NBSIR 78-1414 (CPSC)

An Evaluation of Safety

Standards for Gasoline and

Kerosene Cans

C. E. Jones

Human Factors Section

Product Systems Analysis Division

Center for Consumer Product Technology

Institute for Applied Technology

National Bureau of Standards

Washington, D C. 20234

September 1977

Final Report

Prepared for Bureau of Engineering Sciences

Consumer Product Safety Commission

NBSIR 78-1414 (CPSC)

AN EVALUATION OF SAFETY

STANDARDS FOR GASOLINE AND

KEROSENE CANS

C. E. Jones

Human Factors Section

Product Systems Analysis Division

Center for Consumer Product Technology

Institute for Applied Technology

National Bureau of Standards

Washington, D.C. 20234

September 1977

Final Report

Prepared for Bureau of Engineering Sciences

Consumer Product Safety Commission

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, Juanita M. Kreps, Secretary

Or. Sidney Harman, Under Secretary

Jordan J. Baruch. Assistant Secretary for Science and Technology

NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS, Ernest Ambler, Acting Director

w
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Executive Summary iv

1. Introduction 1

2. Method 2

3. Results 8

4 . Conclusions and Recommendations 16

5. Tables

; 18

Table I Gasoline and Kerosene Can, NEISS FY 1974, 1975,

1976 Accident Data Distribution 19

Table II

Type of Container vs Functional Failure Mode

Accident Distribution • 22

Table III

Functional Failure Mode Subsequence - -Child Access

Prevention - Ingestion (2e) and Personal Contact

(2g) 23

Table IV

Functional Failure Mode Subsequence - -Child Access

Prevention - Burn Events 24

Table V

Functional Failure Mode Subsequence - -Dispens ing - Spill, Splash, Liquid, Fumes, Preignition- -Person

(4c) , Area (4d) 25

Table VI

Functional Failure Mode Subsequence - -Containment

,

Passive - Splash, Spill, Liquid, Preignition,

Person (4c) 26

Table VII

Functional Failure Mode Subsequence - -Containment

,

Passive - Splash, Spill, Liquid, Fumes, Preignition, Area (4d) 27

li
TABLE OF CONTENTS CONTINUED

Table VIII

Functional Failure Mode Subsequence - -Containment

,

Passive - Splash, Spill, Liquid, Fumes, Preignition, Person (4c) and Area (4d) 29

Table IX

Functional Failure Mode Subsequence - -Containment

,

Passive - Splash, Spill, Liquid, Fumes--Other . . 31

Table X

Functional Failure Mode Subsequence - -Barr ier - Fire Transition to Container (3h) 32

Table XI

Functional Failure Mode Subsequence - -Barr ier - Direct Container Ignition (3j) 33

Table XII

Functional Failure Mode Subsequence - -Containment

,

Active - Splash, Spill -- Ignited (4e) 34

Table XIII

Functional Failure Mode Subsequence - -Containment

,

Active - Container Explosion (4a) 37

Table XIV

Functional Failure Mode Subsequence - -Containment

,

Active - Burn in Container Only (4b) 38

Table XV

Functional Failure Mode Subsequence - -Handl ing and

Stability - Upset or Drop Container (2i) .... 39

Table XVI

Functional Failure Mode Subsequence -- Ident if ica

tion - Misidentify (2k) 41

Table XVII

Functional Failure Mode Subsequence - -Storage Control - Storage (4h) 42

Table XVIII

Functional Failure Mode Subsequence - -Structural

Integrity - Container Failure (4i) 43

Table XIX

Standard Application to Functional Failure Mode . 44

m
TABLE OF CONTENTS CONTINUED

References 48

Appendix 1 Accident Event Coding 49

Appendix 2 Standards Summary 54

Appendix 3 Functional Failure Mode Scenarios .... 61

IV
of the standards to the functional failure modes showed

very little applicability to Child Access Prevention and

Containment, Active; some indirect applicability to Dispensing;

Containment, Passive; and Barrier; good direct applicability

to Handling and Stability; Identification; Storage Control

and Structural Integrity.

It is concluded that Containment, Active failures

cannot be directly addressed in a standard because of

the extremely rigorous structural requirements that such

standards would impose. It is further concluded that

there is an urgent need to develop methods and standards

to child-proof containers, to improve user control of

dispensing liquid from the container, and to increase

the isolation of liquid in the container from external

ignition sources. However, it is also concluded that

the standards reviewed provide a sound technical guide

for the handling and stability, structural integrity and

proper identification of containers for flammable and

combustible fluids as well as preventing unintentional

release of liquids from the container openings.

vii
*

.
AN EVALUATION OF SAFETY STANDARDS FOR

GASOLINE AND KEROSENE CANS

1. INTRODUCTION

Accidents which involve flammable liquids are primarily

related to the nature of the liquids. These liquids are

both flammable, toxic and hazardous as liquids and as

fumes independent of the action of the user. The accidents,

however, are also related to the interaction between the

use of the liquids and the characteristics of the containers

in which they are stored, transported and handled and

from which they are dispensed. The nature of this interaction

is critical to the development of safety standards for

gasoline and kerosene containers.

The purpose of this study is to evaluate existing

product safety standards for gasoline and kerosene containers

and to recommend provisions in areas not covered adequately

by these standards. The analysis is limited to container

function as revealed by the use of the containers. Two

previous studies at NBS , Pezoldt (3) and Tyrrell (4),

have provided quantitative analyses of Container involvement

in gasoline accidents. These studies are not duplicated

here although some overlap in scope and content is unavoidable

because of similarities of data source and interpretation.

The analysis is further restricted to the technical applicability of the standard. It is not concerned witjv the

feasibility of applying these standards, or suggested

standards, to containers designed for home use since feasibility goes beyond technical applicability. T-he technical

applicability of the standards can be evaluated by a comparison of the provisions of 'the standard with the product

performance safety requirements. The feasibility of applying

the standards to the product is dependent upon such factors

as cost and maintainability which cannot be evaluated

on the basis of the data available for this study.

This study is primarily a description of what users

do with containers of flammable liquid when using the

liquid and how the containers function or fail to function

when so used. This description is the basis for the evaluation

of existing safety standards and recommendations for further

standards

.

Although the analysis in this study is primarily

non -quant itat ive some quantitative description of the

data base is presented to facilitate understanding of

the limitations imposed by the data on the findings of
the study. This quantitative description is valid only

for the data base, i.e., the NEISS data, FFACT reports

and IDIR's actually used, and must not be presumed to

be statistically descriptive of the real world of flammable

fluid accidents.

It should be noted that the data base includes accidents

with flammable and combustible liquids other than gasoline

and kerosene. It is recognized that the behavior of these

liquids may not be identical with gasoline and kerosene

in ignition characteristics. However, it is felt that

there is sufficient similarity so that container functioning

can be generalized from their behavior where they are

involved in the accidents included in the data base.

The study is not directly a study of gasoline or

kerosene containers per se since only 15 percent of the

containers involved in the accidents ca-n be identified

as gasoline or kerosene containers designed as such. However,

the uses to which all types of containers were put, and

the results of using them, are analyzed to reveal what

functions a container should perform and what functional

failures should be addressed by a safety standard.

2. METHOD

The data base for the present study consisted of

the following:

a. National Electronic Surveillance System

(NEISS) data--the NEISS data were for

FY 74, 75 and 76 and were tabulated by

products (Gasoline, Kerosene and Gasoline

Cans), age of victim, and type of injury.

b. In-Depth Investigative Reports (IDIR);-

there were 134 IDIR's covering container

related flammable and combustible liquid

accidents for 1974, 1975, 1976.

c. Flammable Fabric Accident and Case Testing

System (FFACTS) narrative reports - -there

were 115 reports covering container- related

flammable and combustible liquid accidents

for 1966 through 1973. FFACTS data collection

was terminated in 1974.

Each of these data sources has a bias toward certain

types of accident injuries. The NEISS data and, to a slightly less extent the IDIR's, both derive from emergency

rooms rather than from burn centers or morgues. These

data thus somewhat understate the frequency and severity

2
of burn accidents, especially for small children for whom

a given burn area comprises a larger proportion of total

body surface area than for adults. The FFACT reports,

on the other hand, are restricted to burn accidents and

thus do not reflect other types of accidents, e.g., those

involving ingestion or aspiration of liquids.

This data bias does not seriously interfere with

the analysis of container failure for the purpose of this

study, although a larger number of ingestion and aspiration

cases might have been useful in studying the role of container

design in these types of accidents. What is more of a handicap in the analysis of container problems is that

the data sources used emphasize the flammable liquid aspect

of the accidents rather than the container aspects. The

containers are infrequently described in detail. Hence,

the role of the containers in the accidents must often

be inferred, especially as to structural integrity and

details of configuration. Also, there are no narrative

accounts of cuts, abrasions, etc. from direct contact

with the container.

In view of the above limitations of the data base

the identification of container involvement from the IDIR's

and FFACT reports probably neglects some container failure

modes which result in accidents in real life. This is

especially true of container failures due to structural

defect and degradation, e.g., seam failure, corrosion,

punctures. Furthermore, it should not be assumed that

the container involvement modes identified in this study

occur with the same relative frequency in real life as

they do in the IDIR’s and FFACT reports.

The literature search on flammable fluid containers

resulted in only four references of any value to the present

study. Three of these references, Pezoldt (3), Tyrrell

(4) and Halsey, Kirstein and Snyder (2) originated at

NBS . The other reference, Greene and Cinibulk (1), suggested

the functional failure mode approach which is used in

this study.

The analysis of the data proceded as follows: summary

of NEISS data, summary of IDIR and FFACT reports, analytic

coding, code sequencing, functional failure mode analysis,

functional failure tabulation, standards review, standards

evaluation

.

The NEISS data were tabulated by product (gasoline,

kerosene, gasoline container), for victim age and type

of injury. This summary was intended to describe the

general data base for the study. The description is more

applicable to the IDIR data than to the FFACT data.

3
Each IDIR and FFACT report was summarized on a 4" X 6"

card. This card was the immediate reference data source

for all further analysis. Figure 1 is an example of such

a report summary card. The summary included the report

number, identification of the liquid, identification of

the container, the age of the operator, the operation

performed with the container, the involvement of the container

in the accident, the involvement of the liquid in the

accident, and the involvement of the victim in the accident.

The report number is an identifying number written on

the copy of the IDIR or FFACT report used in the study

and served to retrieve the report for further reference

if the summary card was not sufficient in some detail.

The age of the operator, i.e., the user or manipulator

of the container, was only noted for children 5 years

or younger. This age limit is arbitrary and is intended

primarily to identify a need for child proofing of containers.

The Operation entry states what was done with or to the

container . The C (container) involvement entry states

the role of the container as a factor in the accident,

e.g., that it spilled gas. The L (liquid) involvement

entry states the role of the liquid in the accident , e.g.,

that it ignited in the can. The victim involvement entry

completes the accident picture by stating how the accident

impacted on the victim, e.g., that he was burned by ignition

of gasoline on his shirt. The victim, in most cases,

is the operator but his role as a victim is of no essential

interest in the analysis except as it is relevant to the

performance of the operator, container or liquid.

No: 149

Liquid: Gasoline Container (s) : Glass Jar 0 Age:

Operation: Poured gas on barbecue coals.

Threw burning jar away.

C involvement: Gas ignited in jar from flashback.

Gas spilled when jar was thrown.

L involvement: Ignited in jar and burned when

splashed from thrown jar.

Victim involvement: Burned by burning gasoline

splashed from jar.

FIGURE 1. Report Summary Card

4
The information from the summary card was coded for type

of container, user operation, fire action mode, container

involvement mode, and injury mode. The coding was recorded

on the back of the summary card. This code is presented

in Appendix 1. The sample summary shown by Figure 1 was

coded as follows:

1L

2a

2d

3a

3d

3h

4b

4e

5c

Open top glass or ceramic container

Pour or spray liquid

Throw or kick away container

Liquid interface

Liquid or fumes to fire

Fire transition to container

Fire burned in container

Ignited liquid splashed or spilled

Victim injured by burning fluid.

After all summaries had been coded the event codes

were placed in their sequence of occurrence for each accident.

This sequence was recorded on the back of each summary

card. The accident event code sequence for the accident

summarized in Figure 1 is:

' 3a

2a | - 3h + 4b 2d + 4e + 5c

3d

In the sequence the arrows (-*) indicate a sequence of events

and the vertical line (|) represents events occurring more or

less simultaneously. The sequence shown above can be

read as follows: the operator poured the liquid (2a),

there was a liquid/fire interface (3a) in which the liquid

went to the fire (3d) , the fire flashed back to the container

(3h) , the fire burned in the container (4b) , the operator

threw the container (2d) , flaming flquid splashed from

the container (4e) and the operator (victim) was burned

by the flaming liquid (5c)

.

The functional failure mode analysis was carried

out on the event code sequences to reveal the ways in

which the container did not function- as an operationally

safe container. The functional failure mode analysis

is an adaptation of the Failure Mode and Effect Analysis

(FMEA) approach to equipment safety assessment. The FMEA

attempts to document potential failure modes of equipment

and to determine the effects of each failure mode on equipment

safety. The FMEA procedure, according to Greene and Cinibulk

(1) , Page 5, assumes that the equipment is capable of

performing within specification requirements and that

no false or erroneous action is initiated by the operator.

5
Obviously, these assumptions are not met by the equipment

(containers) and the operators referred to in the IDIK's

and FFACT reports. That is, most of the containers conformed

to no standard or specification relevant to flammable

or combustible liquids and the operators used both the

containers and the liquids in a variety of inappropriate

ways. A strict FMEA approach is thus not appropriate

here. However, the present data analysis indicates certain

functions which containers should perform to reduce hazards

in the use and misuse of flammable and combustible liquids.

The analysis also reveals the effects of functional failure.

These functions are as follows:

A. Child Access Prevention (CAP) - Prevention of

access to flammable or combustible liquids by a person 5 years of age or younger.

B. Dispensing (D) - Control of the transition of

liquid to a selected destination.

C. Containment, Passive (CP) - Prevention of the

unintended release of liquid or fumes.

D. Barrier (B) - Prevention of ignition of fluid

within a container.

E. Containment, Active (CA) - Confinement of fire,

flaming fluid or explosion within a container.

F. Handling and Stability (H-S) - Positioning, holding

and carrying control of the container.

G. Identification (I) - Representation of container

contents as flammable, combustible, explosive,

or toxic.

H. Storage Control (SC) - Provision of a safe and secure

environment, including the control and release of vapor

build-up, within the container as relatively long

term holding facility.

I. Structural Integrity (SI) - Preservation of

materials, configuration and security of

container and attachments.

Each of the accident sequences was analyzed into

failures of these functions, i.e. functional failure modes,

and these functional failure modes were noted on the summary

cards. The functional failure modes, in the accident

summarized in Figure 1 are Barrier (B) and Containment,

6
Active (CA) , i.e., there was a flash-back (3h) to the

container which caught fire and spilled flaming gasoline

( 4 e ) when it was kicked or thrown.

From the summary cards the functional failure modes

were tabulated as "subsequences" involving that particular

failure. For example, the accident sequence illustrated

in Figure 1, breaks down into subsequence 2a->-3h for the

Barrier functional failure and subsequence 3h+4b+2d-*4

e

for the Containment, Active functional failure. The subsequences overlap in the interests of giving a complete

context for the functional failures. The fire action

mode codes 3a are eliminated since they add no significant

(I ) 3d

information to the functional failure context. The functional

failure mode subsequences were tabulated for all accidents.

Two of the most comprehensive standards of specific

applicability to flammable fluid containers are UL 30,

Standard for Safety, Metal Safety Cans, Underwriters Laboratory, October 4, 1974, and PS 61-74, Voluntary Product

Standard, Plastic Containers (Jerry Cans) for Petroleum

Products, American National Standards MH 17.1-1974, November

21, 1974. UL 30 has also been adopted as ANSI Z218.1,

1971. Also, the Factory Mutual Research Safety Container

Standard and the RR-S-30E Federal Specification for Safety

Can, Spring Closing Type, contain specific provisions

which are of special interest to this analysis although

they generally parallel UL 30 for purpose of this report.

In addition, the Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code,

NFPA No. 30-1976 gives certain basic definitions for flammable

and combustible liquids and types of container.

The provisions of the standards and specifications

noted above were evaluated as to their applicability to

the functional failure sequences. This evaluation was

carried out with the assistance of Mr. Emil Braun of the

Fire Safety Engineering Division, Institute of Applied

Technology, National Bureau of Standards. The relevant

provisions of these standards are presented in Appendix

2. The evaluation of these standards were also the point

of departure for recommendations for further standard

coverage

.

Appendix 3 consists of scenarios for each of the

functional failure modes. These scenarios are presented

to provide a more complete picture of the accident events

since the failure mode subsequences presented in Tables

III through XVIII are necessarily somewhat fragmentary.

7
3. RESULTS

The type of injury distribution for the NEISS data

is shown in Table I. This data base is sampled more intensively by the IDIR's than it is by the FFACT reports.

While only 32 percent of the accidents tabulated in Table

I involved thermal burn injuries, 80 percent of the combined

IDIR and FFACT reports involved thermal burn injuries.

This can be interpreted to mean that, for the sample of

reports analyzed in the present study, the thermal burn

understatement of the IDIR data base is compensated for

by the thermal burn overstatement of the FFACT reports.

This does not necessarily indicate that the accident report

data base for this study is representative of flammable

fluid container involvement in real life accidents, even

for type of accident. It does, however, indicate that

the accident report data base includes an important segment

of possible accidents and can be used as a basis for at

least some standard evaluation. For example, while the

proportion of Dispensing failure modes vs the proportion

of Handling and Stability failure modes identified in

the data base may not be reflected in the real world of

accidents, it is a reasonable assumption that both of

these types of accident events do occur.

There is, however, one major point of similarity

between the NEISS data in Table I and the combined data

from the IDIR's and FFACT reports: 86 percent of children

under five years of age in the NEISS data and 86 percent

of the children five years of age and under in the combined

IDIR and FFACT data were victims of flammable fluid ingestion.

This is probably a slight overstatement for the IDIRFFACT data since victims were not counted in this study

unless they were also operators, i.e., a number of small

child burn victims were not counted whereas all small

child ingestion victims were counted. In both sets of

data the proportion of ingestion victims drops off sharply

after the five year old group. Although quantitative

results must be treated very cautiously in this report,

it seems reasonable to say that ingestion is the flammable

fluid hazard with which young children are most frequently

involved and is primarily a young child problem.

Table II presents the functional failure mode distribution

by type of container for the IDIR's and FFACT reports.

Cases involving operators five years of age or younger

were tabulated only for Child Access Prevention and any

other functional failure modes for these 51 cases are

not included elsewhere in the tabulations. This does

8
not result in a major understatement for any of the other

functional failure modes except Identification, for which

the tabulation does not include 19 cases of misidentif icat ion

included in the cases tabulated as Child Access Prevention

failures. Structural failure modes could not be frequently

identified in the accident reports. Only three cases

of Structural Integrity and two cases of Storage Control

failure were directly identified. However, as noted before,

neither the FFACT reports nor the IDIR's were container

oriented and most of the containers used, e.g., open top

deep or shallow containers, were more configurationally

than structurally hazardous as' flammable liquid receptacles.

Thus, the data source was not adequate for identification

of structural defects in containers. However, Table II

can and does illustrate the presence of "operational”

failures, i.e., Dispensing; Containment, Passive; Barrier;

and Containment, Active, across all types of containers,

including those identified as "standard". While the format

of Table II does not directly show cross relationships

between functional failure modes, certain associations

were found in the data base. For example, a Barrier failure

mode was usually associated with a Containment, Active

failure and about two thirds of the Handling and Stability

failures were associated with Containment, Passive failures.

These associations are rather obvious. A Containment,

Active function does not usually become relevant unless

a Barrier function fails. Also, a Handling and Stability

function failure, e.g., a dropped container, is conducive

to a Containment, Passive function failure, e.g., spillage.

By contrast, a Dispensing function failure usually’ occurs

without any obvious relationship to other failure modes.

It is not, by definition, a Containment, Passive function,

does not usually lead to a container fire and cannot usually

be identified from the accident report as being due to

a Handling and Stability failure or a Structural Integrity

failure although both of them may actually have been involved.

Tables III through XVIII present the subsequences

of events within which the functional failure modes were

identified from the IDIR's and FFACT reports. Each table

presents a variation of a functional failure mode. The

first column shows the subsequence codes which outline

the failure

- mode , the next column describes the events

coded in the subsequence and 4 the last column shows the

number of cases in which this subsequence was identified.

The last column serves to identify points for discussion

but is not a statement of the frequency of occurrence

of these events in real life accidents.

9
The recording and analysis of accident reports after

the event is not a highly valid way of determining what

actually occurred in accidents. However, for present

purposes, the subsequences may be regarded as credible

in that such combinations of events do occur. Therefore,

the material presented in Tables III through XVIII can

be used as a basis for a realistic discussion of the adequacy

of safety standards.

Tables III and IV present functional failure mode

subsequences for the Child Access Prevention function

for ingestion and personal contact and burn events, respectively. The predominant ingestion method employed (32

cases) was drinking directly from the container in which

the child found the liquid. In 15 of these 32 cases,

there is reason to believe that the child misidentif ied

the container as one containing a normally potable liquid.

In the burn cases, the child directly ignited the fluid

in the container, poured the liquid and ignited it or

poured the liquid near an ignition source. The basic

preventive measure for all variations of the Child Access

Prevention failure mode is child proofing of all containers

containing flammable liquids. Identification of such

containers is always desirable but is not a sufficient

preventive measure, in itself, where the small child is

involved

.

Table V presents functional failure mode subsequences

for the Dispensing function in which liquid was splashed

or spilled on either or both the person or the area.

In none of these cases was the liquid ignited at the time

of spillage. In 41 of the cases there was a misdirection

of pouring. In four cases siphoning was involved. The

basic remedial approach to all such problems would seem

to be to improve spout design to increase control of pouring

and to eliminate the need for siphoning.

Tables VI, VII, VIII and IX present functional failure

mode subsequences for the Containment, Passive function

in which unignited liquid or fumes are splashed or spilled

on the person (Table VI), phe area (Table VII), on both

person and area (Table VIII), or ’'other” (Table IX).

No one or more predominant subsequences were found for

any variation on the Containment, Passive failure mode.

The containers were jerked when the operator was startled,

dropped, upset, thrown, kicked, washed in and transported.

The basic remedy to prevent this failure mode would seem

to be a container design and construction that would prevent

any release of liquid (including by leakage) except while

the operator was deliberately activating such a release,

i.e., a "dead man control” provision. Even such design

10
and construction would not always terminate release of

liquid if a startle reaction occurred while the operator

was activating release.

Tables X and XI present functional failure mode subsequences for the Barrier function in which fire transitions

to the container (Table X) and in which the liquid is

directly ignited in the container (Table XI). There are

two dominant patterns in Table X, one in which a flashback

occurs while pouring liquid on a fire and the other in

which a container releases liquid or fumes to a general

area in which an ignition source, such as a pilot light,

is located and a flashback to the container occurs. In

direct ignition of fluid in a container (Table XI) the

usual pattern of events is for a fire source, for example,

a spark, to directly contact the liquid or fumes in the

container. Both varieties of Barrier mode failure might

be prevented by a filter or valve in the spout of the

container

.

Tables XII, XIII, and XIV present functional failure

mode subsequences for the Containment, Active function

in which the container releases ignited fuel (Table XII),

fails to contain an explosion within the container (Table

XIII) or fails to contain a fire within the container

(Table XIV). The containment of ignited fuel, provided

no explosion occurs, might be adressed by the same design

and construction standards as for the Containment, Passive

function. Containment of fire is a more rigorous requirement,

even if no explosion takes place. The containment of

an explosion is probably not a reasonable requirement

to impose upon container design and structure and, therefore,

should not be incorporated in a standard. At a recent

1977 Engineering Foundation Conference on Product Safety,

Franklin Pierce College, New Hampshire, there was discussed*

a container design consisting of a coil of perforated

metal sheets inside a container. This design was presented

as a measure to limit fire action within a container and

prevent an explosion from developing. However, this device

has not been further reported upon. Probably the most,

and possibly only, feasible approach to reducing or eliminating

Containment, Active function failures is to enhance the

operation of the Barrier function.

*Personal communication, Dr. II. P. Van Cott, Chief, Human Factors

Section, Product Systems Analysis Division, Center for Consumer

Product Technology, National Bureau of Standards, Washington,

D.C. 20234

11
Table IV presents functional failure mode subsequences

for the Handling and Stability function. The containers

were knocked over or dropped during pouring or transport

or by being bumped into while not in use. The frequency

of dropping a container can be reduced by handle design

and placement. The knock over problem is a matter of

stability design, probably to a large extent configurational.

The enhancement of the Containment, Passive function would,

of course, reduce the spillage problem from Handling and

Stability related accidents.

Table XVI presents functional failure mode subsequences

for the Identification function. As noted before, most

of Identification problems are associated with liquid

ingestion by small children. table XVI pertains only

to older persons. None of the cases in Table XVI involved

ingestion. Since the IDIR’s and FFACT reports for adults

analyzed for the present study are usually for cases in

which the operator presumably knew what the liquid was

and what he wanted to use it for, one would expect to

find relatively few cases of mis ident if icat ion of the

liquid. Nevertheless, clear identification of flammable

fluid containers is an obvious safety requirement.

Table XVII presents functional failure mode subsequences

for the Storage Control function. These failures can

be expected to be reported relatively infrequently in

personal injury accident reports since there is relatively

little direct personal contact with a container in storage.

Storage accidents would tend to be reflected in property

damage reports in which personal injury, if any, would

tend to be attributed to products other than flammable

liquids or containers. The remedy for storage control

failure probably lies in container structural and design

requirements. It should be noted that some advocates

of plastic je rry cans claim that expansion of the plastic

can, along with expansion of the liquid contained therein,

tends to reduce the chance of container rupture when the

temperature of the storage area rises.

Table XVIII presents functional failure mode subsequences

for Structural Integrity. In one case a handle fitting

allowed leakage, in another case a glass container broke

when dropped and in the third case a plastic container

melted or burned. As noted before, the IDIR's and FFACT

reports are not container oriented and thus do not identify

many container failures. Also, in many of the cases analyzed,

the accident was primarily related to the configuration

of the container involved rather than to its structural

defects

.

12
The applicability of the provisions of the UL 30,

Metal Safety Can, the PS 6174, Plastic Jerry Can, and

the Factory Mutual Safety Containers Standard, and the

RR-S-30F Safety Cans Specification to the functional failure

modes is summarized in Table XIX. Table XIX is based

on Table I, Appendix 2, but the reader should go to the

standards themselves for detailed information on specific

paragraphs

.

Neither UL 30 or PS 6174 has any specific provisions

directly or indirectly related to Child Access Prevention.

The color and identification provisions of the Federal

Hazardous Substances Act may help in teaching a small

child what to avoid but they may also make the container

more attractive to the child.

The UL 30 standard has spout provisions which probably

make pouring stream control more effective for the Dispensing

function. The PS 6174 standard has only a general requirement

for a spout. The provisions in UL 30, Factory Mutual,

and RR-S-30F for Automatic Valve Closure with manual valve

opening probably would enhance Dispensing control.

The Containment, Passive function is covered in UL

30 by provisions for containment capacity, valve action

and spout leakage. These same provisions are generally

in PS 6174 with the exception of any reference to valve

action. Structural integrity provisions in both standards

are generally applicable to Containment, Passive. The

automatic closing valves specified in the UL 30 and Factory

Mutual Standards and the RR-S-30F Specification seem to

be an approach to a "dead man control" of liquid release

through the spout

.

There is no specific provision for a Barrier function

in either UL 30 or PS 6174. However, it is the opinion

of Mr. Emil Braun, Fire Safety Engineering Division, National

Bureau of Standards, that the screens or strainers specified

in UL 30, paragraphs 12.1 and 12.2, might be adapted as

a flashback barrier or a barrier to direct ignition of

the interior of the container via the spout. This is

probably the intent of the Flame Arrester provision and

Fire Exposure test in both RR-S-30E and the Factory Mutual

Standard

.

. There are no provisions in these standards directly

applicable to the Containment, Active function. General

structural integrity provisions are somewhat relevant

and the effective containment of unignited liquid, i.e.,

13
Containment, Passive, might also somewhat restrict the

release of burning fluid. However, it is probably unrealistic

to impose strict standards on containment of fire or burning

fluid within a container or to require any containment

of an explosion within a container, since such standards

would require a greater structural and material strength

than would be feasible in portable containers.

Handling and Stability are considered in the standards

as different topics. Handling is covered by the UL 30

in terms of placement and configuration of handles to

enhance security in carrying the containers and to provide

a top and bottom container grip placement for control

in manipulating the container. PS 6174 specifies only

that a handle shall be provided. The UL 30 handle requirements

would seem to reduce the number of incidents from dropped

containers. They would also facilitate control of pouring

and thus reduce Dispensing functional failures.

Stability, in both UL 30 and PS 6174 is considered

as static stability on an inclined plane, of 30 and 20

degrees, respectively. UL 30 also specifies a design

for stability in which the diameter of the base of the

can shall not be less than 85 percent of the height of

the body of the can. These provisions are directly applicable

to a static test of stability in which a container is

passively placed on a sloping surface. They may not,

however, give full consideration to a more dynamic type

of stability in which a container is kicked or knocked

over to an angle and is subsequently required to fall

back on its base. This might be a more severe test of

stability than a static incline test, especially if there

was liquid "slosh" within the container. The Factory

Mutual Standard and the RR-S-30F Specification provide

for tilting the can to 30° and requiring it to fall back

to an upright position. This test would seem to be more

applicable to dynamic stability.

Identification is not touched upon in UL 30. PL

6174 refers to the Federal Hazardous Substances Act.

This referral seems adequate as a specification for identification of flammability and toxicity. In fact, a survey

of gasoline containers for sale in drug stores, hardware

stores, farm supply stores, and elsewhere shows that these

containers are generally well identified for their use.

by

PS

The Storage Control function is generally

the Structural Integrity provisions of both

6174. In fact, these standards are largely

covered

UL 30 and

structural

14
standards. Both cover materials, coating, leak proofing,

and an extensive program of structural testing. In addition,

PL 6174 deals with melting, brittleness and flammability

requirements

.

Halsey, Kirstein and Snyder (2) have reviewed the

provisions on handling, stability and structural integrity

of the standards cited in this report and have performed

tests on several containers. Their primary objective

was to determine if these standards could be applied to

containers for home use. Their conclusions, as stated

in their concluding remarks, are quoted below:

"The purpose of this study was to determine

the feasibility of transferring the technology

involved in voluntary standards for safety cans

to standards for flammable liquid containers for

home use. In general, the results of this study

on the mechanical tests for stability, leakage,

and handle strength indicate that reasonable

performance standards for these characteristics

can be developed for flammable liquid containers

for home use. It remains, of course, for CPSC

to establish appropriate pass-fail criteria for

the tests.

The results of the pour spout strength

tests did not appear to apply directly to

containers for home use unless it is deemed

necessary or desirable to require that these

containers be equipped with valves similar

to those used on safety cans. On the other

hand, the results of these tests and the

associated inverted can leakage tests did

accent the need for leak-proof caps and

extension spouts. Leak-proof caps and

extension spouts are important not only

because of liquid leakage in an inverted or

upset position, but also because of the

possibility of vapor leakage in the upright

position and liquid leakage frojn the cap

or extension spout while decanting.

v ' The referenced voluntary standards and

specifications [1, 2, 3, and 4] provide

additional considerations which may be

* necessary to produce a meaningful standard

for flammable liquid containers for home

use. Further studies along these lines

could address features such as air vent

openings, pressure relief valves, flame

15
arresting screens, protective coatings,

material properties, capacity, fire

exposure, color, and markings."

4.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The analysis of the IDIR’s and FFACT reports which

form the data base for this study has led to the identification of nine major functional failure modes of flammable

fluid containers. These modes are failures in the following

functions with the associated consequences:

1. Child Access Prevention. A failure results

in ingestion of flammable liquid and burn

accidents by small children.

2. Dispensing. A failure leads to lack of

control of pouring or other transfer of

liquid from a container.

3. Containment, Passive. A failure leads to

leakage or spillage of unignited liquid

on the person or in an area.

4. Barrier. A failure leads to ignition of

liquid within a container.

5. Containment, Active. A failure leads to

spillage of burning liquid, exposure to a container fire or exposure to an explosion

in the container.

6. Handling and Stability. A failure leads to

lack of control, dropping or upsetting a container

.

7. Identification. A failure leads to treating

a flammable liquid as a safe liquid.

8. Storage Control. A failure leads to a flammable fluid accident during relatively

passive storage.

9. Structural Integrity. A failure leads to

breakdown of a container as a handling or

storage device.

An analysis of the applicability of the provisions

of the UL 30 Metal Safety Can, the PL 6174 Plastic Jerry

Can and the Factory Mutual Safety Container Standards,

16
and the RR-5-30F Federal Specification on safety cans

to these functional failure inodes leads to tne following

conclusions

:

1. The standards have no applicability to

Child Access Prevention.

2. The standards have some applicability to

Dispensing, primarily in the provisions for

spout and valve design, operation and structure.

3. The Structural Integrity and valve provisions of the standards are a possible approach

to the Containment, Passive function, especially

if automatic valve action results in a ’’dead man

control" of liquid release through the spout.

4. The screening and valve provisions of the

UL 30 standards suggests a possible line

of improvement of Barrier functions, as also

do the flame arrester provisions of RR-S-30F

and the Factory Mutual Standard.

5. It is not realistic to directly address

the Containment, Active function in a standard since this would involve unrealistic

material and structural requirements.

6. The handle design and placement provisions

of UL 30 seem fairly adequate for setting

requirements for container manipulation

and transport. However, the stability

requirements of the standards may not adequately address dynamic instability of containers, although a tilt test of stability,

as in the Factory Mutual Standard, may be

considered a dynamic test.

7. The reference in PL 6174 to the provisions

of the Federal Hazardous Substances Act

seem to adequately address the Identification function. However, this reference

should be incorporated in UL 30.

The analysis of the accident data and the evaluation

of the standards for containers for flammable and combustibl

liquids suggests that there is an urgent need to develop

methods and standards for child proofing these containers,

making the containers more ignition proof and giving the

user of the container control over the transition of the

liquid from container to objective. Present standards

17
seem to be generally adequate for container handling and

stability and structcral integrity and to be specifically

applicable to prevention of unintentional release of contain ;r contents

.

5. TABLES

This section contains all tables referred to elsewhere

in this report, except for the Standards Summary table

in Appendix 2. The tables are made available in this

way for reader convenience and to avoid disrupting the

text format of the main body, of the report.

18
TABLE I GASOLINE AND KEROSENE CAN

NEISS FY 1974, 1975, 1976 ACCIDENT DATA DISTRIBUTION

Age (Yrs .)

4-* U

D

<5

5

1 10

1 15

1 20

1

25

1 35

1 451 55

1 >64 Total

Diagnosis £ 9 14 19 24 34 44 54 64

Burns - Gas 2 2 3 8 4 8 4 5 0 2 38

Not Specified

Ker

.

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Gas 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 2

Can

Burns - Chemical

Gas 25 26 38 53 47 43 48 21 12 8 321

Ker

.

1 2 3 2 3 4 1 2 3 0 21

Gas 0 2 1 4 3 3 1 0 1 1 16

Can • Burns - Gas 1 0 5 3 2 3 2 0 1 0 17

Scalds

Ker

.

0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2

Gas 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1

Can

Burns - Thermal

Gas 21 77 147 115 102 143 80 54 32 22 793

Ker

.

2 2 6 8 3 5 3 1 3 1 34

Gas 0 4 5 5 3 3 2 1 1 1 25

Can

Poisoning Gas 441 78 102 119 99 62 14 12 6 2 935

Ker. 185 4 0 3 4 2 1 2 0 0 201

Gas 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 Can

Ingested - Foreign

Gas 6 0 0 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 11

Ker

.

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

Gas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Can

Aspirated - Gas 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 2

Foreign

Ker

.

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Gas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Can

19
TABLE I CONTINUED

Diagnosis

Dermatitis

Anoxia

Laceration/

Puncture

Contusion/

Abrasion

Hematoma

Fracture

Strain or

Sprain

5 10 15 20 25 35 4 5 55

8

cx, <5 19

1 14

1 191 24

1 341 441 541 64

>64 Total

Gas 22 8 6 15 20 14 7 6 1 2 101

Ker

.

2 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4

Gas

Can

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

Gas 5 2 7 8 4 2 1 1 1 2 33

Ker

.

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

Gas

Can

0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 3

Gas 1 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 5 Ker

.

0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0

Gas

Can

6 0 5 1 0 2 2 1 0 1 18

Gas 0 1 1 3 4 2 2 0 0 0 15

Ker

.

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Gas

Can

1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 4

Gas 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Ker

.

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Gas

Can

0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2

Gas 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 Ker

.

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Gas

Can

0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3

Gas 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 4 Ker

.

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Gas

Can

0 0 0 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 4

20
TABLE I CONTINUED

*->

Produc 5 10 15 20 25 35 45 55

<5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 >64 Total

Diagnosis 9 14 19 24 34 44 54 64

Foreign

Body

Gas 3 1 3 9 4 5 2 2 1 0 30

Ker

.

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Gas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Can

Internal Gas 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2

Organ

Ker

.

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Gas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Can

Total Gas 528 196 313 335 290 288 163 101 55 38 2307

Ker

.

192 9 9 13 12 11 5 6 6 1 264

Gas 9 7 15 13 9 10 10 2 3 3 81

Can

2652

21
TYPE

OF

CONTAINER

vs

FUNCTIONAL

FAILURE

MODE

ACCIDENT

DISTRIBUTION

I

43 r-1 60 O

(4 U

J-i *-> o c

4-> o

to u

o o o o o o o

c

• o

>H *r4

4-> 4-» d rt o> u

-a

«

K>

-dd *3

ca d X rt

u

d

3

u-a

c

•H

cd

4-> c c: o a> u 6N N

CM H

rH CM CM

00 0 9) m o

CM H

CM K) CM 6 a.

a>o

1»Ad

V

a.

to 60 o to o o Htn *-t o vo to o o o o LO •H C H

Q -H

lA T3 to • H 11 > «

•H U 43 cn NOO to to fs o v o o o r-4 .d U f-a LO U < 0* »

"O •3

* D - 4-. o P u <4 p O U C4 d p 4) •H o S *-h *h o s 5

' d H *J O H IA JD o H III Ew J3 O -t O

V <4 CO G n) to to -a c i4 to « to ~a a cd C

CA 4-1 (4 ^ *J n) d Va^ *-> (4 d <4 l-i *-> a* o JIH c OH-I d C tIH tIH « C ft) c u X a- X X o d. u x 2UUD.UD X 33

4) €> c

•H

cd •

«-> CA • d cd x

o o *-> d 1 • u a 3 rt

Cd O U O. Da u* 1- o 8 o O * p o CD U 4> H H* O 5

+-» -• O rH r—4 o rH

lit d 3 r-1 d o. d —

<

d cd p. cd O <4 t* 4J o a> 43 14 a* 4-»

4-* Da £3 <4 o Da 43 Dad d o H to to tO •"} « O Q o to 3) H

22

•Child

Access

Prevention

includes

19

cases

of

misidentification
FUNCTIONAL

FAILURE

MODE

SUBSEQUENCE -

-CHILD

ACCESS

PREVENTION

tO0

10

cd u rH rj in (S| cm

No.

x

x

GG

G cd

G • H

•H 3 G 3 G cr 0 G cr •H •H G 0 •rH 3 rH •H G ,—1

cr cd

H

G •HGG

G

cd

G

G rH 0 »HC

4—' 0 cd

G 3 O

G rH

G

g cr o o G rH G 0 0 -rH >—> u 0 •H 0 G 4n rH G

DO

G G<

G to to 0

(vi 0 •H to •H 0 G

GG

v / G cd td DO cd 0 0 O G G G G G G P. H G 0 G •H G to O

G

U £ O

G

O 0 O < o O to o - DO *> CO H g 0 G G G G G Z 44 £ DO £ O O -H O 0 o o G o •H •H •H CL, u G G •H G G G G G

•H 4-1 4h cd cd

G cd

G

X 3 • •>

uO cdO

O < cTG G G G •H •H •H G 2: •H X •H 0 •H 4h 44 G 44 0 G o G X 3 3 G 3 •H •H 0 •H G •H

CO

O cT cr • H crGG

X

G -H 3

cZ •H

G -H •H cd •H

GG

G

G cd cr

w

G 0 rH rHG rH 0 0 O 0 G •H

Cl, o,

G

G

GG

G

GG rH • H G G G O G •H •H cd •H O

G

G 0 0 0 u 0 to to to

uG

G

u 44

G 4->G • rH •H

O •H 0

cd to to to CO

G to £ E G E £ rH 0 G 0 0 0 0 O X /—\ Q cd DO DO to DO X X G X G •H 0 G G G P. G G G G 0 G 44 a,

(sj +-> -H •H 3 •H

O •H •H

G •H to

v / to £ -H £ G

~G * - G

G cd •H

— z to c to to tO 0 tO 0 to G to 3 to o to cd to to to CL, to G to G to cr to H 0 0 0 0 0 *H 0 O 0 -H 0 H U G o u U G O cd U U U X u

co

U 0 u o O

O

U

G

u

uu

w Cd

X cd cd cd cd

G cd 0 cdG cd ID G G o G 0 Z G o G G G 0 G U G O G G G •—i

•h

g •H •H •H rH •H •H •H tO •r4 3 cd 3 3 3 x 3 £ 3 £ 3 0 3

cr cr1 cr ct-h cr o cr o cr do cr

•H

O •H •H •H CL, •H

G •H

G •H

G •H

X

G

X

X

X tOX 4hX 44X -HX 0u (SI G fH 0 0 0 (SI 3 (VI + cr to (V) (SI (SI to 0 0 0 • H 0 DO 0 0 0 DO • to (M Csl (SI (S| (SJ (SI (S| (S| CM X + + + t + t + t 3 DO DO DO DO DO DO X DO X DO

CO H- CM csj H" CM

23
FUNCTIONAL

FAILURE

MODE

SUBSEQUENCE -

-CHILD

ACCESS

PREVENTION

to

<L> to

ctJ Uoz 3 3 3 tu •H •H . 3 3 3 3

cr 3 cr

A 3 to •H O •rH 3 rO <u rH to rH O E 3 to 3 3 i *3 CD 3 <D 3 •H 4h 3 <U ft O U tu 3 N. o 10 to CtJ ft cr 3 o ctJ 4-1 CtJ rH •H •H 3 O <D ft 3 rH 3 3 rH rH o cr o 3 3 O 3 ** •H • iH 3 O 3 *H 3 3 rH P 3 •H •h a • H

•H ~ o P **3 3 o 3 3 3 1/) •H 3 V CT* to cr 3

DO <U 3 3 <U 3 •H 3 •H <U H 3 3 DO 3 O P D rH 3

•H •H •H rH ft • H P ctJ - ft 3 3 CtJ O P CH P p x tU O <U P

<u 3 O

U 3 <U rH P P 3 3 O tU o rH •H O

•H

O 3 3 O 3 •H 3 3 U - 3 3 o •H •H ft tu DO

<U •3 *H 3 3 3 to 3 •H 3 1 CO » 3 4) 4J tu CT o <U H 3 -h ft-H * ft-H •v H a ft Z 3 •H CtJ ft 3 3 ftr-H 3 P 3 ft w O 3 P O DO •H O •H -H •H o > •H cr 3 3 *H 3 3 - 3 to 3 3 , w P •H o 3 cr 3 ccJ cr 3 cr 3

ft 1-1

u P •H CU •H CtJ • H 1 pr •H 3 U rH 3 3 «H 3 rH 3 2 3 x) 3 O <U O CtJ p O D <J o «H 3 3 3 3

CQ V) P 4-> »H <u P 3 0 <U <U P

<U •H 3 <U 3 3 <U -H 3 3 3 tu O 3 0) 10 3 to 3 -H 3 to DO 3 ft « o ft3 O 4h O ft •H 3 3 ctJ ft 3 3 ft ft 3 3 <U ctJ a

r * 3 * •k *3

A •k tO t/l CtJ to to 4h to -H to to lO CU 10 to to rH to 3 to to

<D 3 <L> 3 CU tu <u <u cr <u tu U -H U *H o o to U *H o u U 4h o u u O rH u o

ctJ ctJ to ctJ ctJ 3 CtJ CtJ <U CtJ •k tU o 3 u 3 3 3 E 3 3 3 tu 3 ctJ 3 •H 0) •H 3 •H •H tO •H +J •H rH •H 3 3 3 4-1 3 3 tu 3 -H 3 ft 3

CT-H cr cr cr e cr 3 cr cr •h ctJ •H •H 3 •H DO •H 3 •H

PI

p

J o rH r-J 4-t -J -H H-J -h t-J

tu rO •H o 4h 4h u rt tO to (NJ to to 3 + + + + + +

0) •r-\ 3 •H 3 U o XJ 3 3 to t* rO H- rH 'd- cr + + + + + +

0) -O •H CtJ •H CO CtJ •H

to C4 rsi rg csj CSJ CSJ + 4 i t t t 3 DO DO DO DO DO DO DO CO "cJ- H- rt H- 24

released

in

area,

liquid

burned

in

place
FUNCTIONAL

FAILURE

MODE

SUBSEQUENCE -

-DISPENSING

Cases

in rH rH CM CM

No.

CM rH

d

d

"Sf

d

v > ud dd d

Ptd •H < d d d Pt CO

Pi

d

d

d £ O d 3 d •H <p

i—/> •H

d

d •H

d Z d •H d • H o d d o' d

tod o' •H o'

CZ •H rH •H w d d rH rH ex O o P 1 V) d 10 rH CO rH 1 X. d Pi rH d rH

<p Pid •H bo •H o ex d ex ex d ex H tO •H co H d d d

i—i o •H o A * z d d d d o o d d d •H o o

l—1

•H •rH • H •H

d *d rd

P-1 P d

dd o' ex ex

a: CX o' o' cr •H •H •rH CX •H •H •H •H rH CO Pi rH rH rH * U d >s X

CO CO rH rH rH rH rO 43 m <D rH rH rH d § Q •H •H •H d d d

S3 ex ex ex

d •H •H

Uh to to <0 -d

dd

o' o'

•* •H • H Q d d d d rH rH tH •H •H •H •H

S3

ddd

d

dd

O' o' o' o' o'

dd

i—i

•H •H •H •H

p Pi hJ «H rH rH H Pi Pi d d

9k

d

d

d

d PH PH

SC

d

ddd CO CO to d Pt Pi Pi d d < d d d d d d

PI o o o o Pi Pi ex ex ex ex ex H H

toJ

r-1 *H

exto

dUd

d

d

d

d CM O' + 1 t d u d o —d

DO rd -d

to H- •st •sf TJ- CM CM CM rO t t + t + + d d d d d DO DO

to CM CM CM CM 25 i
FUNCTIONAL

FAILURE

MODE

SUBSEQUENCE -

-CONTAINMENT ,

PASSIVE

to

V

(0dU rH rH rH rH rH rH to o

z: PU

0) cu P P. p O •H •H

<u

O 4HX

p P

•H •H * <r r* x* C|H d d d d o o o o * rt n VO to to to

<D 3 d

p P P p t—\ U o o <1> <L) 0) <D u d CO to CL CL 3. CL

rH P p

CL <D o f-H

d

d

d

CL CL o o o o d o •rH C! d X X X X

CO

O o 0) 0) <D <u od x) rH rH rH rH w a) X X rH rH rH rH

Cl. I,

d •H •H -H •H •H •h

d P 3 3 CL CL CL CL o

** 3 cr cr to to to to -H

JO •H •H P O d rH rH X <D x} X X -H H X O •H U •H •H •H C

Ed V)

XX 3 d 3 3 3 00

i—i d c. <D CT rH cr cr ct-h

sz; a> rH rH •H CL •H •H •H

CJ3

X cl rH rH iH rH rH rH

d

t—( d <D •H •H

d o W o P d CL CL r-H r r - to ei •H H o 10 to P P P p p

Cl. P d P 0)X <D <u <D <u

CL, OOX * r <£)d o ddd cl •H •H *H x( x d •p d •rH • H •rH

O P CJ <D <D -H

dpd

d

dd P —t o x cr rH rH d P 3 P o p P u

3D to •H *H P P P d -o

d todd o

O' <L> 3 rH P pd o O P o O P H Q O' d d o U X u a> u u -H

PI •H x)p P u

d CLdX

rH

O to to P d P P o X i—1 d o O 0) o d) -H <D •» -J •* rH - O • p to X to P to P CLX

-J X) -HX *HX CL <3 CL CL-H CL-H

tH •H CL •H P •H

x 3 P 3 X 3 d

O 3

CL 3 «0 3 *H 3 <d •H <U O0

p cr

CO cr cr

d crd

p

d

p

d P -HX -H

•H

r •H DO •H o O DO o o o rH

rH x) rH *H rH -H •H •H rH

p

n: 0) P X

X P X

d

O

X

CO

X i-H

xdX *H o x <D -H a>

d <D < <U p 0) o a> to CL-H CL tO CL o P P

>—1 P P p V)

p

d CL 3 CLd cl to 0) -H

CL, 3 d 3 p 3 d o cr

O

d

O P to

d

co

O P O <L>O P P -Hppp CL fcO CL to CL CL CL P Q rH Q P Q CL CD -H

<D

U •H

X •H

O to to K) d + + +

a>

u o o 4-1 00 •H i 3 CM H- to to to CM cr t t i f + i t

<D 4h

O

u o u o U

to to CM CM ** H- -O + + t + t t i 3 d d d Q> •H •H •H CO CM CM (NJ CM CM CM (M

26

2g-*4c-*2b-*-3j

Handled

liquid,

liquid

spilled

on

person,

ignited

liquid,

direct

container

ignition
FUNCTIONAL

FAILURE

MODE

SUBSEQUENCE -

-CONTAINMENT ,

PASSIVE

to

0)to3

CJ

rH eg rH rH rH rH rH

H toH

H oz *

•s 3

tO 3 3 G +-» E 3 u to 3 3 3 3

cm 3 G

G

G E 3 o 4-» 3 • H • H •H 3 3

+->

G • H 3 G 3 CM

G

O

G

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M 3 3 z CtJ 3 3 rH '3 rH 3 3 3 G O CM o 3 3 3 <D 3 3 G •H •H 3 O 3

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CtZ

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pH

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cm cm to CM cr cr c •H c 3 G

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t—1 o G o G

O •H

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MM

ex 3 3 rHO rH *H •H

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O rO 3 3 O

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to •H 10

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-3

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CO eg rg eg (NJ eg eg eg eg

27

2d-»-4d-*3e

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area,

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place
TABLE

VII

CONTINUED

in

4>m

flj to rH L/S rH rH rH rH CnJ to eg in oz d

4)

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4)

a

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d

dd

G

dd P U aJ cr in in • H •H 4J •H 4) 4) 4) G 4) rH •H P aS as G in aS U in in O U d cu rH 4) 4) 4) cr CT as P aS as aS (J as <u G T l rH •H •H 4S G rH 4J 4) >H CU G •» • rH 4> 4) rH 4> rH iH O CU rH rH d CU cu-h 4) aS P P O 4) U 4) <D 4) o OOP

•> ctf •*. Q) P G P P CU

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p

d asG in in P rH P o d -h Cu-H d 4S P O <v 4) 4) CU 4) aS tn 4) in in o G O U B B p P rH 4> cud 4S p d p p P d d

in

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d 4> o d in o p

p

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dG rO

p o OS aS G p p p ip ip P P p G

p

p

•H P d P -H

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n> •H 4) •H Xi cr c in aS cr cr aS • H -H rH in -H

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a.

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28
FUNCTIONAL

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MODE

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to

03 u to o

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to

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of

person
TABLE

VIII

CONTINUED

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if) dU r*4 o

22

po d

d

p

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p

+-> o o d *h

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cem 4j

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4-1

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30
FUNCTIONAL

FAILURE

MODE

SUBSEQUENCE -

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PASSIVE

to

LUCO<uoz

T3

•H

cr •H

+-» - u

4-> CCj <D +->

w co

p

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p

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CO rg

CO + X XI

CO *ef 31 i
FUNCTIONAL

FAILURE

MODE

SUBSEQUENCE -

-BARRIER

10

4>

i/l 3U

««r rH lO rH 0 o2 3 • 443

•H3

443O o o 3

44 3 4) o 44 33

44 3 44 3 4) 3 •H »H 3

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r

—\ 3 44 +-> •H -3 4-> Pi 3 3 44 tO 3 3 O O •H s

/ O o • H O t/1 U t/1 •M 3

cd 3 •H

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tH

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t—

4) 41 rH 3 3 3 O

co

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»—

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33 33 -H 33 4) 4) -H

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4)U3

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U

uX -3

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XI + i + + + t 3 3 3 3 X •r4 33

CO Cxi 0x1 0x1 CM CM

32
FUNCTIONAL

FAILURE

MODE

SUBSEQUENCE -

-BARRIER

co

0)CO

o3 U rg rH rH rH LO • r—1 o2 d d

ai Cl p P

•H •rH d d CO bo DO o3 •H •H £ X X d

rH rH 0 P P d a u p

d Cl Cld oS

d 0)

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•H

d

d

u

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r

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r

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•H Cl

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t-H

d 0 d

d •Hdd < O d •H • H 03 •H iH H C/1 • H a3 o3 p o3 cp 0 a3 P P d P o p P d d o d d u d o o u o 0 o u o u co

d

H o d 03 0 U •w Cl 0 P w d d ps d rH *P d • rH •H u •H 0 d

t—1•P

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Q

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rH P Cp IP

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Cp

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a, tH

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HX

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CO rg rg rg rg rg vr

33
FUNCTIONAL

FAILURE

MODE

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-CONTAINMENT ,

ACTIVE

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(O

«« CJ rH rH rH rH 00 OH to vO

X o d X 0d

#• r>

dd

d

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bO P 0) P Cu

dX

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x to

p

d

•H to pu to P P o X Cu to •H d d d

d •>d - o * -d •»

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rH 0 (D a)

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O 0 o X d d d d 0 d o d O d x 0 to d u

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X

C

d

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d

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x

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x o d o O CL O to o o o - d d o o to x o L> to o u d u d O d o o o • H d 3 d o o 0 u X 0

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X to

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a> •H £ CU <D ID 0 X cu

p o 0 CU a) 3 0 <L) <D CU ID P ID X 0 p X 0 CU 0 -H 0 o d Ci cc d d d O d d d U d X •H d o d d d

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H- 0 + + + d •H 0 0 d 0 0 0 o on CM H- (SI H d 0 + + + + f i t t 0 O o tp d tp •H u X 3 H- OH CM OH OH H- OH OH H- O' 0 1 X 1 + + + + + + 0 X X X X X X X d to TJ- *3- rf ^3- OH X i t t t t i + t f t 3 X X X X X X X X X X to to to to to to to to to to to

34
TABLE:

XII

CONTINUED

toP

to

••

ct3 U• CM i-n CM rH LO C'- rH rH rsi (NJ CsJ

No

03 P j P O 03 P to •H P P o3 P 3

•k 03 03

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03 P £ P top fH rH

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p 03

p f—t •H 3 o P P O o3 O P (X 03 •H

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if) P • H P p

p P P P X 03 P •H 3 £ p P a. P p P P P P P X cr

<D P P •H 10 •H •H Cl •H •H tO P to •H p tx X P o3 03 O rt P Ctj rH P P X x O DO 03 P P P o P o3 P rH P

+->

p •H •H •H P P 03p P -H E CU P o3 o X 3 O O P O 03 O 3 to •H P

cT

UU rH

O P o cr P P P

03 03 P 03 •H rH r-H •H P 03 P • H P P o P »H P P -H P rH P •H P P X t—1 rH •H •H p. •H »rH •H •H 3 O DO

4-> <-( s P 03 10

p 03 P cT o •H P -H p P P o3 o3 03 to 03 P P •H

03 CUp 03 P P P 03 P P P P rH

p •k 4-> VI X P •H P P -H P 03 P *H O •H 03

if) •M if) P P P 3 P -H

p

p

U 03 P

03 P DO 3 3 cr 3 3 3 00 P P 03

X ~ O •k •H X X -H X cr X -H - o P P p P 3 P if) P rH •H p to •H P p p cr P P P •k * r> fH A p p P P p

p P *H P P P P P P 03

p

pp

p

p DO 3 p o •H r—1

•H p, •H P P P P P o3

pp •H (X •HX to •H 03 P o3 P P P P p p p p P

4-> +-> 03 H> P P • H •H •H *H •H P •H »H P P •k •k «k P. p p P O P o3 03 P 03 P c3 *H o3 P P o P P p

•H o +-> o O

p P O P DO

p

p

p

p o U

u

u P U -H u o3 U p P to P -H P 00 p p U 03 P p p U p p o O P O o -H O O P fH fH X

if)

O DO

O rH o U

U P u •>u

UUO rH (X (X Pu

p +-> *H P X

p a.p P rH

Q •H <H

m

p <Hp t+H o3 •H

pp

p

o3 - 03 P 03 P O o P o p

O P O P 03 (X

•H •H c • H

pp

p if) P O o •H

p P p to o P p P P to P p P o3 P -H P P P 03 o3 to 03 o P O 03 O P o O 03 O P O o3 O O O 03 p P P P

•H *H •H *H •H P •H • H

p •H

C •H P •H J-i •H 03 03 P 03

+-> 03 P 3 P (X P P rH P o p

p P o3 P 3 O o a,

O

•H H> •h cr •H •H •H r-H •H

O •H

O •H •H O' rH tH rH

t0 P t/3 *H V) P P P -H P P o P •> to *H (X

p.p P, P O P rH P o DO DO (X D0o3 DO 00 P P rH X X o X P

03

U ctJ 03 • H •H If) •H P •H

H •H P P p

p P o P P o3 P 03 X P P P 03 03 to

+-> 03 P P P P P P P 03 P U P to P -H P P 03 03 P 03 P P P rH u o U *H O -H u p (_) P P •H •H tH •H P

a>

m P »H P rH

p if) P 3 P X P 3 P P P -H 3 3 rH 3 P< P o P P P »H p p p cr P P P P P P cr CT-H cr •H *H •H DO •H {X •H P •H *H •H •H J-t •H O •H DO •H •H Pf •H c

U<M P *H PU if)

Q P.Q rH

a o QO

Q

O U. -H

XX to

X o Pt p p P P •H u H- t}- CM p t + + + p 03 P p 03 •H tH p P 3 CM *3- CM CM CM Hcr + f + + t + + + p U 03 o p X X X X P tH P X O

to (N| CM rM -tr H" H" H"H- H" CM

X i i + t + t + t i t 3 X X •x •x •x •x •x X p P P

CO to to to to to to to to to to to to

35
TABLE

XII

CONTINUED

Cases

No.

t—

rH rH £O £ * to O £

M3 £ •H

•* •H 4) m3 £ £ P 4) M3

4> cr P 4) £ •H £ PL, £ £

•H rH

O

OO £ £ £ to £

+-> M3 m3 m3 £ X> £ 4) 4) 4) O +-> rH - P M3 O •H rH £ •rH £ £ •H 4J £ £ O

m3 eo

p £ O cr to

0) • H to •H •H £

.X £ M3 rH 4) U m3 £ 4> P

•H M3 •H £ rH

4) £ O rH £ £

iH cr

O -H

OO £ +-> •H P •H O £ iH £ to 4-> m3 £ £ • H • H 4) £ O +J m3 M3 £ rH

<D 10 (O 4» m3 -H CO rH £ £ 4-> <3 3 •H *H £ .£ <D •s •H £ cr P o +-> (X £ £ £ -H £ to •H O co £ rH 4) M " £ to •H X5 £ M3 P 4> o £ M3 •H *H

•H

u 4)

r (^) £ £ £ £ n3 P 4) 4) 4-> +-> cr O i—1 4) U O -H £ -H

10 P-H

O £ £ £ O rH 0) <H 4-> rH rH DO U o £ -H P P-H M3

•H P M3 £ M3 4)

to 4)

O £ £ r £ +-» m3 £ to •H •H £ £ -H

4) m3O £ 4) £

M3 *H •H 4) M3 M3 £ £ 00 O £ •M P 4) 4) *H O -H

i—( cT •H £ £ £ to P-H tO £ £ £ 4-> £ - X rH £ O £ £ £ 4) £

4) £ rP

O P 4) M3 £ m3 O £

M3 0) +-> 4) M3 M3 +-> -H

•H -M rH •H •H

U £ £ -H 4) rH £ £ 4) 4) +-> cr* £ £ *H cr or1 to £ £

•H CO •H P •H •H

p •H

O

rJ -H PH tO rj £1 £ Q

U

4> 4> O Mt £ t

4) 4> 4) •H 4> £ H- Hcr + t t +

4> M3

U 4) .O

to fN| Csl Mt- .O t + + + + £ 4) CO •-H <4H • H r-, to tO to to to to to

36
FUNCTIONAL

FAILURE

MODE

SUBSEQUENCE -

-CONTAINMENT ,

ACTIVE

in0

in

co o

LO P rH rH eg LO rH P • co o2

nd0

ndo nd

c.

p 0

ID CL

X

•H

d

X

u

d • H 0 •H

o' cO

X

•Hp Cl

•* rH

d 0 C. nd nd #k o d o 0 0 c. nd o •H nd Td a) CD nd nd CO

•>

O o d i—( O nd ID P 0 ,—

r—

•H i-H nd ID nd

d c

CL, CL, CO • HOX o o r-*

XX P CLP

U

p o P 0 0 d in CL •H CL o X rX X •* U c. u •> CD ID 0 0 0 0 nd C. U u d d nd <D c O Ci CO cO •H 0 P (D 0 1—

p

co CO CL

p

d £ d CL CL /—

p P CL c. -H ID •H

cO

d

d

O cO cO c. CO d.

d

p o o Ci P P rd P •H •H v / u u id in (d p d o o nd nd z •k #\ i u •k o 0 0 o Cl u Ci Ci c nd nd

t-H <I) 0 0) <D ID •k o o nd

CO

ddd

d

d c.

d Cl

p

p 0 o O •H • H •H •H 0 •H 0 CL CLnd

-1 • H CO cO CO co

d cOdX

X o

Cl +-> P p P P -H

p •rH 0 0 p

X CL,

dd

dd co

d CO Cl

UJ •H o o o O P o P in in

X

c.

u 0 u

u

d o d 0 0 0

OCu o o ' £ £ w in o o o o o o o d d c, z 0 p p p p p <HH <HH 0

t—

Q nd nd nd <HHd < nd nd Cl nd 0) nd 0 nd (D o c. C *H H 0 0 0 0) nd <D CL id nd o O co Z. d d d d o d CL d o d p o o o -H O rH o o O P o • nd nd d

CJ •H •H CO •H p. •H Cl •H pu •H •H •H o P P P P X P nd P X P d d u

•H •h

d •H 0) •H •H ID •H o' o'

in in o in in •> in

d •rH •H

r

dd 0 d c.d

d

d c. w> P P c. co cO CO ID co o CO ID •H 0

Ci Ci nd c d Ci <n c d nd nd

d

p P 0 P «H P Ci P -H P 0 0 -H

CL, cO ID cO

u

p P cO 0 0 CL ID P <D CL a) p 0 •H •H P

Cl c.

O Cl

d c c d Ciddd

•H •H

C •H o •h c •H o • H O0 00 o

H, CL nd Hi 0 CL

O H,

O

Q l—H

p 0

cO P 0 •H 0 eg d + 0 •H cO 0 cO co d CsJ P P p p

o' + + + * + 0 cO cO •H 0 nd cO to nd

in P P eg eg eg P p eg rO + t t 1 t + + + d .d rd rd rd X •f—

0 0

co to to ro to to to to to

37
FUNCTIONAL

FAILURE

MODE

SUBSEQUENCE -

-CONTAINMENT ,

ACTIVE

w

4>V)3u ro ro O2 d

4>(X

fXo3

-d

<uo3 +

4> x> 4-t •H 3 rg CM

cf

a> i

•H +X) JO i w <N| x> + + t t 3 .3 X x W ro ro ro ro 3

•t 3 3 3 3 •H

4) 4> 4) 3 3 3 3 P P •H •H •H 3 o 3 3 3 O

<rt P P P U

(X 3 3 3 3 O O O 3 U O U •H 3 /—\ o 3 3 3 ^ d

•H •H •H

u 4)

d 3 3 /—\

4)

d

dd P 3

X) O. 4) 4) 4> P 3

04 3 3 3 3 JO O 3 3 3 3 3 <D 3 3 3 P 4>

>-<

d 3 X> JO JO 3 3

•J •H 3 •H Z • 3 •* 4) *P O 3 P 3 3 3 J3

4) 3 4) 4) 4) c2 3 3 O 3 3 3 • 3 w O •H u •H •H ‘ •H 3 4> z •H 3 3 3 3 3 3

t-H P P 3 P P P 3 •H < (X 3 -H 3 3 3 JO 3 H •H O O O O P Z 3 U d O O u o 3 o O 4> 3 3 O u V) O 3 O <D o O O

4) P 3 P 3 p P z Q 3 •H 3 «P d *3 d 3 d d 4> O o 4) P 4) <U 3 z 3 4) 3 3 3 3 *H 3 2 O 3 O O O O 3 O

•H *H •H

U • H •H P • H

CQ P P P 3 P

•H •h

d •H •H

O •H

CO ^ (/> 4) 10 to

u 3 3 3 3 P 3 3 &0 3 4) 3 3 3 3 P •H 3 3 3 O 3 3 4J P *H P o< P P 10 P 3 t/> 04 U

4) P 4) 3 d 4) 3 4) 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

•H o •H 3 •H •H 3 • H

(3

O IX P tP 03

O

Q

jo+

ro

38
FUNCTIONAL

FAILURE

MODE

SUBSEQUENCE -

-HANDLING

AND

STABILITY

Cases

O CM rH fH

No. P X)

p • rH •rH <u

p 3 3 p o

cr O' •H •H •H c p

rH rH W> tu •H rH P X) X5 rH

<u 45 tu

X •H

x:XX rH

p

tO to to P to G 05 o5 U

rH rH rH <u p P P P P

10 to (O •H (U P G /—\ P P P •H

•rH o o o P 05 CM <u H-> v / P X) X) g G

0) 0 4) •H

O

D

rH ! < rH 05 <J

W rH rH rH H-> 2 •H H • H g P

t—

P P P O <u < 10 to to U p H G p 2 O a •t •t o O •H P p P P p u P 4) <U <u tu p p g G g G P •H •rH •H • H •H P 05 O P G G o5 o5 O <U U, U P p H-> Oj p P Q lO G G c <u G +-» 05 o O O P O <U

cr;

Q o U

U 05O (O

G o P-H P G X5 X5 G P 3 H <D O <U 1) >H <u p W P to P P p * *H

to

p

p P PX5

p P 3 P o <v O o c o •h cr P p p P 5-i 05 p 3 -H P X) X5 p ct<h g C •H P O P p o p rH p O O 05 O to o <U P 45 p P rC P *H P P H-* tU +-> tu to

4>

p 0)

G <L> P <u P oj

to o' to to to 3 rH P-H p c P G p O P P rH pi -H P o p P to

«H CM rH CM O'- P

<u P G tu •H p P G •H P P <U p c

<U <u

GG

.C -G •H

O •H

to to

G

U

05

G P G *> rH rH G <U P P P P O 5-. <u tu

to to

O

G

pG

•H

#« «• - G o G P 5-i Jh -H p +-> tu tu <U p G G G G P O

•H • H •H

G

p

O

G

G

GG o P P p P G G G G p tu O O O O tu P O O u to to P P p o P P P <U 3 p

<u tu <u

p

p

p P G P

<U

G

p P G o O 5-< O O <u O O

5-. 5-i

G P rH (O P P P P P p p C <u P tu tu P Jh -h P rC, G to On O O o to P p P G to 3 G P P G P rH O

<U <UG <u

p - •• to to to to P P P P 05 pp p <U tu <u 3 <U 3 rH 3 P G G rH P tu o •H •H rH

•>

G •> to

GG -H P p p p P P

<U

G tU

G <u <u

G

G to

G -HG

O

G rH

OO

•H •H •H rH

UU P G P G p G -H o

4-> -H P -H P P G

G

G 3 G 3 G to •H •H Hd o cr o cr O tu u *H u -H U P P P JC

rH rH •H (U tu (A P P P 3 G G G

tu P <U P tu cr P P rH p tu p tu p -H 3 3 P P rH P iH P rH -o J3 tO O rH O rH O

P-H P-H P - P P P to p to P to <U •H •H *H G to G to G P5 3 3 3 G G G O cr cr cr P P 5h p P P •H • H *H H O H O H -o J rH

4)OG

4)

p 3

cr +

(U

u P o —

p

•r-\ •H

(0 *3- rf CM JU + + + + 3 •H •H •H •H G

CO CNJ CM tM] (SI CM P U P •H •H tu hT h}- CM + + i + +

•H • H •H o •H

CM CS) (NJ (SI (NJ f i + i

PH «p tp rO xi

CM CM CM sr •5}-

39
TABLE

XV

CONTINUED*

tO

<D

to

cd U

H

H

p

O2

XI

•H P X) £

a> o Vi O'

10 P O •rH P<—

P £ -H x> P 0) XJ

•> in p£ <U P to P

<u P cd £ o i—

•H •H Pi Pi

Cd XJ to to P <U £ X! •* P o tn Vi o U cd 0)

i—4 £ X) XJ P •H <u O V) cd p p P to P X) £ cd O -H o p P £ u Pi

to o' to £ -H X)

Cd r—f <D

A

Vi Pi XI P X) Pi <D £ <u O P o » p P P • H Vi -H XJ o P <D c p P £ CO P

•H •H -H

O P cd cd P

t> P «• P <L>

O

to £ Vi 0) P o O <D to cd P Q o £ p o

•pH £ £ to £ Cd •rH p •H 4-> £ £ XI X)

X)O •H *H X)

(U

O £ £ • H £ cr o' £

Vi XS •H P o' £ <U £ P P •H rO cu O P P to XI X) cd XJ O Vi (U 0) XI 0) •H V (D P P o P £ XJ P X) P P cd o' £ P o

•H

V £ cd

p P £ POO X to to -H o <D u£ t o •H XJ H3 £ <NJ m- O' t t o «p •H •H

to Csl (NI CnI XI£ 1 +

CO +pG

to rf CM

40
FUNCTIONAL

FAILURE

MODE

SUBSEQUENCE

-

-IDENTIFICATION

COo

CO

CO u »—

rH rH o2

T)

<D

* rH nd rH

0) •H x a,

<d to to •H cO f—

•s. •H a. £

+-1 to CD £ £

<u •» •H nd £ CO

•l-l ID 4-> CO £ £

•H •H O

E CO O M

£ nd

T) O CO (D •H U <D d £ u

o' Td cO •H

/—

\

•H <D r* M i—

+->' £

Os] £ *H £

V ' nd O o

£ CD fir'd >< o i—l to £ £

PU. •H "3 £ cO CD

1—1 +-> £ cO £ H CX cO £ £ X

X +-> O +-> W £ to Q o -TJ *• £ A

t—

CO Td *H nd (D nd

m CD •H 3 •h cx • H

i—i Q d o' d d £ cr-H cr £ cr

1 •H r

•H o •H

i—

rH iH

Hd 'd cO T3 CD nd -h Td <D 0> £ <D 3 CD £

•H 3 •H o' •H cO 4m o <-H -H 4M •H fX •H iH •H £

+J +-> P -H £ - £ -a £

4) T) (D CD CD rtd Td -H nd rH *3 -H •h d •H rH •H 3

to o' 10 -H to o' •H •!-( •H fX •H -H S rH S rH

0) cO u CM £ t

CD u —nd *3

d cm **

O' + i +

CD bO 4-1 nd

to CM CM CM X + + + d X X

CO CM CM CM

41
FUNCTIONAL

FAILURE

MODE

SUBSEQUENCE -

-STORAGE

CONTROL

Wt

rt Uoz

X) X*

•H •rt 3 3

cr O' •H •H

r—

r—

•s 3 3

0) a> 3 3 • H •H X)

rt Cl} <1> 3 3 3 3 3 « rt O o x) <L> o o o X

'O 3 3 O <D •H •H rH > & O

X) x}

X / N 1) <1> <D -3 X 3 3 3 3 o O 3 rt V / o 4-> 3 <D •H w in 3 3 W 3 rt •rH 3 U (X x) <u X) cij in < •H •H O •H 3 3 3 rt 3 3 3 o U cr O' O O H W •H o •H o X

toO r-4 4-* rH o A 3

-XI * <D •H

<u <u <D

U > in > rt 3

•h rt •H r-H *3

in <l> in o-i a> W f—

in iH

rt <i) 03 3

(X 3 p4*H 3

<D 3 in 3 X3 3 O <D O <D •H

<-> e 3 X> rt

rt 3 rt o 3 3 m 3 r—1 3 o <D P< O

(X 3 fX

XU o o O O « O rt o3 t

a> X) o 3 •S' K) cr t +

<uXX

in '3- 3 •1—

•<—» to INI (SI 42
FUNCTIONAL

FAILURE

MODE

SUBSEQUENCE-

-STRUCTURAL

INTEGRITY

too

todU rH rH rH oz G

44g

•Hd

4-> gO

d

O

G

44

g

X - 4)

to

G 6 d

d a>

g 44 rH G o G

ft •H

G

G

10

d *H 3

4-> > rO

G

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G

v''~ o O 44 d o 44 d G G

(1)

d

O rH rH a> 4) rH ftd £

•H ft

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ft

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d

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G 44 d G G

•k o •H d G 10 d

w • H

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a4 4-> ft

O

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t—•H rH to 3 < +-> ft o

ft ft

d 3 G

•H a>

d 44 ft G G «« <L) G

ft

U 3 G to •H 2 V) O <i) d d

t—

a> ft

G 44

G < o •H rH G H * d 44 O Z d g 4-4 G U O <u o G

C_4 rH tfl o d

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d 44 3

<4-1 ft

d cr

d

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d ftd -O

d *H to 4>

4-» 3 G rH 44 G a4 d *H G O -H G d •H U iH H ft ft

44 t>—

U '3- G +

44

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ft

44

d •H

to rsj

'3' X4 + + + 3 •H ft rO

to 'St CM

43
STANDARD

APPLICATION

TO

FUNCTIONAL

FAILURE

MODE & rH

ft)

X o

to

x

O CO

G

G

X X) 4-»

O

X

O i/i

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G • H 44 4-) G X ft) u o

4-)

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u

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ft)

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G o E tO X X i—1 r-t 1 E 3 • a, o X o -G o' g ex CX G U G U Oft ft) G X G 4-> X o

ft)

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X

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U E CO G4) G<t X G O G OH'HN G 4-> 4-) 44 rtGO E GOG to OH O G G • G

4-) * O /-v •H

X

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to

ft)G CX

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GX 4-4 o 'U

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ft)

G

xx

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<_>

GG

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G > G UG o > bO bO o G X O XX G •H £ G to

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ft)

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ft) 13

G ft) ft) • X COO rH

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ft)GG XxG

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X

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tog ex 2;

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to

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ct-h

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to •> CO X O . • X • G CM • 4t G (N) G

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O X) X cG u

•H X) 44 X

•H

G

U O'

ft) •H

CX

X

to

O

<dX

G . G u c

•H o

to 44

X

X •H 4-> G u c

ft) ft) ft) E ex >

ft) to ft) G G

•H ft) ex G G

O'G ft)

ft) to G to G X ft)

ft)

G

x

bO • ft) ft) G ft) E G X bo ft) G G G ft)

ft)

X

x

g

rH rH

GG

•H O'44

x) ex ft) G to G * G X

44 ft)

G

C

O bO ft) o G X X £ r* X X O G 4) U X ft) G X X ft) G E

ft) ft)

x o > > G to X ft) o G G CX o > ex to X

VO

to • X

CM •t vO ~CM • vO . to • OO CM X . G . — G G x Cl, G • CX oo r Xr t". o - X

to

X vO

X VO to

35

x CX

to cG G E ft) TJ C g xo g X3 x c co

rH

to

to

ft)

G bO

G

u o G

G

U

X •H

O 4) < X to •H X G G X G X) 4) ft) O x ft) X > ex G x x) • H ft) to G G O -C G •H

ex ex 2 U CX o

•> xg

ft) EG ft) •h > G x

4-> lO G w O G u ex, 44

Factory

Mutual

Par.

1.1

Automatic

valve

closing

provides a

possible

cut-off

for

spout

and

other

openings

when c

not

held

by

operator.
TABLE

XIX

CONTINUED

oJ

10 •

Z. *H P X

p

p

U P 'O

cd P •H

O •H

X E p > CL > • to T3 P r—1 • P to O to P

Cd

X Cd

X T3 P tox P Cd P p p CL P

X)

X

p <1> cd

X •H P t p x 6 X O P P o U C to x p p p u P X cd cd CL tO

r-t P Cd •H • E O

O

X

p

XX T3 > p P CL •H 0) to P P > P X X

CO

X o X P X top P

to £ P u Cl,O cd o o p cd X > T3 Cl P

CL to V) o X3 4->

X to £

to

w +_> cd

X

X P cd rt p p u O X X

•H «0

X P to cd £ cd

x

to

p

X

C

X

X

X P P C cd to

p

p

•X) CL.

p > X

X tox o X

•H

O E P x

u cd P x

X > P X to P X P X O P P P X P <x E UP p p •H p E *H 1 P P O

clx P TJ •H P P x cr x to X •H X tO to o P X p p P P P p P rH P o cd cr p o • H x3 • cd p P p X

10 P P Xp •H

X

p P X

X

O cd

O 4-> P cdO E p cd

XX •H

p

p cd o P P u

O

X Cdp P X

X top cd

x

p

p to to to

X XXX

0)O 0)

p top tO CL > CL CL X p P cd > POE X tO O C P O x cd p X X

Cd •H cd <xXp >x > P X to cd x

p

O xi

X P X

X

U P u t-H Cd X p p cd p p X

•H X3 P X

p

p E E CL P |JtHH P -H p > cd to P

cd txpX P U P to

x cd e o x u to to P P X cd X O ' P P Cl, > XXX P X P rH P P P P P O X P X O X O X < U P CO X H X > H X H

cm• CM to ?H X• LO

CM • • H CN) to • IS • CsJ X CO X * • rH • X cd ,3- P CM P •

CTJ • ISX to

CL

p • X

p

cd

p • 5£ -

CL cl cd oo to o CL, X '3- X • to r- p cm 1 P o o - x o

to P to to

X OP

X • 1 X • P OP

OS

X

XX

x co o cd cd os o p> X x CL 2 X CL pp

•Hpp

cd « P X

cd •n X o X p p •H > • X x x rH O to o X PL P oo CL CL CL P to P X p p cd X p to o U X3 O p o cd P X X X p p p p xt X rH

CLO

x to

p

p

X E O 00 P cd P X cd P •H P p P p X p X Xx P

to P X) P cd cd c o p p p E x p

X) CL P X)X oo

X to

X

p

p P X P X P X O P • p o X cd X X •H X P p £ cd P p to > cd • X p X cox

to

p to to P u > p to CO

X o p

X

p

pO

x

p

G

p

X • H

p X)p

p

p o p X X p X P CL P X •H E u CL E p p XI X to P p E p p P P •rH XP p •H p > o to p > X X p to cd O P o p X p p >

1 p x x p

CP P to cr CL cd

X to CL

ppp

p POX

p

X

X

pX

X • P x o x

p

U cd CL P X

p

p

pp

x £ P X •H

p cd

p

p r* P P x> P X X p X 'S X) P X CO

to to

p

X to

pp

p • p u o p to p • to cd O X p p CL cd P CT'P P 5 p

cd

p

X

X

XO *H *Hp <X •H

p cd •Hp

x

x

p CL

O

X

X

u

X to

X P X o p p p cd •rip X O P o cd E CL E p > p tO t3 Lh p X cd to P O X X) p <x p o X rH X P X p X X P X p X cd X o CL P X X X u p OOX P to p p p P p p P x p P COX p p X O X X X p CO X cd X X

cd

H

X

H toH P X HEX CO

Is

X

r

cd

XX P • • P to X • • * X u

to

XX

X

p • p • p p p *• p CM p X cd lo E o CO

CL • P • 2 to X P p • cd cd P P >S

CL to

X CL to CO

X

O ‘ P P X

X •H

to - o > * £ - P i X t" u x o p X o OO

CO • • to to P ‘O P to

p i to x p to X P X

OS • • p cd

X

X CO o X P

OS toX CO CL

O CL 2 X

X P P > >

•H

X

X

X

U

u < " < X

•s r—

* •s X x X X P CL p p P CO p p p E E o g XP -P P X p

p

X P X to

X *H

cd tox cd o cd

x cd

x

X

X

x

p P x p P CL p P O CL CO O X o p U CO H u w U 0Q

45
TABLE

XIX

CONTINUED

o) 8

rH

p

x ip p X p

X

u

xp

p

p

•H P •H CO

X

p

x

x rH

p

p XX •H Td p X

O, X) P X

u P 0) • p p X p X pd P *H p p pd p p X P p CO rH POP p X

rH

X Pd

Up

p

p

p CO • rH V) • H P P p <x Pd X P > o X X 6 P x p pd p P H" o <P • p P D x X p P P rH p P p p O CO X P > p ' • PH O P u X Cx X o p P to •H p P pd X X X

DO P P P «pX

p

p

p P p

Pd

X P o pu Ph P P p P p P P p p p •H U p > P P I i do p X P X p p X P rH p p i X U P X X X

•>

D cd x:

x pd CX

X P p P X

CO CNJX CO .P DO P p o •H

p

ppp P X .O P CO •H CO P p o p O • cd O P P •H pd • P cx pd CO p x to 6 •H p -P P X p p P •H C

t/> 6 CO rH

u pd

p

p

p P

•H •> Cd P pd o x

p P P X-H P DO > to rH p P p p •H p rH rH p O O • Mh E P •H U XX O X •H P P <N) •H rP P rH P X PEP x u CO p

O. • P pd P X P Xp

X

p o < •H

p

to

p P P Xl •H E u > X P Pd P P P X POP p O CO X w p P E x o P X P p p P P

•H jC co cd P P CO P P X CJ

X o P Pr P rP •H DO P P P p p •H

DO cd P p P pd P P o p E cr

p

p P (O

CD P U P o •H

X P P • X CO

X

X DO

p

X P MH

X

p P P P X pd

p P > P cd X E rH CO P p p p P X P o

•h

p

pp P p CO P p E x

pp

p

X

p

cd P U o X P X o 0)

X P X CO P X

H P,d) cd pd cx

p P p

p

p

cd t-> rH CO P X

X •H P X

X pd

p

X P - CP p p > X P P E u P P P X P P o •H •H o •H P cr p p p p o P X X CD X p «P <p p X pd P P X X E Pd P P U > P rH • H •H X •H •rH P X X l E P CO DO P P CO pd u o X > P Oh O P CO p P £ P p p p pd P o p crx o U M P X P O rH cd Ph Oh P X p X P P P p p p p

co

xxX CO CO P co Ph

X

px pd cc

x

X

X

rH

X • p ln

X

•H rH

p P •*. t^- LO to p

DO rH • •* • • H- P P • to to X X P O • rH • • O P rH • <N| • P • 04 p

p t—

p

p 2 p

p P • p • p X p • X

CO rH P to CP

u Or P to

X LO P CO

cd cd • r* oj S • rH P x p CP o •H a, •» X X LO •H • X P X ^ P rH H" *3- X • o • H- tO P X t>- P r- r-~ a t'-' P to to to r-~ * c/i p

rH

U

O ~ rH o X o 1 O rHr

O DO VO 3 to IN) X) to X X • CO • to p CO to O P P • U P • P p X (O X

CO P X) o CO

X COp

p

Xp

x o CO • X)

X

p

CP CO

X rH CP

X CX P-t Ph « X

x 2:

X to ^d < X P XO o P

pd •H

X P X p p P o u CJ DO X •H P x cp p

•H

X •H DO

X

X P

pd

x P p P P P o P X pd X X co X CO

46

PS

6174

Structural

integrity

provisions

are

generally

relevant.
3 o> O • H -H o CO *44 v 3 *H

4> o

u> 4-> CD 3 X 3. 3 4) co

4>> CO CO o 3 3 u O

<u 0 -H

4-» CO > • H *H • H 3 >

V) cr o 3 3

a> P> 3

4-» o X 3 co

4) 3

to • co -3 • H 3 co 4-1 -3 3 'P 3 O 3 3 • *3 *H 3 co 3 CO •X) O 3 3 *H 3 co 0) H3 > 3 3 3 o +-> _1 -h

Q 3 Pi cop 3 W 4-> 3 4-1 to CO -3- CO 3 z rH t'' 3 O

H-l o 3 rH

O

H CO Pi v£> 4) Z 3 DO

O o 4-> W 3'H u ^ o 3 3+-i 3 4) CO X 4> Pi CD > 3 X 4-1 rP O 3 X H CO H O 3 w T—C i—4 3 3 X 3

PQ Pi CO •H 3 3 < X 3 -3 3 33 H •H P ft 3 4-» 3

X)

U Cd 4)

O 3 3 3 Pi 3 3 3

0) Pi OC 3 3 M

3.4-1 Cd <4-»3

3CO Pi to 3 < cd 4> 3 * P4 4) *3

0) t—

CO H4

<U

X

X

(OOP » 0 p i—t -H M1 H ’H

Pi r- 3 3 o cd m r-t 3 W)

to

H

O \D

h 1)

4-1 4-» -1 - 3 CO * 3

ZD CM t-t 3 CM

w

Structural

Integrity

47

REFERENCES

1. Greene, K., and Cinibulk, W„M. Failure Mode Effects and

Criticality Analysis (FMEfJCA) Procedure for Equipment

Safety Assessment. QRC, Inc., Silver Spring, Md . 21

May 1970.

2. Halsey, N., Kirstein, R.F., and Snyder, R.E. Mechanical

Tests of Flammable Liquid Containers, NBSIR 74-614,

Engineering Mechanics Section, Mechanics Division,

Institute for Basic Standards, National Bureau of Standards, Washington, D.C., December, 1974.

3. Pezoldt , V.J. An Analysis of Container Involvement in

Gasoline Related Personal Injury Incidents. Human

Factors Section, Product Systems Analysis Division,

Center for Consumer Product Technology, National

Bureau of Standards, Washington, D.C. January, 1975.

4. Tyrrell, G.A. Gasoline and Gasoline Container Fire

Incidents. NBS TR 850, Programmatic Center for Fire

Research, Institute for Applied Technology, National

Bureau of Standards, Washington, D.C., January, 1975.

5. Standards for Safety, Metal Safety Cans, Underwriters

Laboratories, Inc., UL 30, Approved as ANSI Z218.1-

1971, March 9, 1971

6. Plastic Containers (Jerry Cans) for Petroleum Products,

Voluntary Product Standard 6174, May 1, 1974.

7. Approval Standard, Safety Containers and Filling, Supply

and Disposal Containers, Factory Mutual Research, Class

6051 and 6052, May 1976.

8. Safety Cans, Spring Closing Type, Federal Specification

RR-S-30F, April 18, 1975.
'
APPENDIX 1 ACCIDENT EVENT CODING

The following coding system was developed and utilized

during the analysis of the IDIR's and FFACT accident reports

in this study. While all of the coding items were considered

in the accident event analyses and sequences, some of

the items were not included in tabulating the functional

failure mode subsequences since they did not appear to

provide significant information concerning the functional

failure mode. These omissions are indicated by an asterisk(*)

in the following list.

Code Title Description

1 Type of Container The container utilized by the

operator to pour, carry, etc.

the liquid.

la Standard gasoline The type of container usually

or kerosene sold in retail stores as a gasoline or kerosene can.

lb Spout can - metal A container with an enclosed

lc Spout can - glass pouring spout and constructed

Id Spout can - plastic of material as noted, but not

identifiable as la.

le Spout can - unknown

If Small mouth jar A container with a relatively

or can - metal large capacity body and a lg Small mouth jar small top opening for filling

or can - glass and dispensing, e.g., a plastic

lh Small mouth jar milk jug, constructed of

or can - plastic, material as noted.

cardboard, paper

li Small mouth jar

or can - unknown

lj Bottle A container with a standard

bottle conf igurat ion , e.g., a soft drink bottle.

lk Open top, deep - A container in a wide mouth,

metal open top configuration con11 Open top, deep - structed of material as noted,

glass ceramic e.g., a drinking glass, tin

lm Open top, deep - plastic, paper

cardboard

can, pail.

51
In Open top, deep - unknown

lo

Ip

lq

Open top, shallow

- metal

Open top, shallow

- glass, ceramic

Open top, shallow

- plastic

A container in a pan or semi

tray configuration constructed

of material as noted, e.g., a paint roller tray.

Ir ' Open top, shallow

- unknown -

Is Unknown Unidentifiable from the report.

2 User Operation The activity carried out with or

on the container and liquid by the

user of the liquid, i.e., the

operator

.

2a Pour or Spray - Transmit the liquid from the

can intentionally

2 b Ignite Directly apply flame to the liquid,

either in the container or elsewhere

2c Startle Jump back or otherwise move suddenly with more or less the whole

body

.

2d Throw or kick

away

Propel the container through the

air other than by knocking it over

or off of a support

.

2e Ingest Drink or aspirate liquid

2el Ingest, spill Spill liquid from container and

ingest

2e2 Ingest from container

Drink directly from container

2e3 Container transfer Transfer liquid to a second container

and drink from second container

2e4 Open container Open container to ingest liquid

52
2f Transport Move the container from one

place to another or passively

hold container.

2g Handle liquid Deliberately contact liquid with

some part of person, e.g., cleaning with liquid

2h Siphon Transfer liquid from a container

by hose and suction method

2i Upset or drop

container

Overturn container or accidentally

let it fall

2j Passive Not actively using or interfacing

with container or liquid

2k Misident ify Mistake liquid for something other

than what it is because of nature

of container or circumstances.

3 Fire action mode The interface with the fire by liquid,

container or person.

*3a Liquid interface Interface with fire by liquid directly

*3b Fume interface Interface with fire by fumes only

or primarily

*3c Fire to liquid

or fumes

Fire applied to liquid, e.g., a spark into container

*3d Liquid or fumes

to fire

Liquid or fumes applied to fire, e.g.,

pouring liquid onto coals

3e Explode in place A localized explosion which is not

generalized or in the container

3£ Burn in place, only A localized "puddle" fire

3g Transition to

person

Ignition of person through a flashback

along a stream of liquid/fumes

3h

• Transition to

container

Ignition in container through a flashback along a stream of liquid/

fumes

3i Direct person

ignition

Direct ignition of person, e.g., from

previously spilled gas on person

ignited by a spark

53
1

I

3j Direct container

ignition

Direct ignition of liquid/fumes in

container, e.g., from a spark

entering a container.

4 Container involvement mode

The direct participation in or

interface of a container with

accident events

4a Explode Explosion of the container from

ignition of liquid/fumes within

container. Usually includes 4e.

4b Burn in Ignition and burning of liquid in

container but without an identifiable explosion

4c Splash/Spill, preignition, person

Release non-ignited fluid from

container to person

4d Splash/Spill, preignition, area

Release of unignited liquid or

fumes to area

4e Splash/ Spill - Igni

ted or in ignition

process

Release of flaming liquid, or

immediately ignited liquid, to

person or area, also included in 4a.

4f Melt/burn Ignition of material of container

4g Liquid access/

transfer

The role of the configuration or

structure of the container in

permitting access to liquid or

influencing transfer of liquid

from one container to another.

4h Storage The characteristics of a container

as a holding facility for liquid.

4i Container failure Structural or material failure

of the container

4j Splash/Spill, no

ignition

Release of liquid to person or area

with no subsequent ignition

5 Injury mode Immediate source of injury to victim

from accident

*5a Explosion - direct Injury from direct effects of an

explosion

54
*5b Burn - direct Injury from direct contact with a fire

* 5 c Burning fluid Injury from burning liquid splashed

or spilled on person

*5d Fluid on person

ignited

Injury resulting from ignition of

liquid splashed or spilled on person

prior to ignition

* 5e Container burn Injury from contact with a hot,

melting or burning container

*5f Ingestion - direct Injury from drinking or aspirating

spilled liquid or liquid from a container

*5g Ingestion - siphon Injury from ingestion or aspiration

of liquid from a siphoning hose

*5h Liquid contact Injury from skin contact with liquid

* 5i Other Injury other than above, e.g., a heart attack precipitated by reaction

to an explosion

*5j None apparent No further injury identified from

the accident report

55
APPENDIX 2

STANDARDS SUMMARY

The basic definitions of flammable and combustible

liquids and containers far this study are contained in

the Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code, NFPA No. 30-

1976. Flammable and combustible liquids are defined as

follows

Flammable Liquid shall mean a liquid having

a flash point below 100° F (37.8° C) and having a vapor pressure not exceeding 40 pounds per square

inch (absolute) at 100° F (37.8° C) and shall be

known as a Class I liquid.

Class I liquids shall be subdivided as follows:

Class IA shall include those having flash

points below 73° F (22.8° C) and having a boiling

point below 100° F (37.8° C) .. Class IB shall include those having flash

points below 73° F (22.8° C) and having a boiling

point at or above 100° F (37.8° C) . Class IC shall include those having flash

points at or above 73° F (22.8° C) and below

100° F (37.8° C)

Combustible Liquid shall mean a liquid having

a flash point at or above 100° F (37.8° C) . Combustible Liquids shall be subdivided

as follows:

Class II liquids shall include those having

flash points at or above 100° F (37.8° C) and

below 140° F (60° C)

Class IIIA liquids shall include those having

flash points at or above 140° F (60° C) and below

200° F (93.4° C)

Class 1 1 1 B liquids shall

flash points at or above 200°

include those having

F (93.4° C) .

56
Safety Can is defined as follows:

Safety Can shall mean an approved container,

of not more than five gallons capacity, having a spring -closing lid and spout cover and so designed

that it will safely relieve internal pressure

when subjected to fire exposure.

The citation of this definition does not necessarily indicate

that the gasoline and kerosene containers to be standardized

for home use must correspond to this definition in all

particulars

.

The standards available for this study are UL-30,

Standard for Safety, Metal Safety Cans; PS 61-74, Voluntary

Product Standard for Plastic Containers (Jerry Cans) for

Petroleum Products; and the Factory Mutual Research Approval

Standard for Safety Containers and Filling Supply and Disposa

Containers. The RR-S-30F Federal Specification for Safety

Can, Spring Closing Type is also cited. The provisions

of these documents are summarized in Table I of this Appendix
STANDARDS

SUMMARY 3o X P *3 3 3 3 60

Ch

O TO TO rH P 3 rH

4-i

X TO rH

H 3 P rH 60 > •H r- •H

O t—> X) 3 TO rH

O JZ TO 3 TO 3 rH 3 +-> P i—i

i->

O TO TO cx TO 60 -3 •H -3 TO •H 3

601 TO > i—< 3 3 rH

O 60 E 3 •rr TO rH

C x: TO 3 3 H vH O O rH CX P •H *C rH rH CX1 TO E

*H o TO <u CX4g TO » TO P 3 3 •H rH

p 3

f-l > > cx TO 60 TO •H > 3 P 3 4-1 TO o 60 3 O

X> o X 0) 3 xs •H 3 O -3 TO JC 3 3 •H 3 cj 3 H X) rH CJ 4-1 O • 4-1 3 3 -3 TO •H rH 3

o3 3 P N 3 3 4-1 TO cr 3 X3 rH rH •H -3 o X) > N O Xi O O Xi X P O 3 P rH •H TO • x: 3 rH o 3 O 3 P -H 3 > rH -O 3 H • H o

•3 TO TO TO TO 3 3 X CX 3 •H

O TO CX4-I cx 3 Xj > CX CX rH Or x cr u -O 3 3 3 TO -3

TO • H TO •» 3 3 CX 3 3 -H TO TO TOO crx? 60

U

X 3 60 TO TO E CX rH cx -3 4-C TO 3 • •H 3

0) cr.3 3 rH 4-i 3 3 • 60 TO TO 3 rH •H 3 -3 TO 60 •H 3 •H X 3 O P TO TO 3 P U 60 60 TO 3 TO 2

TO rH *H rH 3 -O rH X) •H rH 3 TO 3 3 60 3 U 3 3 rH •H 3 /—» o •H TO JO 3 •H TO •H TO 3 X3 TO •H O P •H £ 3 TO 3 60 3 O TO 3 3 P 3 -3 •H 4-1 P 3 rH TO 4-1 3 3 3 cr -3 E P P »—i P 3 3 TO O > 3

TO JD 3 TO 3 TO P •H •H

U E • H Pt CX P rH rH TO

X TO o X 3 O CJ P- rH rH TO

u

O TO

O

H CX P 60 TO CJ

5-i

p E (—1 3 O rH 60 rH •H 3 o o 3 3 >

TO *3 E rH TO i—i

CD X<3 •H P 3 4i 4-i rH TO X) 3 •H

p 6 3 TO TO rH rH 3 O <3 rH •H 4-1 rH CJ P TO X) 3 3 P X- 6 fH 00 60 TO 3 3 rO 3 4-1 3 TO > P p 4-1 3 > 3 * 3 3 4-4 3 60 •H 0) P X) TO CX O TO rH 3 > P TO X

co o LT> •H

X •r—»

60 3 E TO -3 • TO 60 rH 4-1 > rG -3 rH

4-i 4 4 3 60

p

v—

TO TO E 60 P 3 rH > O 3 rH

O o 3 «H 3 TO P 3 > •H P TO > rE rH •H TO TO 3 O O <3 3 O TO rH -3 -H TO

•» > P 3 P 3 rH £ 3 3 TO CX 3 P 3 3 4-1 3 rH -3 P 3 TO o TO •H TO 3

TO

p TO TO 3 TO P XJ P i—1 O CJ 2 ro £ -3 X3 TO CJ •H 3 -3 3 •H 3 3 4g c rH N 3 TO P E

+-> 3 3 O -3 • TO

X •H

OO TO rH •H X5

O P TO

X•H •H

O rH 3 X 3 3 TO 4-( -3 TO TO

M 3 • 3 • 3 60' O X) 3 3 CX-Q rH •H rH 3 TO 3 TO -3 3 60 TO 60 P 3 rH p P e TO 2 3 O 3 3 TO 3 3 TO X) CTX) 3 .3 3 4-1 •H u 3

4-1 TO •TO" 3 60

OUOO 3 • TOO P • rH P •H 3 •H 3 3 P

TO 3 O XJ Or CJ P X CJ 3 3 rH 3 3 rH P P X CX

CO cr •> 4-i rH 0) 60 CJ E 3 3 P TO TO •H 3 P rH 3 CX<H o

TO CX 3 •H

p

X•H 1HX 60

U 3 rH E O 3 •H 3 o p

rHr

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62
APPENDIX 3

\

FUNCTIONAL FAILURE

The following scenarios illustrate accident event

sequences for eight functional failure modes:

1. Child Access Prevention - Ingestion

Sequence 4g+2k+2e2-»-5f

The subject's father had used gasoline in a plastic

measuring cup to start a lawn mower. When he succeeded

in starting the mower, he proceded to mow the lawn in the

rear of the house, leaving the cup about half filled with

gasoline on the steps of the back porch. His three year

old son came out of the house, drank the gasoline and began

to choke and cry. The father took the child immediately

to the emergency room of the local hospital. The child

was treated for digestive upset and kept in the hospital

for observation to determine if any gasoline had entered

the lungs

.

2. Child Access Prevention - Burn

3b 3h 5b

Sequence 4g->-2a+2g->- | -»•

| -*4b->|

3d 3i 5d

The four year old child was playing in the basement

of the home. He found a five gallon glass jug about three

quarters full of gasoline which his older brother kept

for his mini bike. The child poured the gasoline in an

old pan and started to wash a small toy. The gasoline

ignited from the pilot light of a hot water heater. The

gasoline ignited in the pan and on the child's hands and

arms. The child's mother heard the child screaming, ran

into the basement and smothered the flames on the child

with a nearby throw rug. The child was taken to a burn

unit at the hospital. The child received severe

burns on his hands and both arms with less severe burns

on his neck and face.

3. Dispensing

3a

Sequence 2a-*-4c-*-2b+ 1 -*3g-*5d

3c

63
The subject poured gasoline on a barbcque from a five

gallon gasoline can. He poured gasoline on his trousers.

He set the can aside and dropped a lighted match on the

barbeque. The barbeque flared up and his pants ignited.

He hastily removed his pants. He then drove to a local

hospital where he was treated for moderate burns on his

legs

.

4. Containment, Passive

3 a Sequence 2a-*2c-Mc-> | +3g->-5d

3c

The subject poured gasoline on a smouldering pile

of leaves from a coffee can. The leaves flared up and

the man jumped back suddenly and spilled the gasoline on

his trousers. The gasoline caught fire on his clothes.

The man rolled on the ground to extinguish the fire. His

wife drove him to the burn unit at hospital where

he was treated for burns on his upper legs.

5. Barrier and Containment, Active

3a 5a

Sequence 2a+| +3h-»-4a+

1

3d 5c

The subject poured gasoline from a five gallon gasoline

can on a smouldering barbeque. The fire flashed back up

the stream of gas and the container exploded. The man

was splashed with flaming gasoline. He was rolled on the

ground by his wife and brother to extinguish the flames.

He was taken to a burn unit at hospital. He was

hospitalized for severe burns on his upper body and chest.

6. Handling and Stability

3b

Sequence 2f+2i-*-4d->- 1 -*-3f+5b

3d

The subject went to the basement to obtain a five

gallon can of gasoline. He was carrying the can by the

handle when it slipped from his hand and overturned. When

it hit the floor, the gasoline spilled from the spout of

the can and was ignited on the floor by the pilot light

of a hot water heater. The pool of gasoline flared up

and the flame burned the subject. The subject drove to

the office of his family physician where he was treated

for moderate burns around his ankles and lower legs.

64
7. Identification

3a

Sequence 2k-*2a+| ->-3f->-5b

3d

The subject's husband had used a small pail of gasoline

to start a trash fire. He left the pail, with some gasoline

in it, sitting on the ground about 200 feet from the fire

and near an outdoor faucet while he went for more trash.

The subject came out of the house and noticed that the

fire was spreading toward some dry grass. She assumed

the pail contained water and poured the gasoline from it

on the edge of the fire. The gasoline flared up and ignited

her skirt. She quickly removed her skirt but not before

she had received slight to moderate burns around one leg.

8. Storage and Structural Integrity*

Sequence 2 j+4h->-4 j + 5j

The subject* purchased a two gallon gasoline can on

June 20, 1977 at an auto supply store. The can was of

steel construction and had a steel spout which was stored

inside the can by screwing the base of the spout into the

filling/pouring outlet. When in the stored position a second cap screwed inside the base of the spout to form

a cap for the otherwise open outlet. A small plastic "flip

to vent" cap was installed in the top of the can in the

corner opposite to the spout. There was a removable cork

seal in the screw base of the spout assembly covering the

spout opening. The container was stored about three - fourths

full of gasoline in a garage during the hot weather of

July 1977. During the week of July 27, the subject's wife

noticed that the top of the container was covered with

gasoline and the hollow, cup-like top of the screw top

over the spout base was filled with gasoline. Upon examination,

initially by the subject and later by the present writer,

the container was found to be structurally intact. The

subject states that vapor pressure above the gasoline in

the can had forced gasoline up through the stored spout.

The gasoline penetrated the cork seal and leaked through

the screw cap above the spout opening to collect on top

*This scenario was provided by Dr. R.J. Lepkowski, Office

of Energy Related Inventions, Institute for Applied Technology, National Bureau of Standards, Washington, D.C.

' r65
i

the can and in the top of the screw cap. The subject

states that no gasoline was found to have been released

through the ‘'flip to vent" cap. It should be noted that

the subject is anosmic (defective sense of smell) and frequently

smokes a pipe. He, therefore, could have entered into

a potential gasoline explosion situation with no warning.

66
NBS-114A (REV. 7-73)

U.S. DEPT. OF comm. 1. PUBLICATION OR REPORT NO. 2. Gov’t Accession

BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA No. SHEET

3. Recipient s Accession No.

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

An Evaluation of Safety Standards for

Gasoline and Kerosene Cans

5. Publication Date September 1977

6. Performing Organization Code

7. AUTHOR(S)

C. E. Jones

8. Performing Organ. Report No.

9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS

NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20234

10. Project/Task/Work Unit No. 441-1425

11. Contract/Grant No.

12. Sponsoring Organization Name and Complete Address (Street, City, State, ZIP)

Bureau of Engineering Sciences

Consumer Product Safety Commission

Washington, D. C. 20207

13. Type of Report & Period Covered

Final

14. Sponsoring Agency Code

15. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

16. ABSTRACT (A 200-word or less factual summary of moat significant information. If document includes a significant

bibliography or literature survey, mention it here.)

Accidents involving home use of gasoline and other flammable and

combustible liquid containers were analyzed to define the functions a

safe container should perform and how the containers failed to perform

these- functions . Safety standards were evaluated for applicability

to these functional failures. The standards were considered inadequate

to prevent child access to fluids in the containers, somewhat adequate

for fluid management and isolation from ignition sources and very

adequate for container structure and materials.

17. KEY WORDS (six to twelve entries; alphabetical order; capitalize only the first letter of the first key word unless a proper name; separated by semicolons

)

Children; containers; failure analysis; flammable fluids; gasoline;

hazards; kerosene; safety; standards

18. AVAILABILITY IX Unlimited

[

' ' For Official Distribution. Do Not Release to NTIS

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