alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Griffin, Appellant, *v.*McFaul, Sheriff, Appellee.

[Cite as *Griffin v. McFaul,*116 Ohio St.3d 30, 2007-Ohio-5506.]

(No. 2007-1082

Submitted October 9, 2007

Decided October 23, 2007.)

Per Curiam.

{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment denying a writ of habeas corpus. Because the petition seeking the writ is fatally defective, we affirm.

{¶ 2} In March 2007, appellant, Theron Griffin, filed a petition in the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County for a writ of habeas corpus to compel appellee, Cuyahoga County Sheriff Gerald T. McFaul, to release him from confinement in the county jail. Griffin did not attach any commitment papers, and his “affidavit of verification” was not notarized. Griffin’s purported R.C. 2969.25(A) affidavit, describing each civil action or appeal of a civil action that he had filed in the previous five years in any state or federal court, was also not notarized. And although Griffin claimed indigency, he did not file an affidavit containing the statement required by R.C. 2969.25(C)(1) setting forth the balance in his inmate account “for each of the preceding six months, as- certified by the institutional cashier.”

{¶ 3} The court of appeals granted Sheriff McFaul’s motion for summary judgment and denied the writ. The court of appeals specified several reasons supporting denial of the writ in its judgment.

{¶ 4} We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. Griffin’s petition was fatally defective and subject to dismissal because he failed to comply with the commitment-paper and verification requirements of R.C. 2725.04. *State ex rel. Winnick v. Gansheimer,*112 Ohio St.3d 149, 2006-Ohio-6521, 858 N.E.2d 409, ¶ 5-6. Griffin’s purported verification was ineffective because it was not notarized. *Chari v. Vore*(2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 323, 327, 744 N.E.2d 763. Griffin also failed to comply with R.C. 2969.25(A) and (C)(1). *Fortson v. Bradshaw,*109 Ohio St.3d 250, 2006-Ohio-2291, 846 N.E.2d 1258, ¶ 12; *State ex rel. Foster v. Belmont Cty. Court of Common Pleas,*107 Ohio St.3d 195, 2005-Ohio-6184, 837 N.E.2d 777, ¶ 5. We need not address the propriety of the court of appeals’ other reasons for *31denying the writ. *Jackson v. Wilson,*100 Ohio St.3d 315, 2003-Ohio-6112, 798 N.E.2d 1086, ¶ 10.

Theron Griffin, pro se.

Judgment affirmed.

Moyer, C.J., and Pfeifer, Lundberg Stratton, O’Connor, O’Donnell, Lanzinger, and Cupp, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE BALANCE
SHEET AS OF MARCH 31, 1999 AND FROM THE STATEMENT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE THREE
MONTHS ENDED MARCH 31, 1999 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE
TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0000765232
<NAME> NTS PROPERTIES VI/MD
       
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<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                         967,366
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  117,912
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             472,309
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (182,691)
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<FN>
<F1>THE PARTNERSHIP HAS AN UNCLASSIFIED BALANCE SHEET, THEREFORE THE VALUE IS $0.
<F2>THIS INFORMATION IS NOT DISCLOSED IN THE PARTNERSHIP'S FORM 10-Q FILING.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
###### Editorial Note on Part 2

#### Editorial Note:

Nomenclature changes to part 2 appear at 79 FR 75739, Dec. 19, 2014.

#### § 2.1000 Scope of subpart J.

The rules in this subpart, together with the rules in subparts C and G of this part, govern the procedure for an application for authorization to construct a high-level radioactive waste repository at a geologic repository operations area noticed under §§ 2.101(f)(8) or 2.105(a)(5), and for an application for a license to receive and possess high level radioactive waste at a geologic repository operations area. The procedures in this subpart take precedence over those in 10 CFR part 2, subpart C, except for the following provisions: §§ 2.301; 2.303; 2.307; 2.309; 2.312; 2.313; 2.314; 2.315; 2.316; 2.317(a); 2.318; 2.319; 2.320; 2.321; 2.322; 2.323; 2.324; 2.325; 2.326; 2.327; 2.328; 2.330; 2.331; 2.333; 2.335; 2.338; 2.339; 2.342; 2.343; 2.344; 2.345; 2.346; 2.348; and 2.390. The procedures in this subpart take precedence over those in 10 CFR part 2, subpart G, except for the following provisions: §§ 2.701, 2.702; 2.703; 2.708; 2.709; 2.710; 2.711; 2.712.

[69 FR 2264, Jan. 14, 2004]
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

, Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Stephen J. Markman

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster , Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

J anuary 8 , 2014 

# Order

Clerk January 8 , 2014

147296 ( 102 ) (105)

WAYNE COUNTY EMPLOYEES

RETIREMENT SYSTEM and WAYNE

COUNTY RETIREMENT COMMISSION,

Plaintiffs/ Counter

Defendants

- Appellees,

SC: 147296

v COA: 308096

Wayne CC: 10

- 013013

- AW

CHARTER COUNTY OF WAYNE,

Defendant/Counter

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

a nd

WAYNE COUNTY BOARD OF

COMMISSIONERS,

Defendant

- Appellant.

_____________________________________ /

On order o f the Chief Justice, the motion s of defendants

- appellant s Wayne County

and Wayne County Board of Commissioners for immediate consideration and to extend

the time to file their supplemental brief are GRANTED. The brief will be accepted as

timely filed if filed on or before January 22, 2014.
**UN PUBLISHED** 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

**No. 16**  **- 7324** 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee ,

v.
JAMAILLE DEVON MIDGETTE , Defendant

- Appellant

.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina , at Greenville

. James C. Dever, III , Chief District Judge. ( 4:12

- cr - 00029

- D

- 1 )

Submitted : January 31, 2017 Decided: February 3, 2017

Before WILKINSON, KEENAN , and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion

.
Jamaille Devon Midgette , Appellant Pro Se. Laura Howard , Augustus D. Willis , OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY , Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.2 PER CURIAM:
Jamaille Devon Midgette appeals the district court’s order denying his 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2012) motion. We have
reviewed the record and conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Midgette ’s motion. See Uni ted
States v. Smalls , 720 F.3d 193, 195 (4th Cir. 2013). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. United States v. Midgette , No. 4:12

- cr - 00029

- D

- 1 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 30,
2016). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

AFFIRMED
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR

THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 3:06-cr-210-MEF

)

MELISSA WARD )

O R D E R

Upon consideration of the defendant's Motion to Continue Sentencing (Doc. #23) filed

on January 24, 2007, it is hereby

ORDERED that the government show cause in writing on or before January 31, 2007

as to why the motion should not be granted.

DONE this the 25th day of January, 2007. 

 /s/ Mark E. Fuller 

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:06-cr-00210-MEF-CSC Document 24 Filed 01/25/2007 Page 1 of 1
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

MIDDLE DISTRICT 

ELIZABETH S. PAOLUCCI, 

 Respondent 

 v. 

UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION 

BOARD OF REVIEW, 

 Petitioner 

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 556 MAL 2015 

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from 

the Order of the Commonwealth Court 

ORDER 

PER CURIAM 

AND NOW, this 8th day of December, 2015, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal 

is GRANTED. The issues are: 

(1) Does the Commonwealth Court’s opinion conflict with this Court’s 

precedent in Bortz v. WCAB,[683 A.2d 259 (Pa. 1996),] which recognized 

the distinct conduct standards in workers’ compensation and

unemployment compensation adjudications? 

(2) Does the Commonwealth Court’s opinion conflict with this Court’s 

precedent in Harkness v. U[nemployment Comp. Bd. of Review 920 A.2d 

162 (Pa. 2007),] which emphasized the prompt and informal nature of 

unemployment compensation proceedings and, therefore, presents a 

question of such substantial public importance as to require this Court’s 

definitive resolution? 

FILED 12/8/2015 Supreme Court Middle District

88 MAP 2015
#### Dorothy M. DiSanto, Respondent, v Frank J. DiSanto, Appellant.

[815 NYS2d 468]

In an action for a divorce and ancillary relief, the defendant husband appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Ross, J.), dated April 15, 2005, which denied his motion for recusal.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

Absent a legal disqualification under Judiciary Law § 14, a trial judge is the sole arbiter of his or her recusal. Since the husband failed to demonstrate that any of the Supreme Court’s determinations in the case were the result of bias, the court providently exercised its discretion in denying his motion for recusal *(see York v York,*250 AD2d 837, 838 [1998]; *Skripek v Skripek,*239 AD2d 488 [1997]; *Anjam v Anjam,*191 AD2d 531, 532-533 [1993]). Crane, J.P., Goldstein, Rivera and Dillon, JJ., concur.
§ 140.85 Criterion II—Substantial damages to persons offsite or property offsite. ( a ) After the Commission has determined that an event has satisfied Criterion I, the Commission will determine that the event has resulted or will probably result in substantial damages to persons offsite or property offsite if any of the following findings are made: ( 1 ) The Commission finds that such event has resulted in the death or hospitalization, within 30 days of the event, of five or more people located offsite showing objective clinical evidence of physical injury from exposure to the radioactive, toxic, explosive, or other hazardous properties of source, special nuclear, or byproduct material; or
( 2 ) The Commission finds that $2,500,000 or more of damage offsite has been or will probably be sustained by any one person, or $5 million or more of such damage in the aggregate has been or will probably be sustained, as the result of such event; or
( 3 ) The Commission finds that $5,000 or more of damage offsite has been or will probably be sustained by each of 50 or more persons, provided that $1 million or more of such damage in the aggregate has been or will probably be sustained, as the result of such event.
( b ) As used in paragraphs (a) (2) and (3) of this section, “damage” shall be that arising out of or resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, or other hazardous properties of source, special nuclear, or byproduct material, and shall be based upon estimates of one or more of the following: ( 1 ) Total cost necessary to put affected property back into use,
( 2 ) Loss of use of affected property,
( 3 ) Value of affected property where not practical to restore to use,
( 4 ) Financial loss resulting from protective actions appropriate to reduce or avoid exposure to radiation or to radioactive materials.
[33 FR 15999, Oct. 31, 1968]
#### Diane Carter et al., Appellants, v City of New York, Respondent, et al., Defendant. (And Another Action.) Sharon Sims, Appellant, v City of New York, Respondent.

(Action No. 1.)

(Action No. 3.)

Submitted August 27, 2007;

decided December 13, 2007

*995Reported below, 38 AD3d 702.

Motion by the Carter appellants for leave to appeal denied with $100 costs and necessary reproduction disbursements. Motion by appellant Sims for leave to appeal dismissed as untimely *(see*CPLR 5513 [b]).
Subpart 809.1 - Responsible Prospective

Contractors

Parent topic: PART 809 - CONTRACTOR QUALIFICATIONS

809.106 Pre-award surveys.

809.106-1 Conditions for pre-award surveys.

(a) Except as provided in paragraphs (b) through (e) of this section, a committee under the direction

of the contracting officer and composed of representatives of the medical service or using service

chiefs or designees appointed by the facility or VISN director will conduct a pre-award on-site

evaluation of the plant, personnel, equipment and processes of the prospective contractor for

contracts covering the products and services of the following:

(1) Bakeries.

(2) Dairies.

(3) Ice cream plants.

(4) Laundry and dry cleaning activities.

(b) Before any inspection, the contracting officer will determine whether another VA facility or

another Federal agency has recently inspected and approved the plant.

(1) The contracting officer will accept an approved inspection report of another VA facility.

(2) If another Federal agency made a plant inspection not more than 6 months before the proposed

VA contract period, the contracting officer may accept an approved inspection report of that other

Federal agency as satisfactory evidence that the facilities of the bidder meet the bid requirements.

(c) VA will not conduct a pre-award on-site evaluation of a dairy plant when VA receives an

acceptable bid from a supplier of dairy products designated as No.1 in the Federal Specifications if

the following conditions are met:

(1) The supplier has received a pasteurized milk rating of 90 percent or more for the type of product

being supplied, on the basis of the U.S. Public Health Service milk ordinance and code.

(2) The rating is current (not over 2 years old) and has been determined by a certified State milk

sanitation rating officer in the State of origin or by the Public Health Service. The contractor must

maintain the rating of 90 percent or more during the period of the contract.

(3) The solicitation specifications must include the requirements in paragraphs (c)(1) and (2) of this

section.

(d) A dairy plant that does not meet paragraph (c) of this section may offer only dairy products

designated as No. 2 in the Federal Specifications. VA will make an award to such a firm only after it

completes a pre-award on-site evaluation conducted under paragraph (a) of this section.
(e) Before it makes an open market purchase of fresh bakery products (such as pies, cakes, and

cookies), VA will inspect and evaluate the plant where these products are produced or prepared

under paragraph (a) of this section. VA will make an on-site evaluation at least annually and record

the results on VA Form 10-2079, Inspection Report of Bakery.
SUBCHAPTER C - CONTRACTING METHODS

AND CONTRACT TYPES

PART 2914 - SEALED BIDDING

PART 2915 - CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION

PART 2916 - CONTRACT TYPES

PART 2917 - SPECIAL CONTRACTING METHODS

PART 2914 - SEALED BIDDING

Subpart 2914.4 - Opening of Bids and Award of Contract

2914.404-1 Cancellation of invitations after opening.

2914.407-3 Other mistakes disclosed before award.

2914.408 Award.

2914.408-1 General.

PART 2915 - CONTRACTING BY NEGOTIATION

Subpart 2915.4 - Contract Pricing

2915.405-70 Determining fair and reasonable price.

Subpart 2915.5 - Preaward, Award, and Postaward Notifications, Protests, and Mistakes

2915.508 Discovery of mistakes.

Subpart 2915.6 - Unsolicited Proposals

2915.604 Agency points of contact.

2915.605 Content of unsolicited proposals.

2915.606 Agency procedures.

PART 2916 - CONTRACT TYPES

2916.000 Scope of part.

Subpart 2916.5 - Indefinite-Delivery Contracts

2916.505 Ordering.

Subpart 2916.6 - Time-and-Materials, Labor-Hour, and Letter Contracts

2916.603-2 Application.

PART 2917 - SPECIAL CONTRACTING METHODS

2917.000 Scope of part.

Subpart 2917.2 - Options

2917.202 Use of options.

2917.207 Exercising options.

Subpart 2917.5 - Interagency Acquisitions Under The Economy Act

2917.500 Scope of subpart.

2917.501 Definitions.

2917.502 General.

2917.503 Determinations and findings requirements.

2917.504 Ordering procedures.

2917.504-70 Signature authority and internal procedures.
# C o u rt o f

A p p ea ls

o f t h e S t a te o f

G eo rg ia

ATLANTA,_

_ _ __ _ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ _
Th e Co u rt

o f Ap p ea l s h er eb y p a s s es t h e f

o ll owi n g o r der :

A2 2 A1 29 2 . J ERRY LEE THOMAS, I I I v . CI TY OF HI NESVI LLE.

Aft er th e M u n i ci pal Co u rt o f H i n es v i l le ad ju di cat ed J erry Lee Th om as , III,

g u i l t y of a traffi c offen s e, Th o m as ap p eal ed t o t h e s u p eri o r co u rt

. Th e s u peri o r co u rt
affi rm ed , an d Th o m as fi l ed t h i s d irect ap p eal . W e l ack ju ri s d i ct i on

. Ap p eal s fro m s u p eri o r co urt d eci s i o n s rev i ew i n g l o wer co u rt d eci s i o n s in

t raffi c c a s e s m

u st b e i n i ti at ed by fi l i n g an ap p li cat i o n fo r d i s cret i on ary ap p eal

. See
OCGA § 5 -6 -3 5 (a) (1 ), (b ); Br o w n v. Ci t y o f Ma ri et t a , 2 14 G a. A p p

. 84 0
, 8 4 2 (1 ) (4 4 9 SE2 d 5 4 0) (1 9 94 ). “ Co m p l i an ce wi th t h e d i s cret i o n ary ap p eal s pr o c e d u r e i s ju ri s d i ct i o n a l

. ” S

m o a k v. Dep t. o

f Hu ma n Res o u rces , 2 2 1 Ga. Ap p

. 25 7
, 2 5 7 (4 7 1
SE2 d 6 0 ) (1 9 96 ). Th o m as ’ s fa i l u r e t o co m p l y wi t h th e d i s cret i o n ary ap p eal s
p ro ced ure d ep ri v es u s o f ju ri s d i ct i o n o v er t h i s d i rect a p p e a l
, w h i ch i s h ereb y DISM ISSED.

C o u r t o f A p p e a l s o f t h e S t a t e o

f G e o r g ia C le r k ’ s O f f i c e , A t la n t a ,

_

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I c e r ti fy t h a t t h e a b o v e i s a t r u e e x t r a c t f r o m
t h e m i n u t e s o

f t h e C o u r t o

f A p p e a l s o f G e o r g i a

. W i tn e s s m y s i g n a t u r e a n d th e s e a l o

f s a i d c o u r t h e r e t o a f f i x e d t h e d a y a n d y e a r l a s t a b o v e w r i t t e n

.

, C l e r k

. July 14, 2022

07/14/2022
#### Muriel M. Freimour, Appellant, v Jacob Freimour, Respondent.

In an action, *inter alia,*to rescind a separation agreement and impress a constructive trust on the marital residence, plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, dated August 20, 1979, which, after a nonjury trial, dismissed the complaint. Judgment affirmed, with costs. The record clearly establishes the propriety of the trial court’s conclusion that the separation agreement in issue was fair and not unconscionable or the product of overreaching. (See *Christian v Christian,*42 NY2d 63.) The substantive terms of the agreement and the negotiations were fair and thus the agreement should not be *897rescinded. (See *Perry v Perry,*64 AD2d 625.) Moreover, appellant’s satisfaction with the agreement was demonstrated when, without alleging coercion or overreaching, she utilized it to obtain a conversion divorce as well as two separate increases of child support during the past four years. In addition, while the practice of one attorney representing both parties in the preparation of a separation agreement has been criticized, the attorney herein was able to maintain neutrality, and the agreement was fairly established without overreaching by either party. Under the particular facts and circumstances of this case, the agreement need not be set aside because one attorney represented both parties. (See *Perry v Perry, supra.)*Finally, appellant was barred from raising the issue of a constructive trust on the marital residence by the Statute of Limitations, as well as the release clause in tfie separation agreement. Lazer, J. P., Gibbons, Gulotta and Cohalan, JJ., concur.
120 STAT. 2018 PUBLIC LAW 109–355—OCT. 16, 2006

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY—H.R. 479:

HOUSE REPORTS: No. 109–620 (Comm. on Resources).

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 152 (2006):

Sept. 12, considered and passed House.

Sept. 29, considered and passed Senate.

Æ

Public Law 109–355

109th Congress

An Act

To replace a Coastal Barrier Resources System map relating to Coastal Barrier

Resources System Grayton Beach Unit FL–95P in Walton County, Florida.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of

the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. REPLACEMENT OF COASTAL BARRIER RESOURCES

SYSTEM MAP RELATING TO GRAYTON BEACH UNIT FL–

95P IN WALTON COUNTY, FLORIDA.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The map described in subsection (b) relating

to the Coastal Barrier Resources System unit Grayton Beach Unit

FL–95P, located in Walton County, Florida, as included in the

set of maps entitled ‘‘Coastal Barrier Resources System’’ referred

to in section 4(a) of the Coastal Barrier Resources Act (16 U.S.C.

3503(a)), is hereby replaced by another map relating to that unit

entitled ‘‘Grayton Beach Unit FL–95P and Draper Lake Unit FL–

96’’ and dated ‘‘July 24, 2006’’.

(b) REPLACED MAP DESCRIBED.—The map replaced under subsection (a) is subtitled ‘‘COASTAL BARRIER RESOURCES

SYSTEM GRAYTON BEACH UNIT FL–95P DRAPER LAKE UNIT

FL–96’’ and dated October 24, 1990.

(c) AVAILABILITY.—The Secretary of the Interior shall keep the

maps referred to in subsections (a) on file and available for inspection in accordance with the provisions of section 4(b) of the Coastal

Barrier Resources Act (16 U.S.C. 3503(b)).

Approved October 16, 2006.

16 USC 3503

note.

Oct. 16, 2006

[H.R. 479]
<PAGE>

                                                                   Exhibit 99(2)


         TREASURER'S CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                   AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE
                           SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and in connection
with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Encore Computer Corporation (the
"Company") for the period ended September 30, 2002, as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the undersigned, the
Treasurer of the Company, certifies that:

     (3)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (4)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
          of the Company.


/s/ Thomas N. Rich
------------------------------
Thomas N. Rich

Treasurer

November 12, 2002