U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Urban Wildlands Fire

Pebble Beach, California

USFA-TR-007/May 1987

Homeland

Security

U.S. Fire Administration Fire Investigations Program

T

he U.S. Fire Administration develops reports on selected major fires throughout the country. 

The fires usually involve multiple deaths or a large loss of property. But the primary criterion 

for deciding to do a report is whether it will result in significant “lessons learned.” In some 

cases these lessons bring to light new knowledge about fire--the effect of building construction or 

contents, human behavior in fire, etc. In other cases, the lessons are not new but are serious enough 

to highlight once again, with yet another fire tragedy report. In some cases, special reports are developed to discuss events, drills, or new technologies which are of interest to the fire service.

The reports are sent to fire magazines and are distributed at National and Regional fire meetings. The 

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fire service. On a continuing basis the reports are available on request from the USFA; announcements of their availability are published widely in fire journals and newsletters.

This body of work provides detailed information on the nature of the fire problem for policymakers 

who must decide on allocations of resources between fire and other pressing problems, and within 

the fire service to improve codes and code enforcement, training, public fire education, building 

technology, and other related areas.

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during the event or even immediately after, but rather after the dust settles, so that a complete and 

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For additional copies of this report write to the U.S. Fire Administration, 16825 South Seton Avenue, 

Emmitsburg, Maryland 21727. The report is available on the Administration’s Web site at http://

www.usfa.dhs.gov/

Urban Wildlands Fire

Pebble Beach, California

Investigated by: Hugh W. Graham

This is Report 007 of the Major Fires Investigation Project conducted

by TriData Corporation under contract EMW-86-C-2277 to the United

States Fire Administration, Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Homeland

Security

Department of Homeland Security

United States Fire Administration

National Fire Data Center

U.S. Fire Administration

Mission Statement

As an entity of the Department of Homeland 

Security, the mission of the USFA is to reduce life and economic losses due to fire 

and related emergencies, through leadership, advocacy, coordination, and support. 

We serve the Nation independently, in coordination with other Federal agencies, 

and in partnership with fire protection and 

emergency service communities. With a 

commitment to excellence, we provide public education, training, technology, and data 

initiatives.

Homeland

Security

Table of Contents

SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

SUMMARY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

THE FIRE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

CAUSES OF RESIDENTIAL FIRE SPREAD. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL USED. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

CASUALTIES AND LOSSES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

FIRE DEPARTMENTS IN THE AREA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

CODES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

DAMAGE ASSESSMENT AND INCIDENT REVIEW TEAMS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

HISTORICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

LESSONS LEARNED. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

CONCLUSIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

APPENDICES LIST. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Appendix A: General Area Sketch of the Morse Fire. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Appendix B: Residential Fire Area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Appendix C: Monterey County Area Mutual Aid Model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Appendix D: Mutual Aid Matrix Showing Response for Pebble Beach. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Appendix E: Public Resources Code 4291. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Appendix F: Summary of Morse Incident by CDF Damage Assessment Team. . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Appendix G: Damage Assessment Worksheets by CDF Damage Assessment Team. . . . . . . . . . 20

Appendix H: Vegetation Damage Assessment by CDF Damage Assessment Team. . . . . . . . . . . 23

Appendix I: Letter of Support to CDF Employees. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Appendix J: County Emergency Coordinator’s Report. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Appendix K: Notes on Slides Taken by Investigator. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Appendix L: Notes on Photographs Received from the California 

Department of Forestry and Fire Protection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

1

URBAN WILDLANDS FIRE

Pebble Beach, California

May 31, 1987

Local Contacts: Robert P. Townsend, Battalion Chief

Pebble Beach Community Services District

Fire Department Forest Lake and Lopez Roads

Pebble Beach, California 93953

408-875-4204

Charles Wilkins, Fire Chief

Pacific Grove Fire Department

600 Pine Avenue

Pacific Grove, California 93950

Brian Weatherford, Fire Control Officer

California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection Central Region

1234 East Shaw Avenue

Fresno, California 93710

Roy Perkins, Ranger in Charge

San Benito-Monterey Ranger Unit

California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection

401 Canal Street

King City, California 93930
2

SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES

Issues Comments

Ignition Illegal campfire.

Structural Issues Wood shingle roofs. Brush around homes (negative). Double pane windows (positive).

Terrain/Nature Issues Dry fuel. Heavy fuel loading. Steep slopes – a classic urban wildlands interface.

Firefighting Problems Water pressure reduced when area electric power shut off. Lack of access to area of origin. 

Lack of mobility of units once hoses were laid. Fire storm.

Incident Command System Used to effect. Problems in communications. Problems with reporting-in procedures.

Evacuation Difficulty in deciding when to evacuate.

SUMMARY

On May 31, 1987, a fire escaped from an illegal campfire in the Del Monte Forest in Pebble Beach, 

California. The resulting fire burned 160 acres and destroyed 31 structures causing an estimated 

damage of approximately $18,000,000. There were 18 injuries, including 15 firefighters and 3 

civilians. All were minor, requiring no hospitalization.

The fire spread from the forest into the residential area. Control of the fire in the forest was difficult due to heavy fuel load and low fuel moisture. Structures were located on a ridge above the 

main body of the fire. A fire storm occurred near the top of this ridge, spreading the fire across the 

residential area.

The spread of the fire through the residential area was aided by wood shingle roofs, natural vegetation around structures, accumulation of pine needle litter on roofs, and the intensity of the fire.

The area had major woodlands fires in the past and is likely to have more in the future. This is a classic example of the need to be concerned about the urban wildlands interface, and has recently been 

given higher priority by the U.S. Forest Service and the U.S. Fire Administration.

THE FIRE

The fire started in the heavily wooded Del Monte Forest located between two portions of the 

S.F.B. Morse Botanical Reserve. (It is therefore called the “Morse” fire.) Officials of the California 

Department of Forestry and Fire Protection believe that a fire in a trash can located at the campsite 

radiated heat through the metal to ignite pine needles on the ground of this area.

The campsite seemed to have been used on more than one occasion. No specific evidence as to the 

ages or number of people using the campsite was available. Evidence found at the scene included 

mattress box springs, a lounge chair, the metal frame for a camp stool, both empty and full beer 

bottles, and a metal pole for what may have been a lean-to. In addition, two pits had been dug to 

contain trash in the area. Both pits contained beer bottles, cans, and other trash.

It appears that the property on which the fire started belonged to the Pebble Beach Company. 

Campfires or open burning in the area was illegal. The area was enclosed by a cyclone fence, but 

there were weak places in the fence where access could be gained into the area.
USFA-TR-007/May 1987 3

The area of origin was on a hill that faced northwest, with an average slope of approximately 11 

percent, but then turning much steeper to an approximately 56 percent slope near the ridge to the 

southeast where the fire spread. Plants in the area include Monterey Pine, Gowen Cypress, Bishop 

Pine, Coast Live Oak, Blue Blossom, Manzanita, Huckleberry, Coyote Bush, Pampas Grass, as well as 

other forbs and grasses. Exact fuel loading is unknown, but estimates vary between 40 and 100 tons 

per acre. Much of the area of the fire had been kept in a natural state; the use of fire in the area was 

prohibited, as was any development, with the exception of some unmaintained roads.

Fuel moisture was extremely low due to the fact that rainfall in the area was 50-60 percent below 

normal for the 1987 season. In addition, rainfall had been below normal for the three years preceding the fire. This reduced fuel moisture would add not only the intensity of the fire, but to the 

difficulty of control. The heavy growth in the area of origin also made access to the area and fire line 

construction extremely difficult.

Three major chimneys or canyons led up the slope from the area of origin to Los Altos Drive and 

Huckleberry Hill. These three canyons, coupled with the steep slope and heavy fuel loading, added 

to the intensity of the fire and funneled the fire into the residential area across Los Altos Drive.

Smoke was spotted initially by a local resident who called the Pebble Beach Security. They, in turn, 

contacted the Pebble Beach Fire Station at 1535. Three units were dispatched from the Pebble Beach 

Fire Station at 1537, including a mini-pumper squad, an engine company, and the duty battalion 

chief, Robert Townsend. Chief Townsend became the Incident Commander for the fire. This initial 

dispatch was to check on smoke reported to the fire station. At 1539, the mini-pumper reported 

smoke visible and estimated that they were approximately one-half mile away from the fire. At 1541, 

a request for a wildland fire response was made by Chief Townsend. Dispatch and manning levels 

are preset according to weather readings. The dispatch level for the date of the fire was low and 

one wildland engine (type three pumper1) responded from the Carmel Hill Station. This unit was 

dispatched at 1542 and arrived at the scene at 1545.

Access into the origin area of the fire was limited; basically, the area could only be reached by foot. 

The mini-pumper was only able to get within approximately 200 feet of the fire and laid a hoseline 

into the area of origin. The size of the fire was estimated at approximately one-third an acre upon the 

arrival of this unit. The mini-pumper expended its 90 gallons of water on the fire, but due to heavy 

brush and heavy fuel loading was unable to control the fire. The heavy brush and timber limited 

access and the ability to attack the fire directly. It should also be noted that the only wildland engine 

immediately available was the one dispatched from the Carmel Hill Station The apparatus dispatched 

from the Pebble Beach Fire Station was structural firefighting equipment (type one pumpers).

At 1555, a request was made for two hand crews, which normally each contain 15 crew members. 

At 1602, a request was submitted for two additional engine companies. At 1610, a request was 

made for an air attack. An air tanker for this area would normally be dispatched from Hollister 

Airfield; however, this unit was already committed on a fire in the Los Padres National Forest. The 

only uncommitted air tanker available in the State was dispatched from Chico airfield, approximately 

210 miles north of the Monterey Peninsula. At 1615, a request was made for a bulldozer on the fire 

line. At 1618, a request was made for a helicopter with a water dropping bucket.

1“Type one” and “type three” are designations for structural and wildland pumpers respectively. The type one has at least 

1,000 gpm capacity, and the type three 120 gpm.
4

At this time, hand crews had still not arrived and the decision was made to start a back fire along a 

gravel haul road which ran north and south through the fire area. At approximately 1630 to 1635, 

hand crews arrived on the scene. At approximately 1640, two spot fires occurred about 200 feet up 

the ridge from the haul road. Equipment on the scene at this time included a mini-pumper, one 

“type one” engine company, three “type three” engine companies, two hand crews, and one helicopter. Handlines were laid to the two spots above the haul road. Although fuel was continuous to the 

area west of the haul road and to the area east of the haul road, the terrain changed drastically from 

the haul road east. The slope to the west of the haul road was approximately 11 percent while the 

slopes to the east of the haul road in the direction the fire spread was approximately 56 percent.

Mutual Aid Requested – At 1643, an hour after the fire was first reported, the Incident Commander 

requested a county mutual aid response of two response teams. Each team consisted of three engine 

companies and a chief officer. Predetermined response teams are set forth in the county’s mutual 

aid plan. One additional fire “overhead” member was also requested at 16432. Pacific Grove Fire 

Chief Charles Wilkins responded with response team A and proceeded to the incident command 

post in the gravel pit (see position F on the map in Appendix A). Chief Wilkins was asked by the 

Incident Commander to act as Sector Commander for the structural portion of the fire, which was 

designated as Sector C. Chief Wilkins established a sector command post at the intersection of Los 

Altos Drive and Constanilla Way. He later said there was some mix-up with the response teams: the 

county communications dispatcher of the day was using a draft matrix (or table) of the response 

teams on call, and not the matrix which was normally used. This created confusion and may be one 

reason why equipment from Fort Ord was not requested. (See the Appendix for an example of the 

response matrix.)

Upon arrival at Sector C, Chief Wilkins found at least three engines from the two response teams 

already committed with hoselines laid. These engines had taken up position along Los Altos Drive. 

At least two of the engines were connected to 5 inch lines. The engines set up along Los Altos Drive 

were in the direct path of the fire and in a very precarious position to defend. Action in this area 

included attempting to stop spot fires and prevent the spread of the fire up the slopes onto Los Altos 

Drive. Thus, upon his arrival, Chief Wilkins was not certain what equipment he had available, and 

some of the equipment was already committed. Not all of the equipment of the response teams had 

checked into the staging point, in addition to the wrong dispatch matrix being used.

At 1708, the Incident Commander requested two additional water dropping helicopters. During 

this time, the two response teams were setting up on Los Altos Drive and residents in the area were 

beginning to water down roofs and areas around their homes. Chief Wilkins later indicated that the 

use of water hoses and other measures taken by local residents did not seem to impair the water 

supply at this time.

At 1713, the Incident Commander requested water tenders for the engines located along the gravel 

haul road. The tenders carried between 2,000 and 3,000 gallons of water. Water supply still was not 

a problem with the response teams located along Los Altos Drive in Sector C.

At 1721, the Monterey County Dispatchers called the California Department of Forestry and Fire 

Protection to ask about the possibility of evacuation for the residential area. According to Art McDole, 

County Emergency Operations Coordinator, they were advised there were no plans for evacuation at 

2 “Overhead” includes the incident and sector commanders and staff people.
USFA-TR-007/May 1987 5

that time. Mr. McDole indicated that the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection was 

called due to the fact that so many calls were being received from citizens in the area.3

At 1841, a request for a county mutual aid strike team was made. A strike team consisting of five 

engine companies with chief officers as leaders was sent to Sector C to work in the residential area. 

Chief Wilkins indicated that there were still some problems with keeping track of resources, as some 

members of the strike team got separated en route to the fire and some did not check into the staging point for the sector. Chief Wilkins also indicated that unfamiliarity with the area by the strike 

team members and the confusing layout of the roads in the residential area probably added to the 

confusion of the incoming response and strike team members. Street signs in the area are on small 

wooden posts and are nonreflective.

Evacuation Starts – By this time, three hours after the fire started, some citizens in the area had begun 

to leave on their own. Security personnel from the Pebble Beach Company were also beginning 

to secure the area. Spotting (small fires) began above Los Altos Drive and into the residential area. 

Apparently some county deputies and police officers were also arriving in the area although they 

had not been officially requested at this point. Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) personnel were also 

in the area.

At approximately 1845, the Incident Commander requested an agency representative from the 

Sheriff’s Office to assist with the evacuation of citizens, and the official evacuation began. This 

turned out to be about ten minutes before the fire swept over the ridge into the residential area being 

evacuated. Spotting was continuing to occur above Los Altos Drive into the structures. Although 

some citizens began evacuation, others continued to attempt to water down roofs and stay with their 

homes.

Water Press Drops – At approximately 1849, workmen with PG&E cut the power to the residential area. 

This was standard procedure to minimize danger from energized electric lines to firefighters and 

residents. The workmen acted after receiving information that a structure was on fire in the area. 

The cutoff of electric power also cut off power to the pumps for the water tanks of the California 

American Water Company which were located in the area. The water system consisted of an 800,000 

gallon storage tank and a 10,000 gallon pressurized tank. After the power was turned off, the pumps 

were unable to maintain pressure in the 10,000 gallon tank. With use by the engines, as well as local 

residents, the tank rapidly lost pressure. This loss of water pressure hampered the fire suppression 

efforts on Los Altos Drive. Water supply was now a problem in Sector C.

At approximately 1850 to 1855, Sheriff’s deputies were attempting to fully evacuate the residential 

area. Most citizens left, but a few were determined to stay with their properties. The area evacuated 

was primarily along Los Altos Drive, Sunset Lane, El Bosque Drive, and Costado Road. Approximately 

175 to 200 people checked into the Red Cross Emergency Center at the Monterey Peninsula College 

gymnasium. In addition, at least one area hotel offered rooms free for those forced to evacuate the 

area. And some residents went to other nearby hotels and motels.

3There was major community concern after the fire about the evacuation. A report subsequently prepared by Mr. McDole 

for the Monterey County Supervisors was critical of the evacuation decision and problems with the Incident Command 

System communications. There is agreement by various parties that there were problems in these areas.
6

Fire Storm Occurs – At approximately 1855 to 1900 hours, a fire storm occurred in the area along Los 

Altos Drive at the head of the fire. The fire storm drove the fire over Los Altos Drive and scattered fire 

throughout the residential area along El Bosque Drive and Sunset Lane. Engines stationed along Los 

Altos Drive found themselves in an untenable situation surrounded by fire. Chief Wilkins ordered all 

firefighting operations ceased, equipment removed, and crews to assist with any further evacuation 

needs of citizens in the area. Equipment was removed and despite the intensity of fire, no major 

damage was reported to equipment or personnel. Chief Wilkins estimated the fire storm lasted less 

than five minutes.

After the fire storm stopped, Chief Wilkins ordered the engine companies back into the area. 

Suppression efforts then focused on directly attacking houses which appeared savable. Numerous 

roofs were on fire and several houses along Los Altos Drive were already fully involved. Crews also 

were ordered to direct efforts at exposure control. Water supply at this time was a problem. Water 

tenders were moved into the area to supply the engines. Chief Wilkins estimated that the majority of 

the houses lost in the area were ignited during the fire storm or shortly thereafter. He estimated that 

most of the structural fires were controlled within two to two and a half hours after the fire storm. 

The residential area was not secured until midnight, May 31, almost eight hours after the fire started. 

Additional requests for equipment and manpower were made, and the fire was finally “contained” 

at 1800 hours on June 1, 1987, 27 hours after the fire began. Extensive mop-up was conducted 

on the fire scene and the fire was reported “controlled” or out at 0800 hours on June 4, 1987. The 

incident had lasted 3-1/2 days.

CAUSES OF RESIDENTIAL FIRE SPREAD

It appears that the fire spread through the residences because of a number of factors, including wood 

shingle or shake roofs, pine needles and litter accumulation on top of roofs, dried natural vegetation 

around the homes, and ultimately the fire storm and increased wind. Although the fire had entered 

a residential area, it had the aspect of a wildland fire and spread through the wildland-type vegetation between and around the residences. Attempts to maintain a natural type environment in the 

residential area provided a wildland fuel situation.

The exact cause of the fire storm is not known for certain. It appears that several factors contributed 

to it, including the heavy fuel loading and the steep terrain coming up to Los Altos Drive. In addition, there were three main canyons or chimneys coming up the slope onto Los Altos Drive. Not 

only were the fuels heavy in this area, but moisture was low both in the brush and the heavier type 

fuels. This added to the energy of the fire in and along the area to the west of Los Altos Drive.

Another factor which probably contributed to the creation of the fire storm was the prevailing high 

winds moving inland from a west/northwesterly direction. This was driving the fire in the east/

southeasterly direction onto the slope at Huckleberry Hill along Los Altos Drive. However, firefighters in the area of Los Altos Drive indicated that winds were coming from the northeast. It appears 

these opposing winds met on the ridge along Huckleberry Hill, and contributed significantly to the 

creation of the fire storm. The opposing winds may have contributed to an unstable condition above 

the area, and coupled with the intensity and energy released from the fire, may have been the triggering mechanism for the fire storm. It may also be this opposing northeast wind which prevented 

the spread of the fire to the east/southeast to more of the residential area. Some spotting did occur 

east of the main fire and some to the east/southeast. Spotting in these areas came from flying debris 

of wood shingles or shakes. The largest spot was approximately three acres in size and was located 
USFA-TR-007/May 1987 7

approximately one-half mile southeast of the main fire (D on the diagram attached). Wood shingle 

material was found in the origin area of this spot. Wood shingle material from the roofs of the 

houses definitely added to the spread of the fire.

EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL USED

The equipment utilized in the fire has been estimated as follows: Two response teams with three 

engines per team; six “type one” strike teams with five engines per team; four “type three” strike 

teams with five engines per team; five to six additional engines supplied by local governments: 15 

hand crews with 15 people each (nine from the California Department of Corrections and six from 

the California Youth Authority); nine hired water tenders; two fixed wing air tankers; one air attack 

coordinator aircraft; eight helicopters (one from the California Department of Forestry and Fire 

Protection, and seven hired medium and light helicopters, two of which were used for observation 

and reconnaissance and the rest for water carrying); four dozers (two California Department of 

Forestry and Fire Protection medium dozers, one hired medium dozer, and one hired heavy dozer); 

an overhead staff from the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection estimated at 26; 

and other agency overhead such as municipal chiefs, estimated at eight people. In addition, a fire 

information office for contact with the media was staffed with four people during the day and four 

at night. Finally, two private felling crews with two men per crew were utilized for cutting down 

trees during the fire.

In all, the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection estimated 885 firefighting personnel 

on the fire. Many of these personnel were involved in final control and mop-up of the fire and were 

not involved in the initial attack or initial spread of the fire.

CASUALTIES AND LOSSES

Fifteen firefighters were treated for minor injuries. Ten were for smoke inhalation, three for eye 

irritation, one for burning embers in eyes, and one for a head injury. Three non-firefighters were 

treated for minor fire injuries, two for eye irritation, and one for smoke inhalation.

Some minor damage did occur to fire equipment and apparatus in the area, but exact information on 

this damage was not readily available.

The total damage from the fire was estimated at approximately $18,000,000. Thirty-one residences 

were totally destroyed. Eleven vehicles were totally destroyed. Partial damage occurred to six homes, 

primarily roof damage. Other damage occurred at 14 residences, including fence and vegetation 

damage. Damage also occurred to three utilities, including PG&E, Pacific Telephone, and Monterey 

Peninsula Cable TV, whose trailer and microwave power were destroyed.

FIRE DEPARTMENTS IN THE AREA

Staffing of the Pebble Beach Fire Department is done under a schedule A contract between the Pebble 

Beach Community Services District and the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection. 

The Pebble Beach Community Services District owns the facility and apparatus, and the California 

Department of Forestry and Fire Protection provides the personnel. Apparatus at this station is for 

structural fire protection, and it has no special wildland equipment or apparatus.

The closest wildland equipment is stationed at the California Department of Forestry and Fire 

Protection station at Carmel Hill. Normal apparatus at this station includes two type-three wildland 
8

engines and one type one engine. This engine is under contract with the California Department of 

Forestry and Fire Protection, the Pebble Beach Community Services District, and two other Monterey 

County Districts. All three districts share expenses of this engine and the California Department of 

Forestry and Fire Protection provides personnel. 

The California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection normally increases its staffing during the 

summer fire season. The Pebble Beach fire occurred prior to the normal fire season and wildland 

personnel had not yet been increased.

CODES

The Pebble Beach Community Services District has an ordinance requiring class B or better roofing 

on all new construction and on new roofs in the Pebble Beach area, but this ordinance had been in 

effect for only approximately 14 months prior to the fire. There was some new construction in the 

area of the fire, but most of the homes were several years old and were built prior to ordinances 

requiring the class B roofing. Many of the homes had wood shingles or shakes, and this may even 

have been required at one time for housing in the area. The Carmel Hill fire station itself has a 

wooden shake roof that was required at the time it was built.

A Monterey County ordinance requires use of fire retardant roofing materials in the north county 

area. Other parts of the county’s unincorporated areas may not have specific codes requiring roofing 

materials; however, permits to build are subject to fire district approval in these areas, and fire resistive roofing materials may be required as a condition for obtaining a permit.

State law also requires vegetation to be cleared at least 30 feet from buildings in wildland areas. This 

is Public Resources Code (PRC) #4291. Information obtained indicates that in the Pebble Beach 

area, the regulation is enforced only when a complaint is registered. House to house annual inspection for compliance has been discontinued due to lack of manpower. A copy of the Public Resources 

Code #4291 is included in the Appendix.

No codes requiring residential sprinklers were in effect in the area, and none of the homes destroyed 

had sprinklers. The majority of them burned from the top down. The effect that residential sprinklers would have in such a situation was undetermined.

DAMAGE ASSESSMENT AND INCIDENT REVIEW TEAMS

The California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection normally reviews all major fire incidents. 

An incident review team is in the process of reviewing this fire, and a full report will be available 

later this year.

The California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection also sent a damage assessment team into 

the fire area to examine damages in detail. This team started work on June 1 and consisted of 

six people. They looked at physical fire damage, such as charring or burning of structures, other 

improvements, and wildland vegetation. Their damage survey included for each dwelling its type of 

exterior siding, roofing, windows, PRC 4291 compliance, and primary vegetation. A damage summary for the incident, the damage assessment worksheets, and the vegetative damage assessment are 

included in the Appendix.

The summary indicates that of the 31 homes totally destroyed, 22 had shake roofs, four had wood 

shingle roofs, three had formed steel over shake with no insulation between, and two had composi-
USFA-TR-007/May 1987 9

tion roofs. For exterior siding, 11 of the destroyed homes had wood siding, 16 had stucco siding, 

three had redwood and stucco, and one was adobe. For windows, 25 of the homes had single pane 

windows while five had double pane windows and one had a combination. The PRC 4291 compliance (clearance of brush) was listed as follows: in compliance, four; not in compliance, 27.

The assessment team noted that no structure was lost that had a combination of composition roofing, 

double pane windows, PRC 4291 compliance, and landscaping.4

 In one composition roof structure 

which was destroyed, fire ingress was from a deck through a single pane window on the side of the 

home. At 4051 Los Altos Drive, a single pane window imploded at the rear of the structure with 

only spot fires in the rear of the yard at the time. The house at 4011 Los Altos Drive withstood fire 

on its own, with only a small deck fire being controlled by a California Department of Forestry and 

Fire Protection engine.5

 It should be also noted that it had no eaves and that the exterior glass of its 

double pane windows had cracked but the interior glass held.

Information obtained from the assessment team seems to indicate that three major factors contributed to 

the loss of the homes: roofing material, the type of windows, and PRC compliance. In particular, the house located 

4011 Los Altos Drive was a prime example of fire resistive construction. It was located almost 

directly in the top of a chimney or canyon on the northwest side of Huckleberry Hill. The structure 

lay directly in the path of the head of the fire. It had a composition shingle roof, double pane windows, no eaves, and was in compliance with the PRC 4291. It also had a 3-4 foot high masonry wall 

constructed across its front which may also have helped to divert heat away from it. Some damage 

did occur to fencing around the structure and some roof damage occurred from burning of pine 

needle debris on the roof. However, the structure basically withstood the entire force of the fire on 

its own.

Another structure located at 4059 Los Altos Drive was also near the top of a canyon or chimney. This 

structure had a shake roof, single pane windows, and was not in compliance with PRC 4291. The 

structure had stucco exterior and survived with only roof damage. However, an engine stayed with 

this structure during the fire. In addition, a driveway located in front of the fire may have helped 

create additional distance between the structure and the main heat from the fire.

Another house located at 4048 Sunset Lane also survived the fire though it had a shake roof. This 

structure had double pane windows but was not in compliance with PRC 4291. The structure did 

sustain minor fence damage and smoke damage. However, there was a large space behind the house 

separating it from the forested area. This probably helped reduce the heat exposure.

The History of the House at 4011 Los Altos Drive – The property at 4011 Los Altos Drive, discussed in part 

above, was purchased approximately one year prior to the fire by Robert and Marie Whittington. 

The Whittingtons indicated that they sustained damage to a wooden fence and deck and also some 

minor roof damage from falling embers. There was some exterior damage, such as cracking of the 

outside pane of the double pane windows and distortion of the plastic light fixtures. There was also 

damage to shrubs and landscape around the structure and some minor smoke damage. Other than 

that, it survived.

4 “Landscaping” here means removal of most native vegetation, and planting of other species around the home. Compared 

to native vegetation, these plants are generally lower in height, spaced further apart, kept watered, and less susceptible 

to being ignited.

5

The address of this house was reported as 4009 in the California Department of Forestry report. 4009 was the legal 

address, but 4011 was the number on the house.
10 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

The Whittingtons indicated that the structure had a composition shingle roof and a stucco exterior. 

The house was constructed approximately nine years prior to the fire. The original builder wanted a 

composition roof due to his concerns about mold or fungus buildup on wood shingle roofs which 

might aggravate allergies of his wife. The undergrowth in and around the house had been removed 

and cleaned up only a few months prior to the fire primarily to control poison ivy in and around the 

house. The Whittingtons indicated that prior to the fire, no one had contacted them discussing fire 

prevention or fuels management around the house. They stated that the fire preventive aspects of the 

construction of the house were not considered in the original purchase.

The Whittingtons said they left the area prior to any organized evacuation. Mrs. Whittington spotted 

the fire earlier in the afternoon and called 9-1-1. She was informed that it had already been reported. 

Later in the afternoon, their son, Mark, called the Carmel Hill Fire Station and was informed to wet 

down vegetation, walls, and the roof of the house. The Whittingtons, their son Mark, and his family, 

who live in the house permanently, then went to a local motel to get a room. The first information 

they received about the destruction of the fire came from the local radio approximately two hours 

after they left the area.

The Whittingtons feel that the removal of undergrowth around their house played a major role in 

the safety of the house during the fire. They also felt that the composition roof played a factor, along 

with the double pane windows. Additionally, Mr. Whittington felt that the wall which was located 

in front of the house may also have helped contribute to the safety of the home.*

HISTORICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

Historical records indicate that fires have previously occurred in this area of the Del Monte Forest. 

The last fire in the area was in June of 1959 and burned 62 acres but did not destroy any homes. It 

began in a remote brushy canyon and spread over the Pacific Grove/Carmel Highway now known as 

Highway 68 or the Holman Highway. The fire was stopped by approximately 300 firefighters.

Back in 1924 a fire burned 100 acres in this area and a fire in 1904 burned approximately 2,000 

acres. No homes were destroyed in either of these fires.

The history suggests that the question is not if a fire will occur but when it will occur in this forested 

area. Certainly the area is along the Pacific coast and is normally in a high moisture and a high fuel 

moisture area. However, certain weather factors coupled with the high fuel loading create periods 

when major fires can occur in the area.

Environmentally, the area is noted for rare plants that grow in unique combinations. The S.F.B. Morse 

Botanical Reserve was dedicated in 1971 as a means of perpetuating them. The Del Monte Forest is 

one of only two locations containing native strands of the rare Gowen Cypress. Other rare plants in 

the area include certain species of Monterey Pines and Bishop Pines.

Fire was a natural element in the original environment of the area. Today, however, the environmental issues have drastically changed. Residents of the area like the natural areas around their homes. 

The natural setting of the forest combined with the spectacular views of the Pacific Ocean add to the 

overall aesthetics of the area. Natural vegetation near and around homes is considered part of the 

aesthetics, as are wood shingle or shake roofs. An attempt is made to maintain as natural an environment as possible around the homes.

*

There are pictures of this house and others in the vicinity in the file of this investigation.
USFA-TR-007/May 1987 11

Prior to the fire, local officials felt that any attempt at fuels management would probably have met 

with stiff resistance from local residents. Certainly, fuels management such as prescribed burning 

would have met with resistance not only from the standpoint of the fire itself, but from air quality 

considerations. Fuels management would have been very advantageous, but given the environmental 

consideration and the probable response of local residents, it would not have been feasible.

LESSONS LEARNED

1. Pre-fire planning for mutual aid and incident management greatly reduced problems which 

could have occurred in this fire incident. The planning for mutual aid insured fast response 

times, and the Incident Commander knew the amount and types of equipment which were 

available. Although there were some relatively minor points of confusion, overall the mutual aid 

worked well. The mutual aid plan is based on the National Incident Management System.

2. Communications is a key element in the coordination of any major incident, even more so where 

mutual aid and various organizations are involved. It appeared that some breakdown of communication may have occurred between the Sector C Commander and the Incident Commander. 

There also was some controversy about communications between the Incident Commander and 

the local county emergency coordinator. Use of designated mutual aid radio frequencies during management of such incidents is a must. Communication must be addressed in the mutual 

aid plans, and communication frequencies assigned. In addition, the Incident Commander 

must maintain communication with Division or Sector Commanders and other key emergency 

personnel.

3. In a mutual aid response, as in any response, Commanders need to take the time to reconnoiter

the terrain in the fire area, along with observing fuels and exposures. They need to know where 

to go if they have to pull back. Some of the roads in the residential area in the Morse fire made 

access in the areas difficult. Major exposures were present. Although it was a residential area, 

there were many areas of wildland-type fuels continuous through the area. Familiarization with 

such items is a must to insure proper placement of equipment and personnel. Equipment could 

have been positioned better in this fire had the Sector Commander been more familiar with the 

area.

4. Standard check-in procedures need to be followed by incoming units. Staging points should 

be designated and incoming units should check in with them. This insures proper placement 

of equipment and personnel and allows the Division, Sector, or Incident Commander a full 

knowledge of equipment and personnel involved in the incident.

5. In a major urban wildlands fire such as the Morse fire, firefighting units need to maintain 

mobility in the fire area. Structural fire units normally locate in one area and fight the fire 

contained within a structure. The Morse fire is a prime example of an urban wildland interface 

fire in which, although the wildland fire had burned into a residential area, the fire continued to 

expand at the normal rate of a wildland fire. The normal spread of a wildland fire dictates that 

the units in a residential area must be mobile to pick up spot fires and to fight structural fires as 

they occur with the spread of the wildland fire. It also means they have to be prepared to pick 

up and move out if necessary.

6. A critique is needed after any major incident for all parties involved. The Morse fire is a prime 

example that mutual aid works; however, as with any major incident, certain points need to be 

reviewed for future improvement. A critique of the incident by all parties insures improvement 

of the system and maintains rapport among the mutual aid parties.
12 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

7. Firefighters need psychological support after an event such as the Morse fire due to feelings 

of guilt over extensive losses and negative responses by the press and the community. The 

fire burned through a major residential area and had the potential to destroy an even greater 

number of homes. Firefighter response in the areas was along standard procedures for firefighting and for conditions under which the incident occurred, but various factors beyond their 

control led to the severity of the incident. Civilians may not know what is considered standard 

procedures in a firefighting operation utilized in such an incident. Unfamiliarity with such 

procedures can create ill feelings and adverse publicity from local media. For example, some 

citizens who saw an engine company waiting to be assigned became irate that it wasn’t in use. 

Some citizens got angry at crews who took a break. Other citizens tried to direct engines to their 

homes. Sympathetic support mechanisms must be utilized by the fire service in the face of such 

responses and feelings. And the community needs to be informed about what measures were 

and were not taken, and why.

8. Construction features and construction materials can reduce the danger from wildland fires 

in residential areas. Fire resistive roofing can reduce the danger of ignition and also the spread of the 

fire. The Morse fire showed that double pane windows can prevent the fire from gaining access into 

the house through window openings. Unprotected or exposed overhangs on structures can allow 

fire to ignite the structure and gain access into the structure.

9. Home owners or dwellers should keep their roofs clean from flammable debris (such as pine 

needle litter and twigs), in areas prone to wildland fires.

10. Removal of wild vegetation around structures can reduce danger from wildland fires. No 

structures in compliance with PRC 4291 suffered total loss in the Morse fire incident. Again, 

the house located at 4011 Los Altos Drive is a prime example of compliance with PRC 4291 and 

reduction of vegetation around the structure. Planted shrubbery was around the house, but the 

natural undergrowth had been removed and there were no continuous ground fuels up to the 

structure itself. Structures on either side of this house were totally destroyed and native vegetation ran up against both of them.

11. Tragic events such as the Morse fire incident can be utilized to direct positive action in fire 

prevention or awareness. Review of newspapers in the days following the Morse fire incident 

indicate that numerous communities were making plans and preparations to avert such disasters. 

Many cities reviewed and examined fire apparatus and fire protection systems. Information 

from such incidents can be utilized to develop ordinances or codes relating to construction or 

construction materials. Newspaper accounts indicated that several local cities used the publicity 

and emphasis of the Morse fire to spur a ban of fireworks in their cities. Such incidents create 

an atmosphere in which education and awareness can be capitalized on by local fire prevention 

and fire education organizations.

CONCLUSIONS

Three major factors which may have reduced the damage were: Safer roofing materials, double pane 

windows, and compliance with PRC 4291 as far as reduction of vegetation around the structure. 

No structures were lost that had a combination of composition roofing, double pane windows, PRC 

4291 compliance, and landscaping with fire-resistive plants.

The Morse fire points out again that pre-fire planning for mutual aid works. Although some minor 

points of confusion existed, overall, the mutual aid response was timely and effective. One major 

point of contention within the overall incident still appears to be evacuation of citizens in the fire 

area, though no one was injured.
13

APPENDICES

A. General Area Sketch of the Morse Fire

B. Residential Fire Area

C. Monterey County Area-Mutual Aid Model

D. Mutual Aid Matrix Showing Response for Pebble Beach

E. Public Resources Code 4291

F. Summary of Morse Incident by CDF Damage Assessment Team

G. Damage Assessment Worksheets by CDF Damage Assessment Team

H. Vegetation Damage Assessment by CDF Damage Assessment Team

I. Letter of Support to CDF Employees by Roy Perkins, 

Ranger in Charge of the San Benito-Monterey Ranger Unit

J. County Emergency Coordinator’s Report

K. Notes on Slides Taken by Investigator

L. Notes on Photographs Received from the 

California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection
14

Appendix A
15

Appendix B
16

Appendix C 

Monterey County Area Mutual Aid Model
17

Appendix D
18

Appendix E
19

Appendix F
20

Appendix G
USFA-TR-007/May 1987 21

Appendix G Continued 
22 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix G Continued
USFA-TR-007/May 1987 23

Appendix H

Vegetation Damage Assessment

 I.Introduction

On May 31, 1987 an illegal campfire escaped its confines and ignited a major brush and timber fire in the hills of the community of Pebble Beach, burning most of the vegetation totally. 

Plant species in this area consist in part of Monterey pines, Gowen cypress, Bishop pine, Coast 

liveoak, Blue blossom (ceanothus spp.), Manzanita (Arctostaphylos spp.), huckleberry, Coyote 

bush, pampas grass and numerous forbs and grasses. Much of the area has been kept in a 

“natural” state, excluding both fire and development with the exception of some roads. The fire 

consumed approximately 160 acres of vegetation as well as 31 homes before being controlled.

II. Area Description

The fire area lies on a northwest facing aspect with an average slope of 13 percent, with the 

steepest slopes occurring at the upper end of the fire, near Huckleberry Hill. Three general 

vegetation areas have been identified for the purposes of this assessment. The first includes the 

area of origin upslope, roughly to where the main haul road traverses the slope. It is an uplifted 

ocean terrace and has an impervious hard pan, or “caliche” layer which has led to the retarded 

development of plants growing on it, commonly referred to as a pygmy forest. The second area 

extends upslope from main haul road to Los Altos Drive just below the ridge of Huckleberry 

Hill. The soil profile is better developed resulting in more normal vegetation growth. The third 

area occurs up from Los Altos Drive including the housing and developed area of Huckleberry 

Hill. Natural vegetation occurs in this area along with a mix of ornamental species where landscaping has occurred.

III. Damage Assessment

A.	 Pygmy Forest

Probably 95 percent of the living vegetation in the pygmy forest area, within the fire perimeter was totally consumed by the fire. The overstory consists primarily of Monterey pine. 

The understory contains a mixture of the other species listed above. Although most of the 

foliar material is gone, it is likely that by the end of the first growing season (+ August 

1988) the area will show ample signs of recovery, sprouting species should be re-established 

uniformly over the burned area. Monterey pine, which releases its seed in response to fire 

will have an excellent seed bed and should also show good signs of re-establishment.

B.	 Normal Forest Area

The forested area on the better developed soils was damaged similarly, although not quite 

so completely. Again, most of the understory was consumed. Roughly 70 percent of the 

Monterey pine crowns were desiccated by heat convection and/or actually burned to the 

point that the trees will not survive. Resprouting and seed germination should show good 

progress toward re-establishment by the end of the first growing season in this area as well.
24 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

C.	 Huckleberry Hill

The area extending from Los Altos Drive through the developed housing contains a mixture 

of natural vegetation and introduced ornamentals used for landscaping. Mature Monterey 

pine forms most of the overstory canopy in this area. Most of these trees were killed by 

the fire. The understory vegetation, on the vacant lots and in many cases both front and 

backyard landscaping consisted of live oak, huckleberry and Manzanita. It, too, was almost 

completely consumed by the flames. Between sprouting and seeding these species should 

show good signs of re-establishment by the end of the first growing season. The pines 

will also re-establish themselves, probably to the point of overstocking, depending on the 

amount of viable seed available for release at the time of the fire. Many of the ornamental 

species located in and adjacent to yards for landscaping are lost and have no vegetative 

and or seeding method of reproduction, unlike the natural species of the area which have 

evolved with fire. They will have to be replaced at the option of the individual landowners, 

many of whom also lost their homes.

Special consideration should be given to the fire damaged and killed Monterey pine in the 

developed areas. Monterey pine is a shallow rooting species. With most of the crowns 

burned and the understory vegetation gone, many of these trees may be susceptible to wind 

throw by high winds when the ground is saturated by winter rains.

IV. Summary

In summary, probably 75 percent of the overstory vegetation consisting primarily of Monterey 

pine was killed by the fire. In all probability, at least 50 percent of the remaining live trees 

will succumb to either insects or disease within the next two years. Close to 90 percent of the 

existing understory consisting primarily of live oak, Manzanita and huckleberry were burned 

completely. Revegetation will probably occur naturally, with obvious signs of it by the end of 

the first growing season. In all probability the area will not see a shift in species composition; 

however, it will take many years for the area to achieve the look it had prior to the fire. The last 

major fire in this area occurred somewhere around 1958 or 1959, approximately 30 years ago. 

Vegetation in this area is indicative of the way the present burned area will recover.

Prepared by Daniel H. Ward, Forester I 
25

Appendix I 
26

Appendix J
USFA-TR-007/May 1987 27

Appendix J Continued
28 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix J Continued
USFA-TR-007/May 1987 29

Appendix J Continued
30 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix J Continued
USFA-TR-007/May 1987 31

Appendix J Continued
32 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix J Continued
USFA-TR-007/May 1987 33

Appendix J Continued
34 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix K

Notes on Slides Taken by Investigator

The slides are described by their roll number and number on the roll – R1x9 is slide #9 on roll #1.

Slides with an asterisk have also been made into photos.

*R1x9 - A view looking northwest at the origin area of the fire. The yellow ribbon visible in the 

center of the slide surrounds the illegal campsite. The fire originated from a barrel being 

used to contain fire inside this illegal camp area.

*R1x8 - A view looking northwest from the area of origin of the fire. Notice the heavy fuel accumulations in the area. Notice also that the vegetation still has most of its leaves in this area 

where the fire backed away from the origin area of the fire. This heavy debris and fuel in 

the area limited access to the fire.

R1x7 - A view looking east/southeast in the direction the fire traveled from the origin area. Note 

again the heavy fuels in the area and the heavy burning which occurred near the origin 

area. Some crowning occurred just to the southeast of the origin area.

R1x11 - A view of one of the many signs in the area of the fire. Notice this is a sign designating 

private property, no camping, hunting, lighting of fires, or trespassing. These signs are 

maintained by the Pebble Beach Company owners of the property.

R1x6 - A view looking at the fuel west of the origin area of the fire. Note that the roads which 

appear clear now were cleaned during the fire operations. Again, notice the heavy fuel 

loading in the area.

*R1x10 - A view looking southeast along the southern perimeter of the fire. Again, the road was 

cleared during the fire operations. Notice the heavy fuel accumulations to the right of the 

slide indicating the fuel loading at the time of the fire.

R1x4 - A view looking at fuels along the western perimeter of the fire. This is a view looking 

west/northwest toward the origin area of the fire.

R2x20 - A view looking at the fuels along the southern and southwestern perimeters of the fire. 

Notice heavy fuel loading and in addition, heavy accumulations of pine needles in the 

understory. Numerous dead trees were located also in this area, apparently from insect 

kills.

R1x3 - A view looking south along the haul road which the suppression crews attempted to back 

fire. The fire spotted over this haul road initially in two spots approximately 200 feet above 

the haul road.

*R1x2 - A view looking east/southeast from the haul road up the slope of Huckleberry Hill. Notice 

the heavy growth of Monterey Pine and heavy fuel loading underneath. This is one of the 

canyons or chimneys which came out on Los Altos Drive. This particular chimney was 

located directly in front of 4011 Los Altos Drive. The address provided in much of the 

official references to this structure was 4009 Los Altos Drive, but the property address was 

posted as 4011 Los Altos Drive.
USFA-TR-007/May 1987 35

*R1x15 - A view looking west/southwest from Los Altos Drive down the canyon or chimney in 

front of 4011 Los Altos Drive. Notice the intensity of the fire indicated by the complete 

burning of all materials in the area. Drowning also occurred along this portion of the 

ridge.

*R1x5 - A view of the gravel or granite pit which was located on the western portion of the fire 

and which served as incident command post for the fire. The western perimeter of the fire 

was located along the east side of this gravel or granite pit.

R1x12 - A view of the intersection of Los Altos Drive and Constanilla Way. This intersection served 

as the staging area for Section C. 

R2x10 - A view looking south/southeasterly at the house located at 4009 Los Altos Drive. A fire 

engine stayed at this location during the fire and protected this house.

R2x8 - A view looking west/southwest from the second turnout spot on 17 Mile Drive. This was 

located just opposite from 4011 Los Altos Drive. Notice heavy fuel loading in and around 

this area.

R1x14 - A view looking south/southeast along Los Altos Drive. This was the area where response 

teams A and B were located when the fire storm came up the side of Huckleberry Hill.

R2x9 - A view looking east at vegetation in the area of 4013 Los Altos Drive. Notice heavy accumulation of fuels in and around the house. This house was totally destroyed.

*R2x11 - A view looking north along the north side of the structure. Again, notice the heavy accumulation of natural fuels up to the area along the west side of the structure. Again, this 

would have been in the area where the fire storm first hit Los Altos Drive.

R1x13 - A view looking northeast at 4011 Los Altos Drive. No heavy fire damage was in or around 

the area. A chimney or canyon from below was located directly in front of this structure. 

Again, this is the area where the fire storm first hit Los Altos Drive.

R1x17 - A view looking southeast at 4011 Los Altos Drive. Again, notice the heavy damage in and 

around the structure but again, the structure remained intact. Note that the fence visible 

in the left center of the photograph was destroyed in the fire. In addition, a wooden deck 

on the structure was destroyed. Notice there is no overhang on the structure and the 

structure had a composition shingle roof. The exterior is stucco.

*R2x12 - A closer view of the structure. Note that the street address of 4011 is visible on the 

exterior of the property. Note there is some vegetation up to and around the structure. 

However, there is no continuous fuel in and around the structure.

R2x14 - A closer view of the wall which was located in front of the structure. This wall may also 

have helped to deflect the fire and would have also prevented the spread of the fire directly 

in front of the structure.

R2x6 - A close view of the landscaping in and around the house itself. Notice there are some 

small shrubs in the area, but there is no undergrowth around the shrubs and there is no 

continuous fuels up to or around the structure itself.
36 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

R2x7 - A view looking at the shrubbery in front of the structure. Again, there is distance between 

most of the shrubbery and there are no fuels in between the shrubbery. Cracking did occur 

to the double pane windows along the west side of the structure which were exposed to 

the brunt of the fire and fire storm.

R2x17 - A view looking west at the back portion of the structure. Some minor roof damage was 

reported but as can be seen; there is no major damage to the structure.

 R1x16 - A view looking north/northeast along Los Altos Drive. This is the area just to the north of 

4011 Los Altos Drive. At least two vehicles were totally destroyed in this area.

R1x24 - A view of one of the structures that was destroyed in the fire. Notice that burn patterns 

indicate that the fire started in the upper portions of the structure and came down. As 

is common throughout the area, fires mostly started in the roof areas and the structure 

burned from the top down.

R1x18 - A view looking north at the structures destroyed along the ridge top of Huckleberry Hill. 

This would have been in the area lying between Los Altos Drive and El Bosque Drive.

 R1x19 - Another view of a structure destroyed in this area. 

R2x15 - A view of the structure located at 4001 Costado Road. This would be across the corner 

from the intersection of El Bosque Drive and Los Altos Drive. Fire damage did occur to 

the southeast of this structure, but notice the green lawn in and around the structure and 

the large space in front created by the intersections of the three roads, Los Altos Drive, El 

Bosque Drive, and Costado Road.

R1x20 - A view looking at the house located at 4048 Sunset Lane. This structure did have a shake 

roof, but also had double pane windows. There was only minor fence and smoke damage 

done to this structure.

R2x18 - A closer view of this structure. There was a large space to the back side of the structure. 

This coupled with the fact that an engine was placed here during the time of the fire probably accounts for the lack of damage to the structure.

*R2x5 - A view of some of the typical spot damage to wood shingle or wood shake roofs around 

the area. Note the covering over an area where a hole has burned through the roof at this 

house.

*R2x3 - A view looking at an area where the structure to the left has a composition roof while the 

structure to the right had a wood shingle roof and is totally destroyed.

R2x16 - A view looking at the house with a tile roof and wood siding. The structure had no major 

damage.

R2x4 - A view looking at the structure located at 4021 El Bosque Drive and had an exterior of 

adobe. The roofing was flat composition with single pane windows. The structure was in 

compliance with PRC 4291. The structure had minor fence damage and smoke damage.

*R2x2 - An example of some of the aftermath of the fire. This house had minor roof damage and 

previously had a wood shingle roof. As can be seen, the house is now having the roof 

replaced with tile.
USFA-TR-007/May 1987 37

R1x25 - An example of some of the accumulation of pine needle litter on top of structures in the 

area. This is probably the extreme case in the area, but indicates that heavy accumulation 

of pine needles can occur in such areas. These pine needles are on top of a wood shingle 

roof.

R1x22 - A view of the 800,000 gallon water storage tank located on top of Huckleberry Hill. Note 

there was heavy wildland fuel accumulations around this storage area. Again, the area was 

left in a natural state as possible to provide pleasing aesthetics to the area.

R1x21 - A view of the 10,000 gallon pressurized tank in the water system.

R2x22 - A view of the common road signs in the residential area where the fire occurred. Notice 

these are of a nonreflective type and again are somewhat small and tend to blend into the 

surrounding area. Such signs, although aesthetically pleasing in such an area, can hinder 

rapid response of units unfamiliar with the area.
38 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

*R1x9
USFA-TR-007/May 1987 39*R1x8
40 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

*R1x10
USFA-TR-007/May 1987 41*R1x2
42 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

*R1x15
USFA-TR-007/May 1987 43*R1x5
44 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

*R2x11
USFA-TR-007/May 1987 45*R2x12
46 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

*R2x5
USFA-TR-007/May 1987 47*R2x3
48 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

*R2x2
USFA-TR-007/May 1987 49

*Appendix L

Notes on Photographs Received from the California 

Department of Forestry and Fire Protection

Photo A is a view looking east at the overall area of the Morse fire. The red arrow in the lower 

center of the photograph indicates the spread from the origin area which was below the red arrow. 

The black arrow in the upper right of the photograph indicates the area in the gravel pit where the 

Incident Command Center was located. The black arrow in the left center of the photograph indicates the haul road which extended north and south across the center portion of the fire. The haul 

road is visible extending from the black arrow in the left of center in the photograph through the 

upper center of the photograph to the gravel pit in the upper right. The black arrow in the upper 

left of the photograph indicates the turnout which was located directly in front of 4011 Los Altos 

Drive. This is a major area in the upper left of the photograph where the fire extended up to the top 

of Huckleberry Hill and into the residential area.

Photo B is a view looking east at the top of Huckleberry Hill. The black arrow to the left of center 

in the photograph indicates 4011 Los Altos Drive. This gives some idea as to the fuel loading around 

this structure, as well as the damage that occurred around the structure. This also gives some idea as 

to the fuel loading throughout the residential area on top of Huckleberry Hill.

Photo C is a view looking westward from the top of Huckleberry Hill in the direction where the fire 

came into the area. Again, in this photograph you can see the steep terrain coming up to the west 

side of Huckleberry Hill. Also, the residence located at 4011 Los Altos is visible in the lower right 

corner of the photograph. Note that the structures that were totally destroyed are visible to the left 

of this structure.

Photo D is another view looking westward from the top of Huckleberry Hill. Again, the residence 

located at 4011 Los Altos is visible in the left center of the photograph. This shows a general view of 

the fuel loading in the area, as well as the damage which occurred in the area.

Photo E is a view looking eastward at the house located at 4011 Los Altos. The house is located just 

to the left of center in the photograph but is nearly invisible due to the heavy trees in and around 

the area.

Photo F is a view looking westward on the top of Huckleberry Hill. The water storage tank is visible 

in the lower left corner of the photograph. The street visible running through the center of the photograph from left to right is Sunset Lane. Again, this photograph gives some idea of the fuel loading 

through the residential area and the natural vegetation which was scattered through the area, as well 

as the damage which occurred in the residential area.

Photo G is a view looking northward along the top of Huckleberry Hill. The red arrow in the center 

of the photograph indicates the house which was located at 4059 Los Altos Drive. Note the greener 

color of crowns of trees to the left of this structure. It appears that the fire was not as intense in 

this area as in other areas onto the north along Los Altos Drive. As has previously been mentioned, 

an engine company stayed with this house during the fire. The red arrow in the upper right of the 

photograph indicates the approximate location of the house located at 4048 Sunset Lane. Sunset 

Lane is the road which is visible in the extreme right of the photograph leading from top to bottom 
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in the photograph. Los Altos Drive is the road which is visible in the left center of the photograph 

going from lower left to upper center.

Photo H is a closer view of the structure located at 4059 Los Altos Drive. Again, notice the greener 

crowns of trees to the left and upper left of the structure. Again, it appears that the fire was somewhat less intense in this area.

Photo I is a view looking southward at the structure located at 4048 Sunset Lane which survived the 

fire. Notice the structure is in the upper center of the photograph and a large open area extended to 

the back side of the structure. It appears there was a major area of separation around the house from 

the timber in the area. Again, a good view of the fuel load and the natural vegetation located in the 

area is visible in the lower portion of the photograph.
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