High and dry in Houma, LA

National Guard photo
359

Chapter 22

Post-Landfall Evacuation

For several days aft er landfall, evacuation of New Orleans proceeded slowly, compounding the misery of residents stranded by the storm. Th e National Response Plan 

(NRP), the Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan, and the New Orleans Comprehensive Emergency Plan stipulate that, typically, emergency response is locally initiated 

and coordinated. 

Federal, state, and local authorities knew long before the storm that at least 100,000 residents 

of New Orleans would lack the means to evacuate.1

 Nonetheless, the city failed to pre-stage 

buses and drivers outside the fl ood zone. Meanwhile, the state’s lead agency for transportation during an evacuation ignored its responsibilities.

Th e plans mentioned above stipulate that local and state governments may call on federal 

support if their own resources become overwhelmed. For catastrophic events, the NRP, the 

federal government’s blueprint for its preparation and response to national emergencies,

adds that the federal government does not need to wait for requests from state or local government before off ering assistance. Although details of this policy were still under development when Hurricane Katrina – an undisputedly catastrophic storm – struck, this should 

not have prevented federal offi cials from preparing before landfall to assist with post-landfall evacuation. Unfortunately, federal offi cials, including those working out of Louisiana’s 

Emergency Operations Center in Baton Rouge, did little to prepare and were forced to 

scramble to provide assistance aft er Katrina struck. 

As the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA) stated in their own aft er-action report: “Hurricane Katrina has presented 

the need for a national focus on evacuation and sheltering.”2

An Incomplete Pre-Landfall Evacuation Likely Compounded the 

Post-Landfall Evacuation

Some 10,000 to 15,000 New Orleans residents took shelter at the Superdome, the “refuge of 

last resort” for those without the means to evacuate, 3 suggesting many may have preferred to 

leave the city altogether as part of a pre-landfall evacuation had they been off ered the means. 

Th eir staying behind placed their lives in jeopardy and increased the strain on responders.4

Before Landfall, the City Failed to Designate Buses and Drivers for a PostLandfall Evacuation

Before landfall, the city failed to designate buses or drivers for post-landfall evacuations. 

Although the Regional Transit Authority (RTA), the local municipal bus agency in New 

Orleans, did stage a fl eet of buses at the Poland Street Wharf,5

 a high-ground location inside 

the city that remained unfl ooded, no level of government attempted to move drivers to 

those buses until Th ursday, three days aft er landfall,6

 even though the route to the wharf 

remained open throughout the crisis.

Before Landfall, the Louisiana Secretary of Transportation and Development 

Ignored His Department’s Responsibility to Prepare for the Post-Landfall 

Evacuation
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360

Th e Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development (LA DOTD) failed in its 

duty, under the state’s emergency plan, to arrange transportation for post-landfall evacuation. As discussed in Chapter 16, in April 2005, the State of Louisiana transferred responsibility for transportation during an evacuation from the Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland 

Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP) to the LA DOTD. Despite signing the 

agreement, LA DOTD Secretary Johnny Bradberry believed his organization was not 

suited to the task because it did not have an in-house stable of transportation and drivers 

like the state Department of Tourism or the Louisiana National Guard.7

 Th e record shows 

no evidence that he raised these concerns outside his department between April 2005 and 

landfall.8 Before and aft er Katrina, Secretary Bradberry’s agency provided no transportation for evacuation, except for fi ve ferries to evacuate 6,000 people from St. Bernard and 

Plaquemines Parishes.9

Ultimately, thousands of buses were mobilized for evacuation through contracts with transportation providers, which LA DOTD – like any other state agency – could have arranged 

both before and aft er landfall. Secretary Bradberry conceded as much, admitting that his 

agency was best positioned in the state to contract with railroads and that it makes sense for 

the state’s lead agency for transportation to be responsible for negotiating agreements with 

other transportation providers.10 Th e Committee concludes that LA DOTD’s failure to carry 

out its duties under the state’s emergency plan delayed the eff orts to locate in-state buses.

LOHSEP, which was responsible under the state’s emergency plan for making sure Secretary 

Bradberry’s agency carried out its duties, did not urge him to take steps to prepare before the 

storm for post-landfall evacuation.11 But the Committee fi nds Secretary Bradberry primarily 

responsible for his department’s inertia aft er landfall to coordinate transportation resources. 

Inadequate Planning Hamstrung the Federal Government’s Assistance With 

the Post-Landfall Evacuation

As discussed elsewhere in this report, federal offi cials knew that (1) a catastrophic hurricane 

could leave hundreds of thousands of New Orleans residents stranded, as 2004’s Hurricane 

Pam catastrophic-storm exercise had predicted (see Chapter 8, Hurricane Pam), (2) that 

such a storm would incapacitate state and local resources, and (3) that the NRP authorized 

federal offi cials to off er help without requests from state and local governments (see Chapter 27, Failures in Implementation of the NRP). Th erefore, failures by the federal government to prepare before landfall for post-landfall evacuation were not failures of law, but, at 

least in part, of leadership.12 Federal offi cials at the highest levels failed to make full use of 

existing authority and resources that were available despite the incompleteness of planning 

for catastrophic storms. 

At a Hurricane Pam transportation workshop in late July 2005, federal, state, and local 

offi cials had discussed New Orleans’ need, before landfall, for at least 600 buses and 1,200 

drivers for post-landfall evacuation.13 A FEMA offi cial suggested that, in fact, 5,000 buses a 

day would be necessary.14 However, unifi ed federal, state, and local planning for evacuation 

aft er a catastrophic New Orleans storm was “less than 10 percent done” by the day before 

landfall and a written draft of the plan was not ready until September 9, 2005.15

One U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) offi cial testifi ed that “the people that were 

involved in that work group must have sensed the same thing that I did, that there was a 

large reliance [by state and local participants] on the federal team coming in and fi x[ing] 

everything.”16 Likewise, the head of Louisiana’s National Guard, who was briefed about the 

workshop, testifi ed that FEMA offi cials there agreed that they “would have the responsibility for the evacuation” of New Orleans.17 A FEMA offi cial testifi ed that, while at the work-
Post-Landfall Evacuation

361

shop, he said the federal government would provide buses, upon a request from the state or 

local government.18

Offi cials at every level of government knew that getting buses to New Orleans would take 

at least 72 hours because of the time it takes both to change the tires on city buses for long 

highway trips and to drive to New Orleans from various points around the country. Th is 

meant pre-storm preparations were required for the post-landfall evacuation.19 However, 

during the weekend before landfall, federal offi cials took barely any action to prepare for a 

post-storm evacuation.20

Sometime between early Friday night, August 26, and early Monday morning, August 29, 

Jules Hurst, a FEMA offi cial who participated in the July Pam workshop, gave DOT a “headsup” that it would need to check with its transportation contractor to locate between 1,000 

and 2,000 buses for evacuations.21 DOT, in turn, called Landstar, its transportation services 

contractor, to determine availability, but did not ask Landstar to send buses to the Gulf Coast 

because FEMA had not given DOT the authority to request it.22 However, neither Hurst nor 

any other FEMA offi cial tasked DOT with actually arranging for their delivery. 

On Sunday, August 28, the day before landfall, FEMA Acting Deputy Director Patrick 

Rhode sent an e-mail to other FEMA offi cials asking what FEMA had done to ensure that 

state and local authorities were doing everything in their power to make transportation 

available. He also asked whether state or local governments had requested evacuation assistance.23 Rhode recognized that FEMA would need 72 hours’ notice to help, time that was 

no longer available.24 Despite the limited time and the likely pressing need for evacuation 

assistance, he failed to act in the absence of a cry for help from state or locals governments. 

Rhode’s e-mail appears to have spurred no follow-up activity at FEMA. 

President Bush, Secretary Chertoff , and Governor Blanco Demonstrated 

a Failure of Engagement and Initiative at a Time When Th eir Leadership 

Was Critical

Before landfall, Governor Blanco failed to ask for evacuation resources from the federal 

government,25 while federal offi cials, including the President and Secretary Chertoff , failed 

to off er assistance. When Secretary Chertoff appeared before the Committee, he testifi ed 

that “the biggest failure was not getting the buses in,”26 adding that the federal government’s 

preparations during the weekend before landfall were inadequate, “particularly in the area 

of ... bus transportation.”27

President Bush and Secretary Chertoff had an opportunity to extend aid at a video-teleconference call among federal, state, and local offi cials at 11 a.m. CT on Sunday, when the 

President informed the participants that the federal government was doing all it could to 

prepare for and respond to the storm.28 Unfortunately, as Secretary Chertoff conceded 

before the Committee, that was not the case – particularly with respect to the evacuation 

of New Orleans.29 If, before or during this call, the President had directed his Cabinet to 

do everything in its power to help evacuate New Orleans, the post-landfall evacuation may 

have begun much sooner rather than three days aft er landfall. According to the Louisiana 

Adjutant General Bennett Landreneau, the head of the Louisiana National Guard, had 

buses arrived in New Orleans on Monday, Tuesday, or Wednesday, the Louisiana National 

Guard would have been able to get people from the Superdome to those buses.30 Th ere is no 

evidence that the President gave such orders. 

Additionally, as detailed in Chapter 12, Secretary Chertoff failed to activate the Catastrophic 

Incident Annex to the NRP, which would have sent an even clearer message to federal agencies that it was permissible for them to push transportation resources to New Orleans. 
Chapter 22

362

Just when the people of New Orleans required engagement, initiative, and leadership from 

their leaders, the President, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Governor exhibited a lack of all three. 

From Monday to Wednesday Night, No Government-Sponsored 

Buses Arrived in New Orleans

As the Hurricane Pam exercise predicted, many of the parish resources were unavailable after landfall, but the city had not planned to move many of its buses either outside the fl ood 

zone or to high ground within it.31

On the day of landfall, aft er learning that some of the city’s major levees had broken, New 

Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin directed his staff to compose a list of “critical needs” to present to 

Brown during a Tuesday morning meeting.32 Although the list included search and rescue 

assets, resources for the Superdome, law and order on the streets, and communications 

capabilities, it did not mention evacuation resources.33 Th e record does not indicate whether 

Mayor Nagin made an oral request during the meeting. 

However, on Tuesday, the Mayor did call Governor Blanco’s chief of staff and identifi ed buses as the “No. 1 priority” for help from the state.34 Also on Tuesday, the city tried to obtain 

Regional Transit Authority (RTA) buses, but they were believed to be fl ooded and unusable, 

as were school buses because they were pre-staged in the fl ood plain.35 In fact, as many as 200 

buses were pre-staged on high ground at the Poland Street Wharf, but that information was 

never passed from the RTA to city offi cials.36 On Wednesday, the Mayor spoke with President Bush and, according to the Mayor’s communications director, purposely limited the 

conversation to a discussion about the levee breaks, search and rescue needs, and buses.37

On the day of landfall, Governor Blanco had asked then-FEMA Director Brown for 500 

buses.38 Brown agreed, but no buses arrived Tuesday morning. Governor Blanco asked 

Brown again.39 Once again, Brown agreed, but no buses arrived in New Orleans Wednesday 

morning either.40 Th e Governor turned to the White House.41 When then- White House 

Chief of Staff Andrew Card called Governor Blanco later that morning, she requested his 

help in obtaining the promised 500 FEMA buses, adding that she might need as many as 

5,000.42 Th e Governor reiterated her frustration about FEMA’s failure to deliver buses in a 

phone call to the President later that aft ernoon.43

FEMA did not ask DOT to send buses to New Orleans until 1:45 a.m. on Wednesday, 

August 31, two days aft er landfall and 36 hours aft er Brown’s agreement to provide them.44

Brown could not explain why it took so long.45

Notably, when FEMA fi nally tasked DOT, FEMA requested 455 buses – not 500.46 According to LOHSEP Acting Deputy Director Colonel Jeff Smith, a FEMA offi cial at headquarters 

had overridden the state’s request because that individual had found the request excessive 

in view of the “number of people” thought to have been left in the city.47 Colonel Smith, a 

Certifi ed Public Accountant, cited this episode as an example of how FEMA’s bureaucracy 

failed the state: “I’ll talk despairingly against one of my previous occupations; some bean 

counter looked at it and fi gured that, you know, we didn’t need this. And I mean, the situations when you’re going and it literally, it’s life or death issues, it’s no time to be quibbling 

about, you know, what you have there.”48

Poor communications between FEMA offi cials at the Superdome and those at the state 

Emergency Operations Center in Baton Rouge may have undermined FEMA’s ability to obtain buses.49 On Tuesday FEMA offi cials at the Superdome informed General Gary Jones, the 
Post-Landfall Evacuation

363

Louisiana National Guard offi cial in charge, that 

they were trying to obtain buses.50 But they had 

trouble reaching their superiors in Baton Rouge,51

which may have slowed the procurement. As DHS 

and FEMA noted in their aft er-action report: 

“During Hurricane Katrina, catastrophic communications failures caused confusion during the 

post-landfall evacuation operation.”52

FEMA’s delays are regrettable, because buses arrived quickly aft er FEMA fi nally tasked the DOT 

with the mission. DOT offi cials immediately began 

contracting for buses,53 the fi rst of which arrived 

at a staging area at Mile Marker 209 (La Place, 

Louisiana) around 6:30 a.m. on Wednesday.54 By 

midnight Th ursday, less than 24 hours aft er DOT 

received the tasking order, approximately 200 

buses were participating in evacuations.55

Th e Governor also turned to state resources,56 asking Leonard Kleinpeter, a special assistant 

to the Governor and the head of the Offi ce of Community Programs, an agency with contacts in all the parishes, on Tuesday to locate buses,57 though without authority to commandeer those buses. Kleinpeter and his staff began to line up buses from local school districts 

and churches on Tuesday,58 and lined up school buses that LOHSEP commandeered on 

Th ursday, aft er the Governor issued an Executive Order on Wednesday.59 Th e Governor’s 

staff did not perceive a need for an Executive Order before Wednesday because the bus 

owners, including school superintendents, contacted by staff were highly cooperative to 

that point. On Wednesday, however, the need for an Executive Order emerged when some 

school systems began to oppose the state’s request for buses and media reports of lawlessness became pervasive.60

In all, the state and federal government obtained and sent 2,000 buses to New Orleans, 

which began heading there Wednesday, but did not arrive until Th ursday.61

Conditions in New Orleans Deteriorated Throughout the Week

Highway Overpasses 

During the Hurricane Pam working group, government offi cials planned to collect rescuees 

on highway overpasses, which they referred to as “lily pads.”62 Th e state’s Department of Wildlife and Fisheries staged at least three highway-overpass collection points: the Elysian Fields 

exit (near the city’s Ninth Ward), the St. Bernard exit (the next exit some 2,000 feet away), and 

the Interstate 10 – Interstate 610 split (near the border of Orleans and Jeff erson Parishes).63

Th e Louisiana National Guard and Coast Guard also collected rescuees from the Lower Ninth 

Ward and brought them to the third fl oor of Jackson Barracks and a highway overpass.64

Th e overpass at the I-10 Causeway intersection (less than a mile into Jeff erson Parish from 

the I-10 and I-610 split), which became known as the “Cloverleaf,” became one of the biggest collection points in New Orleans, as well as an ad-hoc triage point. Th e presence of 

medical assistance drew others, and soon the resources there (food, water, and medicine) 

were overwhelmed.65

Dr. Scott Delacroix, who was treating patients at the Cloverleaf, reported severe shortages of 

medical supplies and other necessities to Dr. Jimmy Guidry, the Secretary of the Louisiana 

Evacuee buses, Louisiana

Photo © 2005 The Times-Picayune Publishing Co., 

all rights reserved. Used with permission of the 

Times-Picayune.)
Chapter 22

364

Department of Health and Hospitals. At one point, Dr. Delacroix was forced to drive to 

Baton Rouge and raid the stockpiles of supplies languishing in the parking lot of the state 

emergency-operations center.66

When government-sponsored buses began trickling into New Orleans on Wednesday evening, they picked up rescuees on highway overpasses like the Cloverleaf (which was not cut 

off by fl ood waters) in addition to heading to the Superdome or the Convention Center.67

The Superdome

Th e Superdome lost electricity on Monday morning and plumbing on Tuesday, resulting 

in a sanitation crisis. Th e population doubled by Wednesday, as citizens who had stayed 

in their homes during the storm sought refuge. As a result, health offi cials were forced to 

move the special-needs population to the New Orleans Arena, across the walkway from the 

Superdome.68

Security opened the doors of the Superdome for the fi rst time late on Tuesday, so that people could see for themselves that the surrounding area was fl ooded and evacuation would 

be diffi cult. Even outside, the temperature and humidity were so brutal that the National 

Guard had helicopters hover over the concourse to function like massive fans.69

Some 20,000 to 30,000 people languished under these conditions until Th ursday at the earliest and as late as Saturday. 

The Convention Center

Although the city had not planned before landfall to open the Morial Convention Center 

to the public as a shelter or refuge, Mayor Nagin opened the facility on Tuesday, August 

30.70 No offi cials had planned for the food, water, medical support, and security needs of the 

people who took shelter there. 

Unlike the Superdome (rumors to the contrary notwithstanding), the Convention Center, where evacuees from the city’s hotels may have become attractive targets for theft ,71

experienced some crime, and the New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) became overwhelmed there.72

Although the record is inconclusive about when the federal government became aware that 

the city had opened the Convention Center to the public,73 the state learned about it on 

Wednesday.74 However, Adjutant General Landreneau instructed the Louisiana National 

Guard offi cers who were evacuating the Superdome to stick to their mission.75

Late on Th ursday night or early on Friday morning, however, the city’s Director of Homeland Security and Public Safety asked General Landreneau to take control of the Convention Center, provide relief, and evacuate the 19,000 people who had gathered there.76

The U.S. Army Located a Staging Area and Coordinated 

the Buses’ Trip to New Orleans

At 5 p.m. Wednesday evening, as buses fi nally began arriving in LaPlace, Louisiana, Governor Blanco asked Lieutenant General Russel L. Honoré, Commander, First Army, and 

Commander of Joint Task Force Katrina, to coordinate the evacuation of New Orleans.77

General Honoré delegated that responsibility to Brigadier General Mark Graham, who had 

arrived in Baton Rouge that day. General Graham established a staging area at Mile Marker 

209 near LaPlace, Louisiana (up to this point the buses were staging on I-10 a few miles away 

by default), and informed DOT, which was responsible for procuring the buses and drivers.78
Post-Landfall Evacuation

365

On Th ursday morning, General Graham learned that Governor Blanco wanted those buses 

heading to the Superdome to pick up 5,000 rescuees at the Cloverleaf fi rst.79 General Graham sent two liaison offi cers there, where they coordinated the convoys of buses arriving 

from Mile Marker 209.80 Th e two evacuation operations ran simultaneously. General Graham estimated that the Superdome evacuation was set back only an hour by this diversion.81

Th e Louisiana National Guard Planned and Executed the Movement of Buses 

from Off -Ramps to the Superdome and Convention Center

Th e Louisiana National Guard (LANG) at the 

Superdome routed buses from the O’Keefe Avenue off -ramp (a few blocks to the southwest of 

the Superdome) to the Superdome.82

First, National Guard offi cers designated a pickup spot for buses to meet Superdome evacuees, 

as the area immediately adjacent to the Superdome was fl ooded. Th e National Guard designated 

the Loyola Street entrance to the Hyatt Regency 

Hotel as the pick-up spot because the road only 

had a foot-and-a-half of water.83

Second, National Guard offi cers identifi ed a 

path to the Hyatt Regency Hotel pick-up point 

for evacuees, from the outdoor concourse surrounding the Superdome to the adjacent mall, 

which connected indoors to the Hyatt. Guardsmen and NOPD offi cers lined the path, ensuring 

that only Superdome evacuees would be entering buses, and that they would not be harassed 

by other people who had not sought refuge at 

the Superdome, but who wanted to sneak onto 

buses designated for the Superdome evacuees.84

Th ird, National Guard offi cers identifi ed and secured a route for buses from the I-10 off -ramp 

to the Loyola Street entrance of the Hyatt, locating checkpoints strategically along the way.85

Evacuation of the Superdome Swung into Full Gear on Thursday

Buses fi nally arrived in large numbers in front of the Hyatt on Th ursday morning, September 1. Th e DOT also expended considerable energy trying to arrange for rail cars, but 

without much luck.86 In the end, just 97 people were evacuated, in a single trip, by rail.87

The Evacuation of the Convention Center Began and Ended on Saturday

On Friday morning, at 8 a.m., the National Guard’s General Jones ordered Colonel Jacques 

Th ibodeaux to plan and execute a “rescue mission,” in coordination with the NOPD, at 

the Convention Center by noon that day.88 Colonel Th ibodeaux designed a plan to bring 

law and order to the Convention Center within the fi rst 30 minutes, provide food, water, 

and medicine within fi ve hours, and evacuate the premises within 48 hours.89 Supported 

by National Guard units from fi ve other states, Colonel Th ibodeaux carried out the plan at 

noon, and National Guard troops secured the entire complex in under 15 minutes without 

incident. Th e 19,000 people taking refuge were evacuated the next day within eight hours, in 

buses sent by General Graham, helicopters, and the Canal Street Ferry.90

Helping hands, Louisiana

U.S. Coast Guard photo
Chapter 22

366

Every Level of Government Failed to Identify an Adequate Number 

of Shelters Before Landfall

Before landfall, neither the city, state, nor federal government identifi ed adequate sheltering 

space outside the area that would become the fl ood zone. Adequate sheltering space was not 

identifi ed until Wednesday, August 31, two days aft er landfall. 

Sheltering options within the State of Louisiana are limited in part because the American Red Cross, the entity 

primarily responsible for sheltering under the NRP, 

will not certify any shelters below the I-10 and I-12 split 

outside of Baton Rouge because the risk of fl ooding is 

too great.91

A FEMA situation report published at 10 p.m. on Tuesday, August 30 stated: “Th e State requested assistance 

in relocating all remaining victims of Hurricane Katrina 

out of the Superdome shelter. Limiting factors include 

identifying where they are to be relocated to and identifying the transportation required.”92 A Department of 

Homeland Security document published a few hours 

later noted, under the heading “Decisions needed,” that 

the state was “expected to identify location[s] of alternate shelter locations this morning.”93

On Tuesday night, Governor Blanco had instructed 

Ann Williamson, the state’s Secretary of Social Services, 

to fi nd a shelter for 25,000 people by 6 a.m. on Wednesday.94 At 1:30 a.m. on Wednesday, Secretary Williamson 

called Texas to request the use of the Astrodome.95 Secretary Williamson explained that she had to ask for the 

Astrodome because demand for shelter space exceeded 

what was available in Louisiana.96 Between 8:30 and 9:30 

a.m. on Wednesday morning, Governor Blanco called 

Governor Perry of Texas, who agreed to open the Astrodome to receive Katrina evacuees.97 According to General Honoré, “the destination was Houston ... because 

Baton Rouge is full. Shreveport is full. Jackson, Mississippi is full. Th ere’s no more capacity in the state.”98

Family Reunifi cation and Prevention of Missing Children 

and Adult Scenarios 

A total of 13,502 adults were reported to the National Center for Missing Adults (NCMA) 

as a result of Katrina,99 and a total of 5,088 children were reported to the National Center 

for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC).100 Many shelters did not have intake forms 

or release forms to track individuals, or they did not use these forms. Additionally, FEMA 

did not fully cooperate with NCMA or NCMEC to help reunite families, citing privacy concerns (which could have been addressed). Finally, due to the lack of coordinated reporting 

or tracking of missing persons, family members oft en had to repeatedly call several organizations to seek help with fi nding family members. 

Small evacuee secured, 

New Orleans

U.S. Coast Guard photo
Post-Landfall Evacuation

367

1 Committee staff interview of Terry Tullier, Director, New Orleans Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness, LA, conducted 

on Nov. 22, 2005, transcript p. 18. FEMA sent the Committee a 2003 document from the state that recognized that 

“250,000 to 350,000 people [would] remain in stranded conditions with limited self rescue capability” aft er landfall of a 

major hurricane in the greater New Orleans area. Source: Sean Fontenot, memorandum to FEMA, Aug. 22, 2003, p. 2. 

Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0079-0000004 through 0000005 (indicating the document was 

also sent on Aug. 25, 2004 to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.); Ron Castleman, memorandum to 

Lacy Suiter, “Catastrophic Planning for New Orleans,” Aug. 8, 2001. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHSFEMA-074-0000027 (stating a need to evacuate 300,000 to 350,000 aft er landfall of a catastrophic hurricane in New 

Orleans.). According to a 2006 Emergency Response/Shelter Plan appropriations request document for which Col. Terry 

Ebbert is the point of contact, “Th e city of New Orleans faces the reality that it is impossible to conduct a mandatory 

evacuation in advance of a Category 3, 4, or 5 hurricane, as well as respond to other...disasters including terrorism. Even 

under the best conditions that currently exist in terms of emergency response in the New Orleans region, evacuation 

would leave 150,000 people in harm’s way.” Source: City of New Orleans, FY2006 Funding Request to Congress, Emergency Response Shelter/Plan Homeland Security Appropriations. Provided to Committee.

2 FEMA, DHS/FEMA Initial Response Hotwash: Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, Feb. 13, 2006, p. 45 [hereinaft er DHS/

FEMA Initial Response Hotwash, Feb. 13, 2006].

3 City offi cials interviewed did not know exactly how many people the RTA buses brought to the Superdome on Sunday, 

but the City’s Director of Homeland Security and Public Safety said that the majority of the total population at the 

Superdome before landfall arrived there by bus. Source: Committee staff interview of Col. Terry Ebbert, U.S. Marine 

Corps, (Ret.), Director, New Orleans Offi ce of Homeland Security, LA, conducted on Jan. 10, 2006, transcript pp. 81-82. 

Th e total population of the Superdome before landfall is not known with certainty, but evidence in the record indicates 

that a range of 10,000 to 15,000 people were there before landfall. Source: Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and 

Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP), Situation Report, Executive Summary, Hurricane Katrina, Aug. 29, 2005, 10 a.m. 

CT. Provided to Committee (stating that 10,342 were in the Superdome); Sally Forman, Communications Director, 

New Orleans Offi ce of the Mayor, Timeline and Notes, Aug. 28, 2005. Provided to Committee (“Dome opens as shelter 

of last resort – 10,000 gather”); Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 52, 112 (estimating 12,000 to 15,000 were in the 

Superdome before landfall).

4 DHS/FEMA Initial Response Hotwash, Feb. 13, 2006, p. iii (stating that with Katrina’s “mass evacuation to locations 

throughout the country and other spillover eff ects nationwide, human resources were stretched particularly thin.”).

5 U.S. Department of Transportation, Hurricane Katrina-Situation Report, Aug. 28, 2005, 3 p.m., p. 3 (“All buses and 

large support vehicles not in use are being moved to the Poland St. Wharves, the highest place in New Orleans.”); Committee staff interview of Dwight Brashear, Chief Executive Offi cer and General Manager, Capital Area Transit System, 

Baton Rouge, LA, conducted on Jan. 5, 2006, transcript pp. 56-57 (recalling conversation RTA Director William DeVille 

telling Mr. Brashear that the RTA “parked 180 buses up there”). U.S. Department of Transportation offi cial circulated an 

e-mail, reporting that buses would be moved to “docks” before the storm hit, to a number of federal offi cials, including 

the Administrator for the Federal Transit Administration, Robert Jamison and the Homeland Security Operations Center. Source: Robert Patrick, e-mail to Anthony Tisdale, Aug. 28, 2005, 11:52 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

no. DHS-HSOC-0002-0000055 (“Buses not being used are being moved to docks. Oddly enough the high ground in new 

Orleans [sic]. Houma does not have high ground but are securing facilities. ... Please forward to all interestd [sic] paries 

[sic]. Ps. I’ve spoken with bill deville. Rta gm and he will keep us updated.”). Tisdale forwarded this e-mail ten minutes 

later to a number of U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT) offi cials, including Robert Jamison, the Administrator 

of the Federal Transit Authority, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) offi cials, including one at DHS headquarters 

and one at the Homeland Security Operations Center. Source: Anthony Tisdale, e-mail to Roger Bohnert and others, 

Aug. 28, 2005, 12:02 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-HSOC-0002-0000055.

6 On Th ursday, a Capital Area Transit Systems offi cial, Dwight Brashear, learned of these buses from RTA Director William DeVille and immediately took steps to move drivers to those buses, so that they could participate in the evacuation 

of New Orleans. Brashear interview, Jan. 5, 2006, pp. 56-59.

7 Committee staff interview of Sec. Johnny Bradberry, Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development, 

conducted on Dec. 21, 2005, transcript p. 80 (“So it makes sense to me what would be an agency that would be more 

closely tied to a function that could provide both, drivers and buses and we needed to iron that out. Could it be – could it 

be tourism. Th ey know, they have all the buses, companies in the State, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. So I had a real issue 

with resources as it relates to this. Not only in terms of drivers and buses, but in terms of in my opinion not having the 

resources that National Guard had. Th ey obviously have access to a lot more people, resources than DOTD people do.”). 

Although he signed the state’s April 2005 Emergency Operations Plan along with the Governor and every other state 

offi cial, Sec. Bradberry testifi ed that he “had serious issues” with LA DOTD’s responsibility under that plan because “we 

didn’t feel like we were the best quote agency or group to coordinate that.” Source: Sec. Bradberry interview, Dec. 21, 

2005, pp. 78-79. Sec. Bradberry testifi ed that he disagreed with the assignment of his department to lead the state’s ESF-1 

eff ort because “My main issue is that it’s a resource issue. We don’t feel like, fi rst of all, we’re not in the transit business, 

we have the title of Department of Transportation but we’re not in the transit business. We have no buses, we have no 

drivers.” Source: Sec. Bradberry interview, Dec. 21, 2005, p. 80.

8 Secretary Bradberry said that between April 2005 and landfall, he was not personally involved in any conversations 

with any Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness offi cials about his department’s new 

transportation responsibilities under the April 2005 plan. Source: Sec. Bradberry interview, Dec. 21, 2005, pp. 84-85. 

Sec. Bradberry’s chief subordinates, LA DOTD Assistant Secretary of Operations Gordon Nelson and LA DOTD Chief 
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of Emergency Services Joe Modicut learned about the assignment of this responsibility to LA DOTD in July 2005, aft er 

which Asst. Sec. Nelson tried to schedule a meeting with LOHSEP Acting Deputy Director Col. Jeff Smith, but the 

meeting did not take place before Katrina made landfall, even though Modicut does not recall becoming aware of the 

department’s responsibility until the weekend before landfall. Source: Committee staff interview of Gordon Nelson, Assistant Secretary of Operations, Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development, conducted on Jan. 6, 2006, 

transcript pp. 52-59; IEM, Inc., notes from Unifi ed Command Final Briefi ng, July 29, 2005, p. 3. Provided to Committee 

(placing Joe Modicut at the July 2005 transportation working group meeting); Committee staff interview of Joe Modicut, 

Emergency Services Coordinator, Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development, conducted on Jan. 5, 

2006, transcript p. 38 (stating he did not know LA DOTD was responsible for transportation under the state plan until 

the weekend before landfall).

9 On Tuesday and Wednesday, the state’s Department of Transportation and Development used fi ve ferries to evacuate 

6,000 people from those parishes. Sec. Bradberry interview, Dec. 21, 2005, pp. 108, 113-114; Nelson interview, Jan. 6, 

2006, pp. 79-83.

10 Sec. Bradberry interview, Dec. 21, 2005, pp. 172-183, 192-193.

11 Sec. Bradberry interview, Dec. 21, 2005, p. 86; Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, 

Emergency Operations Plan, Apr. 2005, p. BASIC-4–A–1 [hereinaft er Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan, Apr. 2005] 

(stating that the Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness would be the lead agency for 

Emergency Support Function 5 – Emergency Management – which required LOHSEP to “[p]repare detailed implementing procedures for all primary functions, to include the procedures by which the offi ce will be alerted and activated for 

24-hour operations when needed.”).

12 DHS/FEMA Initial Response Hotwash, Feb. 13, 2006, p. 45 (“Th e Federal government has neither generic nor specifi c 

evacuation plans.”). Th e Department of Homeland Security and FEMA recognized their failure to train personnel for an 

evacuation, before Katrina approached the Gulf Coast. DHS/FEMA Initial Response Hotwash, Feb. 13, 2006, p. v (“Hurricane Katrina highlighted the need to train operations personnel for evacuation.”).

13 Don Day, Region VI Regional Emergency Transportation Representative, Offi ce of Intelligence, Security and 

Emergency Response, U.S. Department of Transportation, cited in notes from Unifi ed Command Final Briefi ng, July 

29, 2005, p. 4. Provided to Committee (reporting to other federal, state, and local offi cials: “600 buses needed just to 

move people from collection points. ... We need to pre-identify the sources for these buses and have them lined up and 

ready. Th ere are plans to evacuate buses and operators out before the storm. Requires forethought, prior action. We have 

never looked into what it takes to make a bus staging/dispatch area.”); Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, 

prepared by IEM, Inc. for LOHSEP and FEMA, Sept. 2005, Appendix 1, p. 1 [hereinaft er Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, Sept. 2005] (Noting that “local/state/federal” offi cials “pre-landfall” should “identify/validate ... 

600 buses [and] 1,200 drivers”); Committee staff interview of Don Day, Region VI Regional Emergency Transportation 

Representative, Offi ce of Intelligence, Security and Emergency Response, U.S. Department of Transportation, conducted 

on Jan. 17, 2006, transcript p. 57 (stating that the need for 1,000 buses “came out of the forethought, a little bit of the 

thought process of Pam.”). 

Day briefed another DOT offi cial on what Day learned at Pam: “Don Day was the U.S. DOT rep in that [Pam] work 

group and I was mainly talking to him. I remember being debriefed as needing hundreds of buses, hundreds of buses to 

augment the hundreds of buses they already had there in New Orleans. ... ” Source: Committee staff interview of Dolph 

Diemont, Region X Regional Emergency Transportation Representative, Offi ce of Intelligence, Security and Emergency 

Response, U.S. Department of Transportation, conducted on Jan. 6, 2006, transcript p. 26 (“I remember Don Day agonizing over that. We were working long hours in there, trying to come up with a plan, a way, some way to move all those 

people. And we said oh, this is so huge, we’re going to need so many buses, we’re going to need all of this planning and 

communications and cooperation, coordination, all of this to come together. It’s really a massive eff ort.”). DOT offi cial, 

Dan Prevo, who participated in that working group, recalled the needed number of buses discussed without prompting. 

Source: Committee staff interview of Dan Prevo, Region VI Regional Emergency Transportation Representative, Offi ce 

of Intelligence, Security and Emergency Response, U.S. Department of Transportation, conducted on Jan. 17, 2006, transcript p. 14 (“Th ey talked in terms of 600 buses. And the reason I remember that is that once we got into Katrina where 

we didn’t have the number of evacuees or number of injured that were estimated in this Pam exercise. But we ended up 

calling up about 1,100 buses. So even that, that 600 estimate had we gotten the number of evacuees and casualties that 

were estimated during Pam, we would have needed considerably more than the 600 than fi rst estimated.”).

14 A FEMA offi cial at the workshop suggested to the other participants that 5,000 buses per day would be needed. Committee staff interview of Jules Hurst, Transportation Supervisor, Logistics Branch, FEMA, conducted on Dec. 27, 2005, 

transcript p. 34 (“At fi rst we were told that – I said you got to give me a number to work with here, and when they said 

how many buses do we need, they said, okay, 75,000 refugees a day – refugees? Evacuees a day for 10 days. And they said, 

What do you need? And I said 5,000 buses a day.”).

15 Don Day, Region VI Regional Emergency Transportation Representative, Offi ce of Intelligence, Security and Emergency Response, U.S. Department of Transportation, cited in notes from Unifi ed Command Final Briefi ng, July 29, 2005, 

p. 4. Provided to Committee (“We’re at less than 10% done with this trans planning when you consider the buses and the 

people.”). Th e inadequacy of local resources to evacuate New Orleans had been a longstanding concern. Source: Brian 

Wolshon, Elba Urbina, and Marc Levitan, Louisiana State University Hurricane Center, National Review of Hurricane 

Evacuation Plans and Policies, 2001, p. 18 (“Th e total number of busses in all of New Orleans would provide only a 

fraction of the capacity needed to transport all of these people.”). It also became known to DOT offi cials that city lacked 

drivers for the buses. Source: Prevo interview, Jan. 17, 2006, pp. 12-14 (stating that based on the Pam discussions, there 

was “no certainty that the drivers – if the buses would be made available, that the drivers would be available ... a whole 
Post-Landfall Evacuation

369

lot of research had to be done with regard to how many drivers would be available, or the liability issues that might be 

faced for the buses and for the drivers”); Hurst interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 37 (recalling that local offi cials in the Pam follow-up workshops reported “they didn’t know if they could get the drivers to report.”).

16 Diemont interview, Jan. 6, 2006, pp. 30-31; Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, Sept. 2005, Appendix 1, 

p. 1 (noting that “local/state/federal” offi cials “pre-landfall” should “identify/validate ... 600 buses [and] 1,200 drivers”) 

(emphasis added).

17 Testimony of Maj. Gen. Bennett Landreneau, Adjutant General, Louisiana, before the U.S. Senate Committee on 

Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Defense Department’s Role in the 

Response, Feb. 9, 2006; Committee staff interview of Maj. Gen. Bennett Landreneau, Adjutant General, Louisiana, conducted on Jan. 11, 2006, transcript pp. 68, 133. 

Th e Secretary of Transportation and Development of the State of Louisiana also expected federal involvement in the 

pre-storm preparation for the post-landfall evacuation. Sec. Bradberry interview, Dec. 21, 2005, p. 87 (“My assumption 

was that once the Federal Government was informed that a disaster or a potential disaster was to strike that appropriate 

assets would be deployed accordingly, that included buses, that included National Guard from other areas, that included 

FEMA and their other assets besides buses, it included the whole gamut.”).

18 Hurst interview, Dec. 27, 2005, p. 36. However Scott Wells, the Federal Coordinating Offi cer during Katrina and a 

Hurricane Pam participant testifi ed the state offi cials at Pam told him not to worry about evacuation because the state 

did not need help with that aspect. Committee staff interview of Scott Wells, Deputy Federal Coordinating Offi cer for 

Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, FEMA, conducted on Nov. 14, 2005, transcript pp. 86-87.

19 Patrick Rhode, e-mail to Edward Buikema, Michael Lowder and Ken Burris, Aug. 28, 2005 10:16 a.m. Provided to 

Committee; fi led as Bates no. HS-FEMA-0091-0000320 (“I know we need 72 hours to do this – we don’t have it.”); 

Committee staff interview of Vincent Pearce, Manager, National Response Program, Offi ce of Intelligence, Security, 

and Emergency Response, U.S. Department of Transportation, Jan. 6, 2006, p. 72 (stating that DOT worked with the 

Metropolitan Transit Authority for the City of New York to get buses to New Orleans aft er landfall, but that “it wasn’t 

an instantaneous thing” in part because “you have to put diff erent tires and wheels on inner-city buses to move them 

interstate,” and then “once they were ready to move, it was going to take ... about 24 hours just to get the buses ready to 

move downrange.”). 

20 By contrast, in the run up to Hurricane Rita, FEMA deployed over 300 people to prepare for the evacuation. DHS/

FEMA Initial Response Hotwash, Feb. 13, 2006, p. 5 (“When it came time to prepare for evacuation when Hurricane Rita 

threatened, over 300 people were reporting to the various teams.”).

21 Compare Hurst interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 8, 44 (stating the heads-up would have occurred “about 48 to 72 hours 

prior” to the time when the task order was ultimately placed on Wednesday, at 1:45 a.m.) with Committee staff interview 

of Reggie Jones, ESF-1 Program Manager, Offi ce of Intelligence, Security and Emergency Response, U.S. Department 

of Transportation, conducted on Jan. 17, 2006, pp. 23, 31 (stating that the heads up was made as early as “Friday night 

... or Saturday morning”); See also: Committee staff interview of Mike Foran, Region IV Regional Emergency Transportation Representative, Offi ce of Intelligence, Security and Emergency Response, U.S. Department of Transportation, 

conducted on Jan. 17, 2006, transcript p. 38 (recalling that he proposed 500 buses, and Hurst said, “you might have to 

double it”). Although Hurst recalled giving a handwritten note with this request to Reggie Jones, a DOT representative 

staffi ng the ESF-1 desk at the NRCC during Katrina, the DOT has not produced the note in response to the Committee’s 

document requests. Hurst’s request made its way into a DOT document published at 3p.m. on Sunday, Aug. 28, 2005, 

which reported that “coordination is underway... with the DOT national transportation contractor for possible provision of buses.” U.S. Department of Transportation, Hurricane Katrina – Situation Report #4, Aug. 27, 2005, 3 p.m., p. 4. 

Provided to Committee.

22 Landstar Express America Inc., Hurricane Katrina Response Research, Aug. 28, 2005. Provided to Committee; Foran 

interview, Jan. 17, 2006, p. 38.

23 Patrick Rhode, e-mail Edward Buikema, Michael Lowder and Ken Burris, Aug. 28, 2005, 10:16 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0091-0000320 (“Have we asked all eoc’s via emac or esf (transportation) to make 

transportation assets available to assist New Orleans today with evacuations? I know we need 72 hours to do this – we 

don’t have it – not sure what state is applying if someone can get some granularity on this issue.”).

24 Patrick Rhode, e-mail to Edward Buikema, Michael Lowder and Ken Burris, Aug. 28, 2005, 10:16 a.m. Provided to 

Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0091-0000320. 

25 It should be noted, however, that on Saturday, Aug. 27, 2005, the Governor did ask the President for funds to assist 

with the state’s coordination of the evacuation. Gov. Kathleen Blanco, letter to President George Bush, Aug. 27, 2005, pp. 

2 and Enclosure A. Provided to Committee (requesting $2.5 million for evacuation-related funds for the Louisiana State 

Police, Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, and the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development, but no request for transportation.). 

26 Testimony of Sec. Michael Chertoff , U.S. Department of Homeland Security, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on 

Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Homeland Security Department’s 

Preparation and Response, Feb. 15, 2006.

27 Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 2006.

28 President George Bush, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 28, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. 

DHS-FEMA-0105-0000079 through 0000080, 0000103 through 0000104; 
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29 Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 2006 (stating that aft er the video teleconference call of Sunday, 

Aug. 28, 2005, he “did not call the Department of Transportation and say, I want to see the plan.”).

30 Maj. Gen. Landreneau, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 9, 2006 (“We had procedures in place. We had contingencies 

to be able to get the personnel to the buses because the water was rising. In every case, from Monday through Th ursday, 

there were – we had plans in place and we had contingencies to be able to get all of the personnel onto the buses.”); Col. 

Ebbert interview, Oct. 13, 2005, p. 121 (stating that “there was no reason not to move people ... out of the Superdome”).

31 Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, Sept. 2005 (“Parish resources in the most severely impacted areas 

will not be available for several weeks or even months, as they were not removed from the area prior to the storm.”)

32 Testimony of Mayor C. Ray Nagin, City of New Orleans, LA, before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Managing the Crisis and Evacuating New Orleans, Feb. 1, 

2006; Col. Ebbert interview, Oct. 13, 2005, p. 121; Committee staff interview of Sally Forman, Communications Director, 

Offi ce of the Mayor, City of New Orleans, LA, conducted on Jan. 10, 2006, transcript pp. 70-76; Mayor C. Ray Nagin, 

City of New Orleans, “Post-Hurricane Katrina Critical Needs Assessment,” Aug. 29, 2005, p. 1. Provided to Committee 

[hereinaft er Mayor Nagin, “Post-Hurricane Katrina Critical Needs Assessment”]

33 Th e list did not list evacuation as a critical need, but it did state that “vehicles and drivers to coordinate the transport 

from the Dome to the Convention Center would also be required,” if and when the city were to open the Convention 

Center as a refuge of last resort “in lieu of the Superdome.” Mayor Nagin, “Post-Hurricane Katrina Critical Needs Assessment,” p. 1; Forman interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 75-76 (noting that transportation needs were not listed).

34 Th e mayor’s communications director provided the Committee with transcribed notes for each day’s activities immediately preceding and following landfall. For Tuesday, Aug. 30, 2005, her notes stated: “Call to [Chief of Staff to the 

Governor] Andy Kopplin for No. 1 priority from state for buses.” Sally Forman, Communications Director, New Orleans Offi ce of the Mayor, Timeline and Notes, Aug. 30, 2005. Provided to Committee; Forman interview, Jan. 10, 2006, 

pp. 99-100 (noting that the city may have also made earlier requests for buses).

35 Forman interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 100-104.

36 Brashear interview, Jan. 5, 2006, p. 57; Committee staff interview of James Tillie, Safety Director, Regional Transit 

Authority, New Orleans, LA, conducted on Dec. 19, 2005, transcript p. 46.

37 Forman interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 92-93, 99.

38 Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Response to the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 

Aff airs, Document and Information Request Dated Oct. 7, 2005 and to the U.S. House of Representatives Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, Overview of Governor Kathleen Babineaux 

Blanco’s Actions in Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, Dec. 2, 2005, p. 7 [hereinaft er Louisiana Offi ce 

of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline] (Governor Blanco told the President on Monday, “We need your help. We need 

everything you’ve got.” Brown told Governor Blanco that FEMA had “500 buses on standby, ready to be deployed,” and 

that Governor Blanco recommended to him that FEMA put two drivers in each bus, so they can alternate shift s and rest 

without losing time.); Maj. Gen. Landreneau, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 9, 2006. 

39 Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 9 (stating that Governor Blanco asked Maj. Gen. Landreneau on Tuesday to check on the status of the FEMA buses); Maj. Gen. Landreneau, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 

9, 2006; Louisiana Offi ce of Emergency Planning, Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development, and 

Louisiana State Police, “OEP, DOTD, LSP Timeline,” p. 18. Provided to Committee (“OEP, 8/31/05, 1:30:00, Verbal 

request to FEMA ESF-1 for 455 buses.”); Testimony of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, before the U.S. Senate, 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Role of U.S. Department of Homeland Security and FEMA Leadership, Feb. 10, 2006 (stating that Brown requested 500 buses from other 

FEMA offi cials, but that FEMA did not task the U.S. Department of Transportation for buses until Wednesday, August 

31, 2005, two days aft er landfall).

40 Brown, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 10, 2006; Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 9 (“the 

expected and promised federal resources still have not arrived on Wednesday.”).

41 Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 9.

42 Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, pp. 9-10.

43 Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 10.

44 FEMA, Tasking Request and Assignment Form, Aug. 31, 2005, 1:45 a.m. Provided to Committee (tasking “Transportation” to send 455 buses to New Orleans). 

45 Brown, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 10, 2006 (unable to explain why the buses did not arrive when expected, and 

why FEMA did not task the U.S. Department of Transportation for buses until Wednesday, Aug. 31, 2005); Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 2006 (incorrectly understood that 450 FEMA buses were on their way to New 

Orleans on Tuesday night, before any FEMA tasking order went out to DOT.); Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, 

Feb. 15, 2006 (stating that “the biggest failure was not getting buses in.”). 

46 FEMA, Tasking Request and Assignment Form, Aug. 31, 2005, 1:45 a.m. Provided to Committee (tasking “Transportation” to send 455 buses to New Orleans). 

47 Committee staff interview of Col. Jeff Smith, Louisiana National Guard (Ret.), Acting Deputy Director, Emergency 

Management, LOHSEP, conducted on Jan. 13, 2006, pp. 113-114 (stating that a FEMA offi cial “at the headquarters 
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371

decided based on the number of people and everything that 455 would be enough.”).

48 Col. Smith interview, Jan. 13, 2006, p. 116.

49 Th e Governor’s eff orts were also set back by a miscommunication from FEMA. Phil Parr, a FEMA offi cial on the 

ground at the Superdome, developed a plan (which ultimately proved impracticable) to use Chinook helicopters to 

evacuate the Superdome. Testimony of Phil Parr, Federal Coordinating Offi cer, Region I, FEMA, before the U.S. Senate, 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Perspectives of FEMA’s 

Operations Professionals, Dec. 8, 2005. At one point on Wednesday, that plan was communicated by FEMA to Ty 

Bromell of the state’s Offi ce of Rural Development. Source: Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 

11; Committee staff interview of Ty Brommel, Executive Director, Louisiana Governor’s Offi ce of Rural Development, 

conducted on Jan. 10, 2006, transcript p. 19. Reacting to that information, Bromell then sent out a statewide e-mail at 

10:30 a.m., which read, in part, “NO MORE CALLS FOR BUSES!” Source: Ty Bromell, e-mail to Rochelle Michaud 

Dugas and others, Aug. 31, 2005, 10:30 a.m. Provided to committe. Brommel interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 19. It is unclear 

from the record whether FEMA told Brommel to stop the buses, or whether he ordered the staff to stop getting buses on 

his own, communications between FEMA. Later in the day, the same staff er learned that the eff ort to obtain buses should 

continue and sent out an e-mail to that eff ect. Source: Brommel interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 28-29.

50 Committee staff interview of Brig. Gen. Gary Jones, Assistant Joint Forces Commander, Louisiana Army National 

Guard, conducted Dec. 7, 2005, transcript pp. 89, 90-91.

51 Parr, Senate Committee hearing, Dec. 18, 2005; DHS/FEMA Initial Response Hotwash, Feb. 13, 2006, p. 46 (“An 

example of a problem associated with the lack of communications was during the Superdome evacuation coordination. 

Th e liaison team at the Superdome attempted to coordinate with the Federal and State elements at the State Emergency 

Operations Center (EOC) in Baton Rouge. Communications to Baton Rouge failed, so the liaisons coordinated with the 

[FEMA Region VI Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) in Denton, TX] and [the National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) in Washington, D.C.]. Consequently, the EOC in Baton Rouge had no visibility on this operation.”). Although this communications failure limited FEMA offi cials’ visibility on the evacuation of the Superdome, it 

should not have eliminated their visibility, assuming they could share information with state offi cials at Baton Rouge. 

52 DHS/FEMA Initial Response Hotwash, Feb. 13, 2006, p. 46.

53 At 3:47 a.m., DOT dispatched the fi rst 50 buses with 200-250 more buses anticipated in the next 12-18 hours. U.S. 

Department of Transportation, Actions for Hurricane Katrina, Annotated Chronology of Signifi cant Events, Oct. 6, 

2005, p. 4. [hereinaft er DOT, Timeline, Oct. 6, 2005].

54 DOT, Timeline, Oct. 6, 2005, p. 4. 

55 DOT, Timeline, Oct. 6, 2005, p. 4. 

56 It is not clear whether the Governor delegated the post-storm evacuation responsibilities outside of LA DOTD 

because she knew LA DOTD was supposed to be responsible for the post-storm evacuation. Committee staff interview of 

James Ballow, Senior Operating Offi cer, LOHSEP, conducted on Jan. 4, 2006, pp. 81-84 (stating that the likely conclusion from the Governor’s assignment of the post-storm evacuation to Leonard Kleinpeter was that she determined the 

LA DOTD was not able to fulfi ll its post-storm evacuation functions under the plan, but “maybe there is a possibility 

that maybe she wasn’t familiar with the plan itself enough to know who to call either. I am not sure. I really can’t say 

how she arrived at that decision.”).

57 Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 8; Committee staff interview of Leonard Kleinpeter, Special 

Assistant to the Governor and Director, Louisiana Offi ce of Community Programs, conducted on Jan. 10, 2006, transcript pp. 6-9, 18 (“And I called my – remember the part about being director of [the Offi ce of Community Programs] 

and rural areas and in charge of all of that. And my folks knew those people on a fi rst named basis. I knew some as well. 

And I picked the phone up and said, “We need the school buses.” And we started calling for school buses. And we called 

for school buses and we put some in motion as fast as we could.”).

58 Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 8; Kleinpeter interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 18.

59 Executive Order No. KBB 2005-31, “Emergency Evacuation by Buses,” Aug. 31, 2005; Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 11. 

60 Kleinpeter interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 28-30, 98-101; Brommel interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 43-47.

61 Th e evacuation was also assisted by Dwight Brashear with the Capital Area Transit System (CATS), whom the 

state enlisted on Wednesday night to follow up on the Governor’s Executive Order and procure school buses. Source: 

Brashear interview, Jan. 5, 2006, pp. 5-6. To that point, the state had been operating without a professional transportation logistics expert, and when Mr. Brashear arrived at the state’s EOC, he found not only a lack of planning for the use 

of buses in evacuation, but also little useful information to assist him in his task: “Th is was major ... but it was almost 

like they weren’t – like they were being hit with a hurricane for the fi rst time. Maybe nobody thought it would ever happen, I guess.” Source: Brashear interview, Jan. 5, 2006, p. 85. 

62 Committee staff interview of Maj. Jeff Mayne, Supervisor, Special Investigator Section, Louisiana Department of 

Wildlife and Fisheries, conducted on Nov. 30, 2005, transcript pp. 72-73, 156; Sec. Landreneau interview, Nov. 30, 2005, 

pp. 191-192; Committee staff interview of Avis Gray, Regional Administrator, Region I, Offi ce of Public Health, Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, conducted on Dec. 8, 2005, transcript pp. 157-161.

63 Committee staff interview of Lt. Col. Keith LaCaze, Assistant Administrator, Law Enforcement Division, Louisiana 

Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, conducted on Nov. 30, 2005, transcript pp. 70-71.
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64 Committee staff interview of Brig. Gen. Brod Veillon, Assistant Adjutant General, Louisiana National Guard, conducted on Nov. 29, 2005, transcript pp. 31, 41-42. 

65 According to Sheriff Harris Lee of Jeff erson Parish, it is only by chance that he learned that thousands of people were 

sitting on I-10 in need of food and water. As a result, the people lacked food and water for as long as a full day. Committee staff interview of Harry Lee, Sheriff , Jeff erson Parish, Louisiana, conducted on Jan. 9, 2006, transcript pp. 34-37. 

66 Committee staff interview of Scott Delacroix, M.D., resident, LSU, conducted on Feb. 20, 2006 (untranscribed).

67 Lt. Col. LaCaze interview, Nov. 30, 2005, pp. 143-144; Committee staff interview of Col. Glenn Curtis, Chief of Staff , 

Louisiana National Guard, conducted on Dec. 6, 2005, transcript pp. 264-265; Committee staff interview of Lonnie 

Swain, Assistant Superintendent, New Orleans Police Department, LA, conducted on Nov. 9, 2005, transcript pp. 101-

102.

68 Louisiana National Guard (LANG) offi cials on the ground at the Superdome began talking about evacuation planning 

to some extent on Monday night, but those conversations intensifi ed on Tuesday, when the area around the Superdome 

fl ooded. On Tuesday, Maj. Gen. Landreneau ordered Gen. Gary Jones, who was in command of the LANG offi cers on 

the ground in New Orleans during Katrina, to take control of the evacuation, even though LANG usually served in a 

supporting role. Gen. Jones assumed his job would be to provide security for the people at the Superdome and get people 

to the buses, when they arrived. Source: Brig. Gen. Jones interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 93 (“FEMA was saying we’ll get you 

the buses, and I was responsible for the security of the people until the buses came.”). Nevertheless, Gen. Jones had his 

soldiers experiment with high water vehicles to see if they could be used to evacuate people, but the vehicles had limited 

capacity, and there were concerns about whether they could handle the volume of passengers give the depth of water on 

the ground. Source: Brig. Gen. Jones interview, Dec. 7, 2005, pp. 106-107.

69 Swain interview, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 102.

70 Mayor Nagin, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 1, 2006.

71 Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 115-116, 137-138; Mayor Nagin, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 1, 2006 

(stating that people from the hotels evacuated to the Convention Center).

72 Maj. Gen. Landreneau interview, Jan. 11, 2006, p. 265 (“New Orleans Police Department was becoming overwhelmed 

at the Convention Center.”).

73 Mayor Nagin, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 1, 2006 (“With all due respect to Secretary Chertoff and Mr. Brown, I 

don’t understand how anyone in authority, with this type of crisis, can say that they were not aware that we had a crisis 

in New Orleans, and we had people that were stranded on roofs, on highways, and at the Convention Center, and they 

didn’t know about it. Th at is just next to impossible. Th e entire Nation was enthralled on this disaster, so I categorically 

reject their claims.”). Key DOD offi cials did not learn of the need until Th ursday, Sept 1. Committee staff interview 

of Brig. Gen. Mark Graham, U.S. Army, Deputy Commanding General, Fift h U.S. Army, conducted on Jan. 12, 2006, 

transcript p. 105.

74 Brig. Gen. Jones interview, Dec. 7, 2005, pp. 96, 190-191.

75 Brig. Gen. Jones interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 196.

76 Maj. Gen. Landreneau interview, Jan. 11, 2006, pp. 265-266 (stating that Col. Ebbert called him late on Th ursday 

night); Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 151-155 (stating that he called Maj. Gen. Landreneau late on Th ursday 

night); Lt. Col. Jacques Th ibodeaux, memorandum on the events surrounding the Louisiana National Guard rescue 

mission of the Morial Convention Center, Dec. 2, 2005, p. 1 [hereinaft er Lt. Col. Th ibodeaux, memorandum on the 

Convention Center, Dec. 2, 2005] (“Early Morning Hours (Approximate 0200), 2 Sep 05–MG Landreneau receives a verbal request from NO Emergency Operations Manager, COL(R) Terry Ebbert to conduct a rescue mission at the MCC. 

COL(R) Ebbert requests the mission be conducted in coordination with the New Orleans Police Department and that it 

commence the same day.”).

77 Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 10; Brig. Gen. Graham interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 26-28.

78 Brig. Gen. Graham interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 54-55. By Wednesday evening, a suffi cient numbers of buses had 

amassed at Mile Marker 209. Source: Brig. Gen. Graham interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 81. He developed a plan: 10 buses at 

a time would leave mile marker 209, escorted by two State Troopers; they would travel to the Hyatt Regency (adjacent 

to the Superdome complex) where evacuees would board. Source: Brig. Gen. Graham interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 78-79. 

Th e convoys (or “serials”) would be appropriately spaced – when buses arrived at the Hyatt, the liaison offi cers on site 

would call back to Mile Marker 209, at which point another serial would leave. By the time the fi rst serial was loaded, the 

next serial had already arrived. Source: Brig. Gen. Graham interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 55.

79 Brig. Gen. Graham interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 95-96.

80 Brig. Gen. Graham interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 57.

81 Brig. Gen. Graham interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 96.

82 Committee staff interview of Lt. Col. Jacques Th ibodeaux, Joint Director of Military Support to Civilian Authorities, 

Louisiana National Guard, conducted on Jan. 12, 2006, transcript pp. 44-49.

83 Committee staff interview of Lt. Col. Jacques Th ibodeaux, Joint Director of Military Support to Civilian Authorities, 

Louisiana National Guard, conducted on Dec. 16, 2005, transcript p. 261; Lt. Col. Th ibodeaux interview, Jan. 12, 2006, 

pp. 44-49, 64; Brig. Gen. Graham interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 53, 64, 69.
Post-Landfall Evacuation

373

84 Lt. Col. Th ibodeaux interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 64; Brig. Gen. Graham interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 83.

85 Lt. Col. Th ibodeaux interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 39-65 (discussing story of LANG offi cials catching U.S. Navy offi cers 

in the act of posing as hotel contractors and stealing buses headed to the Superdome, so that the offi cers could use them 

to evacuate the stranded families of Naval offi cers in New Orleans); Lt. Col. Th ibodeaux, memorandum on the Convention Center, Dec. 2, 2005, p. 3.

86 Diemont interview, Jan. 6, 2006, pp. 99-100.

87 U.S. DOT, Timeline, Oct. 6, 2005, p. 6.

88 Lt. Col. Th ibodeaux, memorandum on the Convention Center, Dec. 2, 2005, p. 1 (“BG Jones further advises LTC 

Th ibodeaux that ... the mission must start not later than 1200 hours.”).

89 Lt. Col. Th ibodeaux, memorandum on the Convention Center, Dec. 2, 2005, pp. 1, 3 (“LTC Th ibodeaux establishes 

goals for each phase: Law & Order: 30 Minutes, Relief: 5 Hours and Evacuation: 48 Hours.”); Lt. Col. Th ibodeaux interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 31-32, 132-133.

90 Lt. Col. Th ibodeaux interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 35. DOD assets on the ground at the Convention Center created some 

confusion for the LANG offi cers at times. For example, LANG Lt. Col. Th ibodeaux, in charge of the Convention Center 

missions for the Guard, discussed the unannounced landing of a limited number of DOD helicopters on Friday, which if 

used at that time to evacuate people, would have forced the Guard and DOD to decide who would get on the helicopters, 

thereby potentially enraging the rest of the crowd. Source: Lt. Col. Th ibodeaux interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 147-149. Lt. 

Col. Th ibodeaux explained that he made arrangements with the DOD helicopter pilots to have the helicopters return to 

the Convention Center on Saturday to participate in the coordinated evacuation at that time. Source: Lt. Col. Th ibodeaux 

interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 147-149. Although Lt. Col. Th ibodeaux initially thought 20,000 to 22,000 people were at the 

Convention Center, he later determined that 19,000 people were there, and they were evacuated by Saturday, September 

3, 2005, at 6:30 p.m. CT. Source: Lt. Col. Th ibodeaux, memorandum on the Convention Center, Dec. 2, 2005, p. 9 (“1830 

hours, 3 Sep 05-LTC Th ibodeaux reports evacuation complete to JOC. LTC Th ibodeaux estimates the total numbers 

evacuated: 2000 via the Canal Street Ferry, 14000 via 269 buses and 3000 (mostly elderly and medical) via helicopters.”).

91 Committee staff interview of Kay Wilkins, Chief Executive Offi cer, Southeast Louisiana Chapter, American Red 

Cross, conducted on Dec. 20, 2005, transcript pp. 14-18. See also: Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 34-35 (characterizing the Red Cross’s ban on sheltering South of I-10 as “arbitrary”).

92 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Region VI RRCC Spot Report #26, Aug. 20, 2005, 10 p.m. CT. Provided to 

Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-HSPC-0003-0001157.

93 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, HSOC Spot Report #30, Aug. 31, 2005, 2 a.m. ET, p. 2. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0061-0000575 through 0000576 (“New, alternate shelter locations have not been 

determined but sites have been considered and the State is making a decision early today.”).

94 Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 9; Committee staff interview of Sec. Ann Williamson, 

Louisiana Department of Social Services, conducted on Dec. 7, 2005, transcript pp. 98-99. Sec. Williamson and her 

team analyzed the shelter capacity in Louisiana and determined that the demand outstripped the supply. At around 10 

or 10:30 that evening, they arrived at the fi nal plan – use the Astrodome in Houston, TX. Sec. Williamson immediately 

conveyed this plan to the TAG and the Governor’s executive staff . Sec. Williamson and her team reached out to offi cials 

in Texas that night. Sec. Williamson interview, Dec. 7, 2005, pp. 98-99, 102-106.

95 Sec. Williamson interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 105.

96 Sec. Williamson interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 102.

97 Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 10; Sec. Williamson interview, Dec. 7, 2005, pp. 105-106. 

According to Gen. Russell Honoré, “ ... the destination was Houston ... because Baton Rouge is full. Shreveport is full. 

Jackson, Mississippi is full. Th ere’s no more capacity in the state.” Committee staff interview of Lt. Gen. Russell Honoré, 

U.S. Army, Commanding General, First U.S. Army, conducted on Jan. 9, 2006, transcript p. 93.

98 Th e Committee’s investigation has revealed that the insuffi ciency of in-state sheltering options was also an obstacle to 

pre-landfall evacuation, and even to pre-storm planning in the months leading up to Katrina. When RTA representative 

James Tillie called Chief Matthews over the weekend to off er their services, he was told that city planners had not yet 

identifi ed destinations for potential evacuees. Source: James Tillie, e-mail to William Deville, “RTA Actives for Hurricane Katrina,” Oct. 23, 2005, 11:29 a.m., p. 1. Provided to Committee. Similarly, the lack of available in-state sheltering 

options was an obstacle to eff orts to conduct advance planning for evacuation; for example, one of the obstacles to the 

fi nalization of draft MOUs between the City and Amtrak to procure emergency means of evacuation was that the city 

planners could not provide destinations for the evacuees. Source: Committee staff interview of William Crosbie, Senior 

Vice-President of Operations, Th e National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak), conducted on Feb. 17, 2006, 

transcript p. 77.

99 Kym I. Pasqualini, National Center for Missing Adults, e-mail to Patricia Rojas, Senate Committee staff member, 

Mar. 29, 2006, 10:53 p.m. See also: National Center for Missing Adults. http://www.missingadults.org.

100 National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, “National Center for Missing and Exploited Children Reunites 

Last Missing Child Separated by Hurricane Katrina and Rita,” press release, Mar. 17, 2006. http://www.missingkids.

com/missingkids/servlet/NewsEventServlet?LanguageCountry=en_US&PageId=2317. Accessed on Mar. 30, 2006.