J-S57041-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

RYAN LEONARD IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

KELLER WILLIAMS REALTY 

INTERNATIONAL, INC., KELLER 

WILLIAMS PHILADELPHIA-NE MARKET 

CENTER, PHILADELPHIA REGIONAL 

REALTY, LLC, LEE ABRAMS, KELLER 

WILLIAMS REAL ESTATE AND BANK OF 

AMERICA

Appellees No. 644 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Order Entered January 23, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County

Civil Division at No: 2014-0357

BEFORE: DONOHUE, MUNDY, and STABILE, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED DECEMBER 04, 2014

Appellant, Ryan Leonard, appeals pro se from the January 23, 2014 

order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County, denying his 

Petition for Preliminary Injunction. Following review, we affirm.

Appellant initiated an action against Appellees alleging fraud, 

fraudulent misrepresentation, intentional interference with prospective 

contractual relations, and a violation of Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practice 

and Consumer Protection Law, all relating to a residential property owned by 

Appellee Bank of America and offered for sale by Appellees Philadelphia 

Regional and listing agent Lee Abrams (“Abrams”) of Keller Williams Real 
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Estate (collectively “Appellees”). In his complaint, and the amended 

versions thereof, Appellant sought specific performance for the sale of the 

property to Appellant as well as monetary damages. Appellant also sought 

to enjoin the sale of the property by petition for injunctive relief, the denial 

of which gave rise to this appeal.

As the trial court explained:

The underlying issue in this case revolves around the sale of a 

residential property located at 99 Upland Drive, Southampton, 

PA (“the property”) which [Appellant] was interested in 

purchasing. On January 17, 2014, [Appellant] filed a Complaint 

against Appellees, asserting Abrams (who was acting on behalf 

of all co-Appellees) made fraudulent representations to 

[Appellant] as to the (un)availability of the property to be 

shown. The nature of the alleged misrepresentations made by 

Abrams are twofold, and consist of the following: (1) Abrams 

informed [Appellant] that the property was not available to be 

shown and later showed the property to other prospective 

buyers and (2) Abrams informed [Appellant] that the property 

was “under contract” on December 18, 2013. [Appellant] holds 

that Abrams knew (or should have known) that both of these 

communications were false and [Appellant] justifiably relied on 

them. 

Trial Court Opinion (“T.C.O.”), 5/22/14, at 2 (footnote and citations to 

record omitted).

In his petition for injunctive relief, Appellant sought to enjoin Appellees 

from proceeding with a closing on the property scheduled for January 28, 

2014. In the petition, Appellant requested “only that the sale of the 

property be temporarily enjoined so that [Appellant] be given an opportunity 

to have his claims decided on the merits.” Emergency Petition for 
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Preliminary or Special Injunction, 1/17/14, at ¶ 14. He did “not seek to 

require the sale of the property be made to [him].” Id. 

The trial court conducted a hearing on Appellant’s petition on January 

23, 2014 and provided the following detailed summary of evidence 

presented at that hearing:

The property was listed on December 2, 2013. According to 

[Appellant], it was listed on TREND (“the website to allow the 

public as well as other realtors to see the property”) as active.

At the hearing, [Appellant] explained that he had been 

interested in the property based on its size and location and 

continuously expressed that interest to his real estate agent, 

Tom Byrne, of Prudential Felte Realty. An affidavit of Mr. Byrne, 

although it was not entered into evidence at this hearing, was 

considered by us. Thereafter, on December 4, 2013 Mr. Byrne 

contacted [listing agent] Abrams and was informed that the 

property could not be shown at that time. Abrams explained 

that “there were still repairs being done to the home at that time 

on behalf of [seller] Bank of America despite that the property 

was listed as active.” Between December 4, 2013 and December 

13, 2013 Mr. Byrne contacted or attempted to contact Abrams to 

schedule a showing on eleven (11) different occasions. On 

December 13, 2013 Abrams stated he would call the following 

Monday if the property was available to be shown or to provide 

an update. After receiving no response from Abrams, Mr. Byrne 

contacted him on December [18], 2013 and was informed that 

the property was “under contract.” According to the Complaint, 

“Abrams acknowledged to Mr. Byrne that the property was 

shown to other potential buyers, which included his own clients.”

As a result, [Appellant] first contacted Keller Williams’ in-house 

legal department and was referred to both Dave Conord, the 

regional director of [] Keller Williams for Pennsylvania, New 

Jersey, and Delaware, and Bob Roman, the operating principal 

for Keller Williams Philadelphia Northeast Market Center. Emails were exchanged between [Appellant] and Mr. Roman on 

numerous occasions between December 20, 2013 and January 7, 

2014. Additionally, [Appellant] received a letter from Keller 

Williams on January 2, 2014.
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[Appellant] avers that the property was not under contract on 

December 18, 2013 as Abrams informed him.

On January 2, 2014, [Appellant] was informed that Abrams 

reached out to Mr. Byrne asking if [Appellant] would be 

interested in submitting a backup offer in case the original sale 

did not go through. [Appellant] explained he would be 

interested in doing so but only after he had an opportunity to 

view the property.

On January 11, 2014 [Appellant] was able to view the property. 

On January 13, 2014 he submitted an offer of $451,000, which 

was over the asking price of $404,900. 

As of the date of the hearing, the property was scheduled to be 

sold on January 28, 2014.

Abrams testified that the property initially went to sheriff’s sale 

in October of 2013. [Bank of America] decided to sell the 

property as-is as opposed to making any unnecessary repairs. 

The property was listed as “active” on MLS.com (a real estate 

website), as [Appellant] indicated, because Abrams was not 

instructed by Bank of America to indicate otherwise and he 

expected the property “to be cleaned any day.” According to 

Abrams, he “did not receive any instruction from the seller to 

remove it as active at that time.” Bank of America contracts 

their asset management to a company named “Steward Lender 

Service.” The asset manager for this particular property is Roger 

Bustillos. On December 2, 2013 Abrams received a listing 

agreement from the asset manager. Shortly thereafter Abrams 

walked through the property and informed the asset manager 

that “nothing had been done” on the property yet. Safeguard 

Properties was employed as a field service team to physically 

inspect the property on behalf of Bank of America. The 

inspection took place and the property was totally cleaned and 

ready to be viewed on December 15, 2013. Abrams was made 

aware that there was an issue with mold in the property which 

was later addressed at the end of December.

At the outset, Abrams testified that he had over twenty (20) 

agents contacting him on behalf of clients that were interested in 

the property and, to the best of his ability, he spoke with 

everyone and informed them to check back with him regarding a 

showing of the property or, in the alternative, check with 
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“Showing Time,” which is a separate and third party entity that 

is responsible for setting up the showing appointments. One of 

these agents was Mr. Byrne (who was [Appellant’s] agent). 

According to Abrams, this is normal protocol in real estate, as 

agents have to register with Showing Time and “it reduces any 

sort of liability and ensures whoever’s going to look at the 

property is who they say they are.” Abrams instructed Showing 

Time that there were to be no showings of the property until 

everything was clean in order to limit Bank of America’s potential 

liability, as there was debris in the residence and holes in the 

floor and he did not want any potential buyers being injured. On 

December 16, 2013 Abrams instructed Showing Time to start 

setting appointments. In fact, the MLS.com website specifically 

listed the Showing Time phone number and instructed agents to 

call Showing Time directly to make an appointment for a 

showing. Abrams stated that he did not contact Mr. Byrne on 

December 16 or December 17, 2014 to specifically inform him 

the property was available to be shown. However, on December 

16, 2013, six potential buyers viewed the property and any one 

of these buyers could have submitted a bid.

Abrams went on to testify that he was consistent in instructing 

all agents who made an inquiry about the property to continually 

follow up with him as to when the property would be shown. He 

stated . . . 

. . . if you look at . . . the last e-mail that I have with Mr. 

Byrne, I was actually going to the property to take a look 

at it . And I told him to follow-up with me just to prevent 

myself ever from getting in a situation such as this.

. . . .

. . . I pretty much told [the agents] to follow-up with me. 

I’d like to sit here and say I can remember every 

conversation I had with Mr. Byrne, and I can’t. There 

were, like I said, there were a lot of agents interested in 

this property.

Another agent from Prudential Felte (where [Appellant’s] agent 

was employed) viewed the property on December 16, 2013.

The individuals who at this time were in the process of 

purchasing the property and had entered into a purchase 

agreement were owner occupants who “have been very 
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aggressive.” The owner occupants contacted Bank of America 

initially and were told to contact Abrams. They did so and 

initially requested that Abrams submit a bid blindly on their 

behalf. They did not make being shown the property a condition 

for making a bid, as they had seen the property previously when 

it was up for Sheriff sale. On December 16, 2014, the first day 

the property was available for showing, Abrams submitted a bid 

on behalf of these unnamed buyers. This was the only bid 

submitted on the property, and it was accepted by Bank of 

America on December 17, 2013. These buyers submitted their 

offer with “special financing,” or a construction loan. Abrams 

represented both the buyer and Bank of America, and earned a 

commission of five percent (5%). His commission would have 

been two percent (2%) had he represented only the bank and 

the property was sold to another buyer. 

The listing report, Exhibit A to [Appellant’s] complaint, states the 

property was sold on December 23, 2014. Appellee Abrams 

went on to explain:

. . . the bank accepts an offer, and this is normal for any 

bank that I deal with. They will accept the offer through 

a system that I use called Equator. And once they accept 

that, the bank will not sign a single document until they 

have everything executed by the buyer.

Now, what that entails is the bank first has to accept an 

offer. When they accept that offer, they generate what’s 

called their corporate addendum. That corporate 

addendum pretty much protects the bank.

And as a matter of fact, normally an attorney would tell a 

buyer not to sign it unless they want the property. It’s 

that one-sided of . . . an addendum because the bank 

never lived in the property . . . 

. . . that addendum is drawn up and then sent to me 

upon the acceptance of the offer. That is then sent to the 

buyer’s agent. . . The agent then has to make any 

changes to the agreement of sale or just draw up a new 

agreement of sale that matches the same terms of the 

corporate addendum. . .
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And then all those items are then drawn up, put together, 

sent back to Lender Stewart Services. Lender Stewart 

Services then sends it to, for final approval, to Bank of 

America and the investors on the loan. So it’s not just a 

matter of the asset manager always signing. They have 

to get approval before they do that.

So it’s not unusual for a property to be accepted and then 

ten days later, 15 days later, to go to pending. So I can’t 

put it to pending until we have a fully executed 

agreement.

Thereafter the bid was accepted on December 17, 2013, and the 

contract was not finalized until December 23, 2014. Abrams 

explained that he would have had his clients submit an offer 

during this six-day period, as banks do not necessarily go with 

the highest offer. In fact, in terms of [Appellant’s] offer, Abrams 

stated that there would have been some concern with his offer, 

as it was a conventional mortgage and the repairs needed for 

the property would not be considered by the bank.

Abrams testified that he did not prevent anyone from trying to 

put a bid on the property, nor did he give [Appellant’s] agent 

any incorrect information.

T.C.O., 5/22/14, at 3-9 (footnotes and citations to record omitted). 

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court announced that the 

preliminary injunction was denied. N.T. Injunction Hearing, 1/23/14, at 84. 

Appellant filed a timely appeal to this Court.1 In response to the trial court’s 

order dated March 5, 2014, Appellant filed a timely Concise Statement of 

____________________________________________

1 Appellant’s appeal from the January 23, 2014 order was timely filed on 

Monday, February 24, 2014, because February 22, 2014 fell on a Saturday. 

See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908 (stating that for computations of time, whenever the 

last day of such period shall fall on a Saturday or Sunday or a legal holiday, 

such day shall be omitted from the computation); see Pa.R.A.P. 903, Note

(noting Pa.R.A.P. 107 incorporates by reference the rules of construction of 

the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S. §§ 1901-1991). 
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Matters Complained of on Appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) asserting 

five claims of trial court error. Appellant reordered those issues in his brief 

and we have reordered them here for purposes of our discussion as follows:

1. Did the trial court commit an abuse of discretion or error of 

law by basing its ruling on the misplaced premise that 

contract principles governed the dispute at issue?

2. Did the trial court commit an abuse of discretion or error of 

law by holding that the appellant was not and could not be 

entitled to relief simply because there was never a written 

contract agreement entered into?

3. Did the trial court commit an abuse of discretion or error of 

law by permitting Appellees’ counsel to ask repeated leading 

questions of his own client, who is a named party in this case, 

over the objection of Appellant, after that witness was first 

called and cross-examined by Appellant as an adverse party?

4. Did the trial court commit an abuse of discretion or error of 

law by prohibiting Appellant from cross-examining the 

Appellee through the use of appropriate hypothetical 

questions at the injunction hearing?

5. Did the trial court commit an abuse of discretion or error of 

law by prohibiting Appellant, as the party with the burden of 

proof, to give final closing remarks as a rebuttal?

Appellant’s Brief at 2-3.2

____________________________________________

2 Appellant acknowledged to the trial court that he is an attorney but was 

pro se in these proceedings. N.T. Injunction Hearing, 1/23/14, at 8. He is 

pro se before this Court as well. We remind Appellant that proceeding pro 

se does not relieve him of his responsibility to comply with the appellate 

rules relating to briefs and, in particular, the requirements to include a 

statement of jurisdiction and the order in question. Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a)(1) 

and (2). Neither appears in his brief filed with this Court. 
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We first note “that, in general, appellate courts review a trial court 

order refusing or granting a preliminary injunction for an abuse of 

discretion.” Summit Towne Centre, Inc. v. The Shoe Show of Rocky 

Mount, Inc., 828 A.2d 995, 1000 (Pa. 2003) (citations omitted). 

[T]his standard of review is to be applied within the realm of 

preliminary injunctions as follows: [W]e recognize that on an 

appeal from the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction, we 

do not inquire into the merits of the controversy, but only 

examine the record to determine if there were any apparently 

reasonable grounds for the action of the court below. Only if it is 

plain that no grounds exist to support the decree or that the rule 

of law relied upon was palpably erroneous or misapplied will we

interfere with the decision of the [trial court].

Id. (quotations and citations omitted). “Thus, in general, appellate inquiry 

is limited to a determination of whether an examination of the record reveals 

that ‘any apparently reasonable grounds’ support the trial court’s disposition 

of the preliminary injunction request.” Id. at 1001 (quotations, citations 

and footnote omitted).

In Summit Towne Centre, our Supreme Court explained the 

“apparently reasonable grounds” standard as follows:

In ruling on a preliminary injunction request, a trial court has 

“apparently reasonable grounds” for its denial of relief where it 

properly finds that any one of the following “essential 

prerequisites” for a preliminary injunction is not satisfied. See . 

. . County of Allegheny v. Commonwealth, 518 Pa. 556, 544 

A.2d 1305, 1307 (1988) (“For a preliminary injunction to issue, 

every one of the [ ] prerequisites must be established; if the 

petitioner fails to establish any one of them, there is no need to 

address the others.”). First, a party seeking a preliminary 

injunction must show that an injunction is necessary to prevent 

immediate and irreparable harm that cannot be adequately 

compensated by damages. Second, the party must show that 
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greater injury would result from refusing an injunction than from 

granting it, and, concomitantly, that issuance of an injunction 

will not substantially harm other interested parties in the 

proceedings. Third, the party must show that a preliminary 

injunction will properly restore the parties to their status as it 

existed immediately prior to the alleged wrongful conduct. 

Fourth, the party seeking an injunction must show that the 

activity it seeks to restrain is actionable, that its right to relief is 

clear, and that the wrong is manifest, or, in other words, must 

show that it is likely to prevail on the merits. Fifth, the party 

must show that the injunction it seeks is reasonably suited to 

abate the offending activity. Sixth and finally, the party seeking 

an injunction must show that a preliminary injunction will not 

adversely affect the public interest. 

Id. at 1001 (citations omitted).

In his 1925(b) Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal, 

Appellant included the two issues dealing with contractual principles that he 

now asks this Court to consider as the first two issues in this appeal. In 

doing so, Appellant is asking this Court to inquire into the merits of the 

controversy. In accordance with the standard announced by our Supreme 

Court in Summit Towne Centre, we decline to do so and instead review 

the record to ascertain whether there exist any reasonable grounds for the 

trial court’s denial of the injunction. 

Addressing the contract issues in the context of the prerequisites for 

an injunction, the trial court stated:

[Appellant] claims that we based our ruling “on the misplaced 

belief that contract principles governed this dispute” and also 

that we abused our discretion “by holding that the fact that 

[Appellant] had not entered in to a written contract agreement 

with [Appellees] prevented [Appellant] from being entitled to 

relief. As previously set forth, we based our denial of his 

requested preliminary injunction on the fact that [Appellant] did 
J-S57041-14

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not satisfy numbers two (2) and six (6) of the necessary 

prerequisites. We found that there would be substantial harm to 

the potential buyers as well as to [Bank of America,] the 

ultimate grantor of the failed mortgage and loan, in stopping the 

sale from going forward. Additionally, we recognized the 

adverse impact issuing a preliminary injunction in this case 

would have on the public interest, as everything dealing with 

real estate should and must be in writing and the issuance of 

this injunction would essentially telegraph just the adverse, that 

a written and presumptively valid agreement for the purchase of 

real estate could be set aside under similar lingual 

circumstances. Our brief comments regarding our concern that 

there was no valid written contract between [Appellant] and any 

Appellee was an afterthought, questioning the plausibility of 

[Appellant’s] claims. We had no doubts, however, about 

Abrams’ credibility and did not find any of his testimony to be 

false, hence casting further doubt on [Appellant’s] claims. 

However, we eventually relied on [Appellant’s] failure to 

establish the necessary [prerequisites] as our reason for denying 

[his] preliminary injunction.

T.C.O., 5/22/14 at 13-14 (footnote omitted).3

Our examination of the record, as thoroughly and accurately 

summarized in the excerpt of the trial court’s opinion set forth above, 

reveals “apparently reasonable grounds” supporting the trial court’s denial of 

the preliminary injunction request. Because reasonable grounds exist to 

____________________________________________

3 By footnote, the trial judge explained that he denied the injunction at the 

conclusion of the hearing based on Appellant’s failure to establish the second 

and sixth prerequisites. However, in the course of analyzing the record for 

purposes of writing his 1925(a) opinion, he concluded that Appellant failed 

as well to establish any of the remaining prerequisites. T.C.O., 5/22/14 at 

13, n. 8. In light of our Supreme Court’s directive that there is no need to 

discuss the remaining prerequisites after establishing the petitioner’s failure 

to establish any one of them, we shall not address the first, third, fourth and 

fifth prerequisites here. See County of Allegheny v. Commonwealth,

544 A.2d 1305, 1307 (Pa. 1988).
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support the order, we conclude the trial court neither abused its discretion 

nor committed error of law in denying Appellant’s petition and, therefore, we 

shall not interfere with the trial court’s decision. Appellant is not entitled to 

any relief on his first or second issues.

Appellant’s remaining issues raise challenges to evidentiary rulings 

relating to leading questions, hypothetical questions, and rebuttal during 

closing argument. As this Court has recognized:

The standard of review for a trial court's evidentiary rulings is 

narrow. The admissibility of evidence is solely within the 

discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only if the trial 

court has abused its discretion. An abuse of discretion is not 

merely an error of judgment, but is rather the overriding or 

misapplication of the law, or the exercise of judgment that is 

manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-will 

or partiality, as shown by the evidence of record.

Commonwealth v. Hanford, 937 A.2d 1094, 1098 (Pa. Super. 2007), 

appeal denied, 956 A.2d 432 (Pa. 2008) (citations, quotation marks and 

footnote omitted).

Appellant’s first evidentiary challenge relates to “repeated leading 

questions” posed by Appellees’ counsel when cross-examining Appellee 

Abrams who was called by Appellant as an adverse witness. 

In its opinion, the trial court explained that Appellant was given much 

“latitude to fashion his own questions, whether they were leading or 

otherwise. Therefore, [Appellees’] counsel’s questioning of Abrams was on 

cross-examination, as he did not call this witness, and, therefore, leading 

questions were appropriate.” T.C.O., 5/22/14, at 11 (citing Pa.R.E. 
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611(c)(1) and (2) (the court should allow leading questions on crossexamination and when a party calls an adverse party)).4

 We find no abuse 

of discretion in the trial court’s ruling in this regard. 

In Katz v. St. Mary Hosp., 816 A.2d 1125 (Pa. Super. 2003), this 

Court stated, “The law in this area is clear. The allowance of leading 

questions lies within the discretion of the trial court and a court’s tolerance 

or intolerance of leading questions will not be reversed absent an abuse of 

discretion.” Id. at 1128 (citing Commonwealth v. Johnson, 541 A.2d 332 

(Pa. Super. 1998)). Moreover, our review of the hearing transcript reveals 

that counsel for Appellees began his cross-examination of Abrams on page 

68 of the hearing transcript. Many of the questions posed are accurately 

described as leading. However, no objection to the leading nature of the 

questions was lodged until page 74 of the transcript, after counsel asked and 

Abrams answered approximately two dozen questions, when Appellant 

stated, “Objection, Your Honor. I tried to sit back as much as I can, but I’m 

just going to object to the continuous leading nature of the questions.” N.T. 

Injunction Hearing, 1/23/14, at 74. Appellant’s failure to object at any 

earlier point in the testimony renders his objections waived. Katz, 816 A.2d 

____________________________________________

4 We note that the trial court included the text of Pa.R.E. 611(c) in its 

opinion but did not include the final sentence of Rule 611(c)(2), which 

provides that “[a] witness [examined as a hostile witness or an adverse 

party] should usually be interrogated by all other parties as to whom the 

witness is not hostile or adverse as if under redirect examination.”
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at 1128 (citing Beaumont v. ETL Services, Inc., 761 A.2d 166 (Pa. Super. 

2000); Pa.R.C.P. 227.1(b)(1)).

However, even if Appellant’s objections were not waived, he is not 

entitled to relief. All testimony elicited from Abrams by Appellees’ counsel 

could have been elicited through questioning that was not leading. 

Moreover, much of Abrams’ testimony in response to questioning by 

Appellees’ counsel simply amplified the testimony elicited in response to 

questions posed by Appellant during his direct examination that spanned 38 

pages of testimony. N.T. Injunction Hearing, 1/23/14, at 30-68. Therefore, 

even if Appellant’s objections were not waived and even if the trial court 

erred in allowing the three leading questions posed after Appellant objected, 

that error was harmless. Katz, 816 A.2d at 1128-29 (where “none of the 

elicited responses is of such a character that the information would not have 

come into evidence but for the leading format . . . any error was harmless”). 

Appellant is not entitled to relief based on leading questions.

Appellant next argues the trial court abused its discretion or 

committed error of law by sustaining objections to hypothetical questions 

Appellant posed to Abrams. In the course of questioning Abrams as on 

cross-examination, Appellant asked:

If you were in a scenario where you just represent the seller, 

there’s no dual representation as there was here, and somebody 

comes in with an offer that’s below the asking price, and another 

potential buyer comes in with an offer that is significantly above 

the asking price, do you typically counter the higher offer that 

come[s] in at a number that would be within the asking price 
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range and within the range of what the property would be valued 

at, but still higher than the other offer? 

N.T. Injunction Hearing, 1/23/14, at 61.5 Counsel for Appellees objected 

and the trial court sustained the objection on the grounds the hypothetical 

assumed facts not in evidence and irrelevant to the proceedings. The trial 

court commented, “I guess the early bird here who was willing to submit an 

offer before looking at the property, so to speak, other than that initial lookthrough, is the one that got the worm.” Id. at 62.

In its opinion, the trial court explained that “hypothetical questions are 

proper only with expert witnesses.” T.C.O., 5/22/14, at 11 (citing Pa.R.E. 

702; O’Malley v. Peerless Petroleum, Inc., 423 A.2d 1251 (Pa. Super. 

1980); SEPTA v. W.C.A.B., 477 A.2d 9, 12 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984). “Even so, 

‘[h]ypothetical questions must be based on matters which appear of record 

and on facts which are warranted by the evidence.” Id. at 11-12 (quoting 

SEPTA, 477 A.2d at 12). While hypothetical questions are most often 

employed in the questioning of expert witnesses, it is true under all 

____________________________________________

5

In his brief, Appellant sets forth four additional “hypothetical questions” 

disallowed by the trial court. Appellant’s Brief at 21. While we do not 

necessarily concur in Appellant’s characterization of these questions as 

“hypothetical,” e.g., asking Abrams if he “believe[d] that at all times 

[Abrams] acted in the best interest of the bank” or “[h]ow long it would 

have taken [Abrams] to call [Appellant’s agent] and tell him the property 

was listed,” we do not believe that the questions are based on “material” or 

“uncontradicted” facts of record. Further, the trial court sustained objection 

to those four “hypothetical questions” but did not state his reasons for doing 

so and did not suggest that the rulings had anything to do with hypothetical 

questions. 
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circumstances that “[a] hypothetical question need not contain all the facts 

of the case, but only those which are material and uncontradicted.” 

O'Malley, 423 A.2d at 1259. 

Appellant contends the hypothetical question quoted above was proper 

“as supported by the facts and the record. Namely, [A]ppellant had indeed 

made an offer above asking price but . . . [A]ppellee sold the property to his 

own client for far below the asking price,” resulting in a higher commission 

to Abrams and a lower sale price to his client, Bank of America. Appellant’s 

Brief at 20. Appellant established through his questioning of Abrams that 

Abrams received a higher commission and Bank of America netted a lower 

sale price as a result of the sale to other buyers. In essence, that was what 

Appellant was trying to establish with the hypothetical question, and he was 

able to establish those facts through testimony properly elicited from 

Abrams. The problem with the hypothetical is that it included “facts” that 

were not established by the testimony. For instance, Abrams did not 

represent only the seller in this case. The offer that was presented below 

the asking price was the only offer on the table when presented to the seller, 

Bank of America, and it was accepted weeks before Appellant visited the 

property and presented an offer. Further, the accepted offer included 

financing with a construction loan whereas Appellant’s offer included a 

conventional mortgage that could raise underwriting concerns because of the 
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appraised value of the property and the financing required for repairs 

needed for the property. N.T. Injunction Hearing, 1/23/14, at 57-61. 

We find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court for 

sustaining the objection to a hypothetical question based on facts that do 

not appear of record and are not warranted by the evidence. Appellant’s 

fourth issue fails for lack of merit.

In his fifth and final issue, Appellant argues the trial court abused its 

discretion or committed error of law by prohibiting Appellant, as the party 

bearing the burden of proof, from providing final closing remarks as a 

rebuttal. Appellant acknowledges that he was able to present closing 

argument to the trial court at the conclusion of testimony. However, based 

on the closing remarks offered by Appellees’ counsel, Appellant sought to 

offer rebuttal. The trial court denied him that opportunity, noting the case 

was not in federal court and the trial court was not going to “have back and 

forth.” N.T. Injunction Hearing, 1/23/14, at 82. When Appellant asserted 

that Appellees’ counsel misrepresented one of Appellant’s claims in his 

closing argument, the trial court acknowledged he “wasn’t paying much 

attention anyway. I already made my mind up based on the standards that 

are required for the issuance of a preliminary injunction.” Id. The trial 

court then proceeded to explain his conclusion that Appellant failed to satisfy 

the second and sixth prerequisites for granting a preliminary injunction. Id. 

at 82-84.
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Appellant argues that Pa.R.C.P. 225 supports his contention that he 

should have been provided the opportunity to present rebuttal. Appellant’s 

Brief at 23. However, Rule 225 simply authorizes attorneys for each party to 

make an opening address to a jury and address the jury after the close of 

testimony. The Note to the rule indicates that the trial court “by local rule or 

otherwise” may regulate the number, length and order of addresses.” Pa. 

R.C.P. 225, Note. 

Appellant quotes the Buck County Rules and, in particular, Local Rule 

223(f), in support of his position. That rule provides:

(f) At the trial of any cause, the party having the affirmative of 

the issue on the pleadings shall open the case and counsel for 

the defendant, at his option, may make his opening address 

before any testimony is taken on behalf of the plaintiff. This 

order shall be reversed in making closing arguments to the jury, 

except in cases where the defendant offers no evidence.

Bucks Cty. R.C.P. 223(f).

Clearly, the Buck County rule provides for the order of closing “to the 

jury,” and does not address bench trials or preliminary injunction hearings. 

Moreover, at the conclusion of testimony, the trial court asked Appellant if 

there was anything else he wanted to present. Appellant responded, “Judge, 

I will be under one minute because I know we went over everything at 

length. . . . So just my closing remarks, if a minute at most.” N.T. 

Injunction Hearing, 1/23/14, at 79. Appellant immediately proceeded with 

his closing argument. He did not suggest to the trial court that Appellee was 

required to present closing argument first, nor did he object when counsel 
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for Appellee offered his closing remarks upon completion of Appellant’s 

argument.

Appellant did not preserve any objection relating to closing arguments. 

Moreover, the rule upon which he relies dictates the order of closing 

arguments presented to a jury. Finally, the trial court acknowledged a lack 

of attention to the closing arguments in any event. We do not find that the 

trial court abused its discretion or committed error of law by precluding 

Appellant’s closing argument rebuttal. Any error, if error occurred, was 

harmless. Appellant’s fifth issue does not afford him any grounds for relief.

Because Appellant has not demonstrated any basis for relief, we shall 

not disturb the ruling of the trial court denying Appellant’s petition for 

preliminary injunctive relief.6

____________________________________________

6 Appellees submitted that this appeal should be dismissed as moot because 

the subject property was conveyed to its current owner on February 24, 

2014. Appellees’ Brief at 7-8 (referring to an August 1, 2014 listing report in 

Appellees’ Reproduced Record that purports to reflect a February 24, 2014 

sale date). In support of their contention, Appellees cite various cases and 

Pa.R.A.P. 1972(a)(4) (“Except as otherwise prescribed by this rule, . . . any 

party may move: (4) to dismiss for mootness.”). We recognize that 

appellate courts do not decide moot issue and that an appeal is subject to 

dismissal if an event occurs that renders the grant of requested relief 

impossible. Delaware River Preservation Co., Inc. v. Miskin, 923 A.2d 

1177, 1183, n.3 (Pa. Super. 2007). However, there is no motion before us 

as authorized by Pa.R.A.P. 1972 (a)(4) and Appellees have not provided 

reference to anything that might appear in the certified record to warrant 

dismissal as moot sua sponte. See Pa.R.A.P. 1921, Note (“An appellate 

court may consider only the facts which have been duly certified in the 

record on appeal. Commonwealth v. Young, [] 317 A.2d 258, 264 

(1974).”). Further, it is not the duty of this Court to scour the record on a 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/4/2014

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

party’s behalf and we decline to do so. See Hayward v. Hayward, 868 

A.2d 554, 558 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citations omitted). In the alternative, 

Appellees suggest the appeal should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction for 

failure to name an indispensable party to the action, i.e., the current owner. 

Appellees’ Brief at 8-9. Again, there is no motion before us and the record 

does not include any information relating to a “current owner.” Therefore, 

we decline Appellees’ invitation to dismiss the appeal for mootness or failure 

to include an indispensable party.