U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Seven Fatality Fire at

Remote Wilderness Lodge

Grand Marais, Minnesota

USFA-TR-055/July 1991

U.S. Fire Administration Fire Investigations Program

T

he U.S. Fire Administration develops reports on selected major fires throughout the country. 

The fires usually involve multiple deaths or a large loss of property. But the primary criterion 

for deciding to do a report is whether it will result in significant “lessons learned.” In some 

cases these lessons bring to light new knowledge about fire--the effect of building construction or 

contents, human behavior in fire, etc. In other cases, the lessons are not new but are serious enough 

to highlight once again, with yet another fire tragedy report. In some cases, special reports are developed to discuss events, drills, or new technologies which are of interest to the fire service.

The reports are sent to fire magazines and are distributed at National and Regional fire meetings. The 

International Association of Fire Chiefs assists the USFA in disseminating the findings throughout the 

fire service. On a continuing basis the reports are available on request from the USFA; announcements of their availability are published widely in fire journals and newsletters.

This body of work provides detailed information on the nature of the fire problem for policymakers 

who must decide on allocations of resources between fire and other pressing problems, and within 

the fire service to improve codes and code enforcement, training, public fire education, building 

technology, and other related areas.

The Fire Administration, which has no regulatory authority, sends an experienced fire investigator 

into a community after a major incident only after having conferred with the local fire authorities 

to insure that the assistance and presence of the USFA would be supportive and would in no way 

interfere with any review of the incident they are themselves conducting. The intent is not to arrive 

during the event or even immediately after, but rather after the dust settles, so that a complete and 

objective review of all the important aspects of the incident can be made. Local authorities review 

the USFA’s report while it is in draft. The USFA investigator or team is available to local authorities 

should they wish to request technical assistance for their own investigation.

This report and its recommendations were developed by USFA staff and by TriData Corporation, 

Arlington, Virginia, its staff and consultants, who are under contract to assist the USFA in carrying 

out the Fire Reports Program.

The USFA greatly appreciates the cooperation and information received from Minnesota State Fire 

Marshal Thomas R. Brace; Deputy State Fire Marshals David Bahma, Terry Christensen, and Glen 

Bergstrand; and Cook County Sheriff John Lyght. Ms. Mary Nachbar, Supervisor, Public Fire Education 

and Data Analysis, of the State Fire Marshal’s Office reviewed the report and provided additional technical information.

For additional copies of this report write to the U.S. Fire Administration, 16825 South Seton Avenue, 

Emmitsburg, Maryland 21727. The report is available on the USFA Web site at http://www.usfa.dhs.gov/

Seven Fatality Fire at

Remote Wilderness Lodge

Grand Marais, Minnesota

Reported by: James W. David

This is Report 055 of the Major Fires Investigation Project conducted

by TriData Corporation under contract EMW-90-C-3338 to the United

States Fire Administration, Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Department of Homeland Security

United States Fire Administration

National Fire Data Center

U.S. Fire Administration

Mission Statement

As an entity of the Department of Homeland 

Security, the mission of the USFA is to reduce life and economic losses due to fire 

and related emergencies, through leadership, advocacy, coordination, and support. 

We serve the Nation independently, in coordination with other Federal agencies, 

and in partnership with fire protection and 

emergency service communities. With a 

commitment to excellence, we provide public education, training, technology, and data 

initiatives.

TAbLe oF ConTenTS

OVERVIEW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

BACKGROUND. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

THE BUILDING. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

THE FIRE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

CASUALTIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

FIRE SPREAD. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

ESCAPE ROUTES AND OCCUPANT ACTIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

CODE IN EFFECT WHEN LODGE WAS BUILT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

SMOKE DETECTOR PERFORMANCE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

LESSONS LEARNED. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Appendix A: Pre-fire Photographs of Windigo Lodge. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Appendix B: Windigo Lodge Site Plan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Appendix C: Windigo Lodge Floor Plans. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Appendix D: Photographs of Fire Scene. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

1

Seven Fatality Fire at Remote Wilderness Lodge

Grand Marais, Minnesota

July 1991

State Contacts: Thomas R. Brace

State Fire Marshal

Minnesota Department of Public Safety

State Fire Marshal Division

285 Bigelow Building

450 North Syndicate Street

St. Paul, Minnesota 55104

David Bahma

Chief Investigator

Deputy State Fire Marshal

St. Paul Office

Terry Christensen

Fire Investigator

Deputy State Fire Marshal

Grand Rapids, Minnesota

Glen Bergstrand

Fire Safety Inspector

Deputy State Fire Marshal

Duluth, Minnesota

Local Contacts: John Lyght, Cook County Sheriff

Tim Weitz, Deputy Sheriff

David Wirt, Deputy Sheriff

Cook County Sheriff’s Department

Grand Marais, Minnesota

Gunflint Trail Lodge Owners

Bruce Kerfoot, Gunflint Lodge

Dana Austin, Rockwood Lodge

Larry Backstrom, Poplar Lake Lodge
2 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

O

An early morning fire at the Windigo Lodge in northern Minnesota left seven people dead and six 

injured. The fire started in the early morning hours of July 12, 1991, as occupants of the lodge 

lay sleeping. The fire was reported to the Cook County Sheriff’s Department from a phone inside 

the lodge, located at the facility’s only enclosed stairway, at 4:21 a.m. There was no organized fire 

department in the area to respond. Therefore, the Sheriff’s Department notified other lodge owners 

in the area of the fire. The area lodge owners responded to the fire and were able to save two nearby 

buildings exposed to the fire with hoses and portable pumps. No attempts were made to suppress 

the lodge fire, since it was fully involved when the area lodge owners arrived. All that was left of the 

lodge following the fire was ash and metal debris.

SUMMARY oF KeY ISSUeS

Issues Comments

Failure of early warning fire detection Smoke detectors used for early warning were single station battery operated units. 

Employees stated the only smoke detector they recalled seeing was on the first 

floor behind the bar. This would not be sufficient to hear on the second floor had it 

sounded. State statute requires smoke detector in all sleeping rooms. Smoke detectors were present at the last inspection in 1988; however, none of the survivors stated 

they heard a smoke detector at any time during the fire.

Absence of a responding fire 

department in the area

Due to rapid spread of fire and lack of early warning detection or alarm devices, 

fire department response would have probably made little, if any, difference to the 

outcome of the fire in terms of life loss. However, damage to the structure may have 

been less severe.

Failure of exit conditions to provide 

adequate escape from the interior of 

the building

Only one of the stairways between the first and second floors offered protection by 

way of fire-resistive construction. None of the other stairways were enclosed from 

the first to third floors. All the stairways were open to the corridor system serving the 

guest rooms. One enclosed stairway did exit directly to the outside; however, it was 

not a factor in escape.

Automatic sprinklers None present.

Compartmentation of lodge Non-existent.

Fire evacuation plans or drills None.

Outside fire escape None present.

Code requirements for enclosed stairs UBC 1973

Fire doors Guest rooms and at one stairway only.

Interior finish Drywalls and ceiling with heavy timber construction and exposed beams, with 3/4-inch 

flame-retardant treated aspen paneling.

Extinguishment finally occurred some ten hours after the fire began by the U.S. Forest Service called 

by the State Fire Marshal Deputies. This was the first attempt to put water on the fire. It was not until 

then that fire investigators were able to work the scene.

At the time of the fire, the Windigo Lodge was occupied by 14 people, seven of whom were Windigo 

employees and seven were guests. The seven who perished in the fire died prior to trying to escape 

or died while in the process of escaping. Six people were injured in their attempts to escape the 

building and one occupant escaped without injuries.
USFA-TR-055/July 1991 3

B

The Windigo Lodge, on the shore of Poplar Lake, was scenically nestled among towering pines, birch 

trees, and lovely lakes in the Boundary Waters Wilderness Canoe Area in northern Minnesota just a 

few miles south of the Canadian border. In 1964, Windigo Lodge was moved from Windigo Point 

on Seagull Lake to its present location at Poplar Lake.

In November of 1974, the Windigo Lodge caught fire and burned to the ground. In 1975, the lodge 

was built by the owners, the Ekroot family, and operated until July 1991, when it again burned to 

the ground.

The Windigo Lodge was licensed by the Minnesota Department of Health for 10 guests on the second floor. However, the night of the fire the lodge was filled to capacity with guests and employees 

on the second floor, the family and two guests on the third floor (contrary to the license agreement). 

Also, Mr. Ekroot, who was confined to a wheel chair, slept on the first floor.

This wilderness area, because of its lack of population, has little in fire protection resources. The 

closest organized fire department is Maple Hill, some 30 miles to the south of Windigo Lodge. To 

the north of the lodge, approximately 12 miles, is the Gunflint Trail Fire and Rescue Squad; however, 

it is only equipped to provide emergency medical service (EMS). 

There was an informal fire protection effort established by lodge owners in the area. Each lodge 

owner has a portable pump and a couple of lengths of hose to use for extinguishment. Their purpose 

is to respond to large fires and protect exposures. The lodge owners have no other firefighting equipment, protective clothing, or self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA).

THe bUILDInG

The Windigo Lodge was a 3-story, wood-frame structure with a partial basement that had a walk-out 

to the lake. The lodge had fire exposures to the east and west which were single unit rental cabins 

and a sauna. The south side of the lodge faced Poplar Lake and the north abutted a parking lot and a 

small liquor store. (See Appendix B, diagram.)

A large, wooden deck wrapped around two sides of the structure nearest the lake. The guest rooms 

were located on the second floor, which was also used to house employees. The third floor was used 

to house the Ekroot family and Mrs. Ekroot’s mother. The first floor was a bar, dining room, and a 

lounge area that overlooked the lake. Mr. Ekroot slept on the first floor; he was handicapped and 

unable to make it up the stairs.

The building was used as a mixed occupancy with assembly areas on the main floor, guest rooms on 

the second floor, and owner’s residence and guest rooms on the third floor. The small half basement 

was used for storage. The approximate exterior dimensions were 60 feet by 60 feet.

This 3-story structure had no vertical separations. It was constructed in 1975. The exterior walls 

were partial height concrete block foundation on the lake side and the rest was wood-frame construction with wooden siding. The interior walls were wood frame. (UBC/UFC Type V-N) covered 

with gypsum wallboard in the guest rooms, corridors, residential areas, and the west stairway. The 

bar and dining area were covered with 3/4-inch tongue-and-groove aspen paneling and had been 

flame retardant treated in 1987.

Structural support for the upper floors was provided by exterior walls and interior wooden columns 

(posts) made of white spruce logs. Interior ceilings were covered on the room side by gypsum wall-
4 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

board. However, some of the wooden beams which supported the floor joists for the upper floors 

were exposed. The first floor ceiling was provided with fiberglass insulation presumably for climate 

control and/or sound transmission. The roof construction is in question; however, it was believed 

to be rafters shaped in a gable configuration with multiple shed dormers.

The second floor had an interior corridor arranged in roughly a “square” configuration. Ten sleeping rooms were located around the exterior perimeter of the building with solid core self-closing 

doors between the corridor and the sleeping rooms. In addition to the sleeping rooms, common 

restrooms were located along the exterior of the second floor wall near the northwest corner. The 

center “core” of the second floor contained a storage room and one of the stairways leading to the 

third floor.

Exit Configuration--There were two stairways serving the second floor from the first floor; one located 

along the west wall and the other located near the northeast corner. The stairway along the west 

wall was of fire-resistive construction with the base of the stairs forming a vestibule which exited 

to the exterior or into the bar area through a one-hour fire rated door. The northeast stairway was 

approximately six feet wide with no headers or partitions to interrupt smoke or fire spread.

There were two stairways from the second to the third floor; one was located along the north wall 

and the other was located near the center of the structure adjacent to the second floor storage area.

Large casement style windows were present in each of the sleeping rooms. Although not specifically 

designed as “egress windows,” it appears that these were the path of escape used by five of the six 

survivors.

Fire Protection Features--An automatic extinguishing system was installed in the commercial cooking 

exhaust system. Single station smoke detectors (believed to be ionization type) had supposedly been 

installed in the guest rooms, corridors, and at the top of the stairways. Due to the extensive destruction as a result of the fire, no remains of the smoke detectors were found. Although not required by 

code due to the limited occupant load, exit signs and emergency lighting units had been installed 

in the corridors of the second floor guest room area. After extensive interviews with guests it was 

not determined if any of the above were in-place or operated at the time of the fire. Based on observations made at the time of the previous inspection, portable fire extinguishers were distributed 

throughout the building.

Building Service Features--When originally constructed the building was heated with two unlisted barrel-type wood stoves. Their use was discontinued sometime later, although they may have still been 

present in the building. At the time of the fire the building was supplied with heat from a woodburning device located in another building. The heat was piped from one building to another. There 

was a fireplace in the lounge area, toward the lake side of the lodge; however, its use at the time of 

the fire was doubtful.

THe FIRe

The fire at the Windigo Lodge occurred sometime between 3:30 a.m. and 4:21 a.m., on July 12, 

1991. The lodge was occupied by seven employees and seven guests at the time of the fire.

The fire was reported to the Cook County Sheriff’s Department at 4:21 a.m., by Donald Anderson, a 

guest staying in one of the cabins. Mr. Anderson stated he was awakened by a family member who 

heard shouting and glass breaking. Mr. Anderson dressed and ran to the lodge where he saw people 
USFA-TR-055/July 1991 5

jumping from windows. He ran to the west side of the building and entered the enclosed stairway 

vestibule where the phone was located. Mr. Anderson stated it was hot, dark, and smoky and he could 

not find the phone. He ran from the building to his pickup truck to get a flashlight. He then ran back 

to the west exit and was able to locate the phone. He was the first person to report the fire.

The Cook County Sheriff’s dispatcher immediately reported the fire to a number of neighboring 

lodge owners. These neighboring lodge owners responded to the Windigo Lodge with portable 

pumps and hoses. The magnitude of the fire, as described by one lodge owner, was that the lodge 

building was fully engulfed with flames upon his arrival. Two portable water pumps were placed 

in-service at the lake, one on the east and the other on the west side of the lodge. These hose streams 

were used to protect exposures. It was felt there was no sufficient hose streams to extinguish the 

lodge fire; therefore, no attempt was made.

The Windigo Lodge was allowed to burn throughout the day until the fire investigators were able to 

enlist the help of the U.S. Forest Service to bring in equipment to extinguish the smoldering remains 

of the structure. The investigation was then able to begin. 

CASUALTIeS

The individuals who perished, were injured, or escaped are as follows:

Victim Floor Room # Affiliation Deceased/Injured/

Escaped

Vincent Rolland Ekroot, Sr. 1st NE corner Owner Deceased

Vincent Charles Liestman 2nd #3 Employee Deceased

Donald Ray McComb 2nd #4 Guest Escaped

Adam Troy Maxwell 2nd #5 Employee Injured

Milan Frank Matetich 2nd #6 Guest Injured

Michelle Lynn Swenson 2nd #7 Guest Deceased

Greg James Swenson 2nd #7 Guest Deceased

William Joseph Nelson 2nd #8 Employee Injured

Bruce Wayne Kellerhuis 2nd #9 Guest Left at 3:30 a.m.

Brian Jay Porter 2nd #9 Guest Deceased

Robert William Reed 2nd #10 Employee Escaped

Glen Ray Wittman 3rd West Bedroom Guest Injured

Thomas Fredrick Cooley 3rd Spare Bedroom Guest

Charlette Geraldine Ekroot 3rd Master Bedroom Owner Injured

Gladys Lillian Merril 3rd Center West Bedroom Owner’s Mother Deceased

Duane Anderson Cabin Guest Injured
6 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

FIRe SPReAD

Due to the extensive fire damage and the almost complete destruction of all structural members, 

fire patterns were virtually impossible to observe and physical evidence was almost nonexistent. 

This lack of physical evidence and observable patterns means that the investigation must center on 

witness statements and any available fire modeling or empirical data available. The investigation is 

continuing at the time of this report and the cause has not yet been determined. However, witness 

accounts suggest that the fire originated on the first floor, possibly in the dining room area. Fire 

development was fast and overwhelmed occupants as they lay sleeping on all three floors.

It was further determined from witness statements that there was no early warning from smoke 

detectors; in fact, there is no witness who states they heard a smoke detector at any time during 

the fire.

The vertical openings in the structure certainly contributed to the rapid spread of the fire from the 

first floor to the third floor. There was little to stop the spread of fire and toxic smoke. In addition, 

the lack of early warning contributed to the spread as it may have gone unnoticed for a period of 

time before discovery.

E

One of the owners, Vince Ekroot, died in the fire. He was confined to the first floor due to a disability 

which restricted him to a wheelchair. There was no indication of an attempted escape. 

The ten rooms on the second floor, at the time of the fire, were occupied by four lodge employees 

and five guests. Three of the guests and one employee died in the fire. Two employees and one guest 

were able to jump from second floor windows, and one employee and one guest were able to escape 

using the interior building stairway before it became impassible. Two of the three persons who 

jumped were injured and one of the two using the stairs were injured while attempting to escape.

Four of the five bedrooms on the third floor were occupied at the time of the fire by Charlette Ekroot 

(owner), Charlette’s mother, Gladys Merril, and two guests. Two of the four died in the fire, the other 

two were seriously injured jumping from the windows.

CoDe In eFFeCT WHen LoDGe WAS bUILT

The building code in effect at the time of construction was the 1973 Uniform Building Code. The 

building code in this area of Minnesota is enforced by the Cook County Building Department.

The Windigo Lodge was the last inspected by the State Fire Marshal Division in 1988 and was on a 

3-year inspection cycle. There had reportedly been extensive remodeling done to the building after 

this inspection.

SMoKe DeTeCToR PeRFoRMAnCe

There were reportedly single station, battery-operated smoke detectors on the first and second floors 

of the lodge. It is uncertain but most likely they were not there. The witness statements said the only 

smoke detector in the building was located on the first floor near the bar.
USFA-TR-055/July 1991 7

LeSSonS LeARneD

1. The choice of early warning detection systems must be adequate for the type of occupancy.

The presence and operation of fire alarm equipment in this incident, such as smoke detectors, 

are somewhat in doubt. The smoke detectors were to have consisted of single station, batteryoperated detectors. One witness stated he heard an alarm; however, he believed it to be an alarm 

clock. Most of the survivors were awakened by other residents.

The usefulness of alarm devices not electrically powered, electronically supervised, or interconnected for this type of occupancy should be seriously questioned. Single station smoke detectors 

have value in single family residential settings where the detectors are meant to alert occupants 

of fire conditions in their immediate area. However, fire alarm systems provide a much higher 

level of fire safety over single station detectors in this application due to audibility concerns, 

maintenance, and lack of other fire protection features in the structure. In this particular case 

there are doubts as to whether the single station detectors were re-installed following the recent 

remodeling.

2. Open stairways are almost always a factor in the spread of smoke and fire; alternate, protected exits must be provided.

Unprotected vertical openings, three or more stories, were certainly a factor in the spread of fire 

and loss of life in this fire. Unfortunately, the same openings which allowed the vertical spread 

of heat and smoke were used as exits and contributed to the delay or impediment of egress from 

the building.

3. Code requirements must be complied with; lack of code-required compartmentation contributed to the outcome of this fire.

Based on the State Building Code in effect at the time of construction, a one-hour occupancy 

separation should have been provided between the assembly area (main floor) and the sleeping/

residential areas (upper floors) of this structure. This may have provided additional time and 

provided a protected exit system for the building’s occupants had it been coupled with an early 

warning alarm system.

4. Evacuation plans and procedures should be practiced by employees and supplied to guests 

in any hotel, motel, or guest lodge facility.

Based on the transient nature of the resort community, having an established plan that is practiced by employees and posted for guests is a vital necessity for this industry.

5. Decorative elements, such as the exposed ceiling beams in this case, require that special 

efforts be made to insure the fire-resistive integrity of the construction.

It was stated the ceiling construction on the first floor was drywall with exposed beams. However, 

there were indications from witnesses and photos that the drywall had large gaps where it met at 

the beams. This allowed fire to travel to the floor construction above and probably contributed 

significantly to the fire spread.
8 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

6. Facilities serving the public located in rural areas at a distance from fire and EMS services 

should take extraordinary responsibility themselves for fire and life safety.

Dependence upon a fire service organization for immediate fire and life safety protection in this 

application is not practical. The most efficient and effective fire and life safety protection can 

only be provided by the facility itself. Ensuring the building is built properly and meets fire and 

life safety codes, such as early warning detection systems, exiting, enclosure of vertical openings, compartmentation, and perhaps sprinklers, is the beginning for providing protection for 

guests in this type of occupancy. Further, given the wilderness area in which Windigo Lodge 

was located, better first aid and firefighting equipment, and the proper maintenance and training of employees in its use, are essential.

Without the proper precautions for fire and life safety, even if a fire department had been located 

as close as five minutes from this structure, it is questionable whether it would have been able 

to positively affect the outcome of this incident.

Responsibility for one’s own safety is also paramount for self protection. Recognizing safe conditions in buildings and not taking the risk of frequenting establishments without solid fire and 

life safety features would go a long way in ensuring personal survival.
9

APPenDIx A

Pre-fire Photographs of Windigo Lodge

Photo provided by the Minnesota State Fire Marshal

Windigo Lodge under construction. Poplar Lake can be seen in background at left.
10 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix A (continued)

Photo provided by the Minnesota State Fire Marshal

Dining room and lounge area on first floor. Note ceiling separations at log beams.
USFA-TR-055/July 1991 11

Appendix A (continued)

Photo provided by the Minnesota State Fire Marshal

East side of lodge.
12 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Photo provided by the Minnesota State Fire Marshal

Lake (south) side of lodge showing deck and stairway from basement walkout down to shoreline.

Appendix A (continued)
13

APPenDIx b

Windigo Lodge Site Plan WINDIGO LODGE

Site Plan
14

Appendix C

Windigo Lodge Floor Plans

WINDIGO LODGE

Gunflint Trail

Grand Marais, Minnesota

N
USFA-TR-055/July 1991 15

Appendix C (continued) WINDIGO LODGE

Gunflint Trail

Grand Marais, Minnesota
16 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix C (continued) WINDIGO LODGE

Gunflint Trail

Grand Marais, Minnesota
17

Appendix D

Photographs of Fire Scene

Photo by James W. David

View along north foundation wall shows total destruction of lodge by the fire.
18 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix D (continued)

Photo by James W. David

Remains of Lodge from west drive, facing lake.
USFA-TR-055/July 1991 19

Appendix D (continued)

Photo by James W. David

Remains of Windigo Lodge from east drive, facing lake.
20 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix D (continued)

Photo by James W. David

Entire structure was consumed by fire; east and north foundation walls shown here.
USFA-TR-055/July 1991 21

Appendix D (continued)

Photo by James W. David

East foundation wall and basement walkout to lake (off photo to left); basement wood frame construction consumed by fire.
22 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Appendix D (continued)

 Photo by James W. David

Damage to 3/4-inch copper water pipe from intense heat of the fire.