avenue, it was fi ne. We saw some movement over to our east, 

but we didn’t take any fi re. We didn’t engage anything as we initially came paralleling the road.

MM: So once you did that and started south, how long before you had enemy 

contact?
213 

JU: We must have only traveled a couple blocks when we started to see it. 

Now, our ROE [Rules of Engagement] was pretty simple. What we see is what 

we shoot. It was that basic. We didn’t really encounter any IEDs. When we went 

in there, our SOP [Standard Operating Procedure] was that if we saw a vehicle in 

the road or blocking the road, we’re supposed to shoot it with our 25s. We did, 

however, see a lot of two- to three-man RPG [Rocket-Propelled Grenade] teams 

roaming around.

JB: I guess non-combatants were not a factor, correct?

JU: No. It was dark when we went in.

MM: And they had pretty much evacuated the city by then.

JU: Yes. We were briefed that the ROE was: anything that moves, anything we 

see is fair game.

MM: Were your Bradleys and the tanks in this company taking some RPG 

hits?

JU: No, on the initial assault we weren’t. We just encountered RPG teams. One 

thing we did encounter that we weren’t used to was that we could see them moving 

and trying to fl ank us. Our plan of attack was to stay on the vehicles and to clear as 

far south as we could while mounted – without dismounting at all.

JB: Did you say that, initially, when you crossed the railroad tracks that there 

was a turn left?

JU: Yes, we crossed over here.

JB: And the tanks were in front of you?

JU: The tanks crossed, and once they crossed, they sent one platoon of tanks 

all the way to the far – that was somewhere right in here. So we could get lined 

up.

JB: Then everybody turned.

JU: Right, everybody turned and we cleared it. I know the rest of Alpha Company was in their sector when we crossed over. 

JB: How was your fi eld of vision in there?

JU: Field of vision was great with the thermals, obviously, and we could see 

quite a ways. Something we weren’t used to was that there were a lot of buildings 

and this was an advantage to them. We could only see down this road, but it curved 

left and right or if there was a building there, we couldn’t see any further. But like 

I said, we were spread out enough that we could see the other Bradleys to our left 

and to our right.
214

MM: Were you able to communicate fairly well – at least on your vehicle’s 

radios – with everybody else?

JU: Yeah. We had no communications problems. As a matter of fact, the brand 

new platoon from Charlie Company, 2-7, they ran into an obstacle and they had to 

push it over into our lane, which was fi ne because the whole task force ended up 

having to push to the west a little bit.

MM: Could talk us through as the fi rst night progresses and becomes November 9th? My understanding is that Highway 10 is actually Phase Line Fran –

JU: Yes.

MM: That was really one of your fi rst objectives, correct?

JU: Roger. There was a park [Jolan Park] and that was our platoon’s main 

objective: to clear that park. We had gathered intel that said that was where the insurgents would get together and have meetings or prayer or any big demonstration. 

It was a big open park and, on the maps we received of the park itself, we had a big 

market area. But as we moved that night into the morning, we encountered a little 

bit more. At one point, our rear track had a three-man RPG team literally within 

10 feet of the vehicle. They were so close to him that he couldn’t see them through 

his sights. When he moved his sight on them, all he could get was a blur. The platoon leader’s vehicle, Lieutenant Duran’s vehicle, actually shot the three-insurgent 

team. That’s how close the RPG teams were getting to our vehicles.

JB: And everybody was still mounted at this time?

JU: Everybody was still mounted. We were basically in a holding area, letting 

everybody else catch up. We encountered about two or three of those teams that 

fi rst night and into the morning.

MM: Were they able to get some RPG-7 shots off?

JU: No. They didn’t even get any small arms fi re off. Like I said, the plan was 

to stay mounted and clear as far as we could mounted, so we kept moving. We 

encountered very little resistance. Once we reached the park late in the morning, 

that was the fi rst time we actually dismounted – and that was to clear that market 

area. Now, attached to our platoon were two Marine engineers, a lance corporal 

and a PFC.

MM: That’s interesting.

JU: They had about 20 pounds of C4, which really came in handy as we got 

into the market. I can back up a little bit. Before we moved out, we had some 

combat cameramen and some regular news reporters. Our platoon didn’t have any, 

but I know Alpha Company had a couple guys that were in there. We did have one 

photographer. He was an Air Force combat photographer.
215 

MM: In your track?

JU: He was in the platoon leader’s track. We did have some of those guys in 

there. Once we reached the market, we left our Bradleys. There was a little complex that overlooked into the park – the park that was the platoon’s main objective. 

Once we dismounted and started to clear in the market, there were concrete walls 

that we didn’t see on the pictures from FalconView – and that’s where the engineers played a vital role. Obviously some of the buildings were a little taller and 

our key point was a big water tower near that three-story building. We could see 

the water tower, so that was our reference point. Once we got into this market, we 

started to blow holes through these concrete walls to work our way in there, and 

that’s where our engineers played a vital role in helping us.

JB: So these walls were taller than a man’s head?

JU: Oh yes. They were 10 to 15 feet tall. 

MM: What did the Marines think about being thrown on a track with a bunch 

of Army guys?

JU: Actually it worked out pretty good. The lance corporal was like, “Hey, 

wherever you need me.” When we did our PCCs and PCIs [Pre-Combat Checks 

and Pre-Combat Inspections], I checked that they already had 10 pounds ready to 

go, already wrapped the fuse and had timers on it, and all you had to do was pull 

them and go. We blew the fi rst initial hole, and some of our soldiers had never 

been around explosives. And on the fi rst hole, we used a little bit too much and we 

put a big enough hole so we could get through. If I remember correctly, we blew 

about three holes fi nally getting into the complex. A couple times, we had to blow 

the holes twice, because it left only a basketball-sized hole, so we needed some 

more C4. But they were enjoying it. They originally were from Camp Fallujah, the 

Marines who were attached to us..

JB: Was there any hostile stuff going on?

JU: Nothing yet on the ground. But we had our vehicles to the left of the park, 

up here on this main road here. I know the platoon leader’s vehicle took an RPG 

hit, but they saw where it came from and shot into it.

MM: Did it penetrate his track?

JU: It hit the front of it. It didn’t penetrate or anything else. We had to go a 

couple days later and change out the armor on it. Our Bradleys were equipped with 

armor.

MM: Right. The anti-armor.

JU: Right. The blocks were about 12 by 12 and it took out about four of them. 

Once we got into the complex was when we encountered our fi rst insurgent. We 
216

entered the complex from the east. We saw the two-story building and there was 

a two-story building behind it. An open area probably about 75 meters by 100 

meters. Like a big open complex. Lieutenant Duran took a squad-plus to the twostory building to overwatch. They hadn’t entered the building; they were just overwatching the building while I went with the other squad to enter the rear two-story 

building. Once we got close to there, for some reason the speakers across the street 

from the park started blaring. Someone was talking. Didn’t know what they were 

saying.

MM: Do you think this was something the insurgents had put up?

JU: I couldn’t tell you that. We did have an interpreter with us who later told us 

they were just giving out warnings that the Americans were coming. 

MM: So this was defi nitely a warning?

JU: Yeah. My lead squad with Staff Sergeant Nathan Scott went into the bottom fl oor of the two-story building. They didn’t encounter any shots but the number one man, Corporal Willie Hudgens, went in to the left and trailing him was 

Specialist Lucas Bondo, who was our SAW [Squad Automatic Weapon] gunner. 

So basically our teams went in – two guys to the left, two guys to the right – and 

they didn’t see the insurgent. He had hidden underneath a table and put like a door 

to hide – and when Specialist Bondo was standing there, he just happened to look 

and saw a body with a weapon, so he opened up on him with the SAW. He shot a 

couple of bursts into him. That’s when I fi nally went in there and saw what was 

going on. We reported it and had one guy call it to the platoon leader. At that point, 

we started clearing and started fi nding more rounds, tubes. We cleared upstairs and 

there was nothing upstairs or the roof. But just in that little area there, we found 

over 500 mortar rounds and 30 or 40 155 and 130 [millimeter] artillery rounds.

JB: So one bad guy in a building with all kinds of ordnance lying around?

JU: Right. We found mortar tubes; we found surface-to-air missiles – like fi ve 

of those. We found quite a bundle just in that area itself. Once we had cleared that 

building, Lieutenant Duran went ahead and moved the squad he was with and 

starting checking this garage to the left that had a fuel truck and two BMWs in it. 

They searched it, cleared it, continued to move and still didn’t encounter anything. 

Went up to the building. Cleared the buildings. We found some grenades, some 

RPGs, some more mortar rounds and so forth and then –

MM: What did you guys do with this captured ordnance?

JU: We still hadn’t done anything with it, we just knew it was there. At that 

point, I sent the squad I was with into a little shack and they found like 300 pounds 

of TNT or PE4 [conventional plastic explosive] – so we were fi nding all this stuff. 

Then we came back and started searching the vehicles. The fuel truck had three 
217 

155 rounds already rigged into the bottom. It had wire coming out that hadn’t been 

connected or anything, but you could see the rounds inside there in the fuel tank. 

We found a black BMW and a blue one. The blue one was almost rigged up. Everything was set in there and had wires, but it wasn’t connected to anything yet.

JB: These BMWs were POVs [Personally Owned Vehicles]?

JU: Yes, POVs. That was one of the things that was brought up: they thought 

there was a VB [Vehicle Borne] IED manufacturing plant.

MM: Right in that area?

JU: Right in that area. The black BMW was completely rigged up and ready to 

go. We found that the doors were also lined with C4. We found fi ve 155 rounds underneath – where they had pulled the passenger’s seat, it had a battery underneath 

it, and you could see wires running to it. It was in the completed stage.

MM: Did your guys just check that out or did you send the engineers in?

JU: We sent the Marine engineers around to say, “What can we move? What 

can we consolidate?” We didn’t know we were going to be holed up in that area. 

The last thing we wanted was to be staying in an area that had all this stuff in it.

JB: So they acted like EOD [Explosive Ordnance Disposal] guys in a way?

JU: Yes. We were not EOD experts, but back in Taji we’d found so many IEDs 

that we kind of knew what to look for. But the ordnance we found in there, we 

only moved what the two Marines told us was okay. We started consolidating everything from the fi rst building we went into and started consolidating everything 

in there. At that point, Captain Twaddell and the rest of the company were to our 

right – in another building over to us by the water tower. He was to our right and 

we were to the left. Captain Twaddell did call up some EOD personnel later on that 

afternoon and they came and checked out what we found. We found some more 

stuff and they said, “This can be moved. Don’t touch this.” We basically moved everything but about 10 to 15 mortar rounds that we couldn’t move. We could move 

the C4. They disconnected some wires to the vehicles, so we could actually control 

that area. That was basically it. We did receive some mortar rounds where Captain 

Twaddell and them were sitting at. A rocket hit the building they were staying in, 

but it didn’t explode. We didn’t receive any fi re or anything.

MM: At this point, then, you guys are pretty much in advance of all the Marine 

guys? They were kind of tagging along?

JU: Right. The initial plan was for us to get to the LOA [Limit of Advance] and 

then they could come in behind us and take over, but we still hadn’t seen any Marines. It wouldn’t be until the next day. We spent the night there. The next day was 

when we started to see the Marines pushup. My third squad leader, Staff Sergeant 
218

Vernon Bigham, he took some fi re, but it was friendly fi re from a Marine. That was 

about it. We could hear their M1s moving forward of us.

JB: Were these Marines that were OPCON’d to [i.e., placed under the operational control of] you guys?

JU: No, these were the guys that were going to go ahead and leapfrog forward 

of us.

MM: Did they actually end up doing that?

JU: Yes, initially they did. So we checked out the park and there was nobody 

there. At the point when we went to this complex, we got attached back to Alpha 

Company. Now we get cross-attached back to Charlie, 3-8 to go ahead and move 

forward some more. Basically route reconnaissance, just patrol forward. That’s 

when we started encountering a little bit more, the following evening, the 9th.

MM: Now, you initially went back to Alpha, 2-7 and then you were sent back 

to Charlie, 3-8. And at this point, you’ve been ordered to move down to Phase Line 

Fran?

JU: Past Fran. We were already past Fran.

MM: Please continue on with your story.

JU: We did the same thing. We got on line and we pushed forward. We were 

out there until the next morning. As we did this, we encountered some RPG teams, 

some fi re, and basically whatever we saw we were taking it out.

MM: I think it was Captain Twaddell that told me – and maybe it was just 

his company that did this. Did you guys do any type of pull over to these bridges 

here?

JU: Yes. We get pulled back – there was a signifi cant mosque, and we basically 

pushed to this mosque. I remember the mosque being right off the road. We cleared 

a route down to here. It was basically a run and gun. We run down this alley, down 

the streets, and shoot what we see, what we encounter. We pushed all the way forward again and then that morning, we got pushed back to Alpha Company again. 

Along here, we could see quite a ways. If notice on the map, it’s pretty open and it 

was easy to detect personnel. Off this mosque, we could see a lot of bodies. People 

would be running in and out. I think it was Captain [Pete] Glass, the company commander for Charlie, 3-8. He ended up calling fi re a couple times on this.

MM: You guys were being supported by a couple Army Paladins? Or were you 

getting indirect fi re from the Marines?

JU: We’re getting our indirect fi re from our own mortar section.

MM: Oh, your own mortar section. That’s what he calls for, okay.
219 

JU: Myself and Lieutenant Duran, while we were sitting here, it was just becoming daybreak and we started receiving a lot of RPG fi re from the buildings 

over here to our west. We ended up calling mortar fi re and taking out a two-story 

building.

JB: I guess everybody had pretty much been up all night on the 8th?

JU: We had been up for about 48 hours.

JB: So then it gets to be the evening of the 9th –

JU: Right, and we’re now going into the morning of the 10th.

JB: Everybody’s still up.

JU: Well, we got one good night’s rest back at the complex. But sometime that 

afternoon, we got pushed back to Alpha Company.

MM: Does that leave just two tank platoons?

JU: Yes. They also have the Bradley platoon with them, too. The big thing 

about being cross-attached to a tank company is they have to go back and refuel. 

We can stay two or three days without refueling, but they have to go back and refuel at least once or twice a day.

MM: Were they just shooting straight back north to do that?

JU: Yes, they were just falling back to this MSR [Main Supply Route].

MM: And they had set up a refueling point?

JU: Initially, our Alpha was about a kilometer north of the railroad station, 

and then once we did the breach and the Marines at this time were already in, they 

moved the fuel point back behind the railroad station.

JB: So I guess by the time you get two days into the battle, it’s okay to move 

up to this MSR and you don’t have to worry about – 

JU: Yes. The Marines and the Iraqi forces were already securing that. Later on 

during the battle, MSR security ends up being our primary mission.

MM: Back to the fuel. Did you also set up your medical evac and all that? Was 

that there?

JU: The Marines had their medical evac down here. Our TOC [Tactical Operations Center] and all that was still back at the assembly area. They just moved 

forward a fueler and moved forward the FLAs [Front Line Ambulance].

MM: So your wounded would be evacuated by your ‘113s?

JU: Back to the railroad station, which would be transported back to the FLA, 

and then back to the assembly area. Part of the reason behind that is, from our 

assembly area to right here just to the north, there’s a rock quarry or something. 
220

There were a lot of deep holes, you have drop-offs, and it was real dangerous at 

night. Now, we still had to go all the way back to our assembly area to get water 

and chow.

MM: So you were supplying yourself. The Marines really weren’t supplying 

anything?

JU: No. We were supplying ourselves. And like I said, we had about four days 

worth of water and four days worth of MREs [Meals Ready to Eat], so more than 

enough. Even though I was attached to Charlie, 3-8, I still would go to our fi rst sergeant, not Charlie 3-8’s fi rst sergeant, and say, “Hey, I need water. I need chow.” 

MM: And that’s First Sergeant Steven Vigil?

JU: Right.

MM: Yeah, he’s with you here at Leavenworth. I was going to interview him, 

but he had to cancel today, but I’ll get him over here at some point.

JU: So we get the call that we’re going back to Alpha Company, 2-7. We link 

back up with Captain Twaddell and we’re going to go check out these bridges that 

were supposedly rigged. When we got the word, we were told that there were some 

friendly forces on the west side of the bridges.

MM: Over in this hospital over here.

JU: Yes. So we knew there were friendlies there. We had an engineer – some 

guy to actually check out the bridges who was qualifi ed. He wasn’t with us. He 

might have been with Captain Twaddell or 1st Platoon. So we go down there and 

check out the bridges. We were given the order to stay and overwatch the bridges. 

At that point, we get attached two snipers, and I still have the Marines with me. 

We take up a house –

MM: Now, were these Marine snipers?

JU: No. These were our battalion snipers. These guys belong to 2-7. Basically 

they were already attached to Captain Twaddell, to the company, and they were riding with him and got crossed over to us. We took up a house near where we could 

see the bridge and we could basically see in all directions. Pretty nice house. You’d 

be surprised. We hung out there during the day. The normal SOP was to mark the 

top of our building with an IR strobe light and also a VS17 panel. We didn’t encounter anything. That was another time we got to catch up on some sleep.

MM: When you were reattached to Alpha, 2-7 and started talking to the other 

men, had the rest of the company suffered any casualties along the way so far?

JU: No, not so far. At this point, from here is where we moved.

MM: I think I’ve got a map that shows the next move.
221 

JU: Here’s where we started to receive the beginning of our casualties. We start 

moving back. I stayed with Alpha Company. I might be getting my days confused. 

I don’t know what Captain Twaddell told you.

MM: Yeah. He said everybody had a hard time remembering dates.

JU: It all blended in, and then for us it was extra hard because one minute I was 

with 3-8 and then the next minute I was back with 2-7. But on this initial push we 

did after we secured the bridges –

MM: So you came back down the road here?

JU: Roger. We linked up and pushed down. Myself and our platoon, 2d Platoon, was on the far west. Alpha Company had a tank platoon with them and they 

were going to be in the center.

MM: I’m assuming that tank platoon came from Charlie, 3-8 as well.

JU: It was Lieutenant Wochejck’s platoon. Their 2d Platoon. We send a Bradley platoon to the armor and armor sends a platoon to the mech guys.

MM: Just a standard task organization.

JU: Right. A task organization, roger. We saw 1st Platoon, we saw the CO 

[Commanding Offi cer] and the XO [Executive Offi cer], but we never saw the 

tanks. We knew they were going to be in the middle but we never actually saw 

them. At this point, right before we started to move out, for some reason we started 

having problems with our FBCB2, so we had to revert back to our maps, which 

was no problem. We didn’t physically make any contact with those vehicles, and 

with our FBCB2 you can tell where everybody is on the battlefi eld.

MM: It’s your Blue Force Tracker.

JU: Right. I can tell where the next vehicle is, who is to my left and my right. 

When the platoon leader’s or platoon sergeant’s vehicle with FBCB2 goes down, 

that basically shuts down your wingman. That’s going to play key here in a minute 

because we didn’t see where the tanks were. At this point, the Marines are already 

up.

MM: They’re side by side?

JU: They’re right behind us. Some of them are a little bit forward of us and 

some of them are a little bit behind us. So we pushed forward and did receive some 

contact. The CO and 1st Platoon were already there and we were at the bridges. 

When we moved along across, we had to help a couple of the Marines out that 

were receiving RPG fi re. They could pinpoint it but they didn’t have the weapons 

capability to destroy it. So we stopped and did this about three times. 

MM: Were the Marines kind of fl agging you down?
222

JU: Yeah, fl agging us down. When we fi nally get on the right sector, we start 

to move out.

MM: Everybody is on line.

JU: Everybody’s on line. We start pushing forward and 1st Platoon started taking a lot of contact – that’s where Captain Twaddell was.

MM: He was over here to the east and that’s where his Bradley was hit?

JU: Roger. It’s kind of simultaneous. His Bradley gets hit and we didn’t know 

he had received any casualties because it was still running. Now, we’re still pushing forward; nobody was telling us to stop.

MM: So the CO didn’t call and say, “Hey, I’ve been hit”?

JU: He called and said he was hit, but we didn’t know the damage. So 1st Platoon was still receiving contact, we’re pushing forward, and that’s when the XO, 

Captain Wiley, gets on the radio and says, “The commander’s vehicle is down.” 

He’s now in charge. They had received some casualties in the commander’s vehicle.

MM: It’s my understanding, from talking with Captain Twaddell, that they’re 

still not certain to this day what went through the back of his track. I don’t think it 

was a 2-7 sergeant, but somebody in there lost his arm?

JU: One of the Air Force guys, right, and the KIA [Killed In Action] was one of 

his interpreters. At that point, 1st Platoon started to receive some casualties, we’re 

receiving contact and we’re getting pretty low on ammo.

MM: Were you just taking small arms fi re?

JU: We were taking small arms fi re and RPG teams. We still hadn’t gotten an 

RPG shot at us. We’re pushing and we see some Marines off to our left and to our 

right. That’s when we get the call that we need to stop and hold our positions. I 

hear over the radio that they need to evac some personnel from the commander’s 

vehicle. So we’re going to regroup and pull back to this intersection up here. We’re 

going to go back to the west – 3-8’s over here now – we’re going to come back to 

the west and regroup.

MM: But they’re going to leave 3-8 down here?

JU: Roger.

MM: So what happens when the company gets up here?

JU: We see the tanks, blow by them and say, “Hey, did you get the word?” 

“Yeah, we got the word.” Well, we blew by them and hung a hard left, continued 

to go, and then we get the call back, “Hey, we just passed the tanks and they’re not 

moving. Do they know to come back?” He’s like, “I don’t know.” “Okay, we’ll go 
223 

back and make sure. We’ll police them up and head on back.” Well, one of their 

vehicles was dead. They were going to have to tow it.

MM: A tank?

JU: A tank. One tank towing another tank.

MM: Had this tank been hit by anything?

JU: No, it just stopped. Not sure what happened. So when we turned around 

and came back, their tank crew is on the ground pulling security and you can see 

they’re receiving small arms fi re. So we pull up our Bradleys and start an overwatch. We basically do what we call a diamond. We go to all four corners and we 

watch while they hook up this tank.

MM: How many of the other tank crews had dismounted to go and hook the 

other tank up?

JU: All of the crews except for the driver.

MM: So they can’t shoot; they can’t do anything?

JU: Yeah. These tow bars for an M1 are massive, so they’re trying to hook it 

up while pulling security. So we roll up and pull security for them. It’s a little bit 

easier and they hook it up. We get the word that they’re good to go – and we actually have communication with them now.

JB: So this is a tank platoon of fi ve tanks?

JU: Four tanks.

JB: And one of them is down?

JU: One of them is down.

JB: So you’ve got all of the crews except the drivers – for all the tanks out 

there – trying to hook up the tow bar?

JU: Right. So we get the word to lead these guys out. At this time, I’m talking 

to the platoon leader of the tanks, Lieutenant Wochejck. Lieutenant Duran’s radio 

went out and he had problems communicating so I’m now talking to the XO. I 

have communications with them on the platoon radio but not the company radio. 

I’m telling Lieutenant Duran what’s going on and what we need to do. Well, they 

hooked it up, we started to roll and one of the pins broke or something, so we had 

to back up again. This time we have a little bit of mortar fi re coming in. So we 

pushed the Bradleys out a little bit further and dismount some of our dismounts to 

help pull security a little bit closer, so they can just worry about hooking this tank 

up. So we get it hooked up and we start to move. At that time, we get the word that 

we need to cross-attach ourselves back to Charlie, 3-8, and I was like, “I can’t do 

anything. We’re low on ammo.” We were black on ammo – we had none. So we 
224

go ahead and move back and we see 1st Platoon. They’re near the MSR. We see 

them, we’re escorting the tanks back, and we go back to the assembly area to get 

some more ammo.

MM: So you’re going all the way back?

JU: Yeah, we’re going all the way back to our assembly area. We get on the 

radio and we say, “I got the ammo. We’re good to go; we’re going back to Charlie 

3-8.” They’re like, “No, you’re staying. We’re going to go back out as a company. 

So forget about going back to 3-8.” At that point, the guys are relaxing. We’re 

doing a little bit of maintenance and we get the word that 1st Platoon had taken a 

couple casualties and one KIA. We see 1st Platoon come by and you can see them 

unloading a couple of their casualties – and at this point, we don’t know who the 

KIA is. Later on, the fi rst sergeant shows back up and we get the word that we just 

took one KIA – Specialist Jose Valez. At this point, we still didn’t know that the 

company commander was a casualty. We knew he was hit, had some casualties, 

but we didn’t know KIAs or anything. So when the fi rst sergeant linked up with 

the platoon sergeants, he let us know who was the KIA and the casualties and so 

forth. We’re still holding there and we stay there overnight, and guys are taking 

the KIA pretty hard. Specialist Valez was our company armorer. One of my squad 

leaders had gone to basic training with him. This guy’s been in this company for 

about fi ve years, so the soldiers are taking it pretty hard, and basically you tell the 

soldiers that, “Hey, you can’t let it get to you. You got to focus. We’ve got a job to 

do. You’ll have time to say goodbye once we get out of here. First we need to get 

out of here safe.” The next morning, we get the word that we are now going to take 

over Charlie 2-7’s mission, which was securing the MSR.

MM: Is that what your company spends the time until the 20th doing?

JU: Yes.

MM: Is there anything that you could leave us with? Any particular stories 

that you could tell us? Any lessons learned? Anything at all that you want to tell us 

about this operation?

JU: You have to remember that that August before, we had already been in 

Najaf and had already been tested dismounted. We’d already been tested fi ghting 

in a city – and not only that, but also using our vehicles in a city and we’d proven 

that it can be done.

MM: And you had worked closely with the Marines on that particular operation?

JU: No, we were helping them out. They were on a different mission.

MM: So nothing at all like this?
225 

JU: Nothing like this. Not saying it was easier – because none of this was easy 

– but we’d already been tested once. But the fi rst sergeant was like, “Hey, you can’t 

judge this like Najaf. Totally different.” And that was one of the things that we kept 

reminding the soldiers: Najaf wasn’t insurgents; it was religious fanatics. Fallujah 

was actually insurgents. It was diffi cult at times, and receiving that one casualty 

– it affected my soldiers more than I thought it was going to. We learned that also 

with the other KIA we had in our company: it didn’t matter who it was; it affected 

everybody. Even if you knew him for two days or if you knew him for three years, 

it didn’t matter.

MM: So you had that one KIA in the operation. Do you have any idea how 

many individuals were wounded? I know there might have been a few that were 

returned to duty.

JU: As far as the company, I know we had the one KIA – Specialist Valez. I 

know we had a sergeant that received a star for his actions in Iraq. He was wounded. Staff Sergeant Nicholson was also wounded. 1st Platoon had about fi ve or six 

wounded. Specialist Watson was wounded. I can’t remember any other names. But 

it was funny – after we got the change of mission and we secured the MSR, we’d 

rotate. 1st Platoon would go out 12 hours during the day and then we would go 12 

hours at night – and we’re just sitting in somebody’s house that we took over. We’d 

resupply ourselves and talk about some of the stuff that had happened.

MM: So it must have been kind of a surreal situation.

JB: Are the occupants still there?

JU: No. The occupants were not there at all. But one of the things that was 

embedded into us – especially the area of Iraq where Taji was – we that these were 

people’s houses. In fact, we moved to a different house. The house that we initially 

stayed in, we cleaned it up and put everything back just like we found it. A different house that we took over, we did the same thing, We might have used their 

sleeping mats if they had them in there, but when we were done, we would put 

them back, sweep, take all of our trash. That was one thing that was instilled into 

us – not just in our soldiers but to our higher-up senior NCOs: “We don’t trash.” 

People still have to come back and live here.

MM: Did you get the impression or did anybody tell you if you captured any 

of the enemy or anything? Were most of these people insurgents that you were up 

against or were there foreign fi ghters?

JU: We would often get a visit from the battalion commander, Lieutenant 

Colonel Jim Rainey, and some of the S3 [operations] and S2 [intelligence] guys 

would come and visit us. They would escort VIPs – maybe some Marine generals 

would come up. They would give us updates and say, “Hey, what you’re doing is 
226

great.” I know our S2 intercepted a radio message from them saying, “They’re everywhere!” As a matter of fact, it was posted in one of the newspapers. “Fight for 

Allah. You’ve got to join together. If they see you out in the street, they’re going to 

shoot you. If they see you in a house, they’re going to shoot you. There’s nowhere 

to hide.” A strong message. I don’t know if Captain Twaddell told you about it.

MM: Yes.

JU: This was the stuff that we’re fi nding out. We’ve got these guys on the 

run.

MM: They were pretty stunned that you came in so quickly.

JU: Yes.

JB: So these are the bad guys saying that the Americans are everyplace?

JU: That we’re everywhere and we’re shifting –

JB: And that we’ll kill them.

JU: “If they see you in a building, outside, wherever, you’re going to get shot.” 

And I know with 3-8, we had a couple people surrender and that was no big deal. 

We took control of them and pushed them back.

MM: Did you get the impression that most of these people were foreign fi ghters or insurgents?

JU: From what we heard from the lieutenant that worked in the S2, there were 

a lot of foreign fi ghters. And we encountered that also in Najaf, so it wasn’t something new to us. As far as working with the Marines, they were great.

MM: So you had no problems?

JU: Nope. They took care of us pretty well, even when we were back at their 

camp. The two Marines I had were excellent guys. We’d mess with them; they’d 

mess with us. Basically just part of the platoon. As a matter of fact, I think they 

one-upped us because we had Wiley Xs and they were issued Oakleys for protection – goggles. I ended up trading my Wiley Xs with that lance corporal for a pair 

of Oakleys. We gave them some coins and so forth. They rode all the way back 

with us to camp and, before we left, they came and saw us. We even got two bottles 

of beer on the Marine Corps’ birthday. That was back at Camp Fallujah.

MM: Do you have any further questions, Jim?

JB: I don’t.

MM: I think that about wraps it up then. We appreciate it.

JU: Thank you.

JB: Thanks a lot.
227 

Staff Sergeant Jimmy Amyett

31 July 2006

JM: My name is John McCool (JM) and I’m with the Operational Leadership 

Experiences Project at the Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 

I’m interviewing Staff Sergeant Jimmy Amyett (JA) on his experiences in Operation Phantom Fury. Today’s date is 31 July 2006 and this is an unclassifi ed telephone interview. Before we begin, if you feel at any time we’re entering classifi ed 

territory, please couch your response in terms that avoid revealing any classifi ed 

information. And if classifi cation requirements prevent you from responding, simply say you’re not able to answer. Could we start off with a little bit of background, 

where you grew up, when you came in the Army? Can you give me a thumbnail 

sketch of your military career up to the present?

JA: I joined the Army straight out of high school in Arkansas. I went to Fort 

Knox for Basic Training and then I was stationed in Schweinfurt, Germany, in 1-4 

CAV for two years and deployed with them to Macedonia. Then I went to Fort Polk 

for a year to be with the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR). I went back to Europe and did two years in Grafenwoehr where I worked at the Sabot Academy and 

the Close Combat Tactical Trainer (CCTT). When the war broke out, I volunteered 

to go back to the scout platoon, the Brigade Reconnaissance Troop (BRT) snatched 

me up and that’s how I ended up back over there.

JM: What was the time period of your Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) deployment?

JA: I deployed early January with the advanced party and then we returned 

around the March timeframe. So from January ‘04 to about March ’05.

JM: Where were you stationed and what were some of the major activities you 

guys were doing prior to Operation Phantom Fury?

JA: We were at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Warhorse in Ba’qubah and 

we did a lot of counter-mortar operations and a lot of raids – taking out suspected 

insurgents. A lot of sweeping operations and clearing out villages, looking for insurgents, palm-grove operations, counter-improvised explosive device (IED) operations, ambush and counter-ambush operations throughout the sector.

JM: When did you fi rst get word that you might be participating in what became Phantom Fury?

JA: I had just gotten back from R&R and landed at Anaconda; and the minute I 

got off the plane the rumor mill had already started that we were going to Fallujah. 

At the time, my troop was in Salman Pak so I went straight there and they said we 

were going to Fallujah. We bounced around a lot in the BRT.
228

JM: Now, you all were a 3d Brigade asset, right?

JA: Yes, we were 3d Brigade Reconnaissance Troop.

JM: Once it was confi rmed that you were going to Fallujah, what was the process for getting attached to Task Force 2-2 Infantry?

JA: For our little piece of the pie, it was more or less we got word we were 

going to Fallujah – and our platoon sergeant was on R&R at the time so our senior 

scout took over as platoon sergeant. It was just me and him getting the intel, getting 

the warning orders and getting the trucks ready. The troop commander did all the 

coordination with 2-2 and we were just prepping the platoon, getting them ready 

because a lot of them had left on R&R. We were at about 50 percent of our original 

strength. 

JM: Was it just your platoon that was being attached to 2-2?

JA: No, our whole troop got attached.

JM: How large was your platoon and what kinds of vehicles did you have?

JA: Roughly we had around 20 people. It was a four-truck Humvee platoon 

and it was fi ve people per truck. We ran into the issues of people going on R&R 

and emergency leave; and at the time, our platoon sergeant was gone and about fi ve 

of our key fi gures, like gunners, were on R&R as well.

JM: The acting platoon sergeant, this was Staff Sergeant Nicholus Danielsen?

JA: Yes.

JM: So he was the platoon sergeant and you were the second-highest-ranking 

noncommissioned offi cer (NCO) for this platoon?

JA: Yes, I was.

JM: Who was your platoon leader?

JA: Lieutenant Chris Boggiano, who’s now a captain.

JM: What were going to be some of your principal duties and how did you 

divide responsibilities with Staff Sergeant Danielsen?

JA: Even though he was the platoon sergeant, he was still the senior scout 

and he was a great guy who led from the front. He continued the duties of being 

up front and being the lead vehicle. I fell back to the rear in the very last vehicle 

where our platoon sergeant usually went and I just handled what the platoon sergeant usually did when we went out on patrols: checkpoints, monitoring the troop 

net, picking up anything the lieutenant missed. As far as the preparatory phase, we 

just worked hand in hand. He would go to the platoon sergeant meetings and other 

briefi ngs and then he would come straight back to me. I would get the platoon hot 

on whatever came down – prepping, ammo, all that stuff – and we worked really 
229 

well together. It was a good platoon. I can’t say we broke everything down as far 

as responsibilities were because we pretty much knew what we had to do and we 

covered each other really well, so we just shared everything. He was getting really 

swamped as the platoon sergeant so I just helped him out as much as I could.

JM: Were there any rehearsals or did you guys do rock drills once Lieutenant 

Boggiano got read in on the plan?

JA: We did rehearsals and rock drills until we were blue in the face and we 

really didn’t get the gist of what the mission was going to be until we got down 

there. We got a warning order of what our role and responsibilities were going to 

be during the actual battle but it changed. Our mission actually changed the minute 

we got down there from what we were supposed to do originally. 

JM: Can you outline for me what your original idea was of how you were going to be employed and then how that was changed once you guys got there?

JA: Our original plan of action was that, during the actual breach into the city, 

we were going to be escorting the bulldozers up to breach the HESCO barriers, 

providing security for them, and then we were actually going to move into the 

outskirts of the city and start clearing buildings. What happened was, we went on 

a leaders recon once we got down into Fallujah – and this was me, Staff Sergeant 

Danielsen, Lieutenant Boggiano and our executive offi cer (XO) all in one vehicle, 

along with a bunch of other vehicles. This was a 2-2 Task Force leaders recon 

and we took along our Long Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System (LRAS) 

truck. I was gunning and we had stopped just short of the cloverleaf because they 

had reported contact up there. So I began scanning and about four clicks into the 

city I identifi ed two insurgents – one with a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) and 

one with an AK-47. We reported it up to see if we could get an artillery strike in 

and, just from that one observation of enemy insurgents within the city, it really got 

the battalion commander and everybody else to see how valuable the LRAS was. 

So after that, our platoon mission got changed from escorting the bulldozers in to 

moving up onto the highway, observing the city, directing indirect fi res and basically just catching insurgents hiding where they thought they were safe.

JM: For the record, can you tell me a little bit about the LRAS? What are its 

capabilities and why is it so unique?

JA: It’s a thermal laser sight that you can see forever with. It’s almost like a 

tank sight and when you scan with it, it can pick up hot spots. The insurgents would 

be like fi ve clicks into the city, thinking they were safe, walking around on roofs, 

and you look through there and magnify in, hit the laser button and it’ll give you a 

10-digit grid and direction – basically everything you need for a perfect call for fi re 

to take them out. And the whole time they have no idea you’re watching them. It’s 

mounted on top of the Humvee, looks like a big square box and it’s probably the 
230

most valuable piece of equipment we had. We just decimated the insurgents with it 

the fi rst day before the breach even started.

JM: What kind of weaponry did you have on the other Humvees?

JA: All the Humvees had dual weapon mounts. The lead truck had a Mk-19 

and a 240B. The lieutenant’s truck had a .50 cal and a 240B. My truck – the truck 

I usually rode on – had the LRAS and a .50 cal. The platoon sergeant’s truck – the 

one I was riding on – had a Mk-19 and a 240B. We had a lot of fi repower.

JM: Before we get into the operation itself, can you give me some of your impressions of Fallujah itself: the terrain and the overall operating environment?

JA: It was defi nitely different compared to what we were used to operating in. 

We had been operating in the palm groves back in Ba’qubah and, down there, it 

was wide open desert. There really wasn’t any place to hide outside of the city. I 

just remember there was a four-lane highway running parallel to the city that we 

operated from and we just moved on top for the fi rst couple days calling fi re. The 

city itself was just like every other Iraqi city – buildings that were stuck together, 

narrow alleyways, and that was pretty much it. There was one main road that ran 

smack down the middle of it that connected to the cloverleaf and then you have the 

industrial center where you had more factory type buildings. The lack of civilians 

there was very eerie.

JM: I understand that it had basically been emptied of its civilian population 

by this point.

JA: Yes.

JM: That must have given you guys a lot of freedom. You didn’t have to worry 

too much about hitting civilians.

JA: Yeah, that was really nice. We still worried about them, though. They said 

they were gone but you’re never actually sure.

JM: This recon you went on where you basically demonstrated the LRAS 

– you said you identifi ed a couple insurgents, but were you actually able to call in 

artillery on them?

JA: No, and I was really frustrated too because I wanted to get the fi rst kill 

of the battle before it even started. Task Force 2-2 and the Marines were running 

off two different fi lls and the communications security (COMSEC) was different, 

so when they tried to call back up to get clearance of fi re to call for artillery, they 

were getting nothing because Marine Corps command was actually running off a 

different fi ll. So those guys got to live another day.

JM: What was the nature of your interaction with the Marine Corps? Was this 

the fi rst time you’d come into close contact with them?
231 

JA: At this point, on a personal level I still hadn’t interacted with the Marines 

at all other than just seeing them on the FOB. There was no operation with them 

up to this point.

JM: Can you talk me through the battle from your vantage point beginning 

with getting to the assembly area and prepping before the breach is blown?

JA: I remember we rolled out early that morning – can’t remember which day 

specifi cally, only that I was tired. We got to the assembly area under cover of darkness and parked the vehicles. Off to the right was this giant slope and up on that 

slope was that highway I spoke of. We could hear sporadic small arms fi re. This 

was early in the morning and the breach itself wasn’t supposed to happen until 

that night. We were down there, the caffeine fi x started kicking in and we were 

just chomping at the bit to get up there and start fi ghting. We kept looking over 

at Lieutenant Boggiano and asking him, “Can we go yet, can we got yet?” I was 

sitting there looking at the LRAS and, knowing what its capabilities were, was 

saying, “We just got to get up there.” Finally we got the word to go. It was between 

0700 and 0900 and it was so cool because the slope – it was about 20 meters up the 

slope we had to drive Humvees up, we’re looking straight up at the sky and, all of 

a sudden, we crested the top and there was the city. We pulled my section up on the 

road and we just started fi ghting. The minute we pulled up on the road, we started 

receiving small arms fi re. We got behind the LRAS, started identifying snipers and 

enemy insurgent positions, and then we just started raining down thunder on them 

using mortars and artillery.

JM: Would you be making the calls for indirect fi re and for close air support 

(CAS)?

JA: We had a forward observer (FO) with us that, in my opinion, was worthless 

because we were already scouts. This was already our mission. So what we ended 

up doing – 

JM: Was this an Army guy or Air Force?

JA: Army. The Air Force CAS guys were great.

JM: You had some joint tactical air controllers (JTACs) with you, right?

JA: Yeah, they were great – it was just the restrictions put on us as far as dropping bombs. We honestly didn’t get to drop any bombs with our JTACs until a 

couple days later. We would fi nd an enemy position or enemy sniper, lase it, get the 

grid and Lieutenant Boggiano would drop down to the fi re net and call missions 

directly. Staff Sergeant Danielsen and I were doing command and control, positioning the trucks, returning small arms fi re, trying not to get shot by the snipers 

who were just everywhere. They moved a Bradley up on the road, and when we 
232

saw that the indirect fi res were taking too long, we’d run over to the Bradley and 

take the snipers out with direct fi re.

JM: Were you calling indirect fi re from the Paladins?

JA: Actually I’m not sure. I know we got a lot of mortars and, yeah, I know we 

did have some 155s coming in.

JM: Were these the 120 mortars?

JA: Yes.

JM: I’ve heard a lot of great things about the 120 mortars.

JA: Actually I liked shooting mortars better than artillery. When you call for 

artillery it takes about fi ve or six minutes to get it in, but when you call for mortars 

you’re talking two or three minutes tops, rounds in the air. The response time was 

just so much better. Artillery was good but it just took so long to get rounds in. It 

was really frustrating.

JM: Tell me a little more about this CAS issue. Were you requesting CAS 

strikes and they were just being denied?

JA: We didn’t want to waste any CAS strikes so we were looking for really 

good targets. I’m guessing everybody was just so scared of fratricide that a lot of 

the CAS missions were getting nixed, or by the time they would approve a CAS 

mission the target was already gone. We actually didn’t get to drop any bombs 

until later on in the battle when we were in the Queens District and were observing 

from there, where we were absolutely positive there were no American soldiers. 

We fi nally got the green light to drop a couple 500-pound bombs and leveled a 

couple buildings.

JM: Were these Air Force jets that were in a pattern that you guys were calling 

up to?

JA: From what the JTAC who was with us told me, he said they had them 

stacked above the city just waiting to drop. F-15s and F-16s.

JM: Was there any Marine air in the area?

JA: I really don’t know. I didn’t see any and I know we didn’t get to utilize any 

if there was. I know what we eventually did use was Air Force.

JM: Did you guys actually witness the breach being blown?

JA: Yeah, we did.

JM: Can you tell me the good, the bad and the ugly about that?

JA: I remember they pulled us back a little bit from up on the interstate where 

we were observing the city and they fi red the mine clearing line charges (MCLCs) 
233 

off. It was this gigantic mushroom cloud and it was just thunder and fi re. The Bradleys rolled through and we were looking through our night vision goggles (NVGs) 

watching; and the minute that fi rst Bradley went through it was like the Fourth of 

July down there with small arms fi re coming from every direction. At the time, I 

was really glad I was sitting up on top of that road and didn’t have to drive through 

it with my Humvee.

JM: Were the Marines doing a separate breach at this time?

JA: Yeah. We had the far eastern corner of the city, the CAV had a breach going 

down through the middle and the Marines were on the far western side. All three 

elements breached at the same time, we watched those MCLCs go off, heard the 

vehicles going through and at the same time the whole edge of the city just started 

opening up with small arms fi re.

JM: I understand the Marines had some trouble with their breach. Did you 

have any visibility on that?

JA: No, we didn’t actually observe any of that. The Marines were so far out of 

our sector that we didn’t see anything like that. I just know it was really frustrating 

waiting on them.

JM: So you’re in an observation position. What was the next movement you 

made after this?

JA: I believe we were up there for two to three days and, as they were clearing 

through the city, we would push ahead of them up along that interstate overwatching. The next day that really sticks out in my mind was when they moved us down 

to the cloverleaf and we were observing the main road that split right down the 

middle of the city. From the push from the breach, they were just pushing all the insurgents south and they came out through the main road running through the city.

JM: Was that Phase Line Fran/Highway 10?

JA: Yes, I believe that was it. It turned into a turkey shoot. Tons and tons of 

insurgents were crossing the road and we just dropped artillery on them left and 

right. They would cross the road, get into a building thinking they were safe, we 

would observe them going in there and just started calling for fi res on them. That 

went on for about two or three days. The fi rst three days we were up observing the 

city and calling for fi res on the insurgents, dealing with snipers, and taking out the 

mortar teams that were trying to hit the logistics resupply point (LRP) behind us.

JM: What rules of engagement (ROE) are you guys operating under at this 

time?

JA: Identify your targets, never shoot an unarmed civilian – we took the ROE 

that we had the whole time we were there.
234

JM: Do you think the ROE was just right, was it too restrictive or anything?

JA: I know on the Army side of the house our ROE was great. We could use 

every weapons system we had. The 25 millimeter, the tank main guns – if we 

needed it we got to shoot; we didn’t have to call and request for missions. When we 

fi nally did interact with some Marines and talk with some of them on the ground, 

their armor units had a lot of restrictions. They had to call up and get clearance of 

fi re to fi re their 25 millimeters and their tank main gun rounds. I thought that was 

ridiculous.

JM: I assume they did too?

JA: Yeah, they were really frustrated about it. I was in awe because here we 

are fi ghting a major battle and these guys have to call up to shoot anything higher 

than a .50 cal.

JM: I understand the Marines were dismounted quite a lot more than you all 

were as well.

JA: That was my understanding too. 

JM: They seem to have taken a lot more casualties because of it.

JA: I just remember having to wait on them a lot. When we fi nally entered the 

city and started dismounting through the industrial center, I remember we had to 

pull back a lot because the Marines were moving so slowly. The ones who were 

on the edge of my sector that I saw operating – when we moved into the city, we 

operated with dismounts and armor. When I took my section clearing, I had a tank 

with me. There were always Bradleys and tanks all along mixed in with us, so if 

we ran into a problem with a building, we didn’t go running into the building; we 

ran up to the tank and had them take it out. 

JM: Knock on the front door with a main gun round?

JA: Exactly. The way I understood it and when I saw them, the Marines were 

just operating strictly dismounted through the city and left their armor back in support, and when they ran into trouble they would have to call it up. It wasn’t like us 

where we could just look to the left and ask the tanks to take a building out for us. 

So I know their movements slowed us down a lot.

JM: Did the nature of the enemy – his tactics or capabilities – represent any 

challenges to you in terms of calling indirect fi res?

JA: At fi rst not really, because they didn’t realize the capability of the LRAS 

and they thought they were safe. There was one point, though, where we were calling in indirect fi res that they started targeting the LRAS truck. I think they fi gured 

out what we were doing; and even the insurgents who were deep in the city started 

hiding a little better. I remember one incident where I was mad because it was my 
235 

truck. I wasn’t on it but one of my squad leaders was commanding it and the sniper 

shot out the headlight and kept shooting at my truck. I was getting mad having to 

watch my truck get shot at. We told him to back up in a defi lade position and the 

sniper still kept shooting at him. We eventually ID’d the sniper and took him out, 

but it was obvious after two days that they knew what the LRAS truck was and 

they started adjusting their tactics to try and take out our observation.

JM: You mentioned taking your section and clearing – so you guys were actually employed as infantrymen, doing dismounted clearing and stuff? 

JA: Oh yeah.

JM: Was that a defi nite change of mission or was that something you just fell 

into?

JA: We actually had prepped for that since the very beginning. We knew at 

some point that we were going to go into the city because they had given us the 

industrial area.

JM: The whole BRT had the industrial area?

JA: Correct. That was our sector and we knew that once we hit the cloverleaf 

we were eventually going to have to dismount. It wasn’t anything we hadn’t already prepped for. We’d been in Iraq since March, we were ready and the tactics 

hadn’t changed.

JM: Can you tell me about any particularly memorable or signifi cant incidents 

that happened when you guys were dismounted?

JA: One that does stick out in my mind and was an eye-opener for me was that 

everywhere we went we found an underground tunnel system that was used by the 

insurgents. We’d see all these tunnels we had to clear and I remember going down 

into these tunnels and they all had IED wires running from them. They had rigged 

buildings to blow and would hide in the tunnels and wait for us to pass, and then 

they’d blow up the buildings. I had my section all stacked on this door and was getting ready to kick it in when Staff Sergeant Danielsen called me on the radio right 

as I had my foot in the air. He said, “I found a building over here rigged to blow. 

Have you run into any of those?” So right then I stopped and checked the doorway, 

found this hole in the side and, sure enough, the door I was getting ready to kick 

was another building that was rigged to blow. That one stood out pretty good. I remember one of our soldiers – Specialist John White – the fi rst day we dismounted 

he actually fragged an underground tunnel and, when the smoke cleared, I went 

down in there and he had actually fragged an insurgent who was down in there hiding. He was just down in there and we were right on top of him. I assume he was 

going to wait until we passed and then pop up behind us.
236

JM: Did you just drop grenades down these holes when you found them or did 

you ever get down into them?

JA: We’d frag it fi rst before we entered and cleared it. I went down a lot of 

holes and they were all over the place.

JM: What kinds of caches were you coming across? Were they just in every 

building?

JA: Not in every building. I remember two large caches we found. One was 

mortar rounds and it looked like the guy was making an IED. It had an intercom 

system, a couple landmines, small arms rounds, a couple RPGs and a bunch of 

clocks that were taken apart with wires hanging out. It looked like he was rigging 

detonators for IEDs. We were clearing every building, every doorway and every 

house. It got so monotonous. There had been word of anti-aircraft guns in the area 

and, towards the end of the day, my section was stacked up on the last building. I 

kicked in the door and when I came through I had this anti-aircraft gun pointing 

right at me. At fi rst I had the “Oh shit” feeling and then I was like, “I found the 

mother load!” And then I realized I still had to clear the building because it wasn’t 

cleared. We found two antiaircraft guns, which I don’t think could operate; they 

looked pretty old. But there were tons of 155 rounds, cases of ammo – it was a 

big cache. All through the town there were small caches, nothing big. A couple 

landmines here and there, a couple 155 shells. Those two caches are the ones that 

stand out in my mind.

JM: When you were clearing the buildings, did you ever have to shoot it out 

with anybody? Were these buildings abandoned?

JA: Most of them were abandoned. We really didn’t run into too much resistance. Once we crossed Phase Line Fran, it was like random snipers here and 

there, but our main concern was buildings that were rigged to blow. That scared 

me more than anything. The 2-2 scout platoon had kicked in a door and a bunch of 

their guys had gotten shot up because there were insurgents in there with an RPK, 

so that weighed in the back of my mind a lot. You could frag buildings before you 

went in, but we learned a hard lesson that that was really stupid – because if you 

fragged a building before you went in, all it does is kick up dust so you need to 

wait fi ve minutes for the dust to settle. What was a really valuable asset that I loved 

and was snatching them up every chance I got were fl ash bang grenades. Those 

are not something we normally got issued, but they were great because you threw 

it in there, it doesn’t kick the dust up and gives you two or three extra seconds to 

get in the room.

JM: Where would you go to get these?
237 

JA: When we came in to get more ammo. I told my driver to go get some more 

Mk-19 rounds and some frags and he came back with one case of frags and he also 

got some fl ash bangs. I told him, “Great. Go get more.” Every chance we got we 

got more because they went like hotcakes. I thought they were a lot more valuable 

that a frag because a frag is only good if you know for sure that there’s insurgents 

in the room.

JM: In terms of ammo or any other classes of supply, how do you feel 2-2 supported you?

JA: Our support was outstanding because I know we were burning through 

some ammo those fi rst couple days. We never had a problem with getting rounds. 

203 rounds started to dwindle down a little bit – and I don’t know why – and hand 

grenades as well started to become in short supply as we moved into clearing the 

city. Other than that, there were plenty of small arms rounds, crew-served weapons 

and AT-4s. We could’ve used more fl ash bangs, but that was something we really 

weren’t used to having. They were really great in that type of situation.

JM: You mentioned early on that there were some comms issues with the Marines. Did you continue to experience this and were there any comms issues with 

other Army units?

JA: That was solved a minute after the leaders recon. That was just something 

nobody really took into consideration. We honestly cut the recon short because of 

it.

JM: Did you have any interaction with the Iraqi units? I understand they were 

moving in behind you. 

JA: Not really. I remember seeing them moving behind us and I was like, “Put 

them in front of us. Give me a little break.” We really didn’t interact with them at 

all. I guess they were just securing the rear fl ank.

JM: What about any fratricide or close calls you guys had? Were there any 

incidents?

JA: No. 

JM: Are you able to get a sense of why, fortunately, there weren’t any?

JA: They stressed fratricide so much and that was what you always thought 

about. When we were calling in artillery, we knew where all the friendly troops 

were and we already had restrictions set up of where we can’t fi re and what the sectors of fi re were – and it was tough sometimes because you could see insurgents, 

see good targets, but couldn’t engage them. We didn’t worry about it too much. We 

just reported it and let the guys down there take them out.

JM: Your platoon had the LRAS. Did any other units have this system?
238

JA: For our troop, our platoon was the only one with the LRAS. The other platoon had their LRAS damaged by an IED attack a couple months earlier. We were 

pretty much the golden children with it for Task Force 2-2.

JM: None of the other companies even had one?

JA: No, not that I was aware of. From my understanding, we were the only 

ones with an LRAS in all of Task Force 2-2. But those things were awesome – especially for a scout. I do believe that was probably the most valuable piece of 

equipment we had next to the radio.

JM: You mentioned that some guys had busted into a building and taken fi re 

from insurgents. Was this when Captain Sean Sims got killed?

JA: No, they weren’t killed. They just received some rounds and were injured. 

It was Staff Sergeant Jason Laser and a couple guys behind him. They got hit in 

their plates so they were lucky – and it goes to show why we wear body armor. But 

that incident taught us that when we kick open a door, we needed to be mindful that 

there might be somebody behind it.

JM: Are you able to step back at this point and overall assess the role your platoon and maybe the BRT as a whole played in this operation, how you contributed 

to the 2-2 mission?

JA: The way I looked at it for Task Force 2-2: we orchestrated a raining-down 

death of artillery shells and mortars on the insurgents those fi rst couple days. They 

thought they were going to be safe deeper within the city, but they couldn’t hide 

from that LRAS. If they stuck their head up in a window or were on a rooftop, we 

saw them. Then, as the battle progressed on, we just cleared the industrial center.

JM: Were you the principal eye looking through the LRAS?

JA: When we fi rst rolled up on top of the berm, I kicked the gunner off the 

LRAS because I wanted to play. I wanted the fi rst artillery mission of the day. Staff 

Sergeant Danielsen and I just rotated out. I attribute this to our platoon sergeant, 

Sergeant First Class Jamie Loy, who wasn’t with us – but Staff Sergeant Danielsen 

and I always led from the front. We wouldn’t make the guys do anything we hadn’t 

done or that we wouldn’t do fi rst. We stayed up behind the LRAS a long time the 

fi rst couple days and we had all the other guys looking up at us like we were the 

big kids on the playground who took their toys away – so we fi nally let them get 

back on it. So besides me and Staff Sergeant Danielsen, the other guys who were 

trained on the LRAS were Specialist Brendan Sandmann who was on R&R leave. 

He came back in and got thrown into the battle about two days into it. We put him 

back on the LRAS because that was his truck, he was my gunner originally, and he 

was always behind the LRAS. Specialist James Taylor was also really profi cient 

with the LRAS too. Between us four, we were usually on the LRAS.
239 

JM: Is there any way you think you could have been better employed?

JA: Honestly, no. We’re scouts and that’s our job: to observe the battlefi eld, call 

indirect and send up spot reports. It was really the fi rst time we actually got to do 

our job and have results as far as a scout’s mission. In my eight years in the Army, 

that was probably the best mission I’ve ever had as far as doing a true scout’s job 

– those fi rst couple days when we were up there in that observation position.

JM: Were there any major lessons learned or takeaways you had from this 

operation that you’ll carry forward with you in your career?

JA: I defi nitely have to say that close quarters combat (CQC) is such a major 

factor over there in the area we operated in and I’ve never let that drop. I’m an 

instructor now and I observe/control (OC) and train the National Guard and Reserves and get them ready to go over to Iraq. I harp on CQC because that’s what 

you’re fi ghting over there. The other thing we learned about were the fl ash bangs 

and I preach to these guys about them and tell them they have to get their hands on 

them if they can. I also tell them that the LRAS is one of the most valuable pieces 

of equipment and that they can do signifi cant damage with it in the right hands. 

Cross training is important too as far as everybody needing to know how to do 

everybody else’s job. Like I said, when the battle kicked off, the platoon sergeant 

was gone, the original LRAS gunner was gone and we had so many guys on leave; 

and then we just started rolling, accomplished the mission and didn’t run into any 

problems because we always had done that. All the training and planning prior to 

that had paid off. Even though we never knew we would be going to fi ght in Fallujah, everybody always knew how to do everybody else’s job and it made our 

platoon successful.

JM: Are there any other individuals you think deserve special attention for 

their actions in this operation?

JA: Staff Sergeant Danielsen obviously. He basically played two roles as the 

senior scout and the platoon sergeant. There’s one more: my squad leader, Sergeant 

Mike Cowles. Since the platoon sergeant was on leave, Staff Sergeant Danielsen 

had his truck and the platoon leader had his truck. I took the platoon sergeant’s 

truck, Sergeant Cowles took over as the commander of my LRAS truck and, between him and the lieutenant, they called in all the indirect fi res – and he was just 

an E5. A PFC scout can call for fi res but he really stepped up and shouldered his 

responsibility as a young E5. We just told him one morning that he was taking 

the LRAS truck and we were going to Fallujah, and he didn’t have any qualms or 

questions or anything. He was really profi cient and really professional. One thing 

he discovered about the artillery was that when we called for fi re and then made 

our adjustments, they were seeming to be wrong. He fi gured out that the artillery 

itself back in the rear was doubling our corrections because they were afraid of 
240

fratricide. So we ended up having to counter that by – and I still don’t understand 

that one at all. All it did was waste more time and more rounds, in my opinion, but 

he orchestrated that artillery really well.

JM: Did you have much interaction with Captain Kirk Mayfi eld?

JA: Oh yeah. Captain Mayfi eld was with us the fi rst couple days. He was our 

troop commander so I saw him all the time. He was always right in the middle of 

things, always keeping us informed. But he was doing the troop commander thing 

and I was more worried about my platoon than about what he was doing.

JM: Do you have any comments about the whole joint-ness aspect? Any 

thoughts about how well the Army, Marine Corps and the Air Force worked together?

JA: I know the Army and the Air Force worked really well together. Those 

JTACs were great guys and they were awesome. They were right there, ready to 

support us in any way we needed and they had planes there ready to go. As far as 

the Marines went, it just seemed that every time I ran into them there were problems. They could defi nitely have used better equipment for one thing. It seemed 

like they always had more restrictions than we did and it almost seemed like they 

were more led by their offi cers than by their NCOs. In my platoon, you could take 

any one of my privates and he could lead a mission without any problem, but we 

saw some Marines up on the interstate that night and they couldn’t really tell us 

what was going on with the city. We were receiving small arms fi re and they were 

like, “Hold on, we have to go get the lieutenant, we have to get the lieutenant.” 

Well, I didn’t want to talk to their lieutenant; I wanted to talk to them. All in all, I’d 

defi nitely say that the Army and the Air Force worked really well together.

JM: You just wished you’d had permission to drop more bombs.

JA: Oh yeah, and I wish we’d had better targets for them too. That did seem to 

hinder us a lot. I remember when the battle fi rst started we wanted to drop and we 

couldn’t get clearance. That was frustrating.

JM: Are than any other aspects about this operation and your role in it that we 

didn’t talk about that you’d like to mention?

JA: Not that I can think of. I think we pretty much covered it all.

JM: Well, thank you very much for your time today then. It was great talking 

to you and thank you for your service as well.

JA: No problem.
241 

Staff Sergeant David Bellavia

27 July 2006

MM: My name is Matt Matthews (MM) and I’m an historian for the Combat 

Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Today is 27 July 2006 and I’m 

interviewing Staff Sergeant David Bellavia (DB) on his experiences in Operation 

Phantom Fury. This is an unclassifi ed interview. If I start to get into anything that 

might be classifi ed just say, “Hey, I can’t answer that,” and I’ll understand what 

you’re talking about. I want to start off with some background information on you 

– where were you born, where you grew up and went to school, the circumstances 

under which you decided to join the Army.

DB: I was born and raised in Buffalo, New York. I attended Franklin Pierce 

College in Rindge, New Hampshire, and the University of Buffalo. I joined the 

Army in the spring of 1999 and served in the infantry for six years, deploying to Iraq 

with the 1st Infantry Division’s 3d Brigade stationed out of Vilseck, Germany. 

MM: You had served, I believe, in Kosovo and in various other places before 

you ever got to Iraq in 2004, is that correct?

DB: That’s right. Our unit in Kosovo was almost identical to what we brought 

to Iraq, with the exception that we deployed for KFOR 4B without our mechanized 

or armored assets. We did nine months instead of the six-month rotation. I have to 

tell you, with all sincerity, those were some of the most diffi cult and enduring days 

of my life. I could take two years in Iraq living out of a MRE bag over that. In Iraq 

we believed in our mission. We knew it was important and that we were needed 

to save lives. Human lives were in the balance in Iraq daily. In Kosovo, though, 

it was very diffi cult to maintain a presence in an area where absolutely nothing 

would ever happen. We were on patrols with soft cover hats and no vests, and you 

pretty much needed a written letter of consent to chamber a round. If it wasn’t 

for the constant training it would have been very diffi cult to endure. The war was 

going on elsewhere and the talk around the campfi re was that we were missing 

our fi ght. You can’t be part of the Big Red One and not buy completely into the 

amazing history of this unit; but how could my generation face this great noble 

adventure if the Big Red One is guarding Mr. Mehmeti’s chicken farm? It was 

criminal to miss the fi ght – and to be in Kosovo felt like a sham while other brave 

men and women were getting hurt. Morale was probably the lowest at that time, 

at least for me personally. Our leadership at our task force and company levels 

truly developed an ingenious plan. It would have been all too easy to lose focus 

on the next trip downrange, and we most certainly did not. Lieutenant Colonel 

Pete Newell, Captain Doug Walter, First Sergeant Peter Smith and Command 

Sergeant Majors Darrin Bohn and Steven Faulkenburg – these guys really made 
242

our nine months of pointless nothingness into a giant fi eld problem with Iraq the 

dangling carrot to bait us. They would invent opportunities to air assault us into 

sectors, land navigate patrols, set up communications networks and drill casualty 

evacuations. The whole thing was training for the real world while in the “sort 

of but not really” world of Kosovo. The terrain got us in great shape and our 

enlisted men had mastered skill levels one and two by the end of the rotation. The 

leadership challenge for the small unit leaders had been met head on. Our success 

in Fallujah and during our whole year in Iraq was not bought and paid for by unit 

readiness training lanes in Germany or divine dumb luck. Rather, it was due to 

the nine months in Kosovo and the continued battalion-level focus when we came 

home. Our success was born from the fruits of outcome-based, goal-focused and 

purpose-driven leadership that started in Kosovo. This ethos, developed over time, 

emboldened the understanding that we are all accountable for each other coming 

home. That team building was essential to enduring the hardships of close quarters 

contact. Without that, we’re just another unit in combat. I believe we shot more 

rounds than any other task force infantry battalion in the United States military, 

without a doubt. We stole ammunition. There’d be people who said, “Yeah, we 

don’t want to go to the range today,” so we just took it: 8,000 rounds here, 4,000 

rounds there. And we literally would go on a 12-hour patrol and then we’d turn 

around and do bunker drills all night long. 

MM: Can you talk me through when you fi rst found out that you guys were 

going to have to go to Iraq in 2004? And also, who were some of the leaders in 

place at that time in 2-2 Infantry?

DB: Command was clearly picking up the training tempo and it was obvious 

that we were next to go when Kosovo ended. Family time was split between ranges 

and preparation. To be honest, I truly applaud our commanders and their ability 

to take the unpopular but professional approach towards family readiness groups 

(FRGs) and say basically, “If we don’t train, we don’t come home. Shut up and 

stop complaining. We’ll be home when we’re done.” I don’t believe that came out 

in actual memorandum form, but the point was clear. 2-2 didn’t cut any corners 

before Iraq. We had a chip on our shoulder too. Everyone was talking about 

stabilization and sustainment operations. President Bush had landed on the carrier. 

No one even knew Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s name, let alone talked about it on Fox 

News. The UN headquarters was still up and running in Baghdad. The popular lay 

opinion was that we were going to open hospitals and clean water supplies. We 

wanted to be the Big Red One of our dad’s war but we were widely considered a 

peacekeeping division. Then we started to read the names of the towns we were 

going to on the front pages of newspapers. When we started to hear on the news 

that the cities in our sector were getting hot, we got pumped up and the motivation 

while training matched the intensity of the training tempo and we knew we had 

something real special. War is horrifi c and ghastly. There are ghoulish images that 
243 

we all endure and it’s impossible to not be changed forever; but only in the midst 

of the worst mankind can produce can you truly see the beauty of human nature: 

self sacrifi ce, true honor, unprecedented loyalty – all the Army values displayed 

in person. When you have the chance to serve your nation with men and women 

you trust and love; when leaders two tax brackets above your pay grade carry 

rifl es on the fi eld next to you; and when you see your peers take bullets for you 

– that environment would motivate the most ardent anti-victory opponent of this 

confl ict. We defended America and together put a lot of pure evil permanently 

out of business. This was truly the greatest experience in my life. I’m honored to 

have had the opportunity to fi ght this enemy during this noble time in my nation’s 

history, but more importantly, to do it as a “Ramrod” in the Big Red One’s 3d 

Brigade. I truly believed I was the most prudently lethal and professional soldier 

in the world when I wore that Red One patch on my arm, and my peers believed 

the same. 

Lieutenant Colonel Newell was running the show at the task force level, 

and he was everything you could expect in a battalion commander. If you built a 

fi eld grade offi cer in your garage out of parts, you would get Lieutenant Colonel 

Newell: square jaw, oozed confi dence. If you beat him in the face with a shovel, 

his expression wouldn’t change. Not a whole lot of laughing going on. No email 

exchanges after training. I spoke to the guy maybe six times in three years, and 

never small talk. He had expectations and we lived to exceed those. When he 

was happy, he went away. When he wasn’t, he was in your living area telling 

your leadership about his displeasure. Command Sergeant Major Faulkenberg was 

always in our living area no matter what happened. You couldn’t get rid of the guy 

even if you became a tanker. He was never happy, he always demanded things 

be better and was relentless about his own standards. He was the stereotypical 

Sam Elliott CSM Basil Plumley character in We Were Soldiers. A barbed wire 

personality, no nonsense. Had “been there” and “done that” on every continent 

in almost every unit. You never knew where you stood with him, though. In the 

fi eld, his face was a red mask of veiny anger. You never questioned his loyalty or 

his passion for his soldiers, but I never knew if a slap on the back was going to be 

followed by a punch in the face. However, if strings of profanity followed by my 

last name is a mark of endearment, then I believe he loved me unconditionally. 

I would’ve gone through a wall for the man. They also brought in CSM Darrin 

Bohn who was a huge addition, because he came not only from Afghanistan but 

was the Alpha Company 1-75 Ranger Regiment fi rst sergeant as well. His boys 

were the tip of the spear during Operation Anaconda and other epic battles of 

Afghanistan. He’s a stud’s stud. He really implemented a world-class close quarters 

marksmanship instruction course and I’m a walking, living, breathing reminder 

that it works. His training is the reason half my platoon is alive today. Unlike 

other units, CSM Bohn was teaching techniques ripped from real world fi refi ghts. 
244

You get these Blackwater former SWAT morons who give vast dissertations from 

their urban room-clearing experiences on the Miami Dade Sheriff’s Department. 

Give me a break. They seized little Elian Gonzalez out of a Miami condo and are 

now trying to reinvent the Army infantry wheel in Kuwait when you fi rst get into 

country. When you hear about these other kids trying to go for head shots in close 

quarters, fl y up walls like Delta Force, it’s insanity. On the other hand, our guys 

under CSM Bohn were shooting center mass controlled pairs over and over again 

until the guy drops – and that saves lives. We strong-walled, put down controlled 

fi re, overwhelmed, sustained, dominated, fi xed and killed scores of insurgents in 

real world close quarters combat. No one jumped around with gravity boots down 

chimneys, so give the man the credit he deserves. CSM Bohn: what an amazing 

asset he was. There was also Major Ken Adgie who was the executive offi cer 

(XO) at the time. He gave outstanding after-actions reviews (AAR), had a wealth 

of infantry knowledge, and was another 2-2 fi eld grade comedian. Ramrod NCOs 

and offi cers were full of scowls and vinegar before Iraq, but they were the best 

in the world at their jobs and they shaped a brilliant unit. You know, not a whole 

lot of chum-chum times at 2-2 back then. Major Adgie left and we got Major 

John Petkosek, and then we just started to gear up. What’s great about Germany 

is that the faces never seem to go away. You have the Major Adgies here and then 

they end up showing up somewhere else in theater. In United States Army Europe 

(USAREUR), you never lose your guys. Once you have those relationships, you 

have them forever. We started to see guys trickle out and come back. We went with 

Captain Walter from February 2003 all the way to the day we left for Iraq. 

MM: Could you talk me through what the company thought when you found 

out that Doug Walter wouldn’t be able to go with you guys?

DM: I’m not a guy who gushes over offi cers in general. I don’t believe that 

college makes you more adept at leading men in battle. You are not able to shoot 

more accurately because of a commission. That’s lunacy. If we could get warrant 

offi cers to lead platoons in the infantry, I would sign up for 20 years tomorrow – 

but Secretary of the Army Francis Harvey doesn’t take my calls. That said, Captain 

(now Major) Doug Walter is perhaps the most honorable man I have ever met in 

my life. I would put him in the inner circle. He is incapable of doing anything 

unethical and I really, truly admire him. I came to the unit under Captain Thomas 

Johnson who is a tenacious and in-your-face commander. Blunt and aggressive, 

he would lead the charge with a saber in his hand cursing the enemy until his last 

breath. Read Johnson’s Silver Star citation for what he did during the battle for 

Ba’qubah in the summer of 2004 and tell me he shouldn’t have a soccer fi eld at 

Fort Benning. So having that predecessor, Captain Walter built on that aggression 

and instilled vast inner-company coordination and the organization of Bradley/

dismounted infantry interaction that would be essential to fi ghting effectively in 

urban and rural Iraq. He would have four pages of notes on the way we reported 
245 

things on the radio. He was meticulous in the training environment. Our platoons 

fought brilliantly with our mounted elements, and in urban contact that is what 

makes you devastating. Each and every leader you have, whether it’s a senior NCO 

or a commissioned offi cer, you take something from them. In Alpha Company 2-2 

we had very different personalities commanding us before combat tested us, and 

we were all better because of them. Captain Walter was the head coach when it 

all came together. He truly deserves the most credit and that’s why I’ve always 

regarded him as the best. I really was looking forward to going to battle with 

Captain Walter in January 2004 but he got real sick with a severe stomach virus 

that comprised his immune system. We knew he was suffering and we saw his 

weight balloon. This is a guy who would punish us on six and seven mile runs. He 

was almost masochistic when he ran with us in company formations. To see him 

so sick, then, it was obvious to us all that something was seriously wrong. He went 

from being really heavy to frail because of the medication he was on. He was going 

through all these invasive medical procedures in Germany that were horrible. We 

all knew it, but he never complained. His wife is a nurse and her research is really 

the main reason he recovered. There was stress because of the fact that he never let 

on that his condition was life threatening, but we knew it could be potentially. We 

got our A bags, the wives are in the parking lot and he tells us he’s not going with 

us the night we fl y to Kuwait. It was really emotional. It was a tough one to take. 

MM: At the last minute he’s replaced by Captain Sean Sims. Could you tell me 

a little bit about that?

DB: Captain Sims had a stellar reputation. He worked at the operations (S3) 

shop with CSM Bohn for awhile and did a lot behind the scenes. I was impressed 

at his complete self confi dence. He changed nothing from what Captain Walter 

had established. So many times a leader will burn the house down just to rebuild a 

different one from their predecessors, but he wasn’t insecure at all. He had nothing 

to prove to us and he earned our respect under fi re. He had a great personality, 

a magnetic personality: warm smile, funny guy. He would bust chops. He had a 

keen, razor sharp intellect and was articulate. Plus, he and Captain Walter had a 

deep personal relationship. Captain Sims observed/controlled a couple of our live 

fi res so we knew he obviously was more than capable of doing whatever he needed 

to do as an infantry offi cer. He went to Texas A&M with Staff Sergeant Benjamin 

Richey from our 1st Platoon, Alpha Company. We fi gured it was going to be a pretty 

smooth transition. He showed up to Kuwait as our newly minted commander and 

had pink eye, which was then passed throughout the entire Alpha Company and 

subsequently the battalion. I remember much to the chagrin of our Special Forces 

physician assistant (PA), we started sharing all the extra eye ointment and pink 

eye infected half the brigade by the time we moved up north into Iraq. Captain 

Sims came up after having recovered from his initial bout and said to me, tongue 

in cheek, “Sergeant, you really need to be more careful about passing that stuff 
246

around.” I accused him of leaving 2d Platoon alone, while he intentionally rubbed 

his eyes on my 3d Platoon and 1st Platoon’s gear. I told him that in over a year with 

Captain Walter he never gave us pink eye and we all laughed. He said it would be 

noted on Captain Walter’s offi cer evaluation report (OER). It was a near perfect 

transition.

MM: Let’s now focus on your arrival into Iraq and anything that stands out in 

your mind that happened before you guys launched into Operation Phantom Fury.

DB: We took over Forward Operating Base (FOB) Normandy from Task Force 

2-8 of the 4th Infantry Division. 2-8 Infantry named it Normandy because they were 

the fi rst boots on the ground during D-Day; and like World War II, the division 

was going to be counted on to seal the deal. On our fi rst mission as a platoon we 

took contact while still on our right-seat ride. This guy fi red at us from a balcony 

not even 10 feet away, just missing Captain Sims and Staff Sergeant Colin Fitts. 

Captain Sims rolled with us that day and he decided to take us into the marketplace 

at night. The guy shooting at us gets off about four rounds before having a weapons 

malfunction. So he’s correcting his malfunction, two of our guys fi re back and we 

just sat there, eyes wide, “What’s going on?” The 4th ID guys are saying, “This is 

a bad idea; let’s get out of here.” Captain Sims is on the ground and it seems like, 

“Holy cow! This is for real!” We all learned and grew together. Had that happened 

about three weeks later, we would’ve handled that area and the guy with the dirty 

rifl e without pause. Captain Sims was extremely aggressive in the beginning of the 

year, and I absolutely loved that about him. Tenacious and cocky – it was really 

what we needed. Sims had a swagger that just let everyone around him know 

that things were going to be okay; and more importantly, he let his NCOs lead 

during fi ght. My platoon sergeant, Sergeant First Class James Cantrell, was the 

lead mounted Bradley element of most of the company and sometimes battalion 

set plays in contact. He never had issues with letting his NCOs do what they do 

best, and Sergeant First Class Cantrell was the best in the battalion. Cantrell would 

inevitably be making contact and reacting to contact on his own while Sims in the 

back would be issuing intent and direction to set up the next move in support. Sims 

was all about results and never about ego, and this worked fl awlessly in our sector. 

Depending on who you talk to, our company killed well over a hundred insurgents 

over two days of fi ghting in April 2004. The mission was relentless and we were 

ready for it. We picked up after two days of fi ghting with attrition and moved into 

Najaf. We lost a great friend of ours, Staff Sergeant Victor Rosales, on the way to 

Najaf, which was horribly tragic. We loved that man. We all did. 

MM: Was that an improvised explosive device (IED) incident?

DB: Yes, he was in the front cab of a heavy equipment transporter (HET). This 

guy was a Ranger, no-quit attitude and simply a wonderful man, a better father. 

His wife was also in our brigade. He had a little baby, was just a fantastic guy and 
247 

a real asset. We lost him, and to lose him and not do anything there in Najaf really 

was devastating. I was very, very disappointed. Specialist Allen Vandayburg was 

killed in Buritz; he was from Charlie Company. Staff Sergeant Raymond Bittinger 

earned our division’s fi rst Silver Star that night and Specialist Nieves was killed a 

few days after that. We had been out in the desert 10 to 15 days doing nothing. But 

at the same time, we had cut our teeth on the intra-theater deployment. Again, a 

huge leadership challenge that 2-2 and 3d Brigade responded to. We were starting 

to lose guys; and with each loss we became more galvanized and tighter as a unit. 

We started to garner more and more swagger and that meant horrible things for 

the enemy back home. They would call us “Wahed Mooshot” (One Infantry) and 

it was nice to hear that spoken with the awe and reverence it deserved. Grandpa 

would have been proud to see us in the fi eld wearing that Red One in battle. We 

were a sight to see.

MM: When you arrived in Iraq, was your platoon leader actually Lieutenant 

Joaquin Meno?

DB: No, we had Lieutenant Christopher Walls. He ended up being the mortar 

platoon leader in Fallujah. 

MM: When did Lieutenant Meno come in? Was that a couple months prior to 

the Fallujah operation?

DB: That would be mid-to-late July 2004. Lieutenant Meno showed up and he 

was over at FOB Gabe with Charlie Company and Task Force 1-6 Field Artillery. 

He was actually with Charlie Company on the ground the night Specialist 

Vandayburg was killed in Burtiz. It was one of those situations where there were 

too many lieutenants for the leadership jobs. He came over and it was a perfect fi t. 

Now, Walls was a West Point Ranger. The kid was like 6-foot-3 and 220 pounds 

of muscle. Everyone around the battalion would genufl ect as he passed. He was 

a great platoon leader, but he looked the role and had the pedigree for greatness. 

Meno was a branch transfer; the kid was all heart and completely unafraid to express 

what was on his mind, which is sometimes not appreciated by all of command. But 

we thought he was great. He is Guamanian and very proud of who he is, where he 

comes from and will defend his point of view furiously. He also was a renegade 

in the sense that he really didn’t care what feathers got ruffl ed in order to get the 

job done. I liked his us-versus-them approach. He valued his NCOs and, quite 

frankly, regardless of what his professional background was, Lieutenant Meno led 

us with uncommon valor. Every time we were hugging earth, getting pounded on 

from the enemy, he was feet away doing the same. What more do you want from 

a lieutenant? 

MM: What branch did he transfer over from? 
248

DB: I think fi nance. He kept it a secret until the end of the tour. It was the type 

of fi eld where he didn’t have any business being where he was but, I tell you what, 

you didn’t notice it. He is going to be a great company commander, and that is an 

important role of the NCO: to help mold his young lieutenant to be an outstanding 

company commander. Meno is fearless and unrelenting. He won’t back down from 

full bird or fi eld grade. If they make all administration offi cers like Joaquin Meno, 

we need to start bringing them into the infantry. But they don’t. So if by chance 

Francis Harvey is reading this, believe me, they don’t. 

MM: Talk me through what you and your men felt when you fi rst started getting 

an inkling that you may have to go to Fallujah and help out the Marines.

DB: The fi rst rumor was Sadr City in the summer of 2004. It was a rumor, 

but I really wanted that fi ght; I wanted something. The Najaf thing devastated 

me. Muqdadiyah was cleaning up and I really thought we could be used more 

and make a difference. I knew we could dent Anbar Province if allowed. It wasn’t 

that we wanted attention; we just believed in the tenacity of the mechanized 

infantry company – and that is what Anbar needed. We had cut our teeth against 

the enemy. Muqdadiyah was like the “billion virgin giveaway” for the enemy. But 

more importantly, we wanted to fi ght and that’s what we were there for. When 

we missed out on the Najaf fi ght and Najaf blew up again and then Samarra – 2d 

Brigade, 1st ID got Samarra, and then Sadr City went to 1st Cavalry Division. We 

heard it all: “Hey, you’re going to Ramadi, you’re going to Fallujah.” When it 

actually happened, I was more than excited. I thought this was predestined, that 

this was what we were all born to do. I was extremely ready for this challenge. I 

thought our soldiers were going to be without peers and unfl appable in the fi ght. 

As soon as the orders came down through to battalion, I started to see how gifted 

we were as a unit. We had guys who were thinking far outside the box. Captain 

Sims was lining up T-barriers and blowing them up with 120 millimeter gun 

tubes; CSM Faulkenburg was setting up Humvee doors and cracking them with 

rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs); CSM Bohn was getting back into a regimen 

of close quarters marksmanship. We started training more furiously, shooting 

more ammunition. It’s ironic because you really can’t be a subject matter expert 

on military operations in urban terrain (MOUT). No one knows what’s going to 

happen inside a house fi ght. I studied SWAT doctrine from the Los Angeles and 

Chicago Police Departments and the early 1970s fi eld manuals from the Army. 

It’s funny because the early 70s MOUT was based on the lessons learned in World 

War II. There is always like a generation gap between when we start throwing 

things into our doctrine. They were teaching their boys in the late 60s and early 

70s: “When in trouble, frag out and shoot like a madman.” Today we are much 

more evolved, right? Yet when it hits the fan, we toss frags and shoot like madmen. 

High-intensity MOUT is without a script. You can’t master golf and you can’t 

master MOUT. You can, however, rehearse myriads of possibilities and hone basic 
249 

fundamentals of close quarters marksmanship, and most importantly master the 

fundamentals of manipulation of your equipment. Magazine reloads, safety lever 

switching, etc. You set up circumstances to test your soldiers’ ability to adapt to 

whatever situation, especially in casualty evacuations and buddy aid. But MOUT is 

very much a lesson in improvisation. Master the fi ve-second fi refi ght and leave the 

rest up to the enemy. When face to face, nothing can ever dominate the American 

infantrymen. Marine or soldier, Air Force or RTO; we’re untouchable. 

MM: So you guys arrive at the Marine camp in Camp Fallujah and the training 

then must really have intensifi ed. Could you tell me about the rock drills and what 

sort of training you went through when you arrived?

DB: I’m going to be completely honest with you: I made sure my guys didn’t 

do that. There was defi nitely training going on everywhere. You see these guys 

running around clearing houses, doing whatever. The thing about MOUT– and 

fi rst of all, whether we were blessed or cursed, we had close quarters fi refi ghts in 

Muqdadiayh. We shot people in houses. My engineers were more combat tested 

than, quite frankly, the second platoon we dished out to the engineer battalion in 

exchange, just because of the way they were used and the sector they fought in. Our 

scouts were more bloodied than your average Army infantry unit. I’m not trying 

to sound like a braggart; I’m just saying that we had an area of operations (AO) 

that was extremely volatile and by handling that we developed tested techniques 

and tactics with regards to the urban fi ght. 2-7 will probably tell you the same 

thing. Then you’ve got your engineers, your fi eld artillery boys and your tank 

crews – and 3d Brigade’s in Ba’qubah and the Brigade Reconnaissance Troop 

(BRT) is slicing up their piece of the pie. We knew the plan when we left FOB 

Normandy. But extra training for Fallujah while at Camp Fallujah? When you boil 

it down, there are two ways you can go into a house: you have center-fed doors 

and corner-fed doors. The only thing you have to get into the head of Joe is that 

he has to acknowledge the fact that 90 percent of his fi ght against a maneuverminded enemy is a psychological fi ght. They rely heavily on trying to intimidate 

you. As our populations continue to grow, urban areas will grow up and enemies 

of America will use these structures to try to neutralize our fi ghting methods. But 

they can’t psych us out if our soldiers are ready for that type of battle. Once you 

determine that no matter what happens when that door opens you are equipped and

trained to handle all of it, baring a Wes Craven fi lm, you are golden. This enemy 

wants to engage you and run away, hoping you give chase. The enemy in an urban 

fi ght wants to lure you into making “inappropriate moves” and get you to chase 

him around the city, away from your mechanized support by fi re base. A house 

fi ght really plays more into our favor than into the enemy’s favor. By fi ghting us 

in the extreme close quarters, they’re making the asymmetrical fi ght symmetrical. 

There, they’re in a house – fi xed – not running from phase line to phase line 

enveloping our positions. They jump into buildings and you have the choice. Do 
250

you have to clear it? Do you need to exercise precision or do you just want to lob 

some main tank rounds in there or some 25 millimeter high explosive (HE). This 

enemy thinks American warriors don’t have the fortitude for the urban fi ght, and 

they are sadly mistaken. Our technological gap is neutralized to some extent, but 

what the enemy and some American politicians don’t understand is that there’s 

no such thing as a technological advantage in the urban fi ght. At some point, it 

comes down to your desire to destroy the threat that’s in front of you. Everyone is 

at risk in the urban fi ght; nothing is bulletproof in the urban fi ght. It has never been 

world class technology that makes the American infantryman great; rather it’s the 

American infantryman who makes the technology world class. We drilled into our 

kids’ heads the fundamentals of CQB, but that doesn’t mean you script how they 

enter and what they carry when they enter a building. Doctrine will tell you that 

you want your leadership and automatic rifl emen towards the back of the stack; 

but if we didn’t have squad automatic weapon (SAW) gunners in the front, we’re 

losing at least four soldiers in Fallujah on day two. This is a fi ve-second fi refi ght. 

I would tell my guys, “We know what your index (trigger) fi nger can do, but what 

your thumb does is much more important (selector switch).” Muscle memory and 

manipulation of weapons, accuracy and fi re superiority – that’s what worked for us. 

“One man goes this way, two men go that way.” I want shotguns and I want SAWs. 

I want AT4s and I want grenades. We must make sure our soldiers know how to 

read a room before they enter it. They must understand how to “cook off” grenades 

and how to toss them in concrete structures. We want our 240B machine gunners 

in the fi ght. We want our indirect assets of our 40 millimeter HE grenades. The 

fundamentals of room clearing are not things you can drill into soldiers’ heads days 

before we go to battle. They are the things we learned in Kosovo and have taught 

for over two years. Like when your buddy gets hurt in a close quarters fi ght, you 

might not be able to give him aid. You’ve got to kill the source of that casualty. Get 

the bad guy or you are going to have more injured. You hear your buddy hurt and 

it sucks; but you eliminate the threat, secure and search the environment and then 

evacuate on command. It’s all psychological – and once you empower subordinates 

to perform above their pay grade, they realize there’s nothing they can’t handle. 

Like professionals, they’ll go out and execute. The enemy doesn’t get it. We talk a 

lot about how this Islamist enemy has been fi ghting for generations and how new 

we are to this type of battle. In 2003, you may have had a point with that argument. 

In 2010 or 2012, though, I really would not want to fi ght an American infantryman 

in an urban situation. This generation today is unfl appable in the worst situations 

imaginable. We never had the Grozny or the Berlin experiences to draw from as 

an Army. But now we have Fallujah, Ramadi, Tall Afar, Ba’qubah and Baghdad. I 

think we can stop telling Mogadishu stories about now. These privates will be far 

superior NCOs for that reason.
251 

MM: So you and your squad are lined up, you’ve gone out of your attack 

positions and you’re getting ready to blow the breach and go into Fallujah. Can 

you talk me through that fi rst night?

DB: We got the go-ahead at 1500 that day that we were ready to roll. The 

Marines were asking if we were ready and we said we were. We’re sleeping outside, 

gorging ourselves on MREs, drinking as much water as we could, getting some shut 

eye and not really knowing what a sustained urban fi ght was going to be like. No 

coming home for sleep and chow, 24/7 urban fi ghting, securing your six o’clock 

and focusing on your twelve and nine and three. It’s challenging. My team leader, 

Sergeant Charles Knapp, and Lieutenant Meno ran off with the Headquarters and 

Headquarters Company (HHC) commander, Captain Fred Dente, and the chaplain, 

Captain Ric Brown, who was a super chaplain the entire rotation. The guy was 

praying with us and consoling us, literally on the battlefi eld and without a weapons 

system. He even got assaulted by ruffi an Georgian Army soldiers at our Morale, 

Welfare and Recreation (MWR) at FOB Normandy. We really loved him. He’s a 

great guy. Anyway, those guys do a quick Humvee reconnaissance on this berm. 

These mortar rounds just missed Captain Dente just a few feet away. We get a 

bunch of Paladins that crack over them and the guys told me they could see the 

binoculars twinkle in the distance and then that artillery round just puffed up pink. 

Our artillery, from the spotters to the shooters to the beautiful men who allowed 

the rounds to fl y, they were crucial to keeping the enemy in one area to be fl ushed 

out. If we had to chase these insurgents from block to block, it would have been 

horrifi c. Their accuracy was spot on; and while they fi red an absurd amount of 

artillery, it was still not enough for me on the ground. Our enemy might disagree, 

but he isn’t available for comment at this time so they obviously did a great job. 

But the wait that afternoon for H-Hour was absolute agony. There are only so 

many Knute Rockne pep talks you can give when you’re stacked eight to a man in 

a Bradley. 

MM: So you’re in the back of this Bradley and you’re waiting for this breach 

to go. Were you able to see anything of the mine clearing line charge (MCLC) 

going off?

DB: We were checking it out before any of it happened. Our engineers were 

great the entire year because, fi rst of all, they taught us how to blow our own stuff 

up. It was fantastic! We never needed explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) in our 

sector because the engineers were on patrol with us. They taught me, and at times 

perhaps they taught me too much. I loved the idea of coming up with different 

ways to get into houses and these guys were more than willing to help us out. So I 

checked out the MCLC, wanted to know how it was fi red and what the rocket and 

the trailer looked like. When it was launched, you think, “Well, this isn’t going 

to be anything.” I’ve had a MCLC go off during training when I was outside and 
252

also when I was inside; and I have to say that inside is actually worse when you’re 

so close to it. Staff Sergeant Bryan Lockwald was the engineer in charge of the 

MCLC. He told me he was more concerned about all the C4 he had in his M113 

if they got hit to worry about the MCLC. He actually fi red a second MCLC in the 

city. We had long talked about what would happen if you fi red a MCLC down 

Main Street. The concussion would take out the fi rst three stories on each side of 

the road. I thought it was awesome. The intense shockwave is actually that lethal, 

but to my knowledge that is the MCLC launched in an urban environment. The 

engineers from our Alpha Company did just that and God bless them for it. After 

that breeching MCLC went off, you probably had two minutes of nothingness and 

that’s the last time I heard the still of the night in Fallujah until we left. 

MM: So your platoon goes through the breach. At some point were you doing 

far or near side security?

DB: Staff Sergeant Biden Jim, a tanker with Bravo Company 1-63, was the 

lead vehicle in Fallujah on our side of the fi ght. His tank was A48 and he was in 

front of my Bradley. This guy was a Pacifi c Islander and really never got any credit 

for all that he did. Sergeant First Class Phelps, his platoon sergeant, did a whole 

bunch too, but tankers have the armor and no one wants to give them credit. If you 

see what happened to the Israeli Defense Forces armor in Lebanon, you realize 

that it’s not just the tanks but the operators who are incredible. Staff Sergeant Jim 

was on point leading the way. We split our squads up by sections, Alpha and Bravo 

Sections. I was in Alpha Section and Fitts was with the Bravo Section, with 7 and 

9. We just kept moving through and, I’ll tell you what, it was really hard for the 

Bradley commanders to stay buttoned up like they were supposed to because we’re 

trying to go with speed and you can just feel the Bradleys hitting soft sand and 

the resistance of them plowing the earth around and moving. You look out your 

periscope and you just see headlights with your infrared. Those Brads moved one 

inch off the chem-lit trail and, boom, there was some explosive, be it land mine or 

IED. It felt like the vehicles lifted off the ground. Sergeant First Class Cantrell’s 

A37 had a small fi re under its track leading up to the initial dismount.

MM: Did you have any diffi culty with the railroad tracks that were blown up 

there?

DM: You felt everything you ran over. We got right up to the edge of the city, 

some idiot is bleeding over on our company net and it’s a Marine. I hear Captain 

Sims lose his mind on the company net, and then I hear our whole platoon net lose 

its mind. We’re on someone else’s fi re net. So the ramp drops, I send everyone 

out and we’re maybe 80 meters from the city. My radio guy, Specialist John Ruiz, 

is ready to refi ll my radio and I said, “What the hell is going on?” They said the 

Marines had washed us out and they told us to get off the net. We actually had to 

do a communications security (COMSEC) changeover.
253 

MM: You got to be kidding me!

DM: I swear, less than 100 meters from the city, right next to the breach. We 

were through and it was just a matter of organizing and getting everyone on line 

to grab our foothold. But we did a COMSEC changeover right there less than 100 

meters from Fallujah.

MM: I’ve heard numerous examples of the Marine load fi lls not working and 

stuff like that.

DM: Right. Well, that’s someone’s purpose I’m sure. Whatever. Blaming who 

screwed up is pointless, but goofi ng on Marines is my favorite pastime. Seriously, 

everything was laid out well in advance at Camp Fallujah for all the detachments. 

We must have done six COMSEC changeovers before we left for the fi ght while at 

Camp Fallujah. I don’t mean to bash the Marines and it might be our fault, but this was 

something that might have been handled a little smoother in retrospect. Whenever 

you work with another branch, there are always going to be issues no matter what 

you do. At this point, military historians will say that we’re in the expeditionary 

era of warfi ghting. This is where we’re all trying to be lighter, faster and more 

adaptable to the ever-changing environment of this global war. Now is probably 

the time where we should be performing more live fi re, joint training missions with 

the Marine Corps and perhaps letting them get a hold of some quality equipment 

that would welcome them into the new millennium. It’s shameful that they’re so 

under-funded that they can’t get basic issued gear. Seriously, we lifted night vision 

and Leopold scopes off the enemy in Fallujah. So it can be said, without hyperbole, 

that some of the insurgents had more modern equipment that our Marines did and 

there is no excuse for that. The days of amphibious assaults on a scale of what the 

Marines were designed to do are as long gone as phosphate sodas at the local drug 

store. Marines are being asked to do more and more offensive urban actions and 

need to be on a technological par with the rest of our world class military. Without 

that, you might as well leave them on the boats – and not the ones they “drove” into 

Fallujah, but the actual boat-boats. 

MM: So you guys get through the breach and I think your fi rst objective right 

there on the northeast side of the city is Objective Lion and you push down to 

Objective Panther that fi rst night. Anything stand out in your mind from that fi rst 

push? I guess you guys actually get through that breach a little after 1900. You’re 

pushing and fi ghting all night to keep moving south, I would assume.

DM: First of all, it was an extremely dark night with very little natural 

illumination. The moon was nonexistent and, thank God, there was white 

phosphorous (WP) on the ground. We wouldn’t have been able to see anything 

without that – secondary fi res and other battlefi eld debris. My stomach’s in a knot. 

I just want that fi rst guy to start shooting so I can get it over with. I feel like my 

grandfather in World War II, that I’m literally living in an historical moment. We 
254

waited and waited and waited for the Iraqis to get their act together behind us. 

After about 45 minutes of standing there, it looked like the Marines were still all 

lined up and not moving. Someone just said, “Let’s go! Take it down, fi rst house, 

we’re moving.” Then a pretty good fi refi ght broke out to our west, which I can 

only assume was the fi refi ght that either preceded or was the actual the death of 

Sergeant Major Faulkenburg but it was defi nitely to our west. There was so much 

electrical wire from the bashed buildings. Captain James Cobb did an amazing job 

of prepping that area. A lot of kids still have fathers today because of his precision 

out there. During the day, you could see the way these insurgents were dug in; 

and without that relentless 155 millimeter barrage, we would’ve taken massive 

casualties. The front four buildings we were going into, which were completely 

pancaked – there were little spider trails and you could see fi ghting positions 

everywhere: dug in, overhead cover, even sumps on the bottom. Evidently FM 

7-8 is available online. You could see where there was a garage, a car shop they 

would use, a little trench where you would change the oil – that was sandbagged 

with an RPK sitting up there. And this is the God’s honest truth: I can’t tell you 

how many bodies I saw in Fallujah, and every single one had a weapon in his hand 

and every one was either belt-fed PKCs or RPKs. There were very few rockets 

left around because they were more precious, obviously, than ball ammunition. 

A couple of my guys got caught in this electrical wire and for a brief moment 

there was some staccato fi re from the distance. Staff Sergeant Fitts’ squad had 

better position to identify the threat of the fi re and he wasn’t fi ring, so I trusted it 

was most likely stray rounds. But I was just having a heart attack thinking these 

soldiers were prone and in a huge danger area out in the open. I started to thrash 

a knife at the wire to free them only to be consumed in the tangle myself. We 

get into the fi rst building, we get a foothold. I meet up with Fitts, Staff Sergeant 

Scott Lawson’s there with his weapons squad, and Lieutenant Meno comes in. 

There are barrels of mo gas ready to blow, to isolate our thermals and night vision 

capability. There were newly-bricked walls behind doors and windows. Almost all 

the access that wasn’t created by tanks and artillery was covered by the insurgents. 

They also made great strides to block our access to rooftops. Stairs would just 

stop and a seven-foot wall would block a door. I jumped into a window and found 

an oversized pineapple grenade on a door handle. Houses were empty, personal 

belongings packed in a hurry, stuff strewn across the fl oors. This one house had a 

serpentine-like maze of cinderblocks in the front yard with two sandbagged crewserved weapons overlooking from the roof. The only way out had a 130 millimeter 

round covered in fl our. This took some planning. I was highly impressed and quite 

taken by the elaborateness of their defenses. Anyway, we get the call that Captain 

Sims was coming with his personal security detachment (PSD), we link up with 

him, 1st Platoon is still mounted up and we grab our fi rst objective. No sooner than 

we do this, I see this dude with just soot all over his face. All I could see were his 
255 

eyes, just two eyeballs walking. He’s carrying a car battery like nothing’s going 

on, his AK-47 smacking against his leg. I engaged him and Fitts – without a reticle 

aim by the way; he just had his night observation devices (NODs) on. But he shot 

three pump-action slugs that catastrophically ruined this guy’s night. He was using 

my head as a tripod, unfortunately, but this was the fi rst guy we hit. We move to the 

next building and I got a kid, Sergeant Knapp – the kid’s an athlete. He can throw 

a grenade 40 meters on average and they almost air burst when he throws them. 

He’s a great grenade thrower. He’s a great baseball and football player. He tosses a 

grenade into this building across the street from where this guy was headed and, by 

the grace of God, our whole platoon piles in there and the whole thing was wired 

to blow. I’ve never seen that much C4 in my entire life. It looked like a log cabin, 

that’s how many bricks were all taped together on the walls. It didn’t take long. 

His grenade actually severed all the wires to the door. We came across our fi rst 

building-contained improvised explosive device (BCIED) not even two buildings 

into the fi ght. It dawned on me that the guy we shot was heading towards the 

building. Knapp’s grenade throw and Fitts’ shotgun saved our platoon. With that 

much PE4 (Soviet C4), we would’ve been done.

MM: Can you talk me through your advance on down to your main objective 

at least initially, down to Phase Line Fran or Highway 10?

DB: The night went pretty slow and pretty much everything was tank or 

Bradley-killed. You would actually hear insurgents challenging Sergeant First 

Class Phelps’ and Staff Sergeant Jim’s tanks with AK47 fi re and then, Boom!

Silence. If it wasn’t so serious it would’ve been funny. They were amazed at the 

enemy’s brazen attempts to attack tanks. 1st Platoon threw a whole lot of fi re in, 

but I have no idea how many they got. I know their Bradleys were racking them up 

and our tanks were doing the same. The AC-130 gunship and A-10s were active in 

the nights previous, as they were the fi rst night, and we saw their harvest the next 

morning. I was most amazed by the audacity of the enemy. The editorializing by 

the tanks and Bradley crews after eliminating targets time and time again became 

the only way to keep focus. We get to the mosque and are going to bust in and let 

the Iraqi Intervention Force (IIF) search the inside as ordered. I shot an AT4, put up 

a Bangalore torpedo, put plain C4 on the hinges of this mosque’s gate to breach into 

it and I couldn’t even bust it. I was prepping a Javelin missile when Sergeant First 

Class Cantrell stopped the insanity and hit it with a Bradley. Nothing happened. 

Our orders were we couldn’t enter and clear a mosque, but we could breach it so the 

Iraqis could come and clear it. So we were about 150 meters from Phase Line Fran 

at the Imam al-Shafi mosque at Objective Cougar. I shot everything we had at this 

door. Finally Staff Sergeant Jim just took his tank and peeled the wall back next to 

the gate. At any rate, the sun is coming up and my SAW gunner, Private First Class 

Alex Stuckert from California, yells for me, says he sees a guy. We’re on a rooftop 

facing north, which is our six o’clock, because we’re headed south and we’ve got 
256

limited security with the Bradleys facing south towards Phase Line Fran. We’ve 

got a pretty good foothold, BRT is somewhere to our east, and 1st Platoon is about 

200 meters to our west. No contact, just a couple booms off to the distance. We 

started to see a hand move a curtain. There was a window in an adjoining building 

next to the building we’re on the roof of. I asked Stuckert what he was talking 

about and said we can get at least an hour of sleep if he just chilled out. But then 

he sees it again and Lawson takes out his nine millimeter. Stuckert and Lawson put 

their nine millimeters in the window, engage it, and blood splatters the curtains. 

The wounded guy comes to the ground fl oor of the building adjacent to ours and, 

I’ll tell you what, all hell broke loose. Things just erupted, he’s screaming the 

entire time and there are echoes of return, either walkie-talkie foghorn/bullhorn or 

just people screaming. It was eerie to hear that as the sun was coming up, to realize 

how many people were behind us and how many people were moving towards us. 

I don’t believe we missed them on the way through. I think in the vacuum with 

the Marines getting stymied, they just swung to the east and followed us up. Fitts 

took his squad and stayed on the bottom fl oor of a building next door. The bad guy 

building was in between Fitts’ building and my building, and Fitts was to the west 

of me. I’ll you what, he laid down a perfect linear ambush. He waited and waited, 

knowing we didn’t have any idea of where he was – and I didn’t want to fi re not 

knowing where he was. He laid down an ambush and his SAW gunners cut down 

fi ve or six individuals running right across the road. None of this was reported in 

the AAR. A Marine platoon was pinned down to the point where they had to put 

green smoke on the roof because they didn’t know who was shooting at them. 

They were taking 360-degree fi re. These guys were running across the T-barriers 

that were cutting off our advance to Phase Line Fran, so we shot TOW missiles 

at them – and nothing. Then we had people across the street from the mosque 

shooting at us from a distance of about 25 to 30 meters. The fi re is coming quick 

and fast. Sergeant Warren Misa, Fitts’ Alpha Team leader, gets hit in the face with a 

7.62 tracer and I pulled it out with my Nomex glove. It was a piece of fragment but, 

my God, his face swelled up pretty good. Anyway, the moral of the story was we 

got a pretty good fi ght. That fi ght maintained its consistency until the BRT came 

up on the east fl ank, which would have been Captain Kirk Mayfi eld. Mayfi eld’s 

Bradleys and tanks really just started taking over and you could just hear it. In that 

fi ght, somehow one of our gun tubes on a 4th Platoon tank got messed up; and to 

be honest with you, it was totally inoperable. The shield on his ammo carrier was 

broken as well. I’ll tell you what, a Chinook came down less than fi ve hours later 

and he got a brand new gun tube and fi red without the shield protecting his ammo. 

So I couldn’t say enough about the tankers. Anyway, I didn’t really feel warm and 

cozy that we had that mosque locked down. One thing that was cool was I brought 

a 65-pound titanium breach ladder. It could be used as a ladder or a runway. They 

always thought I was retarded for bringing this thing. But we strapped it on the 
257 

Bradley. One of my corporals, my Bravo Team leader, Piotr Sucholas, actually got 

a Bronze Star with Valor (BSV) for retrieving that under rocket fi re. But anyway, 

we put it across the other rooftop, the one where the bad guy was, and crossed 

maybe nine feet of alleyway with this thing. We opened up a completely different 

avenue of fi re and Fitts used his advanced combat optical gunsight (ACOG), his 

marksmen just brilliantly. I mean, we were taking guys off left and right and it was 

really well done. He did an excellent job setting that up. I don’t think we really 

won that fi ght but I think they stopped shooting at us. And until we get to Phase 

Line Fran, we’re going to have to go backwards, fl ush this thing out and massage 

the battlefi eld a little better. 

MM: When you guys did get down to Fran, the sun’s up by this time –

DB: It was afternoon.

MM: You guys are taking some pretty heavy fi re down there too, aren’t you?

DB: We get to Fran and this guy comes running down the street from our west. 

1st Platoon left the VS17 panel on one building and then went to another building, 

so they actually occupied two buildings. They had perfect fi elds of fi re, whereas 

we were a little bit far to the east. So I could see their location but it was kind of 

forward of our location so we really didn’t have the perfect area to defend ourselves 

or even put up any sort of a fi ght. But this guy running away from Headquarters 

Platoon and 1st Platoon ran right down the street into a building and detonated 

over 10 IEDs that were laced around telephone poles going up to Fran. A piece 

of shrapnel, a piece of the door lock, lodged into the genital region of Sergeant 

Lawson’s team leader, Alan Pratt, and he was the fi rst guy we medically evacuated 

(MEDEVAC’d). Debris was fl ying everywhere and there was nothing we could 

do. We knew he was in the building so we brought a Bradley up there to pound the 

windows and doors, which is what we learned in Muqdadiyah, but unfortunately 

the houses are like castles. We weren’t really wanting to smash through walls at 40 

miles an hour and deadline the Bradleys, so I took PFC Victor Santos, prepped a 

Javelin, and the battle damage assessment was that we engaged and destroyed one 

dude with a top attack. That was a great moment for the whole team. 

MM: My understanding is that once you guys are at Fran, there’s a little bit of 

a rearm/refuel and then you’re ordered to go back and check out the area back to 

the line of departure (LD). 

DB: 9 November was the morning of the mosque fi ght, so it was late at 

night. That day we lost Pratt to injury and then on the morning of 10 November 

– not everyone went back. First of all, everyone was loading up on ammo for the 

company. Certain people were grabbing things they needed that they were running 

low on. We got four crates of grenades because we were just throwing grenades 

everywhere. It was a grenade shower. I wanted to get the claymores in the fi ght. I 
258

just thought it would be the best static defense you could possibly have in a house. 

So we ordered a bunch of them but they just sat in the Bradley; we never used 

them. We got more AT4s, more 40 millimeter, Bradleys got fi xed, the missile teams 

did a great job. Our logistics were perfect. On the morning of 10 November, we 

rolled back to the north and basically hit the areas that have now been cleared by, I 

assume, the BRT or the IIF. We were fi nding weapons caches in the middle of the 

street and I don’t know if the IIF was grabbing them. We were fi nding bodies piled 

on top of each other and someone was going through and cleaning up the area. We 

were also fi nding different fl ags on different houses that mean different things. 

Bricks that are painted red have IVs, gauze and lidocaine and you name it inside. A 

few have rockets and land mines. It’s like they’re marking their egress routes. And 

there’s so much to blow, you literally don’t have the time. Our rules of engagement 

(ROE) are to destroy every vehicle because of the vehicle-borne IED (VBIED) 

threat. To make a long story short, it was just a tremendous amount of work and 

we get a call around 1700 that we need to be at Objective Wolf. That was the night 

of 10 November and that was 1st Platoon’s call. They were supposed to show up 

but they got stymied with contact so they’re handling their business. By the time 

1st Platoon showed up at the scene, across the street there was a guy in the building 

heavily fortifi ed. He shot Staff Sergeant Jason Laser and some other scouts. Laser 

got hit from behind. The round hit his M16 and his fi nger, a round went around 

his neck and one hit his Gerber tactical tool. It was ridiculous: these guys were so 

lucky not to have gotten killed. But again, there’s nothing you can do when there 

are guys behind cover when you walk up the stairs. 

MM: Had you been called over to Objective Wolf?

DB: There are two situations transpiring at the same time. The one that 

happened in the early afternoon, the scouts had made contact to the north. They 

cordoned the area and then Lieutenant Ed Iwan saw these guys run across the 

way into this block. He shot at these individuals, killed one, his 25 millimeter 

malfunctioned and, without even hesitating, he moved tanks and Bradleys to 

completely cordon this area. Now, simultaneously, we have probably a 350-meter 

lead on the Marine Corps at this time. They were to our west and probably a third 

of a kilometer north of our position as we are moving southerly. That’s what it 

appeared because I’m going by the source of fi re. Iwan gets out, he’s sweating, we 

haven’t had a whole lot of rest, we’ve hardly eaten, and this is the fi rst day of the 

prickly heat: wet T-shirts, the ornery attitudes, the smells, the soldiering is really 

starting to hit hard, and our discipline is starting to be a challenge. It’s a leadership 

challenge for the NCOs to keep these guys focused. Essentially our mission is to 

sweep this block of upscale houses, upper middle class homes. The Askari District 

is called the “Soldier’s District” and all the Sunni offi cers lived in this area, so 

there’s a whole lot of upper class homes. I remember Iwan said to Meno: “Hey, 

platoon leader, what you got? Give me a plan.” And Meno said, “We’re going 
259 

to fi re as many tank rounds as these guys have. We’re going to 25 after that and 

we’re going to shoot TOW missiles in at the base and pepper the outside of these 

buildings before we go in.” High-explosive, anti-tank (HEAT) rounds are going 

through like three buildings of nothing but fi re. We noticed in the mosque fi ght on 

9 November that we were fi ghting guys who were wearing Kevlar and the same 

uniforms the IIF were wearing. We knew that; it wasn’t a shock. The IIF have a red 

and a white piece of tape and they weren’t anywhere near our front. So any guy in 

that uniform to our front was dead. But it did kind of freak us out. In the buildup 

training to Iraq, we’re basically fi ghting our own defense. So now you have 19-

year-old privates who are asking, “So, you’re telling me if I shoot to the side of a 

guy with a small arms protective insert (SAPI) plate, that SAPI plate’s integrity 

will be –” You know what I mean? We’re essentially telling them how to destroy 

their only safeguard. So psychologically it’s quite a challenge. So anyway, we go 

into these houses, we’re about to get ready, and we’re literally moving behind 

armor that’s driving up this road. There’s probably a 150-meter breach of nothing 

that’s between a road, our side of the fi ght, Captain Sims and the scouts, and 1st

Platoon’s side of the fi ght. Meanwhile on the other side of the road, Sims has shot 

TOW missiles, 25 millimeter, tank rounds; he’s hit it with artillery, AT4s, they’re 

calling in an air strike as we move out and, literally, it’s like the $6 Million Man. 

This guy is shouting in broken English, he’s obnoxious, he’s wounded three of our 

guys and we don’t know how serious the wounds are. But it was pretty touch and 

go. We’re on our side and we know we’re fi ghting guys who are going to fi ght to 

the death. I’m expecting close air support (CAS) and artillery to come in at any 

moment. That was Sergeant Chad Ellis in the 6 track. He just got his 25 millimeter 

put back on, he shot a 25 and the wall collapsed after he shot a TOW. The 25 went 

through the wall, ricocheted to the west. The Marines unloaded in response on our 

positions, rounds impacting all around us. Meno is yelling on the radio, Cantrell 

is yelling back to him to check our fi re. Chaos. The response of the fi re was over 

two minutes. I have the DVD a reporter took of the exchange. Marine crew-served 

weapons fi re chewed up real estate around us for a good chunk of time. 

MM: These are all going against those particular houses that have been 

cordoned off that you guys thought these six or eight insurgents had run into?

DB: Negative. This was the fi re that was coming from the Marine Corps.

MM: Oh okay.

DB: This is my argument: every fi ve steps I took towards this structure, a 

parachute fl are would go up. We would have complete isolation where the fi res 

were inside homes and we still had enough cover where we weren’t giving away our 

signatures at all. We’re walking away from the hotspots of the town. There wasn’t 

any electricity but there are still fi res going on, so there are hotspots. We’re doing 

our best to have our light discipline and these parachute fl ares are going off like 
260

every 10 minutes. What’s going on? We’re hearing on the radios that the Marines 

only have night vision for their squad leaders. Then Ellis’ round goes off, and then 

from the origin of where the parachute fl ares came there was a tremendous amount 

of tracer fi re. I’m putting it out there because it happened. The parachute fl ares 

continued and then some jackass in civil affairs (CA) pulls up a speaker system 

on a Humvee and starts blaring at max decibels the Team America: World Police

movie theme song and the song by Dope called “Die, M-----f-----, Die.” Now, 

this might be cool to some people, but when you’re actually trying to focus men 

to go into each building and have the presence of mind to understand situational 

awareness, psychological operations (PSYOP) are really not needed. 

MM: Who sent this guy down there?

DB: I have no idea. But he’s playing the “America, F--- Yeah!” song, everyone’s 

high-fi ving on the other side of the street and I’m like, “What the f---, guy?” I was 

really adamant and I was really pissed off. Fitts was pissed, Lieutenant Meno was 

highly agitated and I was really trying to control myself. I had no idea what the hell 

was going on – Marines are shooting at us. We’re fi nding American grenades, 

American Kevlar helmets, our old school Kevlar vests, American boots all over the 

place. At any minute we could have fi ve wackos jumping out and blowing our 

heads off, and some asshole wants to play a soundtrack to this. You name it, this 

stuff was everywhere. I have no idea if I’m going to walk into a bunch of guys 

wearing an EOD suit with Browning automatics. I’m trying to focus these kids 

who are doing a really outstanding job of not losing their bearings. So fi nally we 

get to the side, we’ve been doing this and we’ve went through – Michael Ware 

from Time magazine says 10 houses as a nice round number, but we had done 75 

percent of the homes and we’re now booking towards the northern side of the 

complex. We’re back to where the opening is where I can see the FOB, the 

commanding offi cer and everyone else and they’re waiting on an air strike. A 

couple rounds are clicking off here and there but nothing big. So all these guys are 

waiting by their vehicles and we’re watching them, they’re watching us. As we 

move, I take point. Sergeant Knapp is my Alpha Team leader who sees a body. I 

see it simultaneously and we raise our weapons, snap off the rounds we need to 

snap off. It’s a guy who recently lost his leg from one of the HEAT rounds and he’s 

on the ground. The pucker factor’s up now because we’re in the bullseye zone and 

there are fi ve houses left. So we did our enemy prisoner of war search on the guy. 

We’re making sure he’s dead, we search him. John Ruiz, my SAW gunner, turns 

his ankle on some bricks and goes down with a pretty bad ankle. I was kind of 

pissed off by the music so Fitts and I decide we’re going to take a break for two 

hours. We’re going to ice off Ruiz’s leg and just tell these guys to chill out. Platoon 

sergeant is calling every fi ve minutes, “Where are you at? What are you doing?” 

“We’re at House 14, we’re moving, leave us alone.” Because we knew we were 

just smoked. We go into the next house and I fi nd an RPG without any safety on it. 
261 

I’m pretty good with these things and I’m going to shoot this rocket down the street 

into one of these houses. They were like, “Dude, the Marines almost killed us all 

for a 25 millimeter. If they see an RPG, they’ll kill us for sure.” I argued that they 

don’t have night vision so we have a chance. But I leave it on the road, put a chem 

light on it, and pull out the rocket and fuse so it’s not armed. We literally go into 

the second gate and it’s opened, which should have been a huge giveaway right 

there. Out of the 12 houses we went to, maybe four of the gates were open. We’d 

all seen signs of life there, but now we’ve been doing this about six hours and we 

think they’re long gone. All I’m hearing is an AT4 being shot from a Bradley 

commander across the street. “What are we doing? It’s pointless.” So Fitts is kind 

of irritated with all our soldiers and he says, “I don’t care what squad you’re in, get 

in a fi le right now.” He starts getting really pissed off and I start asserting myself 

to help him out. The guys walk in the building and open up the fi rst door. Specialist 

Lance Ohle from Orlando, Florida, a SAW gunner, I don’t have any idea how he 

manipulated – well, I do know because we drilled him to death on a SAW. This kid 

fl icked that thing into fi re, put a burst back, and Warren Misa pulled him out from 

the doorway and saved his life. Before I knew it, the weapons squad had pulled 

security on the outside of the house. I just saw fi re coming everywhere. The wall 

that partitioned me from Fitts – the two doorways and behind this wall – it looked 

like if you took a campfi re and threw a telephone pole on it, embers of tracer fi re 

just going through everything and going everywhere, guys are screaming. And 

then I yell, “Cease fi re!” because I fi gure it’s Ohle and Misa shooting. Fitts says, 

“No, don’t cease fi re” and I’m like, “F------ cease f------ fi re right now!” Fitts yells 

over to me, “How about you tell those f-----s on the other side of the wall to cease 

fi re?” And I look above his head and start to hear a tremendous amount of machine 

gun fi re coming from outside, and it’s going through. Our cordon outside got hit 

from the kitchen – bottles and glass. One of our guys’ whole face is swollen from 

glass and metal and he’s screaming, “My eyes, my eyes!” Right then, I hear from 

the other side of the wall this f------ creepy insurgent son of a bitch mocking him 

and screaming, “My eyes, my eyes! Ah help me, my eyes,” cackling all this shit. I 

tell you what, I was scared but I was absolutely f------ livid. I was just beyond livid. 

I called for a 240 and a SAW gunner to come in. Fitts and I would just come up 

with all these little TTPs. One that I had was I put a 240 gunner in the prone and a 

SAW gunner on one knee pulling rear security. I used the back of his heel to pie 

wedge that 240 on the asphalt. So I want to pie wedge the door with that 240B and, 

as soon as we do, PFC Jim Metcalf, SAW gunner, gets hit under the vest trying to 

move in. He falls down and I don’t know his condition. Our radio guy outside, 

Rodriquez, who we kind of rented from HHC, says, “He’s hit!” Then one after 

another. No one has any idea. Michael Ware is outside, I have Lieutenant Meno on 

my feet; he runs back and tries to get up. I see the guys through Fitts’ room and the 

tracer rounds from the 240 are coming through the kitchen wall and going right 
262

over Fitts’ head. So, someone’s got to ceasefi re so I tell the guy outside, “Just aim 

towards the base of the window, go long with the fi re. Don’t go high, go long.” The 

next thing I know, I’m like, “Just give me the f------ SAW!” I threw my M4 across 

the fl oor, someone threw me a SAW, and Fitts said, “I need you.” He was totally 

pinned down. This guy took three rounds and he’s got three BSVs and a Purple 

Heart. Staff Sergeant Colin Fitts is an American hero; he’s the bravest dude in the 

battalion by far. It’s true; he’s a stud. But there’s nothing he can do, he’s screwed. 

I’m there, I orient myself and just throw the bitch on fi re and, I’ll tell you what, it 

runs away on me. I’m just squeezing this thing down and people are just piling out, 

slipping on glass, falling. There are blood handprints, there’s blood on the ground. 

I see Meno throw this Rodriguez kid in a toilet in the outhouse outside the gate. 

“Where’s Rodriguez?” He goes back to the gate, picks him up and throws him in 

the road. We get back to the road and we’re trying to fi nd out where our guys are. 

As I’m in the house – and I’m the only one in there – I hear the confusion. I know 

what I have to do. I know no one else knows where I’m at and no one else can see 

what I can see. I know what it’s going to take is for me to just completely f------ nut 

up. I just felt my heart beating a mile a minute. These guys are laughing at me. I 

can see their eyes and they’re angry but they’re smiling; they look completely evil. 

I can see their faces from the tracers. I’m getting low on ammo and I slow it down, 

my barrel is smoking, my fl ash suppressor is hot, so I ran out and threw down my 

SAW. I grab another SAW and blast from the front gate until that’s out of ammo. I 

yell, “Give me an M16 with a 203.” From the road, these dudes are shooting at us 

from the roof. Michael Ware says I got two guys on the fi rst exchange. If I wounded 

one – he has better eyes than me. I don’t see that happening. But anyway, I started 

prepping grenades and throwing them to Knapp. “Knapp, when you get it, you pull 

it, you throw it, no tape, no spoon. Pull the pin and throw it, pull the pin and throw 

it!” Finally I started pulling the pins for him, putting them in his hands and just 

said, “Throw as many grenades as you can!” and he threw maybe four or fi ve 

grenades. I called for a Bradley, we started receiving more fi res, Stuckert shoots his 

SAW, and people are now trying to get to a house across the way to get on line so 

we can at least fi re suppressive from a roof. I come up with a plan, I bring seven 

up, and I’m just livid. I feel like a complete coward. Every fi ve seconds I told these 

kids: “In an emergency we’ll be unfl appable. I will never not do what I ask you to 

do. I will not cower, I will not give in.” I felt like an absolute liar and I was just 

fuming. I’m clenching my teeth, grinding them. Cantrell shoots his 25 millimeter 

and this shit wasn’t going anywhere. He shot his coax. He’s frustrated, I’m talking 

through a radio, I’m frustrated. 

MM: The Bradley can’t get a good shot because there’s a wall there or 

something?

DB: It’s not the wall – if the gate were a door to a room, it would be a cornerfed door. You have no space on the right side of this gate. Then there’s an opening 
263 

into a quarter-acre palm grove which is beautifully manicured: grass, it’s got fruit 

trees, you name it. It has beautiful palms, well manicured. Everything is beautiful 

in the house, to be honest with you. I don’t know how high the house is; it looks 

higher than the house next to it. I’m trying to get how many – did these guys run 

in from the kitchen; what are they doing? I yell for my team leader and look up 

and see Knapp telling the kids what to do. I’m really proud of my soldiers and my 

peers. I love these guys to death. I’ll be honest with you, we’re all replaceable. If 

you’re going to look at a leader, the quality of a leader is that his kids are better 

than he is; and I’ll tell you what: at that level, Knapp was better than I was. I felt 

he was completely competent to take over a squad and if anything happened, it 

happened. I yelled for two SAW gunners and Stuckert was right there but he had 

just shot around 200 rounds and I couldn’t wait for him to reload. So Specialist 

Tristan Maxfi eld, great kid – who ended up almost losing a leg three days later – 

and Specialist Ohle, my two SAW gunners came out. Michael Ware is right behind 

me. He says I told him to get out, and I did. I wanted to scare him into getting out 

of there. The best motivation sometimes is false motivation, and I’m trying to 

convince myself and these kids that this is a great idea. Everyone’s face is white. I 

hand a grenade to Maxfi eld and he almost misses the wall with it. It hits like twice 

on the top of the wall. I said, “Dude, if you can’t throw a grenade, we’re going to 

be in a world of hurt. You need to do it.” So I start chewing his ass to let him know 

that I’m back, that I’m an asshole and I’m ready to roll, trying to get into character 

a little bit. And meanwhile I’m about shitting in my pants, I’m not going to hide it, 

but I’m putting up a great front. Lawson comes up to me and here’s the quote the 

guy misconstrued. Lawson says to me, “I’m not going to let you go in there and die 

alone.” That’s what he said. My response to him was, “You’re coming?”

MM: So Michael Ware had gotten that wrong in the Time magazine article 

then?

DB: Ware is extremely accurate, just his syntax was wrong. Lawson told me 

he wasn’t going to let me go in there and die alone, and then he echoed it again 

that night after all this was over. He was like, “I couldn’t let you go in there and die 

alone.” We were both emotional. That to me was literally one of the most beautiful 

gestures I’ve ever heard. It also kind of pissed me off: “I’m not going to f------ 

die!” A kid on the road was screaming as we were taking fi re from the roof: “We’re 

all going to die! We can’t just stand out here; we’re all going to die!” I yelled back, 

“We’re not going to f------ die!” That was said in the road. But Lawson said to 

me, “We’re going in there and I’m not going to let you die alone.” I said, “You’re 

coming with me?” He said, “Absolutely, let’s do this.” He said, “All right.” I used 

to tell my kids, “Charlie’s Angels.” Charlie’s Angels was our little audible that 

when you walked into a building, it meant everyone’s weapon was at the high 

ready, just like Charlie’s Angels. It means your weapons are at the high ready and 

that’s the only position you can have your weapon in a fi ght: at the high ready. 
264

There’s a two percent chance there’s a manhole cover in there; but the chance of a 

guy getting a higher elevated shot off on you from a stairwell is a lot greater. 

MM: So you agree that you told Ware to get the f--- out, that he’s not –

DB: Yes, I did that in my most aggressive tone. I don’t remember what was 

said. I do remember being kind of pushy with my barrel because I didn’t want 

him to die and, to be honest with you, I had very little interaction with him up that 

point. I didn’t know what his motives were.

MM: Did Ware say, “I’m coming with you” or something like that?

DB: He was bullshitting me. He would say he’s coming and then say, “You 

know what? F--- this. You’re absolutely right, this is stupid. I don’t want to do 

this.” Then I’d turn around and he’d be right behind me. I said, “Dude, what the 

hell? Get out of here.” He said, “I will. You know what? Roger, you’re right.” 

Then I turn around again and he’s right behind me! As we were in the house, he’s 

right there: “I can’t let you go. I have to see this. This is the most amazing thing 

I’ve ever seen.” So I’m like, “F------ great,” and I leave my two SAW gunners on 

the side of the house. My whole objective is to soften these insurgents up. They’re 

going to run out of the house, I’m going to go in there like a banshee, I’m going 

to throw grenades, I’m going to make a loud noise, they’re going to run out of the 

house and my guys are going to shoot them. I noticed at that point that Lawson’s 

got a nine millimeter. “How many magazines do you have?” He said, “One.” I 

said, “Dude, not cool.” But whatever ended up happening, I turn the corner, I 

get low, these guys are whispering in Arabic and then they shoot a burst. I hear 

them talking to each other again and then the fi rst thing I hear is the scream from 

upstairs. My heart absolutely stops right there. I’m sweating all over my leg. I’m 

like, “Oh my God, dude! I can do this, I can do this.” I put my head down to peer 

the corner and this barrage of fi re, accurate as all get out, takes a shot at the base of 

the wall. Bullet holes everywhere. I’m bleeding from my face, Lawson’s bleeding 

from his face, my knuckles are red, I have my Nomex gloves on and I’m like, 

“Holy God, if I make another stupid mistake I’m done.” It’s one thing to die in the 

house but quite another to get shot in the carport. So, “Think, think, think.” At this 

time, they’d started their “Allahu Akbar! Allahu Akbar!” and it was almost like 

a freakin’ coward’s chant. They said it over and over again and over each other 

like, “Row, row, row your boat.” I looked over and he’s twisting an RPG into a 

launcher. The only thing I could think of in my religion – and I’m a pretty religious 

guy – was under my breath from that stupid Exorcist movie. I’m repeating, “The 

power of Christ compels you!” I’ve become a shitty PG-13 movie. I start getting 

myself motivated and, for an instant, I think about that poor bastard who dies on 

his birthday. The family who walks through the graveyard and says, “Oh, that poor 

bastard.” So I was like, “Okay man, f--- this! I’m going to do this, I’m not going 

to make it and I don’t care!” In an instant I went from where my feet were 10,000 
265 

pounds to, “F--- it!” I was a coward in life and I’m going to die the way I should 

have lived – on my feet – and I don’t care about anything. I got Lawson here, I got 

my boys outside, I love them, they’d do it for me and I’m going to do this now. I 

was completely fatalistic. I turned the corner and I’ll tell you what, I couldn’t feel 

a thing. I was squeezing my M16 and the RPG guy just dropped. They were fi ring 

RPKs, AK47s and whatnot. The guy who had two AK47s dropped one and went 

to an RPK, but his fi rst burst was really left, long and high. I hit him. That’s why 

I yelled, “Two f-----s down!” to tell Lawson, “Hey bro’, we got it.” I just got a 

foothold and that’s all we needed. I hit this guy and Lawson comes over the corner 

of the door, shoots his nine millimeter into the kitchen, and it gets a retort of fi re 

from the same guy I thought I had just killed who ran into the kitchen. The rounds 

are going through the room Lawson is in, and now he’s out of ammunition.

MM: Was that kitchen door closed? It didn’t go through the door; it went 

through the wall of the kitchen?

DB: It went through the inside of the room. He had one shoulder exposed. I 

was near the stairwell and my back was to a room I hadn’t been in, so I’m using 

the stairs as cover from the kitchen. I’ve got a dead guy underneath me and I’m 

using that stairwell for cover. It looked like hot brass went into his interceptor body 

armor (IBA) and he starts beating on his leg and breathing hard. His whole face 

is sweaty. I look over him at Michael Ware and he’s gone; he’s completely gone. 

He’s outside and I tell Lawson to go get Fitts, get me a shotgun and a f------ SAW 

and come back. He said, “Don’t go anywhere!” I realize my back is turned and I 

can’t have that so I drop my magazine and put another one in. At this time, Ware is 

outside yelling, “Sergeant Bellavia is dead!” They’re hearing the guy in the kitchen 

groaning, Ohle’s on that corner of the wall, Ohle thinks it’s me, and so he’s telling 

everyone, “Bellavia’s hit, Bellavia’s hit!” I get on the radio to Sergeant First Class 

Cantrell and he says, “Give me a situation report, goddamnit. What the f--- are 

you doing?” And I said, “Dude, I’m stressed the f--- out right now, I’m shitting my 

pants, and I’ll give you a SITREP when the shit’s over!” Enough is enough. He 

wants a SITREP and I’m in the f------ pillbox here. 

MM: And at this time the platoon sergeant, the platoon leader, and Fitts and 

everybody, are they still in the building across the street?

DB: I can still hear fi ring and they’re trying to get into buildings by shooting 

locks and stuff. It took awhile to get into some of these houses. Most of these 

houses, in preparation for a northern invasion, they actually sealed all the doors 

and windows with locks and fi xed grenades on door handles. It was an event to just 

get in one of these bitches. It really was; it took a lot of time. There was a closet 

to my left. My night vision is still on. The squad was to my left and I hear the fl ipfl ops coming down the stairs. 

MM: So you did have some sort of night vision capability at this time?
266

DB: At this point, I got my NODs working and everything’s great. There’s an 

elbow of a wall I backed into not knowing where it was, tripping over shit. But the 

dude comes into the room just using the wall close to the stairwell, blind fi ring his 

weapon, doing nothing but making echoes that were just piercing to my ears. It 

was just horrible. I’m scanning and I see tracer rounds going lengthwise in the 

room. I have no idea what’s happening. I don’t know what’s happening because 

they’re just shooting from left to right and I’m just shooting controlled pairs. I get 

to my third door when the injured guy from across the kitchen comes blasting into 

the room. He’s shot and crawls back to the kitchen where we fi nd him dead later 

on. I hear fl ip-fl ops coming down the stairs. The guy from the kitchen was noticeably 

bleeding and it’s like dark brown from my PEQ2A. I’ll tell you what, I don’t know 

if he couldn’t hold his weapon up or what the deal was, but it was quick. A guy 

from the stairs is making a sand paper noise with his sandals, he gives me a shoulder 

and I took the left part of his breast, just below it in the abdomen. He just crumpled 

and moaned. And then another AK47 came around the corner and I could hear him 

yelling like a female’s scream. I don’t really know what happened. That guy fell by 

the stairs. I could see him from the door for awhile. As the rounds were coming 

against the wall, the closet opens up and literally I don’t see anything. As I move 

my head quickly, my NODs fall off my mount and are hanging by the tie down. 

The wardrobe doesn’t land on the door. You know how a door is only supposed to 

open so wide? If you take two doors in the middle and “Y” them out, if you stepped 

out of the closet you could probably snap the doors out. The wardrobe fell on the 

inside doors and so it rested like a miniature TV. The dude was shooting through 

the closet and a little piece of wood went through my shirt and nicked me above 

the elbow. As I was wondering whether that was a bullet – what does it feel like? 

– and assessing myself, I rolled into the corner of the room on my kneepads and 

the rounds were just hitting the top and there were pieces of crap going everywhere. 

He runs across the bed and the only reason I saw this was because the wood was 

on fi re, the clothing was on fi re and the foam from the Iraqi mattress completely 

comes apart. He falls on his ass with his back facing the door of the room. As he 

was running, he had his AK47 under his armpit shooting backwards – completely 

inaccurate but creative nonetheless. I thought that was kind of freaky. But he’s 

shooting backwards, he falls on his back into the door and I thought I hit him good. 

I hit him square and it was just the thunk of a fatal wound. He goes to his knees 

with his back on the thing, lifts his pelvis in the air and pulls himself to his knees, 

picks up and charges up the stairs. They’re screaming in broken English and I’m 

screaming in Arabic. They scream back and I saw the look on his face as he left. 

I’m like, “I got this dude. I straight up have this guy, I know it.” Then I ran up those 

stairs and I slipped a little bit. I don’t know if it was water or the fact that my boot 

was dusty, but whatever the case may be, I slipped, a round went off. I met them 

on the landing, exchanged fi re. The guy goes into a room. I was looking at him 
267 

square in the eye and I can’t see anything. The smell in the upstairs – it was cool 

and dusty like something was going on and it’s giving off a burn. I’m completely 

panicked and I don’t know what the hell is happening. I take my frag, pull the pin, 

and I throw the frag into his head. I hit him in the face with it. I then turn over and 

try to affi x my NODs so I can actually see. I change another magazine, leaving it 

on the ground, and I hear a scream. I wait by the stairs, hear a door open and see, 

from just the illumination from the fi res outside, a guy jumping up and down, 

screaming and fi ring his weapon until it’s empty. He goes back into the little back 

room. Once I go back into that room, I can see from the fi re from the foam mattress 

that I hit him in the head but the grenade traveled long, and the room is L-shaped. 

It rolled the other way and the grenade went off. I go in there and, to be honest with 

you, I’m smelling natural gas at that point. I’m swinging my rifl e to whack him in 

the head. I make contact with him a couple times like Mark McGwire, baseball bat 

style. I hit him and he hit me with something metallic. I think it was part of a 

weapon. It completely cracked my tooth and, believe it or not, that pain caused my 

whole – when your NODs are on, and the new helmets especially are really light. 

When you put your NODs up or jolt your head, your whole helmet goes down over 

your eyes with those stupid new pads. So my NODs and my helmet were too 

heavy. I got hit on the side of the head, my NODs fl ew, my helmet was now in front 

of my face and I’m hitting him on top of his head with my barrel. I shot two rounds 

that went nowhere. I felt what was to my right, felt my arm hitting the dial of a 

propane tank, and I took my helmet and hit him on top of the head. He started 

screaming. When I hit him, he fell to the ground and I literally jumped on him to 

the point where I knew he was hurt when I put the left side of my body on his right 

arm. He completely quit. He didn’t want to fi ght anymore. I was covering his 

mouth, telling him to shut up. His breath was horrible, just stale, nasty breath. The 

moral of the story is that the dude bites my left hand near the thumb knuckle 

through my glove. I open up my SAPI plate and hit him with the inside of my vest. 

He’s screaming, there are people screaming downstairs and I have no composure 

at all. This is not a John Rambo moment. I’m really scared. I stand up and he digs 

into my leg with his fi ngers. I’m looking for my Rex Applegate Gerber knife: not 

a multi-tool, just a serious blade. I go to reach for it and he puts his teeth – I don’t 

wear underwear and he bites me right in the genital region. I’m standing at this 

point almost straddling him, but it’s dark and I have no idea where he is or where 

my position is. I try to dig into his eyeballs, and I don’t know if it’s sweat or blood 

but my gloves are not giving me any traction or feeling. I literally cuff him with my 

hands and I’ve got the thing on my belt. My IBA is now down to my arms and it’s 

like I’m in a crucifi x type of thing. My IBA is almost causing me to have little 

movement and panic. I stomp and kick at his left side and he quits. He gave up; he 

got limp; he fell back. He is screaming and in pain. I continued to choke and told 

him to, “Es tes lem.” I also told him in English, “I don’t want to f------ kill you! Just 
268

shut your f------ mouth!” And he was crying when I put all my weight on his chest. 

I fi nally fi nd his face and my groin is very sore when I laid on top of him to restrain 

him. He was in agony, his mouth was open and he was spitting. I covered his 

mouth with my hand and punched down on his clavicle trying to break his collar 

bone. He screams when I uncover his mouth. I let go a little bit, he started screaming 

again and I cover him back up. I don’t know if he thought I was going to give him 

mercy, but in the struggle my Velcro knife case slid off my belt and was now on the 

ground next to his head. I hear someone yell down from above me in a panic. The 

man underneath me yells back. The more I put pressure on his left arm the more he 

goes limp. I fl ick my blade to the side and it snaps to the ready. I had never stabbed 

anyone before so I went down on him with a stabbing motion. I lost the grip on the 

knife and it went right across the base of my right pinkie fi nger. As soon as I let it 

go, a hot wave hit me and it smelled like rust. I put one hand on his mouth and 

other under his chin and just started to push like I was giving him CPR. The stream 

only got powerful when I pushed down and it opened up. I fell over and was 

completely exhausted. I didn’t want to touch myself because I thought about AIDS 

or something. I was confused and scared to death. I didn’t have time, or perhaps I 

was afraid to do a quick inventory of my parts. I couldn’t see and I smelled natural 

gas. I walked outside, I’m screaming for Lawson and Fitts and I don’t hear anything. 

They’re yelling, “He’s alive, he’s alive!” downstairs. I can hear people from across 

the way getting excited. The next thing I know, this dude just lands. I don’t have a 

weapon in my hands and the dude just falls from the third story balcony. He fell 

right in front of me. He fell on his knees, his AK47 magazines – the one that was 

taped upside down is empty – and we looked at each other for what felt like 10 

minutes. His weapon is at least fi ve feet away from him. I didn’t know who was 

here for who. I was really just agitated at that point and I ran in the house. The 

whole room is full of smoke. I looked for the AK47 and I looked for the M16. I 

kick the M16 and I shoot him. He tries to run away instead of fi ght, so I shoot until 

I’m out of ammunition. He falls, the AK47 is nowhere near him and I fi gure he’s 

dead or wounded and I put in my last magazine. As I do that, I look out and the 

dude has one leg over the water tank and one leg over the side of the roof. I got 

chunks of muscle ripped out of his quad. He looked like Johnny Taliban; he looked 

really sooty and hairy. But they’re all Palestinian. 

MM: Is that what they found out later? These guys were all Palestinians?

DB: They were fl ying Hezbollah fl ags, the green arm holding an AK47 under 

a yellow fl ag. Usually if you see that, you have to assume there’s a lot of trouble. 

They bring their passport and their fl ag so there has to be some correlation. Anyway, 

he falls and just lands on a pretty big bush and does not move. I shoot a 203 round 

down that I didn’t even realize I had and it blows up. I remember at that moment 

I also had guys who were downstairs on the corner. I never even thought about 

what I was shooting at. So I yelled, “Ohle!” and all of a sudden I hear shotgun 
269 

rounds and Lawson comes fl ying up the stairs. He had an M4. All the guys I hit 

downstairs, Fitts shoots them again. Then he shot up the stairs and almost hits 

Lawson with buckshot. Lawson was fl ipping out. “Why are you shooting at me?” 

I was just smoking a cigarette in the corner of the room. I was completely out of 

my shit. One of the things I never really wanted to get into was: was he killed by 

what weapon or why didn’t you just shoot him? But all in all, I shot and killed 

four individuals and one of them, I assume, was gravely wounded. But Fitts, Misa 

and Sergeant Hugh Hall went up to the next story and there was a metal door that 

was heavy and leaning up against a locked metal door. There were bricks that 

were removed. They all put their weapons systems inside the bricks and then just 

unloaded on them. There was a guttural moan and I assume that was a person. I 

assume from what they told me. I never saw it. I saw them shoot and I couldn’t 

know if I was hearing that or another guy or what the case might be. To be honest, 

I was kind of off on my own. But I went downstairs and everyone’s trickling in. 

I got on the horn: “They’re all dead, they’re all gone.” We looked in the grove 

for guy number fi ve and then all of a sudden I heard an F-16 do a ghost run. They 

yelled, “Dude, it’s coming in, it’s coming in! They’re going hot, get out of here!” 

Everyone’s pouring out of the house, we dug ourselves a little thing, and the bomb 

drops and nothing happens. We go back in the house and start spiking weapons and 

gathering bodies. As we’re pulling the fi rst two guys out, another F-16 comes in, 

you hear something drop but, again, you don’t hear an explosion. 

MM: Two duds?

DB: Two duds! Finally, we get all four bodies out. I was moving to fi nd what’s 

behind door number six and getting someone in the backyard. We lit up that entire 

palm grove, just all got on line and lit it up. So even if I didn’t kill that guy, someone 

else did. They said, “Take a photo of it! No one’s going to believe this shit. Take 

a photo of it!” So they took a photo of it. Then another F-16 came in and we all 

ran like bitches. All the Bradleys were now on line, we jumped in the Bradleys for 

cover and the shockwave just hit us. “Man, they’re smoked!” “How many did you 

say were in there?” “Six” “Is there a possibility that there were eight? We’ll check 

the last two houses.” “We got six, dude. Is that good enough for you?” “That’s 

plenty, good job.” That was it. That’s what I know. I really wasn’t in an emotional 

state where I went through and checked pulses, and we don’t confi rm kills in the 

infantry. I know Hall doubletapped a guy in the kitchen. The guy was wrapped 

under a drape and Hall stepped on him. He shot him and then Lawson came in, “Is 

that guy moving?” But again, this was shit that we didn’t really want Ware to see 

and we didn’t want to talk about. Everyone ended up with BSVs.

MM: That’s an amazing fi ght. I hope somebody gets off their ass and gets 

you the Medal of Honor. But we’ll talk about that off line. Can you tell me about 

the following days when tragedy strikes the company – when the XO, Lieutenant 
270

Iwan, is killed and then the death of Captain Sims?

DB: The only guy we lost in that was Sergeant James Matteson.

MM: And he was with the scout platoon, correct?

DB: Right. As a matter of fact, he did some really great stuff that day, 10 

November. He killed an insurgent leaving a house his Mk-19. He’s actually from 

West New York like I am. I met his father and got to share with him some stuff. Mr. 

Matteson is a great man who truly admired and loved his son, who was defi nitely 

a stalwart soldier. On 12 November we had a couple other objectives. We did 

some other stuff, we had some contact, took some enemy attrition and moved out 

to Phase Lines Jena and Ethan, I believe. Again, I’m in the back of the track and I 

don’t have a radio at this point either. Somehow something gets fried and my radio 

doesn’t work right. I can’t hear anything unless I’m listening to my own radio and 

there aren’t any charges out there. Fitts is on the mike for two hours, then I use 

mine for two and then he uses his for two because we didn’t have a charger. We 

dismount under fi re, I don’t see anything as far as what happens, and Fitts tells me 

we’re shooting our weapons systems. He asks me, “Did you hear about the XO?” 

I said, “No, what happened?” “He’s dead.” I didn’t even know about the sergeant 

major at the time. This was the fi rst news we heard. That night we heard about 

the sergeant major dying on the opening night and then we hear about Matteson 

dying. We got into a building that, from the bottom fl oor, looked like it could be a 

fortress. Unfortunately when we got to the second story, there weren’t any northern 

or southern walls. It was completely without walls; it was in the middle of being 

constructed. But it was so high that we couldn’t see that. Contact was coming from 

the west. Whether it came from Newell or Sims, we couldn’t cross this road, this 

intersection, because it was Marine territory and we had to keep our fi re control 

measures. And so we didn’t cross the road, and these guys were literally in an 

alleyway on the other side of the road. Every time we attempted to cross the road, 

“You can’t cross the road!” They’re a kilometer behind us and there’s no way I can 

shoot a recoilless rifl e to my west and hit anything there. There’s no one there. If 

the Marines were to our west, this wouldn’t be happening. Do you know what I’m 

saying? We’re south of Highway 10, south of Fran. We’re in the industrial area, 

we’re right at the end, and this shit is coming hot and heavy. We just got unloaded 

on. Swanson is to the east and, no shit, the enemy’s got a Dragunov sniper rifl e and 

it’s very effective. It almost lifts his head. His 240B is up at a 45-degree angle as 

he’s getting down for cover. That guy shot his upper assembly so he couldn’t bring 

his bolt forward; it deadlined his weapon. So his 240 was gone. Then Knapp just 

started throwing a bunch of grenades; he was completely deaf. A rocket missed the 

side of the building and Knapp takes his helmet off, puts it on a spare barrel, and 

starts bringing it up and down to engage fi re. They draw fi re, they throw grenades, 

shoot a 203, then they get a Bradley in there and put rounds in the window and 
271 

the sniper stops. They actually went to a Warner Brothers method to get that guy. 

My kid, Maxfi eld, one of the bravest kids – he’s in the prone with the SAW. There 

were just so many targets of opportunity. I got A39, Staff Sergeant McDaniel, who 

was bottlenecked behind Lieutenant Brian Hartman, who was the platoon leader 

for the 4th Platoon of tanks. For whatever reason, they couldn’t maneuver around 

one of the tanks so they just stayed there. They had three Bradleys shooting, one 

tank shooting and one Bradley and one tank not shooting. The dismounts are just 

getting whacked. It was really frustrating. Fitts fi nally took the mike and went 

on all the frequencies. He really called that fi ght from the ground. Staff Sergeant 

Jim’s tank crossed over and just started putting HEAT rounds. I really thought this 

guy was shooting a semi-automatic. His loader was just blasting and it looked 

like red paint hitting a wall 20 meters behind that building. It looked like shitty 

special effects. It was very effective but also gratuitous. I’ll tell you what, though, 

the fi ring stopped. A rocket was launched, it hit the inside of a wall that we didn’t 

have, so it hit a pillar and ricocheted backwards and hit Maxfi eld in his left ankle. 

It snapped his ankle and exposed the skin from the ankle to below the calf. He 

had hot, burning metal right on his quad. Ruiz jumped on top of Maxfi eld to shoot 

the SAW and our medic, Doc Lucas Abernathy, ran over and started treating him. 

No shit, Maxfi eld said something like, “Patch me up while I’m on my stomach!” 

And sure enough, he rolled on his stomach, Doc wrapped him, gauzed him and 

stabilized him while he was shooting his SAW. You really can’t ask any more than 

that. He’s a great kid. That was the one fi ght out of 12 that we didn’t win on our 

own. Had it not been for artillery, which we had none of – and they wouldn’t give 

us a CAS, which we defi nitely needed. If it wasn’t for Staff Sergeant Biden Jim of 

Bravo Company 1-63 Armor, we’re all dead in that fi ght.

MM: You were having a hard time getting CAS then?

DB: We had none whatsoever. I don’t know if it was a matter of being too 

timid on the microphone, which is why Fitts grabbed it. He thought the people 

on the microphone, like Rodriguez, were being a little too timid. He grabbed the 

microphone and started screaming. They said, “Look, we don’t have it, we’re not 

getting it!” He said, “What about artillery, can we get that?” They said, “No.” 

“Can we drive the tank a half block to the west?” I look over and I don’t even see 

1st Platoon dismounted. I’m looking and I see 1st Platoon’s Bradleys but they’re 

just moving their turrets. I asked, “Did 1st Platoon drop their kids off? Get them 

over here; get them in the company fi ght.” “No, they’re needed to block off this 

area.” So on 12 November, the battalion got hit, they moved Alpha Company into 

position where they and the two tanks from 4th Platoon really took all of the brunt. 

The scouts were the ones who made contact and took a tragic fatality. Then Iwan 

was killed and then they pushed us forward. It would have been bad news had that 

tank not said, “I’m doing my own thing.” An RPG got his shot right after Maxfi eld 

and it was a dud. It tic-tac-toed in the building and landed right next to Rodriguez’s 
272

head. But Fitts really went above his pay grade on that one. Meno was brilliant in 

that fi ght. He was very calm, he gave the microphone to Fitts and was focusing on 

getting another 240 out of a Bradley to get in the fi ght. But I have to be honest with 

you: that was probably the worst small arms fi ght I’ve ever been in.

MM: After you get through this hellacious fi ght on 12 November, it rolls into 

the next day and my understanding is your company commander is killed, Captain 

Sims. 

DB: Right. They say Captain Sims is going to show up and I say, “Great.” 

I’m thinking he’s going to tell us to shave. I really don’t need to be told to shave 

because I’ve had a horrible f------ week. We’re doing it pretty rough. He shows 

up and he’s got a beard, a real Grizzly Adams beard. Far beyond needing a shave, 

he’s got a beard. I looked at him and said, “I thought you were going to tell us to 

shave.” He said, “I am,” and we all had a good laugh. We were joking around and 

sharing some private humor involving some shit the Joes were doing and Captain 

Sims is there laughing. That was his personality. I asked him how he was doing 

with losing his XO. He said, “You know what, we’ll just have to deal with that 

later,” and it looked like his eyes were pretty red and bloodshot, so he was taking 

it hard. I showed him these two Campbell’s soup can grenades I found and asked 

him if he wanted to see what it would be like if I threw them. And he said, “Hey, 

Sarge, do you think that thing has a fuse?” I answered: “You know what, I never 

thought about that.” “Yeah, I think it’s just a Campbell’s soup can with a fuse in 

it.” “Thanks, sir, I appreciate that.” He probably just saved my arm. So we laughed 

about that. I was smoking a cigarette and he took me aside. An embedded reporter 

from the London Telegraph wrote two articles about our platoon, one of which 

was unfortunately about what happened right after. Captain Sims came up to me 

and said, “I heard what you did the other night. You have to be smart. You’re not 

Audie Murphy, but I’m real proud of you.” I was kind of touched by that. We went 

for a walk with him and Fitts’ squad was on the left and mine was on the right. 

We showed him everything we found. That night after Iwan was killed, I found a 

tunnel and tried to crawl in it until I realized there wasn’t any way to get out of 

it. We found a tunnel and we blew it with C4. We found a spider network. There 

was another building containing IEDs down the street and he said he wanted to go 

down. CNN was shooting some footage. They had these rockets that were SA14s 

that we found maybe four days prior. They’re not 107s; they’re shorter and about 

35 to 40 pounds. They’re all rammed into pipes and they were all pointed towards 

the east. He was really fascinated by this. The EOD and Air Force guys were with 

him. The Air Force guy said, “Yeah, those are SA14s.” I said, “Yeah, cool, that’s 

what I thought too.” Anyway, he was looking at all this shit and then he walked 

past his Bradley. I was goofi ng on Specialist Joey Seyford because he had a piece 

of shrapnel in his face. Now, Seyford was shot in Kuwait in a training exercise. 

He got shot in the ass with a SAW, okay? Then he took a piece of shrapnel in his 
273 

eye, right next to his tear duct. So he’s got two injuries and one Purple Heart. He’s 

walking to the bathroom before Najaf after being shot in the ass and he pushes the 

glass of the door through and cuts a tendon in his wrist. The guy’s a walking time 

bomb, but he’s a great, great kid. Essentially they walked down the street, my guys 

are upstairs on the roof and my brand new kid – brand new in sector – tells me 

he saw some people running from house to house. I called it up, it was relayed, 

then BRT got into a little bit of a skirmish and, from the fi rst report, it looked 

like they were running that way. As soon as I went downstairs, Cantrell came 

downstairs. There was small arms fi re real quick. About fi ve minutes later, we’re 

eating MREs, smoking and joking, and then Cantrell is screaming at the top of 

his lungs, “I need all squad leaders outside now!” I’m wondering, “What the hell 

is going on?” It was completely unnecessary to scream like that. Jesse Flannery, 

Fitts’ SAW gunner, said, “I think he said the commander is dead.” “What?” He 

said, “That’s what I heard, Sarge.” Then Cantrell left with the fi rst sergeant and 

I don’t have any confi rmation at all. I was pissed off because Fitts had told him 

right before he left, “Hey, let us go.” Sims basically told us, “Look, you guys have 

been through enough. You’ve had your fi ght, we can do our job.” That really hurt. 

There’s nothing those guys could have done. This bullshit about CNN’s Jane Arraf 

pushing them into the line of fi re is ridiculous. CNN had nothing to do with that. 

At that point, as a matter of fact, CNN was with the battalion commander. So that 

was absurd. The kids in the house didn’t do anything wrong. Joey got shot in the 

leg and shoulder. Joey threw his M16A4 at the insurgent. He hit them with his rifl e, 

he was so pissed off. Corporal Travis Barreto was an outstanding soldier. All these 

men would’ve died for each other. I hate people who try to overanalyze. 

MM: So there was more than one in the room then?

DB: There were two guys under a blanket. He threw his rifl e and then he got 

hit and fell back. The Air Force guy pulled him out of the door and got hit in the 

shoulder himself. I assume the exchange either hit the commander in the leg or the 

shoulder. But it hit him in the hip bone, and the way he rolled he was obscured and 

the line of sight was gone. So Corporal Barreto is on top of the building pulling 

security because our sniper broke his leg three days before that, or else he’s the 

point man in that house. Barreto jumps down, over a fence, pulls Seyford and the 

Air Force guy over the fence, links up with a Bradley and, as he should, loads up 

his dudes, thinking Staff Sergeant O’Brien or Sami the interpreter is going to take 

care of Sims.

MM: Sami is Sims’ interpreter I take it?

DB: Exactly. No one took Captain Sims’ death worse than Sami. He was a 

former Republican Guard weapons sergeant and very handsome – looks like Andy 

Garcia. Very good looking kid, very loyal. I got to the point where I actually would 

hand Sami my weapon on patrol. This guy would tell us when people were lying, 
274

say this guy’s a piece of shit, and if you open up that door they’ll be bad guys 

there. But he was also an emotional guy. He wrote a message in the US News and 

World Report article about 2-2. He’s the one who wrote the message on the wall 

saying, “I’m so sorry this had to happen to your town.” But anyway, he ran across 

the street with O’Brien and actually came to the door shooting. He had chrome 

magazines that were as shiny as a ’62 Corvette’s wheels and they have given to 

Sami for his AK47. “Sami, you want these?” So he had a chrome magazine on 

his AK. He says – and I’ve never known him to lie – he told me he shot into the 

house and wounded a guy. There was a trickle of blood. He says there could have 

been three, but he’s positive he saw two. They were both limping. There were little 

splatters of blood and he didn’t know what the case was. He defi nitely saw that one 

of them had an M16 which he never even knew about. He said it was a Marine’s 

weapon, and that made me believe he was telling the truth because we certainly 

weren’t telling the world that we lost an M16. By the way, that was returned to us 

by serial number three months later. So when 1st Platoon shows up, they just don’t 

know what the hell is going on amidst all the confusion. They don’t know where 

Sami or O’Brien are at this time. It was just a horrible situation that transpired. 

That was tough to take.

MM: Talk me through the rest of the operation. Does anything stand out in 

your mind and particularly anything for young NCOs who are out there now? 

What do they need to know if they’re going to go into this kind of situation?

DB: I just got back from Ramadi and the biggest problem there is: we don’t 

know whether we want to level a house or risk hurting the innocent neighbor next 

door in order to kill a bad guy. We need to make a decision as a nation and as a 

military as to what we’re doing in the urban fi ght. It is almost like we’re a bipolar 

military now, so concerned as to how we will be perceived that we second guess 

ourselves before we fi re a round. We can’t conduct combat operations like that 

and expect to do anything but run in place. I mean, the Iraqi Army is leaps and 

bounds beyond what it was in 2004. The Iraqi police are making progress. I’m just 

really concerned at seeing so many people stateside who appear to be enjoying 

the prospects of America’s defeat in Iraq. The General Anthony Zinnis and the 

Congressman John Murthas are quick to tell you, “I told you so,” but not so quick 

to come up with real world solutions to what is plaguing our success in the region. 

Debating 2003 talking points and talking about torture is not going to solve how 

our nation deals with counterinsurgencies in the future.

MM: If there’s anything else you’d like to tell me, feel free to do so or we can 

wrap it up now.

DB: As long as I’m free to do so, someone has got to state the obvious. I want 

to talk about micromanagement of leadership briefl y. I would like to speak for just 

about 95 percent of my peers when I say that I’m personally and professionally 
275 

ashamed by the vapid cries for attention – masqueraded by concern for troop 

welfare – of my former proud 1st ID commander, Major General John R.S. Batiste. 

In recent months, the man has been on more talk shows than the guy who claims 

he fathered Anna Nicole Smith’s baby – and even that guy I fi nd more convincing 

at times. Look, it was Batiste’s very own brainchild, concoctions like the Victory 

Standard, that talk about personal responsibility in the absence of failed leadership. 

If you can’t change the world as a division commander, then the best thing Batiste 

ever did for his country was to retire from its Army. Only losers make excuses. 

While Batiste wants to talk about how handcuffed he was as a division commander 

by his secretary of defense, I would like to mention the time he told me and my 

peers to shave our faces before we ate the fi rst hot chow we would have in over 

10 of the most agonizing days of urban fi ghting in modern American history in 

Fallujah. After we were properly shaved, only then we were ready to share a photo 

with Danger 6 and he could fi nally properly console us on the record regarding 

the sergeant major, the XO, the team leader and the beloved company commander 

we bagged earlier in the week. I think even Donald Rumsfeld would’ve let the 

scraggly kids eat fi rst. Duty First! 

MM: I greatly appreciate you taking the time to do this interview. I’m going to 

go ahead now and turn the tape off and we’ll talk a little bit off line.

277 

Staff Sergeant Matthew Horgan

25 July 2006

JM: My name is John McCool (JM) and today is 25 July 2006. I’m with the 

Operational Leadership Experiences Project at the Combat Studies Institute, Fort 

Leavenworth, Kansas, and I’m interviewing Staff Sergeant Matthew Horgan (MH), 

US Air Force, about his experiences in Operation Phantom Fury. This is an unclassifi ed interview. Before we begin, if you feel at any time we are entering classifi ed 

territory, please couch your response in terms that avoid revealing any classifi ed 

information; and if classifi cation requirements prevent you from responding, simply say you’re not able to answer. Could you fi rst tell me a little bit about your 

background, where you grew up, how you got in the Air Force, your military career 

up to the present?

MH: I grew up in the city of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. I played soccer since 

I was about fi ve and was put on state teams that are called select teams. You go 

through a selection, you’re picked up for soccer and you travel around, playing 

other select teams. It’s a level above high school, skill wise. I did that for many 

years then went to high school. I didn’t play high school sports; I stayed with the 

select soccer. I dropped out of high school in 10th grade, just wasn’t interested in 

it. At 17, I entered college and played soccer there. I went to a Division III school 

called California State University of Pennsylvania for two years. I left there, went 

to a community college for a semester and then joined the military.

JM: Can you give me a brief sketch of the duty positions you’ve held, the units 

you’ve served with, any deployments?

MH: I originally came in the military to be a survival, evasion, escape and 

resistance (SEER) instructor but I didn’t like the teaching aspect of that. After that, 

I tried out for tactical air control party (TAC-P), which is my current job, and went 

through that process and the 14-week school in Florida. It basically teaches you 

infantry skills and a little bit more. My main job is communications and calling in 

close air support (CAS). I deployed for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) with the 

173d Airborne Brigade to northern Iraq, came back for a couple months, and then 

went back with the 1st Infantry Division (ID) for our fi rst rotation, which was four 

months. We ended up staying about fi ve months, came back to Germany and then 

went back to Iraq three or four months later for a third rotation. That’s when Operation Phantom Fury kicked off.

JM: What was the period of time of this third rotation?

MH: I got back to Iraq in October 2004. We went to Salman Pak for a little 

while and then got pulled back from there to go to Fallujah. 
278

JM: What unit were you assigned to?

MH: We were assigned to the brigade, but most of our operations were with 

the Brigade Reconnaissance Troop (BRT).

JM: Captain Kirk Mayfi eld was your BRT commander?

MH: Yes.

JM: Were you assigned to a specifi c platoon?

MH: No. Whoever was going to be most forward or whoever they fi gured was 

going to get into trouble, that’s who they put us with.

JM: I see. When did you fi rst hear there might be an operation that eventually 

became Phantom Fury?

MH: When I got back for the third rotation, some of our joint tactical air controllers (JTACs) were coming out of Samarra and the guy I was replacing was the 

one who told me about it, that it was about to kick off.

JM: Can you talk me through the preparation and planning phase of this? What 

kind of visibility did you have and what was your role in planning?

MH: I was made the noncommissioned offi cer in charge (NCOIC) of the teams 

that were going in for the Air Force, and two of the guys were higher in rank than 

me. I knew the BRT and was with 2-2 Infantry for four years here in Germany, so 

I knew all the staff there. They let me take what I wanted and what teams I wanted 

to take with me. We ended up taking a team from Hawaii. We took a battalion air 

liaison offi cer (BALO), a tech sergeant, which is one rank higher than me. As the 

BALO, he came to Operation Phantom Fury a couple days late just for planning 

purposes. We didn’t realize we would need a BALO; we thought we would fall 

under our typical chain of command. But when we got down there we realized 

everything was totally different. It was like a new type of CAS scenario going on. 

JM: Were you part of a pair of JTACs who were assigned to the BRT?

MH: Yes. Typically whenever we go forward from the base, we go with one 

JTAC and one guy who’s in upgrade training and he’ll be a JTAC in the next 

couple years. 

JM: Like an apprenticeship?

MH: Yes, we call them 1C4s. When you fi rst come into our job, you start as the 

radio guy, the driver – they would basically protect us if we were calling in air support; they would be the shooter. We also had a Guard unit that was under us when 

we went down there. They were Staff Sergeant Greg Overbay and Senior Airman 

Michael Smyre; they both got injured in the beginning part of the battle.
279 

JM: How did you feel you were integrated into the BRT and into Lieutenant, 

now Captain, Chris Boggiano’s platoon?

MH: I knew all those guys real well just from being back there with them 

in Germany, from deploying and training, Combat Maneuver Training Center 

(CMTC) rotations and stuff. We all knew each other fairly well. 

JM: Can you describe the pre-mission planning process and how you thought 

you were going to be employed? 

MH: A lot of the information we got came from the same scenario: Samarra. 

How they would set up the roads as phase lines. We’d do our portion, which is 

making maps and overlays. We’d start handing out all our information to the Army 

guys and then they decided they wanted to put their own spin on the maps since it 

was their operation, so we helped them make all the maps for it. We were with the 

same unit in Salman Pak so we just stayed with them when we got back to Forward 

Operating Base (FOB) Warhorse. We stayed with the same unit we were with and 

then we went to Phantom Fury with the same guys.

JM: Where were you going to be located while the battle was taking place?

MH: We had to be somewhere in the vicinity of the ground commander – Captain Mayfi eld in this case – but Lieutenant Colonel Pete Newell was the ground 

commander and above him was a Marine general. We have to be somewhere where 

we can get an “okay” to drop a bomb. We just can’t go out and blow stuff up; 

someone’s got to approve it. 

JM: Can you talk me through this approval process and how a typical call for 

CAS would go? How did you go about doing that and who would give you the 

approval?

MH: For myself, I would call in CAS anytime I thought we needed it. You 

could use different tactics; you don’t just have to drop a bomb when you’re doing CAS. You can have the airplanes come lower and scare the people, and a lot 

of times that works. We call it a “show of force.” Other than that, a couple times 

the Army would ask us to get some airplanes, but most of the time we already had 

them coming.

JM: Were you also calling in strafi ng missions too?

MH: Yes, I called in a couple strafi ng missions.

JM: What kind of platforms are we talking about here?

MH: Any fi ghter aircraft that comes; we train with every one of them. 

JM: What ones were used in this battle?

MH: F-18s, F-16s, F-15s, AC-130s at night, the Marine Super Cobras.
280

JM: What were the primary targets you guys were looking at during the planning phase? Were there particular areas you were going to be working in?

MH: Yes. We had the whole eastern side of the city. If you drew a line, we 

had the eastern side. The [inaudible] guys were more in the city and we were on 

eastern edge of it with the reconnaissance team. We were mostly south of the rest 

of the people.

JM: Who were the Guard guys attached to?

MH: They fell under me and we decided to put them with 2-2, since Senior 

Airman Sean Mitchell and I had been working with the BRT for the last couple 

weeks. 

JM: Can you talk me through the battle once it commences from your vantage 

point? What was your role, how many air strikes did you call in and what were the 

effects of them?

MH: Probably eight hours before anyone else moved, we started; we breached 

up over the berm into the city. We had priority of fi res so we could call in air support at any time we wanted. The targets at that time were just random one or two 

people, so we didn’t drop any bombs or call in any air on that. At night the AC-130 

would come in; and since no one was in the city except other people we didn’t 

know about, they controlled the AC-130s – the special ops guys who were sneaking around. We stayed up there for a couple days and then started moving around 

the eastern side of the city. Our job was to keep anyone from coming out of the east 

and we were watching the east/west roads as the battle was moving north to south. 

So if anyone crossed the roads where we were at, we had a fi re support guy with us 

and had the ability to call in artillery as well as CAS.

JM: Were you calling in 500-pound bombs?

MH: Yeah, all the bombs we dropped were 500 pounders and all the strafi ng 

was 20 millimeter. 

JM: Were these from AC-130s mainly at night and there were other strafi ng 

missions called during the day?

MH: The only CAS I did was in the daytime. At night, we tasked the AC-130 

up to the BALO, who was with Lieutenant Colonel Newell at the tactical command post (TAC). Sergeant Mikalodos (ph) would control the AC-130s at night 

because we were only getting about a half hour to 45 minutes of sleep in between 

watch and patrolling in the city.

JM: Were you in a vehicle at this time?
281 

MH: Whenever we deploy we take our own Humvee. We have every satellite 

radio, HF radio to talk to the Navy. We talked to the airplanes and helicopters. We 

could call Florida if we really wanted to on our radio. 

JM: Did you have any communications issues?

MH: The only comms issues we had were down in the city, and that was because the buildings were masking everything. 

JM: Were you principally targeting buildings with these 500-pound bombs?

MH: Some of the information getting passed back to us – one of the missions 

we did we had to abort the airplanes because we were talking an airplane onto a 

target and were going to mark our own position with smoke. Somebody overheard 

us on the radio and decided that everyone should mark their position with smoke. 

The plane called back to me and asked, “What’s the deal with all the smoke on the 

battlefi eld?” He just couldn’t pick up the target anymore. There were probably 10 

vehicles that had all popped smoke at the same time.

JM: What was your personal proximity to enemy forces? How close were you 

to the actual fi ghting?

MH: We defi nitely had one enemy sniper who probably was within 300 meters of us. We took, I think, 18 rounds to our vehicle and at least three of them hit 

our windshield. Whenever my driver, Senior Airman Mitchell, would pull up his 

binoculars to try to fi nd him, he’d actually shoot the binoculars – but the windows 

stopped it of course.

JM: Do you guys have a .50 cal or anything in the back of your Humvee?

MH: We actually had the worst Army person in the world to be our gunner. He 

wouldn’t fi re back. I tried getting him fi red twice – and our Air Force commander 

who sent us down there wouldn’t let us get in the gun turret because we wouldn’t 

have any CAS if one of us got shot. Before we left, he said absolutely under no 

circumstances were we to get in the turret, which didn’t go over well with us. But 

now everything has changed for our job. We have to be trained for crew-served 

weapons so we’ll be able to man our own guns, which is a good thing because our 

Army gunner actually played dead on us. 

JM: Was this different than your deployment in OIF I or any other rotations?

MH: No. Earlier in the rotations, our Humvees didn’t have a gun turret in them. 

It was just a turtle-back Humvee and the radios take up all the space for a turret. 

JM: So during this operation, were you guys ever fi ring personal weapons, like 

M-4s? 

MH: Yeah, we fi red those. We were clearing buildings. When we were doing 

CAS we weren’t actually fi ring our weapons, but the rest of the time we were.
282

JM: But you were not, at any time, allowed to man crew-served weapons?

MH: Our commander didn’t want our role being the gunner. My driver’s job 

was to drive, plus he had to man the four radios we have to be on at all times. We 

split the responsibility, so I would man two of them. I would talk to the airplanes 

and helicopters and he would talk to our request net where we got the airplanes 

from and to the Army net, which was three different channels at once. We had the 

Army commander’s net and we had to be on the fi re support net.

JM: Did you have any visibility on the death of Captain Sean Sims, the Alpha 

Company commander, and the wounding of Staff Sergeant Overbay?

MH: No. Earlier in the battle when 2-2 breached, Senior Airman Smyre was 

the driver for Staff Sergeant Overbay and he had a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) 

go through his armored Humvee. Both of his legs got shrapnel in them so he was 

pulled out of the battle, and this was maybe that fi rst night. Then a couple days 

later, Staff Sergeant Overbay was actually with Captain Sims when he got shot. 

Staff Sergeant Overbay got shot at the same time when they were breaching the 

house.

JM: Was it that they thought the building had already been cleared or something and went in? Obviously it hadn’t been.

MH: I think it was a manning issue. Because of not knowing, training-wise, 

how to approach that big of a city, everyone split up and they just put smaller 

teams in the houses. I think that’s what happened, but I’m not sure because I wasn’t 

there.

JM: Would you consider most of these to be danger close missions?

MH: For artillery, we had a lot of danger close ones. I wasn’t uncomfortable 

dropping the bombs. I dropped them closer earlier, but we were dropping more 

bombs so it was a different effect. At no time was I unsure that we were too close 

to the bombs. I thought we were pretty much out of the way.

JM: In talking to Captain Boggiano, he said something about wanting 500-

pound bombs dropped but that that was being overruled by Captain Mayfi eld. Was 

this your understanding as well?

MH: Yeah. They turned off a lot of the bombs we wanted to drop. I think we 

only got off eight and we probably phoned in a request every two hours for 10 

days. 

JM: What was the reasoning behind that, as explained to you? Why were they 

called off?

MH: The way I understood is that they wanted to shoot artillery at it, which 

didn’t make any sense to me because CAS was more accurate. Our main focus was 
283 

trying to limit the collateral damage and artillery just throws that out the window 

in an urban environment.

JM: I’m just looking at an email here that Chris Boggiano sent us. He also said 

that since Captain Mayfi eld wouldn’t allow that, “I got the Air Force guys to get 

someone else’s permission to do it.” 

MH: We went through Lieutenant Colonel Newell for approval to drop it. My 

chain of command goes from me to Lieutenant Colonel Newell to our BALO, who 

was with Lieutenant Colonel Newell, so I just called my BALO and asked him to 

ask Lieutenant Colonel Newell if we could drop it. We needed ground commander’s initials for that one particular bomb. 

JM: What one was that?

MH: It was just danger close.

JM: Was Lieutenant Colonel Newell more responsive to your requests?

MH: Yeah. I worked with Lieutenant Colonel Newell a lot and I actually fell 

under him for about two years back in the rear. We did a lot of CMTC rotations together, plus anytime we left FOB Warhorse we would go up to his FOB and make 

sure they were all right and see if they needed us to do anything. We had a great 

working relationship with 2-2 and their staff. 

JM: Can you share any overall assessments of Lieutenant Colonel Newell?

MH: He’s an awesome person and leader. Every time we go out, we’re by ourselves – two Air Force guys in a big sea of Army – and he’s always the guy who 

would help us out, see if we needed anything, get us a place to sleep whenever we 

showed up at his base, and made sure we were fed. He was always looking out 

for our best interests and it just continued when we got down there. We were just 

happy we had him as our commander. There was also Captain James Cobb who 

was the fi res commander for Lieutenant Colonel Newell, and I’ve known him for 

quite awhile. He and Sergeant Hayden (ph) are both the fi re support guys at 2-2. 

Those were probably the two most important reasons we had such a good relationship with that battalion. We were always training together.

JM: Had you worked with either Captain Boggiano or Captain Mayfi eld before?

MH: Captain Mayfi eld was in the 3d Brigade tactical operation center (TOC) 

when I fi rst met him. He wasn’t in charge of the BRT when I was working with 

them earlier. I can’t remember the commander’s name but he got promoted to major so they moved him out. He was the fi rst commander of the BRT in Iraq. I didn’t 

know Captain Mayfi eld’s role when he was in the TOC. I believe he was part of the 

S3 shop and then he got moved to the BRT right before Salman Pak, right before 
284

my third rotation started. I knew him from the TOC, but I didn’t know him from 

being out in the fi eld working with him. 

JM: How would you overall assess the Air Force’s role in Operation Phantom 

Fury? Do you have any general thoughts about how well you were employed or if 

you could have been better employed?

MH: At one point we wanted to separate ourselves from the fi re support guy. 

In the beginning of the battle, it seemed to make sense to keep us together because we’re on the outside of the city. A couple days into the battle, though, they 

wouldn’t let us go into the city – which is where we needed to be to call in all the 

air support. They wanted us to stay on the outside of the city and that limited us in 

our abilities. The forward observer’s role was similar to ours, but whenever you get 

into an urban area I don’t think we mend as well as we should.

JM: What about the whole joint-ness aspect of this operation: how would you 

assess that?

MH: For us, every day, day in and day out, is joint work. Working with the 

Army on this particular mission was kind of weird because we had to work with 

the Marines also, and the Marines and the Army weren’t talking. We actually went 

to a staff meeting between the Marines and ourselves just for CAS. At that time, it 

was probably less than 24 hours before the battle was to kick off and my younger 

airman pointed out that no one was on the same frequency together. The Army and 

the Marines couldn’t talk together. So we let them know that they were on different 

times so they could talk together, or else they might not have talked through that 

whole battle. It was chaos. We pointed out, “Hey, you guys are on different times.” 

So for us, it was pretty easy. When we got into the city, the Marines and the Army 

weren’t sharing information. We went through a minefi eld that the Marines knew 

about – and they were on our fl ank. If they were talking, we would have never gone 

through the minefi eld.

JM: Could you get Marine air or was this just Air Force?

MH: In Samarra back around August, before our battle, they came out with 

a new concept called Keyhole CAS. I can’t really get into that too much, but we 

adopted the same thing in Fallujah. It’s where you’re basically sharing assets. So I 

could call in any available aircraft.

JM: Was Marine air more or less responsive than the Air Force?

MH: The Marines operate a little differently where they’re calling up each 

channel just to request the air. With the Air Force, though, I can just call directly 

to the air support operations center (ASOC) and request air. The Marines have to 

call it through everybody. I’ve had situations where, from the time I keyed the 

hand mike to the time I got off, it was 42 seconds and the airplanes were checking 
285 

on – and the Marines are still talking to the company level if you’re down at the 

platoon or squad. It’s just a lot quicker for us, and we use satellite radios whereas 

they were using HF radios. It’s like the Vietnam era. We have the same radio, we 

just don’t use it; it’s outdated.

JM: How was the battle different from your having been there in the role you 

played?

MH: We were able to take out a good amount of people at the end of the battle 

when they weren’t so worried about us dropping bombs. I guess we had proved 

ourselves to them. But they started approving all our requests. I got credit for over 

100 people, for calling in air strikes on them.

JM: So, 100 personnel were basically destroyed.

MH: Yes. 

JM: Did you have a sense of enemy tactics, the level of their capabilities?

MH: They seemed pretty determined to win but towards the end I think they 

just gave up. There were a lot of people talking about how they would just keep 

running out after the same RPG and the Bradley would just keep hitting them, then 

another guy would come out to grab the same RPG and the Bradley would mow 

him down too. I don’t think they clearly understood that they were getting annihilated. Then we got reports that they had intercepted a cell phone call, which said 

they were scared to come out of the buildings. If they stayed in the buildings we’d 

come in and get them, and if they ran out we’d drop a bomb on them.

JM: Had you operated in a major urban environment before? 

MH: I have dropped bombs in an urban area but that was the fi rst battle I’ve 

been in an urban area. It was still pretty new. Before it would just be targeting one 

building, but this was every building for every block as far as you could see, so it 

was like a rolling battle. 

JM: Knowing this was how it was going to be, did you make any special 

preparations?

MH: For urban CAS, no; it’s all pretty similar to us. For us, we don’t want to 

drop bombs on ourselves, on any friendly troops, and make sure we hit the right 

building.

JM: Are there any major lessons learned you personally or the Air Force generally took after Phantom Fury? 

MH: I sent up a huge after-action report (AAR) about what happened. I wrote 

it a couple days after we had been pulled out and I haven’t any clue what happened 

to that AAR. I haven’t heard a word about it. If we’re going to get an Army driver 
286

for our vehicle or if we’re going to get an Army gunner, make sure it’s not the guy 

they just don’t want with them, because that’s what usually happens.

JM: And that’s what you think happened?

MH: That’s absolutely what happened. They even told us – not the commanders but the younger guys. It’s just a guy they didn’t want there.

JM: You said he played dead at one point?

MH: Yes. I think he got demoted twice. Over that whole timeframe he got 

promoted and demoted – and this was only about a month long. He’s not a real 

squared-away guy.

JM: Are there any other individuals you think deserve special recognition for 

their actions?

MH: Oh defi nitely. My IC4, Senior Airman Mitchell, defi nitely didn’t get 

enough recognition. 

JM: What was the nature of his contributions?

MH: He was on point all the time. Anything I needed from him he was right 

there. He’s actually here too if you wanted to talk to him as well.

JM: Sure, maybe we can schedule a time with him as well. That’d be great. 

How long after Phantom Fury did you stay with the unit?

MH: I’m actually still with the same Army unit. I’m actually on the same team 

with Senior Airman Mitchell right now. I left in December, right after we got back, 

and they brought in a guy to replace me. I wasn’t supposed to go on that rotation, 

but my NCOIC asked me to go as a favor to him. I went down with him and they 

brought a newer, less experienced guy down to replace me and get him some experience. 

JM: Are there any other aspects about this particular operation you want to 

draw attention to or that we haven’t talked about?

MH: I just think the joint-ness, with everyone talking on the same sheet of 

music. There were too many little meetings going on without one big meeting – for 

whoever the ground commander was to say, “Hey this is what’s going to happen.” 

All the information was passed down to the lowest level and you kind of had to 

rebuild what was going on. 

JM: Is this something you’ve noticed before or is this a unique problem for this 

particular battle?

MH: No, a lot of times it’s like that. In our job, we need to know the whole 

picture. And if we get stuck in with a battalion, we don’t get the whole big picture; 

we just get the battalion’s picture. If we’re going to drop a bomb that’s going to 
287 

affect the guys next to us, we need to at least have their frequencies so we can 

contact them. We had to run through the fi elds just to talk to the Marines next to 

us so we could get on the same frequency. The Army didn’t even have that information. They were on totally different fi lls anyway, so they couldn’t have talked 

regardless. 

JM: Had you worked with Marines before?

MH: I’ve worked with Navy before. It was different this time because everyone was there: Navy, Marines, Air Force and Army. It’s just shocking that they 

weren’t talking, especially in that high profi le of a battle.

JM: You said you wrote up this big AAR? Were there any other highlights you 

wanted to mention that you can talk about in an unclassifi ed manner?

MH: I just brought up giving us a bad gunner and the communications glitch 

between the Army and the Marines. We had a lack of training, not as far as CAS 

goes – just with the Army and Marines standard operating procedures (SOPs), how 

they were going to enter a building and things of that nature. There wasn’t anything really set up to explain how they were going to do something with a JTAC 

with them. I don’t think they thought that deep into it. At brigade level, they have 

plans for where your ALO is going to be and where all those Air Force people are. 

But when you get down to the lower levels like company and battalion – and the 

troop we were with doesn’t have a plan to have a JTAC with them. That’s defi nitely 

stuff they have to think about.

JM: All right, if there aren’t any other issues we’ll conclude the interview here. 

Thanks very much for your time and for your service as well. It’s greatly appreciated.

289 

Sergeant Wes Smith

13 August 2006

JM: My name is John McCool (JM) and I’m with the Operational Leadership 

Experiences Project at the Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 

I’m interviewing Sergeant Wes Smith (WS) on his experiences in Operation 

Phantom Fury. Today’s date is 13 August 2006 and this is an unclassifi ed telephone 

interview. Before we begin, Wes, if you feel at any time we’re entering classifi ed 

territory, please couch your response in terms that avoid revealing any classifi ed 

information. And if classifi cation requirements prevent you from responding, 

simply say you’re not able to answer. Could you start off by giving me a little bit 

of background information on yourself – where you were born, where you grew 

up, where you went to school, how you entered the Army – things like that?

WS: Okay. I was born in 1974 in Birmingham, Alabama. When I was about 

six, my immediate family and I moved to Florida and I was raised there until I 

graduated high school in Plant City, Florida; and as soon as I graduated I left for 

the Army. I went to Basic Training at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, in August 

’93 and then in October ’93 I went to Fort Sam Houston, Texas, for the medical 

specialist Advanced Individual Training (AIT). I was there until February ’94. My 

fi rst duty station was Fort Lewis, Washington, where I’m currently stationed, and I 

was in a ground ambulance unit in the 62d Medical Brigade from ’94 until 2000. In 

2000 was when I reenlisted, went to Germany and was in 2-2 Infantry from 2000 

until we returned from Iraq. Now I’m back here at Fort Lewis with 1-38 Infantry, 

4th Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT).

JM: What was the time period of your deployment to Operation Iraqi Freedom 

(OIF)?

WS: We were there about a year. I remember we left on Valentine’s Day and 

we returned maybe one or two days after Valentine’s Day the following year.

JM: So this is February ’04 through February ’05?

WS: Yes, sir.

JM: What was your duty position during this time?

WS: When I was in Iraq, I was in the evacuation section of the medical platoon. 

There were quite a few of us actually and we had some attachments from the 201st

Forward Support Battalion (FSB) that were added to our section. I was an M113 

crewmember, evac noncommissioned offi cer (NCO), and my primary assigned 

company was Alpha Company, 2-2 Infantry.

JM: Before we get into Fallujah and Operation Phantom Fury, could you tell 

me a little about what you were doing and where you were located prior to?
290

WS: While we were fi rst there during set up, we were pretty much assigned 

to the aid station. If there was a big company mission, then they would send an 

evacuation asset out there with them. Sometimes the forward aid station would go 

with Captain Gregory McCrum, the physician assistant (PA), and his treatment 

team and maybe one or two evacuation assets. A lot of the time in the evacuation 

section we would pull a 24-hour shift in the aid station on Forward Operating Base 

(FOB) Normandy in Muqdadiyah. We would monitor radios and if patients came 

in during any time throughout the night, we would notify Captain McCrum, Major 

(Dr.) Lisa DeWitt and the treatment teams. We would be involved in calling in air 

evacuation for any casualties we had in the aid station. Also, we were just helping 

out if the treatment teams needed it with treatment. My driver and I were attached 

to Charlie Company at the time. I believe it was in March into April, and Charlie 

Company was out in a town at their own little base that they had. It was called 

Camp Comanche. This was right before Najaf started and they sent the task force 

to Najaf. We had gotten hit at Camp Comanche pretty hard for about two or three 

days. I want to say it was around 7 to 9 April, and it seemed like they were trying 

to take over that little camp. Once that was over, Lieutenant Colonel Peter Newell 

pulled Charlie Company out of Camp Comanche and we pretty much left it, went 

back to FOB Normandy and the next day they were getting ready to go to Najaf. 

I did not go on that mission because I was still at Camp Comanche. I stayed back 

as sort of a rear detachment on FOB Normandy in Muqdadiyah while the rest of 

the task force went to Najaf and sat out there for a couple weeks. Also as part of 

the evacuation section, we’d go to the retrans site that was up in the mountains. 

We spent about a week there with our fi eld artillery attachments. We had some 

communications stuff up there on a hill so we could send our signals out farther 

to retransmit if we had any patrols out. That was a real boring duty. After Najaf, 

we’d gone out on a couple small company missions, cordons and searches, but we 

never really saw anything. We had gone out with Major DeWitt a few times on 

civil affairs (CA) type missions to pass out stuffed animals, little types of medical 

supplies or any treatment we could give – and that’s about all we did up until 

Fallujah when we got really busy.

JM: When did you fi rst hear that 2-2 Infantry might be participating in this 

operation with the Marines?

WS: I fi rst heard about it around October or November. There were some 

rumblings about it. We had been put on standby and were supposed to start getting 

our stuff together because we may be going somewhere. I didn’t really know for 

sure until we got our op order and they said who was going and what tentatively 

we would be doing. When it gets trickled down to us, all we hear about is the kind 

of medical coverage that’s needed, who we are going to support, what we’re going 

to bring out and stuff like that.
291 

JM: What was the degree of planning, rehearsals and training that went on once 

you found out you were actually going to be going to Fallujah and be involved in 

this major urban operation?

WS: We only had a little bit of prep time, but we were always prepared anyway. 

There was vehicle maintenance to be done. We had a couple of our 113s that were 

non-operational so we had to hurry and get those fi xed to where they could move. 

We had to pack up the aid station, our trauma sets and sick call sets. We got a 

couple briefi ngs from the chaplain. Captain McCrum gave us a lot of information 

on how the opposing force was operating, things we may see on our level in terms 

of trauma and injuries.

JM: What were some of the concerns you had, things that were weighing on 

your mind as you were preparing?

WS: My time at Comanche was pretty nerve wracking, but this one – 

considering the way it was getting put out to us – I thought it was going to be 10 

times more intense than the couple days we spent getting shot at at Comanche. 

I was concerned about how I was going to be covered. As a medical evacuation 

asset, under the Geneva Conventions we’re not allowed to have any crew-served 

weapons. I had an M16 and my driver had his so we had to fi gure out if we needed 

escorts, how deep were we going to be going into the city, what type of stuff do I 

need to look for there. I needed to keep my head on a swivel.

JM: Your responsibilities were going to be, as needed, to go into the city in 

your 113 and retrieve casualties?

WS: Yes, sir. I was to be in First Sergeant Peter Smith’s back pocket at all 

times. He was the Alpha Company fi rst sergeant, and wherever his vehicle went, I 

was right behind him.

JM: Can you talk me through what happens as the units blow the breach, cross 

the berm and combat commences? Where are you located, what do you see and 

basically what’s going on?

WS: We sat out in an assembly area for what seemed like forever, waiting for 

it to get dark. My driver got some sleep. I tried but I was running around checking 

on the guys, keeping in contact with the fi rst sergeant and the aid station. Once it 

got dark and we started rolling out, you could see the prep fi res from our mortars 

and the artillery.

JM: I understand there was quite a fi reworks show.

WS: Yes, it was. It was amazing. We sat behind the breach a couple hundred 

meters. We could see and hear once they breached into the city and started fi ring. 

We could see it, but I don’t think any sort of return fi re was coming our way. We 

would creep up a few feet and then would just sit and I’d listen to the radio, keep 
292

an eye out and it seemed like we did that for forever. I don’t know how long that 

went until we fi nally pushed up through the breach. I think we were sitting right 

at the breach or just a little forward of it when they brought Sergeant Major Steve 

Faulkenburg back through after he got hit.

JM: Do you know how he was actually evacuated? Was it one of the other 

medic teams that brought him out?

WS: It was. He was in another medical 113 track and I believe that track was 

part of 1-63 Armor. When they came through and saw my track and First Sergeant 

Smith’s track sitting there, they thought we were the aid station so they were 

yelling for help. There was so much going on and I was yelling back down, asking 

what’s going on, telling them that we weren’t the aid station. They’re yelling for 

air evac and we didn’t have any air support so I asked them what they needed me 

to do. First Sergeant Smith told me to stay put. I think he knew and he went down 

and found out what was going on. He escorted them back to the aid station and we 

just sat at the breach for awhile until First Sergeant Smith could get back and we 

could push forward.

JM: The whole task force didn’t have any air, is that right?

WS: That’s correct, sir.

JM: All the evacuations were going by ground?

WS: Yes, sir.

JM: Who are the fi rst casualties you guys actually encounter and treat?

WS: The fi rst that my crew encountered were our Air Force air controllers. 

Their Humvee got hit by a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) and it went through 

the driver’s door down by the fl oorboard, hit his foot and went through the engine 

panel. They pulled the Humvee up; it was barely running but they got it to us and 

transferred the driver to my 113 where I treated his foot. The RPG didn’t explode 

and take his foot off but there was some damage to his foot. It was most likely 

broken so I wrapped it really good and we took him back. That was the very fi rst 

I saw while we were there. I saw a couple Marines later on that night driving the 

big D9 bulldozers; they got hit with an RPG and had some minor shrapnel wounds 

that we treated and took back. For that fi rst night, that’s really all my crew saw as 

far as casualties.

JM: You mentioned the Marines. Had it been something that was talked about 

beforehand that you guys would possibly be evacuating Marines as well?

WS: Yes, sir. We knew they had their own sector but we didn’t have any big 

engineer type vehicles with us so they attached two of those bulldozers to the 

whole task force. We were the closest to them when they got hit, so when they 

brought them in we weren’t surprised that they were there.
293 

JM: These were just Marines who were attached to 2-2, though, right? They 

wouldn’t be Marines who were in the other battalions?

WS: No, sir. They were the ones attached to us.

JM: Did you ever treat or evacuate any Marines who were not attached to 

you?

WS: No, sir. Not personally.

JM: Could you explain what the standard operating procedure (SOP) was for 

being alerted that there was a potential casualty? Would this come down from First 

Sergeant Smith?

WS: Yes, sir. We stayed on the same radio frequency and they would call First 

Sergeant Smith, but I was listening in on the radio so I heard what was coming. 

There were a couple times that they would come back in a vehicle and we didn’t 

know they were coming, so that kind of caught us off guard. Luckily it was minor 

stuff; it was nothing life threatening that we were unprepared for.

JM: Did you ever have any comms issues with the fi rst sergeant’s track?

WS: Not at all, thank goodness.

JM: What was the next major event after treating the Air Force guys?

WS: The next major event occurred early in the morning once we had gotten 

into the city and established a command center for Alpha Company in one of the 

buildings. Some engineers who were attached to one of the infantry platoons in 

a building adjacent to us had an incident that wasn’t combat related. One of the 

guys was pulling guard up on the roof and fell through a hole from the second 

story. He was a 240 machine gunner and so he had that big gun and all his gear 

on, and that wound up being one of those surprise ones we didn’t get commo on. 

Their platoon medic was on the scene and treated him and sent somebody to come 

look for us while we were trying to catch a couple Zs before our guard shift. They 

kind of surprised us and I was a little disoriented where I was at, wondering who 

was yelling at me, but we went to pick him up and transported him back to the aid 

station.

JM: How long of a trip is it back to the aid station?

WS: It took fi ve to 10 minutes.

JM: I guess it varies by how deep in the city you were, but what was shortest 

to longest?

WS: Shortest was maybe about fi ve minutes and the longest was probably 

about 10 to 20 minutes depending on the severity. If it wasn’t life threatening, we 

didn’t have it fl oored so we could maintain safety for ourselves and whoever may 

have been around. There were a lot of personnel on the ground a lot of the times.
294

JM: When you go into the city, how worried are you about general force 

protection issues, seeing as you didn’t have any crew-served weapons with you? 

Did you come under fi re at any time?

WS: Once or twice, but it was sporadic. We had First Sergeant Smith’s track 

in front of us, a maintenance track behind us that also had a crew-served, and 

they kept pretty good cover on us for the most part. The most fi re we had taken 

ourselves was the Lieutenant Ed Iwan incident when we were evacuating him.

JM: Can you tell me a little bit about what happened with Lieutenant Iwan, the 

Alpha Company executive offi cer (XO)?

WS: We had just fi nished pushing through a section of the city and were in a 

big square – there were buildings on all four sides. Lieutenant Colonel Newell’s 

Bradley was there, Sergeant Major Darrin Bohn’s Bradley was there and I believe 

we were in a holding pattern. It wasn’t totally light outside but it was light enough 

to see around us and we were just sitting there listening to the radio. There was an 

M88 maintenance track behind us – the big ones that can tow Bradleys and Abrams 

– and they started shooting their .50 cal machine gun behind us. I turned to see 

what they were shooting at and they were messing with the machine gun and the 

ammo tray, and so I fi gured they were just doing a test fi re. There wasn’t really a 

lot of radio traffi c so I fi gured everything was fi ne. Then a couple of M16s went 

off behind us. I had turned to cover our rear with my M16 and out of the corner of 

my eye, about 50 to 60 meters to my right, I saw a streak come fl ying down this 

alleyway and it seemed like it was head level to the ground. It looked like a laser 

beam that came fl ying through and I watched it and saw it hit Lieutenant Iwan’s 

vehicle but it didn’t explode. Because of the light conditions it was a little hazy, 

and I didn’t know he was standing up in his turret when this happened. I didn’t see 

an explosion so I thought maybe it hit the reactive armor that was on the turret and 

sort of fi zzled out or bounced away, because there was no radio traffi c. My driver 

asked me if I had seen that and I said yes, that it looked like it hit Lieutenant Iwan’s 

Bradley. He was wondering if Lieutenant Iwan was okay and there was still nothing 

on the radio. Then the Alpha Company commander, Captain Sean Sims, came up 

on the radio and was calling for Lieutenant Iwan, and he called two or three times 

with no answer. I thought maybe he was down on the ground and didn’t have his 

radio. The last time Captain Sims called he sounded angry, like he couldn’t get in 

touch with Lieutenant Iwan – and that was when his gunner came up on the radio 

and all he said was that the XO was dead. I perked up and told my driver, “We 

need to get up there now!” So we pushed forward and pulled behind Lieutenant 

Iwan’s Bradley. Lieutenant Colonel Newell’s Bradley was parked behind it and we 

went in between them. Once we got up there, I had my ramp dropped and I was 

getting off the track with a litter. They were pulling Lieutenant Iwan’s body out 

onto the ramp of the Bradley and I just went into tunnel vision. What shows up in 
295 

my mind the most is that I could see through him and see the Bradley’s ramp on the 

other side, and I just told myself that this wasn’t good. I was told later by Sergeant 

Major Bohn and Lieutenant Colonel Newell’s gunner that we were taking small 

arms fi re as I was down there trying to get him on the litter. I had help from Staff 

Sergeant Albert Harris who was the Alpha Company senior medic at the time and 

was inside Lieutenant Iwan’s Bradley when it happened. He had pulled him out of 

the turret and got him out onto the ramp for me. I helped Staff Sergeant Harris get 

a fi eld dressing put on Lieutenant Iwan and that was the best we could do for him 

at the time. I got him onto my 113, got my helmet back on so I could try to contact 

First Sergeant Smith – and I had lost track of him because he had pulled up earlier 

before the incident happened, up towards the sergeant major’s track where they 

were having a meeting or something. I just took off by myself to pull up there once 

we found out what happened. I had trouble contacting him, couldn’t get him on the 

radio and I couldn’t roll without him, not having a weapons system. So we were 

stuck there only a minute or two but it felt like 30 minutes because we needed to 

get Lieutenant Iwan out of there fast. So I’m yelling for First Sergeant Smith and 

Lieutenant Colonel Newell’s gunner is yelling at me because we had parked right 

in front of his gun and he couldn’t shoot down the alleyway where the RPG came 

from.

JM: Are you still taking small arms fi re from that direction as well?

WS: Yes, sir. I don’t know how close it was coming to me. Like I said, I had 

that tunnel vision, but they said it looked like a cowboy movie or something, that I 

had stuff kicking up all around me when I was trying to get him up. I didn’t realize 

that until later and my knees went weak when I heard it. We took RPG fi re and 

more small arms fi re on the way out once we linked up with First Sergeant Smith, 

because our only direction of travel to get to the aid station was down the alleyway 

that the RPG came from. I was down inside the track with Lieutenant Iwan so I 

wasn’t up outside and couldn’t see where it was coming from, but my driver was 

talking to me. He had his seat down and was looking through the periscope as he 

was driving. He said an RPG blew up right in front of us and we rolled over it as it 

exploded. We didn’t take any damage from that. First Sergeant Smith said that one 

hit his weapons system on top of the track. It missed his driver and hit the barrel 

of the weapons system and bounced off, and I believe the weapons system took 

some damage. For that whole trip I was down inside trying to work on Lieutenant 

Iwan with his dressings and just yelling at him. It was so noisy so I was screaming 

at him. I had my hand on his shoulder and I was telling him, “XO, you’re going 

to be okay.” I could tell he was barley breathing. He had a weak pulse that I could 

get in his neck. A 113 is bumpy and loud and stuff was falling everywhere inside 

so it was hard, but I could get a weak pulse. He wasn’t conscious but I was hoping 

he could hear me so I was screaming at him the whole time, telling him we were 

getting him to the aid station, that he was going to be okay and that we were helping 
296

him. At the same time, I was trying to contact the aid station and it took a few tries 

because I was yelling and I was scared. I was crying a little bit and I’m frustrated 

because I couldn’t get the aid station on the radio. Finally they came up and I didn’t 

let them know who it was, just said we had a serious abdominal injury due to an 

RPG coming in – and it took maybe fi ve to 10 minutes to get there but seemed like 

an eternity. I didn’t know the RPG was still in his abdomen. We had gotten the 

dressing on and, due to the extent of his injuries, there wasn’t a whole lot I could do 

on that trip because it was such a short time. I just made sure the dressing was on 

him and tried to catch any bleeding I could. That dressing was covering the RPG 

so I didn’t know about it until we had him offl oaded and I heard Captain McCrum 

call for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD). That’s when someone let me know 

that it was still in there and I broke down after that. Because it was so bumpy and 

we were going so fast that, if we’d have hit something just right, it could have gone 

off in the patient compartment.

JM: What was the delay in getting a hold of First Sergeant Smith?

WS: He was on the ground at the time. I didn’t listen but they told me he 

was actually at the XO’s track and was helping to get him out. I think he opened 

my litter for me. I don’t know, though, because I had that tunnel vision and was 

focusing only on Lieutenant Iwan. I guess I was ready to go before he could get 

back to his track and there were so many vehicles there and so much going on that 

I didn’t see him, but fi nally he caught hold of me and was ahead of me, so we just 

caught up to him. The maintenance guys were behind us and we headed out.

JM: How soon after this are you back in the city?

WS: We stayed long enough for me to clean my track out. There was a lot 

of blood and I had to exchange litters and compose myself. That was my fi rst 

real serious incident since being there, so it took a lot out of me. I know the fi rst 

sergeant was a little troubled so he hung around there for a little bit to fi nd out the 

status of Lieutenant Iwan before he was evacuated further back to Bravo Surgical 

on Camp Fallujah. We were there maybe 30 to 45 minutes before we headed right 

back out to the city.

JM: Is the next major incident when Captain Sims is killed?

WS: Yes, sir. There were a couple small things like an RPG hit a rock and 

kicked it up onto a guy’s ankle and broke it – minimal stuff. It was always little 

stuff in the lulls between the big stuff.

JM: A quick question before we get to Captain Sims. Are you ever treating or 

evacuating any Iraqi soldiers that are attached to 2-2?

WS: Not personally. Of the Iraqi Intervention Force (IIF) guys, the only one 

I ever saw was the guy who shot himself in the foot before we even rolled out. I 

don’t know if that was by accident or on purpose.
297 

JM: I think it’s just been described as a self-infl icted gunshot wound. What 

about any non-combatants? Did you even see any?

WS: I don’t know if they were unlucky non-combatants or actual combatants, 

but just the guys left on the side of the road as we were pushing into the city. There 

was nothing we could do for those guys. After Captain Sims got killed, I helped 

with some combatants at the aid station because the company was back there; but 

as far as being out in the city dealing with combatants I, myself, didn’t treat any 

combatants or non-combatants.

JM: So Alpha Company loses their XO and was it the next day that Captain 

Sims was killed?

WS: Yes, sir.

JM: What was your visibility on that?

WS: We were back at the aid station. We had taken one guy who had a twisted 

knee back there and it seemed like there was a lull in the fi ghting, so the fi rst 

sergeant got down and was talking to Captain McCrum and Major DeWitt. I went 

and saw Sergeant Jennifer Amato who worked at the aid station. It was almost like 

a break when we got word that we had casualties coming in, so First Sergeant Smith 

climbed in his track, we jumped in ours and were headed straight out there. We 

actually caught them coming in a Bradley and it was Captain Sims’ radio operator 

and our other Air Force guy, Staff Sergeant Overbay. They were in the Bradley.

JM: They were not evacuated by medics?

WS: No, sir. They call that casualty evacuation (CASEVAC) if it’s a nonstandard medical evacuation. We caught them halfway so we turned around and 

followed them to see what had happened. We were there for a little bit, briefl y helped 

out with their treatment, and then First Sergeant Smith came and got me and told 

me we had to go back out there because there were more casualties. So we jumped 

in and as I’m putting my helmet on to hear the radio and get moving, I could hear 

the traffi c that said, “Terminator 6 is down. Terminator 6 is down. We can’t get to 

him.” So my reaction was that we had to get there now. I told the fi rst sergeant that 

we had to get moving, pick it up a little bit. We stopped just short of a phase line 

and I was wondering why we were stopped. Was this it? It wasn’t clicking with my 

map of where we were supposed to be headed and we stopped at the heavy tactical 

command post (TAC) where Sergeant Major Bohn and Lieutenant Colonel Newell 

were set up. The fi rst sergeant got down and was talking to the sergeant major 

and I ran up and said, “First Sergeant, we have to get there!” And he said it was 

too late. I walked back to my track, told my driver what was going on, and we sat 

there for awhile while the company was trying to reconsolidate. For that incident, 

I never saw Captain Sims’ body. They already had him packaged and in someone’s 

Bradley by the time we made it up to where the rest of the company was and they 
298

had sent a vehicle. Sergeant Amato, Sergeant Wolf and our medical platoon leader 

– Lieutenant Chris Carlson – were on that vehicle to come and retrieve Captain 

Sims’ body and take it back to the aid station for processing. After that, we sat for 

awhile. They brought the company together and reconsolidated. At the time, First 

Sergeant Smith and Sergeant First Class Ryan – because we couldn’t just stop; 

we had to keep going because we still had that section of the city that we needed 

to get cleared. We had that mission to complete so they took the reigns; and from 

what I could see, they did a pretty good job so we could fi nish that little part of the 

operation. 

JM: This is First Sergeant Smith, and who was the other person you 

mentioned?

WS: Sergeant First Class Ryan. He was part of Alpha Company. He was a 

platoon sergeant for a while, but at the time he was moved to a staff section within 

the command group. I believe he was in the heavy TAC with Lieutenant Colonel 

Newell and Sergeant Major Bohn.

JM: I don’t know what kind of visibility you had on this, but Lieutenant 

Jeff Emery was the senior platoon leader and normally the senior platoon leader 

would take over since Iwan, the XO, had been killed and now Sims, the company 

commander, as well. What was the command relationship between Emery and 

Smith? Was Smith the acting company commander?

WS: I’m not really sure what role he played. Lieutenant Emery was 1st Platoon’s 

platoon leader and I think he was wearing two hats. I believe you’re right. I’m not 

sure what position he took, but I think Sergeant First Class Ryan jumped in to give 

the fi rst sergeant a hand. I just noticed because he used to be in the company when I 

was a platoon medic; he was my platoon sergeant for that platoon. I thought it was 

funny that he had come back over to the company because I knew he had gotten 

moved to a different section.

JM: So your understanding was that it wasn’t a formal thing. No one said, 

“Hey, First Sergeant Smith is your new company commander”?

WS: Not that I could see down at my level. I was always in the fi rst sergeant’s 

back pocket and he had moved [inaudible] on one of the Bradleys. I don’t remember 

if it was Lieutenant Iwan’s or Captain Sims’ vehicle. He left his track with his 

gunner – Sergeant Eric Dove – and since I always was in the fi rst sergeant’s back 

pocket, I was a little concerned about how I was going to operate with just them 

and not the fi rst sergeant to follow. But it worked out in the end. We weren’t out 

there that long before we got pulled back to where the aid station was and they had 

a company assembly area. That’s when Captain Doug Walter came back and took 

over the company.
299 

JM: Had you known Doug Walter when he was the previous Alpha Company 

commander?

WS: Yes, sir. I was his company senior medic when we were in Kosovo so I 

was pretty excited to see him come back. I know he had some medical problems 

and thought he wasn’t deploying with us, so it was kind of a shock to me when he 

showed up out there and assumed command again of the company.

JM: Yeah, and other people we’ve talked to have said it was a very pleasant 

surprise to see him again.

WS: Yes, sir. He had come out, it was dark and I was trying to get some shuteye. 

The back of my track was open and I heard, “Hey, who is this?” and I was like, “It’s 

Sergeant Smith; we’re the medics.” He asked to use my radio. I didn’t know who 

it was, but I said sure; and once he came in I saw who it was. He called battalion, 

gave a report and I remember it sent a shiver up my spine. I’ll always remember 

that. He fi nished his report, had his head in his hands and he was looking down 

at the fl oor. There was a pause, and after the pause he said, “This is Terminator 

6, out.” And that just sent a shiver up my spine because I remember him being 

Terminator 6 in Kosovo and here he comes and takes over again. I thought he was 

an excellent commander in Kosovo so I was glad to have him back, especially after 

all that had happened. 

JM: How do you think Alpha Company as a whole dealt with these tremendous 

leadership losses?

WS: They took it hard on the level of the soldiers and the NCOs. I’m sure the 

offi cers did too, but because of their positions I don’t think they could show it as 

much. As far as the soldiers and the NCOs, they took it hard. I took it hard myself. 

They had brought some combatants into the aid station and there were four to six 

of them and they were messed up pretty bad. They had been in hiding for a few 

days and had been caught coming out of wherever they were hiding. Their wounds 

were pretty bad off because they’d been sitting for a few days untreated, so they 

brought them to the aid station and I went over there to see if I could help out. I 

was angry, and I know a lot of other people were as well. Major DeWitt actually 

yelled at me. I had a fi eld medical card and was documenting treatment and there 

was a Marine or some type of naval intelligence guy who was there interrogating 

as they were getting treated.

JM: These are insurgents you’re talking about?

WS: Yes, sir. He was asking questions and I was mad because we had these 

guys coming in. I said, “Ask them if any of these guys were the ones who killed my 

commander and XO.” Well, Major DeWitt was standing next to me and she yelled 

at me and said, “Sergeant Smith, you’re better than that.” As medics we have to 

treat injuries no matter whose side they’re on. We have to give the same standard 
300

of care whether it’s a US soldier or an insurgent. So she yelled at me and kind of 

hurt my feelings a little bit so I dropped what I was doing and walked back to my 

vehicle in the assembly area. That’s when I saw that a lot of the guys were mad and 

they started crowding around the aid station, saying they wanted to go shoot the 

insurgents. I was like, “We can’t do that. I’m pissed too. I just got yelled at, but we 

can’t do that. You guys need to stay back.” Some of them looked like they didn’t 

care who was around. They looked like they were going to go up there and do 

something to those guys for what happened to Lieutenant Iwan and Captain Sims. 

After they had been treated and taken away, they calmed down a little bit. The 

chaplain came around and talked to them and I talked to some of the guys. They 

looked to the medics as not just plugging holes and giving band-aids; they seem to 

think of us as psychologists and counselors too, so a couple of them came over and 

expressed their feelings. It was hard for me to console them because I was feeling 

the same thing and we’re not trained for that type of counseling when we’re at Fort 

Sam Houston learning how to be a medic. I believe Major General John Batiste 

also came out that day and walked around, talked to some of the guys in Alpha 

Company while we were there. That was the most I had seen as far as casualties 

on our side for that operation. It was getting close to the end of our operation, we 

had cleared the rest of our section and it was just the same routine – follow the fi rst 

sergeant and pull a little bit of guard at night. We found a big weapons cache either 

the day before or the day we were pulling back. They blew that and that was huge. 

They told me that Captain Walter was around there as it was going off, there was 

ammo blowing up and stuff, and they were like, “Oh, man. We’re fi xing to lose him 

too.” After that, I remember going back to the camp, doing some debriefi ngs and 

getting ready to pack up to leave.

JM: Do you have any idea how many times you went back and forth into and 

out of the city?

WS: Three or four times a day. Not all the time with patients, just knowing I 

had to follow the fi rst sergeant around if he needed to come back for something.

JM: Did you ever keep track of how many guys you evacuated from the city?

WS: I believe it was nine or 10, maybe 11 total for the operation that I evacuated 

myself. There was more CASEVAC from non-standard vehicles and from 1-63 

which was on one of our fl anks. The IIF guys had their own evacuation assets and 

they came back a couple times.

JM: After the battle, did you guys do any sort of medical focused after-action 

review (AAR), evaluating how the operation went and the medical support that 

was given?

WS: I had a little input on that. Most of the hotwash was the infantry side of 

the operation. In the unit I’m in now, we stress that we really need a big input on 
301 

some of this stuff because they seem to forget about us until they really need us 

– and that’s usually when something has gone wrong. I had a little bit of input and 

told the fi rst sergeant certain things that we needed to do. For example, if we could 

keep a certain same route or I would ask him to keep me informed so we could 

prepare for what we may see casualty wise or anything like that. I would sit in on 

the op orders before the mission. We have a little paragraph for medical support 

and that’s usually the fi rst sergeant’s job on missions. He’s ultimately in charge of 

the support side – ammo resupply, CASEVAC – so during his little brief of the op 

order he would let us know how we’re evacuating, call signs, all that stuff.

JM: How do you think the medical support went as you look back? Did you 

have adequate supplies? Were there any ineffi ciencies that you noticed?

WS: I believe it went very well. It was a blessing that the aid station was set up 

so close because it cut down our evacuation time. From point of injury to a level of 

higher care – which would be the battalion aid station – that shorter amount of time 

from injury to next level of care can make all the difference in the world.

JM: Apparently the aid station came under some indirect fi re and they had to 

jump a couple times. They were really close.

WS: Yes, sir. They were right over the berm a lot of times. There was a big 

highway that turned into the cloverleaf and there was this raised area the highway 

was on. They were behind that raised area and we were right on the opposite side 

of it operating in the city. Towards the end, once we had gotten towards the end of 

our sector of the city, I know they jumped and were set up at a gas station. That was 

a little bit farther of an evacuation time because we would take the hardball road 

and would have to go back through where we already cleared, jump on the hardball 

and follow the highway to it. There was a shorter route to it but it was through this 

dust bowl. We would have to stand up out of our vehicles and the vehicles in front 

of us would just kick up so much dust that it was impossible to see where we were 

going.

JM: Are there any other individuals you think deserve recognition for their 

contributions to this battle that we haven’t mentioned?

WS: Anybody working in that aid station was exceptional. Our attachments 

– Sergeant Amato, Sergeant Roger Wolf, Sergeant Ellen Smith, Specialist Ivy 

Marks – they were all from our FSB and they worked great with our treatment 

teams. That’s the medical side. As far as being out in the city, Staff Sergeant David 

Bellavia was an amazing guy.

JM: Actually, we just talked to him a couple days ago and, let me tell you, that 

was an incredible interview.

WS: I’ll bet. I talked to him when I was at the NCO Academy at Fort Sam 

Houston back in February because he’s preparing a book on the operation and had 
302

everybody’s story but the medical side of it, so we kept up an email relationship 

for a bit. Any of the guys in Alpha Company – I’m fond of them because since I’ve 

been in 2-2 I’ve been involved with them in some way, being their senior medic 

during two Kosovo rotations and their evacuation NCO for Iraq. There are so many 

names.

JM: Are there any other issues about this operation, the medical piece or your 

role in it that maybe we didn’t discuss that you’d like to focus on, or other points 

you’d like to make?

WS: It was a trying experience for me. A lot of my training paid off for that 

operation and I credit Captain McCrum for a lot of that. They only teach us so 

much at school after Basic Training, and a lot of our further training came from the 

PA and Major DeWitt. They tried to teach us everything they knew, almost working 

at their level because the platoon medics and us are the ones who are right there 

when the incidents happen. They taught us a lot. It taught me a lot about myself 

and I was pleased that my training paid off. I got a Bronze Star with a V device for 

the Lieutenant Iwan incident and I’m really pretty humbled by it because, from my 

perspective, I was just doing my job. That’s what I was there to do. If we weren’t 

out there, who knows what would have happened.

JM: Well, thank you so much for your time. It was great talking to you and I 

appreciate you sharing your experiences with us.

WS: Thank you for contacting me. It was a pleasure to give my little bit of it.
303 

Jane Arraf

3 April 2006

MM: My name is Matt Matthews [MM] and I work for the Combat Studies 

Institute at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Today is 3 April 2006 and I’m interviewing 

Jane Arraf [JA], who’s currently on leave from CNN as the Edward R. Murrow 

Press Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. I’d like to start by getting some 

background information on you. Where you were born, where you went to school, 

your assignments, that type of thing.

JA: Sure. I studied journalism at Carleton University in Ottawa and that’s sort 

of like the Canadian equivalent of the Columbia School of Journalism. Then after 

I fi nished, I went to Reuters in Montreal, ran a one-person bureau there, and then 

moved to New York and worked for Reuters in New York, reporting in places like 

Haiti and Bosnia. I was then appointed bureau chief in Jordan just before Saddam 

Hussein invaded Kuwait; and when he actually invaded Kuwait, it turned into a 

much different job than the one I applied for. During the ’91 Gulf War, I was in 

Jordan. The fi rst winter after the war, I went to Iraq for the fi rst time and thought it 

was the most fascinating, challenging place I’d ever reported from. I moved back 

to the States in late 1993 and worked for Reuters in New York and then Reuters Financial Television as a correspondent in D.C. In 1997, I joined CNN to open their 

fi rst permanent Baghdad Bureau. I stayed there for kind of a diffi cult three years, 

in which I was the only Western correspondent based in Iraq, and then moved to 

Turkey to open a bureau in Istanbul for CNN. I was then asked to go back to Baghdad, which I did, and then I was expelled a few months before the war by the Iraqi 

government for a protest I’d covered that they’d warned everyone not to report. I 

went back to Turkey to cover the debate there over whether to allow U.S. troops in 

the country, traveled through Iran, and spent the war on the front lines in northern 

Iraq. After Baghdad fell, I made my way back to Baghdad as bureau chief. Then in 

2004, I became senior Baghdad correspondent and essentially spent all of my time 

traveling throughout Iraq, mostly embedded. 

MM: Did you cover the April 2004 Fallujah fi ght that the Marines were involved in?

JA: I did not. I watched that unfold from Baghdad. Actually, I didn’t watch it 

unfold: I was in Najaf at the time embedded with Army forces fi ghting the Mahdi 

Militia.

MM: Could you talk me through how you became involved with going down 

to Fallujah and getting embedded with 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry Regiment, with 

Lieutenant Colonel Pete Newell and the S3 [operations offi cer], Major John Reynolds? 
304

JA: Sure. We had covered Lieutenant Colonel Newell’s unit extensively when 

they were in Muqdadiyah. We’d been embedded with the brigade in Ba’qubah under Colonel Dana Pittard who told us that we might want to see the progress they 

were making in training Iraqi forces in Ba’qubah. So we spent a couple of weeks 

in Muqdadiyah. I thought what 2-2 was doing there and the rapport that Lieutenant Colonel Newell and his team had developed with the Iraqi National Guard at 

the time was really quite impressive. When Fallujah came up, it was clear it was 

probably going to be more dangerous than anything any of us had covered before, 

so dangerous that the networks decided to pool their footage to minimize the risk. 

In fact, journalists were dropping out once they were told by the Marines what it 

was going to be like. I thought it really should be covered from the point of view 

of the Army, which was going in with the heavy armor, as well as the Marines, 

so I proposed a second team that I would have covering Fallujah with Lieutenant 

Colonel Newell – because we knew them, essentially trusted them, knew how they 

operated and they knew us. I thought, rather than be embedded with a random unit 

where we didn’t know what access we’d have, it would be the best possible way 

to cover that battle. So that’s what we did. I had quite a diffi cult time convincing 

CNN that we needed that coverage, because the main effort was supposed to be the 

Marines and this was seen as a bit of a luxury. But eventually they let me go and 

it ended up being extraordinary. I think the coverage would have been a lot poorer 

had we not been with Task Force 2-2. Had we not been with them transmitting 

those pictures, the world wouldn’t have seen the initial assault into the city. 

MM: That’s remarkable that they thought the fi ght would be more with the 

Marines because, from my research so far with 2-2, it just seems like the most 

amazing fi ght of all the fi ghts I’ve researched so far. 

JA: That’s interesting. I think you probably know that the media sees things 

pretty simplistically. This was going to be a Marine effort, basically, so all of the 

focus was on the Marines as opposed to 2-2. And even though we told them this 

was going to be the initial assault paving the way for the Marines, that doesn’t really sink in until you’re actually there and you can show them pictures of what’s 

happening. 

MM: I’ve interviewed a lot of people from 2-2 and from 2-7 CAV [2d Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment] that were over in the west, and I seem to get the 

impression from those interviews that the Marines didn’t really want the press 

around. Did you get that impression as well? 

JA: It varies immensely, because after 2-2 went back – and we went back with 

them for the memorials – we jumped over because I wanted to stay in Fallujah and 

see what happened after the major fi ghting was over. We went to a Marine unit. 

It really varies depending on the division you get, the regiment you get. The Ma-
305 

rines as a whole are perhaps less welcoming than the Army as a whole, but within 

individual regiments, I had nothing but amazing embeds with RCT-7 [Regimental 

Combat Team 7], for instance. So during Fallujah, it really made a difference who 

you were embedded with. We had two of our people embedded with the Marines. 

One of them was dis-embedded because of three basic things they said he had done 

– and a couple of them might have been in dispute. One of them was that he ran 

a story that a senior Iraqi Army offi cial had defected and gone back to Kurdistan, 

had given up, and basically said, “I’m not going to be a part of this,” after seeing 

the plans for Fallujah. He believed that he ran it by a senior Marine offi cial who 

said it was okay to report. Well, the Marines decided later that it wasn’t okay to 

report – so whatever you want to make of that. The thing that was the fi nal straw 

was that he reported which direction the Marines were moving and, at that point, 

the assault was well underway and it was quite obvious. I’m pretty sure I reported 

the same thing with the Army after clearing it with the Army, but the Army and the 

Marines have very different rules about what you can report. There were several 

instances in which we had cleared everything – and we didn’t even have to clear 

things because we were right there with the command element. The proximity 

was so close. You basically knew what you could report and what you couldn’t 

report, and unless there were really serious questions, you automatically knew 

it was okay. It was quite obvious which direction the troops were moving in, 

but someone with the Marines reporting the same thing was dis-embedded. They 

may have had their own considerations, but those considerations weren’t apparent 

even to the Army we were embedded with. I faced that several times, where I’d 

been cleared to report information and use video which was perfectly fi ne with the 

Army. But when we got to the stage where it was to be transmitted – and that was 

under military censorship run by the Marines – the Marines had a problem with it, 

even though we made clear to them that it was fi ne with the unit we were embedded in. So that was a frequent problem. The reporter who went in with the Marines 

replacing our correspondent who had been dis-embedded stayed just a couple of 

days and then left - saying he never received the support he needed from them to 

cover an infantry unit. 

MM: Did you get the impression that soldiers were more forthcoming or more 

honest when you interviewed them, or do you think they held back if they knew 

that the press was there? 

JA: It really depends. As I said, I’ve really been embedded for most of two 

years so I’ve done hundreds and hundreds of interviews. What I tend to fi nd is that 

you start off with a unit that may distrust you. I don’t actively work to win their 

trust because, one, it’s a full-time job; two, it’s a bit manipulative; and three, I’m 

really busy doing my real job. But at the end of it, what they generally say is: “You 

know, we don’t like the media, but you’re okay.” So something happens in that 
306

process where they see you’re serious, they see you’re sincere, they see you’re trying to tell the truth, and they become somewhat less guarded generally. There are 

those who will never trust the media and there are those who will never trust specifi cally CNN – and those are people who probably won’t be terribly forthcoming. 

But in terms of the battle going on around you, a lot of the coverage I did wasn’t so 

much based on interviews. It was trying to capture those moments either in battle 

or when the battle paused, or those moments when soldiers were refl ecting on what 

was going on. That’s less of an interview and more of just being able to capture 

something that’s naturally happening.

MM: What do you think is the connection between the news coming out of 

Iraq, current U.S. public opinion and the lagging support for the war? 

JA: I see the administration and [Secretary of Defense] Donald Rumsfeld and 

others trying to blame the media for the negative perception of what’s happening 

there. It has a link, certainly, when you see news that’s not perceived as positive everyday. It does give you a certain impression of how that war is going, but the news 

you’re seeing is true. It’s impossible to put it all in complete context. In television, 

for instance, in a two- or three-minute piece, you very rarely are able to get across 

the fact that shops opened and people went to school and people went to work today, even though there was a suicide bomb, although I always try to weave that in. 

The argument we get over there from military commanders or soldiers is, “This is 

so different from what I’m seeing; the media must be lying.” Yes, we could report a 

school or clinic being built, but the argument usually goes that that’s the only thing 

we should report. If I were to report a clinic being built and ignore the fact – as we 

saw today, for instance – that there were 120 clinics that were supposed to be built 

that will not be built because the reconstruction money has run out, that would be 

entirely missing the picture. I think this has become so politicized that this is the 

most diffi cult story to cover that I could ever have imagined. Not just because of 

the dangers in Iraq, not just because of the complexity of the war and Iraqi society. 

It’s the intense politicization here in the U.S. where everything you say is taken as 

a political statement. 

MM: Let’s go back to Fallujah for a minute. John Reynolds left me with a 

bunch of fi lm footage and just a truckload of photographs, a lot of them of you, 

your producers and I assume your assistant. Was it always in the back of your mind 

that, at any moment, you could have been killed during this fi ght?

JA: Oh, sure. It was in the back of my mind, and I tried to instill that in my 

producer, Arwa Damon, because I wasn’t sure that was in the back of her mind. I 

remember before the assault started, they did shaping operations and there were 

mortars and artillery all night long. It really felt like the end of the world. It sounded like the end of the world, and at that point we’d been through quite a lot. The 
307 

battle in Najaf where we were mortared every night, the battle for Samarra where 

we were under small arms fi re for hours at a time, but this was nothing like that. 

We were sleeping in these cots - trying to sleep - and I woke Arwa and told her 

that I really needed her to know that we could very well be killed and that she 

didn’t have to do this. She basically said, “What do you mean I don’t have to do 

this?” I think she thought I was stating the obvious or that I was a bit nuts. I didn’t 

get the impression that she had absorbed the fact that we could easily be killed or 

maimed. I think if you’re going to do that, you have to know what the worst-case 

scenario is and accept it, as opposed to doing what a lot of people do, which is to 

say, “That could never happen to me.” It was always in the back of my mind and I 

tried to remind her so she could make a choice. I’m not sure how well that lesson 

stuck but everyone deals with things differently. She was extraordinarily brave, as 

was our cameraman/editor Neil Hallsworth, and he realizes the danger and wants 

to go back. I’m going back, and Arwa will go back as well into situations like that. 

I think everyone deals with it in a different way, but there was so much death and 

destruction around us that it would be hard not to keep in mind that, yes, we could 

be killed at any time. 

MM: It’s my understanding that you and your crew were right in the middle 

of that complex ambush that killed Lieutenant [Edward] Iwan. Could you briefl y 

describe that experience for me? 

JA: It was an ambush and there was fi ring all around. Niel Hallsworth, our 

cameraman, and I would take turns popping up out of the hatch because there 

wasn’t a lot of room. He had to take video. You know, when you’re doing TV, 

there’s no way you can just sit in a Bradley; you actually have to put yourself in 

harm’s way to get the pictures. And I needed to know what was going on because I 

was doing live reports. So we were told to basically put our heads down, which we 

did, and then – did they tell you about the part when Michael Ware –? 

MM: Right. He was on another vehicle, on a Bradley, and he was trying to get 

over to the vehicle you guys were in, or something to that effect. 

JA: Yeah, and he believes that the lieutenant turned around to wave to him - 

I’m not sure if he did - and, shortly after that, the RPG [Rocket-Propelled Grenade] 

ripped through him. At that point, we were still in the hatch, Niel was shooting, and 

they said to me, “Don’t look at this.” And, of course, I had to look. So I saw him 

on the ground. We didn’t use the footage where the RPG hit. There was no reason 

to. I don’t think Neil fi lmed him on the ground - we wouldn’t have used that part of 

it. The image, though, was so seared into my mind that I’d thought for the longest 

time that it was so vivid because I saw it on tape. I hadn’t, though. When we went 

back to Muqdadiyah for the memorial, one of the guys said he used to grow fl owers. I hadn’t known that about him. There are so many things in that war, in any 
308

war, that are so unbearably sad that you can’t begin to describe or explain them, 

but it’s details like that that make people understand. 

MM: Did you consider that to be the biggest scare of your career?

JA: Well, Neil, Arwa and I had been through a lot of these things. Nothing 

like the intensity of Fallujah, but in Najaf we were mortared every night and there 

were RPGs that would land so close to us that you would be showered with concrete chips. We’ve been in ambushes with small arms fi re and RPGs where I really 

thought, “This is it. We’re going to die.” We were in the Palestine Hotel when a 

rocket was launched into the room across from mine. I could go on and on. Fallujah was absolutely horrifi c - terrifying at times - but the thing about reporting is 

that you really have to focus on what you’re seeing and what you’re telling people 

at the time. The same way Neil focuses on what he’s seeing, because things sort 

of narrow and being afraid is a luxury you can’t afford, so you just do whatever it 

is you’re doing. I think it probably sinks in later. And it’s not so much the danger 

and the fear; it’s that horrible soul-destroying aspect of seeing so much destruction. That’s the worst part. The fi rst time I really had a sense of what war could 

do was when the U.S. launched cruise missiles against Baghdad under Saddam. I 

lived in the Rasheed Hotel and, when the missiles hit, all the air was sucked out of 

the room. All of a sudden, that view I looked at every day was gone: buildings that 

had taken months to construct gone in an instant. Watching the Marines fi re TOW 

missiles a few weeks later into a row of houses in Fallujah, it was the same sort 

of feeling. You can’t help but be in awe of that terrible destructive power, but it’s 

always a defeat, always a failure, when you have to come to that. 

MM: What did you think of the commander of 2-2, Pete Newell, and his S3, 

John Reynolds? Just your observations of being with them on this battlefi eld.

JA: They were amazing. I think Major Reynolds – now Lieutenant Colonel 

– and some of the others started out not terribly happy that we were going to be embedded with them. It’s not like a traditional embed. We were actually in the same 

deserted house. Their TAC [Tactical Command Post] was basically all around us, 

so there was really not very much they could hide from us – although not being 

military people it’s not as if we would have understood the signifi cance of everything we were seeing anyway. But there got to be a real trust there, which was due 

to Lieutenant Colonel Newell, who is an extraordinary person. It’s hard for me to 

talk about it with distance, I think, because we really got to know each other very 

well and there’s a certain amount of affection combined with the immense respect I 

would have had even if I hadn’t known them so well. I thought that they were both 

extraordinary, and it was an amazing look at just how adaptable you have to be as 

a commander and a leader. We were there when Sergeant Major [Steve] Faulkenberg was killed. That was one of the toughest things I’d ever seen: Colonel Newell 
309 

having to go on and make decisions when the sergeant major had just been killed 

and not deal with that part of it. I have immense respect for Lieutenant Colonel 

Reynolds because he isn’t someone who will try to give you easy answers or pat 

answers. Neither is Lieutenant Colonel Newell. They’re both extremely intellectually honest, which is something I was really grateful for.

MM: Did you get the impression that Fallujah was pretty much denuded of 

civilians before the November attack? Everybody I talk to in the military is like, 

“Hey, the great thing is that we got all the civilians out.” 

JA: Well, they can’t say they got all of the civilians out. We saw some civilians. I reported on a body, for instance – it was clear to me later, and I should have 

known it at the time, that it was a woman lying under there. I could only see her 

hand and I didn’t know it at the time, so I said we couldn’t tell, but I found out 

later it was a woman. However, there were very few civilians – and that was actually my biggest fear going into it, that this would be a battle where we would see 

civilians being killed and caught in the crossfi re. But we hardly saw any in the 

initial assault. The only thing we really saw were insurgents, presumably, and dead 

insurgents and dogs roaming around. However, I believe other reporters embedded 

with the Marines ran across civilians. And when we stayed with RCT-7 in those 

waning days of the battle, there were quite a lot of civilians there, and that was one 

of the huge challenges for them. There were people who had stayed and put up 

these signs on their houses that said, “We are family” in the hope that soldiers or 

Marines wouldn’t attack their houses. We were in the industrial section and, in the 

area we came in on, there were very few civilians. That doesn’t mean that was the 

case for the whole town, but in general, compared to the fi rst battle for Fallujah, 

there were very few. They either had been driven out by the insurgents or had left 

in preparation for the battle.

MM: Did you or CNN get involved with the issue of 2-2 fi ring white phosphorous rounds? Was anybody complaining about that? I guess some of the European 

press got a hold of it, and I talked to Captain [James] Cobb, the fi re support offi cer, 

and he said he was being raked over the coals on the Internet over some article he 

wrote about the “shake and bake” missions. 

JA: Well, the uproar came about because the military denied using white phosphorous on offi cial levels. They said, “We never used white phosphorous.” As you 

know, rule number one in dealing with the media or the public, as soon as you’re 

found out to have lied – even if it’s because you were misinformed – nobody ever 

trusts you again. The whole thing about white phosphorous came out because an 

Italian television station got a hold of photographs that seemed to show insurgents 

and/or civilians with white phosphorous burns. Then the military said, “No, we 

never used white phosphorous.” But then they came back and said, “Well, yes, 
310

we did use white phosphorous, but only against insurgents.” I felt really stupid 

because we were actually in fi elds where there was still white phosphorous burning and it wasn’t clear to me at the time that these were fi red by 2-2. I think it was 

probably clear to my cameraman, we just never discussed it at the time – nor was 

it an issue at the time because we didn’t see any bodies where people had suffered 

the effects of it.

MM: You can actually see it going off in some of the night footage. As they 

blow through the breach on the fi rst night, you can actually see it in an airburst. 

JA: You know, you’re absolutely right. I just didn’t connect it with the later 

controversy with the white phosphorous. 

MM: Did Pete Newell or John Reynolds say anything about it at the time? 

JA: I’m sure they would have treated it very matter-of-factly. I know we did 

a story in a fi eld with a warehouse where they were looking for insurgents. We 

were with them and there was white phosphorous still burning in that fi eld. I think 

I might have referred to it in a stand-up because it was very dramatic, but I didn’t 

connect it at the time with anything that would be controversial. 

MM: So you weren’t getting any pressure from your bosses back in the States 

to fi nd out what was going on about it?

JA: No. That whole issue didn’t come up until just a few months ago. 

MM: That’s why Captain Cobb was asking me who I was and why did I want 

to know this. Is there anything else you can tell me about your time in Fallujah and 

anything that struck you or impressed you or horrifi ed you? 

JA: Yes. Just in a big picture sense, it was an example of an embed working, 

and there were a lot of factors that had to come together for that. Part of it is, 

I think, the chemistry of somebody like Lieutenant Colonel Newell. I just have 

immense respect for him and Lieutenant Colonel Reynolds and the rest of them. 

I have immense respect for all of them, and even more respect after the battle: 

because they had the foresight and that certain amount of courage it takes to trust 

the media. Now, they knew us personally and trusted us, but it still takes a leap of 

faith to let people in that closely. Our reporting was pool footage, but it was our 

footage that was given to the pool. So without those pictures, without that reporting, people would have had a much different view of that initial assault in Fallujah. 

You would have had a lot of stories saying, “Yes, the American troops are killing 

civilians.” I did not intend to be the person helping the military by saying there 

were no civilians that I could see, but that was part of the backdrop of it. What 

horrifi ed me? As I said, the almost total destruction of the city. They fl attened that 

city. The other thing that disturbed me greatly – although I kind of understand why 
311 

this happens: there was an article that appeared in Rolling Stone magazine with 

Charlie Company.

MM: I have that here. By Janet Reitman?

JA: Yeah. The initial version of that went a lot further, because these guys all 

got together and decided that actually we were part of the reason their company 

commander died. They felt they had to babysit us; and had they not been babysitting us, they would have been able to protect him. It was a rather large group of 

journalists they were with, but they focused on me and Arwa. I contacted Lieutenant Colonel Newell, because as you can understand, this was incredibly upsetting. 

He said to me, and to Janet, that this wasn’t the case at all. They were tasked with 

doing this, they were in a different sector, and it wouldn’t have made a difference. 

But it’s that perception, in some cases, where they don’t really understand why 

they have to deal with us. Some of them do, but not all of them. Enlightened commanders understand that it’s also an information battle; and not only that, but we’re 

fi ghting for the same things. Things the Army and the Marines are fi ghting for, we 

as journalists believe we’re fi ghting for a strong democracy in terms of transparency. We won’t promise and we won’t – if we have any credibility – be cheerleaders for the Army or the Marines, but we do promise to be accurate and faithful to 

what actually happens. We believe that’s really important to the overall mission so 

that Americans know what war is and can make informed decisions about it. A lot 

of the guys on the ground don’t feel that, and I can understand why they feel they 

needed somebody to blame. 

MM: And that was Captain Sean Sims that was killed. It’s my understanding 

that he went into a room they thought had been cleared and, as it turned out, an 

insurgent had crawled back in there. I don’t see how they could have blamed that 

on you guys. Did you get a chance to meet Sean Sims?

JA: Yes, we did; he was a nice guy. The other thing that sort of disturbed me 

was they had a lingering impression that all we did was lecture them about not using the word hajji. It sounds like a really small thing, but it is not. It’s an example 

to me of how the military is needlessly creating enemies and, three years later, is 

still not getting the cultural context right. And it’s not political correctness; it’s 

survival. You cannot use that term as an insult and not expect there to be consequences. Arwa and I are both ethnically Arab and we sort of feel this intrinsically, 

as well as know it intellectually. So it’s really hard to stand by and watch these 

guys make enemies by doing that sort of stuff, so we tend to mention it to them in 

a friendly way. Out of all the things I’ve seen in Iraq, and I’ve seen a lot of horrible 

things – because basically I’ve spent the last three years going to the site of suicide 

bombs and car bombs and covering battles. You know, I’m not sure where I was 

going with that sentence. I think what I was starting to say is that Fallujah was like 
312

nothing any of us had ever seen. And in the middle of it - particularly towards the 

end - in between the moments of terror, there were long periods of intense tedium 

where you’re standing around for what seems like forever waiting for the next moment of potential terror. You get into these conversations about things like how not 

to use the word hajji, and then the shooting starts again. 

MM: They’re just not paying you enough money for that.

JA: Well, it’s not something I hope I ever have to do again, but I will. But I 

felt really lucky to be able to be there and see it as it was actually going on. To 

witness it.

MM: Did you get to spend any time at all with the Iraqi battalion that came 

in behind you guys? There was a Major Fred Miller that was the advisor for that 

unit. 

JA: I’m trying to think which battalion that was. We spent a lot of time with the 

Iraqi battalion that Lieutenant Colonel Newell was working with. 

MM: He said at one point there was a Spanish reporter who actually spoke 

Arabic and was able to interpret when he ran into some of these guys in a building. 

It was the 2d Iraqi Battalion and they’re all coming in on little light trucks. I was 

wondering if you had any comments on their performance and if you got to talk to 

those guys at all. 

JA: We tended to talk to them quite a lot. We did see that unit there and in 

some other places as well. I remember seeing them in their unarmored vehicles 

with the Iraqi fl ags and being incredibly moved and proud of them and saddened. 

Some of those guys we had actually seen during the battle of Samarra, so some 

of them we already knew. As you know, the Army thought it was a major accomplishment when they didn’t actually run away – and some of them are very brave. 

Compared to U.S. soldiers though, they’re not very well trained. I always thought 

that one of the most dangerous places to be in Iraq – given all the dangers that can 

surround you – is actually with Iraqi forces, because they really have very little 

muzzle discipline. I’ve seen cases where they’ve shot each other accidentally. As 

bad as things are now, I often think about what it was like in 2004 when there were 

simultaneous uprisings in the south by the Mahdi Army and Fallujah kicking up at 

the same time. That was when a lot of the Iraqi security forces collapsed. I’m not 

sure, given the pressures on Iraqis – the threat of being kidnapped, blown up or assassinated – that if we were in their shoes we’d keep showing up to be policemen 

or soldiers.

MM: In one of these interviews I have, you can hear the physician’s assistant, 

First Lieutenant Greg McCrum, just as they blow that breach that fi rst night, the 
313 

fi rst casualty – as he’s whispering into the fi lm there – is apparently one of the guys 

from the Iraqi battalion with a self-infl icted gunshot wound.

JA: They also were not terribly well equipped. It’s not as if they had armored 

vehicles. 

MM: Right, or night vision devices and that sort of thing. This has been fantastic. Our transcriptionist will type this up and we’ll email you a copy. 

JA: That’s really kind. 

MM: I think I’ve covered it all. I do have one other question that one of our 

interviewers wanted me to ask. While you were over there, did you make any 

attempts to report on the success stories of new schools and ribbon cuttings and 

positive reconstruction efforts? 

JA: Every time someone says success stories or good news stories, it really 

drives journalists insane. We like to think of it as, “We report the news.” I know a 

lot of you don’t see it that way, but having said that, there wasn’t a lot of that with 

Task Force 2-2. Is the interviewer asking whether I reported on success stories 

of ribbon cuttings and new schools during the battle for Fallujah? If so, I have to 

think that that’s not a serious question. In fact, to be perfectly honest, people who 

ask questions that way generally have decided that the media is only covering “bad 

news.” We make every attempt to report the news - good and bad. If you want 

someone to focus only on ribbon cuttings or schools, that’s not really a journalist; that’s someone else entirely. We stayed with 2-2 for the battle and went back 

with them for the memorials. Then we came back with RCT-7, and there wasn’t 

a lot of that (new schools and ribbon cuttings) with RCT-7 either. They were still 

fi ghting insurgents even weeks after and were trying to pay compensation claims. 

We covered extensively the relief efforts to get food to the civilians in the city. I’m 

fascinated by Fallujah and it haunts me in a sense. I went back to see what had 

happened a couple months after and they were doing a lot of reconstruction. I did 

a lot of stories that didn’t get a lot of air in the United States because Americans, 

that week, were more interested in the girl who was missing in Aruba. We actually 

went back to the house where we were with Lieutenant Colonel Newell, that they 

had actually occupied during the battle. The family had moved back in; it was fantastic. I think they thought I was a bit deranged. I was so happy to see them back I 

couldn’t stop smiling at them. 

MM: Did you get the impression at all that there was any sort of animosity 

between the Marines and the Army? From the people I’ve interviewed so far, this 

seems like a model of joint warfare where they all seemed to get along. 

JA: There was a lot of that, but again, I think a lot of that is personality. Lieutenant Colonel Newell intersected with RCT-7’s territory and Colonel [Craig] Tucker. 
314

They’re both incredibly smart so they got along and were all on the same page. I 

think there was a certain frustration on the part of the Army when they had to delay 

operations at a couple points, when the Marines were moving more slowly than 

they thought they’d be able to move. A few logistical quirks – at some point, there 

really wasn’t enough hot food. I don’t know enough about that to know whether 

that’s a major thing or a minor thing. I know it’s not ideal, but I don’t know if it’s 

inevitable. 

MM: While you were out there on the battlefi eld, did you get a chance to meet 

the task force surgeon, Major Lisa DeWitt?

JA: I did a great story on her. I mean, the story was great because she’s a great 

person. She is amazing. 

MM: Everybody I’ve interviewed has said she’s the greatest thing since sliced 

bread. 

JA: It was a really poignant story, I thought. 

MM: Did you do a special on CNN about her? 

JA: Yeah. It was a very long piece, by CNN standards. I think it was about six 

or seven minutes long. 

MM: I’ve got to dig this up. 

JA: Yeah, let me know if you have trouble fi nding it. She’s really fantastic. The 

thing about Lisa is that she desperately wanted to be there - to be where she would 

be the most useful. She made a point of going there and she made a point of staying. She was a civilian so it wasn’t all that easy for her, but she was terrifi c. I’m not 

sure she realized what a difference she made there.

MM: I hope to interview her sometime this week. She’s only available on 

weekends. 

JA: The Marines gave the Army beer on the Marine Corps’ birthday. There was 

this amazing sound when they popped open these beers in the fi eld and they were 

the fi rst beers they’d had for months and months. It was just really funny. And poignant – some of the guys drank to their buddies who’d been killed. I think it’s hard 

for civilians to understand how soldiers and Marines both simultaneously honor 

their dead by keeping them always in their minds and, at the same time, accept 

casualties far more than civilians do. There is a huge cultural difference between 

the Marines and the Army, but I think what bridged it, in this instance, in Fallujah, 

was the skill of the commanders, because you could tell they were all on the same 

page. Colonel Tucker, who dealt a lot with Lieutenant Colonel Newell, I thought 

he was extraordinary as well, as far as the agility you have to have in the fi ght he 

was facing. He was doing a RIP [Relief in Place] with the guy who was replacing 
315 

him and he said something which I think is really key and characterizes the best 

commanders – and it’s something Lieutenant Colonel Newell used to say as well. 

They would tell people coming in: “Don’t assume every Iraqi is your enemy.” And 

that is really typical of how Lieutenant Colonel Newell operated and part of the 

reason I think he made such a success of the cooperation with those Iraqi forces. 

MM: That’s excellent. Thank you very much for your time.

317 

Glossary

AAR: After-Action Review

A&L: Administration and Logistics

AIF: Anti-Iraqi Forces

ALO: Air Liaison Offi cer

ANGLICO: Air and Naval Gunfi re Liaison Company

AO: Area of Operations

AST: Advisor Support Team

ATC: Air Traffi c Control

BCT: Brigade Combat Team

BDA: Battle Damage Assessment

BMO: Battalion Maintenance Offi cer

BRT: Brigade Reconnaissance Troop

C2: Command and Control

CAS: Close Air Support

CFL: Coordinated Fire line

CMTC: Combat Maneuver Training Center

CO: Commanding Offi cer

COMSEC: Communications Security

CP: Command Post

CSH: Combat Support Hospital

DISCOM: Division Support Command

DSN: Defense Switchboard Network

ECP: Entry Control Point

EOD: Explosive Ordnance Disposal

EPW: Enemy Prisoner of War

FLA: Front-Line Ambulance

FLE: Forward Logistics Element

FO: Forward Observer

FOB: Forward Operating Base

FRAGO: Fragmentary Order

FSB: Forward Support Base

FSC: Fire Support Center

FSCC: Fire Support Coordination Center

FSO: Fire Support Offi cer

GPS: Global Positioning System

HEAT: High-Explosive, Anti-Tank
318

HESCO: A company specializing in pre-fabricated protective structures

HHC: Headquarters and Headquarters Company

HUMINT: Human Intelligence

IBA: Interceptor Body Armor

IED: Improvised Explosive Device

IIF: Iraqi Intervention Forces

ING: Iraqi National Guard

IO: Information operations

IP: Initial Point

IPB: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefi eld

IR: Infra-Red

JTAC: Joint Tactical Air Controller

LAV: Light Armored Vehicle

LD: Line of Departure

LNO: Liaison Offi cer

LOA: Limit of Advance

LOC: Line of Communication

LRAS: Long-Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System

LRP: Logistics Resupply Point

LZ: Landing Zone

MANPAD: Man-Portable Air Defense

MARDIV: Marine Division

MCLC: Mine Clearing Line Charge

MEDEVAC: Medical Evacuation

MEF: Marine Expeditionary Force

MNC-I: Multi-National Corps-Iraq

MNF-I: Multi-National Forces-Iraq

MOS: Military Occupational Specialty

MOUT: Military Operations on Urban Terrain

MPAD: Mobile Public Affairs Detachment

MSR: Main Supply Route

NCO: Non-Commissioned Offi cer

NIPRNET: Non-secure Internet Protocol Router Network

NOD: Night Observation Device

NVG: Night Vision Goggles

OPCON: Operational Control

PA: Physician Assistant

PSD: Personal Security Detachment
319 

PSYOP: Psychological Operation

QRF: Quick Reaction Force

RCT: Regimental Combat Team

RIP: Relief in Place

ROE: Rules of Engagement

RPG: Rocket-Propelled Grenade

S1: Personnel

S2: Intelligence

S3: Operations and training

S4: Supply/Logistics

S5: Civil-Military Operations

S6: Communications/Electronics

SAW: Squad Automatic Weapon

SIGINT: Signals Intelligence

SINCGARS: Single Channel Ground to Air Radio System

SIPRNET: Secure Internet Protocol Router Network

SPO: Security and Plans Offi cer

TAC: Tactical Command Post

TACON: Tactical control

TAD: Temporary Assigned Duty

TCP: Traffi c Control Point

TDY: Temporary Duty

TF: Task Force

TOC: Tactical Operations Center

TOW: Tube-launched Optically-tracked Wire-guided

TTP: Tactics, Techniques, Procedures

UAV: Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

VBIED: Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device

WP: White Phosphorous

XO: Executive Offi cer
320

About the Project Team

Mr. Kendall D. Gott retired from the US Army in 2000, having served as an 

armor/cavalry and military intelligence offi cer. His combat experience consists of 

the Persian Gulf War and two subsequent bombing campaigns against Iraq. Before 

returning to Kansas in 2002, he was an adjunct professor of history at Augusta 

State University and the Georgia Military College. In October 2002, he joined the 

Combat Studies Institute where he researches and prepares articles and studies on 

topics of military history. His book-length works include In Glory’s Shadow: The 

2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment During the Persian Gulf War, 1990-1991, Where 

the South Lost the War: An Analysis of the Fort Henry-Fort Donelson Campaign, 

February 1862, and Breaking the Mold: Tanks in the Cities. Mr. Gott is a frequent 

speaker at Civil War roundtables and appeared on a History Channel documentary 

on the Battle of Mine Creek, Kansas, and the documentary Three Forts in Tennessee 

by Aperture Films.

Mr. John McCool is the administrator, editor, and senior interviewer for the 

Operational Leadership Experiences Project which is an oral history enterprise 

based at Fort Leavenworth’s Combat Studies Institute. The OLE Project team 

conducts, transcribes, and archives interviews with military personnel who 

executed key operations in the Global War on Terrorism. Mr. McCool possesses 

a Master of Arts Degree in History from the University of Kansas and has a 

demonstrated background in both public and oral history. He has participated in 

several collaborative projects to include Web-based development endeavors. Mr. 

McCool has focused his research and writing interests on a wide variety of modern 

American political, diplomatic and military history topics.

Mr. Matt Matthews joined the Combat Studies Institute in July 2005 after 

working for 16 years as a member of the World Class Opposing Force (OPFOR) 

for the Battle Command Training Program at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Mr. 

Matthews graduated from Kansas State University in 1986 with a BS in History. 

He served as an infantry enlisted man in the Regular Army from 1977 to 1981. He 

was a Cavalry offi cer in the US Army Reserve from 1983 to 1986; and an Armor 

offi cer in the Kansas Army National Guard from 1986 to 1991. Mr. Matthews has 

coauthored numerous scholarly articles on the Civil War in the Trans-Mississippi 

to include Shot All To Pieces: The Battle of Lone Jack, To Play a Bold Game: 

The Battle of Honey Springs, and Better Off in Hell: The Evolution of the Kansas 

Red Legs. He is the author of Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 14, The 

Posse Comitatus Act and the United States Army: A Historical Perspective. He is a 

frequent speaker at Civil War Roundtables and he recently appeared on the History 

Channel as a historian for the Bill Kurtis production entitled Investigating History. 

Mr. Matthews is also the former mayor of Ottawa, Kansas.
321 

Dr. Christopher K. Ives serves as an interviewer for the Operational Leadership 

Experiences Project. He possesses a Ph.D. from Ohio State University. Dr. Ives 

works as a defense and business process consultant. His Knowledge and Strategy: 

Operational Innovation, Institutional Failure, US Army Special Forces in Vietnam 

1961-1963 will appear in April 2007 (Routledge/Taylor and Francis Group). He is 

a retired US Army Reserve offi cer with an extensive background in Special Forces 

as well as general purpose forces C4I. Dr. Ives’ next project is a paper for the 2007 

Society of Military History annual conference titled Continuities and Combatants: 

Counterinsurgency in Vietnam.

Ms. Colette Kiszka acts as the Project Technician and Transcriptionist for the 

Operational Leadership Experiences Project at the Combat Studies Institute. She 

uploads the completed oral interviews onto Fort Leavenworth’s Combined Arms 

Research Library website. She has an extensive administrative background that has 

led her to work in and around the US Army for over 25 years. As a retired Army 

spouse, she feels most at home within the military environment and thoroughly 

enjoys working at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Mrs. Jennifer Vedder is a Military Analyst currently charged with transcribing 

interviews for the Combat Studies Institute’s Operational Leadership Experiences 

Project. Mrs. Vedder possesses a Masters of Science Degree in Health Care 

Administration and has previously served as an offi cer on Active Duty in the 

Medical Service Corps.

Ms. Jennifer Lindsey is an editor for the Research and Publications team at 

Ft. Leavenworth’s Combat Studies Institute. She is a graduate of the University 

of Kansas with a BS in Journalism/Broadcast News. She spent many years as a 

television news producer for NBC, ABC, CBS and FOX in Kansas City and San 

Diego. She has also worked as a freelance writer in corporate communications and 

for numerous publications. 
322