NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

JAVIER ANGEL AGUAYO, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 16-0736

 1 CA-CR 16-0737

 (Consolidated)

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2012-115872-001

 CR2013-428986-001

The Honorable Pamela S. Gates, Judge

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix

By Terry M. Crist, III

Counsel for Appellee

Michael J. Dew Attorney at Law, Phoenix

By Michael J. Dew

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 4-10-2018
STATE v. AGUAYO

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Kent E. Cattani and Judge Jennifer M. Perkins joined.

J O H N S E N, Judge:

¶1 Javier Aguayo appeals his convictions and sentences for 

conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, 

aggravated assault and disorderly conduct. For the following reasons, we 

affirm the convictions and affirm the sentences as modified.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 P.D. was driving in Phoenix with T.F. and their young son one 

evening, when their vehicle inadvertently cut off an Acura Integra.1

Decelerating quickly, the Acura darted behind P.D.'s vehicle, then swiftly

pulled up on its left side. When P.D. and T.F. glanced to their left, they

looked through the open car windows and clearly saw Aguayo in the 

driver's seat, with his right arm extended, pointing a black handgun in their 

direction. Fearing for their lives, P.D. immediately braked and called 9-1-

1, providing the emergency operator a description of the driver and the 

Acura's license plate number. Less than an hour later, police officers 

detained Aguayo, and both victims identified him as the person who had

pointed a gun at them.

¶3 Approximately four months later, Aguayo approached Ricco 

Monge and asked him to help with a home-invasion robbery. As initially 

presented to Monge, Aguayo planned to break into a home, restrain the 

owners, then ransack the home, with Monge serving as the get-away driver.

During subsequent conversations, however, Aguayo revealed that he 

actually planned to kill the homeowner, T.F.

¶4 In the weeks leading up to the planned home invasion, 

Aguayo and Monge surveilled T.F. to learn her daily routine. At 

approximately 7:15 a.m. one morning, Aguayo, Monge, and Monge's 

roommate, Jeremie Villaverde, drove to T.F.'s house in Monge's Chevrolet

 

1 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the 

verdicts. State v. Payne, 233 Ariz. 484, 509, ¶ 93 (2013).
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3

Cobalt. As the men pulled up, T.F. got into her car, preparing to drive to 

work. Monge and Villaverde waited in the Chevrolet while Aguayo 

walked toward T.F.'s car, firing five bullets. Although T.F. sustained 

numerous gunshot wounds, she drove away and called 9-1-1.

¶5 Later that afternoon, a detective interviewed T.F. at the 

hospital. Describing the shooter, T.F. explained that the man's face was 

mostly covered, but his complexion, height, weight and overall build 

resembled Aguayo, "that guy that . . . pulled a gun [on her] the first time."

T.F. also stated that she could not think of anyone else who might want to 

harm her.

¶6 When the detective spoke with her again the following day, 

T.F. explained that she had described the silver revolver used in the 

shooting to P.D., which led P.D. to say his brother might have been the 

shooter. The detective asked T.F. if she could exclude P.D.'s brother as a 

suspect based on the shooter's physical appearance, and T.F. responded

that P.D.'s brother and the shooter shared a similar build. Nonetheless, as 

the interview continued, T.F. repeatedly reaffirmed her belief that the 

shooter looked like Aguayo.

¶7 During the ensuing investigation, detectives obtained a 

warrant to attach a GPS tracking device to Aguayo's Acura. Later, they

obtained warrants for Aguayo's home, electronics, vehicle and telephone 

records. Through these warrants, detectives (1) learned that Aguayo had 

driven by T.F.'s residence after the shooting, (2) seized a store receipt for 

Remington .357 Magnum shells from the Acura that an expert later 

determined were consistent with bullet fragments recovered from the 

shooting, (3) retrieved text messages from Aguayo's cell phone discussing

Monge's payment for his role as the get-away driver, and (4) obtained cell 

tower data demonstrating that Aguayo's, Monge's, and Villaverde's phones 

each accessed the tower closest to T.F.'s house near the time of the shooting.

¶8 The State charged Aguayo with one count of attempted firstdegree murder and three counts of aggravated assault (identifying T.F. as 

the victim of the shooting and she and P.D. as victims in the road incident).

By separate indictment, the State also charged Aguayo with one count of 

conspiracy to commit murder and further alleged multiple aggravating 

circumstances. The superior court consolidated the charges for trial.

¶9 After a 28-day trial, a jury found Aguayo guilty of attempted 

first-degree murder (renumbered Count 3), conspiracy to commit firstdegree murder (renumbered Count 5), aggravated assault against P.D. 
STATE v. AGUAYO

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4

(renumbered Count 2), and the lesser-included offense of disorderly 

conduct against T.F. (renumbered Count 1 – in the road incident). The 

jurors were unable to reach a verdict on the other charge. After the jury 

found multiple aggravating factors, the court sentenced Aguayo to a 

presumptive term of 2.25 years' imprisonment on Count 1; a concurrent, 

presumptive term of 7.5 years' imprisonment on Count 2; a consecutive

term of 25 years' imprisonment on Count 3; and a consecutive term of life 

without the possibility of parole for 25 years on Count 5.

2 Aguayo timely 

appealed, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes 

("A.R.S.") sections 12-120.21(A)(1) (2018), 13-4031 (2018), and -4033(A)(1) 

(2018).3

DISCUSSION

A. Validity of Warrant Affidavits.

¶10 Aguayo contends that the affidavits supporting the search 

warrants for his vehicle, home and cellular phone records omitted material 

facts in violation of Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).

¶11 Early in the prosecution, Aguayo requested a Franks hearing

and moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the GPS tracking device 

placed on his vehicle. To support his requests, Aguayo identified the 

following facts, recounted in police reports and interviews but omitted 

from the warrant affidavit, that he claimed would have altered the judicial 

officer's probable cause analysis if they been disclosed in the warrant 

affidavit: (1) T.F.'s statement that P.D. suspected his brother was the 

shooter, (2) eyewitnesses' contradictory descriptions of the shooter, (3) 

Villaverde's criminal history and admitted drug use, and (4) Villaverde's 

exculpatory statements regarding Aguayo.

¶12 The superior court denied Aguayo's request for an 

evidentiary hearing and his motion to suppress, finding the affidavit 

 

2 Under the relevant statute, the sentence on the conspiracy 

conviction, Count 5, is stated as "life imprisonment without possibility of 

release on any basis until the service of twenty-five calendar," Ariz. Rev. 

Stat. ("A.R.S.") § 13-1003(D) (2018), and we modify the judgment 

accordingly. See A.R.S. § 13-4037(A) (2018) (authorizing an appellate court 

to "correct" an illegal sentence); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(d) (authorizing court 

to modify a judgment).

3 Absent a material revision of a statute or rule of procedure since the 

relevant date, we cite the current version.
STATE v. AGUAYO

Decision of the Court

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submitted in support of the warrant did not contain "any false statements 

made knowingly, intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth." 

The court noted, however, that the affidavit "may have failed to convey 

accurately some equivocal statements made by [T.F.] regarding the 

identification of the shooter." The court also rejected Aguayo's contention 

that the other eyewitnesses' descriptions of the shooter were inconsistent 

with the affidavit and further found that the limited "information regarding 

Mr. Villaverde" did not render the affidavit "false, incomplete, or 

misleading."

¶13 Aguayo then filed another request for a Franks hearing and 

moved to suppress all evidence seized pursuant to the search warrants 

executed on his home and vehicle, as well as the cellular phone records that 

investigating officers obtained pursuant to a warrant. The superior court 

held a five-day evidentiary hearing on these motions, and after considering 

the evidence presented – including testimony from the investigating 

detectives – the court ruled the search warrants were valid.

4 The court 

found that the affidavits did not contain any false statements made 

knowingly, intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth, although 

it again acknowledged that the affidavits "failed to convey accurately some 

equivocal statements" T.F. made regarding the shooter. The court further

noted that even without T.F.'s statement that she was "sure" Aguayo was 

the shooter, the "remaining content" in the affidavits was "sufficient to 

establish probable cause." With respect to Aguayo's other contentions, the 

court found that neither the summation of the other eyewitnesses' accounts 

nor the omission of certain information regarding Villaverde rendered the 

affidavits false, incomplete or misleading. Accordingly, the court denied 

Aguayo's motions to suppress.

¶14 Under Franks, "a defendant may challenge the truthfulness of 

the factual statements in an affidavit supporting a warrant," State v. Carter, 

145 Ariz. 101, 108 (1985), and may contest any "deliberate or reckless 

omissions of facts that tend to mislead," Frimmel v. Sanders, 236 Ariz. 232, 

239, ¶ 27 (2014) (quotation omitted). The superior court must suppress 

evidence seized pursuant to a warrant if the defendant proves, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, that (1) the affiant intentionally, knowingly, 

or with reckless disregard for the truth omitted material information, and 

 

4 Although the court's minute entry rulings expressly denied 

Aguayo's requests for a Franks hearing, and Aguayo argues error on that 

basis, the record clearly reflects that the court held a lengthy evidentiary 

hearing on the motions, which provided Aguayo a full opportunity to 

explore the alleged omissions.
STATE v. AGUAYO

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6

(2) the omitted material information, if included, would have rendered the 

affidavit insufficient to support a finding of probable cause. See State v. 

Poland, 132 Ariz. 269, 279 (1982).

¶15 On appeal, our review is limited to the evidence the superior 

court considered at the suppression hearing, and we view the facts in the 

light most favorable to sustaining the court's ruling. State v. Hausner, 230 

Ariz. 60, 70, ¶ 23 (2012). We uphold the court's finding "on whether the 

affiant deliberately . . . excluded material facts" unless it is clearly 

erroneous. State v. Buccini, 167 Ariz. 550, 554 (1991). We review de novo, 

however, a superior court's finding "whether a redrafted search warrant 

affidavit is sufficient to establish probable cause." Id. at 555.

¶16 "[I]nnocent or negligent" errors in an affidavit do not satisfy 

the first prong of the Franks test; instead, the defendant must prove that the

affiant did not believe the avowals or at least entertained serious doubts 

about their truth. Carter, 145 Ariz. at 109. Such doubts may "be shown by 

actual deliberation" or "by obvious reasons to doubt" the veracity or 

accuracy of the information relied upon. Poland, 132 Ariz. at 279 (quotation 

omitted).

¶17 Although not identical, the underlying affidavits relied on to 

establish probable cause for the search warrants set forth substantially 

similar information regarding T.F.'s description and identification of the 

shooter, the other eyewitnesses' descriptions of the shooter, and 

Villaverde's involvement in the case. T.F. described the shooter as a male 

wearing a red and blue plaid jacket, jeans, a gray hoodie pulled over his 

head and a dark blue beanie pulled over his mouth and nose. Based on the 

shooter's body type, body shape and skin tone, T.F. positively identified 

Aguayo as the shooter; she was certain the shooter was the same man who 

had previously pointed a gun at her. Other witnesses generally described 

the shooter as a slender Hispanic man in his 20's, between 5'6" to 6'0" tall, 

wearing a hooded sweatshirt and a ski mask, running or walking with a 

limp. Meanwhile, a detective observed Villaverde as he met with Aguayo 

in a parking lot, and said he drove a vehicle that matched the eyewitnesses'

description of the getaway car, and the men appeared to examine and 

remove something from inside the trunk of Villaverde's car. A short time 

later, when Villaverde was pulled over for traffic violations, he admitted 

possessing illegal drugs in his trunk and also acknowledged selling illegal 

drugs.

¶18 At the evidentiary hearing, the affiant detective testified that 

she interviewed Villaverde at length and acknowledged that she did not 
STATE v. AGUAYO

Decision of the Court

7

incorporate many of his statements in the affidavits, such as his contentions

that he had never seen Aguayo act violently or possess a gun. She 

explained, however, that she is trained to provide a short and succinct 

probable cause statement, and therefore, as a matter of course, includes 

only "enough information to show that there [was] probable cause." When 

pressed on that point, the detective avowed that, in this case, she included 

all relevant and pertinent information that she believed would be helpful 

to the judicial officer charged with assessing probable cause.

¶19 Because the superior court is in a "unique position to judge"

an affiant's credibility, we defer to its finding as to whether the affiant knew 

material facts had been omitted from the affidavit. See Buccini, 167 Ariz. at 

555. Here, the investigating detective's testimony supported the superior 

court's conclusion that the detective did not intend to mislead the judicial 

officer. See Carter, 145 Ariz. at 109. Thus, to the extent there arguably were 

material omissions, the record supports a finding that they were only 

innocent or negligent mistakes. See id. Accordingly, the superior court did 

not err in finding that the affiant detective was not recklessly, knowingly or 

intentionally deceitful by failing to include the challenged information in 

the affidavits.

¶20 Moreover, if redrafted to include the excluded facts, the 

affidavits would have provided sufficient information to support a finding 

of probable cause. Incorporating the challenged omitted facts, the affidavits 

would have informed the judicial officer that: (1) T.F. believed she 

recognized Aguayo as the shooter, (2) P.D. believed his brother may have 

been the shooter based on T.F.'s description of the handgun, (3) other 

eyewitnesses uniformly described the shooter as a young, slender male 

whose face and body was mostly covered, but inconsistently reported his 

height, providing a range between 5'6" to 6' tall, and race (some reported 

the shooter was Hispanic and at least one reported the shooter was white), 

(4) Aguayo met with Villaverde, who drove a vehicle similar in appearance 

to the getaway car described by eyewitnesses, (5) Aguayo associated with 

Monge, who owned a .357 revolver handgun matching T.F.'s description of 

the shooter's weapon, (6) Villaverde was involved in criminal drug activity, 

and (7) Villaverde claimed he never saw Aguayo act violently or possess a 

gun.

¶21 Contrary to Aguayo's argument, P.D.'s suspicion that his 

brother might have been the shooter because he owned a silver handgun 

did not undermine T.F.'s repeated avowals that she recognized Aguayo as 

the shooter. Although T.F. arguably equivocated on her identification of 

the shooter during her second interview by mentioning P.D.'s suspicion 
STATE v. AGUAYO

Decision of the Court

8

and noting that P.D.'s brother and the shooter had a similar build, when 

pressed by the detective, T.F. reaffirmed her identification of Aguayo, 

stating he and not P.D.'s brother was the shooter. Therefore, viewed in 

context, P.D.'s suspicion did not preclude a finding of probable cause.

¶22 Furthermore, the affidavits' composite of the eyewitnesses'

descriptions was not false or misleading; explaining that there were some 

discrepancies in the eyewitnesses' accounts would not have defeated a 

finding of probable cause. And, to the extent Aguayo argues Villaverde's 

criminal activity and drug use were relevant, the affidavits clearly detailed

that Villaverde admitted transporting and selling illegal drugs, thereby 

providing the judicial officer a meaningful opportunity to evaluate his 

veracity. Cf. Frimmel, 236 Ariz. at 240, ¶¶ 33-34 (affiant's failure to provide 

background information regarding informants deprived magistrate "of the 

opportunity to meaningfully and neutrally evaluate the veracity of the 

informants"). Given his admitted criminal activity and suspected 

involvement in the shooting, there is no basis to conclude that Villaverde's 

exculpatory statements regarding Aguayo would have changed the judicial 

officer's probable cause determination. Therefore, read in their entirety and 

including the omitted facts, the affidavits provided sufficient information 

to support a finding of probable cause, and the superior court did not err in 

holding the search warrants were valid.

B. Denial of Motions to Suppress.

¶23 The federal and state constitutions protect individuals against 

unreasonable searches and seizures, U.S. Const. amend. IV; Ariz. Const. art. 

2, § 8, and "any evidence collected in violation" of these provisions "is 

generally inadmissible in a subsequent criminal trial." State v. Valenzuela, 

239 Ariz. 299, 302, ¶ 10 (2016); see State v. Peoples, 240 Ariz. 244, 247, ¶ 9 

(2016) ("A warrantless search is per se unreasonable . . . unless an exception 

to the warrant requirement applies."). 

¶24 We review the denial of a motion to suppress evidence for an 

abuse of discretion. Brown v. McClennen, 239 Ariz. 521, 524, ¶ 10 (2016). In 

doing so, we defer to the superior court's determination of officers'

credibility, State v. Mendoza-Ruiz, 225 Ariz. 473, 475, ¶ 6 (App. 2010), and 

uphold the court's ruling if it is legally correct for any reason. State v. Huez, 

240 Ariz. 406, 412, ¶ 19 (App. 2016).
STATE v. AGUAYO

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1. Cell phone evidence.

¶25 Aguayo contends the superior court improperly denied his 

motion to suppress evidence from the cell phones seized from his home. 

He argues police officers who executed an initial search warrant on his 

home unlawfully searched the cell phones they found there by accessing 

them before they obtained a second search warrant that specifically 

included electronics. See Peoples, 240 Ariz. at 249, ¶ 15 (holding cell phones 

"are intrinsically private," and therefore cell phone owners have a 

"legitimate expectation of privacy" that their phones will be protected from 

unlawful search and seizure). In a series of motions to suppress, Aguayo 

moved to suppress evidence obtained from two cell phones seized from his 

home. Citing police records, Aguayo argued the phones were manipulated

twenty minutes before a judicial officer issued the electronics warrant, 

reasoning the cell phones therefore were seized unlawfully.

¶26 Officers executed a warrant on Aguayo's home that 

authorized the search and seizure of Aguayo, a buccal swab from Aguayo, 

all firearms, all ammunition, and any biological evidence. While 

conducting an initial sweep of the property, a sergeant noticed two cell 

phones in Aguayo's bedroom on a desk in plain view. He then contacted 

the investigating detective and asked her to draft a second affidavit for a 

search warrant on the residence that included electronics. The resulting 

electronics warrant identified the phone carrier and described the cell 

phones to be seized.

¶27 At the evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress, the 

officers who executed the warrants on Aguayo's home avowed that no one 

touched or otherwise manipulated the cell phones before the electronics 

warrant issued. However, when defense counsel asked a sergeant how the 

officers had determined which carrier serviced the cell phones, as noted in 

the electronics warrant, the sergeant answered that he did not "remember"

how that information was obtained. Nonetheless, he testified that, as a 

matter of routine protocol, officers do not turn on electronic devices before 

they are seized pursuant to a warrant. At that point, defense counsel 

pressed further, asserting "something had to be done physically" to the cell 

phones to ascertain the identifying information set forth in the affidavit. In 

response, the sergeant replied, "[I]t's extremely possible, yes." When

defense counsel suggested that someone may have turned the phone 

"around," the sergeant agreed, "That's probabl[e]." When prompted on 

redirect, however, the sergeant recalled that Villaverde had disclosed 

Aguayo's cell phone number to police officers before the first search 

warrant was executed, as noted in the initial affidavit, and officers were able 
STATE v. AGUAYO

Decision of the Court

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to use that information to determine the service provider listed on the 

warrant without manipulating the phone. Accordingly, the sergeant 

reaffirmed that the officers seized the cell phones only after the electronics 

warrant had issued, not before.

¶28 In denying the motion to suppress, the superior court 

specifically found the sergeant's testimony credible and concluded there 

was "no evidence" that law enforcement officers searched or seized the 

phones before the electronics warrant issued. Accordingly, the court 

determined the cell phone evidence was lawfully seized, and denied the 

motion to suppress.

¶29 The record supports the court's findings. Although the 

sergeant equivocated on cross-examination when asked whether officers 

may have manipulated the cell phones to obtain service-provider 

information, he clarified his testimony on redirect and explained that it 

would not have been necessary to access the phones because Villaverde 

already had disclosed Aguayo's cell phone number, which by itself would 

have been sufficient to determine the phone's service provider.

¶30 To the extent Aguayo argues the police records show that the 

cell phones were seized 20 minutes before the electronics warrant issued, 

we note that the cited police reports state that the phones were "located"

and "found" at 1:25 p.m. Without question, these items were found before 

the affiant drafted the second affidavit and the judicial officer issued the 

corresponding electronics warrant at 1:45 p.m., but the police records do 

not reflect that the phones were searched or seized before the electronics 

warrant issued. Therefore, the superior court did not abuse its discretion 

by denying the motion to suppress the cell phone evidence.

2. Vehicle evidence.

¶31 Aguayo contends the superior court improperly denied his 

motion to suppress all evidence seized from his car. Because a police officer 

impounded the Acura five days before a search warrant issued, Aguayo 

argues his car was unlawfully seized and therefore any subsequent search 

was likewise illegal.

¶32 At the evidentiary hearing, an investigating detective 

explained that police officers tracked Aguayo's Acura to a repair shop, 

where the car was inoperable. Because the shop was not secure, officers 

decided to seize the vehicle before obtaining a warrant. Consistent with the 

detective's testimony, the officer who ordered the Acura towed to a police 

crime lab explained he did so without a warrant because he was concerned 
STATE v. AGUAYO

Decision of the Court

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evidence might be tampered with or destroyed. And the officer avowed 

that police did not open the Acura until a vehicle search warrant issued five 

days later.

¶33 After taking the matter under advisement, the superior court 

denied the motion to suppress, finding the warrantless seizure was not 

unlawful. Noting law enforcement officers may seize a car from a public 

place without a warrant when they have probable cause to believe that the 

vehicle contains evidence of a crime, the court found Aguayo "had the same 

or lesser expectation of privacy" in his vehicle when it was housed at a 

repair shop than if it had "been parked in a public street because a repair 

person would presumably have access to the interior of the vehicle, the 

engine, and the trunk."

¶34 Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, 

law enforcement officials acting with probable cause do not need a warrant 

to seize a readily mobile vehicle parked in a street, parking lot or other open 

space because such a seizure does "not involve any invasion of privacy." 

Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 566 (1999) (quotation omitted). Although this 

exception recognizes the "impracticability of securing a warrant to search a 

vehicle that could be quickly moved," it is "also justified by a lessened 

expectation of privacy with respect to vehicles." State v. Reyna, 205 Ariz. 

374, 375, ¶ 5 (App. 2003); see also California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391 (1985) 

("Besides the element of mobility, less rigorous warrant requirements 

govern because the expectation of privacy with respect to one's automobile 

is significantly less than that relating to one's home or office.") (quotation 

omitted). As such, "the justification to conduct . . . a warrantless search does 

not vanish once [a] car has been immobilized; nor does it depend upon a 

reviewing court's assessment of the likelihood . . . that the car would have 

been driven away, or that its contents would have been tampered with, 

during the period required for the police to obtain a warrant." Michigan v. 

Thomas, 458 U.S. 259, 261 (1982); see also Reyna, 205 Ariz. at 378, ¶ 15 

("exigent circumstances are not needed to authorize a warrantless search"

under the automobile exception "when probable cause exists to believe the 

vehicle contains contraband").

¶35 Consistent with the superior court's findings, the record 

reflects that Aguayo's privacy interest in the Acura was lessened by the 

vehicle's location in a commercial facility. Indeed, Aguayo does not dispute 

that repair shop employees could access the interior of his car. Although 

the Acura was temporarily inoperable, a mechanic told police the car's

malfunction had been diagnosed, and therefore it was unclear how long the

vehicle would remain immobile. See United States v. Mercado, 307 F.3d 1226, 
STATE v. AGUAYO

Decision of the Court

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1229 (10th Cir. 2002) ("temporary immobility due to a readily repairable 

problem while at an open public repair shop does not remove [a] vehicle 

from the category of 'readily mobile'"). Given these circumstances and the 

officers' probable cause to believe that the Acura contained evidence of a 

crime, the automobile exception authorized the vehicle's seizure.

CONCLUSION

¶36 As stated, see note 2, supra, we modify the sentence imposed 

on Count 5, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, to "life 

imprisonment without possibility of release on any basis until the service 

of twenty-five calendar." See A.R.S. § 13-1003(D). Otherwise, for the 

foregoing reasons, we affirm the convictions and affirm the sentences as 

modified.