If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

UNPUBLISHED

In re FRYER/GASSER, Minors. February 24, 2022

No. 357905

Crawford Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 18-004436-NA

Before: CAVANAGH, P.J., and JANSEN and RIORDAN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent appeals as of right the order terminating her parental rights to her minor 

children, SF, FF, KF I, KF II,

1

and IG, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (failure to rectify conditions 

of adjudication), (c)(ii) (failure to rectify other conditions), and (j) (reasonable likelihood of harm 

if returned to parent).2 We affirm.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Respondent is the mother of five children. In 2018, the Department of Health and Human 

Services (DHHS) filed a petition to remove the children from respondent’s care after Child 

Protective Services (CPS) received a complaint that 11-year-old SF had a black eye that was 

caused by respondent. Respondent initially refused to allow CPS and police into her home and 

denied causing SF’s injury. DHHS also stated in the petition that respondent’s home was filthy 

and the children were dirty and unkempt. Respondent refused to participate in voluntary services 

with DHHS, and told DHHS she would not “jump through hoops” for them. The petition also 

stated that respondent had tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine, and that she 

reported marijuana use. The trial court granted the petition to remove the children, placed SF, FF, 

KF I, and KF II in foster care, and placed IG with her father. 

 

1 Respondent is the mother to twins with the same first and second initials.

2 The father of four of the children had his parental rights terminated on May 28, 2021, but is not 

a party to this appeal. The father of IG was not a respondent in this case and is not part of this 

appeal. 
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During the first year of the case, respondent participated in numerous services. She 

completed individual counseling at Grace Center, family counseling with the children, and a 

trauma-informed parenting class. However, respondent had chronic housing instability—she was 

evicted from her home, lost her apartment in a fire, and was homeless for several months. 

Respondent was also inconsistent with drug testing, missed numerous screens, and started 

frequently testing positive for marijuana, although she did not test positive for methamphetamine. 

At some point, respondent started taking prescribed medications to treat her mental health, and 

caseworkers reported that she was more willing to participate in services. However, respondent 

did not like the way that she felt on the medications and stopped taking them, which caused her 

mood to decline. Respondent reported that she used medical marijuana to help with her posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), anxiety, and depression, and that she obtained a medical 

marijuana card in August 2020. DHHS and respondent’s physician referred respondent to Munson 

Behavioral Health (MBH) for psychotherapy services, although respondent maintained that she 

did not need mental health services. Respondent went to three appointments and stopped attending 

because she reported scheduling conflicts. Respondent later stated that she tried to start attending 

services again, but had an issue with her insurance, then could not connect with MBH because of 

the pandemic, then needed a second referral after she fixed her insurance because the first one had 

lapsed. She did not attend MBH services for more than a year. 

In 2020, DHHS filed a petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights because of her 

lack of progress with the parent agency treatment plan. The case was delayed for more than a year 

because respondent asserted in two separate hearings that the children had Native American 

heritage, although the identified tribes ultimately did not recognize the children for tribal 

membership. After hearings spanning four months, the trial court issued an oral opinion and 

terminated respondent’s parental rights. The court found that termination was proper under MCL 

712A.19b(3)(c)(i) because although respondent had rectified her housing issues by the end of the 

case, she had not rectified her physical abuse of SF; the court noted that because respondent did 

not acknowledge her role in the incident until very late in the case, she had not been able to obtain 

appropriate counseling to deal with her underlying issues. The court also determined that 

respondent had not rectified the barrier of her substance abuse because respondent used marijuana 

to self-medicate her mental health issues and had not provided any testimony from a medical 

professional that showed that marijuana was a necessary treatment for her. The court found that 

termination was proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(ii) because to the extent that respondent’s 

mental health issues were identified later in the case, they continued to be a barrier to reunification. 

The trial court found that clear and convincing evidence supported termination under MCL 

712A.19b(3)(j) because respondent had not addressed her mental health issues, caseworkers and 

the court had seen her anger and defiance, and respondent’s lack of insight and inappropriate 

communications directly impacted the children in a negative way. The trial court found that 

termination was in the children’s best interests, and terminated respondent’s parental rights. 

II. ANALYSIS

We review for clear error the trial court’s determination that at least one statutory ground 

for termination is supported by clear and convincing evidence. In re VanDalen, 293 Mich App 

120, 139; 809 NW2d 412 (2011). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has 

a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due regard to the trial 
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court’s special opportunity to observe the witnesses.” In re BZ, 264 Mich App 286, 296-297; 690 

NW2d 505 (2004).

“In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must find by clear and convincing 

evidence that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been 

met.” VanDalen, 293 Mich App at 139. If we conclude that termination is supported by at least 

one statutory ground, additional grounds for the trial court’s decision need not be considered. In 

re HRC, 286 Mich App 444, 461; 781 NW2d 105 (2009). 

A. FAILURE TO RECTIFY CONDITIONS OF ADJUDICATION

The trial court did not err by finding that clear and convincing evidence supported 

termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) provides that termination is 

appropriate when:

(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 

182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order, 

and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds . . . 

(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is 

no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable 

time considering the child’s age.

Even if conditions improved in the months before the termination hearing, a trial court may look 

to the totality of the evidence to determine whether a parent accomplished meaningful change in 

conditions that led to adjudication. In re Williams, 286 Mich App 253, 272; 779 NW2d 286 (2009).

The children were originally brought into care because of respondent’s physical assault of

SF, the filthy conditions of respondent’s home, and respondent’s use of methamphetamine and 

marijuana. The trial court recognized that respondent’s housing was no longer a barrier. The trial 

court also found that respondent had not had appropriate counseling to deal with her physical abuse 

of SF because her acknowledgment of her own actions came so late in the proceeding. Although 

respondent testified that she benefited from a trauma-informed parenting class and acknowledged 

her role in the abuse, respondent continued to blame outside factors for the children’s removal

throughout the case, and she blamed DHHS for her lack of progress. This showed that respondent 

continued to refuse to recognize her role in the children’s removal. Respondent also repeatedly

commented that she did not benefit from therapy services because the counselors had not been 

through her specific trauma and were judgmental, and that she did not need mental health services, 

which showed that respondent lacked insight to address her mental health issues and had failed to 

benefit from the services. Therefore, the trial court correctly found that respondent had not 

appropriately addressed the issue of her physical abuse of SF in counseling. Because respondent 

was the perpetrator of the abuse, rather than the victim, this was properly considered as a basis to 

terminate respondent’s parental rights. In re Jackisch/Stamm-Jackisch, ___ Mich App ___, ___; 

___ NW2d ___ (2021) (Docket No. 357001); slip op at 4-5.

Most significantly, the trial court correctly found that respondent failed to rectify the barrier 

of her substance abuse. Although methamphetamine was no longer a barrier for respondent, 
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respondent’s ongoing use of marijuana remained a concern. Respondent argued that she used

marijuana for medical purposes to treat her PTSD, anxiety, and depression. However, respondent 

only obtained a medical marijuana card in August 2020, months after she had consistently tested 

positive for tetrahydrocannabinol (THC). Even with the medical marijuana card, respondent failed 

to provide any professional testimony or evidence that suggested that marijuana was an appropriate 

treatment for her conditions. As the trial court pointed out, even though marijuana was legal for 

both recreational and medical use at the time of the termination trial, it was no more appropriate 

to self-medicate with marijuana than it would be to self-medicate with alcohol. The trial court also 

noted that respondent’s psychological evaluation expressly recommended that respondent needed 

to be sober from substances to parent effectively, but respondent’s reliance on marijuana only 

became more pronounced as the case went on. Therefore, clear and convincing evidence supported 

the trial court’s conclusion that the issue of respondent’s substance use continued to be a barrier 

to reunification, and termination was appropriate under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). 

B. FAILURE TO RECTIFY OTHER CONDITIONS

The trial court did not err by finding that clear and convincing evidence supported 

termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(ii). MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(ii) provides that termination is 

appropriate when:

(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 

182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order, 

and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds . . . 

* * *

(ii) Other conditions exist that cause the child to come within the court’s 

jurisdiction, the parent has received recommendations to rectify those conditions, 

the conditions have not been rectified by the parent after the parent has received 

notice and a hearing and has been given a reasonable opportunity to rectify the 

conditions, and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified 

within a reasonable time considering the child’s age.

Respondent argues that the trial court did not clearly articulate what the “other conditions” 

were that prevented reunification, so she had no opportunity to address those issues. However, the 

trial court articulated that MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(ii) encompassed respondent’s mental health issues 

that were identified later in the case. The trial court extensively addressed this statutory ground

and properly concluded that respondent had not rectified the barrier of her trauma and mental 

health concerns. The court noted that respondent’s aggression toward caseworkers, defiance 

toward the court and DHHS, and comments that she could not trust counselors who had not been 

through her specific trauma showed her lack of insight. Respondent’s suicidal ideations showed 

that she was not dealing with her emotional stability. Respondent’s refusal to take her prescription 

medication; conclusion that she could treat herself with marijuana, yoga, and meditation; and delay

in restarting mental health services all showed that respondent did not take her mental health issues 

seriously. Respondent repeatedly insisted that she did not need mental health services, made 

multiple excuses about her delays in participating in therapy services, and continued to blame 

caseworkers for her lack of progress, which reflected respondent’s continued defiance toward the 
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court and DHHS. The record showed that despite nearly three years of services, respondent had 

not adequately addressed her mental health issues, and given her delay in participating in services, 

would not likely do so within a reasonable time. Therefore, the trial court did not err by terminating 

respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(ii).

C. RISK OF HARM

The trial court did not err by finding that clear and convincing evidence supported 

termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). 

MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) provides that termination is appropriate when “[t]here is a reasonable 

likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if 

he or she is returned to the home of the parent.” This Court has recognized that either physical or 

emotional harm is sufficient to support termination under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). In re Hudson, 

294 Mich App 261, 268; 817 NW2d 115 (2011). Further, a parent’s failure to comply with the 

terms and conditions of her service plan is evidence that the child will be harmed if returned to the 

parent’s home. In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 711; 846 NW2d 61 (2014).

Respondent argues that she did not pose a risk of harm to the children because she had 

engaged in therapy services to address her mental health issues. However, as previously discussed, 

respondent’s repeated refusals and delays to participate in services made her unable to address her 

significant mental health concerns. The trial court recognized that “the record is replete with 

examples of lack of insight, lack of guidance, [and] inappropriate communications” that directly 

impacted the children in a negative way. For example, respondent repeatedly told the children at 

parenting time visits that she could not afford to bring them snacks, yet she would bring energy 

drinks for herself and talk about going to bars with her friends on the weekend, which made the 

children feel like they were not a priority. She would make inappropriate comments during 

parenting time, including telling the children that they were coming home, telling SF that she had 

a “fat a**” and looked like a boy, and complaining about the caseworkers. She struggled to follow 

COVID mask mandates, and the children mimicked her behavior. She frequently missed parenting 

time sessions, which had measured effects on the children—FF began self-harming after 

respondent missed visits, and KF I and KF II had behaviors of lying, stealing, and bedwetting. 

Respondent cancelled a virtual visit with IG on IG’s birthday. Respondent also struggled to parent 

the children at the same time, and did not bring activities for them at parenting time. The trial 

court did not err by finding that respondent’s instability and failure to timely treat her mental health 

services made placement with her a risk of harm to the children. See In re Jackisch/StammJackisch, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 6 (where the respondent struggled to manage the children 

and said inappropriate things during parenting time, statutory grounds to terminate existed). 

Therefore, the trial court did not err by terminating respondent’s parental rights under MCL 

712A.19b(3)(j).

Affirmed. 

/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh

/s/ Kathleen Jansen

/s/ Michael J. Riordan