Exemption No. 10507 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 

WASHINGTON, DC 20591 

 

In the matter of the petition of 

 

PHI, INC. Regulatory Docket No. 2011-1039 

for an exemption from § 91.9(a) 

of Title 14, Code of 

Federal Regulations 

 

 

GRANT OF EXEMPTION 

 By letter dated September 20, 2011, Mr. Michael C. Hurst, Chief Pilot, PHI, Inc. (PHI), 

P.O. Box 90808, Lafayette, LA 70509, petitioned the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 

on behalf of PHI for an exemption from § 91.9(a) of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations 

(14 CFR). The proposed exemption, if granted, would allow PHI to operate Sikorsky S-92A 

(S-92A) helicopters with limited exposure to engine failure during takeoff and landing while 

carrying up to 19 passengers between land-based and offshore facilities or when operating 

between two offshore facilities, day, night, visual flight rules, and instrument flight rules. 

The petitioner requests relief from the following regulation:

Section 91.9(a) prescribes, in pertinent part, that no person may operate a civil aircraft 

without complying with the operating limitations specified in the approved Rotorcraft 

Flight Manual. 

The petitioner supports its request with the following information:

The petitioner states that the petition for exemption is for operations conducted in its Sikorsky 

S-92A aircraft when operating between land-based and offshore facilities or when operating 

between two offshore facilities. 

AFS-11-466-E 

PHI states that its S-92As were certificated under part 29, amendment 47 relating to safety 

and ditching equipment, which provides the highest level of safety today. The petitioner 

states its S-92As are equipped with aircraft flotation gear and are certified for ditching in up 
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to sea state 4. Additionally, when operating over water, each S-92A occupant is provided, 

and wears, personal flotation equipment. Also, the S-92A is equipped with life rafts that can 

be deployed from inside or outside the aircraft. 

PHI states that European operators, using the same aircraft, operate them in accordance with 

Joint Aviation Requirement-OPS-3 which already permits similar operations with limited 

exposure to engine failure. In addition, petitioner states that it has operated its S-92As under 

operations specification (OpSpec) H100 since 2003. The petitioner requests that this 

exemption extend to its operations “conducted outside the United States.” 

The petitioner believes that the requested exemption will continue to provide the same level 

of safety that is currently in place for offshore operations. PHI states that collected data 

related to the engine reliability reflects that the in-flight shutdown rate is less than 1 per 

100,000 flight hours. 

PHI has operated under OpSpec H100 in the United States since 2003 which authorized 

operations similar to International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Performance Class 2 

with limited exposure. During this period, no S-92A accidents have been caused by power 

loss due to engine failure during takeoff or landing. 

PHI has instituted operational controls through its general operations manual, training 

program, and management surveillance. PHI will conduct operations in such a manner as to 

minimize the time spent exposed to engine failure. This will be accomplished by following 

the manufacturer’s recommended takeoff and landing procedures whenever feasible. 

Operations will not be conducted unless the current aircraft weight, altitude, and temperature 

ensure 100 feet per minute climb at 1,000 feet above the takeoff surface with one engine 

inoperative and the remaining engine at maximum continuous one engine inoperative (OEI) 

power. 

PHI states that it further mitigates exposure by: (1) Conducting flight operations to and from 

helidecks and shore based heliports that meet or exceed size and weight requirements 

appropriate to the aircraft configuration; (2) Training its crews in a Level D, FFS (Full Flight 

Simulator) initially and annually, ensuring the highest levels of proficiency and competency; 

(3) Conducting route checks to confirm that its crews remain procedurally compliant and use 

crew resource management principles during all flight operations; and (4) Using PHI's Flight 

Data Monitoring Program (known as LAMP) to ensure flight profiles are in accordance with 

Performance Class 2 procedures. 

The petitioner understands that the FAA is considering the rescission of OpSpec H-100. PHI 

notes that it has accumulated over 60,000 hours of operational experience in this make/model 

all in accordance with OpSpec H-100 and Performance Class 2 profiles. This experience 

demonstrates that when takeoff and landing techniques are used to minimize exposure to 

forced landing due to engine failure, that this aircraft can be operated at an equivalent level of 

safety to Category A. Additionally, if the rescission occurred without this relief, the S-92A 
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would become economically unfeasible which likely would result in their removal from 

service. The outcome would be a reversion to smaller, older, less sophisticated aircraft that 

do not provide the same level of safety. This would result in an overall degradation of safety 

and not serve the most important stakeholder, the passenger. 

A summary of the petition was published in the Federal Register on October 12, 2011 

(76 FR 63342). No comments were received. 

The FAA's analysis is as follows:

The FAA has considered the petitioner’s request and supporting materials and finds that, 

subject to the conditions and limitations below, a grant of exemption would be in the public 

interest and would provide a level of safety equivalent to that provided by the current 

regulations. 

The FAA finds that PHI provides transportation under contract to employees of various oil 

companies from land based facilities to offshore facilities within the Gulf of Mexico. 

Aviation operations within the U.S. are conducted under the provisions of part 135. 

Operations to offshore facilities present a unique operating environment which requires 

special consideration in operations, training, and standardization. Based on the drawings and 

photographs contained in the petition, “offshore facilities” include an overwater elevated 

helideck. 

The FAA recognizes that there may be instances in which a safe forced landing may not be 

possible due to environmental or other factors. The FAA notes that regulatory agencies 

worldwide have already applied risk management and permitted variations to specific 

operations, such as operations to helidecks where exposure to an engine failure is present 

without a safe forced landing area. Risk assessment is used to determine whether to permit 

these variations. When operations without suitable areas for safe forced landings are being 

considered, all relevant factors should be evaluated. These factors include the likelihood of 

the event, the possible consequences, and any mitigating measures weighed against the 

potential benefits of the operation. Accident history and other relevant safety data and 

analysis are crucial to making the operational determination. 

The FAA notes the petitioner states that it has operated since 2003 under the provisions of 

OpSpec H100. That operations specification prohibits operations unless the current aircraft 

weight, altitude and temperature would ensure the ability to climb 150 feet per minute at 

1,000 feet above the takeoff surface with one engine inoperative and the remaining engine at 

maximum continuous OEI power. These specifications are also similar to those 

characteristics of operations under ICAO Performance Class 2. The ICAO standard for 

Performance Class 2 with limited exposure to engine failure is to have that exposure period be 

less than 9 seconds. The petitioner’s operations meet or exceed this standard. However, the 

FAA notes a discrepancy in the petitioner’s application where it states that its operations 
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would not be conducted unless the climb rate was at least 100 feet per minute. This would 

not meet the current requirements of H100. Condition and limitation number 7 below reflects 

the 150 feet per minute climb rate currently required by H100. 

The petitioner has proposed operational controls consistent with those in OpSpec H100. The 

FAA is considering the rescission of that operations specification. A grant of exemption 

would provide for continuity of operations demonstrated since PHI began S-92A operations 

in 2003. The FAA believes the limitations contained in OpSpec H100 have been effective 

and therefore would continue them in limitations associated with a grant of exemption. 

Granting this petition is in the public interest because these S-92A aircraft replaced older 

designs which do not offer the safety advancements, and are not required to meet the more 

stringent performance requirements imposed on the S-92A and other similar aircraft. The 

FAA concurs with the petitioner that permitting the use of the S-92A provides those 

passengers with the safe transportation, while maintaining an efficient transportation system 

for the oil and gas industry. 

The FAA’s Decision 

 In consideration of the foregoing, I find that a grant of exemption is in the public interest. 

Therefore, pursuant to the authority contained in 49 U.S.C. §§ 40113 and 44701, delegated to 

me by the Administrator, PHI, Inc., is granted an exemption from 14 CFR § 91.9(a) to the 

extent necessary to allow PHI to conduct arrivals and departures to and from offshore 

facilities using approach and departure profiles similar to Performance Class 2 with limited 

exposure to engine failure operations within the United States and in international airspace. 

This exemption is subject to the conditions and limitations listed below. 

Conditions and Limitations 

1. This exemption is limited to operations conducted in PHI’s S-92A helicopters. 

2. This exemption is limited to operations conducted between land-based airports and 

offshore heliports, or operations conducted between two offshore heliports. 

3. This exemption is not valid for operations in foreign airspace without the prior 

authorization of the Civil Aviation Authority with jurisdiction over that airspace. 

4. Occupants of flights conducted under this exemption must wear personal floatation 

equipment whenever the aircraft is over water and the aircraft must be equipped with 

floats, accessible rafts, and a 406 MHz beacon. 

5. PHI must make available and provide access, upon request by the FAA, to its engine 

reliability historical data for the S-92As in its fleet in order to provide ongoing 

surveillance of engine reliability. 
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6. Computations regarding the determination of the approach and departure profiles must 

not exceed the ICAO standard of 9 seconds of exposure to engine failure related to 

Performance Class 2 with limited exposure to engine failure. 

 

7. Operations will not be conducted unless the current aircraft weight, altitude and 

temperature, as provided in the S-92A Rotorcraft Flight Manual, ensure the ability to 

climb 150 feet per minute at 1,000 feet above the takeoff surface with one engine 

inoperative and the remaining engine at maximum continuous one-engine inoperative 

(OEI) power. 

8. PHI must comply with, in addition to other routine preflight computations, the 

procedures cited in the S-92A Rotorcraft Flight Manual, Part 2, Section III, 

Supplemental Performance Data, page III-1-50, contained in the paragraphs titled 

“Elevated Helideck Takeoff and Landing –Limited Exposure – (At Figure 3-22 

WAT)” and the paragraph following titled “Vertical Takeoff – Elevated Helideck.” 

9. Operations under the provisions of this exemption must be flown by 2 pilot crews that 

are qualified and current in the operation of the S-92A. 

10. PHI’s approved training program must include provisions for training of appropriate 

crews on the profiles associated with a Performance Class 2 with limited exposure 

takeoff and arrival, including performance planning. PHI must document the conduct 

and completion of that training for appropriate flight crewmembers. 

11. Proficiency in the use of the profiles described in condition and limitation number 10 

must be demonstrated satisfactorily during recurrent evaluations required by 

§§135.293 or 135.299. 

12. PHI must establish parameters for takeoff and arrival at helidecks for its flight data 

monitoring program and provide ongoing surveillance of those operations. 

13. PHI must advise all S-92A flight crewmembers of the provisions of this exemption, 

and document that notification. 
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14. A copy of this exemption must be carried onboard each S-92A utilizing these 

provisions. 

This exemption terminates on April 30, 2014, unless sooner superseded or rescinded. 

Issued in Washington, D.C., on April 18, 2012. 

/s/ 

John S. Duncan 

Deputy Director, Flight Standards 

 Service .