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Recommendations

I

n the recommendations that follow, we set out seven core recommendations meant to 

help establish a sturdy underpinning for the nation’s emergency-management structure. Based on the weaknesses and challenges we uncovered in our investigation, we 

believe the core recommendations are the essential fi rst steps in the successful construction 

of an eff ective system. 

Th ese recommendations are then followed by what will be the building blocks for the structure, the more tactical actions that must be taken – by federal, state, and local governments, 

non-governmental organizations, the private sector, and individual citizens – to make the 

system strong, agile, eff ective, and robust. Th e foundation is crucial, and every building 

block we can add will make the system stronger. We believe these measures, if implemented, will signifi cantly improve the nation’s ability to prepare for and respond to disasters and 

catastrophes, providing better safety and security for our citizens.

Core Recommendations

Core Recommendation #1 – Create a New, Comprehensive Emergency-Management 

Organization within DHS to Prepare for and Respond to All Disasters and Catastrophes.

Hurricane Katrina exposed fl aws in the structure of the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that are too substantial to mend. We propose to abolish FEMA and build a stronger, more capable structure 

within DHS. Th e structure will form the foundation of the nation’s emergency-management 

system. It will be an independent entity within DHS, but will draw on the resources of the 

Department and will be led and staff ed by capable, committed individuals.

We must create a robust National Preparedness and Response Authority (NPRA) within the 

Department of Homeland Security. Th e NPRA would fuse the Department’s emergencymanagement, preparedness, and critical-infrastructure assets into a powerful new organization that can confront the challenges of natural or man-made catastrophes. It will provide 

critical leadership for preparedness and response by combining key federal personnel and 

assets, as well as federal partnerships with state and local offi cials and the private sector to 

prepare for and respond to terror attacks or natural disasters. 

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared
608

Recommendations

The NPRA Will Have the Following Characteristics:1

Distinct Entity within DHS, with Access to the Full Resources of the Department. It is essential that NPRA be located within DHS, but it should be situated as a “distinct entity” – the 

same status accorded the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Secret Service. Th e organization’s 

mission and components should also be protected from internal reorganizations or diminution by the Department.

DHS is the central agency in the federal government for protecting the nation from the effects of terrorist attacks and natural disasters, and NPRA’s mission is a necessary part 

of that. Maintaining NPRA within DHS allows the new organization to take full advantage 

of the substantial range of resources DHS has at its disposal – the Coast Guard, the 

National Communications System, SAFECOM (which provides research and support for 

interoperable communications), and one of the largest bodies of law-enforcement agents in 

National Preparedness and Response Authority

Director

National Preparedness

and Response Authority

Advisor to the President

(and the Secretary) for

national emergency

management

Direct line to the

President during

catastrophic events

President and HSC

Secretary DHS

Deputy Director Deputy Director Deputy Director

10 Regional Offices

Deputy Secretary DHS
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Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Uprepared 

any federal agency. DHS’s prevention and intelligence resources also represent potentially 

valuable assets, as more eff ective identifi cation of risks and vulnerabilities can lead to better 

and more targeted preparedness. In short, DHS has a substantially greater and wider range 

of resources that can be brought to bear on the challenge of natural or man-made catastrophes in a disaster than was or would be the case with an independent FEMA; what was 

formerly the responsibility of a small 2,500-person independent agency is now the responsibility of a 180,000 person, Cabinet-level department. 

Removing NPRA (or FEMA as it currently exists) from the Department, moreover, would 

do nothing to solve the key problems that Katrina has revealed, including a lack of resources 

and weak and ineff ective leadership. Separating NPRA from DHS could, in fact, cause new 

diffi culties, including the need to replicate a number of key functions, such as facilities to 

maintain situational awareness, in two diff erent agencies. It would also place a hardship on 

states that would have to coordinate their preparedness and response eff orts through two 

separate federal agencies. Katrina has made it clear that we need more integration in federal 

preparedness and response, not less, and that we need to eff ectively integrate, not bifurcate, 

prevention, preparedness, protection and response initiatives with state, local, and non-governmental and private-sector partners.

It is important to distinguish between preventing a terrorist attack and preventing damage 

from a terrorist attack or natural disaster. Prevention activities related directly to preventing 

a terrorist incident from occurring – largely a law-enforcement and intelligence function 

– are not included in the NPRA. Neither would be the grants that support this function.

Director with Sufficient Access and Clout. Th e Director of National Preparedness and Response should be a Level II offi cial – that is, of the same rank as the Deputy Secretary – and 

would report directly to the Secretary of DHS. Th e Director would also serve as the Advisor 

to the President for national emergency management, in a manner akin to the Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff . Th e Director would have a direct line of communication to the 

President during catastrophes. 

Th e Director should also have the political authority to direct appropriate personnel within 

DHS and in other departments and agencies of the federal government to carry out their 

assigned emergency-management responsibilities under the Staff ord Act, the National 

Response Plan (NRP), Emergency Support Functions (ESFs), and other appropriate emergency-management doctrine.

Capable and Qualified Leadership. Th ose leading NPRA should have skills commensurate 

with the organization’s critically important mission of protecting American lives and property in the event of a terrorist attack or natural disaster. Th e three Deputy Directors – for 

Preparedness and Mitigation, Response, and Recovery – would serve under the Director 

and would be Level III, Senate-confi rmed appointees. Each of the ten regional offi ces would 

be headed by a Senior Executive Service-level Regional Director qualifi ed to act as a senior 

Federal Coordinating Offi cer (FCO) to provide strategic oversight of incident management 

when needed. 

Th e Director and each of the three Deputy Directors should have signifi cant experience 

in crisis management, in addition to substantial management and leadership experience, 

whether in the public, private, or nonprofi t sector. For example, appropriate experience 

could include a military career with broad leadership experience; emergency-management 

experience and a proven track record of leading complex preparedness and response eff orts; 

or private-sector experience successfully leading a company or organization through a crisis. 
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Recommendations

Th ose with direct technical and operational responsibilities during disasters should be 

individuals with emergency or crisis-management knowledge, training, and experience. Th e 

nation’s preparedness and response agency requires a cadre of seasoned professionals with 

knowledge of crisis management and government operations, who have exhibited leadership and commitment and will build trusted relationships with other federal agencies, state 

and local governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), volunteer organizations, 

and the private sector. 

Core Recommendation #2 – From the Federal Level Down, Take 

a Comprehensive All-Hazards Plus Approach to Emergency 

Management. 

Th e new organization should bring together the full range of responsibilities that are core 

to preparing for and responding to disasters. Th ese include the four central functions of 

comprehensive emergency management – preparedness, response, recovery and mitigation 

– which need to be integrated. Actions in recent years that removed preparedness grants 

from FEMA and separated preparedness from response weakened FEMA’s relationship 

with state offi cials and undermined its ability to utilize “the power of the purse,” in the form 

of grant funding, to encourage states to improve their preparedness and response functions. A more comprehensive approach should be restored. If NPRA is going to eff ectively 

respond to major events, for example, it needs to have been involved in the preparations 

for such events. Th e Director, moreover, must be responsible for administering and distributing preparedness grants to state and local governments and for national preparedness 

training, as these are key tools for ensuring a consistent and coordinated national response 

system.

All-Hazards Plus. NPRA would adopt an “all-hazards plus” strategy for preparedness. In 

preparing our nation to respond to terrorist attacks and natural disasters, NPRA must focus 

on building those common capabilities – for example survivable, interoperable communications and evacuation plans – that are necessary regardless of the incident. At the same time, 

it must not neglect to build those unique capabilities – like mass decontamination in the 

case of a radiological attack, or water search and rescue in the case of fl ooding – that will be 

needed for particular types of incidents.

Natural Hazards-Specific 

Capabilities

Common Emergency Management Elements

• Evacuations

• Search and Rescue

• General Medical Support

• Temporary Housing

• Food, Water, and Fuel

• Integrating Private Sector and NGO Support

• Evacuee Registration

• Communications

Terrorism-Specific 

Capabilities
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Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Uprepared 

Protect Critical Infrastructure. NPRA’s mandate would also include overseeing protection 

of critical infrastructure, such as energy facilities and telecommunications systems, both 

to protect such infrastructure from harm and to ensure that such infrastructure is restored 

as quickly as possible aft er a natural disaster or terrorist attack – an essential part of an effective response. Th e critical-infrastructure programs would work with the Department’s 

intelligence arm and other Department assets to help prevent terror attacks, and should 

establish priorities for the protection and restoration of critical infrastructure during an 

emergency and should help support restorative eff orts.

Core Recommendation #3 – Establish Regional Strike Teams and 

Enhance Regional Operations to Provide Better Coordination 

Between Federal Agencies and the States.

Most of the essential work of emergency management does not happen in Washington, 

D.C., but on the front lines, with state and local offi cials and fi rst responders having lead responsibility in a disaster. Regional offi ces – building on FEMA’s 10 existing regional offi ces 

– should play a key role in coordinating with and assisting states and localities in preparing for and responding to disasters. Regional offi ces can facilitate planning tailored to the 

specifi c risks and needs of a particular geographic area: for example, the risks faced, and the 

types of preparedness necessary, in Gulf Coast states may diff er markedly from that of cities 

along the Northeast Corridor that were attacked on 9/11, or of those areas that lie along the 

New Madrid seismic fault in the central Mississippi Valley.

Federal Strike Teams. Th e regional offi ces should provide the federal government’s fi rstline response to a disaster when a state requests assistance. A critical feature of the regional 

structure should be a robust, deployable, multi-agency Strike Team at each of the regional 

offi ces that consists of, at a minimum: a designated FCO; personnel trained in incident 

management, public aff airs, response and recovery, and communications support; a Defense Coordinating Offi cer (DCO); and liaisons to other federal agencies. Th ese regional 

Strike Teams should coordinate their training and exercises with the state and local offi cials 

and the private-sector entities they will support when disasters occur. 

Coordination and Assistance to States. Th e regional offi ces should provide coordination 

and assist in planning, training, and exercising of emergency preparedness and response 

activities; work with states to ensure that grant funds are spent most eff ectively, based on 

the specifi c risks and weaknesses identifi ed at the regional level; coordinate and develop inter-state agreements; enhance coordination with NGOs and the private sector; and provide 

personnel and assets, in the form of Strike Teams, to be the federal government’s fi rst line of 

response to a disaster.

Adequate Regional Staffing. Regional offi ces would be staff ed based on the needs in that 

region, but would likely include any or all of the following: a regional Strike Team; a dedicated staff and FCO for each state in the region; regional grants administration and oversight coordinator(s); regional and interstate planning; training, and exercise support and 

coordination offi cer(s); a federal interagency liaison; an interstate cooperation coordinator, 

designated state DCOs and National Guard liaisons; a private-sector, NGO, and volunteerorganization coordinator; mitigation specialist(s); and response-and-recovery specialist(s).

Multi-Agency Regional Efforts. Th e regional offi ces should coordinate with personnel from 

other components of DHS as well as from federal agencies outside DHS who are likely to 

be called upon to respond to a signifi cant disaster in the region, including the Coast Guard, 

and the Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS), Defense (DOD), Transportation (DOT), Justice (DOJ), and others.
612

Recommendations

Core Recommendation #4 – Build a True, Government-Wide 

Operations Center to Provide Enhanced Situational Awareness 

and Manage Interagency Coordination in a Disaster. 

During Katrina, the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) had diffi culty maintaining accurate situational awareness and failed to ensure that those in DHS’s leadership 

had an accurate picture of the situation on the Gulf Coast, particularly about the failing 

levee system in New Orleans. Currently, a multiplicity of interagency coordinating structures with overlapping missions attempt to facilitate an integrated federal response. Th ree 

of these structures – the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC), the National 

Response Coordination Center (NRCC), and the Interagency Incident Management Group 

(IIMG) – should be consolidated into a single, integrated entity – a new National Operations Center (NOC). 

Common Operating Picture. Th e NOC, housed within DHS, should include representatives 

from all relevant federal agencies. In an actual or potential disaster, the operations center 

should supply government-wide situational awareness, facilitate information sharing, and 

provide overall operational coordination through agency mission assignments and the 

NRP’s Emergency Support Function (ESF) process. All federal and relevant state and local command centers would feed relevant information to the NOC, which would develop 

a common operating picture not just for DHS, but for the entire federal government, as 

well as states and local jurisdictions involved in an incident. Th e NOC should provide for 

one clearly defi ned emergency-management line of communication from the states to the 

federal government and from the federal government to the states. DHS should work with 

the NOC to develop protocols for disseminating information on the status of relief eff orts to 

decisionmakers, responders, the private sector, and aff ected individuals.

Replace the IIMG. Th e IIMG would be disbanded and replaced by a permanent policy staff 

composed of detailees from relevant federal agencies who would conduct planning for 

emergencies and would help resolve confl icts among diff erent federal entities. Confl icts that 

could not be resolved at this level would be forwarded to higher-level agency offi cials or 

the HSC for resolution. Th e NOC would include a strong analytic team capable of sorting 

through and assessing information and determining which pieces would become part of the 

common operating picture. 

Improved Performance. To improve its performance in future disasters, the NOC should 

establish clear protocols and procedures to ensure that reports are received and reviewed, 

at appropriate levels, in a timely manner. When there is notice of a potential major disaster, 

the NOC should implement plans, including one for securing information from DOD, for 

obtaining post-disaster situational awareness, including identifying sources of information 

and data particular to the region in which the disaster may occur and, where appropriate, 

bringing in individuals with particular knowledge or expertise about that region.

Core Recommendation #5 – Renew and Sustain Commitments 

at All Levels of Government to the Nation’s Emergency 

Management System.

Commitment from State and Local Government. Although the federal government should 

play a more proactive role in responding to catastrophic events when state and local offi cials 

may be overwhelmed, states and localities will continue to provide the backbone of response 

– the fi rst response – for all disasters, catastrophic or not. State and local offi cials must take 

responsibility for their citizens’ welfare and conduct the planning, training, and exercising 

that will prepare them to meet this obligation.
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Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Uprepared 

Commitment Commensurate with the Mission. Th e importance of providing for the safety of 

American citizens in the event of a natural disaster or terrorist attack can hardly be overstated. Yet this investigation showed that FEMA did not have the resources to fulfi ll the 

mission and respond eff ectively in a catastrophic event. Resources are needed for additional 

planning, more frequent and ambitious training and exercises, enhancement of regional 

offi ces, staffi ng and preparation of regional Strike Teams, better development of a trained 

cadre of reservists, and development of new logistics capabilities. If the federal government 

is to improve its performance and be prepared to respond eff ectively to the next disaster, 

it must give NPRA – and the other federal agencies with central responsibilities under the 

NRP – the necessary resources to accomplish this. NPRA funding must be commensurate 

with the signifi cance of its mission, with assurance that those funds are well-spent.

To be full partners in the national preparedness eff ort, states and localities will need additional resources as well. Th e pattern over the last three years of steadily declining funds for 

state and local preparedness needs to be reversed. NPRA should be given suffi cient funds 

for homeland security and emergency-management grants to assist state and local governments in developing and exercising emergency plans, providing training, and attaining and 

maintaining essential capabilities, such as survivable and interoperable communications. 

But the states and localities must do their part as well. Every homeland security dollar, 

whether provided by the federal government or through state and local resources, must 

be spent only on those things that truly support the homeland-security mission. Th e new 

NPRA regional offi ces should be tasked with working with states to ensure that homelandsecurity expenditures are based on the risks and needs identifi ed for that state or locality.

Federal Commitment. Th e President, DHS, and Congress must ensure that the NPRA is 

funded, staff ed and equipped consistent with the range of risks facing American citizens. 

Th e federal government must provide protection no less robustly for all domestic hazards 

than it does for the defense from threats abroad.

Th e Administration and DHS must ensure that federal leaders understand their key responsibilities under the NRP and the resources they need to eff ectively carry out the comprehensive planning required, while also training and exercising on the National Incident 

Management System (NIMS), NRP and other operational plans. Each agency that has a 

role under an ESF, whether primary, coordinating, or supporting, should have a suffi cient 

number of full-time staff whose primary responsibilities are to prepare for executing the 

agency’s responsibilities under the ESF. Such preparedness activities should include training people who will be deployed to DHS’s operational center for disaster response or to the 

disaster scene. Th ese individuals must have suffi cient authority and experience to be able to 

effi ciently and eff ectively execute the agency’s responsibilities under the ESFs.

State and Local Advisory Council. Any attempt to develop a full-fl edged national system 

of preparedness and response must fully integrate state and local offi cials into the system. 

Th ere should be established an advisory council to NPRA made up of state and local offi -

cials and fi rst responders. Th e advisory council should play an integral role in ensuring that 

the full range of activities of the new organization – including developing response plans, 

conducting training and exercises, formulating preparedness goals, and eff ectively managing grants and other resources – are done in full consultation and coordination with, and 

take into account the needs and priorities of, states and localities.

Better Integrate Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and the Private Sector. Aft er 

Katrina struck, private companies and their employees provided important and even 

life-saving, relief to citizens across the Gulf Coast region; many other companies sought to 

off er assistance. Yet there was no system in place to eff ectively incorporate many privatesector resources into the response eff ort. Nor was there a system to effi ciently incorporate 
614

Recommendations

important contributions from faith-based and other charitable and community organizations that sought to off er assistance.

DHS and NPRA should more fully integrate the private and nonprofi t sectors into their 

planning and preparedness initiatives. Among other things, they should designate specifi c 

individuals at the national and regional levels to work directly with private-sector organizations. Where appropriate, private-sector representatives should also be included in 

planning, training, and exercises. In all cases, advance planning for how to most eff ectively 

utilize these nongovernmental resources is essential.

Core Recommendation #6 – Strengthen the Plans and Systems for 

the Nation’s Response to Disasters and Catastrophes.

Despite their shortcomings and imperfections, the NRP and National Incident Management System (NIMS), including the ESF structure that has taken years to develop, currently 

represent the best approach available to respond to multi-agency, multi-jurisdictional emergencies of any kind, and should be retained and improved. Federal, state and local offi cials 

and other responders must commit to supporting the NRP and NIMS and work together 

to improve the performance of the national emergency-management system. We must undertake further refi nements of the NRP and NIMS, develop operational plans, and engage 

in training and exercises to ensure that everyone involved in disaster response understands 

them and is prepared to carry them out.

Th e NRP should be amended to add an ESF responsible for assessing the damage to critical 

infrastructure, taking measures to mitigate the impact on the economy and national security, and restoring critical infrastructure. DHS should be responsible for leading this ESF, 

but it should have the involvement of the private sector, other federal agencies, and state 

and local governments, as appropriate.

Successfully implementing the NIMS during a disaster or catastrophe requires a true unity 

of eff ort. Katrina showed that a unity of eff ort generates much better outcomes than the lack 

thereof. Th e NRP should be strengthened to make the unity of eff ort concept very clear, so 

that everyone understands the concept and their roles in establishing unity. Th e NRP should 

clearly demonstrate the importance of establishing a unifi ed command in which the principal 

incident-management organizations – the Federal Joint Field Offi ce (JFO), the DOD Joint 

Task Force (JTF), and the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) – are co-located where 

the Incident Command System (ICS) and ESF staff s can be fully integrated. Th e NRP should 

also be revised to further clarify the importance of integrating agencies with ESF responsibilities into the ICS, rather than their operating in “stovepipes.” Agencies should not function as 

independent “cells,” but should be represented by functional areas throughout the ICS. For 

example, agency representatives working on transportation issues should be sitting together, 

whether they are from DOT, NPRA, or DOD. Likewise, agencies supporting ESF-13 (Public 

Safety and Security), which may include the DOJ, NPRA, the Coast Guard, and the State 

Police, should all be physically located and working together in a unity of eff ort.

Th e roles and responsibilities of the Principal Federal Offi cial (PFO) and the FCO overlap and were a source of confusion during Hurricane Katrina. Th e Staff ord Act should be 

amended to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the FCO, and the NRP should be revised 

to eliminate the PFO position for Staff ord Act-declared emergencies and disasters.

DHS should work with state and local governments to clarify expectations for such governments within the NRP. For the federal response to be eff ective, all levels of government 

must follow the same game plan. Th is did not always occur in Katrina.
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Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Uprepared 

Th e Staff ord Act should be amended to address responses to all disasters and catastrophes, 

whether natural or man-made.

Core Recommendation #7 – Improve the Nation’s Capacity to 

Respond to Catastrophic Events.

As documented in this report, FEMA does not have the capacity to respond to large-scale 

disasters and catastrophes. Th e United States was, and is, ill-prepared to respond to a 

catastrophic event of the magnitude of Hurricane Katrina. Catastrophic events are, by their 

nature, diffi cult to imagine and to adequately plan for, and the existing plans and training 

proved inadequate in Katrina. Yet it is precisely events of such magnitude – where local 

responders may be rendered victims, where hundreds of thousands of citizens are rendered 

homeless and thousands may need medical attention, where normal communications 

systems may fail, and where the usual coordination mechanisms may not be available – that 

most require advance planning. As stated previously, preparation for domestic incidents 

must be done as robustly as that for foreign threats. We would not tolerate a DOD that was 

not prepared for a worst-case catastrophic attack, nor should we tolerate a FEMA that is 

unprepared for domestic catastrophes.

Catastrophic Incident Annex and Supplement. DHS should ensure that the Catastrophic 

Incident Annex (NRP-CIA) is fully understood by the federal departments and agencies 

with associated responsibilities. Th e NRP-Catastrophic Incident Supplement (NRP-CIS) 

should be clarifi ed and published, and the supporting operational plans for departments 

and agencies with responsibilities under the NRP-CIA should be completed. Th ese plans 

should be reviewed and coordinated with the states, and on a regional basis, to ensure they 

are understood, trained, and exercised prior to an emergency. In addition, ambiguities in 

the plans – such as whether commodities are to be pre-positioned to mobilization centers 

or directly to incident sites absent a state request – must be clarifi ed. Th e NRP-CIS itself 

should also be continuously reviewed and revised based upon the lessons of Katrina and 

future catastrophes.

DHS should defi ne the circumstances under which the NRP-CIA and NRP-CIS may be invoked, both for known and no-notice events. Finally, the Staff ord Act should be amended to 

more clearly refl ect the proactive responsibility of the federal government for catastrophic 

events represented in the NRP-CIA, including authorizing funding for federal agencies to 

pre-deploy necessary assets before a disaster when the NRP-CIA is activated by the Secretary or NPRA Director.

Surge Capacity. DHS must develop the national capabilities – especially surge capacity – it 

needs to respond to catastrophic disasters, ensuring it has suffi cient full-time staff , response 

teams, contracting personnel, and adequately trained and suffi ciently staff ed reserve corps 

to ramp up capabilities, as needed. Th ese capabilities must be scalable so that NPRA can 

draw on the appropriate resources from supporting ESF agencies to respond to a disaster 

regardless of cause, size, or complexity. Th e Disaster Assistance Employee (DAE) corps 

should be modifi ed/revamped so that it more closely resembles a reserve corps that can 

quickly and reliably respond with trained personnel in the case of a large-scale catastrophic 

event. Funds should be made available to ensure that these reservists receive appropriate 

and regular training, as well as adequate compensation for their time when called upon. 

DHS should investigate cross-training some of its 180,000 employees to become part of this 

reserve cadre.
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Recommendations

Building Blocks: Coordination

Reviewing, Aligning and Improving the Stafford Act, the National Response Plan, and 

the National Incident Management System

Recommendation 8: Th e NRP should be reviewed and revised to provide clear guidance 

to federal agencies and clear information to state, local, and tribal offi cials, private-sector 

organizations and non-governmental organizations, eliminating ambiguities. Th e NRP 

should be a clear and accessible document that can be readily understood by those preparing for or participating in the response to a disaster. DHS should build commitment to the 

National Incident Management System (NIMS) from federal, state, and local offi cials, and 

other responders. 

Recommendation 9: Th e Staff ord Act and the NRP should be updated to better address and 

provide guidance for short- and long-term recovery activities, so that DHS, the Executive 

Branch, and Congress are not forced to react, but will already have plans and a structure 

in place to guide short- and long-term recovery eff orts. Within the Recovery Branch of the 

new organization, there should be a long-term recovery offi ce, able to ramp up and coordinate the federal government’s long-term recovery assistance, as needed.Recommendation 

10: Th e Staff ord Act should be reviewed, and if, appropriate, amended, to provide statutory authority for committing resources and technical assistance to enable state and local 

governments and eligible non-profi ts to conduct short-term assessments and long-term 

recovery activities to meet the environmental mitigation needs of aff ected communities.

Recommendation 11: Th e scope of ESF-8 (Public Health and Medical Services), as defi ned 

in the NRP, should be expanded to clearly include the public-health and medical needs not 

only of victims of an emergency, but also those of evacuees, special-needs populations, and 

the general population who may be impacted by the event or may need to be evacuated or 

sheltered in place. Th e NRP should also clarify that responsibility for all mortuary activities, 

including collection of victims, resides with ESF-8, and appropriate mass fatality plans and 

capabilities should be developed.

Planning, Training, Exercising (39-41)

Waste/Fraud/Abuse (42-43)

Evacuation and Sheltering (44-50)

Search and Rescue (51-52)

Mitigation (53-55)

Credentialing (56-58)

Education (59-62)

Special Needs Awareness (63-64)

Military Preparations (65-72)

State and Local (73-83)

Levees (84-88)

Building the Nation’s Emergency-Management System

Coordination

Stafford Act/NRP/NIMS (8-14)

Interagency Coordination (15-22)

NGO/Private Sector Involvement (23-25)

Technological Support

Communications/Interoperability (26-31)

Information Systems (32-38)

 Readiness 

New Structure

Core Recommendations (1-4)

Commitment

Core Recommendations (5-7)
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Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Uprepared 

Recommendation 12: Th e NRP should be revised to include language assigning a single federal 

maritime-salvage coordinator who will be responsible for responses to maritime-salvage needs 

during times of national disasters (man-made or natural) and clarify federal-agency responsibilities (NPRA, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Navy, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers). 

Recommendation 13: DHS should amend the NRP to designate which agency should have 

primary responsibility for ESF-13 (Public Safety and Security) in which circumstances, and 

clarify relationships between the Senior Federal Law Enforcement Offi cial (SFLEO) designation and ESF-13 functions described in the NRP support annex. 

Recommendation 14: Th e NRP should be revised to refl ect the broad range of search and 

rescue requirements that may arise in a disaster or catastrophe. ESF-9 (currently Urban 

Search and Rescue) should be expanded to encompass the multiple environments and requirements that may arise in a disaster or catastrophe, and should designate the appropriate 

lead agency and supporting agencies, as determined by the nature of the disaster. 

Interagency Coordination

Recommendation 15: DOD and DHS should improve their coordination. 

• DOD should continue to provide experienced offi cers to assist DHS offi cials 

in the execution of their responsibilities during an incident or disaster;

• DHS and NPRA offi cials should receive better training as to the capabilities 

and authorities of DOD during an emergency; 

• DOD should streamline its existing, cumbersome process for Mission Assignments (MAs), particularly as applied in the event of a catastrophe;

• Key DOD personnel who may be called to participate in DOD’s response efforts should receive training on the NRP, NIMS, and ICS; 

• DOD should coordinate with the Secretary of DHS to develop a plan for 

commodities distribution in the event that DOD is called upon to augment 

DHS’s commodities distribution in a catastrophic event. 

• DOD and DHS should coordinate to expand the presence of DHS offi cials 

at U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and, as appropriate, U.S. Pacifi c 

Command (PACOM), and integrate DHS offi cials into NORTHCOM and 

PACOM’s planning, training, exercising, and responding to an incident or 

disaster.

• DOD and DHS should develop an inventory of assets under DOD’s control 

that are most likely to be needed in response to a disaster in order to enable 

expeditious deployment should they be required. Such assets may include, for 

example, utility and heavy-lift helicopters, medium-lift helicopters capable of 

performing search and rescue, shallow-draft boats, communications equipment, medical equipment and personnel, and engineering equipment. 

Recommendation 16: DHS and HHS should improve their coordination.

• Th e Secretary of HHS should strengthen the Department’s emergency preparedness and response organization (Offi ce of Public Health Emergency Preparedness) by giving it greater authority to coordinate and integrate programs 

across HHS that relate to emergency, bioterrorism- and public-health preparedness. In addition, the Secretary of HHS should increase the capabilities 

of the regional emergency-coordination offi cers in the fi eld and direct them to 

coordinate eff orts with the regional NPRA offi ces.
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Recommendations

• Th e Secretary of DHS and the Secretary of HHS should enter into a formal 

memorandum of understanding between the two agencies specifi cally describing how the departments will coordinate ESF-8 (Public Health and Medical 

Services) resources on all aspects of preparedness and deployment, as well as 

clearly defi ning responsibility for logistical, security, and other support, including mortuary activities, required by health care facilities and organizations 

providing emergency medical care in a disaster or catastrophe.

• DHS, in conjunction with HHS, should develop and implement a system to 

identify, deploy and track federal public health and medical assets (human, 

fi xed, and materiel) used in preparation for or response to national disasters 

and catastrophes.

• Th e National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) is a critical medical-response 

asset whose capabilities must be increased. In particular, the Secretary of DHS 

should develop a strategic plan and a management structure that recognizes 

the unique nature of NDMS teams (i.e., highly skilled, all-volunteer staff 

and outside-sponsor relationships). Th is should include providing adequate 

resources to equip, staff , and train NDMS teams; improving transportation, 

logistics, and communications capabilities; and developing more eff ective 

management-support team capability. NDMS should remain in DHS – possibly reporting to the Chief Medical Offi cer (CMO) – but should coordinate 

closely with HHS in preparing for disaster response.

Recommendation 17: DOJ and DHS should inventory their law-enforcement assets and 

identify other available assets, including units with particular skill sets, in advance of a domestic incident. Planning for the deployment of law-enforcement personnel should include 

how to transport offi cers to the aff ected region, which may require coordination with the 

Department of Defense and the Department of Transportation. Planning also should include arrangements to provide personnel with food, sheltering, supplies, and vehicles once 

they arrive. Federal law-enforcement units should be self-sustaining so that they do not 

impose any additional burden on state and local responders.

Recommendation 18: Federal agencies and departments, including DOD, HHS, and DOJ, 

should work with DHS to create an inventory of physical and support assets within the 

agencies and departments that can be used in responding to disasters. For assets most likely 

to be used in responding to future disasters, DHS should develop pre-scripted Mission 

Assignments/Requests for Assistance (MAs/RFAs). Th e purpose of the pre-scripted MAs/

RFAs should be to expedite the submission and approval of MAs/RFAs and the provision of 

commonly requested assets and support in the event of a disaster. Th ese MAs/RFAs should 

include provisions to pre-position assets and personnel.

Recommendation 19: Th e NPRA, through the National Communications System (NCS), 

should develop a database for monitoring the inventory of all federal, including DOD and, 

where appropriate, private-sector communications equipment that can be deployed following a catastrophic incident to assist fi rst responders and restore commercial communications services. In addition, DHS should maintain an inventory of what federal resources are 

necessary to support the deployment and operation of such assets.

Recommendation 20: DHS should work with all federal departments and agencies with 

responsibilities under the NRP, including the ESFs, to pre-identify areas in policy, doctrine, 

and guidance that can be streamlined, or that provide an opportunity for regulatory fl exibility, where appropriate or necessary during a disaster or catastrophe. DHS should ensure 

that policies and procedures provide emergency-management experts suffi cient regulatory 

and policy fl exibility so that they are empowered to make decisions that are critical to a 
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Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Uprepared 

quick and eff ective response during a catastrophic event. For example, during a catastrophe, 

it may be appropriate to waive certain training requirements.

Recommendation 21: NPRA should develop data-sharing arrangements with other federal 

agencies and other appropriate organizations, prior to the next disaster, to more eff ectively 

respond to disasters, while protecting privacy and protecting against waste, fraud, and 

abuse. For example:

• A data-sharing agreement between NPRA, HHS, DOJ, and other appropriate organizations (such as the National Center for Missing and Exploited 

Children) could facilitate tracking missing children and adults and reunifying 

families separated during evacuation. Th ese data-sharing arrangements should 

have protections in place to address privacy concerns and to comply with 

child-custody agreements.

• A data-sharing agreement between NPRA and the Social Security Administration would allow NPRA to ensure that a disaster victim registering for assistance is using a valid Social Security number, helping to prevent fraudulent 

registrations.

Recommendation 22: Th e lack of easily understandable, policy-based, fi eld operations guides 

available to responders at all levels contributed to misunderstandings and ineffi ciencies, 

and degraded overall operations. DHS should develop and publish a comprehensive Federal 

Disaster Field Operations Guide and make the guide available to all federal, state, and local 

response offi cials, so that all responders are better informed of what to expect from federal 

agency operations.

NGO and Private-Sector Involvement

Recommendation 23: DHS should coordinate with the private sector and NGOs at the state, 

regional, and national level to incorporate those entities, where appropriate, into their planning, training, and exercises, to the greatest extent possible.

Recommendation 24: Th ere needs to be a balance, even in a time of disaster, between 

procuring essential goods and services and maintaining fairness and reasonableness in the 

procurement process to the extent possible. 

• Th e federal government should establish pre-negotiated contracts for priority resources prior to disasters, especially in the areas of food, water, ice, fuel 

distribution, and housing. DHS should include provisions in pre-negotiated 

contracts to provide the surge capacity needed to respond to catastrophic 

disasters.

• Th e federal government, working with the private sector, should develop 

standard-form agreements tailored for various needs to facilitate faster procurement for disaster relief operations. 

• Th e federal government should consider expanding the cooperative purchasing authority of state and local governments to use all of the General Services 

Administration (GSA) Schedules (not just Information Technology Schedule 70), for the purchase of goods and services that are designed to facilitate 

response to and recovery from a presidentially declared disaster or catastrophe. 

Under the expanded authority, state and local governments would use the 

same procedures as GSA already has adopted for IT Schedule 70 cooperative 

purchasing.
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Recommendations

Recommendation 25: DHS should develop a policy for accepting and directing corporate inkind donations. Th e U.S. Department of State, in coordination with DHS, should develop a 

policy for accepting and directing foreign donations.

Technological Support

Communications and Interoperability

Recommendation 26: DHS should develop a national strategy, including timeframes, for 

implementing a survivable and resilient national interoperable-communications network. 

DHS should establish a plan to migrate to the use of (1) interoperable platforms for communications networks; (2) equipment that permits sharing of resources in times of crisis; and (3) 

systems to promote high-precedence data communications and interoperability during disasters so that information such as medical, victim registration, and Geographic Information 

Systems (GIS) data can be electronically shared among responders, as needed, at all levels of 

government. Th is process of developing a national strategy should recognize existing state 

plans and provide a mechanism for states to collaborate on interoperability and the ability 

to provide emergency assistance to other states through shared communications resources. 

DHS should condition the award of grants for public-safety communications equipment 

on their being used to purchase interoperable communications systems that operate under 

open-architecture standards developed by the SAFECOM unit within DHS. 

Recommendation 27: Th e NPRA, through the regional Strike Teams, should coordinate with 

NCS, state-level ESF-2 (Communications) agencies, and private-sector partners to be prepared to deploy in an emergency to facilitate reestablishment of public and private communications systems that work across jurisdictions. Th is should be done with the recognition 

that maintaining and/or reestablishing communications capabilities is critical to an eff ective 

emergency response. Although most of the physical damage to telecommunications equipment may occur in a central area, it can adversely aff ect large portions of the surrounding 

areas. DHS should take a lead role to facilitate and encourage cooperation among local jurisdictions to address mutual restoration and redundant routing that will help create a more 

resilient network to aid public-safety fi rst responders.

Recommendation 28: DHS should strengthen its mobile emergency-response teams’ (now 

incorporated into the regional Strike Teams) ability to provide communications support 

during disasters. DHS should acquire and position at regional offi ces mobile-communications suites or caches of secure, interoperable emergency-communications equipment and 

systems that can be deployed when normal land line, mobile, and radio systems are disrupted or destroyed, as does the National Interagency Fire Center.

Recommendation 29: Th e NPRA, through NCS, should work with all communications 

providers to encourage development of and adherence to best practices to ensure reliability 

in the event of a disaster, or quick restoration of services and facilities in the event service is 

disrupted. Th ese best practices should address, among other things, (1) maintaining service 

during extended commercial power outages through the use of back-up generators and 

equipment; (2) building communications towers, transmitters, and repeaters to withstand a 

severe storm; and (3) implementing regional, interoperable communications networks that 

would increase the survivability of communications by allowing fi rst responders’ radios to 

operate via towers in a neighboring jurisdiction that survived the disaster. DHS and state 

and local governments should develop plans for better direct, redundant lines of communications between the emergency-operations centers used by all levels of government.
621

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Uprepared 

Recommendation 30: States should be encouraged to purchase communications systems 

such as satellite phones that can operate when land-based infrastructures are damaged or 

destroyed.

Recommendation 31: DHS should work with state and local offi cials to encourage 911 call 

centers to develop plans to route calls to other centers in case the center is not functional 

and should encourage the inclusion of 911 communicators in Emergency Management Assistance Compacts (EMACs).

Information Systems

Recommendation 32: DHS should adopt a common computer-soft ware standard for use by 

all federal and state entities involved in incident management that will serve as the information architecture for shared situational and operational awareness. Based on this standard, 

the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) may be improved, or a new system 

may need to be developed. Th e system might include a Geographic Information System capability to support functions such as tracking commodities, Search and Rescue (SAR), and 

status of evacuation shelters, among others. 

Recommendation 33: DHS should refi ne and streamline the Action Request Form (ARF) 

system (through which state and local governments request disaster-related assistance from 

the federal government) and work with state and local governments to ensure that federal 

and state systems are compatible and provide for seamless interfacing.

Recommendation 34: DHS should complete and/or adopt technology and informationmanagement systems to eff ectively manage disaster-related activities. DHS should develop 

an effi cient ordering system that minimizes delays and provides order-status visibility and 

accurate, timely commodity tracking, and a transportation protocol that moves commodities and resources directly from the supplier to the usage area. 

Recommendation 35: Th e states, in coordination with DHS, DOJ, HHS and other appropriate agencies and organizations, should establish evacuee-registration systems to facilitate reunifi cation of family members separated as a result of a disaster or catastrophe. DHS should 

work with the states to encourage development of systems that can share data across states, 

including the use of a model intake form with standard information to be collected.

Recommendation 36: Given the importance of providing as much warning as possible to 

coastal populations in the event of a major hurricane, the National Oceanographic and 

Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the National Hurricane Center (NHC) should 

review their protocols for issuing hurricane advisories and related forecast products to 

ensure that critical information is made available to the public as soon as possible, in a form 

that is as complete and understandable as possible. Further, NOAA and the NHC should 

identify any technical or resource constraints that limit their ability to do so.

Recommendation 37: Because storm surge is historically the most deadly element in major 

hurricanes, NOAA and the NHC should examine the use of additional forecasting models, 

such as the Advanced Circulation Model (ADCIRC) sponsored by the U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers (the Corps), to provide additional confi dence and perspective to their periodic modeling and publication of storm-surge projections and pre-landfall storm-surge 

forecasts, as is currently done for forecasting hurricane intensity and track. As part of this 

review, the NHC should also reexamine its practice of making pre-landfall storm-surge 

forecasts for major hurricanes no earlier than 24 hours before landfall.

Recommendation 38: NOAA, utilizing expertise within the NWS, the NHC, and the National 

Geodetic Survey, should routinely revise its models and published impacts of hurricane 
622

Recommendations

storm-surge projections to take into account changes in modeling and forecasting technology and regional conditions, such as regional subsidence, loss of coastal wetlands, and 

sea-level rise. Changes in projected impacts as a result of such revisions should be clearly 

documented and published.

Readiness

Planning, Training, and Exercising

Recommendation 39: DHS should ensure that the NRP becomes more than just words on 

paper – it must be operationalized if it is to be eff ectively executed in response to disasters 

and catastrophes. In doing so, DHS should direct all federal departments and agencies with 

responsibilities in the NRP, including DOD, in the completion of a coordinated, operational, federal disaster-response plan that is then exercised, with lessons learned incorporated 

into a revised plan. DHS should simultaneously coordinate with the states to ensure that 

the states’ emergency-response plans are aligned with the NRP, including ESF responsibilities, to the highest degree possible and exercised, with lessons learned incorporated into a 

revised plan, and should provide necessary support for any additional planning required to 

achieve this level of preparedness. DHS should lead an eff ort, coordinated with the states, 

to develop response plans for specifi c geographic regions and for specifi c types of high-risk 

events that will augment the NRP and provide additional operational detail.

Recommendation 40: Federal departments and agencies with responsibilities under the NRP 

should be required to conduct exercises to ensure that their plans are continually revised 

and updated. Th e exercises should include broad, all-encompassing federal disaster and 

catastrophic exercises. DHS, in conjunction with DOD, other federal agencies, and state and 

local participants should stage exercises simulating a large-scale catastrophe to improve the 

training for all personnel, familiarize responding agencies with one another’s personnel and 

capabilities, address issues of command and control, and improve the working relationships 

between DHS and other response agencies. 

Recommendation 41: Emergency agencies at the federal, state, and local levels of government, as well as fi rst-responder groups outside of government, should receive regular 

training on NRP and NIMS, integrating the ESF structure, including statutorily required exercises and simulations to expose unaddressed challenges, provide feedback about progress, 

and maintain pressure to improve. Th ese exercises and simulations should be objectively 

assessed by an independent evaluator. DHS should consider tying future cost-share requirements for preparedness grant funds to performance and results of these exercises.

Protecting Against Waste, Fraud, and Abuse

Recommendation 42: Fraud related to disaster assistance and contracting is not tolerable. 

DHS should work with DOJ and other federal agencies to ensure that a cooperative eff ort is 

made to investigate and prosecute fraud. DHS should also strengthen controls on the Individuals and Households Program (IHP), and other programs where appropriate, to reduce 

fraud and abuse, while continuing to off er speedy assistance and relief to the true victims of 

a disaster.

Recommendation 43: In a disaster where the government is entering into contracts and 

other procurement vehicles (grants, cooperative agreements, direct purchase orders, etc.) 

quickly and with expedited procedures and oversight, it is all the more important that the 

agencies making these procurements be thoroughly committed to full transparency. Th is 

transparency must occur from the outset so that waste, fraud, abuse, or simple mismanagement or ineffi ciency can be identifi ed before additional fi nancial liability is incurred by the 
623

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Uprepared 

taxpayers. Th ere is no federal dollar that is spent on disaster relief and recovery for which 

the government is not accountable to taxpayers. DHS should:

• Ensure that NPRA has suffi cient contracting staff to handle the fl ow of 

disaster assistance and should identify and train procurement staff from other 

agencies who can provide additional surge capacity.

• Develop procurement plans, based on past experience, for a variety of disaster scenarios and use those plans as a guide in future disasters so that spending 

is not simply reactive.

• Engage in more rigorous procurement planning and execution to ensure that 

one or more competitively awarded technical-assistance contracts are always in 

place.

• Improve acquisition-process accountability post-disaster, discouraging and 

strictly reviewing sole-source and no-bid contracts (where necessary), as well 

as reviewing purchase decisions by the government that appear excessive, 

unwise, or poorly managed.

• Make non-proprietary information related to disaster-related procurements 

available to the general public in an easily accessible format. 

Evacuation and Sheltering

Recommendation 44: As the primary federal agency under ESF-1 (Transportation), the 

Department of Transportation, in coordination with DHS, should:

• Develop plans to assist in conducting mass evacuations when an eff ective 

evacuation is beyond the capabilities, or is likely to be beyond the capabilities, of the state and aff ected local governments. DOT should develop plans 

to quickly deploy transportation assets to an area in need of mass evacuation. 

DHS should, in coordination with DOT, assist state and aff ected local governments in evacuating populations when requested.

• In coordination with the states, plan, train, and exercise for evacuations 

including medical patients and others with special needs, in coordination 

with other relevant federal agencies, the American Red Cross, and state and 

local partners. DOT should consider using a variety of transportation modes, 

including air medical services.

• Work with state and local emergency planners – in particular, state and 

local agencies charged with ESF-1 responsibilities – to help them assess the 

resources needed to assist with evacuations, those that are locally available, and 

what shortfalls exist; determine unique geographical/demographic obstacles to 

evacuation in particular areas; and develop catalogues of regionally available 

evacuation-related assets, including transit agencies from various municipalities.

• Establish liaisons with ESF-6 (Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services) to 

coordinate sheltering destinations for evacuees from various areas, and work 

with ESF-13 (Public Safety and Security) to ensure that air, bus, and other 

transportation providers have appropriate security escorts to ensure safety during evacuation activities.

Recommendation 45: All evacuation plans must provide for populations that do not have 

the means to evacuate. DHS and DOT should make available assistance to state and local 

governments for developing plans to ensure that the nation’s most vulnerable citizens are 

not left behind in a disaster.
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Recommendations

Recommendation 46: DHS should support state and local governments in planning, training, and exercising evacuation plans and ensure that these plans address the challenges 

posed by evacuating hospitals, nursing homes, and individuals with special needs. 

Recommendation 47: DHS, in conjunction with HHS, DOD, the U.S. Department of Veterans Aff airs (VA), and state and local partners in the patient-movement system, should 

develop a specifi c concept of operations (CONOP), training and outreach programs, and 

patient triage and tracking capabilities to execute domestic patient movement/evacuations 

utilizing the NDMS patient-movement capability. Non-governmental emergency-response 

and emergency-management entities, including private air medical services, should be integrated into the planning and response process.

Recommendation 48: DHS and DOT should support state and local governments in developing evacuation plans that prevent, to the extent practicable, families being separated from 

one another during an evacuation and that facilitate rapid reunifi cation in the event that 

families are separated.

Recommendation 49: DHS should coordinate with DOT to annually evaluate state evacuation plans, as well as evacuation plans for large urban areas.

Recommendation 50: DHS should encourage individuals, and state and local governments 

to plan for evacuating and sheltering pets.

• Due to various health, safety, and other concerns, pets may be separated from 

their owners during transportation or sheltering. State and local agencies should 

work with animal-welfare organizations to develop procedures for animal identifi cation and processing to facilitate the return of the pets to their owners.

• State and local agencies should establish memorandums of understanding 

with animal- welfare organizations to ensure their assistance with the transport, sheltering, and rescue of pets. 

• State and local evacuation plans should include consideration of transportation and sheltering of pets owned by residents in need of transportation or 

shelter themselves.

Search and Rescue

Recommendation 51: Signatory agencies to the National Search and Rescue Plan should 

develop a comprehensive plan for search and rescue in a multi-environment disaster. Th e 

plan should provide for a unifi ed coordination structure, with subordinate coordination of 

air, land, and water-borne assets, and should establish the means for obtaining the necessary 

assets and personnel. Th e plan should also provide for a unifi ed communications network, a 

common grid-reference system, and standardized procedures and methods for utilizing and 

sharing local situational awareness acquired by search and rescue operational units. 

Recommendation 52: Policies, plans, and procedures, as defi ned by the National Search and 

Rescue Plan, need to be incorporated into personnel recovery training at the operational 

and strategic levels of NORTHCOM and, as appropriate, PACOM, so that DOD can more 

eff ectively participate in future domestic mass-rescue operations.

Mitigation

Recommendation 53: In order to protect coastal areas from becoming increasingly 

vulnerable to damage from hurricanes, ecological-restoration eff orts must be integrated 

into hurricane protection in a comprehensive manner that addresses the root causes of 

ongoing ecological and geological processes, such as the loss of coastal wetlands and regional subsidence.
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Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Uprepared 

Recommendation 54: Future decision making regarding the Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet 

(MRGO) and other navigation channels should recognize, account for, and mitigate not 

only the direct role that navigation channels can play in increasing, speeding, or transferring storm surges, but also the impact of the channels on wetland loss and the coastal environment, and the resulting long-term implications for hurricane vulnerability.

Recommendation 55: DHS, with the participation of the Corps, the U.S. Department of the 

Interior, NOAA, and other relevant agencies, should establish an interagency review board, 

including state and local offi cials, to examine the level of vulnerability of communities located in fl oodplains and coastal regions to hurricanes and fl oods, and specifi cally examine the 

adequacy of existing and planned fl ood and hurricane protection for levees and fl ood-control structures, the contribution of environmental and ecological conditions, and the impact 

of non-structural programs, such as the federal fl ood-insurance program and pre- and postdisaster mitigation programs.

Credentialing

Recommendation 56: DHS should ensure that all federal emergency-response personnel 

from federal departments and agencies with responsibilities under the NRP have a standard 

credential (a Red Card system) that details the emergency-management positions the person is qualifi ed for based on measurable criteria, performance, objectives and standards so 

that they may easily integrate into emergency response operations. DHS should coordinate 

with state governments to ensure that all state emergency-response personnel from departments and agencies with responsibilities under the state emergency-response plan, and 

volunteers, also have a standard credential based on the same credentialing system.

Recommendation 57: HHS, in conjunction with DHS, should lead a federal, state, and local 

initiative to roster and credential, in a centralized or linked manner, medical personnel and 

volunteers (National Disaster Medical System, Medical Reserve Corps, U.S. Public Health 

Service, etc.) to ensure that in case of national emergencies, properly qualifi ed medical providers are quickly identifi ed and are able to gain appropriate access to the aff ected area.

Recommendation 58: Private-sector telecommunications, utility, critical infrastructure, and 

other private entities should be included in emergency-response planning and be assured 

appropriate access to disaster areas to repair critical infrastructure and restore essential services. DHS should coordinate with federal, state, local, and other emergency management 

offi cials to develop a standardized national credential that would allow emergency management professionals, fi rst responders, and other response personnel from the private sector 

access to disaster areas, as appropriate.

Professional and Public Education

Recommendation 59: DHS should, during the transition to the NPRA organizational structure, conduct an agency-wide training assessment (inventory) of the current state of capabilities to meet the FEMA/NPRA mission. Based on this assessment, DHS should develop and 

implement strategies, including appropriate incentives and rewards, to recruit, retain, and 

build a cadre of trained, practiced, and experienced professional emergency-response professionals; develop career paths that reward and promote individuals who have served in multiple state and federal agencies with emergency-management responsibilities; and, as part of 

the NPRA career track, require all personnel to engage in continuous learning and education.

Recommendation 60: DHS should establish and maintain a Homeland Security Academy to:

• Develop and provide a course of instruction on Homeland Security matters, 

including the nation’s emergency-preparedness and response system, to meet 

the specifi c needs of political offi cials (Cabinet offi cials, agency heads, gover-
626

Recommendations

nors, mayors, and other federal, state and local offi cials) who must provide 

leadership during emergency-response operations; and

• Develop and provide a course of instruction, and maintain a Web-based 

“lessons recognized-lessons learned” and best-practices program that can be 

accessed by emergency-management professionals at the federal, state, and 

local levels.

Recommendation 61: DHS should strengthen and expand the Emergency Management 

Institute’s (EMI) courses for emergency-management personnel. In order to reach the widest audience, EMI should develop “train the trainer” courses to expedite building a cadre of 

emergency-management experts around the country. Course schedules should be designed 

around the heaviest emergency “seasons,” so that experienced instructors are available to 

teach the courses.

Recommendation 62: DHS should develop and implement a comprehensive strategy to 

develop a culture of preparedness in America. DHS should coordinate with state and local 

offi cials to ensure that emergency plans are community-based and include outreach and 

education to the public, through community and faith-based organizations and other institutions to promote individual preparedness based on the risks in their communities. Th is 

information should be widely distributed in languages appropriate to the relevant constituencies.

Special Needs Awareness 

Recommendation 63: DHS should ensure and direct that all federal departments and agencies with responsibilities under the NRP, including the ESFs, take into consideration the 

special needs of persons with physical, mental, and other disabilities, the most vulnerable 

and those least able to help themselves, in their response and recovery plans. DHS should 

coordinate with state and local governments to ensure that their response and recovery 

plans also address persons with special needs. 

Recommendation 64: DHS should coordinate with the private sector and NGOs, including 

the American Red Cross, to ensure that the response and recovery plans of those participating in emergency-preparedness and response operations take into consideration the special 

needs of persons with physical, mental, and other disabilities.

Military Preparations

Recommendation 65: DOD should continue to provide the Commander, U.S. Northern 

Command (NORTHCOM) and, as appropriate, the Commander, U.S. Pacifi c Command 

(PACOM), with authority to assign DCOs and Defense Coordinating Elements, and identify staging bases as necessary and prudent, to provide anticipated support for a domestic 

emergency or catastrophe. DOD should expand this authority to include the ability to deploy pre-packaged or pre-identifi ed basic response assets (such as helicopters, boats, medical supplies and personnel, food and water, and communications equipment). DOD should 

develop procedures and guidelines for pre-positioning assets. 

Recommendation 66: DOD should make the position of DCO in NPRA regional offi ces a 

full-time assignment for senior offi cers. Th e DCO should receive training and education on 

DOD’s role under the NRP, and should coordinate closely with DHS, NORTHCOM, and 

PACOM, as appropriate, and state offi cials in plans, training, and exercises. 

Recommendation 67: NPRA should work with DOD and the state governors to assist them 

in developing an integrated plan for the deployment of National Guard units and personnel in state status when large-scale military support is requested by a state to respond to a 

catastrophic incident or disaster. Th e plan should include a process for identifi cation of Na-
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Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Uprepared 

tional Guard units with the capabilities required to respond to the incident or disaster, and 

should take into account the availability of National Guard units for mobilization for national-defense missions. Th e plan should include expedited procedures for requesting and 

approving federal funding under Title 32, United States Code, for National Guard forces 

employed in accordance with the plan, and procedures for DOD and the governors, during a catastrophe, to coordinate the process of matching units and capabilities of National 

Guard forces with the requirements of the governors. Th e integrated plan should ensure 

that there is suffi cient command and control and reception, staging and onward integration 

capability for any such large-scale National Guard deployment.

Recommendation 68: In developing a federal catastrophic-disaster response plan, DHS 

should work with DOD to develop a plan for the employment of active-duty units and personnel when wide-scale military support is requested by a state or ordered by the President 

to respond to a catastrophic incident or disaster. Th e plan should include a process for identifi cation of active-duty units with the capabilities required to respond to the incident or 

disaster, include planning for reception, staging and onward integration of the active-duty 

forces and commodities distribution, and should, via the National Guard Bureau, take into 

account the availability and capability of National Guard units. 

Recommendation 69: DHS, DOD, and the states should develop detailed operational plans 

for Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) missions, including specifi c plans for 

response to hurricanes, wildfi res, earthquakes, pandemics, and other natural disasters.

Recommendation 70: DOD and the States should develop the systems and processes of 

communication, coordination, and command and control, to ensure unity of eff ort when 

National Guard and Title 10 forces are deployed in integrated disaster-response missions.

Recommendation 71: NORTHCOM and the National Guard Bureau should coordinate to 

expand the presence of the National Guard Bureau at NORTHCOM and integrate National 

Guard Bureau offi cials into NORTHCOM’s planning, training, exercising, and responding 

to an incident or disaster. 

Recommendation 72: DOD should require that offi cers selected for general-offi cer or fl ag 

rank are trained on the NRP, NIMS, ICS, and DOD’s Defense Support to Civil Authorities 

(DSCA) missions. 

State and Local Preparations

Recommendation 73: At least annually, state emergency-preparedness offi ces should audit 

plans of agencies with ESF responsibilities under the state’s emergency-operations plan to 

ensure they: (1) take an all-hazards approach to emergency management; (2) comprehensively address the agency’s ESF responsibilities; (3) are up-to-date; and (4) include provisions for regular training and exercising. Governors should require their state emergencypreparedness offi ces to then report to them the state of the emergency-preparedness offi ce, 

all supporting agencies, and the state emergency-operations plan. Th e audit should review, 

at a minimum:

• Realistic, comprehensive evacuation plans to provide for the safety of the 

state’s population in a disaster, especially those who lack their own transportation or have physical, mental, or other disabilities;

• Th e staffi ng needs of agencies with emergency-operations responsibilities and 

long-range plans to attract and maintain qualifi ed staff ;

• Laws, regulations, and plans to ensure clear responsibilities for ordering 

evacuations and to address liability issues that may be impediments to evacuation orders;
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Recommendations

• Laws, regulations, and plans that clarify the governor’s authority to assume 

control of emergency response where local governments’ response capabilities 

are signifi cantly damaged;

• Pre-contracting for emergency supplies to address needs of shelters in disaster-stricken areas; plans for sheltering and then evacuating people who have 

remained in an area struck by a disaster; and evaluations of the capacity, suitability, and structural strength of shelters in the state; 

• Plans for alternative means of distributing commodities in situations where 

distribution through central distribution points may not be possible;

• Plans that outline resource needs, such as volunteers for emergency support 

functions, transportation providers, and medical supplies, and where they will 

be obtained when disaster strikes;

• Plans under ESF-9 (Urban Search and Rescue) of the state emergency operations plan, to ensure there is appropriate equipment and resources, based on 

the state’s terrain and risks, to eff ectively carry out this function; and

• Plans for ensuring the protection of vital records, whether paper or electronic, such as property titles, court-case fi les, and driver’s license and voter 

information.

Recommendation 74: States should coordinate with the NPRA to assess or upgrade their 

logistics-management capabilities and address any asset-tracking defi ciencies. 

Recommendation 75: States should coordinate through the NPRA regional offi ces to develop 

plans adequate to address shelter needs in a catastrophe or when needs exceed a state’s 

capacity. 

Recommendation 76: State and local governments should review and resolve, to the extent 

possible, legal and operational issues incident to the issuance of evacuation orders, and 

should be prepared to issue a mandatory-evacuation order quickly in the event of a disaster.

Recommendation 77: States with high-risk urban areas should develop multi-phased evacuation plans that provide for the speediest evacuation of residents most at risk, particularly 

those who lack the means to evacuate on their own. States with high-risk urban areas should 

consider whether a contrafl ow plan is advisable, and if so, should develop agreements with 

bordering states to secure their participation in the contrafl ow plan. Neighboring political 

entities should work together to coordinate evacuation plans in advance, and state and local 

governments should publicize their evacuation plans and ensure that citizens are familiar 

with one or more evacuation options. States whose location puts them at high risk of recurring hurricanes and tropical storms should use updated storm-surge estimates to establish 

evacuation zones and evacuation-clearance times. States whose locations put them at risk of 

other types of natural disasters should evaluate those risks and consider evacuation zones 

and clearance times in line with them.

Recommendation 78: States should develop estimates of populations that will require shortterm sheltering in the event of a catastrophic event. Th is estimate should particularly focus 

on special-needs populations. In consultation with NPRA, states should then develop plans 

for providing shelter for these estimated populations. Such plans should include a way to 

create a voluntary database of people in the shelters so victims can be accounted for. States 

should develop a catastrophic medical-response plan that is integrated with its evacuation 

and shelter plan and documents the availability of nurses and health-care professionals with 

emergency medical and trauma training in the state.
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Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Uprepared 

Recommendation 79: States should establish neighborhood pre- and post-disaster information centers at schools, shopping centers, places of worship, and other community institutions, to provide information on evacuations and the location of disaster assistance sites.

Recommendation 80: States should ensure that eff ective communications lines and information-sharing systems exist between the state emergency operations centers and all facilities 

or mobile units that provide medical care or other assistance to victims of a catastrophic 

event. 

Recommendation 81: State agencies responsible for licensing of hospitals and nursing 

homes should ensure those facilities have evacuation plans and audit them annually, including evaluation of availability of transportation resources, to verify that they are viable. 

Recommendation 82: State agencies responsible for special-needs shelters, working with 

local counterparts and emergency-support organizations, should consider developing and 

maintaining a voluntary database of special-needs persons residing in the area. 

Recommendation 83: Th e EMAC system should (1) be refi ned to pre-certify qualifi ed 

out-of-state fi rst responders, such as those with specialized skills like search and rescue or 

medical services, in order to shorten the response time; (2) develop National Guard civil 

aff airs support teams trained in continuity of government operations (these could be the 

same teams that are already constituted for a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) event); 

(3) streamline the required paperwork process; and (4) streamline the deputization process 

with regard to various law-enforcement agencies that may assist during the disaster response.

Levees

Recommendation 84: Th e Interagency Performance Evaluation Taskforce (IPET), along 

with the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) External Review Panel (ERP), should 

be continued beyond the scope of the current task and should have the ongoing responsibility to evaluate and review the design, construction, operation, reconstruction, and improvements to the hurricane-protection levee system in southeast Louisiana. Formal charters for 

the IPET and the ASCE ERP should be created for this purpose and should ensure that the 

IPET process is independent from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ operational organizations. Th e independent review task forces should be extended to other levee systems that 

protect signifi cant population centers throughout the country.

Recommendation 85: Th e Corps, in conjunction with the State of Louisiana, the local levee 

districts, and other relevant federal, state, and local agencies, should assume responsibility 

for development of a comprehensive emergency plan for the hurricane-protection and Mississippi River levees systems, including high-water accidents, breaches, and fl oods. Current 

plans, including, but not limited to, the New Orleans Unwatering Plan, must be re-examined and brought into conformance with this comprehensive plan. Th e emergency plan 

must address incident command, interoperable communications, repair, and fl ood-fi ghting 

resources, monitoring of levee conditions, the acquisition of assets or alternative arrangements that allow the Corps to have real-time (or close to real-time) situational awareness of 

levee and fl ood conditions in the New Orleans area, and reporting and exercise procedures.

Recommendation 86: Th e Corps and local levee sponsors should immediately clarify and 

memorialize responsibilities and procedures for the turn-over of projects to local sponsors, 

and for operations and maintenance, including, but not limited to, procedures for the repair 

or correction of levee conditions that reduce the level of protection below the original design level (due to subsidence or other factors) and also emergency response. It must always 

be clear – to all parties involved – which entity is ultimately in charge of each stage of each 
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Recommendations

project. Th e Corps should also provide real-time information to the public on the level of 

protection aff orded by the levee system. A mechanism should be included for the public to 

report potential problems and provide general feedback to the Corps.

Recommendation 87: In states where applicable, governors should ensure that the equivalent of ESF-3 (Public Works and Engineering) of the state emergency plan is clarifi ed to 

ensure that hurricane-protection levee systems and other fl ood-control infrastructures 

within the state are included within the defi nition of critical infrastructure, that a designated 

state agency is responsible for ensuring that state and local agencies and levee districts prepare for, and are able to respond to, emergencies involving these structures, whether they 

are directly owned by the state or not, and that the designated state agency executes this 

responsibility.

Recommendation 88: State statutes governing the operation of levee districts, such as preparation of emergency plans and training for levee board members and staff , must be re-examined and revised to ensure that levee districts exercise state-of-the art care and inspection 

of levees and are prepared to meet their primary obligation of fl ood protection and respond 

to emergencies. Th e inspection regime should include the use of advanced inspection techniques that are commensurate with the potential threat to life and property posed by the 

failure of a fl ood control project. 

1 While the entirety of DHS’s Preparedness Directorate would become part of NPRA, we continue to review the appropriate placement of individual offi ces (e.g., Infrastructure Protection, the Chief Medical Offi cer, and Cyber- and 

Telecommunications).