NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit 

__________________________ 

DOUGLAS S. MARSHALL, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, 

Respondent. 

__________________________ 

2010-3128 

__________________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in NY0353100042-I-1. 

__________________________ 

Decided: November 8, 2010 

__________________________ 

DOUGLAS S. MARSHALL, of Guayanilla, Puerto Rico, 

pro se. 

ELIZABETH A. SPECK, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department 

of Justice, of Washington, DC, for respondent. With her 

on the brief were TONY WEST, Assistant Attorney General, 

JEANNE E. DAVIDSON, Director, and KENNETH M. DINTZER, 

Assistant Director. 

__________________________ 
MARSHALL v. USPS 2

Before LOURIE, LINN, and MOORE, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. 

Douglas S. Marshall (“Marshall”) appeals the final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board (“Board”), 

dismissing his claim for restoration rights under 5 C.F.R. 

Part 353. Marshall v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. NY-0353-10-

0042-I-1 (M.S.P.B. Apr. 22, 2010). For the reasons set 

forth below, this court affirms. 

BACKGROUND

In 1995, Marshall was a part-time letter carrier for 

the U.S. Postal Service (“Postal Service”) in Detroit, 

Michigan when he suffered a knee injury. After surgery 

and a period of receiving worker’s compensation, Marshall 

accepted a modified job as a City Carrier Technician in 

Detroit. This job carried an 8-hour workday and accomodated Marshall’s physical restrictions. Effective November 27, 2004, Marshall transferred to become a part-time 

Flexible City Carrier in Guayanilla, Puerto Rico. For 

some time he was paid for 40-hours per week, but, pursuant to Postal Service policy, as a full-time employee who 

transferred to a part-time position, it was later determined that he was not entitled to a 40-hour work week 

guarantee. On October 7, 2005, Marshall accepted a parttime 36-hour work week position in Puerto Rico. 

Marshall filed a complaint with the Office of Workers 

Compensation Program (“OWCP”) for intermittent wage 

loss; with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) for discrimination based on race and disability; and with the United States District Court for the 

District of Puerto Rico for violation of the Federal Employees Compensation Act of 1990 (“FECA”), the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and Title I and Title V of the 

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, all alleging that 
3 MARSHALL v. USPS

he was entitled to the 40-hour work week he had before 

his knee injury. In each forum, it was held that Marshall’s voluntary transfer from a full-time position in 

Detroit to a part-time position in Guayanilla was the 

reason for the decrease in his hours, not his knee injury. 

In 2008, the Postal Service initiated a National Reassessment Process to evaluate the efficiency of the service’s 

employment corps. Pursuant to this process, the Postal 

Service found that there were no tasks for Marshall to 

perform and put him on leave without pay status effective 

November 30, 2009. Marshall brought an action with the 

Board, claiming the Postal Service violated his restoration 

rights under 5 C.F.R. Part 353 by not assigning him to a 

40-hour work week. 

On March 16, 2010, Marshall and the Postal Service 

signed a settlement agreement, in which Marshall agreed 

to “fully and finally release[], acquit[] and discharge[] the 

Postal Service . . . from any and all manner of claims . . . 

which he now has or might have or might claim to have at 

this time against the Postal Service . . . arising out of Mr. 

Marshall’s employment with the Postal Service, which 

were asserted or which might have been asserted in the 

above-captioned Appeal [to the Board].” In exchange, 

Marshall received a lump sum of $12,356.60. The agreement included a provision acknowledging that Marshall 

entered into the agreement “freely, knowingly, voluntarily 

and without coercion, threat or duress” and “that he 

understands the final and binding effect of this Settlement Agreement and General Release.” Thereafter, the 

Administrative Judge dismissed Marshall’s appeal on the 

basis of the settlement. Marshall appealed to this court. 

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(9). 
MARSHALL v. USPS 4

DISCUSSION

This court will affirm the Board unless the Board’s 

decision is “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained 

without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation 

having been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial 

evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c). 

Marshall argues that the Board erred in failing to 

look past the settlement agreement because he did not 

enter into the agreement voluntarily and that the Postal 

Service was required to pay him for 40 hours per week 

regardless of the settlement agreement. 

A settlement agreement is presumed to be valid, and 

“[t]hose who employ the judicial appellate process to 

attack a settlement through which controversy has been 

sent to rest bear a properly heavy burden” of proving that 

the settlement was invalid. Asberry v. U.S. Postal Serv., 

692 F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1982). We will set aside a 

settlement agreement only if it can be shown that it is 

unlawful, entered into involuntarily, or was the result of 

fraud or mutual mistake. Sargent v. Dep’t of Health and 

Human Servs., 229 F.3d 1088, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (per 

curium). 

Marshall appears to argue that he was coerced into 

the settlement agreement because the mediator knew 

that Marshall’s house was being foreclosed, and recommended that Marshall “take what [he] can get.” There is 

no evidence in the record that Marshall’s decision to 

follow-through on the recommendation and proceed with 

the settlement was involuntary. Moreover, the agreement 

itself states that Marshall entered into the settlement 

“voluntarily and without coercion.” Marshall has failed to 

carry the burden required to set aside the settlement 

agreement. 
5 MARSHALL v. USPS

Second thoughts about the terms of a settlement 

agreement do not provide a legally cognizable basis on 

which to set aside the agreement. See Miller v. U.S. 

Postal Serv., No. 99-3023, 1999 WL 159938, at *2 (Fed. 

Cir. Mar. 16, 1999) (“In light of this waiver [in the settlement agreement of the right to appeal], it is not available 

to Petitioner now to raise the issue of the fairness of the 

terms of the settlement agreement.”). Thus, even assuming that Marshall is entitled to a 40-hour work week, and 

that his arguments are not foreclosed by the proceedings 

at the OWCP, the EEOC and the district court, we will 

not ignore Marshall’s voluntary agreement to the terms of 

the settlement. 

Marshall has failed to show that the Board’s dismissal 

of his claim was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this court affirms the decision of the Board dismissing Marshall’s claims. Because 

of our holding that the settlement agreement is binding 

on Marshall, we do not reach the merits of Marshall’s 

contentions regarding his entitlement to additional hours. 

AFFIRMED 

COSTS

 Each party shall bear its own costs.