IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, 

NORTHERN DIVISION 

HAROLD KELLY MURPHY, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

v. ) Case No.: 2:06-cv-618-MEF 

 ) 

SOUTHERN ENERGY HOMES, INC., ) 

et al., ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

COMES NOW the Defendant, Southern Energy Homes, Inc. (“Southern”), and 

submits the following Reply Brief in Support of its Motion for Judgment on the 

Pleadings. 

I. Introduction. 

The plaintiff, Harold Kelly Murphy (“Murphy”), advances five principal 

arguments in support of his opposition to Southern’s Motion for Judgment on the 

Pleadings. 

Murphy contends that a recent development in a nearly identical case, Guidroz v. 

Champion Enterprises, Inc., which is pending in the Federal District Court for the 

Western District of Louisiana, undermines Southern’s argument that all of Murphy’s 

claims are preempted under federal law. Murphy represents that after the Guidroz court 

dismissed the Louisiana case based on preemption grounds,1

 that the court granted 

 

1

 Southern supplied this court with a copy of the Guidroz court order, dismissing a class complaint on 

preemption grounds, with its Brief in Support of Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. 

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plaintiffs leave2

 to amend the complaint because “if [the Judge] truly believed that the 

Complaint as Amended was still preempted he would not waste his time allowing the 

amendment.” (See Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for 

Judgment on the Pleadings (referred to hereafter as “Murphy’s Opposition”), p.23) 

Murphy’s position is nothing more than an exercise in wishful thinking. As Southern 

will demonstrate below, the Guidroz court reaffirmed its position on federal preemption, 

holding that all of the plaintiffs’ original claims are preempted and that any amendment 

incorporating such claims would likewise be preempted. 

Murphy contends that Southern’s selection of a wallboard design under 24 C.F.R. 

§ 3280.504(b)(1) (interior vapor barrier) violates a general provision of the HUD Code 

set forth at 24 C.F.R. § 3280.303(b). Respectfully, Murphy misapprehends the rules of 

regulatory construction, as a general provision of the HUD Code cannot be invoked to 

overcome a specific provision. Moreover, HUD recently reviewed this novel legal theory 

and firmly rejected it through an informal opinion letter. 

Next, Murphy relies on a handful of legal decisions from other jurisdictions in 

support of his position that his claims are not preempted. Murphy conveniently overlooks 

the only decision directly on point – Guidroz – which held that wallboard claims 

attacking the use of interior vapor barriers under the HUD Code are preempted by federal 

law. This court should not be persuaded by the other cases cited by Murphy, as they are 

factually and legally distinguishable from the instant case. 

Murphy also urges this Court to reject Southern’s “field preemption” argument. 

This Court need not waste its time on this issue, as Southern firmly conceded that this is 

 

2

 Plaintiff’s counsel in Murphy also represents the plaintiffs in the Guidroz action. 

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not a field preemption case. (See Southern’s Brief in Support of Motion for Judgment on 

the Pleadings, p. 7, n.9) 

Finally, Murphy argues that Section 3280.504(b) is a “performance code” and that 

Southern can be held liable for not selecting what Murphy contends is the “best” choice 

on a list of approved HUD code design options. The Guidroz court soundly rejected this 

argument, relying on analogous United States Supreme Court precedent, Geier v. 

American Honda Motor Corp., Inc., 529 U.S. 861 (2000). Furthermore, HUD purposely 

chose not to impose a geographical limitation on the use of interior vapor barrier designs 

because HUD approves of that design everywhere in the United States. Murphy’s 

attempt to undermine that position through a lawsuit is a direct attack on the HUD Code, 

which is foreclosed by federal preemption doctrine. 

 

II. The Guidroz Court Reaffirmed its Holding that Wallboard Claims are 

Preempted. 

In Guidroz, after issuing a thorough 29-page order dismissing plaintiffs’ 

wallboard claims with prejudice (the same claims presented here), the court, months later, 

granted plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint in order to plead a new theory of 

recovery, which might survive a preemption attack. Murphy contends that the court’s 

decision to permit an amendment is a signal that the preemption defense is flawed. 

Murphy’s characterization of the court’s order is incorrect. A transcript of the hearing on 

Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend in Guidroz (See Exhibit A) makes it overwhelmingly clear 

that the court has not reconsidered its decision on the preemption issue. In fact, the court 

affirmed that its original decision was, and is, correct: plaintiffs’ wallboard theory is 

indeed preempted by federal law. The court entered an order allowing an amendment, 

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simply because the court promised plaintiffs’ counsel the opportunity to do so in a prior 

hearing. (See Court Order, attached hereto as Exhibit B) During the hearing, the court 

again held that plaintiffs’ wallboard theory is preempted and any amendment 

incorporating similar allegations would likewise be preempted: 

THE COURT: So I apologize to you. I apologize for forgetting 

about you, for forgetting about what I told you. I don’t apologize for the 

opinion, which I happen to think was right, but I do apologize for not 

allowing you your opportunity to amend which I told you I was going to 

do. I have no excuse for that. 

This was an opinion that Janet and I agonized over for a long time. 

It’s a hard case and it was a hard opinion to write. She and I don’t 

normally agonize. We usually argue. In this one we agonized. 

I believe the conclusion I reached was the correct one under 

the circumstances, but it was the passage of that time in trying to get 

the opinion right that it just simply slipped my mind what I had told 

you I was going to allow you to do. 

Exhibit A, p. 2:18-3:6. (emphasis added). 

 THE COURT: ... The claim that you pled in the initial complaint I 

believe it to be peremptory. 

 We’ll see if the amending complaint gets you past that, but to the 

extent that the amending complaint incorporates those allegations 

found in the original complaint, I believe that is preempted and that’s 

why I’m going to make it a partial dismissal. That’s the intent of what 

I’m trying to get done, and then we’ll take a look at – we’ll take a look at 

the amended pleading after that. 

Exhibit A, p. 4:7-16. (emphasis added). 

The Defendants in Guidroz are scheduled to file a second motion to dismiss 

tomorrow attacking the plaintiffs’ new theory of recovery – that some unidentified aspect 

of manufactured home ventilation systems (i.e., furnaces and/or air conditioners) is 

defective. Importantly, Murphy just filed a motion for leave to file an identical 

amendment. Murphy’s filing underscores the weakness of his position: if Murphy’s 

wallboard claims are not preempted, then why is he seeking leave to swap to a new legal 

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theory in mid-stream? The question answers itself. Southern intends to oppose the 

amendment for a variety of reasons, including the fact that the amendment is untimely, as 

well as preempted. 

 

III. Murphy Misapprehends the Relationship Between Sections 3280.504(b) and 

3280.303(b).

Murphy incorrectly contends that Southern’s selection of an interior vapor barrier 

design under Section 3280.504(b)(1) of the HUD Code violates another, more general 

HUD Code provision, set forth at Section 3280.303(b), which states in pertinent part: 

All construction methods shall be in conformance with accepted 

engineering practices to insure durable, livable and safe housing 

and shall demonstrate acceptable workmanship reflecting 

journeyman quality of work of the various trades. 

24 C.F.R. § 3280.303(b). 

 Murphy is attempting to improperly cannibalize one specific HUD Code provision 

(3280.504(b)) with a general provision (3280.303(b)), which runs afoul of controlling 

rules of regulatory construction. 

The Guidroz court recently rejected this very argument. Applying rules of 

statutory construction, the court held that a general regulation cannot be used to control a 

specific regulation that is “tailor made for” the facts of the case. (Guidroz, pp. 17-18). 

The outcome should be the same here, as controlling law in this Circuit provides that 

general code provisions cannot be utilized to supersede specific ones. Tug Allie-B, Inc. v. 

United States, 273 F.3d 936, 948 (11th Cir. 2001). Furthermore, a court is duty bound to 

harmonize regulations whenever possible, since regulations are due to be enforced in 

accordance with their plain meaning. McClenney v. United Air Lines, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 

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372, 375 (W.D. Mo. 1959); Tierdael Constr. Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health 

Review Comm., 340 F.3d 1110, 1114 (10th Cir. 2003). 

 Not surprisingly, the wallboard cases in the southeast have captured the attention 

of HUD itself, and HUD has taken the position that plaintiffs’ Section 3280.303(b) 

argument is flawed. HUD’s Associate Deputy Assistant Secretary for Regulatory Affairs 

and Manufactured Housing, William W. Matchneer III, recently wrote: 

Following up on our December meeting with you and your 

colleagues, we have had a chance to review the plaintiffs’ pleadings you 

have provided us on various vapor barrier cases. As the HUD official 

responsible for the enforcement of the Manufactured Home Construction 

and Safety Standards, I can say that these pleadings consistently 

misrepresent HUD enforcement policy by arguing that HUD’s general 

standard at 3280.303(b) should be applied to manufacturers’ practices 

regarding the placement of vapor barriers even though these 

manufacturers have complied with HUD’s more specific vapor barrier 

standard at 3280.504(b). 

 Consistent with basic principles of administrative law, it is HUD’s 

practice to hold manufacturers accountable for compliance with the 

standard that most specifically applies to a particular aspect of 

construction. Accordingly, there is no case in which HUD has applied 

3280.303(b) to a manufacturer that has complied with 3280.504(b). 

 

Thank you again for bringing this situation to our attention. HUD 

has a distinct interest in maintaining an accurate understanding by 

arbitrators and the courts of HUD’s enforcement policies and practices 

regarding the Manufactured Home Construction and Safety Standards. We 

would be especially concerned by a reported judicial decision that 

misstated HUD policy and practice, so please keep us advised of 

developments in these cases. 

(See HUD letter attached hereto as Exhibit C). 

 Agency interpretations, such as this one, should be given deference, as courts 

have recognized that the agency that crafts a regulation is in a superior position to 

understand its own rules. See Secretary of the Interior v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965); 

see also Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 578 (2000)(quoting Skidmore v. 

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Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)(agency opinion letters are “entitled to respect” to the 

extent they “have the power to persuade”) )(internal quotations omitted). 

 Accordingly, this Court should hold that the general regulation of Section 

3280.303(b) does not overcome or displace the wallboard design option set forth at 

Section 3280.504(b), and dismiss Murphy’s claims with prejudice. 

IV. Murphy’s Case Law is Not Persuasive.

Murphy argues that other case law supports a finding of no preemption. The 

cases cited by Murphy are factually and legally distinguishable and, in many respects, 

supportive of Southern’s position. Furthermore, Murphy offers no reasoning to 

overcome the opinion in Guidroz, choosing instead to mischaracterize the outcome of 

plaintiffs’ motion to amend the judgment, which again dismissed the wallboard claims 

with prejudice based on the preemption doctrine (see argument in Section II, supra). The 

cases cited by Murphy are discussed below. 

Murphy cites Bott v. Sterling Homes, Inc., 527 So. 2d 548 (La. Ct. App. 1988) in 

support of his position that his wallboards aims are not preempted. In Bott, the Louisiana 

Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of a trial court that awarded 

damages to a mobile home purchaser who made a redhibition claim based on numerous, 

severe water leaks. Id. at 549-50. The manufacturer argued that the plaintiff’s claims 

failed because the home was HUD Code compliant when it left the factory. Applying a 

Louisiana statute that requires courts to apply the standard of care set forth in the HUD 

Code, the Court of Appeals held that HUD Code violations in the field could serve as a 

basis for liability. Id. at 549-50. Bott does not help Murphy; in fact, it undermines his 

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position. In Bott, the court applied the HUD Code; whereas Murphy argues the inverse, 

that compliance with Section 3280.504(b)(1) actually creates liability. 

Richardson v. Fleetwood Enterprises, Inc., 4 F. Supp.2d 650 (E.D. Tex 1998) also 

offers no help to Murphy’s argument because Richardson addressed the argument of 

whether the HUD Code preempts all causes of action. The court held that violations of 

the HUD Code can serve as the basis for common law liability. Id. at 657. Murphy’s 

case is different because he urges this court to hold Southern liable in warranty and tort 

because it followed a HUD Code provision with which Murphy disagrees. Murphy 

cannot cite this court to any decisional law or statute that permits a plaintiff to create a 

theory of recovery predicated on compliance with federal law, since controlling precedent 

compels the opposite conclusion. Irving v. Mazda Motor Corp., 136 F.3d 764, 769 (11th

Cir. 1998)(“a state cannot impose common law damages on individuals for doing what a 

federal act or regulation ‘authorized them to do’”). Accordingly, Richardson offers no 

helpful analysis. 

Murphy cites this Court to Shorter v. Champion Home Builders Co., 776 F. Supp. 

333 (N.D. Ohio), where the court held that the HUD Code preempts common law 

standards but not common law claims. Again, this is inapplicable. Some common law 

claims may be preserved, but not if they are predicated on standards that seek to re-write 

the HUD Code. 

Murphy cites this Court to Choate v. Champion Home Builders Co., 222 F.3d 788 

(10th Cir. 2000). Choate is a housing case involving a manufacturer’s alleged failure to 

install battery powered smoke detectors. Id. at 790-91. The court held that the plaintiffs’ 

tort claims were not preempted where the HUD Code required a hard-wired smoke 

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detector and the plaintiffs advocated a local standard requiring battery powered detectors. 

Id. at 797. The evidence showed that the manufacturer built this particular model of 

home two different ways – under the HUD Code and the local building code. Id. at 791 

n.3. In homes built under the local code, the manufacturer used battery backed-up 

detectors; in HUD Code homes, the manufacturer used only electrically-wired detectors. 

Id. The court reversed the lower court’s entry of summary judgment holding that 

plaintiffs’ theory of recovery was not preempted. Id. at 797. 

Choate is distinguishable because there, the court addressed a section of the HUD 

Code which is performance based. The Guidroz court has determined that Section 

3280.504(b) is not performance based; therefore, non-identical standards are not 

permitted, and Choate is inapplicable. Guidroz, pp. 24-5. 

Lastly, Murphy relies on an Alabama Supreme Court decision, Turner v. PFS 

Corp., 674 So. 2d 60 (Ala. 1995). Turner offers no help to Murphy because it holds that 

the violation of a federal standard can create tort liability; whereas a tort claim that seeks 

to impose a standard of care different than the HUD Code is expressly preempted. Id. at 

62-3. This decision captures our point exactly. Murphy is not arguing that Southern 

violated the provisions of Section 3280.504(b), by selecting an unapproved wall design. 

Instead, he argues that Southern violated the general dictates of Section 3280.303(b) by 

incorporating a design option expressly permitted in Section 3280.504(b)(1). Essentially, 

Murphy is crafting his own version of the HUD Code by simultaneously declaring 

Section 3280.504(b)(1) to be retrospectively invalid, and then seeking to hold Southern 

liable for violating “Murphy’s new law.” Respectfully, Murphy’s interpretation must be 

rejected because the law does not allow a litigant to invalidate a formal regulation, 

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enacted in accordance with federal law, simply by urging incongruity with another 

regulation. Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has held that courts should not 

second-guess the policy choices of administrative agencies acting within their statutory 

mandate: 

When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly 

conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency’s policy, rather 

than whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, 

the challenge must fail. In such a case, federal judges – who have no 

constituency – have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by 

those who do. The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such 

policy choices and resolving the struggle between competing views of the 

public interest are not judicial ones: “Our Constitution vests such 

responsibilities in the political branches.” 

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 

(1984)(quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978)). 

 Indeed, the HUD Code should not be blithely set aside in this case simply because 

one litigant (Murphy) desires that outcome. HUD’s policy choices with respect to 

wallboard design were made in keeping with federal administrative law in order to ensure 

that the public is properly protected and the correct outcome is reached. A brief 

discussion of the processes involved demonstrates this point. 

Congress enacted comprehensive manufactured home legislation (the National 

Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety Standards Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. 5401 

et seq. (the “MHCSSA”)), in order to regulate construction and safety standards for 

manufactured homes. Congress delegated rule-making authority to HUD, and ordered 

HUD to promulgate construction standards consistent with the purposes of the MHCSSA. 

42 U.S.C. § 5403. There are a variety of stated purposes in the MHCSSA. Some relate to 

safety, while others emphasize uniformity of construction techniques and cost savings: 

(b) Purposes. The purposes of this title are-- 

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(1) to protect the quality, durability, safety, and affordability of manufactured 

homes; 

(2) to facilitate the availability of affordable manufactured homes and to increase 

homeownership for all Americans; 

(3) to provide for the establishment of practical, uniform, and, to the extent 

possible, performance-based Federal construction standards for manufactured 

homes; 

(4) to encourage innovative and cost-effective construction techniques for 

manufactured homes; 

(5) to protect residents of manufactured homes with respect to personal injuries 

and the amount of insurance costs and property damages in manufactured 

housing, consistent with the other purposes of this section; 

(6) to establish a balanced consensus process for the development, revision, and 

interpretation of Federal construction and safety standards for manufactured 

homes and related regulations for the enforcement of such standards; 

(7) to ensure uniform and effective enforcement of Federal construction and 

safety standards for manufactured homes; and 

(8) to ensure that the public interest in, and need for, affordable manufactured 

housing is duly considered in all determinations relating to the Federal standards 

and their enforcement. 

42 U.S.C. § 5401. 

 Consistent with the purposes of the MHCSSA, HUD promulgated the HUD Code 

1975, which regulates virtually every aspect of manufactured housing construction. 24 

C.F.R. § 3280 and § 3282. Unlike conventional building codes, the HUD Code is 

promulgated through formal rule-making procedures under the Federal Administrative 

Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 501 et seq. HUD balances the policy goals of the MHCSSA, 

and promulgates rules that best meet Congress’ intent with respect to construction 

standards. There are additional safeguards built into the regulatory process, as federal 

statutory law creates a standing consensus committee, which must approve of proposed 

changes to the HUD Code before the Secretary of HUD publishes a proposed rule in the 

Federal Register. 42 U.S.C. § 5403(a)(4)-(6). In short, Congress has crafted a thorough 

regulatory scheme to ensure that the right regulations are enacted, and that such 

regulations are not modified until considerable deliberation and debate has taken place, 

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including the receipt of public comments solicited through the Federal Register. The 

Murphy case, which involves one homeowner’s point of view, is not the proper forum to 

launch a repeal of HUD’s wallboard design regulations, which have been in place since 

1975. For these reasons, Southern urges this Court to reject Murphy’s arguments and 

dismiss this action with prejudice. 

 

V. Section 3280.504(b) is not a “Performance Based” Standard that Implies a 

Duty to Choose One Federal Option Over Any Other. 

Murphy argues that Section 3280.504(b) is “performance based” standard that 

requires manufacturers to select the “best” choice from among the federally prescribed 

options set forth in the HUD Code. Of course, nothing in Section 3280.504(b) actually 

says or means that. To the contrary, the regulation is written in the disjunctive (each 

choice is set off by the word “or”), which gives every manufacturer the right to select any 

method prescribed by HUD. Murphy has to persuade this court that there is an implied

picking duty with respect to wallboard designs in order to have any success on the merits; 

otherwise, his theory is negated by federal preemption law. 

The Guidroz court directly addressed this argument, where the court held that: 

Section 3280.504(b), like the regulation at issue in Geier, does not set a 

minimum standard for exterior wall construction, but rather the regulation 

provides manufacturers with federally authorized options for the 

construction of exterior walls. While HUD has, in some instances, 

designated certain manufactured housing standards as “minimums” or 

used modifying language to designate that the standard sets only a 

minimum requirement, there is no such language contained in 

3280.504(b). To the contrary, the options are contained in one of the 

energy conservation regulations, designated by Congress as “preemptive.” 

See 42 U.S.C. 5403 (g); See also 57 Fed. Reg. 6420 (Feb. 24, 1992) 

(proposing to amend 504 “to include preemptive standards significantly 

upgrading the existing energy conservation requirements”); 58 Fed. Reg. 

54975, 54975 (Oct. 25, 1993)(amending 504 “to include preemptive 

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standards significantly upgrading the existing energy conservation 

requirements”). Accordingly, as in Geier, if plaintiffs were successful in 

this action, a state rule of law would effectively eliminate one of the 

statutorily approved options, forcing manufactured home manufacturers to 

choose one of the other two options (ventilated or unventilated walls) over 

the option permitting placement of a vapor barrier on the “living space 

side” of the wall. Such a rule would conflict with, impair and frustrate the 

Federal superintendence of the manufactured home industry by effectively 

precluding the use of one of the federal chosen methods of exterior wall 

construction. Under Geier, that result is impermissible. Plaintiffs’ state 

law claims are impliedly conflict preempted. 

Guidroz, pp. 24-5. (emphasis added). 

HUD expressly decides when to make a regulation geographically specific. It has 

done so in at least three situations. The interior vapor barrier design choice (§ 

3280.504(b)(1)) is not a regulation that HUD decided to limit, geographically speaking. 

First, in Section 3280.506, HUD divided the country into thermal zones (1, 2 and 3). 

Alabama lies in zone 1, and homes situated there are required to have less insulation, for 

example, than homes sold into Maine, which lies in zone 3. HUD law does not permit a 

zone 1 home to be moved into zone 3 because the colder climate will cause the Alabama 

home to not perform correctly in a colder climate. 

Similarly, the experience gained from major hurricanes over the last 15 years 

caused HUD to create wind zones (1, 2 and 3). 24 C.F.R. § 3280.305. Homes sold into 

the gulf coast regions are now designed with higher wind tolerances than homes sold into 

inland areas. The HUD Code does not permit a wind zone 1 home to be sold into the 

hurricane prone coastal regions (wind zones 2 and 3) for obvious reasons. 

Lastly, and most importantly, HUD amended the wall design regulation last year 

to permit the use of external vapor barriers in certain homes. That regulation did not alter 

the other design options prescribed by HUD, as internal vapor barrier design is still 

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permitted everywhere.3

 In connection with that amended regulation, HUD limited the 

use of external vapor barriers to certain areas within the gulf region (§ 3280.504(b)(5)), 

but did not geographically limit the use of any other wallboard design. The point is, 

HUD chooses when to limit design choices to specific geographical areas, when it is 

proper to do so. The fact that HUD consciously chose not to limit the use of interior vapor 

barriers in the south underscores the weakness of Murphy’s position. Murphy views this 

case as an opportunity fill a perceived gap in the law by fixing what HUD “overlooked,” 

albeit through a tortured and misplaced application of regulatory construction standards 

(i.e., the Section 3280.303(b) argument). The regulatory history relating to wall designs 

demonstrates that HUD was, and is, actively regulating wall designs. 58 F.R. 54975 (Oct. 

25, 1993); 67 F.R. 20400 (Apr. 24, 2002); 69 F.R. 70016 (Dec. 1, 2004); 70 F.R. 72024 

(Nov. 30, 2005). The fact that HUD reached a different interpretation than Murphy on a 

point of technical design should not persuade this Court to alter controlling administrative 

regulations crafted by HUD. 

VI. Conclusion. 

For the reasons stated herein, Southern urges this Court to grant its Motion for 

Judgment on the Pleadings based on federal preemption standards. 

 Respectfully submitted, 

/s W. Scott Simpson__ 

W. Scott Simpson, Attorney for Defendant 

Southern Energy Homes, Inc. 

 

3

 The new regulation does not apply to our case since the Murphy home was constructed in 2003 – 3 years 

before the new regulation. 

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OF COUNSEL: 

RITCHEY & SIMPSON, PLLC 

3288 Morgan Drive, Suite 100 

Birmingham, Alabama 35216 

Telephone: (205) 876-1600 

Facsimile: (205) 876-1616 

Email: wssimpson@ritcheysimpson.com 

Thomas W. Thagard, III 

Edward S. Sledge, IV 

MAYNARD, COOPER & GALES, P.C. 

1901 6th Avenue North, Suite 2400 

AmSouth/Harbert Plaza 

Birmingham, Alabama 35203-2618 

Telephone: (205) 254-1000 

Facsimile: (205) 254-1999 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

 I hereby certify that on the 31st day of May, 2007, I electronically filed the 

foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send 

notification of such filing to the following: 

• Charles Lance Gould

lance.gould@beasleyallen.com holly.stroh@beasleyallen.com 

• Carter Gibson Vance

gibson.vance@beasleyallen.com heidi.bowers@beasleyallen.com 

 /s W. Scott Simpson 

 Of Counsel 

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