A city become a lake, New Orleans

U.S. Coast Guard photo
51

Katrina Strikes

Louisiana 

On August 23, 2005, Tropical Depression 12 developed about 200 miles southeast of Nassau. Within 24 hours, it was designated Tropical Storm Katrina.1

 Over the next two days, 

the storm strengthened and set a course for Florida. On August 25, Tropical Storm Katrina 

became a Category 1 hurricane, just hours before striking the Florida coast between Fort 

Lauderdale and Miami.2

 (See Chapter 3 for information about how hurricanes form and 

grow, and other relevant data.)

Katrina’s six-hour march across land diminished its winds, but – atypically – left it with a 

more concentrated eye because it continued taking up heat and moisture as it passed over 

a marshy part of Florida’s Everglades before entering the Gulf of Mexico.3

 Th ere, the storm 

strengthened further, turned north and headed for the Florida Panhandle.4

Friday, August 26

By early Friday morning, August 26, Katrina was well into the Gulf of Mexico, just off the 

Florida Keys, 365 miles southeast of the mouth of the Mississippi River. It continued to 

grow and became more powerful.5

 Until now, the diff erent modeling programs used by the 

National Weather Service’s (NWS) National Hurricane Center (NHC) had projected the 

hurricane’s track making landfall in the Florida Panhandle.6

By midday, however, the models began to converge on a course that showed a marked shift 

westward, toward Louisiana.7

 Th e NHC did not immediately issue a new advisory, but it 

now appeared that the agency’s long-time fear – that New Orleans would take a direct hit 

from a major hurricane – was increasingly likely to come true.8

Th e 5 p.m. NHC advisory made the new track offi cial: Katrina, still growing, had shift ed 

170 miles west.9

 It would soon become a major Category 3 hurricane, and, as reported by 

the NHC, conditions in the Gulf of Mexico “should allow the hurricane to reach Category 4 

status before landfall occurs.”10

Max Mayfi eld, Director of the NHC, phoned Walter Maestri, an old friend and the Emergency Preparedness Director in Jeff erson Parish, Louisiana. Maestri recalled Mayfi eld’s 

words: “Th is is it. Th is is what we’ve been talking about all of these years. You are going to 

take it. ... It’s a 30, 90 storm.” Maestri explained, “Th at’s the longitude and latitude of the 

City of New Orleans.”11 Other forecasters made similar calls to offi cials in Louisiana and 

Mississippi warning that Katrina was shift ing their way.12

Th is new information was shared in a 5 p.m. CT (all subsequent times are Central Time) 

statewide conference call run by Colonel Jeff Smith, Deputy Director of the Louisiana Offi ce 

of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP). Katrina would be striking the eastern portion of the Mississippi coast in approximately 72 hours with Category 4 

winds, a NWS forecaster informed offi cials.13

Th e forecaster reminded emergency managers that landfall was extremely diffi cult to predict 

with precision three days in advance.14 But, the forecaster added, referring to the computer 

model used to measure storm surge, “If you look at a Category 4 storm surge, looking at the 

SLOSH models, you’d get into the 15 to 20-foot range quite easily.”15

Chapter 4
Chapter 4

52

Saturday, August 27 

Th roughout Saturday, August 27, Katrina nearly 

doubled in size. Its tropical storm-force winds extended outward about 160 miles from the center.16

At the NHC, offi cials were increasingly confi dent 

that Katrina would make landfall at or near New 

Orleans; a level of geographic precision was required 

for more accurate predictions of storm surge.17 On 

a 7:30 a.m. conference call, a federal forecaster told 

Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco and state and 

parish emergency offi cials that by 9 a.m. Monday, 

southeast Louisiana could expect hurricane-force 

winds and a storm surge of 15 to 18 feet. Th e latest track prediction put the hurricane “smack dab 

through the metropolitan New Orleans areas.”18

On Saturday evening, Max Mayfi eld made another round of telephone calls to assure himself that local and state offi cials understood what was coming. At approximately 7:25 p.m., 

he spoke with Governor Blanco, who suggested he call New Orleans Mayor C. Ray Nagin. 

Twenty minutes later, he spoke with Governor Haley Barbour in Mississippi. By 8 p.m., he 

had spoken with Mayor Nagin.19

Sunday, August 28

At 7 a.m., August 28, the NHC announced that Katrina was a “potentially catastrophic Category 5 hurricane.”20 Th e storm’s tropical-force winds extended 230 miles from the center, 

“making Katrina not only extremely intense but also exceptionally large.”21 At that point, 

Katrina was twice as wide as 1992’s Hurricane Andrew. Superimposed over the United 

States, it would have reached from Boston to Washington, D.C.

Less than an hour later, at 7:50 a.m., a NWS forecaster advised the St. Bernard Parish Offi ce of Emergency Management to expect a direct strike from the hurricane with “[m]ajor 

overtopping” of the levees. He advised offi cials that “Residents should leave now before the 

onset of tropical force winds and rising tides cut off evacuation routes.”22

Th roughout the aft ernoon and evening, local forecasters advised local emergency managers 

about the intensifying storm. At 4:45 p.m., Hancock County, Mississippi, emergency managers were warned that Category 5 winds could produce a 28-foot storm surge in Waveland, 

on the coast. Th e City of New Orleans was warned to expect 18 to 22 feet.23

By early evening, storm-surge projections had grown more worrying. To underscore the 

danger, the NWS offi ce in Slidell, Louisiana, issued a 5:45 p.m. advisory that called Katrina 

a “catastrophic” Category 5 hurricane and warned that “a few areas may experience storm 

surge fl ooding as high as 28 feet along with large and dangerous battering waves.”24 For the 

fi rst time, the weather agency publicly warned of levee overtopping.25

The Geography of the Metropolitan New Orleans Region 

While the New Orleans metropolitan area has been referred to as a “bowl,” it would be 

more accurately described as three distinct, large, urban bowls, and one very thin, elongated, predominantly rural bowl.

A fl ood-control system surrounds these four areas, known as “polders”: (1) Orleans East 

Bank, (2) New Orleans East, (3) Ninth Ward/St. Bernard, and (4) Plaquemines Parish.

Katrina’s storm track by day, 

time, and severity 

Courtesy of University of Wisconsin Space 

Science and Engineering Center
Katrina Strikes

53

Th e Orleans East Bank polder includes the downtown district, the French Quarter, the Garden District, and several other central New Orleans neighborhoods. It borders Lake Pontchartrain to the north and the Mississippi River to its south; the Industrial Canal forms its 

eastern border. Th ree large drainage canals penetrate the Orleans East Bank polder, emptying 

out into Lake Pontchartrain: the 17th Street, Orleans Avenue, and London Avenue Canals.

Th e New Orleans East polder also borders Lake Pontchartrain to the north; the Industrial 

Canal forms the west edge. To the south is the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway/Mississippi 

River Gulf Outlet (MRGO). Undeveloped swampland contained within the levee ring takes 

up the eastern edge. To the southeast is Lake Borgne.

Th e Ninth Ward/St. Bernard polder also borders the Industrial Canal to the west; the Gulf 

Intracoastal Waterway/MRGO channel is to the north and northeast. Lake Borgne is east, 

separated from the polder by the MRGO channel and undeveloped marshland. Th e polder’s 

primary urban areas are in the south (St. Bernard Parish) and west (Ninth Ward). 

Plaquemines Parish is a thin strip of land along the Mississippi River, which runs southsoutheast from St. Bernard Parish to the mouth of the Mississippi River at the Gulf of 

Mexico. Th is strip, less than a mile wide in many areas, has levees fronting the Mississippi 

River and a second set of hurricane levees on its other side to protect against Gulf waters. 

Th e levees surround several small communities, utilities, and pipelines.26

Monday, August 29

Late Sunday, August 28, hurricane-force winds reached more than 100 miles from Katrina’s 

eye.27 Th e winds and, later, the accompanying storm surge would strike land well before the 

offi cial landfall event of the eye’s arrival. By 5 a.m. on Monday, with the wind fi eld already 

over land, but the eye’s landfall an hour away, Katrina was at Category 4 strength with 

maximum sustained winds of more than 130 miles an hour.28 Th e NHC reported that with 

the storm’s radius of maximum winds extending out roughly 30 to 35 miles from its center, 

“It is possible that sustained winds of Category 4 strength briefl y impacted the extreme 

southeastern tip of Louisiana in advance of landfall.”29

As the eye approached New Orleans, Katrina shoved a 14 to 17-foot storm surge up a “funnel” created by the hurricane protection levees at the convergence of the south bank of the 

MRGO and the north bank of the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway, and focused a torrent of 

water on the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal.30 Th e eye of Hurricane Katrina made landfall 

at Buras, Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana, at 6:10 a.m. Th e storm was at the high end of Category 3 strength, with estimated maximum sustained winds of 127 miles an hour.31 It tore

through the Mississippi River and hurricane protection levees of the Plaquemines Parish 

polder.32 By 10 a.m. the northward-moving eye had reached the mouth of the Pearl River at 

the Louisiana/Mississippi border.33

As the storm continued north – just east of downtown New Orleans – its strongest winds 

likely existed over the Gulf of Mexico to the east of the eye. Winds over the greater New 

Orleans metropolitan area were most likely weaker than Category 3,34 but were probably 

stronger several hundred feet above ground, where brutal wind punched out windows in 

hotels and offi ce buildings.35

As the counterclockwise-moving hurricane passed over Lake Borgne on the eastern side of 

the city with a storm surge estimated at 18 to 25 feet, it shoved water westward onto an edge 

of the levee that protected the northern edge of the Ninth Ward and St. Bernard Parish; 5 to 

10 feet of excess surge easily slid over the levee walls.36 Upon reaching Lake Pontchartrain, 

Katrina’s winds produced a southward surge of lakewater along the northern edges of the 
Chapter 4

54

Orleans East Bank and New Orleans East polders, with overtopping and a breach in New 

Orleans East, adjacent to the Lakefront Airport.37

Th e surge from Lake Pontchartrain and Lake Borgne streamed into the Industrial Canal 

and the MRGO channel. Here, too, the fl oodwaters easily overfl owed the levees. In time, the 

erosion of the earthen levees by overtopping led to numerous breaches that added to the 

torrent of water quickly fi lling the “bowls” that included the New Orleans East and Ninth 

Ward/St. Bernard polders.38

Th e inundation of New Orleans happened in two stages. A “surge funnel” that attacked 

the levees and fl oodwalls along the MRGO, the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway and the Inner 

Harbor Navigation Canal caused the fi rst fl ooding. Th e second stage began when Katrina’s 

storm surge muscled into Lake Pontchartrain.39 “Both events caused overtopping, or fl ow 

over intact levees and fl oodwalls, as well as breaching that resulted in fl ow under and 

through levees and fl oodwalls,”40 according to a report by the Center for the Study of Public 

Health Impacts of Hurricanes at Louisiana State University. “In some cases, overtopping 

preceded or led to breaching, while in other places breaches opened before surge levels rose 

high enough to cause overtopping.”41

A report by the American Society of Civil Engineers and the National Science Foundation 

reached a similar conclusion, noting that “Most of the levee and fl oodwall failures were 

caused by overtopping, as the storm surge rose over the tops of the levees and/or their 

fl oodwalls and produced erosion that subsequently led to failures and breaches.”42

Because the storm surge arrived ahead of the hurricane, some residential areas in the greater New Orleans area began to fl ood just aft er 4 

a.m.43 Between 4 and 5 a.m., minor breaches opened in the levees at the 

intersection of the CSX Railroad and the northern arm of the Industrial Canal (adjacent and parallel to I-10) sending water into the New 

Orleans East polder to the east and the Orleans East Bank polder to 

the west. Th e fl ooding continued for over 12 hours.44 At approximately 

6:50 a.m., the levees along all reaches of the Industrial Canal began to 

be overtopped and water started to pour into the city both to the east 

and the west.45

Between 5 and 7 a.m., the storm surge coming through Lake Borgne struck and destroyed 

several levee reaches along the MRGO channel and the Industrial Canal, fl ooding portions 

of the New Orleans East, Orleans East Bank and the Ninth Ward/St. Bernard polders.46 In 

some places, fl ooding continued for days.47 Levees along several reaches of the Industrial 

Canal were overtopped, resulting in water gushing to the west into the Orleans East Bank 

polder and to the east into the New Orleans East and Ninth Ward/St. Bernard polders. 48

At about 7 a.m., the 18-foot Lake Borgne storm surge peaked and almost certainly caused 

the rapid fl ooding at the Louisiana National Guard’s Jackson Barracks in St. Bernard Parish.49 For years, the Louisiana National Guard had used this compound to deploy a small 

group of soldiers and offi cers close to the area where a major hurricane was likely to strike. 

Th e facility had stood up to numerous strong storms, including 1965’s Hurricane Betsy. 

Brigadier General Brod Veillon, who was in command at Jackson Barracks on the night of 

August 28, said that, by dawn, Jackson Barracks had 6 to 12 inches of water in the parking 

lot, a typical amount from heavy rainfall. Within 30 minutes, however, the compound was 

engulfed by 10 feet of water. “It rose about a foot every 3 minutes. We watched it climb the 

stairs. ... I knew it was signifi cant when the walls of Jackson Barracks, which are brick walls, 

began to collapse.”50

First image of breaching, 

New Orleans

Courtesy of National Geographic Channel’s 

“Explorer: Drowning New Orleans.”

Photo by Paul Hellmers © Paul Hellmers
Katrina Strikes

55

By 7:30 a.m., levees along the 

west side of the Industrial Canal 

(at the railroad yard) failed and 

began a fl ood of the Orleans East 

Bank polder that continued for 

about 12 to 15 hours.51 By this 

time, there was massive fl ooding in much of the city, and the 

pumping stations had died.52

At approximately 7:45 a.m., 

the levees along the east side of 

the southeastern section of the 

Industrial Canal failed, sending 

a wall of water into the neighborhoods of the Ninth Ward/St. 

Bernard polder, especially the 

Lower Ninth Ward.53 Th e National Weather Service reported 

that 3 to 8 feet of fl ooding was 

possible.54 Th en, at 8:30 a.m., a 

continuous wave of storm surge 

poured over a one-mile section 

of levee along Lake Pontchartrain behind the Lakefront Airport. Th e water kept coming for another two to three hours.55

In the Ninth Ward/St. Bernard polder,56 fl oodwaters were reaching the second stories of 

bigger buildings and residents were fl eeing to their attics.57

To the west – along the northern edge of the Orleans East Bank polder – the storm surge 

that hit the southern lakefront of Lake Pontchartrain did not produce waters high enough 

to overtop the concrete fl oodwalls lining the three major drainage canals: the 17th Street, 

Orleans Avenue, and London Avenue Canals. Nevertheless, three major breaches occurred 

along these canals. Based on two very detailed eyewitness accounts in the area, it is estimated 

that the initial breach on the east side of the 17th Street Canal occurred at approximately 6:30 

a.m.,58 and that the catastrophic failure of the levee took place somewhere between 9 and 10 

a.m. 59 Similarly, sometime between 7 and 9:30 a.m., a section on the east side of the London 

Avenue Canal (close to the Mirabeau Bridge) failed;60 sometime between 7:30 and 10:30 a.m., 

a section on the west side of the London Avenue Canal breached, “sen[ding] an 8 foot high 

wall of water cascading into the surrounding neighborhoods.”61 All three of these breaches 

caused catastrophic fl ooding in the Orleans East Bank polder, which includes (among others) 

the Central Business District, Lakeview, Mid City, and Lakewood areas of the city. 

Captains Paul Hellmers and Joe Fincher, two New Orleans Fire Department fi remen located 

at a department refuge in the Lakefront area of the city, videotaped the 17th Street Canal 

breach. In the video, which captures the breach at 11:11 a.m., Capt. Hellmers said:62

You can ... see the water pouring through the [inaudible] wall. Th ere’s a ... 

concrete wall on top of the dirt levee. And you can see that the ... wall is gone 

– you can see the water pouring through, it looks like about a 200-foot section 

of wall that’s gone! Th e water is continuing to rise – very slowly.63

While Capt. Hellmers observed that the water in the entire area was rising “very slowly,” it 

is clear from the video that the water from the 17th Street Canal breach is pouring through 

the gaping hole with enormous pressure and speed.64 A second video of the New Orleans 

A canal breached, New Orleans

Photo © 2005 The Times-Picayune Publishing 

Co., all rights reserved. Used with permission of 

the Times-Picayune
Chapter 4

56

area, shot from a Coast Guard helicopter during the early aft ernoon of August 29, helps 

explain the diff erent impressions.65 From the vantage point of the helicopter’s bay window, 

it is evident that the infl ow from Lake Pontchartrain was spreading out rapidly into a vast 

area of land, so the water level rose slowly despite the power of the fl ow.

Later in the day, between approximately 5:15 and 7 p.m., Marty Bahamonde, a public- affairs offi cial with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) who had spent the 

night at the New Orleans City Hall Emergency Operations Center, joined a Coast Guard 

helicopter crew to conduct a visual inspection. Th e fi rst of his two rides began with a quick 

pass over the 17th Street Canal. A second fl ight of approximately 45 minutes covered most 

of the metropolitan area of New Orleans. Bahamonde described the scene: 

As far as the eye could see in either direction was completely covered with 

water. Th ere was no dry land. I saw no dry land the moment I left , other than 

around the Superdome. ... It was varying in depth. Th ere were houses that 

were completely under water. All you saw was rooft ops. ... It was obvious that 

there was massive fl ooding throughout the city. ... And we went out and fl ew 

over the [I-10] twin span and it was completely destroyed. ... We fl ew over the 

canal area, may have even been the Mississippi, where a huge tanker had been 

run aground. ... Chalmette, the Ninth Ward, all completely fl ooded ... the 

Intracoastal Industrial Canal. You didn’t really know it was a canal because it 

was just one sheet of water. ... And as we got back toward the city, it became 

obvious now that – it’s close to 7 o’clock – that there are literally hundreds of 

people on rooft ops, standing in balconies in apartments, and that there was a 

desperate need for a rescue mission because it was now getting dark.66

Around the same time that Bahamonde was observing the devastation from a Coast Guard 

helicopter, Colonel Richard P. Wagenaar, Commander of the Army Corps of Engineers 

district offi ce in New Orleans, was conducting a similar reconnaissance in a four-wheeldrive vehicle. Col. Wagenaar told the Committee that between 5 and 5:30 p.m. he reached 

an elevated overpass on Interstate 10 near downtown New Orleans: 

Th en we saw the water, and the water was – all you could see were the trees 

sticking out of the water. ... Th at’s probably 10 or 15 feet of water ... a sight to 

behold, because, literally, I mean, you just drive on an interstate and there is a 

lake. I mean, it literally was a lake.” 67

Mississippi

Hurricanes are part of life on the Mississippi Gulf Coast. Every year there are hurricane 

warnings, evacuations, and scares; some years the coast gets hit. Before Katrina, the gold 

standard for storms in the region was Hurricane Camille,68 a Category 5 hurricane that 

struck Mississippi on August 17-18, 1969, killing 143 along the coast, bringing with it about 

10 inches of rain and a storm tide as high as 24 feet.69

Th e area’s familiarity with hurricanes – and with the inevitable false alarms generated as the 

storms wander toward land – gives coastal residents both a healthy respect for storms and a 

degree of nonchalance toward dire warnings. False alarms during previous seasons – including an evacuation in 2004 before Hurricane Ivan, which ultimately veered away from 

the Mississippi coast – may have contributed to this attitude. Surviving Camille, widely 

viewed as the worst storm imaginable, may have led some to believe that future storms 

would be no worse. 
Katrina Strikes

57

Katrina changed all that. As Governor Barbour recounted at a February 2, 2006, hearing of 

the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs Committee:

On Aug. 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck our state a grievous blow. Although the eye of the storm landed at the Mississippi-Louisiana line, that eye 

was more than 30 miles wide, and Katrina completely devastated our entire 

coastline, from Pearlington to Pascagoula. Th e miles and miles of utter destruction is unimaginable. ... But this hurricane wasn’t just a calamity for the 

Mississippi Gulf Coast. Its impact extended inland with hurricane force more 

than 200 miles from the coast. In her wake, Katrina left literally tens of thousands of uninhabitable, oft en obliterated homes; thousands of small businesses 

in shambles; dozens of schools and public buildings ruined and unusable; 

highways, ports and railroads, water and sewer systems, all destroyed.70

The Region

In 2005, the State of Mississippi had a population of approximately 2.9 million people. Th e 

state comprises 82 counties, with three (Hancock, Harrison, and Jackson) located directly 

on the Gulf of Mexico, and three directly to the north of them (Pearl River, Stone, and 

George). Th e three counties that lie directly on the Gulf are generally referred to as the 

Mississippi Gulf Coast, and have a combined population of approximately 374,000 people 

(with populations of 46,000 in Hancock, 193,000 in Harrison, and 135,000 in Jackson). Th e 

Mississippi Gulf Coast extends for some 90 miles between Louisiana and Alabama. With 

the three counties to the north (Pearl River has 52,000, Stone has 14,000, and George has 

21,000), that number rises to 461,000.71

Th e largest cities of the southernmost six counties are Gulfport and Biloxi, both located in 

Harrison County. Th ey are the second and third largest cities in the state aft er the capital, 

Jackson, with populations of 71,000 and 50,000 respectively. Th e next largest in the region 

are the cities of Pascagoula in Jackson County (26,000), Laurel in Jones County (18,000), 

and Long Beach in Harrison County (17,000). Other cities in Hancock County include Bay 

St. Louis (8,000) and Waveland (6,000). 72

Th e Mississippi coastal area had a varied economy before Katrina struck. Major sectors 

included oil-and-gas refi ning and distribution, light manufacturing, and tourism. Th e area’s 

beaches and casino resorts were a mainstay of the tourism industry. Recent years had seen 

development of a number of casino/hotel complexes, including the Hard Rock Casino, the 

Beau Rivage, the Palace Casino, and the Grand Casino. To comply with Mississippi law, the 

casino operations were off shore, on barges arrayed along the coast.73 Th e casino industry 

was an important source of jobs and tax revenue for the region.74

Katrina Approaches 

At about 10 a.m. on Wednesday, August 24, the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency 

(MEMA) activated the state Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Jackson, Mississippi. At 

this point Katrina was just a tropical storm in the Atlantic.75 By 4 p.m. the next day, Katrina 

was bearing down on Florida and its entry into the Gulf of Mexico was increasingly likely.76

At 10 a.m. on Friday, August 26, MEMA’s situation report reported that Katrina was likely 

to make a gradual turn to west-northwest and northwest from Florida and noted, “Th is longer westerly motion is signifi cant in that it indicates an increasing threat farther west along 
Chapter 4

58

the northern Gulf Coast.”77 By 4:30 p.m. that day, MEMA reported, “Landfall is now projected for near the Alabama/Mississippi border on Monday morning” as a Category 4 hurricane.78 On August 26, the Governor declared a State of Emergency and signed Executive 

Order #939, activating the National Guard.79 By 9 a.m. the next day, Katrina was forecasted 

to make landfall in the Mississippi Delta/New Orleans area as a Category 4 hurricane.80

By noon on Saturday, August 27, Harrison County and the City of Pass Christian issued 

Proclamations of Local Emergency.81 Th ese proclamations meant that these localities felt it 

was beyond their capacity to respond to the threat Hurricane Katrina posed and that they required help from other counties and the state.82 By 4 p.m., they had been joined by Hancock 

County and the City of Waveland.83 By 8 a.m. the next day, Jackson County did as well.84

On the morning of Sunday, August 28, MEMA issued a situation report describing Katrina 

as an “extremely dangerous” Category 5 storm and stating that the entire Mississippi coast 

was subject to a hurricane warning.85 By noon that day, Katrina had been upgraded to “potentially catastrophic,” with expected storm surges of up to 25 feet.86

As recounted more fully elsewhere in this report, federal, state, and local governments 

made various preparations and preliminary deployments in the days leading up to Katrina’s 

landfall on August 29. Th e Governor called up Mississippi National Guard units, which had 

begun deploying August 27, with some units positioned in the coastal counties while others 

formed up at Camp Shelby, near Hattiesburg, Mississippi. By noon on Sunday, August 28, 

MEMA’s State Emergency Response Team (SERT) had deployed to Camp Shelby.87 FEMA 

representatives arrived as well. 

The Storm Hits 

Katrina weakened from a Category 5 to a Category 3 storm as it made landfall on the Mississippi Gulf Coast, but its magnitude was still extraordinary. No one the Committee staff 

spoke to had ever seen a comparable storm. On August 29, Katrina’s radius of maximum 

winds stretched out 25 to 30 nautical miles from its center, and hurricane-force winds extended out at least 75 nautical miles eastward from its center, making it a storm of unprecedented size on the Mississippi Gulf Coast.88 

Th e Surge: Witnesses from the Gulf Coast have told of the horrible, overwhelming storm 

surge driven ashore by Katrina, a surge that caused signifi cant fl ooding the length of the 

coast. Yet, as the NWS has observed, “A precise measure of the storm surge . . . is complicated by many factors, including the widespread failure of tide gauges. Additionally, in 

many locations, most of the buildings along the coast were completely destroyed, leaving 

few structures within which to identify still-water marks.”89

Whatever its exact surge level, Katrina battered Mississippi with a deadly and unprecedented 

wall of water. Unoffi cial measurements hint at its power. Th e Hancock County Emergency 

Operations Center recorded a 28-foot storm tide.90 Th e Harrison County emergency director 

estimates that a tidal surge of 25 to 35 feet hit that part of the coast.91 Across the Mississippi 

Gulf Coast in Pascagoula, the Jackson County EOC recorded a high water mark of 16.2 feet.92

Th e NWS reports that Katrina’s ferocity in the Gulf of Mexico, combined with its enormous 

size at landfall, caused the extraordinary surges. “Overall, Katrina’s very high water levels 

are attributable to a large Category 3 hurricane’s storm surge being enhanced by waves 

generated not long before by a Category 5 strength storm.”93
Katrina Strikes

59

Katrina’s waves and high waters lasted for hours, 

compounding the destruction. D.J. Ziegler, the Gulfport Harbormaster, rode out the storm in a parking 

deck near the ocean: 

Th e word “surge” irritates me a little. ... People 

want to act like there’s one sudden ... surge 

that comes in, and it’s not the case. Th e water 

just keeps getting deeper and the swells getting 

larger. So what you really have is a constant 

pounding. ... So it’s more like somebody’s got a 

sledge hammer ... and keeps hitting.94

Th e surge penetrated at least six miles inland along 

many portions of coastal Mississippi, and up to 12 

miles along bays and rivers.95

Th e Rain: Even without the storm surge, Katrina’s 

rain was enough to fl ood many communities along 

the coast. Eight to 10 inches of rain fell across a large 

swath of southwestern Mississippi.96 Estimates gathered by the NWS indicate that Hancock County received more than 10 inches of rain. Even 

Jackson, almost 150 miles north of the coast, still received nearly four inches of rain.97

Th e Wind: Katrina’s winds were strong, broad in reach, and long-lasting. As a Category 3 

hurricane, Katrina had sustained winds of 111 to 130 miles per hour. In Jackson County, 

the reported winds were even higher.98

Katrina’s Reach: Katrina remained a destructive storm well north of the Gulf Coast. It weakened to a tropical storm late in the day on August 29 just northwest of Meridian, Mississippi.99 Winds of over 56 m.p.h. were registered in the state capital of Jackson, and as far north 

as Columbus, Mississippi, there were winds of over 50 m.p.h. 100 Mayor Bob Massengill of 

Brookhaven, Mississippi, located 135 miles northwest of the Mississippi Gulf Coast, recalled 

that his community received wind gusts of up to 85 miles per hour and had several hours of 

sustained winds of over 50 miles per hour. Th is resulted in hundreds of downed trees and 

dozens of severely damaged or destroyed homes.101

As if the destructive force of the hurricane winds alone were not enough, Katrina produced 

a total of 11 reported tornados in Mississippi during August 29 and 30.102 

Immediate Impact on Mississippi 

Within hours, Katrina brought the coast to a halt. By 4 p.m. on Monday, all of Highway 

90 along the Gulf Coast had fl ooded, along with parts of I-10.103 Th e two main bridges on 

Highway 90, the Biloxi-Ocean Springs Bridge and the Bay St. Louis Bridge, collapsed. Th e 

Bay St. Louis Bridge fell into the bay, between supports that had withstood the storm. Th e 

storm rendered roads completely impassable, and rail service was discontinued.104

Th e most basic of community services were totally disrupted, in some cases for weeks. 

Water and sewer service failed. Local schools closed. Gulfport Memorial Hospital and other 

hospitals along the coast were damaged and forced to relocate hundreds of patients.105 Katrina knocked out power to hundreds of thousands of Mississippi residents. At its peak, as 

of August 30, almost one million energy customers were without power.106

Devastated neighborhood, 

Waveland, MS 

Sun Herald news photo, Biloxi/Gulfport, MS
Chapter 4

60

Th e physical damage was staggering. According to estimates, 65,380 homes were destroyed in 

southern Mississippi – over 95 percent of the statewide total of 68,641 destroyed homes. Katrina left 44 million cubic yards of debris and caused billions of dollars in property damage.107

Th e impact on many communities along the coast is diffi cult to conceive. In Waveland and 

Bay St. Louis, communities of thousands of homes on the westernmost part of the Mississippi Gulf Coast, Katrina left only a few dozen habitable residences. Mayor Brent Warr of 

Gulfport estimates that 80 to 90 percent of the residential and commercial properties of his 

city sustained heavy damage or were destroyed.108 In Gulfport and Biloxi, the big casino 

barges so signifi cant to the region’s economy were destroyed. In many instances, the casinos 

were lift ed off of their anchoring stanchions by the powerful water and dumped hundreds 

of yards away. At one casino, boats from nearby Gulfport Harbor were wedged between the 

girders of what was left of the structure, like nails hammered in by some unseen hand.109

According to recent fi gures, 231 identifi ed victims perished in Mississippi as a result of 

Katrina, with 5 other unidentifi ed dead and 67 missing.110

Alabama

While Alabama did not suff er the same level of damage as Louisiana and Mississippi, Hurricane Katrina gave the state a battering, especially coastal Baldwin and Mobile counties. 

Dauphin Island, a barrier island, faced 100 m.p.h. wind gusts; Mobile had gusts exceeding 

80 m.p.h.111 An oil rig under construction along the Mobile River in Alabama was dislodged, fl oated 1.5 miles northward, and struck the Cochrane Bridge, causing signifi cant 

damage just north of downtown Mobile.112 Another off shore oil rig washed up near the 

beach of Dauphin Island. 113 Katrina also reportedly caused signifi cant beach erosion and 

signifi cant tree damage throughout the state. 114

Hurricane Katrina produced a large storm surge along the Alabama coast. A Dauphin 

Island town-council member described the damage:

Th e West End of our island ... was ravaged by Katrina. Visual inspections of 

this area show 190 homes totally swept away, another 96 homes totally destroyed or severely damaged, roads completely obliterated, and water, sewer, 

phone, and power are non-existent. No home was left unscathed by Katrina in 

this area.115

According to a study published by the National Hurricane Center, the storm surge was as 

high as 10 feet as far east as Mobile, Alabama, and caused fl ooding several miles inland from 

the Gulf Coast along Mobile Bay.116 In addition, the Alabama Emergency Management 

Agency (AEMA) reported that the highest storm surge, 15 feet, was in Bayou La Batre, approximately 30 miles south of Mobile on the Gulf Coast. 117

In addition to the storm surge and wind damage, there were four confi rmed tornadoes, in 

Montgomery, Macon, Tallapoosa, and Calhoun counties in the eastern half of the state. 

AEMA described rainfall during Katrina as “insignifi cant.” 118

Two indirect fatalities occurred in Alabama during Hurricane Katrina as a result of a car accident in heavy rain during the storm. Th ese fatalities, Alabama’s only fatalities in Katrina, occurred in Washington County, directly north of Mobile County on the Mississippi border.119

Th e Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) registered a total of 25,454 evacuees in 

the state. Nearly 112,000 individuals registered for federal assistance in the state.120
Katrina Strikes

61

Texas

Despite ominous early signs, Katrina ultimately infl icted minimal direct damage on Texas. 121 In the days that followed, however, Texas took in an estimated 400,000 evacuees, stretching the capacity of shelters and relief workers across the state.122

1 Richard D. Knabb, Jamie Rhome, and Daniel Brown, National Hurricane Center, “‘Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,’ Hurricane Katrina 23-30 Augusta 2005,” Dec. 20, 2005, p. 1. http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/TCR-L122005_

Katrina.pdf. Accessed on Mar. 30, 2006 [hereinaft er NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,”] (“Th e 

complex genesis of Katrina involved the interaction of a tropical wave, the middle tropospheric remnants of Tropical 

Depression Ten, and an upper tropospheric trough” that created a “tropical depression by 1800 UTC 23 August over the 

southeastern Bahamas about 175 nautical miles (n mi) southeast of Nassau” that eventually became “designated Tropical 

Depression Twelve.”).

2 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” Hurricane Katrina,” p. 2 (“Further strengthening ensued, and 

Katrina is estimated to have reached hurricane status near 2100 UTC 25 August, less than two hours before its center 

made landfall on the southeastern coast of Florida.”).

3 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” p. 2 (“In fact, the eye feature actually became better defi ned 

while Katrina moved inland, and it remained intact during its entire track across the peninsula. ... Katrina continued 

west-southwestward overnight and spent only about six hours over land, mostly over the water-laden Everglades.”).

4 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” p. 2 (“Th e center of Tropical Storm Katrina then emerged into the 

southeastern Gulf of Mexico at approximately 0500 UTC on 26 August just north of Cape Sable. Once back over water, Katrina quickly regained hurricane status at 0600 UTC with maximum sustained winds of 65 knots. ... Th e center of Katrina 

continued west-southwestward over the southeastern Gulf of Mexico and away from the southern Florida peninsula.”).

5 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” p. 3 (On August 27, “Katrina became a Category 3 hurricane 

with 100 kt winds at 1200 UTC that morning about 365 n mi southeast of the mouth of the Mississippi River. ... Accompanying the intensifi cation...was a signifi cant expansion of the wind fi eld on 27 August. Katrina nearly doubled in size 

on 27 August, and by the end of that day tropical storm-force winds extended up to about 140 n mi from the center.”).

6 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” p. 3 (“Th e strong middle- to upper-tropospheric ridge that had 

kept Katrina on a west-southwestward track over the Florida peninsula and southeastern Gulf of Mexico began to shift 

eastward toward Florida, while a mid-latitude trough amplifi ed over the north-central United States. Th is evolving pattern resulted in a general westward motion on 27 August and a turn toward the northwest on 28 August when Katrina 

moved around the western periphery of the retreating ridge.”).

7 Committee staff interview of Max Mayfi eld, Ph.D., Director, National Hurricane Center, conducted on Jan. 27, 2005, 

transcript pp. 40-41 (“By that Friday aft ernoon, the models have come into much, much better agreement. ... So when 

all these models started to fi nally converge – I mean, still not on top of each other; I mean, there’s still some scatter, but 

they were in much, much better agreement than we had seen up to that time, and they started converging towards the 

Mississippi and Southeast Louisiana coast, yeah, you bet the alarm bells started sounding.”).

8 Mayfi eld interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 40 (“At least for the 34 years that I’ve been at the National Hurricane Center, we’ve 

always been saying that the greatest concern from a hurricane anywhere in the Gulf of Mexico is Southeastern Louisiana 

and the great New Orleans area.”).

9 National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Advisory, Aug. 26, 2005, 5 p.m.

10 National Weather Service, Hurricane Katrina Discussion Number 14, Aug. 26, 2005, 5 p.m.

11 Committee staff interview of Walter Maestri, Ph.D., Director, Jeff erson Parish Offi ce of Emergency Management, LA, 

conducted on Oct. 25, 2005, transcript p. 119.

12 Mayfi eld interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 35-36 (“And they were doing a very good job, in my opinion, of reaching out. ... 

So they were indeed making their local offi cials aware that, hey, you’re in the cone.”). 

13 Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP), Katrina Conference Call Number 1, 

Aug. 26, 2005, 5 p.m. CT, pp. 4-5. Provided to Committee.

14 LOHSEP, Katrina Conference Call Number 1, Aug. 26, 2005, 5 p.m. CT, p. 5. Provided to Committee. (“Th ere is still a lot 

of uncertainty here, so I don’t want to really say what area has the highest landfall threat. Certainly with Plaquemines Parish

sticking out into the Gulf, it typically has the highest threat, but I don’t want to focus on one specifi c region right now.”).

15 LOHSEP, Katrina Conference Call Number 1, Aug. 26, 2005, 5 p.m. CT, p. 6. Provided to Committee.

16 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” p. 3 (“Accompanying the intensifi cation and the subsequent deterioration of the inner eyewall was a signifi cant expansion of the wind fi eld on 27 August. Katrina nearly doubled in size 

on 27 August, and by the end of that day tropical storm-force winds extended up to about 140 n mi from the center.”).
Chapter 4

62

17 Mayfi eld interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 60 (“Th ere is indeed a storm surge model that the National Weather Service runs. 

We have agreed to do that about 24 hours before landfall to let people see what might happen, what the storm surge 

might be, if we had that perfect forecast.”).

18 LOHSEP, Katrina Conference Call Number 2, Aug. 27, 2005, 7:30 a.m. CT, p. 10. Provided to Committee.

19 Mayfi eld interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 56-57 (“I wanted to make sure that they understood the severity of the situation. 

... And I should say, too, that when I called Governor Blanco, she’s the one that suggested that I call Mayor Nagin, which 

I did. I left a message, and he called me back very quickly. ... Th is is Saturday. Th e log here shows – the HLT log shows 

7:25 Central daylight time, called Governor Blanco.”). See also: National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Katrina Forecast 

Timeline, 2006, p. 3. Provided to Committee [hereinaft er NHC Timeline].

20 National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Advisory, Aug. 28, 2005, 7 a.m. CT. Th e New Orleans NWS offi ce broadcast 

a similar warning at 8 a.m., stating “direct strike of catastrophic hurricane expected ... rush protective measures to 

completion and leave area as soon as possible.” National Weather Service, Hurricane Katrina Local Statement, New 

Orleans, Aug. 28, 2005, 8 a.m. CT.

21 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” p. 3 (“Katrina strengthened from a low-end Category 3 hurricane to a Category 5 in less than 12 h, reaching an intensity of 145 kt by 1200 UTC 28 August. Katrina attained its peak 

intensity of 150 kt at 1800 UTC 28 August about 170 n mi southeast of the mouth of the Mississippi River. Th e wind fi eld 

continued to expand on 28 August, and by late that day tropical stormforce winds extended out to about 200 n mi from 

the center, and hurricane-force winds extended out to about 90 n mi from the center, making Katrina not only extremely 

intense but also exceptionally large.”).

22 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Briefi ng to Committee, Dec. 21, 2005 [hereinaft er NOAA Briefing to Committee].

23 NOAA Briefi ng to Committee, Dec. 21, 2005.

24 National Weather Service, Hurricane Katrina Local Statement, New Orleans, Aug. 28, 2005, 5:45 p.m. 

25 National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Advisory, Aug. 28, 2005, 4 p.m. CT.

26 R. B. Seed et al., ASCE/NSF, Preliminary Report on the Performance of the New Orleans Levee Systems in Hurricane 

Katrina on August 29, 2005, Nov. 2, 2005, pp. 1–2, 1–3 [hereinaft er ASCE/NSF, Preliminary Report].

27 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” p. 3.

28 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” p. 7.

29 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” p. 7.

30 Ivor Ll. van Heerden, G. Paul Kemp, Wes Shrum, Ezra Boyd and Hassan Mashriqui, Louisiana State University, 

Center for the Study of Public Health Impacts of Hurricanes, Initial Assesment of the New Orleans’ Flooding Event during the Passage of Hurricane Katrina, p. 4 [hereinaft er LSU, Initial Assessment of New Orleans Flooding] (“Th e ‘Funnel’ 

eff ects: As the eye of the storm approached the latitude of New Orleans a 14-17 foot surge was pushed into the western 

apex of a triangle known as the ‘Funnel’, so called because the hurricane protection levees that form the south bank of 

the MRGO and the north bank of the GIWW converge from being about 10 m miles apart to a few hundred yards as 

the banks of the GIWW where it separates the East Orleans and St. Bernard polders. Th e Funnel is a 6-mile long section 

of the GIWW where the cross-section was enlarged by a factor of three when the MRGO was built to expand it from a 

barge channel to accommodate ocean-going vessels. At the western end, the funnel focused a jet into the IHNC. Th e US 

Army Corps of Engineers had inadvertently designed an excellent storm surge delivery system – nothing less – to bring 

this mass of water with simply tremendous ‘load’ – potential energy – right into the middle of New Orleans.”).

31 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” p. 3.

32 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” p. 3.

33 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” p. 3.

34 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” p. 8.

35 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” p. 8 (“[W]inds in a hurricane generally increase from the 

ground upward to a few hundred meters in altitude, and the sustained winds experienced on upper fl oors of high-rise 

buildings were likely stronger than the winds at the same location near the ground. For example, on average the 25th 

story of a building would experience sustained winds corresponding to one Saffi r-Simpson category stronger than that 

experienced at the standard observing height of 10 m[eters].”).

36 ASCE/NSF, Preliminary Report, pp. 1–4, 1–5.

37 ASCE/NSF, Preliminary Report, pp. 1–4, 1–10 (Figure 1.4); See also: LSU, Initial Assessment of New Orleans Flooding, p. 7 (“Lake Pontchartrain levee overtopping: Between 8:30 and 11:00 am, fl ood water poured into Orleans East from 

Lake Pontchartrain where a section of concrete levee wall at the Lakefront Airport that strangely was almost two feet 

lower than the earthen walls it was attached to served as a spillway when it was overtopped. Otherwise, no signifi cant 

overtopping occurred anywhere along the south shore of Lake Pontchartrain.”).

38 ASCE/NSF, Preliminary Report, p. 1–5.

39 LSU, Initial Assessment of New Orleans Flooding, p. 1.

40 LSU, Initial Assessment of New Orleans Flooding, p. 1.
Katrina Strikes

63

41 LSU, Initial Assessment of New Orleans Flooding, p. 1.

42 ASCE/NSF, Preliminary Report, p. iv.

43 Ivor van Heerden, Ph.D., Timeline for Hurricane Katrina, 2006. Provided to Committee. Th ere are numerous reports 

and oral refl ections regarding the timing on Monday, August 29, 2005, of the overtopping and breaching of levees and 

fl oodwalls, and subsequent fl ooding, in the metropolitan New Orleans region. Th e Committee, through numerous 

interviews, copious documents, and scientifi c analyses received from experts, has done its best to construct a tentative 

timeline with respect to these events. To this end, the Committee has depended to a large degree on the information provided by van Heerden, and from information contained in the ASCE/NSF, Preliminary Report and U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers, Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force, Performance Evaluation Status and Interim Results, Report 2 

of a Series, Mar. 10, 2006 [hereinaft er IPET, Report 2 of a Series].

Van Heerden is the Deputy Director of the LSU Hurricane Center and the Director of the LSU Center for the Study of 

Public Health Impacts of Hurricanes. Van Heerden was also designated by the State of Louisiana to lead its Forensic 

Data Gathering Team in its eff orts to learn more about the causes of the levee failures in the metropolitan New Orleans 

area. As part of his work, van Heerden and his colleagues at LSU have reviewed video camera footage and conducted 

several fi rst-responder and survivor interviews. Th e team of LSU scientists also implemented the “stopped clock program,” in which they collected stopped battery-operated and mechanical hand-dial clocks from fl ooded homes, noting 

both the time and elevation. Th e data is compiled in a report provided to the Committee entitled, Initial Assessment of 

the New Orleans’ Flooding Event During the Passage of Hurricane Katrina. 

It should also be noted that two scientists who testifi ed before the Committee – Raymond Seed, Ph.D., who led the 

National Science Foundation sponsored forensic gathering and analysis team, and Peter Nicholson, P.F., head of the 

American Society of Civil Engineer’s data gathering team – stated that they not only funneled information regarding 

witnesses’ statements to Dr. van Heerden, but that “Th e time lines described by Dr. van Heerden would make sense with 

the geotechnical observations we see in the fi eld ... they are consistent.” Testimony of Raymond Seed, Team Leader, National Science Foundation, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing 

on Hurricane Katrina, Why Did the Levees Fail?, Nov. 2, 2005. 

Similarly, the IPET observed over 200 high-water marks, contacted over 600 people for eyewitness accounts and interviewed over 175 persons who observed fl ooding induced by Hurricane Katrina. See, IPET, Report 2 of a Series, p. V-5. 

Th e IPET also employed the use of stopped clocks in houses, and gathered videos and still photos. See, IPET, Report 2 of 

a Series, p. V-5.

44 LSU, Initial Assessment of New Orleans Flooding, p. 11; IPET, Report 2 of a Series, p. V–9.

45 LSU, Initial Assessment of New Orleans Flooding, p. 4.

46 Ivor van Heerden, Timeline for Hurricane Katrina, 2006. Provided to Committee; LSU, Initial Assessment of New 

Orleans Flooding, p. 3; IPET, Report 2 of a Series, pp. V–9 through V–11.

47 Van Heerden, Timeline for Hurricane Katrina, 2006. Provided to Committee.

48 Van Heerden, Timeline for Hurricane Katrina, 2006. Provided to Committee; LSU, Initial Assessment of New Orleans 

Flooding, pp. 3-7.

49 LSU, Initial Assessment of New Orleans Flooding, p. 4.

50 Committee staff interview of Brig. Gen. Brod Veillon, Assistant Adjutant General, Louisiana National Guard, conducted on Nov. 29, 2005, transcript p. 18.

51 LSU, Initial Assessment of New Orleans Flooding, p. 11.

52 Col. Terry Ebbert, LOHSEP, Katrina Conference Call Number 10, Aug. 29, 2005, 7:30 a.m. CT, p. 13.

53 Van Heerden, Timeline for Hurricane Katrina, 2006. Provided to Committee; LSU, Initial Assessment of New Orleans 

Flooding, pp. 5, 11.

54 Transportation Security Administration, Katrina Brief, Aug. 29, 2005, 9 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi les as Bates no. 

DHS-HSOC-0002-0000190.

55 LSU, Initial Assessment of New Orleans Flooding, pp. 7, 11.

56 At 9 a.m., the local weather offi ce issued a “Hurricane Katrina Local Statement: “Levees overtopped in Orleans and 

St. Bernard Parishes....Extensive and life threatening storm surge fl ooding occurring along the Louisiana and Mississippi coast at this time....Signifi cant and life threatening storm surge 18 to 22 feet above normal is occurring.” National 

Weather Service, Hurricane Katrina Local Statement, New Orleans, Aug. 29, 2005, 9 a.m. CT.

57 Michael Heath, e-mail to Michael Lowder, Aug. 29, 2005, 10:43 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHSFEMA-0029-0002963.

58 IPET, Report 2 of a Series, pp. V–5 through V–7.

59 LSU, Initial Assessment of New Orleans Flooding, pp. 8, 11. See also: IPET, Report 2 of a Series, p. V–5 through V–7.

60 Van Heerden, Timeline for Hurricane Katrina, 2006. Provided to Committee; and LSU, Initial Assessment of New 

Orleans Flooding, p. 9. See also: IPET, Report 2 of a Series, p. V–5 through V–7.

61 LSU, Initial Assessment of New Orleans Flooding, p. 9. See also: IPET, Report 2 of a Series, pp. V–5 through V–7.

62 Moreover, the NOFD Hurricane Katrina Log (Fire Communications) produced to the Committee by the NOFD, 
Chapter 4

64

refl ects that at 11:15 a.m. CT, the “fi rst report of levee either being breeched [sic] or topped at 17th Ave. Canal.” New 

Orleans Fire Department, Hurricane Katrina Fire Communications Log, 2005. Provided to Committee. 

63 NOFD, Capt. Paul Hellmers, Lake Marina Towers Video, Aug. 29, 2005. Provided to Committee.

64 LSU, Initial Assessment of New Orleans Flooding, p. 8 (“Eye witnesses reported the fl ood waters rose rapidly.”).

65 U.S. Coast Guard, Initial Helicopter Overfl ight Video, Aug. 29, 2005. Provided to the Committee.

66 Committee staff interview of Marty Bahamonde, Region I Director, External Aff airs, FEMA, conducted on Oct. 7, 

2005, transcript pp. 106-110.

67 Committee staff interview of Col. Richard P. Wagenaar, U.S. Army, District Commander, New Orleans District, U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers, conducted on Nov. 15, 2005, transcript pp. 56-58.

68 Written Statement of Robert Latham, Executive Director, Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, for the U.S. 

House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing on 

Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Mississippi, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 1.

69 National Hurricane Center, “Hurricane History.” http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/HAW2/english/history.shtml#camille. 

Accessed on Mar. 30, 2006. Camille is only one of three Category 5 hurricanes to make landfall on the United States 

coast since records have been kept. National Hurricane Center, Th e Saffi r-Simpson Scale. http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/

aboutsshs.shtml. Accessed on Apr. 3, 2006.

70 Written statement of Gov. Haley Barbour, Mississippi, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Role of Governors in Managing the Catastrophe, Feb. 2, 2006, 

p. 1.

71 U.S. Census Bureau, American Factfi nder, 2006. http://factfi nder.census.gov. Accessed on Mar. 30, 2006.

72 U.S. Census Bureau, American Factfi nder, 2006. http://factfi nder.census.gov. Accessed on Mar. 30, 2006.

73 Richard Fausset, “Mississippi Casinos Trump Katrina,” Los Angeles Times, Feb. 25, 2006.

74 Committee staff interview of Mayor A.J. Holloway, City of Biloxi, MS, conducted on Jan. 5, 2006 (untranscribed).

75 Mississippi Emergency Management Agency (MEMA), Hurricane Situation Report: Tropical Storm Katrina, Aug. 24, 

2005, 10 a.m. CT, p. 1. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. MEMA-0010808.

76 MEMA, Hurricane Situation Report: Hurricane Katrina, Aug. 25, 2005, 4 p.m. CT, p. 1. Provided to Committee; fi led 

as Bates no. MEMA-0010820.

77 MEMA, Hurricane Situation Report: Hurricane Katrina, Aug. 26, 2005, 10 a.m. CT, p. 1. Provided to Committee; fi led 

as Bates no. MEMA-0010824.

78 MEMA, Hurricane Situation Report: Hurricane Katrina, Aug. 26, 2005, 4:30 p.m. CT, p. 1. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates no. MEMA-0010828.

79 MEMA, Hurricane Situation Report: Hurricane Katrina, Aug. 27, 2005, noon CT, p. 2. Provided to Committee; fi led 

as Bates no. MEMA-0010832.

80 MEMA, Hurricane Situation Report: Hurricane Katrina, Aug. 27, 2005, 9 a.m. CT. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. MEMA-0010831.

81 MEMA, Hurricane Situation Report: Hurricane Katrina, Aug. 27, 2005, noon CT, p. 2. Provided to Committee; fi led 

as Bates no. MEMA-0010835.

82 Miss. Code Ann. § 33-15-5 (g).

83 MEMA, Hurricane Situation Report: Hurricane Katrina, Aug. 27, 2005, 4 p.m. CT, p. 2. Provided to Committee; fi led 

as Bates no. MEMA-0010838.

84 MEMA, Hurricane Situation Report #5: Hurricane Katrina, Aug. 28, 2005, 8 a.m. CT, p. 2. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates no. MEMA-0010859.

85 MEMA, Hurricane Situation Report #5: Hurricane Katrina, Aug. 28, 2005, 8 a.m. CT, p. 1. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates no. MEMA-0010858.

86 MEMA, Hurricane Situation Report #6: Hurricane Katrina, Aug. 28, 2005, noon CT, p. 1. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates no. MEMA-0010864.

87 MEMA, Hurricane Situation Report #6: Hurricane Katrina, Aug. 28, 2005, noon CT. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates nos. MEMA-0010864 through 0010869.

88 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” p. 9. 

89 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” p. 8. In an interview with Committee staff , Brian Adam, the 

Hancock County Director of Emergency Management, recounted that the Hancock County EOC sits 27 feet above sea 

level but was fl ooded by 3.5 feet of water during Katrina. Committee staff interview of Brian Adam, Director of Emergency Management, Hancock County, MS, conducted on Nov. 16, 2005 (untranscribed). 

90 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” p. 8. 

91 Testimony of Col. Joe Spraggins, Director of Emergency Management, Harrison County, MS, for the U.S. House, Se-
Katrina Strikes

65

lect Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing on Hurricane 

Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Mississippi, Dec. 7, 2005.

92 Committee staff interview of Butch Loper, Emergency Management Director, Jackson County, MS, conducted on 

Dec. 6, 2005, transcript pp. 64-65. 

93 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” p. 9. Th e expected storm surge for a Category 3 hurricane 

would normally be between 9-12 feet, according to the Saffi r-Simpson Hurricane Scale. An introduction to the scale may 

be found at http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/aboutsshs.shtml.

94 Committee staff interview of D.J. Ziegler, Harbor Master, Gulfport Harbor, MS, conducted on Dec. 8, 2005, transcript, p. 30. 

95 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” pp. 8-9.

96 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” p. 10. 

97 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” pp. 27-28. 

98 Loper interview, Dec. 6, 2005, p. 64. Th is is consistent with wind speeds noted in the MEMA situation reports. 

MEMA, Hurricane Situation Report #13: Hurricane Katrina, Aug. 29, 2005, 4 p.m. CT. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. MEMA-0010924.

99 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” p. 4. 

100 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” pp. 27-28. 

101 Written Statement of Mayor Robert V. Massengill, Brookhaven, MS, for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland 

Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Recovering from Hurricane Katrina: Responding to the Immediate Needs 

of Its Victims, Sept. 28, 2005, p. 1.

102 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” p. 10. 

103 MEMA, Hurricane Situation Report #13: Hurricane Katrina, Aug. 29, 2005, 4 p.m. CT, p. 6. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates no. MEMA-0010929.

104 MEMA, Hurricane Situation Report #19 Hurricane Katrina, Aug. 30, 2005 at 4:30 p.m. CT, p. 6. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. MEMA-0010989.

105 MEMA, Hurricane Situation Report #19 Hurricane Katrina, Aug. 30, 2005 at 4:30 p.m. CT, p. 8. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. MEMA-0010990 through 0010991.

106 MEMA, Hurricane Situation Report #20 Hurricane Katrina, Aug. 31, 2005 at 1:30 a.m. CT, p. 9. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. MEMA-0011002.

107 “Mississippi’s Invisible Coast,” Biloxi Sun-Herald, Dec. 14, 2005. http://www.sunherald.com/mld/sunherald/13402585.htm. Accessed on Apr. 24, 2006; MEMA, Red Cross Damage Assessments. http://www.msema.org/redcrossassessments.htm. Accessed on Apr. 24, 2006.

108 Committee staff interview of Bret Warr, Mayor, City of Gulfport, MS, conducted on Jan. 9, 2006 (untranscribed). 

109 Ziegler interview, Dec. 8, 2005, p. 27. 

110 “Mississippi’s Invisible Coast,” Biloxi Sun-Herald, Dec. 14, 2005. http://www.sunherald.com/mld/sunherald/13402585.htm. Accessed on Apr. 24, 2006.

111 Alabama Emergency Management Agency, Hurricane Katrina Situation Report #7, Aug. 31, 2005, 7 p.m. CT.

112 Written Statement of Don Vaughn, Chief Engineer, Alabama Department of Transportation, for the U.S. House, 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, hearing on Rebuilding Transit Infrastructure in the Gulf Coast Area, 

Oct. 27, 2005.

113 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” p. 12. 

114 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” p. 12.

115 Jackie Previto, Dauphin Island, Alabama Town Council Member, letter to Governor Bob Riley, Alabama, Sept. 7, 

2005.

116 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” p. 9.

117 Alabama Emergency Management Agency, Hurricane Katrina Situation Report #7, Aug. 31, 2005, 7 p.m. CT.

118 Alabama Emergency Management Agency, Hurricane Katrina Situation Report #7, Aug. 31, 2005, 7 p.m. CT.

119 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” pp. 10-11; Garry Mitchell, “Massive Storm Damage Found in 

Alabama,” Associated Press Online, Aug. 30, 2005. Accessed on LexisNexis.

120 Garry Mitchell, “Katrina’s painful blow to coast Alabama’s top story in 2005,” Montgomery Advisor, Dec. 21, 2005.

121 Texas State Operations Center, Hurricane Katrina Situation Report #10, Aug. 29, 2005, 4 p.m.

122 Final Report to the Governor, Governor’s Task Force on Evacuation, Transportation, and Logistics, Texas, Feb. 14, 

2006.