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31–268 PDF 2006

S. HRG. 109–706

FBI OVERSIGHT

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MAY 2, 2006

Serial No. J–109–72

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

(

(II)

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah 

CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa 

JON KYL, Arizona 

MIKE DEWINE, Ohio 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont 

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts 

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware 

HERBERT KOHL, Wisconsin 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin 

CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

MICHAEL O’NEILL, Chief Counsel and Staff Director 

BRUCE A. COHEN, Democratic Chief Counsel and Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS 

Page

Grassley, Hon. Charles E., a U.S. Senator from the State of Iowa, prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 269

Kennedy, Hon. Edward M., a U.S. Senator from the State of Massachusetts ... 2

prepared statement .......................................................................................... 274

Leahy, Hon. Patrick J., a U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont .................... 12

prepared statement .......................................................................................... 275

Specter, Hon. Arlen, a U.S. Senator from the State of Pennsylvania ................. 1

WITNESSES 

Calbom, Linda M., Director, Financial Management and Assurance, U.S. Government Accountability Office, Washington, D.C. ............................................. 39

Fine, Glenn A., Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington 

D.C. ........................................................................................................................ 37

Gannon, John C., Vice President for Global Analysis, BAE Systems Information Technology, and Former Staff Director, Homeland Security Committee, 

U.S. House of Representatives, McLean, Virginia ............................................ 40

Mueller, Robert S., III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. .............................................................. 4

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 

Responses of Linda M. Calbom to questions submitted by Senator Specter ...... 48

Responses of Glenn A. Fine to questions submitted by Senators Specter, 

Grassley, and Schumer ........................................................................................ 53

Responses of John C. Gannon to questions submitted by Senator Specter ........ 60

Responses of Robert S. Mueller to questions submitted by Senators Specter, 

Leahy, Grassley, Kennedy, Kyl, DeWine, Feingold, Schumer, Durbin, and 

Feinstein ............................................................................................................... 65

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Calbom, Linda M., Director, Financial Management and Assurance, U.S. Government Accountability Office, Washington, D.C., prepared statement and 

attachments .......................................................................................................... 212

Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, memoranda ............... 230

Fine, Glenn A., Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington 

D.C., prepared statement .................................................................................... 234

Gannon, John C., Vice President for Global Analysis, BAE Systems Information Technology, and Former Staff Director, Homeland Security Committee, 

U.S. House of Representatives, McLean, Virginia, prepared statement ......... 254

Mueller, Robert S., III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. .............................................................. 279

New York Times, April 19, 2006, editorial ............................................................ 285

Plan Dealer, Cleveland, Ohio, April 29, 2006, editorial ....................................... 287

Seattle Post-Intelligencer, March 21, 2006, article ............................................... 288

U.S. News & World Report, April 17, 2006, article .............................................. 290

Washington Post, April 19, 2006, article ............................................................... 292

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FBI OVERSIGHT 

TUESDAY, MAY 2, 2006

UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m., in room 

SD–226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Arlen Specter, 

Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Specter, Grassley, Kyl, DeWine, Sessions, 

Cornyn, Leahy, Kennedy, Feinstein, Feingold, Schumer, and Durbin. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ARLEN SPECTER, A SENATOR 

FROM THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Chairman SPECTER. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. The 

Judiciary Committee will now proceed with the oversight hearing 

on the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and we welcome the distinguished Director, Robert Mueller. 

The FBI, with its great tradition for law enforcement and investigative techniques, has enormous responsibilities in an era where 

we are fighting terrorism, and it has great responsibilities in the 

protection of civil liberties as well; a delicate balance which the 

United States has been so adept at maintaining. The FBI is being 

very seriously challenged this year and the years intervening since 

9/11/2001 and will be challenged into the future. 

The Federal Bureau of Investigation has responded with very 

significant technological changes, and we will be taking a look at 

those today. We have been in touch with the Director on an informal basis to review what he has done with the so-called Virtual 

Case File, which had a cost in the range of $170 million, and what 

is being done now with the very extensive $305 million contract to 

Lockheed Martin. 

A GAO report in February of this year has raised some very serious questions as to the adequacy of the FBI’s control over the Trilogy project; GAO reported that there were payments of unallowable 

and questionable contractor costs and missing assets. We will be 

looking into the very important issue of information sharing, which 

was a major problem with the agencies prior to 9/11 and one which 

we have tried to correct with the creation of a new Directorate, 

which is a subject of ongoing concern. 

A March 2006 GAO report found that there are still very substantial issues relating to information sharing. We will be asking 

the Director about that. 

2

In the war on terror, there are still grave difficulties. The FBI 

statistics disclose a translation program as taking 14 months to secure contract linguists. A 2005 March report by the Department of 

Justice Inspector General found that there were more than 8,000 

hours of counterterrorism audio that had not been reviewed. The 

2005 Office of the Inspector General report raised questions about 

whether there was adequate coverage on the identities of people 

who constituted threats. 

We are also going to be inquiring today on the recent FBI action 

looking to obtain some of the files of the late columnist Jack Anderson. A question as to why now. If those files were important, why 

not have sought their return during Jack Anderson’s life, and 

would if be more appropriate to have a judicial action in replevin, 

for example, as opposed to, as reports have it—and we want to find 

out from the Director—having two agents appear in the home of 

the custodian of those records? 

Another issue of very substantial concern is what is happening 

with the investigation of journalists. This Committee is about to report out a bill on reporter’s privilege triggered by the 85 days of 

incarceration of Judith Miller. No doubt national security interests 

are of enormous concern, and there is an issue as to whether that 

kind of a contempt citation is appropriate where the focus has 

shifted from national security, shifted from the disclosure of the 

identity of a CIA agent, to whether people are telling the truth before a grand jury. That is a serious matter as well, but not one 

which rises to the same level as national security. 

There has been recent speculation as to whether two criminal 

statutes relating to the disclosure of classified information may be 

used to prosecute reporters. A very extensive story appeared in the 

Sunday Times, which referred back to the Pentagon Papers case. 

The issue has been lurking for a long time on the concurring opinions of Justice White and Justice Potter Stewart, where Justice 

White says, ‘‘I would have no difficulty in sustaining convictions 

under these statutes on facts that would not justify the intervention of equity and the imposition of prior restraint.’’ The Pentagon 

Papers case involved the effort to restrain the Times from publishing, and the White-Stewart opinions state pretty flat out that 

there is authority under those statutes to prosecute a newspaper, 

to inferentially prosecute reporters. And if that is so, that is something which requires some oversight and some analysis by this 

Committee, going back to the formulation of those statutes and to 

what Congressional intent was at that time, and depending upon 

the administration’s interpretation of the statutes, whether there 

needs to be some further action by the Congress on modification or 

clarification of those statutes. 

Senator Leahy will be along shortly, Mr. Director. In his absence, 

Senator Kennedy, would you care to make an opening statement? 

STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD M. KENNEDY, A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS 

Senator KENNEDY. Just a brief one, if I could. Mr. Chairman, we 

want to welcome Mr. Mueller, and thank you. 

No challenge that we face is more important than dealing effectively with the terrorist threat facing the Nation and reform of the 

3

FBI as an essential part of meeting that challenge. We all agree 

on the need for strong powers for law enforcement and intelligence 

offices to investigate terrorism and prevent future attacks and improve information sharing between Federal, State, and local enforcement. And in the wake of the tragic events of September 11th, 

Congress, the administration, and the country face the urgent need 

to do everything possible to strengthen our National security and 

our counterterrorist efforts. 

On 9/11, we were united in our commitment to protect our country, to respond aggressively to terrorism and destroy al Qaeda. This 

was not an issue of party or partisan politics. We all worked together. 

Unfortunately, however, we are now at an impasse where the administration refuses to work with Congress, and it is putting our 

national security and the public trust at risk. There is a way to 

fight terrorism within the framework of our Constitution. As Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson wrote in 1941, ‘‘The Constitution is not a suicide pact.’’ 

Thirty years ago, when the cold war threatened our security, a 

Republican administration and a Democratic Congress worked together to pass the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, giving 

broad authority to the Government in cases involving national security. Then, as now, the debate was driven by reports of 

watchlists, sweeping surveillance programs. Then, as now, the 

American people had questions about the proper scope of the President’s authority. 

Today, the politics of fear seems to be driving our National security policy, and at the same time, there are fundamental questions 

about whether we are getting it right. And there are new concerns 

that we may not be any safer now than we were 4 years ago. So 

I hope that you can address some of the concerns about the job the 

FBI is doing to get its house in order and to help us meet the national terror threat. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Kennedy appears as a submission for the record.] 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Senator Kennedy. 

Director Mueller comes to the Office of the Director of the FBI 

with an outstanding record. He was an Assistant Attorney General 

in the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice. He was the 

United States Attorney for the Northern District of California, San 

Francisco, and also the United States Attorney for the District of 

Massachusetts, and after holding those lofty positions, came back 

to the criminal courts of Washington, D.C., to try cases—perhaps 

the highest calling, certainly higher than that of a Senator, and 

maybe even higher than that of a Director of the FBI. 

It is our practice on these oversight hearings, Director Mueller, 

to ask you to be sworn in, so if you would stand. Do you swear that 

the testimony you will give before the Judiciary Committee will be 

the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you 

God? 

Director MUELLER. I do. 

Chairman SPECTER. We will turn off the time clock for Director 

Mueller. We will keep it on for the Senators on the 5-minute 

4

rounds, but take the time you need, Mr. Director, to make your 

opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, WASHINGTON D.C. 

Director MUELLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, 

members of the Committee, for having me here today. I am pleased 

to appear before you to thank you, first of all, for your continued 

work with the Bureau. I appreciate your efforts to ensure our success as we pursue the shared goal of making America safer, as well 

as preserving our civil liberties. 

As this Committee knows, much of the last year has been devoted to a national discussion about the tools that should be afforded to the men and women engaged in the fight against terrorism, both at home and abroad. And I do want to thank this 

Committee and the Chairman for your work in producing what I 

consider to be a balanced law reauthorizing the USA PATRIOT 

Act. Through your efforts, our agents will retain the tools necessary 

to wage an effective fight against terrorism, within a framework 

that ensures important safeguards for civil liberties and enhanced 

judicial and Congressional oversight. 

Mr. Chairman, when I last appeared before the Committee, just 

1 month after the President had approved the recommendations of 

what is commonly known as the WMD Commission, we talked 

about a recommendation regarding the establishment of an intelligence service within the FBI. I am pleased to report that the 

FBI’s National Security Branch has been established to ensure the 

integration of the FBI’s primary national security programs under 

the leadership of a single Executive Assistant Director and to implement policies and initiatives designed to enhance the capability 

of the entire FBI to support its national security mission. 

And although still relatively new, the National Security Branch 

is making significant progress in integrating the missions, the capabilities, and the resources of the Counterterrorism, Counterintelligence Divisions, as well as the Directorate of Intelligence. The 

FBI is currently working with the Department of Justice and the 

administration to ensure that the National Security Branch meets 

the directives set forth by the President and is responsive to the 

Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 

While I am optimistic about the National Security Branch, I am 

also aware that some harbor doubts about the FBI’s ability to 

transform itself into a leading intelligence agency. Such critics 

often cite the mistaken believe that the intelligence mission and 

the law enforcement mission are inherently incompatible. They also 

contend that the FBI is reluctant to share information with its 

partner agencies. 

I believe it is important to note that both the 9/11 Commission 

and the WMD Commission found that the intelligence and law enforcement functions should not be separated. They understood that 

intelligence developed in criminal investigations could be relevant 

to ongoing intelligence matters. And, in addition, many of the skills 

necessary to a successful criminal investigation are mirrored in the 

intelligence arena. The need to cultivate confidential informants 

5

and build rapport with cooperating witnesses, the ability to follow 

complex money trails, the ability to decipher the coded language of 

gang members or drug dealers, and the know-how to extract meaning from a collection of seemingly unrelated clues are all skills that 

can be and are being applied to intelligence matters. 

With regard to information sharing, we have doubled the number 

of intelligence analysts in every field, and in every field office we 

have established a Field Intelligence Group, or FIGs, as we call 

them—agents and analysts working together with one shared mission: to leverage intelligence to protect our Nation. From January 

2004 through January 2006, intelligence analyst staffing increased 

on the Field Intelligence Groups by 61 percent, from 617 to 995. 

This increase in analysts has helped to fuel our sharing of intelligence products. Since September 11th, we have disseminated 

more than 20,000 intelligence reports, assessments, and bulletins 

to our partners. 

While our National security efforts remain our top priority, we 

continue to fulfill our crime-fighting responsibilities as well. Public 

corruption and protecting civil rights are the top criminal priorities 

for the FBI. Over the last 2 years, our public corruption investigations have led to the conviction of over 1,000 Government employees involved in corrupt activities, to include 177 Federal officials, 

158 State officials, 360 local officials, and more than 365 police officers. 

Among our civil rights initiatives are our Human Trafficking 

Task Forces as well as an ongoing review of unsolved or inadequately addressed hate crimes that occurred prior to 1970. 

We also continue to focus on violent crime and transnational and 

national criminal organizations. Operating primarily through our 

Safe Streets Task Forces and more recently our MS–13 National 

Gang Task Force, we are working to identify the prolific and violent gangs in the United States. And together with ATF and other 

Federal and State and local agencies, we are investigating, disrupting, and dismantling these criminal enterprises through prosecution under the appropriate laws. 

White-collar crime, particularly corporate fraud, is also an FBI 

priority. We currently have 15 corporate fraud investigations in 

which investors in each of these investigations have lost at least a 

billion dollars. And, in fact, in two of those investigations, they represent $80 billion crimes, and each of those two investigations of 

those 15. And given the impact of these crimes on corporate America and on investors, we will continue to pursue these cases, as we 

have done with Enron, Qwest, WorldCom, HealthSouth, just to 

name a few. 

And while I am confident in our intelligence and law enforcement 

capabilities, our technology must keep pace. As this Committee 

knows, in March of this year we announced the award of the contract for development of the Sentinel program, and that contract 

was awarded to Lockheed Martin. Under the terms of the $305 million contract, Lockheed Martin and its industry partners will use 

proven commercial, off-the-shelf technologies to produce an integrated system that supports processing, storage and management 

of the FBI’s current paper-based record system. The program also 

includes incremental development and delivery of Sentinel capabiliVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:02 Dec 08, 2006 Jkt 031268 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\31268.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
6

ties, including $73 million for operations and maintenance activities. 

And now that the contract has been awarded, we are moving forward with phase one of the development process. Each of the four 

phases will introduce new stand-alone capabilities and will be userfocused. And as each phase is implemented, existing information 

will be transferred to new systems and older legacy systems will 

be retired. 

I do want to emphasize at the outset that the Sentinel program 

is not a reincarnation of the Virtual Case File program. Not only 

will Sentinel provide greater capabilities, it will be deployed on an 

incremental basis over 4 years. And to prevent any missteps, each 

phase of the Sentinel contracting process is being closely scrutinized by a team of FBI technical experts, the GAO, the Office of 

Management and Budget, and the Department of Justice’s Chief 

Information Office, not to mention the Department of Justice’s Inspector General. I know that you are to hear from several of these 

individuals later today. Furthermore, at the urging of Congress, we 

have also engaged outside experts to help us review and assess the 

implementation of Sentinel. 

And without minimizing the disappointments we have had in the 

past, I do believe it important to underscore the improvements that 

have already been achieved in our efforts to modernize the FBI’s 

information technology. 

Today, when an FBI agent sits down at her desk and logs on to 

a computer, he or she is connected at the ‘‘secret’’ level to a fast, 

secure system that allows her to send e-mails, photographs, and 

documents to any other agent or analyst in the Bureau—across the 

country and around the world. 

For ‘‘top secret’’ communications, we have deployed the Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information Operation Network, or 

SCION. And nearly 4,000 personnel have been trained on the 

SCION network as well as on associated intelligence community 

systems. The SCION system is the backbone for the FBI personnel 

to coordinate, collaborate, disseminate, and conduct research on 

analysis in conjunction with the rest of the intelligence community. 

Other technology initiatives, such as the Investigative Data 

Warehouse, have surpassed our expectations. The IDW is a centralized repository for relevant counterterrorism and investigative data 

that allows users to query the information using advanced software 

tools. IDW now contains over 560 million FBI and other agency 

documents from various previously stovepiped systems. Nearly 

12,000 users, including task force members from other Federal, 

State, and local agencies, can access IDW through the FBI’s classified network from any FBI terminal throughout the world. 

And we have worked hard to build a solid foundation for the successful implementation of major information technology investments, and these are just a few examples of our successes. 

Now, while technology is essential to our mission, it is the men 

and women of the FBI who remain our most important asset. It is 

their talent, their creativity, and their commitment to the public 

good that are the true keys to our success and have been the keys 

to our success for the 98 years of our existence. Accordingly, we 

continue to reshape our human resources program to recruit, hire, 

7

train, and retain quality individuals for our expanding human capital needs. 

In my prepared testimony, I discuss additional steps we have 

taken to enhance our human resources, to include the hiring in October of 2005 of a Chief Human Resources Officer with over 20 

years’ experience in the private sector. 

Before I close, Mr. Chairman, I would like to take this opportunity to advise the Committee of a recent report that probably will 

be discussed by the Inspector General today, but it is a report that 

highlights the fact that FBI agents are committed to protecting the 

Nation and are equally committed to the rule of law. As this Committee may recall, shortly after the Republican and Democratic National Conventions in the summer of 2004, media reports stated 

that the FBI had questioned political demonstrators across the 

country in advance of the conventions, leading civil liberties groups 

to allege that the FBI was attempting to chill protesters from exercising their First Amendment rights. At the request of Congress, 

the DOJ Inspector General conducted an investigation and last 

week released its final report on the matter. The OIG did not substantiate the allegations and concluded that all interviews conducted by the FBI of potential convention protesters were conducted for legitimate law enforcement purposes and were conducted consistent with Attorney General guidelines. 

I am pleased but not at all surprised by the Inspector General’s 

findings. The men and women of the FBI understand and appreciate the power entrusted to them and are vigilant in their efforts 

to protect the country while respecting civil liberties. 

Mr. Chairman, this year will mark the 5-year anniversary of 

September 11th. The FBI has changed dramatically since the terrorist attacks of that day, and we will continue to evolve to meet 

the emerging threats to our country. I’d like to invite the members 

of the Committee to the FBI, either our headquarters or our field 

offices, to observe this transformation yourselves. You can spend 

time with the Joint Terrorism Task Forces and the Field Intelligence Groups and see the enhanced technological capabilities 

available in the field. 

I and we are proud of the progress we have made, and I am certainly proud of the dedicated men and women of the FBI who have 

made our transformation possible. 

Thank you for your support of the FBI, Mr. Chairman, and I am 

happy to answer any questions you might have. 

[The prepared statement of Director Mueller appears as a submission for the record.] 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you, Director Mueller. 

We will now proceed to the 5-minute rounds of questioning by 

members. 

Director Mueller, on the issue of information sharing, the GAO 

report in March of this year raises questions about the adequacy 

of the information sharing. We recollect the hearings which this 

Committee had back in June of 2002 where we heard from Agent 

Coleen Rowley and we heard from you about the failure to process 

the information from the Minneapolis Field Office about Zacarias 

Moussaoui. And we also had testimony about the difficulties not 

only within the FBI of understanding the information which you 

8

had, but also on the information sharing. And we now have legislated a new level of bureaucracy with the Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte. 

Is the GAO report accurate that there are still problems on information sharing? And to what extent has the new Office of Director 

of National Intelligence helped, if at all? 

Director MUELLER. There is still work to be done in information 

sharing, but let me point out where we have made substantial 

strides. 

Firstly, the PATRIOT Act has broken down the walls between intelligence and law enforcement exchanges of information. That was 

a substantial problem before September 11th and was identified as 

such by the 9/11 Commission, WMD Commission, the joint Congressional inquiry. And so both within the FBI, where we now can 

initiate investigations—it could be an intelligence investigation 

that may lead to a criminal violation, or it can be an intelligence 

investigation that continues on for a period of time. But that wall 

is down within the FBI. Between the FBI, the CIA, NSA, and other 

entities in the intelligence community, there is now a free exchange 

of information. 

Most specifically, the National Counterterrorism Center is the 

hub of intelligence related to counterterrorism. It has access to the 

information in the data bases of each of the various contributing 

agencies, and while we collect information according to different 

protocols—in the case of the FBI, according to the Constitution, the 

applicable statutes, and the Attorney General’s guidelines—nonetheless, that information that is produced is shared at the National 

Counterterrorism Center where analyses that cut across all of the 

information are done. That is a tremendous advance in terms of 

giving us— 

Chairman SPECTER. Director Mueller, let me followup with you 

on that on an informal basis because of the limitation of the 5-

minute rounds of questions, and also on an informal basis on the 

work which the Bureau is doing on technology acquisition and the 

recent $305 million contract with Lockheed Martin. And let me go 

to the question of the prosecution of newspapers or newspaper reporters under 18 U.S.C. 798 and 50 U.S.C. 421. 

Is it your interpretation of these statutes that Congress intended 

them to apply to the dissemination of classified information by reporters or by newspapers? 

Director MUELLER. Mr. Chairman, I was alerted just before I 

came in that you may ask this question with regard to the applicability of the statutes. I have not had an opportunity to look at the 

statutes to determine their applicability. It’s been several years 

since I have looked at them, so I don’t feel I’d be in a position to 

render an opinion on that. 

Chairman SPECTER. Well, fair enough. It has come into very 

sharp focus as a result of a very extensive New York Times article 

the day before yesterday, so it is true that we have alerted you only 

recently. I asked that you be alerted yesterday. But if you would 

take a look, we can talk about that further. 

Let me move to the Jack Anderson situation. 

Director MUELLER. Yes, sir. 

9

Chairman SPECTER. And the reports that FBI agents have sought 

the return of materials which Jack Anderson had during his lifetime. If the Bureau wants those back, why not earlier? And why 

now at all? 

Director MUELLER. Well, my understanding—and I’d have to 

check this—is that we recently came into possession of information 

indicating that there may be classified national security documents 

within Mr. Anderson’s collection, and the concern was—and our understanding is that collection may well be made available to the 

public. And so the concern was that there may be documents in 

there that relate to the national security, may be classified, and the 

disclosure of those documents may harm the national security. 

I think the agents were doing their job in making the inquiry as 

to whether or not such documents were found or could be found 

there, and were looking for ways so that we can determine whether 

or not there are such documents there, and if there are such documents, whether disclosure would adversely affect the national security. 

Chairman SPECTER. The red light went on in the middle of your 

answer, after your answer started, and I am going to observe the 

time limits meticulously because we have a great many Senators 

here, and we are going to have a vote at 11 o’clock, so I will come 

back to that later in the hearing. 

Senator Kennedy. 

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

The warrantless surveillance issue, 1976, President Ford, Attorney General Levi, welcomed the Judiciary Committee to the Justice 

Department on four different times; in 1978, we passed the FISA 

law. Only one member of the U.S. Senate voted in opposition. Collaboration has been successful in the past. We have heard the testimony now from members of the administration that it is not applicable to the current kinds of situations that we are facing on national security. 

Now we have a situation where we are putting employees at the 

National Security Agency at risk. We have criminal and civil cases 

that are challenging the legality of the administration’s program 

and the warrantless wiretapping. AT&T is back in court. Just this 

last month the Justice Department has filed its own brief in the 

AT&T case. Last month three judges on a panel, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, sent back a criminal case, saying the 

evidence obtained during the NSA’s warrantless surveillance, questioning whether it was used validly. 

How concerned should we be about the current situation where 

we are seeing the repeated challenges? We have had the American 

Bar Association say that the actions of the President of the United 

States have exceeded his authority. We have had the Congressional 

Research Service say the President exceeded his authority. At other 

times when this was an issue, we achieved a bipartisan agreement, 

working together with the administration, that was consistent with 

the national security and the Nation benefited. Why are we not 

back into that situation today? 

Director MUELLER. I don’t believe I can speak to where the Congress is in discussing what if any legislation should be passed to 

address what you have discussed. I can tell you that I believe there 

10

have been several instances around the country, in cases that are 

being prosecuted. in which this issue has arisen, but I do not believe any of them has presented an issue. 

Senator KENNEDY. Where it has arisen, whether the evidence 

that has been obtained has been obtained legally, that issue. 

Director MUELLER. And my understanding is defense counsel 

have raised this in several prosecutions, and judges who are—before whom those prosecutions are pending have looked at the issue 

and determined that the issue is not relevant in those proceedings. 

Senator KENNEDY. I think that this is obviously going to continue 

to be an issue. I think it can be avoided rather simply rather than 

to have it left out there. 

Let me move quickly. In terms of the recruitment by the FBI, in 

terms of Arab and the Muslim community—I asked you about this 

in 2003, about the recruitment efforts in Arab-American, Muslim 

communities. The FBI recruited in the Super Bowl. Can you tell us 

what the results have been in terms of the recruitment within the 

Arab and Muslim community in terms of the FBI? 

Director MUELLER. Senator, since we last discussed this, we’ve 

made substantial efforts to enhance our recruiting. They have been 

successful, but not as successful as I would like. We continue to encourage members from diverse communities within the United 

States to join the FBI. I can get you the figures. I don’t have the 

figures off the top of my head. 

Senator KENNEDY. OK. Just to followup in this area. Many of us 

are interested in the challenges on hate crimes. We know 

anecdotally that these groups, the Muslim and Arab community, 

have been particularly targeted in the wake of 9/11. The FBI keeps 

statistics and figures only on anti-Hispanic and other ethnicities, so 

that it is very difficult from your information that you make generally available to determine how significant this is. Anecdotally, 

other groups report a rather dramatic increase and spike in this. 

I would like to be able to sort of work with you to see if there is 

a way of detecting it. The FBI does provide a range of different 

kinds of opportunities for local law enforcement in the situations 

of hate crimes to be able to go ahead and prosecute, and I would 

like to see if we cannot get a greater focus on it. 

Director MUELLER. I do believe we keep statistics. We keep statistics of hate crimes against Muslim-Americans, Sikh-Americans, 

Arab-Americans, and we can get you those. I can assure you when 

you look at those statistics, we take every one of these hate crimes 

investigations exceptionally seriously, and any number of them 

have been prosecuted at the Federal level as well as the State and 

local level. 

Senator KENNEDY. Just finally—my time is up—on the use of 

confidential informants, you know well the challenge that we had 

in Boston, and we have the Inspector General’s report, and a situation in New York, and the prosecutions of agents down there. What 

assurance can you give to the American people that the agents are 

conforming with the Attorney General guidelines on confidential informants? Now, given the history, we had heard that those are just 

a few bad apples when we had the Boston situation, a few bad apples in terms of New York, now the district attorney’s, up there, 

vigorous prosecution. What can you tell us that you are going to 

11

do to make sure that we have conformance by the agents with the 

standards established by the Agency and the Attorney General? 

Director MUELLER. Given the circumstance in New York, the protocols relating to our handling of informants changed dramatically. 

We also have had other occurrences, out on the West Coast, the 

Leung case. We have—and since that case, we have continued to 

modify our vetting of our confidential informants, have in place appropriate protocols, do a great deal of education. The training at 

Quantico hammers on those instances in the past where protocols 

were not followed. 

So we’ve taken a number of steps to assure that we don’t repeat 

those mistakes of the past. We understand the sensitivity to using 

sources and informants. And I believe—we put in a series of steps 

that are being taken to assure the appropriate oversight of those 

programs, and I believe that the IG’s report indicates and acknowledges a number of the steps that we have taken in that regard. 

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you, Senator Kennedy. 

Under the early bird rule, Senator Grassley. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Director Mueller, I am going to go through 

three questions, and I would ask you to take note so I can go 

through all three, and then you can answer them. They deal with 

the indictment of the FBI agent in New York, the Inspector General’s recent report on the allegations made by Joe Webber about 

the FBI’s lack of coordination with ICE, and last, something about 

Jack Anderson beyond what the Chairman has already brought up. 

In March a grand jury accused former agent Lin DeVecchio of 

taking bribes and giving secret information to his mafia informant, 

which led to the murders of four people, similar to the awful Boston scandal a few years ago. Do you think this is going to cause 

the same sort of damage to the FBI’s reputation as those scandals 

did? Do you approve of the support that this former agent is receiving, because we have current and former FBI personnel publicly 

raising money for him, giving the impression that the FBI might 

be circling the wagons to defend the organization and defend one 

of it own charged with murder? 

Second, I did ask you about the Houston terrorism financing case 

last year. The head of the ICE office said that the FBI was dragging its feet on wiretap application. You agreed that problems at 

the FBI had caused the delay, and then the Inspector General investigated. So just last week the IG completed his report, but the 

FBI classified it secret. The FBI should not abuse its classification 

authority to hide its mistakes from public scrutiny. And I would 

like to get a commitment from you today that you would work with 

the Inspector General’s Office and me to put together a version of 

this report that can be released to the public. 

And then third, according to Jack Anderson’s son, and as closely 

as yesterday, my staff had an opportunity to discuss with him some 

of these issues. Some FBI agents recently tried to get the right to 

take copies of his files by tricking his 79-year-old mother into signing a consent form that she did not understand. They did this by 

returning to speak to Mrs. Anderson alone after her son, who is 

also her attorney, made it clear that any permission to take documents would have to be discussed with the entire family. If that 

12

is true, do you think that that is an appropriate investigate technique? 

That is the end of my three questions. 

Director MUELLER. Let me start with the first one, with the indictment of DeVecchio in New York. That is, quite obviously, not 

good for him, certainly not good for the FBI. The persons who have 

shown support for him are either former agents or not agents on 

duty. Certainly, there was no institutional support when that person is facing such substantial charges in New York. 

Second, with regard to the incident down in Houston, or the case 

down in Houston, we did have a discussion on that. I indicated I 

would welcome the Inspector General’s investigation into that, and 

my understanding is that portions of it are classified, but there are 

two point I would make in response to your issue there. And that 

is, that the report did issue a finding that the FBI did not intentionally delay processing a criminal wiretap application in order to 

derail an ICE investigation. That was the bottom—that was the 

finding. I think it’s the finding that we discussed when we originally discussed this, that there was a miscommunication and there 

was delay. And also my understanding is that in a footnote, the IG 

states the following: the IG found no indications that the FBI overclassified this report to prevent its dissemination. 

So my belief is that there is not over-classification. I can tell you 

from our perspective there is no intent to over-classify the report 

to prevent its dissemination. That’s on the second issue that you 

raised. 

With regard to that, we’re very happy to work with you and the 

IG to find—to try to find a way to produce some summary that is 

not classified. 

Last, with regard to Anderson, I’m not familiar with the circumstances of the interviews there. I do understand at some point 

there was discussion about perhaps family ties, but I would have 

to go back and find out more facts about that interview that you 

advert to, Senator. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Senator Grassley. 

Senator GRASSLEY. The only thing I would say, if the facts are 

like I said, that there was an understanding with her lawyer, also 

her son, that this would be a family matter, then should the FBI 

go back to a 79-year-old woman and confront her by herself? 

Director MUELLER. Senator, I would have to look at the facts of 

the case. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you, Senator Grassley. 

Senator Leahy, in the capacity as Ranking Member, you are recognized for an opening statement, and beyond that, your turn for 

a round of questions. 

STATEMENT OF HON. PATRICK J. LEAHY, A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM THE STATE OF VERMONT 

Senator LEAHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 

your usual courtesy in such matters. I appreciate you convening today’s hearing. I was at a matter with the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and I knew that— 

Director MUELLER. Priorities. 

13

Senator LEAHY. —Director Mueller would forgive me for being a 

little bit late. I think these oversight hearings are extremely important, as I said right after 9/11. In fact, after the oversight hearings 

that I conducted at that time, we acted in the Congress very quickly to give the Bureau new tools to combat terrorism. We funded information technology. We pushed to correct institutional and management flaws that prevented the FBI field agents from operating 

at their full potential. I am concerned four and a half years later 

that the Bureau is not as strong as many of us would like to see. 

Director Mueller, you and your leadership team, the hard-working men and women of the FBI deserve, and they have, the constant appreciation of all of us as Americans for the things you do, 

the sacrifices you make, working tirelessly for decades, especially 

since 9/11, under great pressure. But the constructive oversight I 

think is helpful. 

You have made great strides in enhancing intelligence gathering 

capabilities, but I am very disappointed when I find out the FBI 

has been using those capabilities to conduct domestic surveillance 

on law-abiding American citizens simply because they oppose the 

Government’s war policy in Iraq. The Seattle Post-Intelligencer reported that Federal Government antiterrorism agencies, including 

the FBI, conducted surveillance on long-time Quaker peace activist 

Glen Milner during the 2003 Seafair Festival. A Freedom of Information Act lawsuit has revealed FBI communications about the 

surveillance of several other domestic peace groups. I think we 

have all learned Quakers are going to protest wars. It does not 

make them un-American. It does not make them unpatriotic. In addition Inspector General Fine detailed more than 100 possible surveillance violations reported by the FBI to the Intelligence Oversight Board in the past 2 years. 

Senator Grassley talked about Jack Anderson’s files. This really 

bothers me. I did not agree with everything Mr. Anderson wrote. 

I felt zings from him as everybody else did. But, you know, frankly, 

there is a concern that the FBI may be going into his files because 

of some of the things he discovered about J. Edgar Hoover’s personal life. I have to tell you, if that turns out—well, don’t shake 

your head—if that turns out to be the reason, for one thing, I cannot see any reason going into his files anyway. I mean it is sort 

of like all of these things that get classified that have been in the 

archives for years and years, and suddenly they are classified, or 

things that are on Government websites, and then when it turns 

out they screwed up, the documents are suddenly classified. I 

worry about that. 

Last month the GAO issued a report finding that despite more 

than 4 years of legislation, executive orders and Presidential directives, this administration has yet to comprehensively improve the 

sharing of counterterrorism information among dozens of Federal 

agencies, including the FBI. I know you have several initiatives 

under way to promote better information-sharing, but I look at the 

terrorist watch list that is produced and disseminated by the FBI’s 

Terrorist Screening Center that has been plagued by too many entries and inaccurate information. We see what happened. I mean 

Senator Kennedy has just left here, but on one of these terrorist 

14

watch lists, he has had 10 times he could not get on the airplane 

he has been used to traveling on for 40 years. 

I suggested to him that some of these Irish terrorists look alike, 

but he suggests that may not be it. We had a 1-year-old, less than 

a year old, whose parents had to get a passport to prove that they 

were not the terrorists on the list. 

We learned that Sentinel is going to cost the American taxpayers $425 million to complete. It may not be done until 2009, and rumor 

is that the true cost of Sentinel is being hidden by cutting other 

programs to cover the cost. 

So these are concerns that I have. I am concerned that some of 

the FBI’s mid-level and senior-level counterterrorism experts do 

not have counterterrorism backgrounds. We have given a huge 

amount of money, and the American taxpayers have given a huge 

amount of money to the FBI. I worry that it is not being used effectively. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Leahy appears as a submission for the record.] 

I will go ahead and begin my questioning. You can go ahead and 

set the clock on that. 

Chairman SPECTER. We will set the clock at 5 minutes, Senator 

Leahy, for your round of questioning. 

Senator LEAHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director, you cited the Inspector General’s report and the FBI’s 

investigative activities concerning the potential protestors at both 

the 2004 Democratic and Republican National Conventions. The report was reassuring as far as it went. But it was limited to allegations arising out of the political conventions, and did not address 

other incidents where the FBI has been alleged to have improperly 

targeted Americans based on their exercise of the First Amendment rights. I mentioned the Seafair Festival in Seattle. There is 

evidence that you have been monitoring other peace groups across 

the Nation, including the Raging Grannies, scary group if there 

ever were, a group of elderly peace advocates who sing at events; 

and the Thomas Merton Center for Peace and Justice, a Catholic 

peace organization in Pittsburgh. These are groups with no history 

of violence. 

One FBI memo, released pursuant to FOIA request, reads as follows: ‘‘The Thomas Merton Center’’—that is the Catholic peace organization I mentioned—‘‘is a left-wing organization advocating, 

among many political causes, pacifism. TMC holds daily leaflet distribution activities in downtown Pittsburgh and is currently focused on its opposition to the potential war with Iraq.’’ This is the 

memo. The memo is dated a few months before the invasion in 

Iraq. It goes on to say that TMC’s executive director stated to a 

local reporter that ‘‘there are more than a few Muslims and people 

of Middle Eastern descent among the regulars attending meetings 

at the Merton Center’s East Library Headquarters.’’ And then they 

say the FBI ‘‘photographed TMC leaflet distributors,’’ and ‘‘these 

photographs are being reviewed by IT Pittsburgh specialists.’’ The 

memo concludes ‘‘one female leaflet distributor, who appeared to be 

of Middle Eastern descent, inquired if the agent was an FBI agent. 

No other TMC participants appeared to be of Middle Eastern descent.’’ 

15

What possible business does the FBI have spying on law-abiding 

American citizens simply because they may oppose the war in Iraq? 

I have said to others, you know, you could save a lot of money and 

time, turn on C–SPAN. I oppose the war in Iraq, and I say so on 

the Senate floor all the time. Maybe I should get my FBI report. 

But go ahead and tell me what possible reasons? 

Director MUELLER. Well, Senator, let me start by saying that the 

IG report—again, there were rumors and there were allegations. 

The IG report put to bed those rumors and allegations relating to 

surveillance at the convention. In every instance that we have— 

Senator LEAHY. I am not— 

Director MUELLER. In every instance we have, Senator— 

Senator LEAHY. On Thomas Merton. 

Director MUELLER. On that particular case, sir, it was as an outgrowth of an investigation. We were attempting to identify an individual. The agents were not concerned about the political dissent. 

They were attempting to identify an individual who happened to 

be, we believed, in attendance at that rally. I’d be happy to have 

the IG look into that and any other of the assertions or allegations 

that you made in terms of our investigating persons who are exercising their First Amendment rights. 

To my knowledge, we have not surveilled the Quakers. To my 

knowledge, I have not heard about that group you talk about of the 

Grannies, and I am very happy to have the IG investigate those 

assertions, rumors and allegations that may have been spread in 

the newspapers, to assure that that is not the case. 

And I am concerned that raising to this level without a shred of 

evidence that there is any support for those rumors, that the public 

have the perception that the FBI is conducting this type of surveillance. 

Senator LEAHY. Well, on the Thomas Merton one, the synopsis on 

the FBI’s report is: ‘‘To report results of investigation of Pittsburgh 

anti-war activity.’’ You say not a shred of evidence. Director, this 

is kind of clear, and if you are talking about—

Director MUELLER. I would be happy to have— 

Senator Leahy [continuing]. Anti-war activists, I mean we have 

a group that meets out in Montpelier once a week. Now, they have 

been surveilled. Good Lord. There are some people in this country 

who do not approve of the war. It does not mean they are not patriotic. 

Director MUELLER. Well, Senator, if you can give me the facts 

supporting the proposition that the FBI surveilled that group, I 

would certainly look into it, and I will ask the IG to look into the— 

Senator LEAHY. I am reading it from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s report ‘‘to report results of investigation of Pittsburgh 

anti-war activity.’’ 

Director MUELLER. I gave you the background of that report, 

Senator, and I would be happy to have the IG followup on that. 

Senator LEAHY. I am sending somebody down with a copy of it 

right now. Let us Xerox that and then just give it to him. 

Mr. Chairman, my time is up but I will have a number of other 

questions. I do want to go back to Sentinel, and when I do, Director, I want to ask if other programs in the FBI have been cut back 

or money taken from them to pay for the Sentinel program. 

16

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you, Senator Leahy. 

Senator DeWine. 

Senator DEWINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director, I would like to discuss the FISA backlog issue. As you 

will remember, we have discussed this before. In fact, I have been 

raising this concern with you and with the Attorney General and 

others for several years. When I asked you about it at a Judiciary 

Committee oversight hearing in 2004, this was what you said, and 

I quote, ‘‘We still have some concerns and we are addressing it 

with the Department of Justice, but there is still frustration out 

there in the field in certain areas, where, because we have had to 

prioritize, we cannot get to certain requests for FISA as fast as perhaps we might have in the past.’’ End of quote. 

Mr. Director, the reason I keep pushing to get this problem fixed 

is that FISA, of course, is one of the most important tools we have 

in the fight against terrorism. We need to use it as much as appropriate, and when we use it, it needs to be quick and efficient. 

Now, I understand that the use of FISA was up substantially 

from 2004 to 2005. I have been told that the FISA backlog has now 

been significantly reduced, but not yet eliminated. This is still a 

problem in a number of ways and it has a major impact on the FBI 

because I am told that officers have to have their FISA renewal 

packages submitted to the FBI 45 days before the FISA warrant 

expires, because it takes that long for the renewal package to work 

its way through the FBI, the Department of Justice, and the FISA 

Court. 

I understand that last year there were over 2,000 FISA applications, and that there are currently close to 100 lawyers who work 

on these issues at the Justice Department. This sounds as though 

it should be more than sufficient to handle the FISA caseload in 

a speedy and efficient manner. 

Let me ask you a series of questions, and if you could respond 

to them. 

First, why do these backlogs and delays persist? 

Second, do you believe we need more attorneys being involved in 

this? Do you think we need more FISA judges? Do you believe we 

need changes in the internal review process at the FBI or at the 

Justice Department? 

Further, how does the Bureau of Department of Justice now actually define a backlog? Has there been a change in the definition 

of what a backlog is? After how many days is a case considered to 

be part of the backlog? How and when did you arrive at the figure, 

and are you looking at ways to reduce it even further? 

Director MUELLER. Quite a number of questions, Senator, so let 

me, if I could, address generally the progress that has been made 

in trying to stay up to date on the FISAs. 

We still have to prioritize, although, as you pointed out, the 

backlog has dropped. The delays are attributable to—can be attributable to a number of factors. It may be the necessity for adding 

additional facts, in which it goes back to the field for those facts. 

But to the bottom line in terms of whether the process would be 

augmented by additional attorneys, a look at the work flow or additional judges, yes, I do believe that additional resources would assist in terms of attorneys. We continuously are looking at improvVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:02 Dec 08, 2006 Jkt 031268 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\31268.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
17

ing the work flow, particularly with the technology so that documents can be sent back and forth through a dedicated network as 

opposed to being sent back and forth, which will be a substantial 

improvement. I do not at this juncture—I am probably not the one 

to respond to the question as to whether we need additional FISA 

judges, and I will say that the additional FISA judges that we 

did—well, the FISA Court as a whole is working exceptionally 

hard, as you can tell from the number of applications that they reviewed. I, as well as anybody who reviews these applications, 

would welcome some mechanism to reduce the amount of paperwork that goes in each application. Each application is approximately a half inch thick in terms of paper, and compiling all that 

paper and putting it in a package for the Court is a substantial 

process. All of us would benefit from having a procedure that was 

somewhat expedited. 

My expectation is that with the establishment of the National 

Security Division at the Department of Justice, that in addition to 

the deputy’s office, which is looking at this, we will have another 

actor over there that is looking at these issues. 

Senator DEWINE. Definition of backlog is the same definition? 

Are we comparing apples to apples? 

Director MUELLER. I would have to go and look at the definition, 

but I have no reason to believe that we’re not comparing apples to 

applies. Certainly, nobody is trying to change the—I have not 

seen—and I get a breakdown every month—I have not seen a 

change in the reporting in any event, much less to make it appear 

that the backlog was reduced. 

Senator DEWINE. Well, my time is up, but the summary would 

be more attorneys would be helpful; somebody else can make the 

decision about judges; reduced paperwork would be helpful; expedited process would be helpful. 

Director MUELLER. Yes. 

Senator DEWINE. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you, Senator DeWine. 

Senator Feinstein. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome, Mr. Mueller. I wanted to ask you three questions. I 

will try to be brief, and if your answers could as well, I can get 

through the questions. 

In 5 years you have had six different heads of Counterterrorism, 

and six different executive assistant directors overseeing 

Counterterrorism. Last week, Gary Bald, the new head of the National Security Branch, announced that he too is leaving. What is 

the reason for this high turnover? What are you doing about it? 

And do you ask people when they join that they be required at 

least to stay for a period of time? 

Director MUELLER. Putting it in perspective, there are a number 

of factors that have contributed to the turnover. The first is, you 

take somebody like Gary Bald, who I’ll use as an example. He has 

30 years of service to the FBI and to the country. He has kids in 

college. He has worked in counterterrorism for at least the last four 

or 5 years, whether the head of the Counterterrorism Division, and 

then head of the National Security Branch. He had a tremendous 

18

opportunity for both him and his family that would be very difficult 

for him to continue. So the opportunities outside, particularly since 

September 11th, where everyone wants a security director, and the 

obvious fact that many of these corporations can pay far more than 

the Federal Government is a factor. The fact that a person has 

spent 30 years in the FBI in a career and still can have a second 

career, and has to make an earlier decision, is a factor. And the 

last factor is that we work 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and it’s 

a lot of pressure on persons in those positions. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Let me stop you for a moment. How long had 

he been in the job? 

Director MUELLER. How long had he been in the job? As the head 

of National Security Branch, probably 6 months. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Doesn’t he consider that before he takes that 

job? 

Director MUELLER. He does— 

Senator FEINSTEIN. I mean these are critical jobs at a critical 

time, and it would seem to me that somebody would not take a job 

for 6 months and then accept something else that came along. It 

would also seem to me that in terms of management practices, this 

ought to be advised against, counseled against, and if somebody 

cannot give you a commitment of time, why hire him? 

Director MUELLER. I understand what you’re saying, and it is an 

issue we’re wrestling with. I will tell you that since September 11th 

we have developed, I think, a very strong bench, particularly in 

counterterrorism. We have a number of people who have been 

working in counterterrorism before September 11th who are coming along, and a strong bench of those who have worked in 

counterterrorism solely on that issue since September 11th. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. All I am saying is you have had six different 

heads, and I think that is a problem. 

Director MUELLER. I understand that. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Now, today the Washington Post indicates 

that you have filed 9,200 national security letters and 2,072 FISA 

Court warrants. I was interested in Senator DeWine’s questions. I 

have written a letter to the Attorney General asking him process 

questions, and he has not responded. We have asked a second time. 

He still has not responded. I am a member of that Subcommittee 

looking at the National Security Administration’s electronic surveillance program. How much time does the FBI need to get a FISA 

warrant? What is the average time? You have clearly gotten 2,072 

of them, if the press is correct. What is the average time it takes 

to process a FISA warrant? 

Director MUELLER. I would have to provide you those figures, 

and it would require going back and looking through records to provide you those figures, and the difference would be between an 

emergency FISA application and a non-emergency FISA application, quite obviously. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Can you also tell us how many of these 2,072 

were emergency? 

Director MUELLER. I cannot off the top of my head. I can provide 

you those figures. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. If you would, I certainly appreciate that. 

Director MUELLER. Yes. 

19

Senator FEINSTEIN. Let me ask the third question then. In his 

written statement, Inspector General Fine notes that there is 

shared responsibility for port security between the FBI and the 

Coast Guard, but that confusion exists over each agency’s authority, affecting the ability to establish a clear and effective command 

structure. General Fine states that the response to a maritime incident could be ‘‘confused and potentially disastrous.’’ That is a quote 

from the report. 

These are strong words, and this is clearly unacceptable. What 

is the FBI doing to address this concern and the other 18 recommendations of the IG? 

Director MUELLER. We’re addressing each of the recommendations of the IG, I can assure you. And with regard to the responsibilities, there is a preliminary agreement that we had with the 

Coast Guard in terms of our responsibilities being in the investigation arena, as opposed to the interdiction arena that generally 

would be the Coast Guard. Now, we are working with DHS and the 

Coast Guard and discussing how we can be more precise in the allocation of responsibilities. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. I might say that if I were the Director and 

saw this response from a very good IG, and his comment is the response to a maritime incident could be ‘‘confused and potentially 

disastrous,’’ those are very strong words. 

Director MUELLER. They are strong words. I will tell you that 

we’ve had a number of incidents—

Senator FEINSTEIN. It seems to me it ought to be beyond ‘‘I am 

going to look into the situation.’’ 

Director MUELLER. Well, we have had a number of incidents over 

the years in which we have worked very closely with the Coast 

Guard. I have every confidence—I understand the words that Mr. 

Fine used. I understand they’re strong, and I understand his concern. And we are addressing that concern in terms of developing 

a new MOU as opposed to the draft MOU that we have been working on for a number of years. But I’m also comfortable and confident, based on our working with the Coast Guard in the past on 

any number of incidents, that depending on the incident, the appropriate personnel will be brought to bear. And so I don’t want 

the impression left that I’m not concerned about it. I am concerned 

about the IG’s finding. I am concerned that we reach a more formalized understanding quickly, but I am also comfortable and confident that our relationships with the Coast Guard and the way we 

handle these incidents together, based on our history, would indicate that such an incident, as it came along, we would allocate the 

appropriate responsibilities and move forward. 

Now, I understand what Mr. Fine has said, and we are moving 

to address that. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you. I am over my time. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you, Senator Feinstein. 

Senator Cornyn. 

Senator CORNYN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome, Director Mueller. I have two questions for you. The 

first had to do with the Brandon Mayfield case. And as you know, 

Mr. Mayfield was a lawyer in Portland, Oregon, who was arrested 

20

for allegedly, or was under suspicion of participating in the Madrid 

bombing. First of all, I want to tell you, as someone who supported 

the PATRIOT Act and its reauthorization, I am glad to see that the 

Inspector General found that the Government did not misuse any 

provisions of the Act, but I am troubled by some of the reported 

actions of the FBI in this case. 

Some of the missteps found by the Inspector General were that 

the material affidavit and report of the arrest of Mayfield contained 

several inaccuracies, including an ‘‘unfounded inference’’ regarding 

fake travel documents. The FBI Lab’s arrogance caused it to disregard questions raised by other professionals, and once the mistake was made public, the FBI made several statements as to the 

cause of the misidentification, which turned out not to be true. 

I know the Office of Professional Responsibility is in charge of 

the investigation, and I do not know where the investigation 

stands, but I certainly hope that strong actions will be taken if 

these are indeed the facts, to make sure that these sorts of things 

do not happen in the future. 

Would you like to comment on that? 

Director MUELLER. Yes. The report is absolutely accurate in 

terms of we made a mistake, that our examiners—I’m not certain 

I’d use the exact same word, ‘‘arrogance,’’ but certainly self-assurance, where they shouldn’t have been self assured, particularly 

when the authorities in Madrid had questioned it. There should 

have been a reevaluation of it, a much closer review of it than was 

done at that time. It was unique in that there was significant similarities between the prints, but that’s no excuse. We should have 

done a better job. We made a mistake on those prints. 

And I can tell you we have taken steps. Where the IG has indicated actions need be taken, we have taken each of those actions. 

Indeed, before the IG report, we had brought in a panel of experts 

ourselves to look at our processes to assure that to the extent that 

we could change those protocols to make certain that this didn’t 

happen again, we did. So we want to make certain it does not happen again. 

Senator CORNYN. With regard to the IG’s statement that the FBI 

made several statements as to the cause of the misidentification 

that were not true, can you tell us any more about that? 

Director MUELLER. I’d have to go back and look at the specifics 

of that. That did not hit me as the most important aspect of what 

the IG told us in that report. 

Senator CORNYN. I want to followup on a question Senator Kennedy asked you about noncompliance with the Attorney General’s 

guidelines with regard to the use of confidential informants. He 

mentioned that. But I was struck to see that the report of the Inspector General found that there were one on more guidelines violations in 87 percent of the confidential informant files that were 

examined, including 49 percent noncompliance with FBI agents 

giving proper instructions to informants. 

As you know, there are serious and high-profile problems that 

were mentioned in Boston, there were some in Forth Worth, with 

regard to the misuse of informants, and also in a another law enforcement agency, ICE. I have been seeking information about an 

ICE informant, who has been involved in multiple murders while 

21

under ICE’s control. Can you tell us what you are doing at the FBI 

to improve compliance with the Attorney General’s guidelines? 

Director MUELLER. Yes. In the wake of the IG’s report, we have 

gone out—an education program, an assurance from top-down that 

documentation, appropriate documentation is done in the files to 

assure that the files reflect the work that has been done by the 

Agency in handling the informants. I believe the Inspector General 

is familiar with the change of protocols in the wake of the Leung 

case out in Los Angeles, so it is a combination of changing the protocols, training of agents so they better understand what is required in terms of handling informants, and last, assuring that 

particularly in our inspections and the like, we make certain that 

we cover those issues. 

Senator CORNYN. Thank you very much. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Senator Cornyn. 

Senator Feingold. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Mueller, as you reference in your testimony, the PATRIOT Act Conference Report requires the Inspector General of the 

Justice Department to complete a comprehensive audit of the FBI’s 

use of national security letters and Section 215 business record orders. And I understand that that audit is under way. Is that right? 

Director MUELLER. I believe that is correct. And I will turn to 

Mr. Fine, yes. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I note that the Inspector General indicated 

that it is. 

In the President’s signing statement, he suggested that he may 

not share the results of this audit with Congress, in direct violation 

of the Conference Report requirements. Will you commit to me 

today that you will fight within the administration to allow these 

audits to be shared with Congress, in a classified setting, if necessary, so that we can fulfill our oversight responsibilities? 

Director MUELLER. Needless to say, I’m bound by the administration, but I see no reason why the report could not be shared in 

some context with Congress. 

Senator FEINGOLD. So you would fight for that, given the clarity 

of the law. 

Director MUELLER. All I can say, that I can see no reason why 

it would not be shared with Congress. I note that that Congress 

has been—there was a report that came from the Attorney General 

on the number of national security letters that have been issued in 

the last year. So my expectation is that they’ll be disclosed to Congress. I see no reason why they should not. 

Now, whether I go out there and fight for it is another issue. I 

will tell you that I see no objection to providing it to Congress. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I have a lot of regard for you, and I think you 

should fight for it. I mean, this is the law, and I would hope you 

would commit to fighting within the administration to comply with 

the law in this case by making this information available. But, I 

do not take your answer as being a refusal in that regard, and I 

look forward to your active role, if it becomes necessary. 

Director MUELLER. Yes, sir. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Unfortunately, the President’s signing statement on the PATRIOT Act is hardly the first time that he has 

22

shown a disrespect for the rule of law. The Boston Globe reported 

on Sunday that the President has used signing statements to reserve the right to break the law more than 750 times, and as we 

all know too well, he secretly authorized Government officials to 

violate the FISA law for more than four years, and continues to do 

so. 

Mr. Director, the President’s action raised some difficult questions for those of us in Congress. Take the PATRIOT Act. We completed our work on reauthorizing the PATRIOT Act in March. How 

can we know whether the Government will comply with the new 

laws that we passed? I am not placing the blame on you, obviously, 

or your agents, who work to protect this country every day, but 

how can we have any assurance that you or your agents have not 

received a secret directive from above requiring you to violate laws 

that we all think apply today? 

Director MUELLER. Senator, I am not familiar with the particular 

signing statements that you discuss, but I can assure you with regard to the FBI, that our actions will be taken according to appropriate legal authorities. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I appreciate that, and all I can say is that if 

somebody had told me back in November when we were debating 

the PATRIOT Act that I would feel it necessary to ask the FBI Director for assurances that he and his agents were not being directed by the President or the Justice Department to violate the 

PATRIOT Act as Congress wrote it, I would not have believed it, 

and yet, here we are. But I appreciate, obviously, your answer. 

Mr. Director, on Friday afternoon, the Justice Department released information about the use of national security letters and orders under Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, and that report states 

that in 2005, the Government made, and the FISA Court approved, 

155 applications for Section 215 orders to obtain business records 

and other tangible things. The report also states that in 2005, 

9,254 national security letters were issued related to U.S. citizens 

or lawful permanent residents. I would like to just ask a few quick 

questions about those statistics. 

First of all, the report does not cover NSLs concerning individuals who are not U.S. persons; is that correct? 

Director MUELLER. I’m not certain on that. 

Senator FEINGOLD. It seems to me that your staff agrees. 

Director MUELLER. My staff indicates that you’re correct. 

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Director. And it does not include NSLs issued to obtain phone and Internet subscriber information; is that not correct? 

Director MUELLER. That is also correct. 

Senator FEINGOLD. So the report does not cover the sum total of 

all NSLs, obviously. 

Director MUELLER. Correct. 

Senator FEINGOLD. But despite those facts, the number of NSLs 

in this report is far, far larger than the number of Section 215 orders. Why is there such a disparity between the use of Section 215 

orders and the use of national security letters? 

Director MUELLER. I’d have to get back to you on that. I haven’t 

given that much thought. Senator, I have to get back to you with 

an answer on that. 

23

Senator FEINGOLD. I look forward to that, because I fear that the 

reason might be that under Section 215 they have to go before a 

judge, and they do not with NSLs. 

Director MUELLER. That is true. 

Senator FEINGOLD. And if that is not the reason, I look forward 

to whatever light you can shed on this in the future. 

Director MUELLER. That’s true, you do use—the number of NSLs 

that you mentioned was in excess of 9,000, but it is on 3,500 persons. In other words, one person could have had a number of NSLs, 

seeking different pieces of information on that particular person. 

Senator FEINGOLD. I understand that, but it is still a great disparity, and it may point to the need for even greater protections 

with regard to the NSLs. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold. 

Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Director Mueller, I appreciate your service 

and the long professional history and background you bring to the 

position that you hold. 

When Director Ridge left, not long after he left, he said, if I had 

one bit of advice to give to my successor at DHS, Department of 

Homeland Security, it would be that we have a biometric identifier 

for those who come in and out of the country, and it be the fingerprint. 

You and I have talked about that before. Based on your experience in law enforcement, the base use of fingerprints throughout 

our system, would you agree that as we move forward to create a 

more workable entry-exit system into our country that we do need 

a biometric identifier, and the fingerprint would be the best idea 

there? 

Director MUELLER. I believe that the fingerprint should be the 

foundation biometric, but I know a number of people, including at 

DHS, are exploring the addition of other biometrics that would 

even give you more certitude in terms of individuals, but, absolutely, the fingerprint should be the foundation biometric that we 

use. 

Senator SESSIONS. That is good. I think it should be the basis because if you come up with a new system, the people that have been 

arrested in the United States for crimes that have had their fingerprints made a part of the record, they would not be picked up by 

a new system, would they? 

Director MUELLER. That’s correct, they would not. But additionally, as you, a former prosecutor, know as well as I do, that fingerprints are left at scenes of crime. It can be in a cave in Afghanistan. They can be left in a safe house in Iraq. And when those latent prints are fed into the fingerprint system, matches are possible that you would not have with any other biometric system, 

which is an additional reason why, in my mind, the fingerprint 

should be the foundational biometric. 

Senator SESSIONS. And FBI manages the fingerprint system nationwide. 

Director MUELLER. We do, yes. 

24

Senator SESSIONS. There is no capacity problem that you know 

of that could not be solved that deals with the additional fingerprints that might need to go in the system? 

Director MUELLER. No. We have on the drawing boards and are 

seeking money from Congress for the next iteration of that fingerprint system. 

Senator SESSIONS. The Inspector General completed a sixth review that examines efforts to integrate the Federal law enforcement and immigration agencies’ automatic fingerprint data bases. 

It has not been done yet, and we have been working on that for 

quite some time, to allow law enforcement and immigration officers 

to more easily identify criminals, known or suspected terrorists entering the United States. The review is continuing to assess the 

FBI and DOJ actions since December of 2004 to achieve full interoperability of FBI and DHS, Department of Homeland Security, 

fingerprint systems. Do you think that is important? How far away 

are we from making that happen? 

Director MUELLER. It is important. The Inspector General has 

looked at this over a number of years. I give a lot of credit to Mike 

Chertoff for understanding that we needed to be on the same page, 

and I think since 2004 we’ve made substantial strides in resolving 

that issue. 

Senator SESSIONS. Let me tell you what I think the problem is. 

The American people are being asked to accept a new and generous 

immigration system. They are also being told that we are going to 

create a system of entry and exist, both at our airports, our ports 

and our borders, that will actually work. It seems to me that the 

American people have a right to be concerned that on matters like 

this that has taken so long, the entry-exit systems that still are not 

in place yet, many of which are not part of your bailiwick, not part 

of your responsibility, but I think we have a right to ask and expect 

that by the time we create any new immigration system, that this 

would be a big part of it. 

First I will ask you, don’t you think an effective entry-exit system is important, and I understand you to say that fingerprints are 

a key part of that? 

Director MUELLER. Yes. Yes, to both. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Senator Sessions. 

Senator Schumer. 

Senator SCHUMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Director Mueller, and I thank you for your efforts to help bring the FBI 

into the 21st century. It is a big job. 

The first question I have is on surveillance programs. In March, 

the U.S. News and World Report published an article in which they 

claimed that the same legal reasoning that the administration used 

in defense of secret NSA electronic surveillance was floated as support for warrantless physical searches. According to the article, you 

were alarmed and personally very concerned, not only because of 

the blow-back issue but also because of the legal and constitutional 

questions raised by warrantless physical searches. Is this true? 

Director MUELLER. I am not familiar with any discussions about 

utilizing an authority, whatever authority, to undertake 

warrantless physical searches? 

25

Senator SCHUMER. So was U.S. News wrong in that? 

Director MUELLER. I do not know what the reporter at U.S. News 

is talking about. 

Senator SCHUMER. OK. So let me ask you the question: Would 

you have legal or constitutional concerns about the use of 

warrantless physical searches in the United States? 

Director MUELLER. Yes. 

Senator SCHUMER. That is a quick, straight, and to-the-point answer. 

To your knowledge, has the FBI conducted any such searches? 

Director MUELLER. No. 

Senator SCHUMER. Is it possible that such searches could have 

been conducted by FBI agents during your tenure without your 

knowledge? 

Director MUELLER. It’s possible, but I would doubt it. 

Senator SCHUMER. OK. The article also mentions that both you 

and Jim Comey had concerns about the NSA domestic surveillance 

program that the President has confirmed because you were worried about the ability to use any evidence that it might have gathered in court. Is this true? 

Director MUELLER. I really believe I shouldn’t go into discussions 

I may have had with others in the administration. 

Senator SCHUMER. OK. 

Director MUELLER. And to the extent that there were concerns, 

there was an OLC opinion that supported the legality of the NSA 

program. 

Senator SCHUMER. But you—well, let me ask you: Do you have 

concerns? Do you believe evidence collected by the NSA without a 

warrant could be successfully challenged in a criminal prosecution 

in court? 

Director MUELLER. I would say that there have been a number 

of cases so far in which this issue has been raised, and my understanding that in each case the judge who is presiding over the trial 

has not found it to be an issue. 

Senator SCHUMER. OK. Let me ask you this: Is there anything 

wrong with the Committee seeing the OLC opinion? 

Director MUELLER. That’s out of my bailiwick. That’s up to the 

Department of Justice. 

Senator SCHUMER. Well, what do you think? Why shouldn’t—I 

mean, there is so much secrecy about this whole thing, and I think 

it drives people on both sides of the aisle—well, it makes us upset. 

Director MUELLER. I think that’s an issue to be taken up with 

the Department of Justice. I have no say over what is released 

from—particularly when it’s not our document. 

Senator SCHUMER. OK. Next I would like to ask about watchlists. 

We all know what watchlists are. They are important. But according to one report, there were several watchlists at one time, terrorist watchlists. 

Director MUELLER. True. 

Senator SCHUMER. And the President set up a Terrorist Screening Center to consolidate and streamline this information, making 

sure it is accurate and effective. That is a common-sense idea. 

It is now 5 years, and we still do not have an accurate, comprehensive data base, according to the Inspector General Fine’s tesVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:02 Dec 08, 2006 Jkt 031268 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\31268.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
26

timony. And what is more, the Inspector General’s office anticipates it will take several more years for the Terrorist Screening 

Center to fully review the records for accuracy and completeness. 

First, do you agree with that assessment? 

Director MUELLER. Yes, sir. Records, when you combine the 

records from no less than, I think, 12 separate agencies in order 

to obtain a comprehensive terrorist list where there have been any 

number of agencies that have contributed the information that has 

put a name on a terrorist list, yes, sir, there are inaccuracies. I 

know that the Terrorist Screening Center is working hard, very 

hard. They have prioritized to eliminate those inaccuracies, but because of the size of the list, yes, it will take some time. 

Senator SCHUMER. Do you think 5 years? 

Director MUELLER. I can’t— 

Senator SCHUMER. You know, it is taking so—I mean, we understand that these things take a while, but whether it is computers 

or these watch lists, I mean, it seems to me that just from my 

small knowledge of this and of corporate America, if a corporation, 

a large corporation—an IBM, a General Electric—had this problem, 

it wouldn’t take them 5 or 7 years to solve. 

Director MUELLER. Well, they may have the personnel and the 

moneys to put to it. But I can tell you that we— 

Senator SCHUMER. Do you not have enough— 

Mr. MUELLER [continuing]. Have over 200,000 names that have 

to be vetted. That takes a long time. 

Senator SCHUMER. Do you have adequate—if we gave you more 

personnel and money, could you do it quicker? 

Director MUELLER. Yes. 

Senator SCHUMER. OK. Just one final question. The OIG made 

40 recommendations for improving the TSC. Do you intend to follow all of them? What steps have been taken to follow these recommendations so far? How many remain largely undone? 

Director MUELLER. I’d have to get back to you. In general, almost—I think Glenn Fine would tell you almost to a one we follow 

the recommendations. Occasionally, there are one or two that we 

disagree on and we’ll have a discussion. 

Senator SCHUMER. I would ask, Mr. Chairman, unanimous consent that the Director be given some chance to answer that in writing with a little more specificity. I don’t expect it here. 

Chairman SPECTER. It is acceptable to have him submit written 

responses. Thank you very much, Senator Schumer. 

Senator SCHUMER. Thank you. 

Chairman SPECTER. Senator Durbin? 

Senator Schumer. You are willing to submit those, I take it? 

Director MUELLER. Yes, sir. 

Senator SCHUMER. OK, thanks. 

Chairman SPECTER. Senator Durbin? 

Senator DURBIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The microphone is 

still warm. 

When we reauthorized the PATRIOT Act, one of the major concerns was its impact on libraries. And we felt, when we wrote the 

language—I use that term loosely because I did not specifically 

write that language, but Congress—that we had finally cleared it 

up, that unless a library was an Internet provider in its traditional 

27

function of just providing Internet services to its customers, that it 

would not be subject to an NSL. Is that your understanding now 

under the reauthorized PATRIOT Act? 

Director MUELLER. I’d have to go back and look at the specific 

language. I can tell you that we have not—well, you’ve made the 

distinction between a library serving as an Internet service provider, which is one sticking point. I’d have to go back and look at 

the specific language, or could you hold just 1 second? Let me see 

if I could... 

[Pause.] 

Director MUELLER. We would have to go back. It’s somewhat of 

a complicated provision. I’d want to be precise in my answer to you. 

So I’d appreciate the opportunity to go back and take a closer look 

at it. 

Senator DURBIN. We felt that we had finally put to rest the concerns of the library community that there were only a handful of 

libraries across America that served as Internet providers that may 

have been subject to the NSLs under the new reauthorized PATRIOT Act. And so if you would be kind enough to come back with, 

as explicit as you can, your understanding as to whether we accomplished in your eyes what we set out to do. 

Director MUELLER. OK. I will say—there is one item you said 

that I’d probably take exception to, and that is, there is but a handful that are Internet service providers, and maybe the distinction 

between an Internet service provider and one who provides computer services in a library, because many, many libraries now 

across the country provide computer services. 

Senator DURBIN. I will tell you, on the basis of what you just said 

we are going to be inundated by libraries now who thought this 

was cleared up. Please look at this— 

Director MUELLER. I did not mean—I will give you a precise answer. I did not mean to confuse the issue at all. 

Senator DURBIN. Please give us a timely answer, because there 

is a genuine concern across America in this community, and we felt 

we had finally put it to rest. And I wanted to hear those words 

from you so that I could sleep easy. But now I am going to have 

restless nights until you get back. Please do that as soon as you 

can. 

Let me move to another issue. A great source of frustration that 

we run into is when people are going through the naturalization 

process and they have to be subject to basic fingerprint analysis by 

the FBI. And the timing of this analysis is now a matter of grave 

concern because it is taking longer and longer for the FBI to complete this fingerprint and background check. 

Could you tell me if you are monitoring this, particularly in light 

of our current debate, which could dramatically expand the number 

of applicants for naturalization? 

Director MUELLER. Yes, I will have to get back to you on that. 

I did not understand that to be the case, but I will check on that 

and get back to you. 

Senator DURBIN. A serious issue. When we contact Citizenship 

and Immigration Services, they point the finger at you. They usually claim the background check is pending at the FBI. Now, 

28

maybe that is a convenient excuse. Whatever. I am sorry. I said 

‘‘fingerprint check.’’ I meant ‘‘name check.’’ 

Director MUELLER. Oh, name checks. 

Senator DURBIN. Name check, please, if you could address that. 

Director MUELLER. Yes, that has been on my radar screen, and 

we have been addressing that, and there is a very small percentage 

of name checks that we do not get back to very quickly. But I will 

have to get you those statistics. 

Senator DURBIN. OK. 

Director MUELLER. I know that that has been a concern. 

Senator DURBIN. Thank you. I apologize for confusing that. 

You and I have had a long conversation about technology, and 

I am certainly not an expert at that nor claim to be. But it appears 

that you have been through several major crises with that, starting 

with what you inherited at the FBI. I guess the kindest thing to 

say is one failed attempt to try to reform the system at great expense, and now you are involved in another attempt. Can you just 

tell me how I would explain to people why this became so complicated with the FBI to establish a modern computer system? 

Director MUELLER. I would reframe the question a wee bit in the 

sense that, yes, we had problems prior to September 11th. We have 

had any number of technological successes since then, all of which 

are overshadowed by the failure of one aspect of the Trilogy project. 

That is the Virtual Case File. People do not acknowledge that we 

have put new computers on everybody’s desk. So we put through 

the—put down the local area networks, the wide area networks. 

We have IDW, Investigative Data Warehouse, all of which we have 

brought on board since September 11th. 

When it came to Virtual Case File, I had to make the decision 

that I could not spend another $50 million in a system that they 

could not assure me was going to work and it was time to bite the 

bullet. The contract we have with Lockheed Martin now is a 

phased project over a period of time. We have learned our lessons. 

We have built up our CIO shop. We have an enterprise architecture. We have a contractor in which I have a great deal of faith. 

We have done a much better job in setting out our requirements 

beforehand. 

I will be meeting with the CEO of Lockheed Martin every quarter, and I believe that we have turned the corner and are on the 

right track, and I believe—and I’d paraphrase something that the 

IG said. I think he said in one of his reports, scrutinizing this, that 

we appear to be on the right track now. I believe we are on the 

right track. 

Senator DURBIN. Thank you, Mr. Director. Thank you for your 

service, and I am going to give you for your staff to review a colloquy between Senator Sununu and myself on the library issue and 

NSLs, which I hope you will look at in a timely fashion and respond to as quickly as you can. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you, Senator Durbin. 

Director Mueller, we are near the ending of a vote. Senator 

Leahy and I are going to go vote, and we will be right back. 

Director MUELLER. Yes, sir. 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you. 

29

Senator LEAHY. Mr. Chairman, I will also give him a copy of this. 

I told you I would give you a copy of the investigation in Pittsburgh. I have it. I will bring it down. 

[Recess at 11:08 a.m. to 11:29 a.m.] 

Chairman SPECTER. Director Mueller, in asking you the question 

about the FBI action to retrieve papers from Jack Anderson’s estate, it is part of an overall concern about the increase of executive 

power where a great many things are happening, and this Committee has not been able to get answers to a great many questions. 

And you are the ranking officer of the principal investigative agency of the executive branch and have very widespread law enforcement authority, both as to crimes of violence and terrorism and intelligence gathering. And I have some specific questions in a context of a concern which this Committee has about the expansion of 

Executive power. 

We have seen a pattern of activity. We have seen the incarceration of a reporter in a context where a grand jury has convened 

because of the disclosure of the identity of a CIA agent—a very serious national security matter. The focus of that grand jury shifted 

away from that to a question of perjury, which is also serious, but 

not at the level of national security. This Committee has had hearings and is preparing legislation introduced by Senator Lugar, and 

the legislation which we are preparing draws a sharp contrast between a reporter’s answering questions that relate to national security as opposed to perjury. 

And it seems to me that a case may be made—I am not saying 

it should be, but may be made for a contempt citation for national 

security, but not for perjury. Perjury is important, but these are all 

relative matters. 

Then you have the introduction of the President’s signing statement and what impact that may have on the interpretation of laws. 

You and I worked very hard to get the PATRIOT Act finished, and 

I appreciated your comment on what we have done in a balanced 

bill. 

We are going to have a hearing on that later, but what is a Presidential signing statement? You will be happy to know I am not 

going to ask you that question. I have got too many other questions 

for you. We are going to reserve that until later. And I say this 

with great respect to President Bush. This is an institutional issue, 

and he and I have had many conversations about the difference between the President and the Presidency. And the issue which we 

have on this surveillance program is an institutional issue. 

And there is the eight-page Attorney General’s letter of October 

15, 2002. I cannot remember seeing such a complicated exposition 

on a statement by the Attorney General, which starts off, ‘‘The 

President and I place deterring, detecting, and punishing unauthorized disclosures of U.S. national security secrets among our 

highest priorities.’’ And then he goes on and on and on as to how 

they are going to deal with it. 

He sends this letter to Speaker Hastert. Then he sends a copy 

to Vice President Cheney. I am not going to ask you why he sent 

a copy to Vice President Cheney either. Maybe it is because Speaker Hastert is the presiding officer of the House and the Vice President is the presiding officer of the Senate. 

30

Now the NSA program, the electronic surveillance, there is an investigation into a leak, and there is a suggestion that not only the 

reporter but the newspapers—or perhaps more importantly, the 

newspapers and the reporter are subject to prosecution. 

Now, that is in a context where the executive branch is violating 

the National Security Act, which requires disclosing information to 

the Intelligence Committees—not the Gang of 8, although as a 

matter of custom, that has been going on in Democrat and Republican administrations for a long time, and as Chairman of the Intelligence Committee in the 104th Congress, I was a member of the 

Gang of 8. And I can tell you we didn’t find out very much. The 

Vice Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, a member of 

the Gang of 8, has a handwritten letter, which has been published, 

to the Vice President complaining that he could not understand the 

program, that he did not have access to a lawyer to discuss the program, that he did not have an assistant to help him with the program. 

And let me come to a couple of questions in this context where 

you have the electronic surveillance program disclosed by the New 

York Times. It was disclosed on December 16th, right in the middle 

of our final day of argument on the PATRIOT Act. We had a hard 

time getting the PATRIOT Act passed. I think we might have gotten it passed if that disclosure had not been made on that day. 

Senators on the floor said they were in doubt or perhaps inclined 

to support the Act, and when they read about that story, they were 

against it. But to manage a bill like the PATRIOT Act, with all the 

complications, and to have that explode in my face was a real problem in trying to get some legislation through. And I committed to 

hearings, and we have had four hearings. We have not found out 

very much because the Attorney General will not tell us anything. 

And Senator Leahy, ardently, and others want to bring him back, 

and I am not going to bring him back in a futile effort. 

So here you have the NSA Program which, on its face, violates 

the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. I do not give any credence to the argument that it was authorized by the resolution for 

the use of force. But if the President is using Article II powers, that 

trumps the statute. And I raised this issue with the President last 

week. He called a group of us in to talk about Sherman and talk 

about his agenda. And he said, ‘‘Are you saying I am doing something wrong?’’ And I said, ‘‘No, I am not saying that, Mr. President. 

I don’t know whether you are or not because I don’t know what the 

program is.’’ And if you’re dealing with Article II powers, you have 

to have a balance. The Supreme Court has made it plain and no 

one disputes the fact that the President doesn’t have a blank check. 

So it is a question of what is going on. 

Let me ask you specifically about your investigations as to reporters and as to national security cases. Do you agree with me 

that there is a sharp distinction between holding a reporter in contempt where there is a national security issue involved, like the 

disclosure of the identity of a CIA agent, as opposed to a perjury 

issue before a grand jury? 

Director MUELLER. Senator, I think it would be a question of the 

context, although certainly being charged and convicted of a crime 

31

is different than being held in contempt. In other words, in terms 

of the penalty, quite obviously it is different. 

Now, you are also talking about the difference between a perjury 

investigation and a disclosure of national security investigation. 

And I think it depends on the circumstances. I would note that in 

the case to which you are adverting, there was a judge who had 

to make the determination as to whether contempt was appropriate. In other words, it was not solely the executive’s decision to 

make, but to hold the reporter in contempt, there had to be a showing and a judge had to make a determination as to the necessity 

for the information, and I presume made the determination taking 

into account the seriousness of the crime. 

That is about all I can— 

Chairman SPECTER. Well, you have not answered the question, 

Director Mueller. 

Director MUELLER. There is certainly a difference between perjury and between— 

Chairman SPECTER. Well, you have cited differences, but the 

question is: Should Congress deal differently with a shield law for 

reporters on a national security issue like the disclosure of the 

identity of a CIA agent contrasted with a perjury investigation? 

Director MUELLER. Well, I can say generally, without knowing 

the context, certainly a national security violation may be far 

more—have a far more adverse impact on the public than a perjury 

violation. But talking generally, yes. 

Chairman SPECTER. Well, that is some help, although my view 

was pretty well established before your answer. I want you to take 

a look at these statutes on unauthorized disclosure, and when the 

New York Times writes about the considerations by the administration about criminal prosecutions under these statutes for newspapers and reporters, that is something which is a matter of the 

jurisdiction of this Committee as to what those statutes mean. The 

courts have to interpret them, but they interpret Congressional intent. And there is a very learned article by two professors from Columbia, Harold Edgar and Ben O. Schmidt, where they raise questions about these statutes, and come to these conclusions: ‘‘There 

has to be a balance of the information, defense significance against 

its important for public understanding and debate.’’ And they say 

that in the absence of a showing of Congressional intent to go after 

newspapers, that ‘‘to whatever policy may become compromised by 

newspapers’ disclosure or defense information, there has to be a 

balancing.’’ Given the absence of Congressional intent, ‘‘doubts 

about whether to protect the efficacy of disclosure rather than 

stress its adverse security consequences should be resolved on the 

side of public debate.’’ They raised a question about whether ‘‘selective enforcement is a real danger.’’ 

But the newspapers have traditionally done a very important job 

in our society on exposing governmental wrongdoing, Senators’ 

wrongdoing, corruption in Government. This Committee gets a lot 

of its leads on what we read about in the paper. There is a lot more 

oversight provided by the press than there is by the Judiciary Committee. It may even be that the FBI gets information leads as to 

what you do from what—may the record show an affirmative nod. 

We are making a little progress, just a little, Director Mueller. 

32

Let me say for the record that I have a very high regard for Director Mueller, and we have had a longstanding relationship, and 

I have a very high regard for the FBI. And as an Assistant DA, 

I used their evidence to convict the Philadelphia Teamsters. On the 

Warren Commission, we used their investigative resources to develop the single-bullet theory—not giving you the blame for it, not 

giving your agency the blame for it, Director Mueller. But I would 

like to have your opinions of these statutes, and one addendum. 

I am particularly concerned about the failure of the Congress to 

assert our constitutional prerogatives. When you have the President’s wiretap program, there is a provision of Article I, section 8, 

which sets forth Congress’ power. It is, ‘‘To make rules for the Government and regulation of the land and naval forces.’’ And that is 

about as close as you can come in 1787 to authority to watch what 

the Government does on electronic surveillance. The Congress has 

been inert, really indifferent to the incursions on our constitutional 

authority. And we are caught in a squeeze with the Supreme Court 

where they declare our Acts unconstitutional because of our, quote, 

method of reasoning and a usurpation of super-legislative authority. And it is a regrettable situation that we spend much of our 

time debating lobbying and ethics and campaign finance, which are 

all important subjects, but not nearly as important as our constitutional responsibilities. 

This Committee intends to be very vigorous in the pursuit of the 

electronic surveillance program. We are finding it hard to get traction on it, but we are going to keep trying. And we are going to 

be pursuing these statutes on disclosure, on this business about 

contempt for reporters. A contempt citation is different. Contempt 

citations for Judith Miller ended up in a longer jail term than most 

prosecutions. 

Senator Leahy, I have exceeded my time, but in the absence of 

any other Senator here to watch the clock, it is like a tree falling 

in the forest. 

Senator LEAHY. I share the concern. I share the concern that this 

Congress has done very little oversight. This has not helped—there 

are some who may think at the White House this helps by having 

a Republican-controlled Senate that refuses to ask questions of a 

Republican administration. I would argue otherwise. Just as it 

would not help a Democratic administration to have a Democraticcontrolled House and Senate that did not ask them questions. Asking questions makes people better. Those of us who have to run for 

election or re-election, we know what that is like. We have to answer questions. This administration has been reluctant to, and I 

think it has hurt them. 

I think it is also what is behind this new idea of just classifying 

everything willy nilly. We saw it at the Archives where historians 

suddenly find materials that they have had for decades. The move 

was being made to yank them out and classify them. Something 

that is on a website for weeks and weeks and weeks is suddenly 

classified just before—maybe it is coincidence, but just before a 

Congressional debate begins where we might refer to that website. 

Even under the best of circumstances, it is difficult getting information from any administration. One of the reasons I support 

33

FOIA is that administrations, Democratic and Republican, will tout 

their successes. Most don’t want to tout their mistakes. 

Mr. Chairman, you talk about sometimes getting the answers. As 

I recall, in the Intelligence Committee, when former Director of the 

CIA, Bill Casey, God rest his soul, came up for the third time in 

maybe a week or so to apologize to the Intelligence Committee because there was something that he was required by law to inform 

us of and had not. But he was there because even though nobody 

in the Congress had ever been informed of this, we read about it 

first in the newspapers. And then he would come up and say, ‘‘By 

the way, I meant to have told you about that’’ after somebody in 

the administration leaked it to the papers. 

After the third time, I said, ‘‘You know, you are spending a lot 

of money to brief the Chairman, the Vice Chairman, every day 

someone comes from the CIA with a little package of classified material.’’ I said, ‘‘Why don’t you do this? Take the New York Times, 

mark it ‘top secret,’ and deliver that.’’ I said, ‘‘We have three benefits: one, we will find out about these things a heck of a lot quicker 

than we do from you; second, we will find out in far more detail; 

and, third, there is that wonderful crossword puzzle.’’ 

He did not find it as amusing as one of the agents who was sitting behind him, who suddenly didn’t find it amusing either when 

the Director turned around and looked at him. 

Let me go to another question, I would hope when you are having discussions within the administration, no administration has 

ever spent so much money—it is now in the billions of dollars—to 

classify as much as this one has. Many of us are beginning to feel—

and it is not just Democrats—many Republicans are beginning to 

feel that this is being done to cutoff criticisms of mistakes or open 

debate. And the Chairman said many, many times, we find out 

about things when we read them in the paper. 

Now, you and I have talked a lot about getting a fully functional 

case management system in the hands of agents. Last year, after 

consultants pronounced it obsolete and riddled with problems, the 

FBI scrapped the $170 million Virtual Case File component of Trilogy. Now we are told that the Trilogy successor, Sentinel, will cost 

the American taxpayers an additional $425 million. But what bothers me even more, it will take 4 more years to deploy. 

And then there is an article in U.S. News and World Report, 

which has often been very supportive of the administration. They 

suggest the Bureau may be skimming funds from other programs 

to help pay for Sentinel and hide its real price from Congress. According to the article, ‘‘some agents in the field have been told to 

use their cars judiciously, curtail use of informants, covert offsite 

rentals for undercover operations,’’ and then ‘‘there is an increase 

in chatter that is as great or greater during VCF that Sentinel is 

going to fail.’’ 

Two questions. How confident are you in the FBI’s current estimate for the Sentinel program, $425 million, 4 more years? And, 

second, are there other programs that have to be cut or scaled back 

to pay for Sentinel? 

Director MUELLER. I am quite confident that we are on the right 

track with Sentinel for a variety of reasons: number one, the contractor, Lockheed Martin; second, it is a service-oriented architecVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:02 Dec 08, 2006 Jkt 031268 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\31268.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
34

ture, it is off-the-shelf products that we are using. And not only am 

I confident that we will move through the contract as we anticipated, but at the end of it, I think we will be far better off because 

we are—we will not be dealing with a proprietary system, but we 

will be dealing with a system of off-the-shelf products that can be 

continuously updated. 

One of the reasons that it is taking 4 years is I want to make 

absolutely certain that each phase—and there are four phases—is 

it works and is beneficial to those to whom it is being provided. 

And if it fails in phase one, which I do not anticipate, then we are 

not down a course that we cannot rectify. 

Let me turn for a second to the issue about whether or not we 

have been open with the funding on this. We have been absolutely 

open with the funding on both Virtual Case File and now Sentinel. 

What that article— 

Senator LEAHY. Is there anything that is being cut or are there 

any other accounts that are being tapped? 

Director MUELLER. Let me explain that in the year 2005, because 

we did not have a contract and yet we had to anticipate the funding for 2006, we put aside $97 million in a reprogramming that 

was approved by the Department of Justice. It was approved by 

OMF, and it was thoroughly briefed to the Hill and approved by 

the Appropriations Committee on the Hill. 

Of that $97 million, approximately $73 million were redirected 

from no-year and prior year balances. There was a remaining $24 

million in which a number of the divisions in the FBI contributed. 

And it is that shortfall that we had in order to bring in and utilize 

the $97 million in 2006, to which they may be referring. But all 

of this was— 

Senator LEAHY. Would that $97 million be part of the $425 million today or in addition to the $425 million? 

Director MUELLER. I believe it is in addition to—well, no, I don’t 

think—I think it is part of the $425 million. I will have to check 

on that. 

Senator LEAHY. Are we over half a billion or under half a billion? 

Director MUELLER. It is part of it. It is part of it. It is part of 

the 425. 

Senator LEAHY. Do you anticipate any programs being cut to pay 

for Sentinel outside the $425 million? 

Director MUELLER. At this juncture, no, I do not. 

Senator LEAHY. Will you notify us if they are? 

Director MUELLER. Yes, absolutely. In order to move the funds, 

we would have to do a reprogramming. It would have to be approved by the Hill, which is what we did with the $97 million. 

Senator LEAHY. Now, going into an area that Senator Feingold 

raised, on Friday the Justice Department reported that in 2005 the 

FBI delivered 9,245 national security letters for information on 

3,501 U.S. citizens and legal residents. Now, that is the first time 

that the numbers have been released. Of course, Congress required 

it in the PATRIOT Act reauthorization, and I worked hard to get 

that requirement. The Justice Department had originally objected 

to that, although they gave no reasons why they should keep it 

classified. 

35

The FBI was a lot more constructive in that discussion, and I 

want to thank you for that. You were far more open. We are not 

asking for ideatifying information, obviously, but the aggregate 

numbers don’t give anything to any enemies. But it gives the 

American people a way to monitor the extent to which their Government is spying on them. 

How does that 2005 number compare to past years? If you were 

to take a trend line for 10 years— 

Director MUELLER. On NSLs, you are talking about? 

Senator LEAHY. Yes. 

Director MUELLER. I would think after September 11th it would 

be—and the passage of the PATRIOT Act, it would be a substantial 

increase. 

Senator LEAHY. Would you support declassifying information 

about the number of NSLs issued since 9/11? 

Director MUELLER. I’d have to look at the issue. I can’t give an 

opinion at this point, Senator. 

Senator LEAHY. Well, nothing was given away or hurt by disclosing last year’s. Give me your thoughts on that. 

Director MUELLER. I will. I can tell you that there would be a 

substantial increase. I mean, our mission has shifted dramatically 

since September 11th. That is what I understand. So— 

Senator LEAHY. This is not a ‘‘gotcha’’ question. I am just curious 

about which way we are going, and, of course, I would expect a 

higher number after 9/11. But I would like to know how the trends 

are going. 

Director MUELLER. Off the top of my head, I don’t know what the 

trending is. I would say that is a very small number. When you 

talk—we have 300 million people in the United States now. It is 

a remarkably small number. I would say only—we only had that 

number. But I don’t know the trending, and, again, it is an issue 

that I would have to think about, and quite obviously, the Department of Justice would have their thoughts on it. 

Senator LEAHY. Thank you. We have a vote on, and I have gone 

beyond my time. You know, these annoying things, having votes, 

what in heaven’s name do they expect Senators to do? 

For anybody who is watching this back in Vermont, that is a 

joke. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator LEAHY. I consider it a great privilege and a great honor 

to be able to vote. Last month, I became the 12th person in history 

to cast 12,000 votes. Some of my colleagues on the other side of the 

aisle said out of 12,000 I got three or four right. Thank you. 

Chairman SPECTER. Director Mueller, thank you very much for 

coming in today. 

Director MUELLER. Thank you, Senator. 

Chairman SPECTER. We appreciate your service. We know the responsibilities. There is a lot of concern about the new system for 

recordkeeping, using the up-to-date techniques. It is problemsome 

that it will not be online fully operational for a very protracted period of time. But I like the idea of your sitting down with the contractors on a periodic basis. You have got a lot at stake there, and 

there have been a lot of problems, and you are not a magician. We 

do not hold you responsible for the problems you have had, but to 

36

get it done and get it done right is really important so you can 

function, you can have the information within your Bureau, and 

share the information with others. 

You have the PATRIOT Act, and we are concerned about the 

scope of the authority that you have, and we will have oversight 

hearings on it. We find those most productive. But what I would 

like to know—and we will be calling for some closed sessions—is 

what have these tools given you? What have these national security letters enabled you to find out? What have you been able to 

learn from the authority to get business records? Are you being unduly restricted by what we have put into the Act? Because the fight 

against terrorism is so very, very important. And we understand 

that you do not make decisions on the electronic surveillance program. I have not asked you any questions about that because I do 

not expect you to provide any answers on the subject. And the administration position on enforcement of these laws is not precisely 

your bailiwick, but it is close enough so that I think it is appropriate to ask you those questions. And you do conduct the investigations, and your agents are on the spot, and your agents are 

interviewing all these people for the grand jury. You are in the 

middle of these cases. You are not the prosecutor, but you are pretty close. You are pretty close to the prosecutor. And you have very 

heavy responsibilities on protection of civil liberties as well. And we 

are about to come to the Voting Rights Act, which gives you a lot 

of authority and a lot of important responsibility. 

So we thank you for coming in, and may the record show that 

we are letting you go about 20 seconds before noontime. 

Director MUELLER. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman SPECTER. We have a vote. We have a second panel, 

and we will return shortly to proceed. Thank you. 

[Recess at 12 noon to 12:27 p.m.] 

Chairman SPECTER. We have delayed the appearance of Panel 

Two, but you have been here for the last 3 hours, so you know exactly what is going on. 

Your testimony is very important, and it is regrettable, but it is 

hard to round up Senators after votes. It just is. But your testimony will be reviewed, I am sure, by other members of the Committee and staffs. 

We turn first to the Inspector General of the Department of Justice, Glenn A. Fine. He has been serving in that capacity since August of 2000, although was acting Inspector General for a time. He 

has an outstanding academic record, magna from Harvard College, 

Rhodes scholar, master’s degree from Oxford, and a law degree, 

again, magna cum laude from Harvard Law School. Why weren’t 

you named Chief Justice? 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman SPECTER. We will put in the record his curriculum 

vitae, which is outstanding, and we thank you for the work you are 

doing in this very important position, and the floor is yours for 5 

minutes. 

37

STATEMENT OF GLENN A. FINE, INSPECTOR GENERAL, 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

General FINE. Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to testify 

about the OIG’s oversight work related to the FBI. The OIG has 

devoted extensive resources to reviewing FBI programs and operations at the FBI as it continues its transformation after the September 11th attacks. 

When assessing the FBI, I believe it is important first to acknowledge the dedication of its employees. The FBI attracts patriotic individuals who are committed to the FBI’s important mission. 

These employees deserve recognition for the sacrifices they make in 

carrying out their critical responsibilities. 

Their task is difficult, and the FBI is under regular and probing 

scrutiny by Congress, the OIG, and other oversight entities. That 

is as it should be. Given the importance of its mission and the impact the FBI has on safety, security, and civil rights in the United 

States, such scrutiny is warranted. I have found that its leaders, 

particularly Director Mueller, understand the value of such independent oversight. 

In general, I believe the FBI has made progress in addressing 

some of its critical challenges, but more progress is clearly needed. 

The first area where additional progress is needed is the ongoing 

effort to upgrade the FBI’s information technology systems. For too 

long the FBI has not had the modern IT systems it needs to perform its mission as efficiently and effectively as it should. The 

FBI’s failed Virtual Case File effort was a major setback in both 

time and money in the FBI’s urgent need for IT modernization. 

The FBI’s current project to upgrade its information technology, 

Sentinel, appears to be on the right track. However, we have identified several issues the FBI needs to address as it moves from preacquisition planning to development of Sentinel. The OIG plans to 

closely monitor the Sentinel project, and we will raise any concerns 

with the FBI and this Committee as the project moves forward. 

A second challenge for the FBI is to pursue its law enforcement 

and intelligence-gathering missions while at the same time safeguarding civil rights. The OIG has performed various reviews related to civil rights issues, including a review of the FBI’s compliance with Attorney General guidelines, a review of intelligence violations forwarded to the President’s Intelligence Oversight Board, 

and a review of the FBI’s interviews of protesters connected to the 

2004 Democratic and Republican National Conventions, which Director Mueller mentioned earlier today. Currently, we are reviewing the FBI’s use of national security letters and orders for records 

under Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act. 

A third challenge for the FBI is to recruit, train, and retain 

skilled individuals in critical positions, such as intelligence analysts, linguists, and information technology. Moreover, the FBI has 

continuing turnover in key management positions at FBI headquarters and in the field. In my view, rapid turnover in these positions reduces the FBI’s effectiveness. 

Fourth, in large part the FBI’s success depends on its ability to 

share information, both internally within the FBI and externally 

with its Federal, State, and local partners. Without effective inforVerDate 0ct 09 2002 15:02 Dec 08, 2006 Jkt 031268 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\HEARINGS\31268.TXT SJUD4 PsN: CMORC
38

mation sharing, the FBI’s counterterrorism, counterintelligence, 

and criminal investigative efforts are diminished. 

Fifth, while there is little dispute that the FBI must transform 

itself to place counterterrorism as its highest priority, the FBI cannot neglect other criminal investigative areas where it has a 

unique role to play. The FBI’s allocation of investigative resources 

needs to be continually monitored to ensure that important areas 

are not neglected. 

Sixth, as the Robert Hanssen case demonstrated so tragically, 

the FBI must remain vigilant in its internal security and counterespionage efforts. The FBI can never afford to become complacent 

about the continuing threat of espionage from both inside and outside the FBI. The OIG is now conducting a follow-up review to assess the FBI’s progress in improving its internal security since the 

Hanssen case. 

And, seventh, the FBI is a leader in a variety of forensic science 

disciplines, but mistakes in the FBI laboratory can have dramatic 

consequences, as demonstrated by the laboratory’s fingerprint 

misidentification in the Brandon Mayfield case. The FBI must be 

vigilant to ensure that the laboratory is not vulnerable to mistakes 

or willful abuse. 

My written statement discusses in more detail many OIG reviews in these areas. In sum, our reports have found that while the 

FBI has made progress in addressing its changed priorities since 

the September 11th terrorist attacks, significant challenges and deficiencies remain. These are not easy challenges, and they require 

constant attention and oversight. To assist in these challenges, the 

OIG will continue to conduct vigorous oversight of FBI programs 

and provide our recommendations for improvement. 

That concludes my prepared statement, and I would be glad to 

answer any questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Fine appears as a submission for the record.] 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, General Fine. And 

thank you for concluding almost on the button. 

We now turn to Ms. Linda Calbom, the Government Accounting 

Office’s Western Regional Director and the author of the report. 

She is a summa cum laude graduate from Washington State University. Mr. Fine was magna. She is summa. 

Ms. CALBOM. You beat me. 

Chairman SPECTER. Mr. Gannon, that puts a very heavy burden 

on you. 

Mr. GANNON. Can I leave now? 

[Laughter.] 

Chairman SPECTER. I had Latin, and I don’t know where we are 

going from here. We will put her extensive resume in the record, 

but we will note also that she spent 11 years in public accounting 

with Deloitte and Touche in Seattle, Washington, so she comes to 

this position with impeccable credentials. Thank you for joining us 

today, Ms. Calbom, and we look forward to your testimony. 

39

STATEMENT OF LINDA M. CALBOM, DIRECTOR, FINANCIAL 

MANAGEMENT AND ASSURANCE, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Ms. CALBOM. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank 

you also for the opportunity to discuss our report that we recently 

issued. And, of course, it was developed at the request of this Committee, and this report is on the results of our audit of FBI’s internal controls over contractor payments and equipment purchases related to the Trilogy project. 

Also with me today is Eileen Larence, who is one of the Directors 

responsible for our report on information sharing, so she will be 

available to answer any questions you may have on that report. 

But today I wanted to summarize the results of our work with 

respect to, first, weaknesses in FBI’s internal controls that made 

it vulnerable to improper payments of contractor costs; second, payments for questionable contractor costs that we identified in our 

audit; and, third, FBI’s inadequate accountability for assets that it 

purchased with Trilogy project funds. 

First of all, FBI’s review and approval process for the Trilogy 

contractor invoices, which was actually carried out by a team consisting of FBI, GSA, and Mitretek, did not provide an adequate 

basis to verify that goods and services billed were actually received 

by FBI or that amounts billed were appropriate. This occurred in 

part because the responsibility for the review and approval of the 

invoices was not really clearly defined or documented amongst the 

parties. 

In addition, contractor invoices frequently lacked the types of information necessary to validate the charges. For example, we have 

a slide—and, Mr. Chairman, I think in front of you is a sheet that 

shows an example here; of an invoice that has a lot of details about 

the small charges, but no details at all for the $1.9 million charge 

that made up the lion’s share of the bill. 

Despite this, this invoice, and many others like it, were paid 

without requesting additional supporting documentation. These 

weaknesses in the review and approval process made FBI highly 

vulnerable to the payment of improper contractor costs. In order to 

assess the effect of these vulnerabilities, we used forensic auditing 

techniques to select certain contractor costs for review. As shown 

in the next slide, which I think you have up there as well, Mr. 

Chairman, we found about $10.1 million of questionable contractor 

costs paid by FBI. These costs included payments for first-class 

travel and other excessive airfare costs, incorrect billings for overtime hours, overcharged labor rates, and inadequately supported 

subcontractor labor and other direct costs. 

Given FBI’s poor control environment over invoice payments and 

the fact that we reviewed only selected FBI payments to Trilogy 

contractors, other questionable costs may have been paid for that 

were not identified. Our audit also disclosed that FBI did not maintain accountability for equipment purchased for the Trilogy project. 

FBI relied extensively on contractors to account for Trilogy assets 

while they were being purchased, warehoused, and installed. However, FBI did not establish controls to verify the accuracy and completeness of contractor records that it was relying on. 

40

Moreover, once FBI took possession of the Trilogy equipment, it 

did not establish adequate physical control over the assets. Consequently, we found that FBI could not locate over 1,200 assets 

purchased with Trilogy funds which were valued at approximately 

$7.6 million. 

While we are encouraged by FBI’s current efforts to account for 

these assets, its ability to definitively determine their existence has 

been compromised by the numerous control weaknesses identified 

in our report. Further, the fact that assets had not been properly 

accounted for at the time of our review means that they were at 

risk of loss or misappropriation since being delivered to FBI. In 

some cases, that was several years. 

Our report includes 27 recommendations to address the issues 

that we identified in our audit, and I am pleased to say that FBI 

has been receptive to our recommendations and has begun to take 

actions to implement them. But let me just emphasize the importance of continuously monitoring the implementation of corrective 

actions to ensure that they are effective in helping to avoid the 

same type of pitfalls that occurred with the Trilogy project. Without such monitoring, Sentinel and other IT efforts will be highly 

exposed to the same types of negative outcomes that they experienced with Trilogy. 

That concludes my prepared statement, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Calbom appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Ms. Calbom. 

Our final witness on the panel is Dr. John Gannon, Vice President and Senior General Manager for Global Analysis at BAE Systems, Inc. He has a bachelor’s degree in psychology from Holy 

Cross, an MBA and Ph.D. from Washington University, St Louis, 

and is an adjunct professor in the National Security Program at 

Georgetown. He has an extraordinary list of awards: the President’s National Security Medal, the CIA’s Distinguished Intelligence Medal, the CIA’s Director’s Medal. And we will put into the 

record a full list of his outstanding record. 

We have had a lot of panels up here before this Committee. I do 

not think we have had one with the credentials that you three 

bring. 

Thank you, Mr. Gannon, for joining us, and the floor is yours for 

5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN C. GANNON, VICE PRESIDENT FOR 

GLOBAL ANALYSIS, BAE SYSTEMS INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, AND FORMER STAFF DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY COMMITTEE, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

MCLEAN, VIRGINIA 

Mr. GANNON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the opportunity to participate this morning in this important hearing. I 

have great respect for the Bureau as a Federal law enforcement 

agency, and strong admiration for FBI officers with whom I have 

worked over the years. FBI officers are working hard today in the 

most challenging environment they have ever faced under an able 

Director of legendary energy, dedication and integrity. 

41

The views expressed now and in my longer written statement for 

the record are my own. They are shaped by my professional experience working with the FBI during a 24-year career at CIA, during 

a brief stint as a team leader for intelligence in the Transition 

Planning Office for the Department of Homeland Security, and during a 2-year tour as the first staff director of the House Homeland 

Security Committee. The also are influenced by my long experience 

building and managing analytic programs in the intelligence community, where I served as CIA’s Deputy Director for Intelligence, 

as the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, and as Assistant Director for Analysis and Production. 

I would make four points to you, sir, today. First, the FBI, as I 

have observed it, has made progress in intelligence, but I think it 

is important for us to distinguish between the Bureau’s traditional 

law enforcement mission and its new national intelligence mandate. In the first instance, I believe the FBI is increasingly using 

intelligence collection and analysis, including in its new field intelligence groups, against the increasingly complex issues associated 

with its criminal investigation mission. The Bureau should be encouraged in this path. Intelligence that benefits a special agent in 

charge can also be useful at the national level. 

But second, the FBI is unacceptably behind, however, in developing a national intelligence collection and analytic capability. The 

Bureau has not structured an intelligence collection requirements 

process that legitimate consumers can readily tap, and it is not, to 

my knowledge, producing on any predictable basis authoritative assessments of the terrorist threat to the homeland. These are serious gaps. It is a good thing that the Bureau’s law enforcement culture is being enriched by intelligence. It is not a good thing that 

law enforcement continues to trump intelligence in the effort to 

build a domestic intelligence capability. The status quo, in my 

view, is not acceptable. 

Third. Even if the FBI were doing better on this domestic intelligence mission, I believe we would find that the mission in today’s 

information environment is much bigger than the FBI and well beyond its resources and competence to carry out. Domestic intelligence today is about protecting the U.S. homeland from threats 

mostly of foreign origin. It does involve the FBI’s law enforcement 

and counterterrorism work, but it relates more to the establishment of a national intelligence capability, integrating Federal, 

State and local government, and when appropriate, the private sector, in a secure, collaborative network to stop our enemies before 

they act, and to confront all those adversaries capable of using 

global electronic and human networks to attack our people, our 

physical and cyber infrastructure, and our space systems. These 

adversaries include WMD proliferators, terrorists, organized criminals, narcotics traffickers, human traffickers, and countries, big 

and small, working alone or in combination against U.S. interests. 

I see the FBI on its present course as a contributor to this vital 

effort, but not as the leader of a new model of collaboration in the 

information age. 

Fourth. Domestic intelligence, moreover, must be viewed as an 

integral part of U.S. intelligence community reform. The connection 

between foreign and domestic intelligence must be seamless today 

42

because the threats we face know no borders. The challenge is Government wide, has historic roots that long precede 9/11, and must 

be concerned, as I have suggested, with a range of deadly threats 

to our National security, largely from abroad and not restricted to 

international terrorism. The domestic piece must be an essential 

part of the transformation of U.S. intelligence driven by the Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney 

General, and the Secretary of Homeland Security. 

That coordinated effort today, which in my view, needs stronger 

sustained direction from the White House and the Congress, should 

be moving as a top priority to unify strategies, to clarify roles and 

responsibilities across competing agencies, and to reduce the IC’s 

bloated bureaucracy, which is today larger than ever. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be glad to take questions on 

what I have said or on the longer statement that I have made for 

the record. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gannon appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Chairman SPECTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Gannon. 

Mr. Fine, the role you have as Inspector General for the Department of Justice is a very, very important role, and I have personally been very pleased to see the work that the Inspectors General 

do generally. During the time I chaired the Intelligence Committee, 

I took the lead—really, my staff director, Charles Battaglia took 

the lead—so often when leads are taken by Senators, they are really staff leads—in establishing the Office of Inspector General for 

the CIA. We almost lost the bill because of that provision, President Bush being an ex-CIA Director, but we got it through. So I 

have seen the work that the Inspectors General do. 

The initial thought which comes to my mind is whether you 

could exert your authority to review the electronic surveillance program, or perhaps I ought to begin and ask if you have reviewed the 

program for constitutionality? 

General FINE. We have not done that. That issue has to do with 

the legal authority for the program, and quite unfortunately, in my 

view, the jurisdiction of the Inspector General in the Department 

of Justice is limited to some degree because there is a Department 

of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility that has jurisdiction 

to review the actions of attorneys in the exercise of their legal authority up to and including the Attorney General. To my knowledge, the Department of Justice is the only area where the Inspector General’s Office has that limitation on its authority, and so— 

Chairman SPECTER. Where does that limitation arise from, Mr. 

Fine? 

General FINE. It originally arose from Attorney General orders 

issued by Attorney General Reno and Attorney General Ashcroft, 

and it was codified in the DOJ Reauthorization Act by the Congress. So it would require a Congressional action to change it at 

this point, but it is a limitation on our authority that does not 

exist, to my knowledge— 

Chairman SPECTER. What does it say specifically to limit your 

authority? 

General FINE. That the Inspector General has authority throughout the Department of Justice except for the actions of attorneys 

43

in the exercise of their authority to litigate, investigate or provide 

legal advice. And so that has been a carve-out. The Department of 

Justice’s Office of Professional Responsibility existed before the Inspector General’s Office was created in the Department of Justice. 

We were created in 1989, and that limitation on our authority has 

continued to exist. 

Chairman SPECTER. You say that the Office of Professional Responsibility has the authority to review what the lawyers do? 

General FINE. Correct. 

Chairman SPECTER. Has there been an inquiry by that office in 

the propriety of the opinion of the Department of Justice of holding 

the constitutionality of the electronic surveillance program? 

General FINE. Yes. My understanding is the Department’s Office 

of Professional Responsibility has been looking into that issue and 

is conducting a review of that matter. 

Chairman SPECTER. What is their basis for their doing that? 

General FINE. Because it revolves around the actions of the Department of Justice attorneys in providing legal authority for the— 

Chairman SPECTER. Well, I know they did that, but was there 

some predicate, some reason to conduct the investigation that you 

know of? 

General FINE. Yes. There was a request from several members 

of the House of Representatives to conduct that kind of investigation. It was sent to us. It was referred to the Office of Professional 

Responsibility. They agreed to do that. 

Chairman SPECTER. But ordinarily you need a predicate, you 

need some reason to conduct an investigation. Was any given? 

General FINE. There were questions about the authority and the 

legal opinion concerning that. And quite honestly, we often investigate things on our own when we see an issue that needs to be 

resolved, and I believe the Department of Justice saw— 

Chairman SPECTER. When you investigate things on your own, 

you ordinarily have a reason. 

General FINE. Correct. 

Chairman SPECTER. Was the House acting on the newspaper reports about the reported meeting in the hospital with the Attorney 

General and the Deputy and Chief of Staff? 

General FINE. I think the House was acting on the information 

that came out in the press regarding a surveillance program. And 

when that information arose, they sent the request. 

Chairman SPECTER. Mr. Fine, there was an issue raised on your 

prior testimony, Mr. Fine, on making suggestions to the FBI. Have 

you done that? 

General FINE. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman? 

Chairman SPECTER. There was an issue raised. I had a hearing 

in July of 2005 about your feeling free to make affirmative suggestions to the FBI as well as performing your role as a constructive 

critic. Have you made suggestions? 

General FINE. Yes, absolutely. In almost all of our reviews, not 

only do we look backward and see what went wrong, but we try 

to make recommendations to improve operations and improve programs. And we follow-up through the FBI to resolve those issues, 

and sometimes we even open follow-up reviews to see whether they 

have actually implemented the changes that we made. 

44

For example, we opened a follow-up review recently about the 

FBI’s hiring, retaining and training of intelligence analysts. We 

made recommendations in a report several years ago. We want to 

see what progress they have made. 

Chairman SPECTER. Mr. Fine, the staff has prepared six tough 

questions for you which I do not have time to ask you, but they 

will be submitted to you, and we would like you to answer them 

for the record.

General FINE. I would be glad to do that, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman SPECTER. Ms. Calbom, you have noted that you have 

made 27 recommendations. How many has the FBI implemented?

Ms. CALBOM. We have not yet gone back in to look and see what 

recommendations they have or have not implemented. As part of 

our normal followup on any report, after some times has gone by, 

and particularly after we get their 60-day letter that they are required to respond back formally on their actions taken to implement our recommendations, then we will be going through a process where we will look at the actions that they have taken.

Chairman SPECTER. So you will take a look to see how many 

they have implemented.

Ms. CALBOM. Yes, we will.

Chairman SPECTER. Would you report back to us, if they do not 

implement them all, and tell us how many they have implemented, 

how many they have not?

Ms. CALBOM. We certainly can do that, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman SPECTER. We would like to know that. You are going 

to continue your reporting on the Trilogy program and the Sentinel 

program to see if this money is being well spent. Here again, I cannot go into all these questions, but there are a series of very piercing questions which I would like to submit to you to have your answer for the record. But let me emphasize the need for you to keep 

a close watch on that program. It is going to take a lot of surveillance. The Director has committed to periodic review, but it is 

going to take more than that. Are you in a position to followup on 

that?

Ms. CALBOM. We have not received any formal request yet to do 

that, but certainly when we do, we are in a position to do that, Mr. 

Chairman.

Chairman SPECTER. My request is not sufficiently formal?

Ms. CALBOM. It is now, yes, sir.

[Laughter.]

Chairman SPECTER. Well, that is true, you said you hadn’t, you 

did not say you haven’t.

Mr. Gannon, how well is the new Director of National Intelligence working out?

Mr. GANNON. In some ways, I think there are some things being 

done. In other ways—

Chairman SPECTER. Let me be specific. Has he taken command?

Mr. GANNON. I would prefer to see a larger profile—

Chairman SPECTER. Prefer to see what?

45

Mr. GANNON. I would prefer to see a larger profile and a stronger 

direction.

Chairman SPECTER. What is he not doing that he should be 

doing?

Mr. GANNON. Partly some of the issues that I addressed in my 

opening statement. I think there is a real need to establish roles 

and responsibilities with regard to the Department of Defense, with 

regard to FBI. I talked somewhat critically about FBI, but what is 

the direction being given to FBI with the authorities that the DNI 

has?

Chairman SPECTER. The Department of Defense is moving into 

these fields with a widespread expansion of powers. Is that consistent with having a Director of National Intelligence?

Mr. GANNON. I think what is bothersome is that movement that 

you are talking about is taking place without any supervision beyond the Department of Defense, and I think it is needed, from the 

DNI, but also from the White House.

Chairman SPECTER. Doesn’t the DNI have authority over the Department of Defense on intelligence matters?

Mr. GANNON. I think it is not entirely clear on some issues, but 

I think he has more authority than I am seeing exercised.

Chairman SPECTER. What are you saying, that he would have to 

invade the Pentagon in order to establish his authority?

Mr. GANNON. No. I would say that you have to claim your jurisdiction you have, and seek jurisdiction that you might not have.

Chairman SPECTER. An invasion would not be necessary?

Mr. GANNON. Right.

Chairman SPECTER. But helpful.

Mr. GANNON. And I think that is partly because the legislation 

does not make clear what authority he does have.

Chairman SPECTER. Perhaps you have already done it, but we 

would be interested in a more precise analysis on that issue, as to 

where the Department of Defense is going. We note your emphasis 

on the Department of Homeland Security as having primacy. You 

think they should have primacy over the FBI, right?

Mr. GANNON. No, sir, I did not put it that way, and in my written statement, I do have quite a lot to say about the Department 

of Defense in the longer statement. But what I did say was that 

in the domestic intelligence collection, I think the model that we 

should be pursuing is a collaborative one, not a centralized new intelligence service or one that would make FBI what I do not think 

it can be, in that as a centralized—

Chairman SPECTER. I have written questions for you too, and one 

of them identifies your written testimony to push DHS into the 

lead role.

Mr. GANNON. That is one. I offered two options. One is that if 

you want the FBI to be the leader of the domestic intelligence effort, there has to be some major restructuring done there that is 

not being done. You cannot get there from the path that FBI is on 

now.

46

The other option is to reinvigorate, almost go back to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, and give the Department the authorities 

that it was supposed to have under that legislation. Then I think 

because it is a department that is designed really to build a collaborative model, it would be the integrator of the information and 

intelligence, and FBI would be a contributor, but the department 

would not control the FBI.

Chairman SPECTER. Is the collaboration and integration adequate?

Mr. GANNON. I think in our society, I think the design of a system that is collaborative and not centralized as an intelligence 

service is, I think, the best model for our society as I see it and 

understand it.

Chairman SPECTER. I do not understand your answer. Is the collaboration and integration adequate, satisfactory?

Mr. GANNON. Oh, today?

Chairman SPECTER. Yes.

Mr. GANNON. Oh, absolutely not. I thought you meant is it in the 

model. No, absolutely not today.

Chairman SPECTER. Well, would you—we are going to submit 

these questions to you, but add an additional one for me. What specifically ought to be done to make it collaborative and integrated?

Mr. GANNON. Sure.

Chairman SPECTER. I really regret that there are not more Senators here to hear your testimony. But that is an inevitable fact of 

life. Everybody has many committees and many subcommittees, 

and frequently you are stuck with just the Chairman, but we have 

your reports, and we have your written testimony. And these questions are unusually good questions that I have reviewed that we 

will ask you to respond to for the record. They are so good that I 

am going to identify the staffers who worked on this hearing: Josh 

Latarette, Kathy Michalko, Adam Turner, Dallas Kaplan, Adam 

Caudle, Evan Kelly and Matt McPhillips. I will not identify who 

wrote them down because I may have misstated some of the names 

because the printing is not really legible.

[Laughter.]

Chairman SPECTER. We have had some interjections from the 

peanut gallery, from the stands.

These are really enormously important subjects as to how we get 

the FBI systems, in effect, with the high price on them noted. 

Somebody estimates it at a billion dollars. Very important how the 

system is working, and that the Department of Defense fit into the 

picture with the Director of National Intelligence. It has been a 

long time getting there. I worked on that, the Governmental Affairs 

Committee. We took time off from the summer of 2004, took time 

away from a campaign for reelection it was so important. That is 

pretty hard to do in August to come back. We had special hearings, 

and I drafted a bill on it, and others did too, and we finally put 

that into place. But unless it is implemented, it is worthless.

So your supplemental ideas on how to accomplish that are very 

important, and we greatly appreciate them. Without objection, I am 

47

going to make a copy of the letter from Attorney General Ashcroft 

a part of the record.

Let me express some regrets, that I had not known that we were 

codifying the Attorney General’s limitation of the Inspector General’s authority. It does not seem to me that the person to be inspected ought to have the standing to limit the inspector’s authority. But then somehow, if it is codified—there is a lot codified that 

does not have any Congressional intent behind it. Justice Scalia is 

right about that.

Thank you all very much. That concludes our hearing.

[Whereupon, at 1:02 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

[Questions and answers and submissions for the record follow.]

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