721

Additional Views

Senator Daniel Akaka, Senator Frank Lautenberg, and 

Senator Mark Pryor 

On Maintaining the Functions of the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA) within the Department of Homeland Security

While we subscribe to the majority of the Committee Report, we do not believe the Committee’s recommendation for restructuring the Federal Emergency Management Agency 

(FEMA) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) adequately addresses the 

chain of command and budget problems made evident by Hurricane Katrina. We believe 

FEMA was more eff ective and robust as an independent, Cabinet-level agency, and we recommend returning FEMA to that status.

When the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which created DHS, was being debated in Congress, the inclusion of FEMA in the new Department was a controversial subject. Members 

of Congress from both sides of the aisle and emergency-management experts questioned the 

wisdom of folding FEMA into DHS. Th e Brookings Institution issued a study in July 2002, 

Assessing the Department of Homeland Security, stating that only agencies “where the function would not be performed as well in its current agency or would provide a useful synergy 

with other entities” should be included in DHS. “Furthermore, mergers should enhance, not 

detract, from the ability to fulfi ll stated agency missions. Th e merger of a consolidated FEMA 

into a larger Department of Homeland Security does not meet any of these criteria.”1

James Lee Witt, Director of FEMA, 1993-2001, recommended creating the new Department slowly, arguing that DHS should fi rst assume responsibility for critical infrastructure 

protection and intelligence analysis instead of assuming FEMA’s emergency-management 

responsibilities, which “were not broken and didn’t need fi xing.”2

Members of Congress questioned whether FEMA would lose its ability to respond to 

natural disasters. For example, at the confi rmation hearing for Michael Brown to be Deputy 

Director of FEMA, Senator Akaka stated:

Th e President’s proposal for a new Department of Homeland Security will 

include the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). A key question 

is how will this new role for FEMA in homeland security aff ect its traditional 

mission? ... Many of the agencies impacted by this proposal, including FEMA, 

have a number of core responsibilities unrelated to their homeland security 

missions. Most of what FEMA does every day, and what Americans expect 

from FEMA, does not fall under the category of homeland security.3

However, these arguments did not prevail, and four years later Hurricane Katrina has made 

evident to us that incorporating FEMA into DHS was a mistake.

Th ere are three main reasons that FEMA must be an independent agency in order to function eff ectively: chain of command, budget integrity, and fl exibility. 

Chain of Command

Th e Director of FEMA should have a direct – not a dotted – line to the President. In 1996, 

recognizing the importance of emergency response, President Bill Clinton elevated the 

FEMA Director position to the Cabinet level. Being a member of the President’s Cabinet 

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared
Additional Views

722

enabled the FEMA Director to task other federal agencies more eff ectively during a disaster 

and provided an established and direct line of communication to the President.

Th is status was eliminated in 2003 when FEMA was folded into DHS and the FEMA Director was reduced to the rank of Undersecretary requiring that he report to the Secretary of 

Homeland Security instead of the President. 

Under the Robert T. Staff ord Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (P.L. 93-288), 

the FEMA Director has the authority to task other federal agencies to provide specifi c assistance to states overwhelmed by disaster. In today’s current structure, this means that an 

Undersecretary of DHS is tasking Cabinet-level Secretaries, who clearly outrank the FEMA 

Director. In addition, the FEMA Director must go through the DHS Secretary to communicate with the President. Former FEMA Director Michael Brown was criticized heavily for at 

times reporting directly to the White House during Katrina. 

Hurricane Katrina provided countless examples of federal assets not being deployed quickly 

enough, such as the delayed arrival of active-duty military in a chaotic New Orleans,4

possibly due to the lack of authority and clarity in the tasking orders. Th e Department of 

Defense (DOD) describes FEMA’s tasks as “requests” that are evaluated by the Department 

before a decision is made as to whether they will be fulfi lled.5

 Th e FEMA Director should 

speak for the President in order to inspire an expedient and eff ective response. In the wake 

of Hurricane Katrina, former FEMA Director Witt made the comparison between an independent FEMA and today’s structure: “We had all the resources of the federal government. 

We didn’t have to ask anyone to activate the Department of Defense. I did that. I called up 

the President.”6

Because FEMA’s primary function is to provide fast, coordinated relief to oft en unforeseen 

disasters, a speedy response is essential. Th is is no time for red tape, which is why the FEMA 

Director must have a clear, direct reporting line to the President. 

Budget Integrity

DHS has an annual budget of over $40 billion, of which FEMA receives approximately $5 

billion or 12 percent. However, the majority of FEMA’s funding is for the National Flood 

Insurance Fund and the Disaster Relief Fund, which is accessed only aft er a federal disaster 

is declared. FEMA’s annual operating budget is less than $1 billion. 

During this Committee’s Hurricane Katrina hearings, Michael Brown testifi ed that when 

FEMA joined DHS, the Agency was forced to pay a “tax” of approximately 14 percent of 

its budget to fund shared services in the Department such as information technology (IT) 

systems and the Secretary’s offi ce. He further testifi ed that this funding was taken disproportionately from mitigation programs instead of other FEMA accounts because the Bush 

Administration gave mitigation funding “a backseat.”7

 Mr. Brown told the House Select 

Katrina Response Investigation Committee that FEMA requested additional funding for 

preparedness aft er the Hurricane Pam exercise, and that the request was denied by DHS.

Congress and the American public never knew about these funding shortfalls because 

FEMA was buried within DHS. Mr. Brown testifi ed that instead of taking his budget proposal to the President, the FEMA Director fi rst cleared it with another Undersecretary at 

DHS, then the Secretary, and then the President. 

FEMA needs to be an independent agency to avoid having its budget siphoned off for other 

homeland security functions. In addition, as a Cabinet member, the FEMA Director can 

better present the funding needs of FEMA to the President and Congress.
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723

Flexibility

When FEMA was folded into DHS it went from being a small, independent agency of 3,000 

employees to becoming part of a Department of 180,000 employees. FEMA went from a 

nimble and agile agency, to one bogged down in a new, extended chain of command.

During the hearings, we heard numerous examples of information and initiative getting lost 

in DHS during the Hurricane Katrina response. Witnesses described sending information 

updates and requests out to the Department, never knowing where those messages went or 

if action had been taken. DHS appeared to be a black hole where information and accountability were lost, not an asset that enhanced FEMA’s performance. 

Being a part of DHS did provide FEMA with access to more resources during a disaster, but 

it is not clear that FEMA was able to draw eff ectively upon the additional DHS resources 

in the immediate aft ermath of Katrina. Th e senior DHS leadership appeared disengaged 

from the hurricane preparation and response until days aft er the hurricane when the failed 

response had garnered national attention. Furthermore, under the Staff ord Act the FEMA 

Director has the authority to draw upon the resources of other federal agencies during a disaster, leaving no reason why an independent FEMA could not tap into DHS for assistance. 

Former FEMA offi cials have stated publicly that they believe an independent FEMA would 

have been much better equipped to coordinate the resources of the federal government during Hurricane Katrina. 

Conclusion

We acknowledge that the Committee Report makes recommendations that would improve 

upon the current emergency management structure, such as reuniting preparedness and 

response. However, keeping these functions under the DHS umbrella is a mistake. Th e 

proposed National Preparedness and Response Authority (NPRA) would be a super-agency 

within a super-agency. Creating more layers is not the solution. We strongly urge our colleagues in Congress and the Administration to consider separating FEMA from the DHS 

and restoring the FEMA Director to a Cabinet-level position. 

1 Ivo Dalde et al., Assessing the Department of Homeland Security (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, July 2002), 

p. 23.

2 Statement of James Lee Witt, before the U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging 

Th reats and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, hearing on Th e Homeland Security Department’s Plan to Consolidate and Co-locate Regional and Field Offi ces: Improving Communication and Coordination, Mar. 

24, 2002. 

3 Nomination Hearing of Michael D. Brown, Committee on Governmental Aff airs, S. Hrg. 107-616 (2002), p. 6.

4 Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared, 2006, 

Ch. 26. 

5 Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared, Ch. 26-7.

6 Bill Walsh, “Tug of war being played out over who has FEMA control,” New Orleans Times-Picayune, Apr. 13, 2006.

7 Testimony of Michael D. Brown, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, 

hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Roles of DHS and FEMA Leadership, Feb. 10, 2006.