United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

AFGHANISTAN 

DRUG CONTROL 

Despite Improved 

Efforts, Deteriorating 

Security Threatens 

Success of U.S. Goals 

November 2006 

 

GAO-07-78 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

November 2006

AFGHANISTAN DRUG CONTROL

Despite Improved Efforts, Deteriorating 

Highlights of GAO-07-78, a report to Security Threatens Success of U.S. Goals 

congressional committees 

The prevalence of opium poppy

cultivation and drug trafficking in

Afghanistan imperils the stability of 

its government and threatens to 

turn the conflict-ridden nation once 

again into a safe haven for 

traffickers and terrorists. To

combat the drug trade, the U.S.

government developed a 

counternarcotics strategy

consisting of five pillars—

alternative livelihoods, elimination 

and eradication, interdiction, law 

enforcement and justice, and 

public information. 

The Emergency Supplemental 

Appropriations Act of 2005 directed

GAO to examine the use of all

fiscal year 2005 funds administered

by the U.S. Agency for 

International Development

(USAID) and Department of State 

(State) for Afghan counternarcotics 

programs. To comply with this

mandate, we examined progress 

under each counternarcotics pillar, 

challenges faced, and efforts to

ensure that funds were used for 

intended purposes. To address 

these objectives, GAO reviewed

pertinent USAID and State

documents and met with cognizant 

U.S. and international officials in 

Washington, D.C., and Afghanistan. 

GAO makes no recommendations 

in this report. USAID, State, 

Department of Defense, and 

Department of Justice were 

provided a draft of this report, but

did not provide formal comments. 

USAID and State received about $532 million in fiscal year 2005 funds and 

initiated a number of projects under each counternarcotics pillar, but delays 

in implementation limited progress. For example, State’s provision of 

aircraft enhanced the mobility of eradicators, but coordination difficulties

between Afghan officials and security forces delayed the eradicators’ 

fielding. Despite increased eradication and other U.S. efforts, the poppy crop 

grew by 50 percent in 2006 to a record level. However, many projects have

not been in place long enough to assess progress toward the overall goal of 

significantly reducing drug cultivation, production, and trafficking. For 

example, projects to provide rural credit and to field teams to discourage

poppy cultivation were not in place prior to the 2005-2006 growing season. 

The worsening security situation and the lack of Afghan capacity are 

tremendous challenges to the success of U.S. counternarcotics programs in 

Afghanistan. The security situation continues to decline; during the 2005-

2006 growing season, eradicators were attacked several times and 

alternative livelihoods project personnel were killed. Moreover, due to 

Afghanistan’s lack of infrastructure, educated populace, and functioning 

governmental institutions, significantly reducing poppy cultivation and drug 

trafficking is expected to take at least a decade. 

USAID and State have made efforts to oversee the use of funds, including the 

use of self certifications, contract clauses, and vetting, when applicable. 

However, a lack of official records and reliable information limited efforts to 

vet Afghan nationals. In addition, although USAID and State have made

efforts to monitor ongoing projects, security concerns and poor 

infrastructure limited site visits. 

Five Pillar Counternarcotics Strategy in Afghanistan 

Alternative 

Livelihoods

Elimination/

Eradication

Interdiction

Counternarcotics Strategy

Law 

Enforcement/ 

Justice Reform

Public

Information

cash for work, 

seeds and 

fertilizer, and 

rural credit

support for 

central and 

provincial 

forces

border security 

and

counternarcotics

police

counternarcotics

law

implementation 

and corrections

reform

raising 

awareness and 

promoting 

behavior 

change 

Sources: GAO and State Department (data and photos).

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-78.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact David Gootnick, 

(202) 512-3149 or GootnickD@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 5

USAID and State Projects Made Progress, but Implementation 

Delays Limited Accomplishments 11 

U.S. Counternarcotics Programs Face Several Challenges 28 

USAID and State Made Efforts to Oversee the Use of Funds, but 

Lack of Information and Security Limited Some Efforts 32 

Concluding Observations 36 

Agency Comments 36 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 38 

Appendix II GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 40 

Tables 

Table 1: Opium Production in Afghanistan, 2002 through 2006 8 

Table 2: Fiscal Year 2005 Counternarcotics Assistance to 

Afghanistan Administered by USAID and State by Pillar as 

of June 2006 (in millions) 11 

Table 3: Fiscal Year 2005 Alternative Livelihoods Assistance as of 

June 2006 (in millions) 13 

Table 4: Alternative Livelihoods Performance Data Reported as of 

September 30, 2006 14 

Table 5: Fiscal Year 2005 Eradication Assistance as of June 2006 (in 

millions) 16

Table 6: Fiscal Year 2005 Interdiction Assistance as of June 2006 

(in millions) 21 

Table 7: Fiscal Year 2005 Law Enforcement/Justice Reform 

Assistance as of June 2006 (in millions) 23 

Table 8: Fiscal Year 2005 Public Information Assistance as of June 

2006 (in millions) 26 

Figures 

Figure 1: Opium Poppy Seed Capsule 7 

Figure 2: Five Pillar Counternarcotics Strategy in Afghanistan 9 

Page i GAO-07-78 Afghanistan Drug Control 
Figure 3: Map of Afghanistan Counternarcotics Projects 12 

Figure 4: Cash-for-Work Road-Construction Project 14 

Figure 5: Huey-II Helicopters in Kandahar 18 

Figure 6: AEF Conducting Manual and Mechanized Eradication in 

Helmand 19

Figure 7: Khirmanjo, Tajikistan, Border Post Scheduled to Be 

Refurbished 22

Figure 8: Afghan Corrections Officer Training 25 

Figure 9: Ministry of Justice Building under Construction in 

Wardak Province 25 

Figure 10: Public Information Campaign Stickers, Billboard, and 

Posters 27

Figure 11: Aftermath of April 7, 2006, Improvised Explosive Device

Attack on Government Vehicle in Helmand 29 

Abbreviations 

AEF Afghan Eradication Force 

CJTF Criminal Justice Task Force 

CNPA Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan 

CPEF Central Poppy Eradication Force 

CSSP Corrections System Support Program 

DEA Drug Enforcement Administration 

NIU National Interdiction Unit 

PEP Poppy Elimination Program 

UN United Nations 

UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further 

permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or 

other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 

Page ii GAO-07-78 Afghanistan Drug Control 
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

November 15, 2006 

The Honorable Mitch McConnell 

Chairman 

The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, 

 and Related Programs 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Jim Kolbe 

Chairman 

The Honorable Nita M. Lowey 

Ranking Minority Member 

Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, 

 Export Financing, and Related Programs 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

The continued prevalence of opium poppy1

 cultivation and drug trafficking 

in Afghanistan imperils the stability of the Afghan government and 

threatens to turn the conflict-ridden nation into a safe haven for traffickers 

and terrorists. In 2005, opium poppy was cultivated in more than threequarters of Afghanistan’s provinces. The estimated export value of opium, 

morphine, and heroin equaled about half of the country’s licit economy, 

with drug profits reportedly funding terrorists and other antigovernment 

entities.2

 As a result, counternarcotics—for which the United Kingdom 

took the international lead in Afghanistan in 20023

—has become one of the 

 1

Opium, which can be used to produce morphine and heroin, is derived from the opium

poppy. 

2

United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2005 (Nov. 2005).

This report provides comprehensive survey results and statistics on Afghanistan’s 2004-

2005 opium cultivation season. 

3

In 2002, the international community established a security reform agenda for Afghanistan 

with five pillars—establishing a national army, reforming the police, countering illicit 

narcotics, reforming the judicial system, and disarming militia groups—and designated a

donor country to take the lead in reforming each pillar. For more information see, GAO, 

Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish Army and Police Have Made Progress, but

Future Plans Need to Be Better Defined, GAO-05-575, (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005). 

Page 1 GAO-07-78 Afghanistan Drug Control
top priorities of the United States. To combat opium poppy cultivation, 

drug trafficking, and their negative effects on Afghan stability and pursuit 

of democracy, in 2005, the U.S. government, working with allied 

governments, developed a five-pillared counternarcotics strategy 

addressing (1) alternative livelihoods, (2) elimination and eradication, (3)

interdiction, (4) law enforcement and justice reform, and (5) public 

information. The overall goal of the strategy is to significantly reduce 

Afghanistan’s poppy cultivation, drug production, and drug trafficking. In

fiscal year 2005, the United States provided about $782 million dollars for 

programs administered by the Departments of Defense (Defense) and 

State (State), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and 

the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) for counternarcotics 

programs in Afghanistan.4

The Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global 

War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief of 20055

 required the Comptroller 

General to examine the use of all fiscal year 2005 funds administered by 

USAID and State—about $532 million—for bilateral Afghanistan 

counternarcotics and alternative livelihoods programs.6

 To comply with 

this mandate, we examined (1) USAID’s and State’s progress in 

implementing counternarcotics programs, projects, and activities under 

each pillar, and the factors, if any, limiting implementation; (2) challenges

faced by counternarcotics efforts; and (3) the agencies’ efforts to ensure 

that the funds were used for intended purposes. 

To address these objectives, we reviewed pertinent USAID and State 

planning, funding, and reporting documents for counternarcotics 

programs. We discussed these programs with cognizant officials from the 

Departments of Defense, Justice (Justice), and State; USAID; DEA in 

Washington, D.C., and Afghanistan; and with private contractors 

implementing U.S. projects in Afghanistan. In Kabul, Afghanistan, we met 

with officials from the United Nations (UN) and the governments of 

Afghanistan and the United Kingdom to discuss counternarcotics efforts. 

We traveled to the provinces of Balkh, Helmand, Kandahar, and Nangarhar 

to meet with U.S. and Afghan officials to discuss various U.S.–funded 

 4

Most of these funds were provided by the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for

Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief of 2005, P.L. 109-13, enacted on May 

11, 2005. 

5

P.L. 109-13, Sec. 2105. 

6

We were not mandated to examine funds administered by Defense and DEA. 

Page 2 GAO-07-78 Afghanistan Drug Control
projects. We determined the data provided to us were sufficiently reliable 

for the purposes of this report. 

We conducted our review from September 2005 through October 2006 in

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. (See

app. I for a more complete description of our scope and methodology.) 

USAID and State initiated a number of projects under each of the U.S. 

counternarcotics strategy’s five pillars, but delays in implementation—due 

to the security situation, poor infrastructure, and other factors—limited 

progress. Many projects have not been in place long enough to fully assess 

progress toward the overall goal of significantly reducing poppy 

cultivation, drug production, and drug trafficking. 

Results in Brief 

Alternative livelihoods. With $180 million, USAID implemented projects to 

provide economic alternatives to poppy production and thus reduce the 

amount of Afghanistan’s economic activity attributable to the drug 

industry. USAID supported regional alternative livelihoods projects, 

distributed seed and fertilizer, and initiated a rural credit project. USAID 

continued cash-for-work projects and supported business development in 

targeted poppy areas. Results varied in the three principal alternative 

livelihoods regions, in part because of the differing security risks and 

access to infrastructure. 

Elimination and eradication. With $258 million, State supported the 

Afghan government’s efforts to prevent poppy planting and eradicate 

poppy crops if prevention failed. State provided support for central and 

provincial eradication efforts. Central government eradication efforts 

improved with the reorganization of the Afghan Eradication Force (AEF) 

into smaller, more mobile units and the addition of purchased and leased

transport and logistical-support aircraft. However, the AEF’s fielding was 

delayed from early February 2006 until late March 2006 because of the 

need to address coordination challenges, reducing the amount of 

eradication possible. Provincial eradication efforts also improved when 

State began reimbursing governors for provincial eradication expenses. 

However, teams designed to help governors discourage farmers from 

growing poppy, the Poppy Elimination Program (PEP) teams, were not 

fully fielded as of June 2006. 

Interdiction. With $65 million, State assisted DEA-led efforts to help build

Afghan capacity to destroy drug labs, seize precursor chemicals and 

opiates, and arrest major traffickers. State provided support for border 

Page 3 GAO-07-78 Afghanistan Drug Control
security enhancements in neighboring countries and the counternarcotics 

police. In the neighboring countries of Pakistan, Tajikistan, and 

Turkmenistan, State began border security projects; however, other 

projects had not started as of June 2006. For example, State had not begun 

planned support for the National Interdiction Unit (NIU) and the Counter 

Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) because an NIU support facility 

and ongoing police reform efforts were not completed. 

Law enforcement and justice reform. With almost $24 million, State 

supported the Afghan government’s efforts to increase its capacity to 

arrest, prosecute, and punish traffickers and corrupt officials. State 

provided support for Department of Justice prosecutors, corrections 

reform, and a planned justice center. The Justice prosecutors helped 

develop and implement a new counternarcotics law. State support for 

corrections reform, including the training of guards and refurbishment of 

courthouses, is under way. State has delayed its support for the operations 

and maintenance of a new counternarcotics justice facility while its 

construction is completed. 

Public information. With $5 million, State led a public information 

campaign intended to convince the Afghan populace to reject poppy 

cultivation and trade. State initially transferred funds to USAID to initiate a 

campaign that used radio spots and print media over three targeted 

phases, and which State continued and expanded. However, because of 

delays with the PEP team implementation, the campaign was not able to

rely on planned support from the PEP teams. 

The worsening security situation and the lack of Afghan capacity are 

tremendous challenges for the success of U.S. counternarcotics programs 

in Afghanistan. The security situation in Afghanistan continues to decline.

The central government faces threats from the Taliban, terrorist attacks, 

and criminal activity. During the 2005-2006 growing season, eradication 

forces were attacked several times and alternative livelihoods project 

personnel were killed. Moreover, because of Afghanistan’s lack of 

infrastructure, educated populace, and functioning governmental 

institutions, addressing opium poppy cultivation and drug trafficking is 

expected to take at least a decade. The nation has few roads and poor 

access to power. The population is mostly illiterate and untrained. 

According to U.S., International Monetary Fund, and other officials, the 

government is plagued by corruption, has a weak judicial sector, and will 

be unable to pay its recurring costs without foreign assistance for at least 

10 years. 

Page 4 GAO-07-78 Afghanistan Drug Control
USAID and State took steps to help ensure that U.S. assistance funds were 

used as intended, but (1) documentation to help prevent terrorists and 

criminals from benefiting from U.S. assistance was limited at best and (2) 

monitoring the status of ongoing projects through site visits and other 

efforts were constrained by the lack of security in many project areas and 

poor or nonexistent infrastructure, such as roads. USAID and State are 

required to adhere to an executive order and laws that ban, among other 

things, assistance to terrorists, drug traffickers, and human rights 

violators. To comply, USAID and State used certifications and contract 

clauses to help ensure that the contractors, grantees, and other aid 

recipients were aware of the legal requirements. However, USAID’s and 

State’s vetting of Afghan nationals was limited because of incomplete or 

nonexistent birth records and other identifying documentation, and the 

difficulty of investigating widespread allegations of misconduct. USAID 

and State also used contractor reporting and site visits to monitor the 

performance of projects. Although USAID and State contractors submitted 

required progress reports, external factors beyond the agencies’ or 

contractors’ control, such as Afghanistan’s poor security environment and 

infrastructure, limited project monitoring by restricting access to project 

sites. 

We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to State, 

USAID, Defense, and Justice. Each agency informed us that they were not 

providing formal comments. However, USAID and Justice provided 

technical comments, which we have incorporated into the report where 

appropriate.

Afghanistan is a mountainous, arid, land-locked country with limited 

natural resources, bordered by Pakistan to the east and south; Tajikistan, 

Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and China to the north; and Iran to the west. At 

647,500 square kilometers, Afghanistan is slightly smaller than the state of

Texas. The country is divided into 34 provinces, more than 300 districts, 

and approximately 30,000 villages. 

Background 

Afghanistan is one of the world’s poorest countries; its population, 

estimated at more than 31 million, is ethnically diverse, largely rural, and 

mostly uneducated. Development indicators published by the World Bank 

and the UN rank Afghanistan at the bottom of virtually every category, 

including nutrition; infant, child, and maternal mortality; life expectancy; 

and literacy.

Page 5 GAO-07-78 Afghanistan Drug Control
Over the last two decades, conflict ravaged Afghanistan. The Soviet Union 

invaded Afghanistan in 1979 and withdrew only after waging a prolonged 

and destructive war against Afghan resistance groups. Following a 

protracted civil war, by 1998, most of Afghanistan was under the control of

the fundamentalist Taliban group. Under the Taliban, Afghanistan became 

a haven for terrorists. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the

United States and a coalition of its allies invaded Afghanistan and removed 

the Taliban from power. 

Following the Taliban’s removal, the coalition began the process of 

establishing a new Afghan government.7

 To help rebuild the country and 

create a stable Afghan society that would not be a threat to itself or others, 

in fiscal years 2002 through 2004 the United States spent $1.6 billion on 

humanitarian and reconstruction projects. In June 2004 and again in July

2005, we reported that U.S. humanitarian and short-term assistance over 

the two-year period had helped Afghanistan’s vulnerable population, but 

that longer-term reconstruction efforts achieved limited results in creating

a stable Afghan society.8

The United States and several other donor nations met in Geneva, 

Switzerland, in April 2002, to help Afghanistan address threats to its 

security. At the Geneva conference, the donors established a five-pillared 

security reform agenda and designated a donor country to take the lead in 

reforming each pillar. In a June 2005 report on efforts to establish the army 

and police, we reported that there needed to be concurrent progress in all 

security pillars, otherwise Afghanistan could again become a haven for 

terrorists. Furthermore, we reported that limited progress had been made 

in reforming Afghanistan’s judiciary and combating illicit narcotics.9

Afghanistan’s Opium 

Industry 

Afghanistan is the world’s largest supplier of opium and has been a source 

of illegal opium for decades. Opium poppy is a hardy, drought-resistant 

 7

Presidential elections were held in October 2004. National Assembly and provincial 

elections were held in September 2005. 

8

GAO, Afghanistan Reconstruction: Deteriorating Security and Limited Resources Have 

Impeded Progress; Improvements in U.S. Strategy Need, GAO-04-403, (Washington, D.C.: 

June 2, 2004), and GAO, Afghanistan Reconstruction: Despite Some Progress, 

Deteriorating Security and Other Obstacles Continue to Threaten Achievement of U.S.

Goals, GAO-05-742 (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2005). 

9

GAO-05-575. 

Page 6 GAO-07-78 Afghanistan Drug Control
crop that is easily grown throughout Afghanistan’s rugged territory. Opium 

poppy, as seen in figure 1, is an annual crop with a six to seven month 

planting cycle that starts earlier in the south and later in the north of 

Afghanistan. It is planted between September and December and flowers 

approximately three months after planting. After the flower’s petals fall 

away, the opium, an opaque, milky sap found in the plant’s seed capsule, is

harvested between April and July. The sap can then be refined into 

morphine and heroin. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 

(UNODC) surveys indicate that the primary deterrent to farmers growing 

poppy is the threat of eradication. The majority of eradication takes place 

after the poppy plant has sprouted and before it is harvested,

approximately a two-month long period. 

Figure 1: Opium Poppy Seed Capsule

Source: Department of State.

According to UNODC, in the three-year period, 2002 through 2004, 

Afghanistan’s opium harvest increased substantially. In 2005, the number 

of hectares of opium poppy cultivation declined by over 20 percent, yet the 

crop yield per hectare rose because of favorable weather conditions. Thus, 

the estimated amount of potential opium produced declined only slightly. 

In 2006, poppy cultivation increased to 165,000 hectares, yielding a record 

Page 7 GAO-07-78 Afghanistan Drug Control
poppy crop estimated at a potential 6,100 metric tons of opium, or more 

than 90 percent of the world’s illicit opium (see table 1). 

Table 1: Opium Production in Afghanistan, 2002 through 2006 

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Net opium poppy 

cultivation (hectares) 74,000 80,000 131,000 104,000 165,000

Potential opium production 

(metric tons) 3,400 3,600 4,200 4,100 6,100

Provinces where opium 

poppy is growna

24 28 32 (all) 25 28

Source: UN Office on Drugs and Crime. 

Notes: 

1 hectare equals 2.47 acres. 

1 metric ton equals 2,204.6 pounds. 

a

In 2005, the Afghan Government reorganized the country’s administrative divisions into 34 provinces. 

However, the 2005 UNODC opium survey was designed, and its results are presented, according to 

the previous 32 provinces. The 2006 survey was based on 34 provinces. 

State attributed the reduction in cultivation in 2005 to surplus opium from 

previous years, public information efforts by President Karzai and others, 

promised alternative livelihoods assistance, and farmers’ fears of 

eradication. However, eradication fears were not realized; only an 

estimated 5,100 hectares of poppy were eradicated. Further, drug-related

corruption is a problem at all levels of government and remains pervasive 

at the provincial and district levels. Conversely, the reasons for the growth 

in 2006 cultivation are not fully known, but U.S. officials described a 

combination of factors, including the relatively small amount of 

eradication in 2005 and pressure from traffickers and the Taliban on 

farmers to grow. For example, U.S. officials said that in southern 

Afghanistan, farmers reported finding “night letters” from the Taliban left

on their doors threatening them if they did not cultivate poppy. Moreover, 

UNODC reported that many farmers paid eradicators not to eradicate their 

fields and that eradication was often a consensual decision between 

eradicators and farmers. 

The U.S. Counternarcotics 

Strategy 

From 2002 through 2004, the United States saw increasing opium poppy 

cultivation and drug trafficking as a growing threat to stability and security 

of Afghanistan and provided approximately $380 million for Afghan- and 

United Kingdom-led counternarcotics efforts. The United States used 

these funds to train Afghan narcotics interdiction units, construct border 

Page 8 GAO-07-78 Afghanistan Drug Control
and highway checkpoint facilities, and supply operational support and 

nonlethal equipment to Afghan eradication teams. These efforts failed to 

have any significant effect on the illicit narcotics industry because of 

limited security and stability across Afghanistan. As a result, the U.S. 

government made counternarcotics a top priority and developed a strategy 

in 2004 to reduce poppy cultivation, drug production, and trafficking. This

new strategy is comprised of five pillars, as illustrated in figure 2. The fivepillar counternarcotics plan is intended to offer incentives to stop the 

growing of opium poppy through alternative livelihoods projects, 

combined with strong disincentives in the form of forced eradication, 

interdiction, and law enforcement, while spreading the Afghan

government’s antinarcotics message. These U.S. efforts are also expected 

to build the Afghan government’s capacity to conduct counternarcotics 

efforts on its own. 

Figure 2: Five Pillar Counternarcotics Strategy in Afghanistan 

Alternative 

Livelihoods

Elimination/

Eradication

Interdiction

Counternarcotics Strategy

Law 

Enforcement/ 

Justice Reform

Public

Information

cash for work, 

seeds and fertilizer, 

and rural credit

support for 

central and 

provincial forces

border security 

and

counternarcotics

police

counternarcotics

law

implementation 

and corrections

reform

raising 

awareness and 

promoting 

behavior change 

Sources: GAO and State Department (data and photos); Nova Development (clip art).

Page 9 GAO-07-78 Afghanistan Drug Control
The United States originally planned to use crop-dusting airplanes to spray 

herbicide on the opium poppy before it could be harvested. However, the 

Afghan government would not allow the use of herbicides. Consequently,

the United States and Afghanistan rely on manual eradication, such as 

police on foot using sticks, sickles, and scythes to knock or cut down 

poppy, and mechanized eradication, which involves police using tractors, 

all-terrain vehicles, and other vehicles to drive over or plow up the poppy.

USAID also modified some of its projects to specifically focus on 

counternarcotics in those provinces where opium poppy cultivation was 

greatest. These alternative livelihoods projects are coordinated with 

USAID’s on-going reconstruction efforts, and several of the short term 

cash-for-work projects stem from prior humanitarian assistance projects 

designed to help vulnerable populations. 

U.S. Funding for 

Counternarcotics 

To accomplish U.S. counternarcotics goals in Afghanistan, the United 

States provided about $782 million in fiscal year 2005, of which $532 

million was administered by USAID and State,10 as shown in table 2, and 

over $250 million by Defense and DEA. The majority of USAID and State 

funding was provided by the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act 

for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, which 

was enacted into law in May 2005.

11 Several federal and agency regulations 

govern USAID’s and State’s use of these funds for counternarcotics 

programs, prohibiting use of the funds to assist terrorists, drug traffickers, 

or human rights violators. Though not explicitly addressed in this report, 

funds administered by Defense and DEA are being expended on projects, 

such as constructing the counternarcotics justice center and supporting 

Afghan interdiction efforts. 

 10USAID and State plan to use $350 million of the funds made available by the Foreign 

Operations and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2006 (P.L. 109-102), to continue their 

counternarcotics programs in Afghanistan. 

11State did not receive all of the supplemental appropriations until August 2005 because it

had to provide congressional notifications of its spending plans. This process took about 

three months. 

Page 10 GAO-07-78 Afghanistan Drug Control
Table 2: Fiscal Year 2005 Counternarcotics Assistance to Afghanistan Administered 

by USAID and State by Pillar as of June 2006 (in millions) 

Pillar Provided Obligated Expendeda

Alternative Livelihoods (USAID) $180 $162 $117

Elimination/Eradication (State) 258 204 69

Interdiction (State) 65 44 2

Law Enforcement/Justice Reform (State) 24 17 2

Public Information (State) 5 5 1

Total $532 $432 $191

Source: USAID and State. 

a

According to a Department of State official, actual expenditures may be higher than reported figures 

due, in part, to delays in receiving bills from other agencies, international organizations, and 

contractors. 

USAID and State established goals for each of the U.S. counternarcotics 

strategy’s five pillars, funded projects under each pillar, and made 

progress toward some project objectives. However, the implementation of 

several projects was hindered by the security situation, poor

infrastructure, and other factors. Moreover, USAID’s and State’s projects 

(see fig. 3) had not been in place long enough to determine whether they 

had contributed toward the overall goal of significantly reducing poppy 

cultivation, drug production, and drug trafficking. 

USAID and State 

Projects Made 

Progress, but 

Implementation 

Delays Limited 

Accomplishments 

Page 11 GAO-07-78 Afghanistan Drug Control
Figure 3: Map of Afghanistan Counternarcotics Projects 

AFGHANI S TAN

Alternative Livelihoods Program

Eradication by both AEF and provincial

governors

Eradication by Afghan Governors (as verified by 

UNODC)

State Department Air Wing

PEP teams

Kabul

Sources: GAO presentation of USAID, State, and UN data; Afghanistan Information Management Services (map); and 

Map Resources (clip art).

Badakhshan

Balkh

Kandahar

Ghazni

Zabol

Lowgar

Baghlan

Bamian

Samangan

Nangarhar

Paktia

Ghowr

Paktika

Oruzgan

Daykondi

Khowst

Nurestan

Sar-e-pol

Laghman

Konar Kapisa

Faryab

Badghis

Jowzjan Kondoz

Parvan

Panjshir

Takhar

Vardak Herat

Alternative 

Livelihoods

North

Alternative 

Livelihoods

East

Alternative 

Livelhoods

South

Nimruz

Helmand

Farah

Pakistan

India

Tu r km e n i st a n

Uzbekistan

Ta j i k i st a n China

Iran

Page 12 GAO-07-78 Afghanistan Drug Control
Alternative Livelihoods: 

Despite Efforts, Increased 

Security Risks and 

Infrastructure Limited 

Achievements 

As shown in table 3, USAID provided $180 million to fund licit economic 

alternatives to poppy cultivation and thus reduce the amount of 

Afghanistan’s economic activity attributable to the drug industry. 

According to UNODC, as of 2006, 2.9 million Afghans were involved in a 

narcotics industry that is equivalent to about half of Afghanistan’s legal 

economic activity. 

Table 3: Fiscal Year 2005 Alternative Livelihoods Assistance as of June 2006 (in

millions) 

Project Provided Obligated Expended

Regional Alternative Livelihoods Projects 

 East $53 $53 $37

 North 22 22 9

 South 50 50 35

Other Alternative Livelihoods Projects 

 Seed and Fertilizer 30 30 29

 Agricultural Credit 16 0 0

 Othera8 7 6

Total

b

$180 $162 $117

Source: USAID. 

a

Other covers funds that were not allocated to the five project lines, including program management 

and contributions to the World Bank for alternative livelihoods projects. 

b

Totals may not add due to rounding. 

USAID provided about $125 million for regional alternative livelihoods 

projects. The projects were split into three regions—Nangarhar, Laghman,

and Konar in the east; Badakshan and Takhar in the north; and Helmand, 

Kandahar, Oruzgan in the south—and were implemented by different 

contractors in an effort to ensure the projects were tailored to the 

appropriate needs and potential of each region. In all the regions, similar 

types of labor intensive, cash-for-work projects were implemented, such 

as road repair, as illustrated in figure 4, and irrigation and drainage canal

rehabilitation. The contractors in each region were supposed to develop

longer-term projects more suited to their provinces. A key element of 

these efforts was to develop industry “clusters.” For example, dairy, 

poultry, and livestock industries were associated with feed development 

and production; veterinary services; and milk, meat, and egg products 

being packaged, processed, and stored. Although rehabilitating the 

agriculture sector is a priority in all of these provinces, in the east, USAID 

Regional Projects Under Way, 

but Results Varied 

Page 13 GAO-07-78 Afghanistan Drug Control
is also exploring ways to expand and add value to the marble industry and, 

in the north, USAID is focusing on cattle and other livestock industries. 

Figure 4: Cash-for-Work Road-Construction Project 

Source: GAO.

As shown in table 4, USAID reported the following results for its cash-forwork projects in the east, north, and south. USAID had not established 

targets for all these activities in fiscal year 2006, but had established 

targets in September 2006 for fiscal year 2007. 

Table 4: Alternative Livelihoods Performance Data Reported as of September 30, 

2006 

Performance Indicator East North South Total

Roads repaired (in kilometers) 306 38 73 417

Irrigation and drainage canals rehabilitated (in 

kilometers) 2,432 543 1,494 4,469

People employed 153,698 25,339 39,783 218,820

Cash-for-work wages (in millions) $14.1 $1.0 $5.2 $20.3

Source: Contractor reports provided to USAID.

Note: Data includes cash-for-work projects begun in 2005 and later incorporated into the alternative 

livelihoods program. 

As part of the longer-term objectives of developing business clusters, 

USAID conducted numerous studies in all three regions to assess various 

Page 14 GAO-07-78 Afghanistan Drug Control
business sectors that could be sustainable in the respective regions, such 

as dairy, fruits and nuts, flour mills, carpets, and other industries. In 

Nangarhar, a business center was opened in April 2006 and is expected to

boost development in the region. The business center will provide 

computer training and other services to local businessmen. Also, in 

Nangarhar and Laghman, fruit and nut trees were planted on some 1,500 

hectares of former poppy-producing land. 

The deteriorating security situation, the lack of infrastructure, and, in 

northern Afghanistan, bad weather all contributed to delays in 

implementing the alternative livelihoods projects. Contractors often 

reported the security situation in a particular district or area forced them 

to suspend projects for weeks or months at a time. For example, in May 

2005, four Afghan subcontractors working on cash-for-work projects in the 

south were killed, which led the USAID contractor to leave the area until

September 2005. Contractors and potential investors cited the lack of 

adequate roads and electricity as deterrents to investors. For example, the 

poor condition of the road leading into Badakshan made it difficult to 

obtain the use of heavy machinery for construction and other projects, as 

many contractors were unable or unwilling to transport such equipment 

there. In addition, the weather in Badakshan led to the delay of projects 

because the area was snowed in for much of the winter, while flooding in

the summer limited activities. 

USAID provided almost $30 million to purchase seed and fertilizer for 

Afghan farmers to use as an alternative to growing poppy. The initial 

quantity of wheat seed and fertilizer in the fall of 2005 was equally 

distributed among all of Afghanistan’s provinces and was intended to 

demonstrate the central government’s reach throughout Afghanistan. The 

spring 2006 distribution of vegetable seeds was limited to the three 

alternative livelihoods regions. According to USAID, this distribution of 

seed and fertilizer targets farmers with access to both water to grow the 

vegetables and markets to sell the produce. USAID reported that the fall

seed and fertilizer distribution reached all 34 provinces and 550,000 

farmers. The spring seed and fertilizer project distributed vegetable seeds 

and fertilizer to approximately 112,000 farmers in the east, north, and 

south. 

Seed and Fertilizer Distributed, 

but Agricultural Credit Project 

Delayed 

USAID provided almost $16 million for an agricultural-credit project. 

Afghan farmers do not have access to credit for planting licit crops, 

although drug traffickers provide credit to farmers for planting opium 

poppies. USAID’s project seeks to remedy this situation by providing loans 

to farmers to grow licit crops. USAID planned to initiate this project by 

Page 15 GAO-07-78 Afghanistan Drug Control
mid-summer 2006, but the funding was not obligated until the fall. 

According to USAID officials, the project was delayed while they searched

for a contractor who was able to initiate the project in all the targeted 

regions. 

Elimination and 

Eradication: Despite More 

Eradication, Cultivation 

Increased 

As shown in table 5, State provided $258 million to support the Afghan 

government’s efforts to prevent poppy planting and eradicate poppy crops 

if prevention failed. In 2005, after central and provincial government 

eradication efforts, an estimated 104,000 hectares of opium poppy were 

cultivated. In 2006, this number increased to an estimated 165,000 hectares 

despite a threefold increase in eradication. 

Table 5: Fiscal Year 2005 Eradication Assistance as of June 2006 (in millions) 

Dollars in millions

Project Provided Obligated Expendeda

Central Government Support 

 Afghan Eradication Force (AEF) support $104 $68 $15

 Air mobility assets 124 114 51

Provincial Government Support 

 Governor-led eradication 6 6 0

 Poppy Elimination Program (PEP) teams 24 16 3

Total $258 $204 $69

Source: Department of State. 

a

According to a Department of State official, actual expenditures may be higher than reported figures 

due, in part, to delays in receiving bills from other agencies, international organizations, and 

contractors. 

State provided $104 million to support the AEF’s operating costs and 

purchase of additional equipment,12 and $124 million to purchase and lease 

aircraft to move the force around the country. These efforts were intended 

to address the challenges faced by the AEF’s predecessor, the Central 

Poppy Eradication Force (CPEF). According to State officials, the CPEF’s 

operational procedures and lack of mobility made getting the force into 

the field and supplying it difficult. For example, a senior State official 

stated that because the CPEF operated as one large unit and traveled in 

convoys on the roads, impassable roads slowed or stopped their getting 

Central Eradication Efforts 

Improved, but Fielding Was 

Delayed 

 12State purchased land vehicles, body armor, small arms, ammunition, communications 

equipment, and other goods. 

Page 16 GAO-07-78 Afghanistan Drug Control
out to planned locations. Moreover, because the CPEF lacked logistical 

support, they had to return to Kabul to re-supply. In 2005, UNODC 

reported, but did not verify, that the CPEF eradicated about 210 hectares 

of opium poppy and the Afghan National Police eradicated about 890 

hectares. 

After the 2005 season, the CPEF was renamed the AEF and reorganized 

into four smaller and more mobile units of 150 counternarcotics police 

each. One half of this police force provided security while the rest served

as eradicators and support. The teams could be deployed in multiple areas 

of the country simultaneously. In order to carry out its eradication efforts, 

the force was expected to have the mobility to get into the field and the 

logistics to remain there. State paid for a “wet lease”13 of four Russianmade aircraft and the purchase and operating costs of ten U.S. Huey-II 

helicopters (see fig. 5). The leased aircraft were used primarily for troop 

and cargo transport to support reconnaissance, establish camps, and 

deploy the AEF, while the Huey-II helicopters provided enhanced security,

reconnaissance, and medical evacuation capacity, as well as limited 

personnel and cargo transport for the AEF. The aircraft were also used to

provide additional lift and transport support to the PEP teams and 

embassy personnel. The addition of airlift at airfields from Kabul, Parvan,

and Kandahar, and other vehicles allowed the AEF to travel more easily 

and remain in the field for longer periods. 

 13A lease for aircraft is termed a “wet lease” when the lease includes the cost of the fuel, as 

well as operation, maintenance, and other costs associated with usage of the aircraft. 

Page 17 GAO-07-78 Afghanistan Drug Control
Figure 5: Huey-II Helicopters in Kandahar 

Source: GAO.

In 2006, UNODC reported the AEF eradicated an estimated 2,250 hectares 

of opium poppy in Helmand and Badakshan provinces (see fig. 6).14

Although the AEF eradicated over ten times the amount eradicated by the 

CPEF in 2005, its initial deployment was delayed. According to USAID and 

State officials, the governor of Helmand wanted additional alternative 

livelihoods projects in place before allowing the AEF to begin working. 

Moreover, State officials stated that because of the security risks in 

Helmand, the AEF needed the Afghan National Police and Afghan National 

Army to provide security. However, coordinating their efforts to assist the 

AEF proved time-consuming. The combination of these challenges pushed 

the AEF’s fielding date back from early February 2006 until late March 

2006. Because most poppy growth occurs over a two-month period, the 

AEF’s fielding delay prevented them from eradicating as much as it might 

have had it been fielded in February, as intended.

 14State also reported about 35 hectares of eradication in Baghlan province. 

Page 18 GAO-07-78 Afghanistan Drug Control
Figure 6: AEF Conducting Manual and Mechanized Eradication in Helmand 

Source: Department of State.

State provided $6 million for equipment and training to provincial 

authorities to conduct eradication activities and $24 million to create 

seven provincial PEP teams to discourage poppy cultivation in the 

provinces where it is most prevalent—Badakshan, Balkh, Farah, Helmand, 

Kandahar, Nangarhar, and Oruzgan. Beginning in 2003, at the initiative of

President Karzai, provincial governors were given the responsibility for 

carrying out their own eradication efforts with the financial support of the 

central government and donors. In 2005, governor-led eradication was 

responsible for more eradication than the central government’s efforts. 

UNODC reported and verified about 4,000 hectares of governor-led 

eradication.15

Governor-Led Eradication 

Improved, but PEP Teams 

Were Not Fully Fielded 

In response to the larger amount of eradication conducted by governors 

than the central government in 2005, State decided to increase support for 

provincial authorities by reimbursing governor-led eradication efforts and 

creating the PEP teams. In 2006, State began to reimburse provincial 

authorities for their eradication expenses at a rate of $60 per hectare of 

 15UNODC verifies eradication results with on-the-ground, trained observers and aerial and

satellite photography. 

Page 19 GAO-07-78 Afghanistan Drug Control
UNODC-verified eradication. However, when UNODC was not able to 

verify provincial efforts, the governor was reimbursed based on his 

submitted expenses.16 According to State officials, they also wanted to 

enhance governor efforts to eliminate poppy cultivation by creating the 

PEP teams attached to the offices of the seven provincial governors where 

poppy cultivation was greatest. The teams were planned to consist of 

seven Afghan advisors hired by the Afghan Ministry of Counter Narcotics 

and two international advisors hired by the United States. PEP teams were 

to assist the provincial governors in discouraging farmers from growing 

poppy and encouraging farmers to eradicate their own poppy fields by 

coordinating antinarcotics public information messages, ensuring delivery 

of assistance projects from all donors, and assisting with verification of 

reported eradication. These teams were also designed to be closely 

integrated with the public information campaign by helping to identify 

local messages and local leaders to assist with the campaign, as well as to 

assist central government counternarcotics efforts by reporting on any 

obstacles that inhibit achieving provincial poppy reduction goals. 

Even though the PEP teams were not fully fielded, governor-led 

eradication, according to UNODC, more than tripled in 2006, to an 

estimated 13,050 hectares. Governor-led eradication took place in 19 

provinces and was again responsible for more eradication than central

eradication forces. Each PEP team was intended to be fully staffed and 

provided security and housing by the end of 2005, however State did not

fully field the PEP teams because its contractor was unable to hire all of 

the international advisors and supply each team with the required security, 

housing, and equipment in time for the 2005 growing season. As of June 

2006, 11 of 14 international PEP advisors had been hired. Moreover, the

Afghan government did not hire all the required Afghan nationals to staff 

each team. Because the teams were not fully fielded, they were unable to 

work as intended with provincial officials to coordinate alternative 

livelihoods projects, assist with eradication verification as planned, or 

coordinate public information projects to discourage poppy growing. 

 16For example, expenses in Helmand included the rental fees for vehicles and salaries of 

provincial eradicators. 

Page 20 GAO-07-78 Afghanistan Drug Control
As seen in table 6, State provided $65 million to support DEA-led 

interdiction efforts17 to help build Afghan capacity to destroy drug labs, 

seize precursor chemicals and opiates, and arrest major traffickers. State’s 

efforts to enhance border security in neighboring countries that serve as 

transit points for narcotics are under way. State also planned to provide 

support for the CNPA and NIU, but these projects were delayed while 

State awaited the results of recently completed police-reform efforts and 

construction of a new facility. 

Table 6: Fiscal Year 2005 Interdiction Assistance as of June 2006 (in millions) 

Project Provided Obligated Expendeda

Border Security Enhancements $41 $41 $2

Counternarcotics Police Support 24 3 0

Total $65 $44 $2

Source: Department of State. 

a

According to a Department of State official, actual expenditures may be higher than reported figures 

due, in part, to delays in receiving bills from other agencies, international organizations, and 

contractors. 

State provided $41 million to enhance border security in the neighboring 

countries that often serve as transit points for drug traffickers, including 

$30 million in Pakistan, $9 million in Tajikistan, and $2 million in 

Turkmenistan. The planned assistance to Pakistan included the purchase 

of vehicles and equipment for Pakistan’s Frontier Corp to conduct 

counternarcotics and border security and Pakistan’s Anti Narcotics Force 

to support poppy eradication and interdiction operations, as well as the 

purchase of pre-fabricated steel bridges to increase mobility in the 

Federally Administered Tribal Areas. The planned assistance for Tajikistan 

and Turkmenistan included the purchase of vehicles and other equipment, 

upgrading of border posts, and the training of border police. 

Interdiction: Border 

Security Projects Begun, 

but State’s Support of 

Counternarcotics Police 

Delayed 

Border Security Enhancements 

Ongoing 

State moved forward with border security enhancements. In Pakistan, 

State began purchasing vehicles, body armor, and surveillance gear for 

border security forces. State also issued a request for proposals for the 

purchase of the pre-fabricated bridges. In Tajikistan, State, working with 

 17DEA focused most of its enforcement program and funding on (1) expanding the

Afghanistan aspects of Operation Containment, a multi-national, law enforcement initiative 

that targets high-level drug trafficking organizations; (2) deploying Foreign-deployed

Advisory and Support Teams (FAST) that work with the Afghans to carry out interdiction 

operations; and (3) advising and training the NIU, the primary narcotics investigators under

the CNPA. 

Page 21 GAO-07-78 Afghanistan Drug Control
UNODC and International Organization for Migration, started to equip 

forensics labs and a police-dog training center; ordered a variety of 

equipment for border police, including a communications system, 

ambulances, surveillance gear, and vehicles; and started refurbishing 

border posts such as the one seen in figure 7. In Turkmenistan, State 

transferred the funds to UNODC, with whom State was already working, 

to properly equip a major border checkpoint and provide relevant training 

to border control personnel. UNODC contracted with a company for 

construction and equipment. 

Figure 7: Khirmanjo, Tajikistan, Border Post Scheduled to Be Refurbished 

Source: Department of State.

State planned to provide $24 million to support the NIU and leadership of 

the CNPA, but the spending of these funds was delayed. Of these funds, 

State planned to spend $12.5 million to provide mentors, housing, 

equipment, and vehicles for the CNPA leadership, with the remaining 

funds going to operate and maintain the NIU Center for two years after its 

completion; provide equipment for the center; and for NIU vetting, 

training, and administrative costs. 

State Support for 

Counternarcotics Police 

Delayed 

Page 22 GAO-07-78 Afghanistan Drug Control
As of August 2006, State’s support for the NIU was delayed while ongoing

police reform plans were finalized and Defense completed construction of 

the NIU facility. Department of Defense-supported police reforms, 

according to State officials, notably pay and rank reform, were only 

recently completed, and State had been waiting until the CNPA’s 

leadership was determined to begin using its support funds. The NIU 

facility is expected to be completed November 30, 2006, almost eight 

months later than the original completion date due, in part, to building 

modifications. 

Law Enforcement and 

Justice Reform: Efforts 

Led to New 

Counternarcotics Law and 

Supported Strengthening 

Corrections System 

As seen in table 7, State provided nearly $24 million to support the Afghan 

government’s efforts to increase its capacity to arrest, prosecute, and 

punish traffickers and corrupt officials. State brought in senior federal 

prosecutors from the Department of Justice to assist with legislative 

reform efforts, such as the crafting of the new counternarcotics law, and 

training investigators and prosecutors. State also began the Corrections 

System Support Program (CSSP) to develop a professional, accountable, 

and centralized Afghan corrections system. Under this program, State 

started training corrections personnel and constructing new facilities. 

State also planned support for the Counter Narcotics Justice Center, a 

counternarcotics court and detention facility. However, construction of 

the facility was still under way. 

Table 7: Fiscal Year 2005 Law Enforcement/Justice Reform Assistance as of June

2006 (in millions) 

Project Provided Obligated Expendeda

Justice prosecutors $2 $2 $0

Corrections Reform and Counternarcotics 

Center 22 15 2

Total $24 $17 $2

Source: Department of State. 

a

According to a Department of State official, actual expenditures may be higher than reported figures 

due, in part, to delays in receiving bills from other agencies, international organizations, and 

contractors. 

State transferred $2 million to the Department of Justice to continue to 

pay for U.S. prosecutors from the Criminal Division’s Senior Federal 

Prosecutors’ Program to provide legal and legislative assistance. The 

prosecutors worked in several areas, including: 

Justice Prosecutors Reformed 

Counternarcotics Law, but 

Coordination Remained a 

Challenge 

• reform of key laws and implementation of regulations and authorities; 

Page 23 GAO-07-78 Afghanistan Drug Control
• design, planning, and coordination of training in fundamentals and 

advanced areas of the criminal law with emphasis on counternarcotics and

antimoney laundering enforcement; and 

• assessment of, mentoring of, and assistance to the Criminal Justice Task 

Force (CJTF), a specialized unit of investigators and prosecutors 

dedicated to working mid- and high-level narcotics and narcotics-related 

investigations and prosecutions. 

The Justice prosecutors, working with the government of Afghanistan, 

helped develop and implement a new comprehensive counternarcotics law 

that grants legal and investigative authority for mid- and high-level 

investigations and prosecutions to a new counternarcotics legal 

infrastructure apart from Afghanistan’s national judicial system. The new 

law nationalized most drug crimes for investigation and prosecution by the 

CJTF and trial by the Central Narcotics Tribunal,18 diminishing local 

influences and chances of intimidation. The new law and the legal 

authorities it provides are the centerpiece of CJTF training developed by 

the United States. The Justice prosecutors, along with their international 

partners, have mentored and guided the CJTF in the successful 

prosecution of three mid- and high-level traffickers. The Justice 

prosecutors are providing advice on the drafting of a more modern and 

flexible criminal procedure code. The Justice prosecutors were also 

instrumental in having the government of Afghanistan effect its first-ever 

extradition to the United States of an Afghan narcotics trafficker. 

State provided almost $16 million for the CSSP, which is designed to 

develop a professional, accountable, and centralized Afghan corrections 

system. The CSSP is expected to devise and conduct training for Afghan 

correctional officers and build and rehabilitate correctional facilities. 

The CSSP began training prison guards and constructing new buildings, 

with the award of the CSSP contract in March 2006. The contractor 

finished a survey of Afghan prisons, developed corrections training 

classes, trained its first 36 corrections officers at the Central Training 

Facility in Kabul, and continued training in three other provinces (see fig. 

8). In addition, the CSSP contractor began construction of an attorney 

general’s office and a courthouse in Wardak province (see fig. 9). 

Corrections Reform Program 

Ongoing 

 18The Central Narcotics Tribunal is a specialized court that has exclusive nationwide 

jurisdiction for the trial and appellate review of mid- and high-level narcotics offenses. 

Page 24 GAO-07-78 Afghanistan Drug Control
Figure 8: Afghan Corrections Officer Training

Figure 9: Ministry of Justice Building under Construction in Wardak Province 

Source: Department of State.

Source: Department of State.

Page 25 GAO-07-78 Afghanistan Drug Control
State provided $6 million to pay the operations and maintenance costs of 

the Counter Narcotics Justice Center—a counternarcotics court and 

administrative offices for the CJTF and Central Narcotics Tribunal, as well 

as a detention facility, which is still under construction. According to 

Defense, State, and Justice, original plans called for Defense to erect a

temporary building for the Counter Narcotics Justice Center. However, 

interagency discussions led to the decision to build a permanent set of 

structures, which delayed expected completion while new plans were 

drafted and a new contractor was chosen. Ongoing discussions may 

further modify the construction. 

The Counter Narcotics Justice Center is expected to be completed in 

November 2006, over three months later than the original completion date

for the permanent structures. Additional modifications to the construction 

design, should they be funded, will further delay the completion of the 

facility. 

As shown in table 8, State provided $5 million to support a public 

information campaign intended to convince the Afghan populace to reject

poppy cultivation and trafficking. State transferred almost $1 million to 

USAID for a grantee to begin a public information campaign. The 

campaign was designed to (1) develop and produce media materials to 

raise awareness and promote behavior change regarding poppy planting in

Afghanistan, (2) establish a regional network to disseminate the materials 

and monitor and assess the efficacy of the campaign, and (3) support the 

government of Afghanistan in its efforts to eliminate poppy cultivation. 

State also provided almost $4 million for a new contractor, hired in May 

2006, to continue and build on public information efforts. 

Table 8: Fiscal Year 2005 Public Information Assistance as of June 2006 (in

millions) 

Counternarcotics Center 

Delayed 

Public Information:

Campaign Launched, but 

Not Fully Coordinated 

with PEP Teams 

Project Provided Obligated Expendeda

2005-2006 Public Information Campaign $5 $5 $1

Source: Department of State. 

a

According to a Department of State official, actual expenditures may be higher than reported figures 

due, in part, to delays in receiving bills from other agencies, international organizations, and 

contractors. 

The 2005 campaign, which used radio spots and printed media, was 

developed to target key poppy-growing provinces over three phases 

concerning (1) pre-planting, (2) pre-eradication and the health impact of 

Page 26 GAO-07-78 Afghanistan Drug Control
drugs, and (3) eradication and the rule of law. The grantee established 

regional offices in the seven provinces with PEP teams to disseminate 

materials and monitor the campaign. The grantee completed the campaign

on time between July 15, 2005 and May 15, 2006. According to information 

provided by State, over the three phases, the campaign paid for 41 radio 

spots that often featured prominent Afghans and were broadcast almost 

9,000 times and prepared millions of stickers, matchboxes, booklets, 

posters, banners, and billboards, as illustrated in figure 10, to publicize the 

counternarcotics message. The grantee used focus groups and surveys to 

assess its efforts. A survey conducted in November 2005 of more than 

2,200 Afghans reported that about 75 percent of respondents had heard 

counternarcotics radio messages. During the last two phases of the 

campaign, the grantee worked with and paid the salaries of the Ministry of 

Interior’s media office personnel. 

Figure 10: Public Information Campaign Stickers, Billboard, and Posters 

Source: Department of State.

Note: Actual stickers, billboards, and posters printed are in Pashto and Dari. 

Page 27 GAO-07-78 Afghanistan Drug Control
Because of delays in getting PEP teams formed, the public-information 

grantee was unable to rely on expected PEP support during the 2005-2006 

poppy growing season. In several provinces, the grantee stated the PEP 

teams did not coordinate their public information activities or were not 

active in public information activities. In particular, the grantee had 

expected the PEP teams to assist in compiling a map of the schools, 

clinics, mosques, civil society organizations, and public gathering places in 

the provinces to use in identifying community stakeholders for delivery of 

public information materials. However, the grantee found most of the PEP 

teams provided no support in building the maps, and the grantee had to 

create them without the help of the provincial PEP teams. The new public 

information contract requires the contractor to implement the campaign in

concert with the PEP teams. 

The deteriorating security situation and the lack of Afghan capacity, 

including governmental institutions, are tremendous challenges to 

reducing illicit drug production and trafficking. The worsening security 

situation in Afghanistan threatens the achievement of the U.S.

counternarcotics strategy. Additionally, the narcotics trade continues to 

undermine Afghanistan’s fragile institutions by fostering persistent 

corruption and criminal activities. Consequently, U.S. officials and others 

have commented that combating narcotics in Afghanistan will take at least 

a decade. 

U.S. Counternarcotics 

Programs Face 

Several Challenges 

U.S. Counternarcotics 

Efforts Jeopardized by 

Worsening Security 

Progress toward the achievement of the U.S. counternarcotics strategy in

Afghanistan is threatened by the worsening security situation. USAID 

predicates the success of its reconstruction plans on an improving security

situation, however, continued attacks prevent some projects from being 

implemented. Moreover, as we reported previously, State officials expect 

that drug processing and trafficking will continue until security is 

established.19 In early 2006,

20 Afghanistan and the international community 

agreed to the Afghanistan Compact, which stated that “genuine security 

remains a fundamental prerequisite for achieving stability and 

development in Afghanistan.” 

 19GAO-05-575. 

20The Afghanistan Compact was agreed to at the London Conference, which took place 

from January 31 through February 1, 2006.

Page 28 GAO-07-78 Afghanistan Drug Control
The central government faces various threats, including Taliban and 

terrorist attacks, tribal violence, and criminal activity. In 2006, U.S. 

officials acknowledged that violence was increasing, including the use of 

improvised explosive devices, such as the one used against the vehicle in 

figure 11, and suicide bombers.21 U.S. military officials also stated the 

presence and strength of the Taliban increased, particularly in the south; 

that they demonstrated better command and control and fighting with 

increased intensity; and that Afghanistan has seen the highest rates of 

violence since the Taliban regime was removed from power in 2001. 

Moreover, UN accessibility maps that denote the risk level of different 

areas of Afghanistan also show that the security environment in many 

areas of Afghanistan has worsened noticeably. 

Figure 11: Aftermath of April 7, 2006, Improvised Explosive Device Attack on

Government Vehicle in Helmand

Source: Department of Defense.

During the 2005-2006 growing season, eradication forces and alternative

livelihoods personnel were attacked several times and in some cases 

killed, slowing or preventing their efforts. 

• In a two-week period in March 2006, Helmand had 20 confirmed security 

incidents, including 4 rocket attacks, 8 improvised explosive devices, 5 

assassinations, and 3 incidents of intimidation against public officials. U.S.

officials said that many of the incidents were related to the eradication 

campaign. 

 21In June 2004 and July 2005, we reported security was deteriorating. See GAO-04-403 and 

GAO-05-742. 

Page 29 GAO-07-78 Afghanistan Drug Control
• In April 2006, AEF came under direct attack and encountered improvised 

explosive devices and mines while eradicating in Helmand province,

including a mine that exploded on April 10, killing two AEF security 

personnel and wounding two others. 

• In May 2006, the alternative livelihoods contractor in the north reported 

that two staff members were killed when their vehicle was struck by an 

improvised explosive device. USAID and contractor officials stated the 

attack may have occurred in retribution for the contractor’s discovery of

fraud on one of its cash-for-work projects, or may have been because of 

eradication occurring in the area. 

• That same month, AEF had a standoff with farmers in Badakshan 

province, and in June, came under small arms fire that injured two AEF 

police. 

• Also in May, in Nangarhar, where the security situation had been more 

permissive, the alternative livelihoods contractor reported that

antigovernment groups were offering rewards for conducting attacks in 

the region. 

• In June 2006, State decided not to allow the PEP international advisors to 

move into their housing in Oruzgan province until the threat level 

diminished and construction of an office complex could begin. 

• During the first half of June 2006, the USAID contractor reported that 

Afghan nationals were threatened with retribution if they participated in 

alternative-livelihoods projects. This circumstance, combined with the 

travel restrictions resulting from the volatile security situation, restricted 

the progress of road construction and irrigation system repairs. 

Reducing opium cultivation and drug trafficking in Afghanistan will take at 

least a decade, in part because of the need to address Afghanistan’s lack of 

infrastructure, human capital, and government capacity. According to U.S., 

International Monetary Fund, and other officials, the impoverished 

country lacks adequate roads and access to power; its labor force is 

mostly illiterate and untrained; and the government, saddled with 

prevalent corruption, has a weak judicial sector and is not expected to be

able to cover its own expenses in the near future. These limitations 

discourage investment in Afghanistan and make Afghanistan dependent on

foreign assistance. 

Afghan Infrastructure, 

Human Capital, and 

Government Institutional 

Capacities Are Limited 

Page 30 GAO-07-78 Afghanistan Drug Control
The nation has few roads and poor access to power. Furthermore, the lack

of roads makes it difficult for farmers to get goods to markets and the lack

of electricity makes it difficult for farmers to store perishable goods. 

Afghanistan has one major highway, the “ring-road,” but access to certain 

areas can still take weeks or more and, during winter months, some areas 

are completely inaccessible, according to U.S. and UN officials. In 

Badakshan, the alternative livelihoods contractor reported that significant 

upgrades to the primary road networks were needed in order to allow 

farmers to deliver fresh vegetables to market centers without the produce 

being bruised, smashed, or otherwise damaged. Further, project staff 

reported that they were unable to visit some field sites in the province at

the end of April 2006 because of heavy rains that made the roads 

impassable. The lack of reliable power was cited as a major concern by 

potential investors. In the short term, USAID intends to provide generators 

for the industrial parks it is planning to build to assure investors of reliable 

power. 

Afghanistan’s human capital provides another capacity problem as most of 

the population is illiterate and many are untrained. U.S. and UN officials 

stated that illiteracy is a tremendous problem, making it difficult to recruit

police, prosecutors, and investigators, adding that even some provincial 

governors are illiterate. Furthermore, the high illiteracy further 

complicated efforts to train Afghans, and the lack of trained personnel 

meant that even government ministries had few adequately trained staff. 

For example, the UN provided the Afghans a small lab for drug testing, but 

it had to be staffed and funded by the UN. 

Capacity is also a challenge for Afghanistan’s government; corruption is 

endemic, the judicial sector is weak, and the government is not expected 

to be able to support itself for at least 10 years, according to U.S. and other 

officials. 

• According to U.S. embassy officials, most Afghan public salaries are very

low, which makes corruption more likely. Moreover, corrupt officials are 

rarely removed from their government jobs, but are instead reassigned. 

For example, as mentioned earlier, corrupt eradicators accepted bribes to

skip certain poppy fields, which eliminated the biggest deterrent to poppy 

cultivation. In addition, corrupt judicial officials reduce the fear of legal

repercussions for drug traffickers. 

• U.S. officials stated that rebuilding the judicial sector of Afghanistan 

lagged behind the other four security pillars—army, police, combating 

drugs, and disarmament. In 2005, we reported that overall justice sector 

Page 31 GAO-07-78 Afghanistan Drug Control
reform was underfunded and understaffed.22 To date, four years after the 

Geneva conference established the five-pillared security agenda, work to 

establish a permanent criminal code has not been completed.

• According to State officials, the government will be unable to support its 

recurring costs without foreign assistance for at least 10 years. In 2004-

2005, Afghan government revenues equaled less than one-third of its 

recurring expenditures. Consequently, Afghanistan remains dependent on

other nations for over half of its budget. 

In an effort to prevent counternarcotics funds from assisting terrorists, 

drug traffickers, or human rights violators in Afghanistan, USAID and State 

required that grantees sign antiterrorism and antitrafficking certifications,

financial agreements contain antiterrorism and antitrafficking clauses, and 

Afghan security personnel receiving training be vetted for associations 

with prohibited activities when applicable. However, a lack of official 

records and reliable information limited efforts to vet Afghan nationals. In

addition, although USAID and State made efforts to monitor ongoing 

projects to ascertain their status, security concerns and poor 

infrastructure limited the agencies’ monitoring of sites outside Kabul. 

USAID and State 

Made Efforts to 

Oversee the Use of 

Funds, but Lack of 

Information and 

Security Limited 

Some Efforts 

 22GAO-05-575. 

Page 32 GAO-07-78 Afghanistan Drug Control
To comply with federal bans on assisting terrorists, drug traffickers, and 

human rights violators,23 USAID and State required that grantees certify 

their nonsupport of prohibited individuals or groups; that financial 

agreements contain clauses outlining U.S. prohibitions; and that 

candidates for security training or assistance are vetted. 

• Certifications. USAID issued guidance requiring that recipients of all 

grants and cooperative agreements sign certifications attesting that they 

are not supporting, and have not supported, terrorists. In signing the 

certifications, recipients also acknowledged the steps they are to take to 

help prevent assistance from being provided to terrorists, including 

reviewing U.S. and UN lists of known terrorists. In addition, USAID and 

State require recipients of assistance to certify that they have not been 

convicted of, or involved in, a narcotics offense.24 We reviewed USAID 

grants and contracts and found that the required certifications were 

included where required by USAID’s regulations. According to State, its 

letter of agreement with the government of Afghanistan requires that each 

recipient of foreign assistance sign a certification disclosing any past 

narcotrafficking. State also included this requirement in fund transfers to 

USAID, Justice, and Defense. 

Agencies Required 

Certifications, Clauses, 

and Vetting to Help

Prevent Funds from Being 

Used for Prohibited 

Purposes, but Lack of 

Information Hampered 

Vetting 

• Clauses. USAID requires that financial agreements, including contracts 

and grants, contain a clause intended to familiarize award recipients with 

their legal responsibilities to comply with the executive order and law 

prohibiting assistance to terrorists.25 In addition, both USAID and State 

require that any financial agreement representing more than $100,000 

 23Executive Order 13224 blocks property and prohibits transactions with persons who 

commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism, and 18 USC 2339A and 2339B 

criminalizes the knowing provision of material support or resources, including financial 

support, lodging, equipment, transportation, training, and expert advice, to terrorists or

foreign terrorist organizations. Section 487 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as 

amended (codified at 22 USC 2291f), and Code of Federal Regulations, Title 22, Part 140,

implementing the act, prohibit assistance to drug traffickers and require the President to

take all reasonable steps to ensure that U.S. assistance is not provided to drug traffickers.

The “Leahy Amendment,” which has been regularly incorporated into foreign operations

appropriations bills, prohibits security assistance to foreign security force units implicated 

in human rights violations. 

24The regulations implementing section 487 of the Foreign Assistance Act (22 CFR 140), 

allow for certain exceptions, including assistance to small farmers when part of a 

community-based alternative development project. 

25USAID issued the guidelines requiring the antiterrorism clause and certification although

it was not legally required to do so. State has not issued, and is not required to issue, such 

guidance or procedures. 

Page 33 GAO-07-78 Afghanistan Drug Control
contain a clause to familiarize award recipients with their legal 

responsibilities to comply with the law prohibiting assistance to drug 

traffickers. In our review of the 10 alternative livelihoods program grants 

and contracts, we found that each agreement included the clauses that 

were required. 

• Vetting. USAID and State require the vetting of individuals and 

organizations for involvement with drug trafficking, through the review of

arrest records and assessment of the credibility of any trafficking 

allegations. State also requires the vetting of individuals and organizations 

against criminal and terrorist databases for any involvement in terrorism 

or human rights violations. According to State, the U.S. embassy runs 

initial screening of security force personnel against local databases and 

with nongovernmental organizations. State then forwards biographical 

data on security forces to the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and 

Labor and Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs for vetting against 

classified and unclassified databases to identify criminal conduct, 

including that related to terrorism, narcotrafficking, and human rights 

violations. However, USAID’s and State’s vetting of Afghan nationals was 

constrained by limited or incomplete records and the difficulty of 

investigating widespread allegations of misconduct. According to State, 

USAID, and contract officials, after years of conflict, Afghanistan lacks 

many official records, such as birth, identification, and criminal records. 

According to U.S. officials, this lack of records forced them to rely on 

word of mouth to vet Afghan nationals. Moreover, rivals often accuse one 

another of criminality and affiliation with terrorists or drug traffickers, and 

it is difficult to investigate the truth of these allegations. To assist with 

future vetting, State plans to administer lie-detector tests to certain project 

participants. However, as of July 2006, State had not been able to initiate

the testing. 

USAID and State monitor project performance through contractor reports, 

site visits, and information from third parties, such as the U.S. military or 

Afghan officials, as access to project sites outside Kabul is difficult 

because of security conditions and poor infrastructure. Contractors 

developed performance management plans, which include performance 

indicators, a monitoring and evaluation plan, and reporting requirements. 

Furthermore, according to U.S. officials, USAID and State used 

experienced U.S. firms and international organizations as the primary 

grantees and contractors. For example, State hired DynCorp International, 

a company that State uses to carry out counternarcotics efforts in 

Colombia and elsewhere, to implement its eradication efforts and used the 

UN to carry out some of the border security station rehabilitation in 

Efforts Made to Monitor 

Projects, but Access to 

Project Sites Is Limited 

Page 34 GAO-07-78 Afghanistan Drug Control
Tajikistan. USAID hired three U.S. firms already experienced with working 

in Afghanistan—Chemonics International; Development Alternatives, Inc.; 

and Planning and Development Collaboration International—to run its 

alternative livelihoods projects. 

USAID attempted to assess progress through various means. First, 

USAID’s contractors submitted required biweekly reports detailing 

challenges and progress in their respective provinces. For example, in May 

2006, the contractor in the south reported that “security concerns have 

dramatically decreased project activities... as such, no monitoring visits 

were conducted.” During the same period, the contractor in the east 

reported they were able “to monitor active and completed cash-for-work 

projects.” In addition to these reports, USAID assigned a project officer to

each region’s provincial reconstruction teams’ compound to be 

responsible for monitoring the contract. They attempted to get to the field 

as often as possible to view the progress of projects and assist in 

developing new ones. USAID also relied on the local U.S. military 

commanders and Afghan officials to report on the status of any projects 

they saw. For example, the U.S. commander in Nangarhar told us during 

our visit that when he goes on routine patrols, he tries to visit any USAID 

projects in the vicinity of his patrol and provides any information from 

those patrols to the resident USAID representative. 

State contractors and other implementers of State-funded projects 

submitted the required reports on the progress and obstacles facing their 

projects. For example, DynCorp submits biweekly reports detailing the 

activities of the leased aircraft, AEF, and PEP teams, and reporting on 

problems, such as the challenges of hiring qualified international advisors

for the PEP teams. In addition, State personnel stated that they regularly 

travel to program sites. For example, State staff made visits to the AEF 

while it was out in the field. Similarly, the Justice prosecutors stated that 

they work several times a week with the CJTF. 

Despite these efforts, external factors, such as security and Afghanistan’s 

poor infrastructure, limited project monitoring by reducing USAID’s, 

contractors’, and, to a lesser extent, State’s access to project sites. For 

example, in Helmand, the monitoring and evaluation plan developed by 

USAID’s alternative livelihoods contractor could not be implemented 

because of the danger to both Afghans and foreign nationals traveling in

the area. Additionally, USAID field staff were constrained by security rules

and restrictions established by the military commanders in their areas. For 

example, in Nangarhar, monitoring staff must provide U.S. commanders 

96-hours notice for trips outside the military camp, and these trips can be 

Page 35 GAO-07-78 Afghanistan Drug Control
cancelled at any time if sufficient military personnel are not available to 

provide security. Poor infrastructure limits the ability to monitor projects. 

In northern Afghanistan, many roads are impassable during the winter 

months. Furthermore, many areas can only be reached via helicopter or on

foot, as no roads exist. State projects in and around Kabul are more 

accessible, and, therefore, are easier to monitor. Additionally, the 

eradication efforts funded by State are being monitored by UNODC in 

cooperation with Afghanistan’s government and are also confirmed 

through satellite and other imagery. However, UNODC was unable to send 

ground monitors to Helmand to verify governor-led eradication efforts 

there. 

Despite significant efforts by USAID and State, the deteriorating security 

situation in Afghanistan threatens the success of the U.S. counternarcotics

goal of significantly reducing illicit drug cultivation, production, and 

trafficking. Unlike in our prior reports concerning other programs in 

Afghanistan, we found USAID and State had developed a strategy for 

counternarcotics tailored to Afghanistan’s difficult environment. They 

reported some accomplishments in each of the strategy’s five pillars; 

nevertheless, the opium poppy crop in 2006 grew by over 50 percent, 

reaching a record amount. The worsening security situation, particularly 

because of the Taliban’s resurgence, threatens to derail U.S. efforts by 

slowing or stopping projects. Moreover, the pace of U.S. efforts was 

further slowed by the country’s persistent developmental challenges, 

including inadequate access to roads and limited government institutions. 

Given the difficulties of working in Afghanistan, sustainable progress 

toward the U.S. counternarcotics goal will likely take a decade or more of 

committed U.S. resources and efforts. Because many of the 

counternarcotics projects are still in the early stages of implementation, 

we have no recommendations at this time. 

We provided a draft of this report for review and comment to State, 

USAID, Defense, and Justice. Each agency informed us that they were not 

providing formal comments. However, USAID and Justice provided 

technical comments, which we have incorporated into the report where 

appropriate.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me 

at (202) 512-3149 or GootnickD@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

Concluding 

Observations 

Agency Comments 

Page 36 GAO-07-78 Afghanistan Drug Control
of this report. GAO staff who made contributions to this report are listed 

in appendix II. 

David Gootnick, Director

International Affairs and Trade 

Page 37 GAO-07-78 Afghanistan Drug Control
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To examine the U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) and 

Department of State’s (State) progress in implementing counternarcotics 

programs, projects, and activities under each pillar, and the factors, if any, 

limiting implementation, we reviewed pertinent USAID and State planning, 

funding, and reporting documents for their counternarcotics programs in 

Afghanistan. Our review of these documents provided us with information 

regarding the program’s structure, goals, objectives, progress, and 

limitations. In addition, we met with cognizant officials from Departments 

of Defense (Defense), Justice (Justice), and State; USAID; and Drug 

Enforcement Administration (DEA) in Washington, D.C. and Kabul, 

Afghanistan. In Kabul, we also met with officials from the United Nations 

(UN) and the governments of Afghanistan and the United Kingdom to 

discuss counternarcotics efforts. We traveled to the provinces of Balkh, 

Helmand, Kandahar, and Nangarhar to meet with U.S. and Afghan officials 

and discussed various U.S.–funded projects. For example, in Helmand and 

Nangarhar, we met with the governors to discuss the progress of USAID’s 

alternative livelihoods projects, visited several projects, and met with U.S. 

contractors implementing the projects. In Balkh, we met with the governor

to discuss the governor-led eradication efforts and how U.S. assistance 

was being used. While in Kandahar, we met with State contractors and 

observed the aircraft being used to enhance the AEF’s eradication efforts. 

To examine the challenges faced by counternarcotics efforts in 

Afghanistan, we reviewed USAID, State, and Defense documents 

addressing the status of U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. Additionally, we 

reviewed UN, International Monetary Fund, and academic reports 

regarding the current security and economic situation in Afghanistan, as 

well as discussing its past problems and outlook for the future. 

Specifically, we reviewed several months of UN reporting on the security 

situation in Afghanistan in regards to what precautions their personnel 

needed to take. In addition, we met with experts and attended academic 

symposia in Washington, D.C., regarding Afghanistan’s current situation 

and the challenges it faces in the future. 

To examine USAID’s and State’s efforts to ensure that the fiscal year 2005 

counternarcotics funds were used for intended purposes, we reviewed the 

contracts, grants, and other financial agreements by which these funds 

were obligated and expended. We reviewed USAID contracts and State 

financial instruments that received fiscal year 2005 counternarcotics 

funding. We met with USAID and State budget and financial officers in 

Washington, D.C., and Kabul to discuss the safeguards placed on the 

funds. Additionally, we talked to several contractors in Afghanistan about 

their monitoring plans and ability to implement them. 

Page 38 GAO-07-78 Afghanistan Drug Control
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

To determine the reliability of the funding data, we compared data from 

multiple sources. For example, we compared the funding data we received 

from USAID and State with the appropriations language and congressional 

notifications. Although we did not audit the funding data and are not 

expressing an opinion on them, based on our examination of the 

documents received and our discussions with cognizant agency officials, 

we concluded that the funding data we obtained were sufficiently reliable 

for the purposes of this report. To determine the reliability of United 

Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) eradication and opium 

poppy cultivation data, we reviewed the methodology used to estimate the 

areas where opium poppy was cultivated in Afghanistan in 2005. In 

particular, we reviewed the sampling and estimation procedures used, the 

ways in which satellite imagery was incorporated into the estimate, and 

the procedures followed by the ground surveyors. We noted that the 

sampling methods were appropriate for generating estimates for 

Afghanistan as a whole, but that there were limitations to the estimates for 

particular provinces. Overall, we determined that the methodologies used 

by the UNODC were reasonable, and that the results were sufficiently 

reliable for the purposes of this report. To determine the reliability of 

Afghan public opinion survey data, we reviewed the survey methodology 

used by the Afghan Center for Socio-economic and Opinion Research, and 

determined it to be sufficiently reliable for our purposes. The information 

on foreign law in this report does not reflect our independent legal 

analysis, but is based on interviews and secondary sources. 

However, because of the security situation in Afghanistan, we could not 

independently verify or randomly test USAID or State project information 

at field locations. Nevertheless, based on our assessments of the data 

provided, our discussions with the cognizant officials, and limited field 

visits, we concluded that the counternarcotics program data provided to 

us were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. 

Page 39 GAO-07-78 Afghanistan Drug Control
Appendix II: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 40 GAO-07-78 

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

David Gootnick, (202) 512-3149 

Key contributors to this report were Al Huntington, Hynek Kalkus, 

Thomas Costa, Elizabeth Repko, Reid Lowe, and David Bruno. 

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(320388) Afghanistan Drug Control
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