HURRICANE KATRINA:

A NATION STILL UNPREPARED

SPECIAL REPORT

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

UNITED STATES SENATE

TOGETHER WITH

ADDITIONAL VIEWS

Printed for the Use of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs

http://hsgac.senate.gov/

ORDERED TO BE PRINTED 

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 2006

FOR SALE BY THE SUPERINTENDENT OF DOCUMENTS

Cover Photo: Helicopter Rescue, New Orleans (Courtesy of U.S. Coast Guard)

109th Congress

2nd Session

SPECIAL REPORT S. Rept. 109-322

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TED STEVENS, Alaska

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota

TOM COBURN, M.D., Oklahoma

LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico

JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut

CARL LEVIN, Michigan

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware

MARK DAYTON, Minnesota

FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas

Majority Staff

Arthur W Adelberg, Senior Counsel

Melvin D. Albritton, Counsel

Kate C. Alford, Research Assistant

Jennifer C. Boone, FBI Detailee

Erin M. Bouchard, Intern

Allison J. Boyd, Counsel

Codias M. Brown, Legislative Correspondent

Donald L. Bumgardner, GAO Detailee

Jennifer S. Burita, Communications Director

Cyrus E. Cheslak, Intern

John H. Cobb, Senior Counsel

Th omas R. Eldridge, Senior Counsel

Ann C. Fisher, Deputy Staff Director

Keith A. Fleming, CBP Detailee

Jennifer E. Gagnon, Executive Assistant

Amy L. Hall, Professional Staff Member

Catherine A. Harrington, Intern

Jennifer A. Hemingway, Professional Staff Member

David E. Hunter, Staff Scientist

Clark T. Irwin, Editor/Professional Staff Member

Keith B. Janssen, USCG Detailee

Kathleen L. Kraninger, Professional Staff Member

Gordon N. Lederman, Special Counsel

Brian J. Lepore, GAO Detailee

Mira L. Lezell, Intern

Jay W. Maroney, Counsel

Asha A. Mathew, Counsel

James R. McKay, Counsel

Jonathan T. Nass, Counsel

David K. Porter, Counsel

Chad T. Sarchio, DOJ Detailee

Debra J. Schlagenhauf, Assistant Clerk

Kurt A. Schmautz, Counsel

Robert L. Strayer, Counsel

Jennifer L. Tarr, Research Assistant

Sarah V. Taylor, Research Assistant

Debra M. Th omas, Executive Assistant

Larry F. Vigil, Professional Staff Member

Monica A. Wickey, Legislative Correspondent

Minority Staff

Michael L. Alexander, Professional Staff Member*

Alistair F. Anagnostou, Staff Assistant

Eric P. Andersen, Professional Staff Member

David M. Berick, Professional Staff Member

Dan M. Berkovitz, Counsel, PSI

Stacey M. Bosshardt, Counsel

Janet L. Burrell, Offi ce Manager/Executive Assistant

Scott G. Campbell, Communications Advisor

William E. Corboy, Professional Staff Member

Troy H. Cribb, Counsel

Heather R. Fine, Counsel

Boris Y. Fishman, Editor

Susan A. Fleming, GAO Detailee

Jeff rey E. Greene, Counsel

Elyse F. Greenwald, Staff Assistant

Beth M. Grossman, Counsel

R. Denton Herring, GAO Detailee

Holly A. Idelson, Counsel

Kristine V. Lam, Staff Assistant

Kevin J. Landy, Senior Counsel

Joshua A. Levy, Counsel

Alysha S. Liljeqvist, Staff Assistant

F. James McGee, Professional Staff Member

Lawrence B. Novey, Senior Counsel

Siobhan C. Oat-Judge, Deputy Press Secretary

Leslie J. Phillips, Communications Director

A. Patricia Rojas, Professional Staff Member 

Mary Beth Schultz, Counsel

Adam R. Sedgewick, Professional Staff Member

Todd M. Stein, Counsel, Offi ce of Senator Lieberman

Traci L. Taylor, DOI Detailee

Donny Ray Williams, Jr., Professional Staff Member

Jason M. Yanussi, Professional Staff Member

Michael D. Bopp, Majority Staff Director and Chief Counsel

David T. Flanagan, Majority General Counsel, Katrina Investigation

Joyce A. Rechtschaff en, Minority Staff Director and Counsel

Laurie R. Rubenstein, Minority Chief Counsel

Robert F. Muse, Minority General Counsel, Katrina Investigation

Trina Driessnack Tyrer, Chief Clerk

Elisabeth F. Butler, Archivist

John S. Gleason, Financial Clerk

Megan T. Gorski, Documents Manager

Patricia R. Hogan, Publications Clerk/GPO Detailee

Daniel M. Muchow, Systems Administrator 

* Succeeded Ms. Rechtshaff en as Minority Staff Director on May 1, 2006.

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine, Chairman
iii

Note to Readers

Fellow Citizens:

In the late summer of 2005, millions of us watched the satellite images of Hurricane 

Katrina as it moved through the Gulf of Mexico and drove menacing swells of water 

toward the American coastline.

We watched in sympathy as hundreds of thousands of lives were upended when the 

hurricane struck the coasts of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. We watched in horror as hundreds died in collapsed or fl ooded houses and nursing homes.

We were heartened by acts of initiative, perseverance, and heroism by local responders 

and the U.S. Coast Guard but, to add bewilderment and outrage to our sense of tragedy, 

we were horrifi ed when the response to the Katrina catastrophe revealed – all too oft en, 

and for far too long – confusion, delay, misdirection, inactivity, poor coordination, and 

lack of leadership at all levels of government.

Meanwhile, thousands languished in heat and squalor on islands of concrete highway, 

in darkened stadiums, in nursing homes, or on rooft ops, waiting for rescue, sometimes 

dying before help arrived.

All of this unfolded nearly four years aft er the terror attacks of September 11, 2001; 

aft er a massive reorganization of federal plans and organizations for disaster response 

and billions of dollars of expenditures; and aft er a closely observed hurricane struck 

when and where forecasters said it would.

We knew Katrina was coming. How much worse would the nightmare have been if the 

disaster had been unannounced – an earthquake in San Francisco, a burst levee near St. 

Louis or Sacramento, a biological weapon smuggled into Boston Harbor, or a chemicalweapon terror attack in Chicago?

Hurricane Katrina found us – still – a nation unprepared for catastrophe.

Th e United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs 

has prepared this bipartisan report to acknowledge what was done well, to identify what 

was done poorly or not at all, and to recommend changes in our national system for 

emergency response that will put local, state, federal, and private responders in a better 

position to provide prompt and eff ective relief when disaster strikes again. Th e Committee conducted a long and thorough investigation of these issues, and is grateful for 

the work of its staff of investigators, writers, researchers, and other professionals that 

made this report possible.

We hope you fi nd it informative and, above all, useful.

Senator Susan M. Collins Senator Joseph I. Lieberman

Maine, Chairman Connecticut, Ranking Member
Table of Contents

iv

Hurricane Katrina: 

A Nation Still Unprepared

Contents Page

Preliminaries

Committee Members and Staff List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

Note to Readers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Narrative

Chapter 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Chapter 2 Hurricane Katrina: Indicators of Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Chapter 3 Hurricanes and the Gulf Coast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Chapter 4 Katrina Strikes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Chapter 5 Hurricane Katrina: Timeline of Key Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

Analysis

Chapter 6 Emergency Management: Louisiana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

Chapter 7 Emergency Management: Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

Chapter 8 “Hurricane Pam”: Warning Flag for Katrina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

Chapter 9 Eff ects of Environmental and Engineering Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

Chapter 10 Levees: Who’s in Charge? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

Chapter 11 “Th e New Orleans Scenario”: State and Local Preparations . . . . . . . . . . 149

Chapter 12 Federal Preparations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

Chapter 13 Department of Homeland Security. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203

Chapter 14 Th e Federal Emergency Management Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211

Chapter 15 Government Response: Th e Role of the White House . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233

Chapter 16 Pre-Storm Evacuations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243

Chapter 17 Why the New Orleans Levees Failed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275

Chapter 18 Communication Voids . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287

Chapter 19 Lack of Situational Awareness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303

Chapter 20 Protecting Infrastructure; Public Communication; 

Role of the Media. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321

Chapter 21 Search and Rescue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331

Chapter 22 Post-Landfall Evacuation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359
Table of Contents

v

Chapter 23 Logistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 375

Chapter 24 Medical Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 399

Chapter 25 Public Safety and Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 439

Chapter 26 Military Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 467

Chapter 27 Failures in National Response Plan: Unifi ed Command . . . . . . . . . . . . 551

Chapter 28 FEMA Waste and Fraud . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 577

Results

Overview: Conclusions and Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 585

Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 589

Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 607

Appendices

Appendix 1 Common Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 631

Appendix 2 Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 635

Appendix 3 Committee Hearings on Hurricane Katrina. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 637

Appendix 4 HSGAC Interviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 643

Appendix 5 Members’ Additional Views

 Senators Collins, Stevens, Coleman, Coburn, Bennett, and Domenici . . 665

 Senators Lieberman, Levin, Akaka, Carper, Lautenberg, and Pryor . . . 667

 Senator Voinovich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 701

 Senator Coburn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 705

 Senator Domenici . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 709

 Senator Warner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 713

 Senator Levin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 717

 Senators Akaka, Lautenberg, and Pryor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 721

 Senator Dayton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 725

 Senator Lautenberg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 729

1

Executive Summary

Hurricane Katrina:

A Nation Still 

Unprepared
2

Executive Summary

Hurricane Katrina was an extraordinary act of nature that spawned a human tragedy. It was the most destructive natural disaster in American history, laying waste 

to 90,000 square miles of land, an area the size of the United Kingdom. In Mississippi, the storm surge obliterated coastal communities and left thousands destitute. New 

Orleans was overwhelmed by fl ooding. All told, more than 1,500 people died. Along the 

Gulf Coast, tens of thousands suff ered without basic essentials for almost a week.

But the suff ering that continued in the days and weeks aft er the storm passed did not happen in a vacuum; instead, it continued longer than it should have because of – and was in 

some cases exacerbated by – the failure of government at all levels to plan, prepare for, and 

and respond aggressively to the storm. Th ese failures were not just conspicuous; they were 

pervasive. Among the many factors that contributed to these failures, the Committee found 

that there were four overarching ones:

1. Long-term warnings went unheeded and government offi cials neglected their duties to prepare 

for a forewarned catastrophe;

2. Government offi cials took insuffi cient actions 

or made poor decisions in the days immediately 

before and aft er landfall;

3. Systems on which offi cials relied on to support 

their response eff orts failed; and

4. Government offi cials at all levels failed to provide eff ective leadership.

Th ese individual failures, moreover, occurred against a 

backdrop of failure, over time, to develop the capacity for 

a coordinated, national response to a truly catastrophic 

event, whether caused by nature or man-made. 

Th e results were tragic loss of life and human suff ering on a massive scale, and an undermining of confi dence in our governments’ ability to plan, prepare for, and respond to 

national catastrophes. 

Eff ective response to mass emergencies is a critical role of every level of government. It is a 

role that requires an unusual level of planning, coordination, and dispatch among governments’ diverse units. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, this country 

went through one of the most sweeping reorganizations of the federal government in history. While driven primarily by concerns of terrorism, the reorganization was designed to 

strengthen our nation’s ability to address the consequences of both natural and man-made 

disasters. In its fi rst major test, this reorganized system failed. Katrina revealed that much 

remains to be done. 

Th e Committee began this investigation of the preparations for and response to Hurricane 

Katrina within two weeks of the hurricane’s landfall on the Gulf Coast. Th e tragic loss of life 

and human suff ering in Katrina’s wake would have been suffi cient in themselves to compel 

the Committee’s attention. But the conspicuous failures in governments’ emergency preparedness and response added a sense of urgency to the investigation – not only because of 

Hurricane Katrina over the 

Gulf Coast, August 2005

NOAA photo

Executive Summary
3

our heightened national awareness of the dangers of both terrorist acts and natural disasters, but because so much eff ort had been directed towards improvement. 

Th e Committee’s investigation has been bipartisan, and has examined in detail the actions 

of offi cials of local, state, and federal government departments and agencies. Th ough suffering was pervasive across the Gulf Coast, the Committee focused most of its eff orts on 

the response in New Orleans, where massive fl ooding presented extraordinary challenges 

to responders and victims alike. In addition, the investigation centered largely on the initial 

response to the hurricane in the critical week or so aft er the storm hit. We have conducted 

formal interviews of more than 325 witnesses, reviewed over 838,000 pages of documentation, and conducted 22 public hearings with 85 witnesses in the course of our information 

gathering eff orts. 

Most of the hearings focused on what went wrong in Katrina. Two of the hearings, however, 

examined the successes: the eff ective and heroic search-and-rescue eff orts by the U.S. Coast 

Guard; and the outstanding performance of certain members of the private sector in restoring essential services to the devastated communities and providing relief to the victims.

Th ese successes shared some important traits. Th e Coast Guard and certain private-sector 

businesses both conducted extensive planning and training for disasters, and they put that 

preparation into use when disaster struck. Both moved material assets and personnel out 

of harm’s way as the storm approached, but kept them close enough to the front lines for 

quick response aft er it passed. Perhaps most important, both had empowered front-line 

leaders who were able to make decisions when they needed to be made.

The Roles of the Different Levels of 

Government in Disaster Response

Assessing the government’s response to Katrina requires, at the outset, an understanding 

of the roles of government entities and their leaders and the framework within which they 

operate. Every level of government, and many components within each level, play important roles. At every level of government, the chief executive has the ultimate responsibility 

to manage an emergency response. 

It has long been standard practice that emergency response begins at the lowest possible 

jurisdictional level – typically the local government, with state government becoming 

involved at the local government’s request when the resources of local government are (or 

are expected to be) overwhelmed. Similarly, while the federal government provides ongoing 

fi nancial support to state and local governments for emergency preparedness, ordinarily it 

becomes involved in responding to a disaster at a state’s request when resources of state and 

local governments are (or are expected to be) overwhelmed. Louisiana’s Emergency Operations Plan explicitly lays out this hierarchy of response.

During a catastrophe, which by defi nition almost immediately exceeds state and local resources and signifi cantly disrupts governmental operations and emergency services, the role 

of the federal government is particularly vital, and it would reasonably be expected to play a 

more substantial role in response than it would in an “ordinary” disaster.

Long-Term and Short-Term Warnings Went Unheeded

Th e Committee has worked to identify and understand the sources of the government’s 

inadequate response and recovery eff orts. And while this Report does not purport to have 

 Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Uprepared
4

Executive Summary

identifi ed every such source, it is clear that there was no lack of information about the devastating potential of Katrina, or the uncertain strength of the levees and fl oodwalls protecting New Orleans, or the likely needs of survivors. Nonetheless, top offi cials at every level 

of government – despite strongly worded advisories from the National Hurricane Center 

(NHC) and personal warnings from NHC Director Max Mayfi eld – did not appear to truly 

grasp the magnitude of the storm’s potential for destruction before it made landfall. 

Th e potentially devastating threat of a catastrophic hurricane to the Gulf Coast has been 

known for 40 years: New Orleans experienced fl ooding in some areas of remarkably similar 

proportions from Hurricane Betsy in 1965, and Hurricane Camille devastated the Gulf 

Coast in 1969. More recently, numerous experts and governmental offi cials had been anticipating an increase in violent hurricanes, and New Orleans’ special and growing vulnerability to catastrophic fl ooding due to changing geological and other conditions was widely 

described in both technical and popular media. 

Hurricane Georges hit the Gulf Coast in 1998, spurring the State of Louisiana to ask Federal 

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for assistance with catastrophic hurricane planning. Little was accomplished for the next six years. Between 2000 and 2003, state authorities, an emergency-preparedness 

contractor, and FEMA’s own 

regional staff repeatedly advised 

FEMA headquarters in Washington that planning for evacuation 

and shelter for the “New Orleans 

scenario” was incomplete and 

inadequate, but FEMA failed to 

approach other federal agencies 

for help with transportation and 

shelter or to ensure that the city 

and state had the matters in hand.

Th en, in 2004, aft er a White 

House aide received a briefi ng on 

the catastrophic consequences 

of a Category 3 hurricane hitting 

New Orleans, the federal government sponsored a planning 

exercise, with participation from 

federal, state, and local offi cials, 

based on a scenario whose characteristics foreshadowed most of 

Katrina’s impacts. While this hypothetical “Hurricane Pam” exercise resulted in draft plans beginning in early 2005, they were 

incomplete when Katrina hit. Nonetheless, some offi cials took the initiative to use concepts 

developed in the draft s, with mixed success, in the critical aspects of the Katrina response. 

However, many of its admonitory lessons were either ignored or inadequately applied. 

During the Hurricane Pam exercise, offi cials determined that massive fl ooding from a catastrophic storm in New Orleans could threaten the lives of 60,000 people and trap hundreds 

of thousands more, while incapacitating local resources for weeks to months. Th e Pam 

exercise gave all levels of government a reminder that the “New Orleans scenario” required 

more forethought, preparation, and investment than a “typical” storm. Also, it reinforced 

Katrina’s track of disaster

Geography and Map Division, 

The Library of Congress
5

the importance of coordination both within and among federal, state, and local governments for an eff ective response.

Th e specifi c danger that Katrina posed to the Gulf Coast became clear on the aft ernoon of 

Friday, August 26, when forecasters at NHC and the National Weather Service (NWS) saw 

that the storm was turning west. First in phone calls to Louisiana emergency-management 

offi cials and then in their 5 p.m. ET Katrina forecast and accompanying briefi ngs, they 

alerted both Louisiana and Mississippi that the track of the storm was now expected to shift 

signifi cantly to the west of its original track toward the Florida panhandle. NHC warned 

that Katrina could be a Category 4 or even a Category 5 by landfall. By the next morning, 

NWS offi cials directly confi rmed to the Governor of Louisiana and other state and local offi cials that New Orleans was squarely at risk. 

Over the weekend, there was a drumbeat of warnings: FEMA held video-teleconferences 

on both days, where the danger of Katrina and the particular risks to New Orleans were 

discussed; NHC’s Max Mayfi eld called the governors of the aff ected states, something he 

had only done once before in his 33-year career; President Bush took the unusual step of 

declaring, in advance, an emergency for the states in the impact zone; numerous media 

reports noted that New Orleans was a “bowl,” and could be left submerged by the storm; the 

Department of Homeland Security’s Simulation and Analysis group generated a report stating that the levees protecting New Orleans were at risk of breaching and overtopping; and 

internal FEMA slides stated that the projected impacts of Katrina could be worse than those 

in the Hurricane Pam exercise. Th e warnings were as widespread as they were dire.

Preparation Proved Insuffi cient 

Katrina was not a “typical” hurricane as it approached landfall; it was much larger, more 

powerful, and was capable of producing catastrophic damage. 

In some respects, offi cials did prepare for Katrina with the understanding that it could be a 

catastrophe. Some coastal towns in Mississippi went to extraordinary lengths to get citizens 

to evacuate, including sending people door-to-door to convince and cajole people to move 

out of harm’s way. Th e State of Louisiana activated more than twice the number of National 

Guard troops called to duty in any prior hurricane, and achieved the largest evacuation of 

a threatened population ever to occur. Th e City of New Orleans issued its fi rst ever mandatory evacuation order. Th e Coast Guard readied its personnel, pre-positioned its equipment, 

and stood by to begin search-and-rescue operations as quickly as humanly possible. Departing from usual practice, the governors of the three aff ected states requested, and President 

Bush issued, emergency declarations before the storm made landfall. 

But however vigorous these preparations, ineff ective leadership, poor advance planning, 

and an unwillingness to devote suffi cient resources to emergency management over the 

long term doomed them to fail when Katrina struck. Despite the understanding of the Gulf 

Coast’s particular vulnerability to hurricane devastation, offi cials braced for Katrina with 

full awareness of critical defi ciencies in their plans and gaping holes in their resources. 

While Katrina’s destructive force could not be denied, state and local offi cials did not marshal enough of the resources at their disposal. 

In addition, years of short-changing federal, state, and local emergency functions left them 

incapable of fully carrying out their missions to protect the public and care for victims. For 

example, the lack of survivable, interoperable communications, which Governor Haley 

Barbour of Mississippi said was the most critical problem in his state, occurred because of 

 Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Uprepared
6

Executive Summary

an accumulation of decisions by federal, state, and local offi cials that left this long-standing 

problem unsolved. 

Th e Committee believes that leadership failures needlessly compounded these losses. New 

Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin and Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco – who knew the limitations of their resources to address a catastrophe – did not specify those needs adequately 

to the federal government before landfall. For example, while Governor Blanco stated in a 

letter to President Bush, two days before landfall, that she anticipated the resources of the 

state would be overwhelmed, she made no specifi c request for assistance in evacuating the 

known tens of thousands of people without means of transportation, and a senior State 

offi cial identifi ed no unmet needs in response to a federal off er of assistance the following 

day. Th e State’s transportation secretary also ignored his responsibilities under the state’s 

emergency operations plan, leaving no arm of the State government prepared to obtain 

and deliver additional transportation to those in New Orleans who lacked it when Katrina 

struck. In view of the long-standing role of requests as a trigger for action by higher levels of 

government, the State bears responsibility for not signaling its needs to the federal government more clearly. 

Compounded by leadership failures of its own, the federal government bears responsibility 

for not preparing eff ectively for its role in the post-storm response.

FEMA was unprepared for a catastrophic event of the scale of Katrina. Well before Katrina, 

FEMA’s relationships with state and local offi cials, once a strength, had been eroded in part 

because certain preparedness grant programs were transferred elsewhere in the Department 

of Homeland Security (DHS). With its importance to state and local preparedness activities reduced, FEMA’s eff ectiveness was diminished. In addition, at no time in its history, 

including in the years before it became part of DHS, had FEMA developed – nor had it been 

designed to develop – response capabilities suffi cient for a catastrophe, nor had it developed 

the capacity to mobilize suffi cient resources from other federal agencies, and the private and 

nonprofi t sectors. 

Moreover, FEMA’s former Director, Michael Brown, lacked the leadership skills that were 

needed. Before landfall, Brown did not direct the adequate pre-positioning of critical personnel and equipment, and willfully failed to communicate with DHS Secretary, Michael 

Chertoff , to whom he was supposed to report. Earlier in the hurricane season, FEMA had 

pre-positioned an unprecedented amount of relief supplies in the region. But the supplies 

were not enough. Similarly, while both FEMA and the Department of Health and Human 

Services (HHS) made eff orts to activate the federal emergency health capabilities of the 

National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) and the U.S. Public Health Service (PHS), only a 

limited number of federal medical teams were actually in position prior to landfall to deploy 

into the aff ected area. Only one such team was in a position to provide immediate medical 

care in the aft ermath of the storm.

More broadly, DHS – as the Department charged with preparing for and responding to 

domestic incidents, whether terrorist attacks or natural disasters – failed to eff ectively lead 

the federal response to Hurricane Katrina. DHS leadership failed to bring a sense of urgency 

to the federal government’s preparation for Hurricane Katrina, and Secretary Chertoff 

himself should have been more engaged in preparations over the weekend before landfall. 

Secretary Chertoff made only top-level inquiries into the state of preparations, and accepted 

uncritically the reassurances he received. He did not appear to reach out to the other Cabinet secretaries to make sure that they were readying their departments to provide whatever 

assistance DHS – and the people of the Gulf Coast – might need. 
7

Similarly, had he invoked the Catastrophic Incident Annex of the National Response Plan 

(NRP-CIA), Secretary Chertoff could have helped remove uncertainty about the federal 

government’s need and authority to take initiative before landfall and signaled that all 

federal government agencies were expected to think – and act – proactively in preparing for 

and responding to Katrina. Th e Secretary’s activation of the NRP-CIA could have increased 

the urgency of the federal response and led the federal government to respond more proactively rather than waiting for formal requests from overwhelmed state and local offi cials. 

Because delay may preclude meaningful 

assistance and state and local resources may 

be quickly overwhelmed and incapacitated, 

the NRP-CIA directs federal agencies to preposition resources without awaiting requests 

from the state and local governments. Even 

then, except in certain prescribed circumstances, the NRP-CIA holds these resources 

at mobilization sites until requested by state 

and local offi cials. 

Th e military also had a role to play, and ultimately, the National Guard and active-duty 

military troops and assets deployed during 

Katrina constituted the largest domestic 

deployment of military forces since the Civil 

War. And while the Department of Defense 

(DOD) took additional steps to prepare for 

Katrina beyond those it had taken for prior 

civil-support missions, its preparations were 

not suffi cient for a storm of Katrina’s magnitude. Individual commanders took actions 

that later helped improve the response, but 

these actions were not coordinated by the 

Department. Th e Department’s preparations 

were consistent with how DOD interpreted 

its role under the NRP, which was to provide support in response to requests for assistance 

from FEMA. However, additional preparations in advance of specifi c requests for support 

could have enabled a more rapid response. 

In addition, the White House shares responsibility for the inadequate pre-landfall preparations. To be sure, President Bush, at the request of Brown, did take the initiative to personally call Governor Blanco to urge a mandatory evacuation. As noted earlier, he also took the 

unusual step of declaring an emergency in the Gulf Coast States prior to Katrina’s landfall. 

On the other hand, the President did not leave his Texas ranch to return to Washington 

until two days aft er landfall, and only then convened his Cabinet, as well as a White House 

task force, to oversee federal response eff orts.

Response at all Levels of 

Government Was Unacceptable

Th e eff ect of the long-term failures at every level of government to plan and prepare adequately for a catastrophic hurricane in the Gulf of Mexico was evident in the inadequate 

preparations before Katrina’s landfall and then again in the initial response to the storm.

Waiting for help, New Orleans

Photo © 2005 The Times-Picayune 

Publishing Co., all rights reserved. 

Used with permission of the TimesPicayune

 Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Uprepared
8

Executive Summary

Search and Rescue

Flooding in New Orleans drove thousands of survivors to attics and rooft ops to await rescue. Some people were trapped in attics and nursing homes and drowned as the dirty waters 

rose around them. Others escaped only by chopping their way through roofs. Infrastructure 

damage complicated the organization and conduct of search-and-rescue missions in New 

Orleans and elsewhere. Destruction of communications towers and equipment, in particular, limited the ability of crews to communicate with one another, undermining coordination and effi ciency. Rescuers also had to contend with weapons fi re, debris, and polluted 

water. Th e skill and dedication of Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (W&F) 

offi cials and others working in these adverse conditions stand out as a singular success story 

of the hurricane response.

Applying a model developed in the Hurricane Pam exercise, rescue teams in Louisiana 

brought hurricane victims to high ground, where they were supposed to receive food, water, 

medical attention, and transport to shelters. Here, too, there were problems. Poor communications delayed state and federal offi cials’ learning about where rescuees had been 

dropped, in turn slowing shipments of food and water to those areas. Th e City of New 

Orleans was unprepared to help people evacuate, as many buses from the city’s own fl eet 

were submerged, while offi cials had not arranged in advance for drivers for those buses that 

were available. 

Th e storm also laid waste to much of the city’s police, whose headquarters and several district offi ces, along with hundreds of vehicles, rounds of ammunition, and uniforms were all 

destroyed within the fi rst two days of landfall.

Planning for search and rescue was also insuffi cient. FEMA, for instance, failed to provide 

boats for its search-and-rescue teams even though fl ooding had been confi rmed by Tuesday. Moreover, interagency coordination was inadequate at both the state and federal levels. 

While the Louisiana W&F and FEMA are responsible for interagency search-and-rescue 

coordination at the state and federal levels, respectively, neither developed adequate plans 

for this mission. Staggeringly, the City of New Orleans Fire Department (NOFD) owned no 

boats, and the New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) owned fi ve. Meanwhile, widespread communications failures in Louisiana and Mississippi were so bad that many offi cers 

reverted to either physically running messages from one person to another, or passing messages along a daisy chain of offi cers using radios with limited range.

Situational Awareness

While authorities recognized the need to begin search-and-rescue missions even before the 

hurricane winds fully subsided, other aspects of the response were hindered by a failure to 

quickly recognize the dimensions of the disaster. Th ese problems were particularly acute 

at the federal level. Th e Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) – charged with 

providing reliable information to decision makers including the Secretary of DHS and the 

President – failed to create a system to identify and acquire all available, relevant information, and as a result situational awareness was deeply fl awed.

With local and state resources immediately overwhelmed, rapid federal mobilization of 

resources was critical. Yet reliable information on such vital developments as the levee 

failures, the extent of fl ooding, and the presence of thousands of people in need of life-sustaining assistance at the New Orleans Convention Center did not reach the White House, 

Secretary Chertoff , or other key offi cials for hours, and in some cases more than a day. 

Brown, then in Louisiana, contributed to the problem by refusing to communicate with 

Secretary Chertoff , opting instead to pass information directly to White House staff . Moreover, even though senior DHS offi cials did receive, on the day of landfall, numerous reports 
9

that should have led to an understanding of the increasingly dire situation in New Orleans, 

many indicated they were not aware of the crisis until sometime Tuesday morning.

DHS was slow to recognize the scope of the disaster or that FEMA had become overwhelmed. On the day aft er landfall, DHS offi cials were still struggling to determine the 

“ground truth” about the extent of the fl ooding despite the many reports they had received 

about the catastrophe; key offi cials did not grasp the need to act on the less-than-complete 

information that is to be expected in a disaster. DHS leaders did not become fully engaged 

in recovery eff orts until Th ursday, when in Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson’s words, they 

“tried to kick it up a notch”; aft er that, they did provide signifi cant leadership within DHS 

(and FEMA) as well as coordination across the federal government. But this eff ort should 

have begun sooner.

DOD also was slow to acquire information regarding the extent of the storm’s devastation. 

DOD offi cials relied primarily on media reports for their information. Many senior DOD 

offi cials did not learn that the levees had breached until Tuesday; some did not learn until 

Wednesday. As DOD waited for DHS to provide information about the scope of the damage, 

it also waited for the lead federal agency, FEMA, to identify the support needed from DOD. 

Th e lack of situational awareness during this phase appears to have been a major reason for 

DOD’s belated adoption of the forward-looking posture necessary in a catastrophic incident.

Post-Storm Evacuation

Overwhelmed by Katrina, the city and state turned to FEMA for help. On Monday, Governor Blanco asked Brown for buses, and Brown assured the state the same day that 500 

buses were en route to assist in the evacuation of New Orleans and would arrive within 

hours. In spite of Brown’s assurances and the state’s continued requests over the course 

of the next two days, FEMA did not direct the U.S. Department of Transportation to send 

buses until very early on Wednesday, two days aft er landfall. Th e buses did not begin to 

arrive until Wednesday evening, and not in signifi cant numbers until Th ursday. Concerned 

over FEMA’s delay in providing buses – and handicapped by the Louisiana Department of 

Transportation and Development’s utter failure to make any preparation to carry out its 

lead role for evacuation under the state’s emergency plan – Governor Blanco directed members of her offi ce to begin locating buses on Tuesday and approved an eff ort to commandeer 

school buses for evacuation on Wednesday. But these eff orts were too little, too late. Tens of 

thousands of people were forced to wait in unspeakably horrible conditions until as late as 

Saturday to be evacuated. 

Logistics and Military Support

Problems with obtaining, communicating, and managing information plagued many other 

aspects of the response as well. FEMA lacked the tools to track the status of shipments, 

interfering with the management of supplying food, water, ice, and other vital commodities to those in need across the Gulf Coast. So, too, did the incompatibility of the electronic 

systems used by federal and state authorities to manage requests for assistance, which made 

it necessary to transfer requests from the state system to the federal system manually.

Supplies of commodities were especially problematic. Federal shipments to Mississippi did 

not reach adequate levels until 10 days aft er landfall. Th e reasons for this are unclear, but 

FEMA’s inadequate “surge capacity” – the ability to quickly ramp up the volume of shipments – is a likely cause. In both Mississippi and Louisiana, there were additional problems 

in getting the supplies the “last mile” to individuals in need. Both states planned to make 

supplies available for pickup at designated distribution points, but neither anticipated the 

problems people would face in reaching those points, due to impassable roads or other issues. And in Louisiana, the National Guard was not equipped to assume this task. One of 

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Uprepared 
10

Louisiana’s greatest shortages was portable toilets, which were requested for the Superdome 

but never arrived there, as more than 20,000 people were forced to stay in the Superdome 

without working plumbing for nearly a week.

For their part, Louisiana and Mississippi relied heavily on support from other states to 

supplement their own emergency resources. Both states were parties to an interstate agreement known as the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), which provides 

a system for sharing National Guard troops and other resources in natural disasters. As in 

many other areas of the Katrina response, however, the magnitude of the demands strained 

the EMAC process and revealed limitations in the system. Paperwork burdens proved overwhelming. Louisiana experienced diffi culties processing the volume of incoming resources. 

On Wednesday, August 31, the federal National Guard Bureau, which ordinarily serves 

a coordinating function within DOD, relieved Louisiana and Mississippi of many of the 

bureaucratic responsibilities by making direct requests for available troops to state adjutants 

general.

Th is process quickly resulted in the largest National Guard deployment in U.S. history, with 

50,000 troops and supporting equipment arriving from 49 states and four territories within 

two weeks. Th ese forces participated in every aspect of emergency response, from medical 

care to law enforcement and debris removal, and were considered invaluable by Louisiana 

and Mississippi offi cials.

Although this process successfully deployed a large number of National Guard troops, it did 

not proceed effi ciently, or according to any pre-existing plan or process. Th ere is, in fact, no 

established process for the large-scale, nation-wide deployment of National Guard troops 

for civil support. In addition, the deployments of National Guard troops were not coordinated with the federal Northern Command, which was overseeing the large-scale deployments and operations of the active-duty military (i.e., Regular and activated Reserve forces). 

While the NRP has specifi c procedures for active-duty involvement in natural disasters, the 

deployment of these troops raised unforeseen issues and was initially a source of frustration 

to Governor Blanco. Th e Governor directed her adjutant general to secure additional troops 

on the day aft er landfall, but federal and state offi cials did not coordinate her requests well, 

and ground troops didn’t arrive in signifi cant numbers for several days. DOD chose to rely 

primarily on the deployment of National Guard troops (versus federal active-duty troops) 

pursuant to its declared strategy and because it believed they were best suited to the required tasks, including performing law enforcement. In addition, the need to resolve command issues between National Guard and active-duty forces – an issue taken up (but not 

resolved) in a face-to-face meeting between President Bush and the Governor on Air Force 

One on the Friday aft er landfall – may have played a role in the timing of active-duty troop 

deployments. Th e issue became moot as the two forces stayed under their separate commands, an arrangement that turned out to work well in this case, thanks to the cooperation 

of the respective commanders.

While the large numbers of active-duty troops did not arrive until the end of the fi rst week 

following landfall, National Guard troops did, and DOD contributed in other important 

ways during that period. Early in the week, DOD ordered its military commanders to 

push available assets to the Gulf Coast. Th ey also streamlined their ordinarily bureaucratic 

processes for handling FEMA requests for assistance and emphasized movement based on 

vocal commands with the paperwork to follow, though some FEMA offi cials believe that 

DOD’s approval process continued to take too long. Th ey provided signifi cant support to 

search-and-rescue missions, evacuee airlift s, logistics management of buses arriving in the 

state for evacuation, and other matters. 

Executive Summary
11

Toward the end of the week, with its own resources stretched thin, FEMA turned to DOD 

to take over logistics for all commodity movements. DOD acceded to the request, and 

provided some logistics assistance to FEMA. However, it did not undertake the complete 

logistical take-over initially requested by FEMA because that was not needed. 

By Tuesday aft ernoon, the New Orleans Superdome had become overcrowded, leading 

offi cials to turn additional refugees away. Mayor Nagin then decided to open the Morial 

Convention Center as a second refuge of last resort inside the city, but did not supply it with 

food or water. Moreover, he communicated his decision to open the Convention Center to 

state and federal offi cials poorly, if at all. Th at failure, in addition to the delay of shipments 

due to security concerns and DHS’s own independent lack of awareness of the situation, 

contributed to the paucity of food, water, security, and medical care at the Convention 

Center, as a population of approximately 19,000 gathered there. Th ose vital commodities 

and services did not arrive until Friday, when the Louisiana National Guard, assisted by 

National Guard units from fi ve other states, brought in relief supplies provided by FEMA, 

established law and order, and then evacuated the Convention Center on Saturday within 

eight hours. 

Law Enforcement

Law enforcement outside the Superdome and the Convention Center was a problem, and 

was fueled by several contributing factors, including erroneous statements by top city offi cials that infl amed the public’s perception of lawlessness in New Orleans. 

Without eff ective law enforcement, real or imagined safety threats interrupted virtually 

every aspect of the response. Fearing for their personal safety, medical and search-and-rescue teams withdrew from their missions. FEMA and commercial vendors of critical supplies oft en refused to make deliveries until military escorts could be arranged. In fact, there 

was some lawlessness, yet for every actual act there were rumors of dozens more, leading 

to widespread and inaccurate reporting that severely complicated a desperate situation. 

Unfortunately, local, state, and federal offi cials did little to stanch this rumor fl ow. Police 

presence on the streets was inadequate, in part because in a matter of hours Katrina turned 

the NOPD from protectors of the public to victims of the storm. Nonetheless, most New 

Orleans police offi cers appear to have reported for duty, many setting aside fears about the 

safety of their families or the status of their homes. 

Even so, the ability of the offi cers who remained to perform their duties was signifi cantly 

hampered by the lack of basic supplies. While supplies such as weapons and ammunition 

were lost to fl ooding, the NOPD leadership did not provide its offi cers with basic necessities 

such as food; nor did the department have logistics in place to handle supplies. Members of 

the NOPD also identifi ed the lack of a unifi ed command for this incident as a major problem; eight members of the command staff were extremely critical of the lack of leadership 

from the City’s Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness (OEP). Th e department’s rank and fi le 

were unfamiliar with both the department’s and the city’s emergency-operations manuals 

and other hurricane emergency procedures. Defi ciencies in the NOPD’s manual, lack of 

training on this manual, lack of familiarity with it, or a combination of the three resulted in 

inadequate protection of department resources.

Federal law-enforcement assistance was too slow in coming, in large part because the two 

federal departments charged under the NRP with providing such assistance – DHS and the 

Department of Justice (DOJ) – had done almost no pre-storm planning. In fact, they failed 

to determine even well into the post-landfall period which of the two departments would 

assume the lead for federal law enforcement under the NRP. As a result, later in the week, as 

federal law-enforcement offi cers did arrive, some were distracted by a pointless “turf war” 

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Uprepared 
12

Executive Summary

between DHS and DOJ over which agency was in the lead. In the end, federal assistance was 

crucial, but should have arrived much sooner.

Health Care

Safety concerns were only one of numerous challenges faced by health-care providers. Th ere 

were numerous other challenges, including the following:

• Medical teams had to triage more than 70,000 rescuees and evacuees and 

provide acute care to the sick and wounded. While offi cials used plans developed in the Hurricane Pam exercise as a helpful framework for managing this 

process, existing emergency-room facilities were overwhelmed by the volume 

of patients. Local and state offi cials quickly set up temporary fi eld hospitals at a 

sports arena and a K-Mart in Baton Rouge to supplement hospital capacity.

• New Orleans had a large population of “special-needs patients,” individuals 

living at home who required ongoing medical assistance. Before Katrina struck, 

the City Health Department activated a plan to establish a care facility for this 

population within the Superdome and provided transportation to evacuate 

several hundred patients and their caregivers to Baton Rouge. While Superdome facilities proved useful in treating special-needs patients who remained 

behind, they had to contend with shortages of supplies, physical damage to 

the facility necessitating a post-landfall relocation of patients and equipment 

to an area adjacent to the Superdome, and a population of more than 20,000 

people using the Superdome as a refuge of last resort. Also, FEMA’s Disaster 

Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs) which provide the invaluable resources 

of pharmacies and hospital equipment, arrived at the Superdome on the night 

following landfall, but left temporarily on Th ursday, before the evacuation of 

the Superdome’s special-needs population was completed, because of security 

concerns.

• In Louisiana, hospitals had to evacuate aft er landfall on short notice, principally due to loss of electrical power. While hospitals had evacuated some of 

their patients before landfall, they had retained others thought to be too frail 

for transport, and believed that by staying open they would be available to 

serve hurricane victims. Th eir strategy became untenable aft er landfall when 

power was lost, and their backup generators were rendered inoperable by 

fl ooding and fuel shortages. Th e Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH) stepped in to arrange for their evacuation; while successful, it had 

to compete with search-and-rescue teams for helicopters and other needed 

resources. 

• Many nursing homes in and around New Orleans lacked adequate evacuation plans. Although they were required to have plans on fi le with local government, there was no process to ensure that there were suffi cient resources to 

evacuate all the nursing homes at once, and dozens of patients who were not 

evacuated died. When evacuation became necessary, some sent their patients 

to the Superdome, where offi cials, struggling to handle the volume of patients 

already there, were obliged to accept still more. 

Long-Term Factors Contributed to the Poor Response

Actions taken – and failures to act – well before Katrina struck compounded the problems 

resulting from the ineff ective leadership that characterized the immediate preparations for 
13

the hurricane and the post-landfall response. A common theme of these earlier actions is 

underfunding emergency preparedness. While the Committee did not examine the confl icting political or budget priorities that may have played a role, in many cases the shortsightedness associated with the underfunding is glaring. Among notable examples are the 

following:

• Th e Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness 

(LOHSEP), the state counterpart to FEMA, suff ered chronic staffi ng problems 

and employee turnover due to underfunding. LOHSEP’s planning chief also 

testifi ed that lack of resources prevented the agency from meeting its schedule 

for periodic review and updates of state emergency plans.

• Th e Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness for New Orleans, a city long known to 

be among the nation’s most vulnerable to a catastrophic hurricane, had a staff 

of only three. Its police and fi re departments, responsible for search-and-rescue activities, had fi ve boats and no boats, respectively. In 2004, the city turned 

down a request by the NOFD to fund the purchase of six additional boats.

• Th e Hurricane Pam exercise faced repeated delays due to funding constraints. 

It took nearly fi ve years for the federal government to approve the state’s initial 

funding request, and the limited funding fi nally granted necessitated last-minute cutbacks in the scope of the exercise. Follow-up workshops were delayed by 

funding shortfalls – some as small as the $15,000 needed for participants’ travel 

expenses – that either the state or federal government should have remedied. 

• Numerous witnesses testifi ed that FEMA’s budget was far short of what was 

needed to accomplish its mission, and that this contributed to FEMA’s failure 

to be prepared for a catastrophe. FEMA witnesses also universally pointed out 

that the agency has suff ered for the last few years from a vacancy rate of 15 to 

20 percent (i.e., between 375 to 500 vacant positions in a 2,500-person agency), 

including several at key supervisory levels. FEMA sought additional funding 

but did not receive it. Th e Committee found that FEMA’s budget shortages 

hindered its preparedness.

Th e Committee also found that inadequate training in the details of the recently promulgated NRP was a contributing factor in shortcomings in the government’s performance. 

Louisiana emergency-management offi cials and National Guardsmen were receiving basic 

NRP and Incident Command System (ICS) training two days aft er the storm hit. Certain 

FEMA offi cials, also, were inadequately trained on the NRP and ICS. Only one large-scale 

federal exercise of the NRP took place before Katrina, the DHS’s Top Offi cials 3 (TOPOFF 

3) exercise in April 2005, approximately three months aft er the NRP was issued. TOPOFF 

3, sponsored by DHS, involved responders from all levels of government. A November 2005 

report by the DHS Inspector General, echoing the fi ndings of an earlier report by DHS itself 

in May 2005, found that the exercise, which involved federal, state and local responders, 

“highlighted – at all levels of government – a fundamental lack of understanding for the 

principles and protocols set forth in the NRP and [National Incident Management System].” Th e lack of familiarity with emergency-management principles and plans hampered 

the Katrina response.

Th e Committee also identifi ed signifi cant planning failures that predated Katrina. One 

of the most remarkable stories from this investigation is the history of planning for the 

100,000 people in New Orleans believed to lack the means to evacuate themselves. Local 

and state offi cials have known since at least 1994 about the need to address this problem. 

For its part, the federal government, which knew about this problem for some time, neither 

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Uprepared 
14

Executive Summary

monitored their planning nor off ered assistance. Th is evacuation problem was not included 

in the Hurricane Pam exercise and, during follow-up meetings in the summer of 2005, 

New Orleans offi cials informed counterparts from FEMA, other federal agencies, and the 

state preparedness agency that the city was not able to provide for the necessary pre-storm 

evacuation, but nothing was done to resolve the issue. 

• Th e City of New Orleans, with primary responsibility for evacuation of its 

citizens, had language in its plan stating the city’s intent to assist those who 

needed transportation for pre-storm evacuation, but had no actual plan provisions to implement that intent. In late 2004 and 2005, city offi cials negotiated 

contracts with Amtrak, riverboat owners, and others to pre-arrange transportation alternatives, but received inadequate 

support from the City’s Director of Homeland 

Security and Emergency Preparedness, and 

contracts were not in place when Katrina 

struck. As Katrina approached, notwithstanding the city’s evacuation plans on paper, the 

best solution New Orleans had for people 

without transportation was a private-citizen 

volunteer carpool initiative called Operation 

Brothers’ Keepers and transit buses taking 

people – not out of the city, but to the Superdome. While the Superdome provided shelter 

from the devastating winds and water, conditions there deteriorated quickly. Katrina’s 

“near miss” ripped the covering off the roof, 

caused leaking, and knocked out the power, 

rendering the plumbing, air conditioning, and 

public announcement system totally useless. 

• Th e Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development 

(DOTD), whose Secretary had personally accepted departmental responsibility 

under the state’s emergency operations plan to arrange for transportation 

for evacuation in emergencies, had done nothing to prepare for that responsibility prior to Katrina. While the Secretary attempted to defend his inaction 

in a personal appearance before the Committee, the Committee found his explanations rang hollow, and his account of uncommunicated doubts and objections to state policy disturbing. Had his Department identifi ed available buses 

or other means of transport for evacuation within the state in the months before 

the hurricane, at a minimum the state would have been prepared to evacuate 

people stranded in New Orleans aft er landfall more quickly than it did. 

• FEMA and the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), charged under the 

NRP with supporting state and local government transportation needs (including evacuation) in emergencies, did little to plan for the possibility that they 

would be called on to assist with post-landfall evacuation needs, despite being 

on notice for over a month before Katrina hit that the state and local governments needed more buses and drivers – and being on notice for years that tens 

of thousands of people would have no means to evacuate. 

Trapped by floodwaters, 

New Orleans

AP/Wide World Photo
15

• Th ough much attention had been paid to addressing communications shortfalls, eff orts to address 

interoperability – as well as simply operability – were 

inadequate. Th ere was little advance preparation for 

responders operating in an area with no power and 

where virtually all forms of pre-existing communications were destroyed. And while satellite phones were 

available to some, either they did not function properly 

or offi cials were not trained to use these relatively complex devices. Moreover, the National Communications 

System, the DHS agency primarily responsible under 

the NRP for providing communications support to fi rst 

responders during disasters, had no plans to do so.

Th ese planning failures would have been of far less consequence had the system of levees built to protect New Orleans 

from fl ooding stayed intact, as they had in most prior hurricanes. But they did not, and the resulting inundation was 

catastrophic. Th e levee failures themselves turned out to have 

roots long predating Katrina as well. While several engineering analyses continue, the Committee found deeply disturbing 

evidence of fl aws in the design and construction of the levees. 

For instance, two major drainage canals – the 17th Street and 

London Avenue Canals – failed at their foundations, prior to 

their fl ood walls being met with the water heights for which 

they were designed to protect central New Orleans.

Moreover, the greater metropolitan New Orleans area was 

literally riddled with levee breaches caused by massive overtopping and scouring of levees that were not “armored,” or properly designed, to guard against the cascading waters that would 

inevitably accompany a storm of the magnitude of Hurricane 

Katrina. Th e Committee also discovered that the inspectionand-maintenance regime in place to ensure that the levees, 

fl oodwalls, and other structures built to protect the residents 

of the greater New Orleans area was in no way commensurate 

with the risk posed to these persons and their property.

Equally troubling was the revelation of serious disagreement 

– still unresolved months aft er Katrina – among offi cials of several government entities over who had responsibility, and when, for key levee issues including 

emergency response and levee repair. Such confl icts prevented any meaningful emergency 

plans from being put in place and, at the time of Katrina, none of the relevant government 

agencies had a plan for responding to a levee breach. While the deadly waters continued to 

pour into the heart of the city aft er the hurricane had passed, the very government agencies 

that were supposed to work together to protect the city from such a catastrophe not only initially disagreed about whose responsibility it was to repair the levee breaches, but disagreed as 

to how the repairs should be conducted. Sadly, due to the lack of foresight and overall coordination prior to the storm, such confl icts existed as the waters of Lake Pontchartrain continued 

to fi ll central New Orleans.

Taking refuge on an Interstate 

island, Louisiana

FEMA

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Uprepared 
16

Executive Summary

Waste, Fraud, and Abuse

Besides overwhelming many government emergency-response capabilities, Katrina severely 

aff ected the government’s ability to properly track and verify its costs when it contracted for 

disaster relief goods and services. While the Committee did not specifi cally include this issue in its investigation, the Committee became aware of wasteful, and sometimes fraudulent 

and abusive spending practices, and held two hearings on the subject.

It takes money to prepare, respond, and recover from a disaster, and typically the bigger the 

disaster, the more money it takes. As of March 8, 2006, the federal government had committed $88 billion to the response, recovery, and rebuilding eff orts. Unfortunately, not all 

of this money has been wisely spent. Precious taxpayer dollars have been lost due to waste, 

fraud, and abuse.

Among the problems that have come to the Committee’s attention are FEMA’s lack of 

fi nancial controls, failures to ensure eligibility of individuals receiving disaster-related assistance, and poor contracting practices, including the use of no-bid contracts. A notable 

example of the resulting wastefulness was FEMA’s purchase of 25,000 manufactured homes 

that are virtually useless because FEMA’s own regulations prohibit their installation in a 

fl ood plain. In a similar vein, FEMA’s lack of controls in dealing with hotels providing temporary housing for evacuees resulted in instances where hotels charged for empty rooms; 

individuals held multiple rooms; hotel rooms were used as storage units for personal goods; 

individuals stayed at resorts; and hotels charged rates as high as $400 per night.

Recommendations: A New National 

Emergency-Management System for the 21ST Century 

Th e Committee’s Report sets out seven core recommendations together with a series of supporting tactical recommendations, all designed to make the nation’s emergency-preparedness and response system strong, agile, eff ective, and robust. 

Hurricane Katrina exposed fl aws in the structure of FEMA and DHS that are too substantial 

to mend. Our fi rst core recommendation is to abolish FEMA and replace it with a stronger, more capable structure, to be known as the National Preparedness and Response Authority (NPRA). To take full advantage of the substantial range of resources DHS has at its 

disposal, NPRA will remain within DHS. Its Director would be assured of having suffi cient 

access and clout by having the rank of Deputy Secretary, and having a direct line of communication to the President during catastrophes. Th e Director would also serve as the Advisor 

to the President for national emergency management, in a manner akin to the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff . To ensure capable and qualifi ed leadership, senior NPRA offi cials 

would be selected from the ranks of professionals with experience in crisis management, 

in addition to substantial management and leadership experience, whether in the public, 

private, or non-profi t sector.

Our second core recommendation is to endow the new organization with the full range of 

responsibilities that are core to preparing for and responding to disasters. Th ese include 

the four central functions of comprehensive emergency management – mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery – which need to be integrated. In addition, NPRA would 

adopt an “all-hazards plus” strategy for preparedness. In preparing our nation to respond to 

terrorist attacks and natural disasters, NPRA must focus on building those common capabilities – for example survivable, interoperable communications and evacuation plans – that 

are necessary regardless of the incident. At the same time, it must not neglect to build those 

unique capabilities – like mass decontamination in the case of a radiological attack or water 
17

search and rescue in the case of fl ooding – that will be needed for particular types of incidents. NPRA’s mandate should also include overseeing protection of critical infrastructure, 

such as energy facilities and telecommunications systems, both to protect such infrastructure from harm and to ensure that such infrastructure is restored as quickly as possible aft er 

a natural disaster or terrorist attack.

Our third core recommendation is to enhance regional operations to provide better coordination between federal agencies and the states and establish regional strike teams. Regional 

offi ces should be adequately staff ed, with representation from federal agencies outside DHS 

that are likely to be called on to respond to a signifi cant disaster in the region. Th ey should 

provide coordination and assist in planning, training, and exercising of emergency-preparedness and response activities; work with states to ensure that grant funds are spent most effectively; coordinate and develop inter-state agreements; enhance coordination with non-governmental organizations and the private sector; and provide personnel and assets, in the form 

of Strike Teams, to be the federal government’s fi rst line of response to a disaster. 

Th e Strike Teams would consist of, at a minimum, a designated Federal Coordinating Offi cer (FCO); personnel trained in incident management, public aff airs, relief and recovery, 

and communications support; a Defense Coordinating Offi cer (DCO); and liaisons to other 

federal agencies. Th ese regional Strike Teams should coordinate their training and exercises with the state and local offi cials and the private sector entities they will support when 

disasters occur.

Our fourth core recommendation is to build a true, government-wide operations center 

to provide enhanced situational awareness and manage interagency coordination in a 

disaster. Currently, there is a multiplicity of interagency coordinating structures, with overlapping missions, that attempt to facilitate an integrated federal response. Th ree of these 

structures – the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC), the National Response 

Coordination Center (NRCC), and the Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG) 

– should be consolidated into a single, integrated entity – a new National Operations Center 

(NOC). Th e NOC would include representatives of all relevant federal agencies, and should 

provide for one clearly defi ned, emergency-management line of communication from the 

states to the federal government, and from the federal government to the states. It would 

also include a strong analytic team capable of sorting through and assessing information 

and determining which pieces would become part of the common operating picture.

To improve its performance in future disasters, the NOC should establish clear protocols 

and procedures to ensure that reports are received and reviewed at appropriate levels and in 

a timely manner. When there is notice of a potential major disaster, the NOC should implement plans, including one for obtaining information from DOD, for obtaining post-disaster 

situational awareness, including identifying sources of information and data particular to 

the region in which the disaster may occur and, where appropriate, bringing in individuals 

with particular knowledge or expertise about that region.

Our fi ft h core recommendation is to renew and sustain commitments at all levels of government to the nation’s emergency core management system. FEMA emergency-response 

teams have been reduced substantially in size, are inadequately equipped, and training for 

these teams has been all but eliminated. If the federal government is to improve its performance and be prepared to respond eff ectively to the next disaster, we must give NPRA 

– and the other federal agencies with central responsibilities under the NRP – the necessary 

resources to accomplish this. We must fund NPRA commensurate with the signifi cance of 

its mission and ensure that those funds are well spent. To be full partners in the national 

preparedness eff ort, states, and localities will need additional resources as well. 

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Uprepared 
18

Executive Summary

Th e Administration and DHS must also ensure that federal leaders of all agencies with 

an emergency-support role understand their key responsibilities under the NRP and the 

resources they need to eff ectively carry out the comprehensive planning required, while also 

training and exercising on NIMS, NRP, and other operational plans. To fully integrate state 

and local offi cials into the system, there should be established an advisory council to NPRA 

made up of state and local offi cials and fi rst responders. Th e advisory council should play 

an integral role in ensuring that the full range of activities of the new organization – including developing response plans, conducting training and exercises, formulating preparedness 

goals, eff ectively managing grants and other resources – are done in full consultation and 

coordination with, and take into account the needs and priorities of, states and localities.

DHS and the NPRA should more fully integrate the private and nonprofi t sectors into their 

planning and preparedness initiatives. Among other things, they should designate specifi c 

individuals at the national and regional levels to work directly with private-sector organizations. Where appropriate, private-sector representatives should also be included in planning, training, and exercises. 

Our sixth core recommendation is to strengthen the underpinning of the nation’s response to disasters and catastrophes. Despite their shortcomings and imperfections, the 

NRP and National Incident Management System (NIMS), including the Emergency Support Function (ESF) structure currently represent the best approach available to respond to 

multi-agency, multi-jurisdictional emergencies. Federal, state, and local offi cials and other 

responders must commit to supporting the NRP and NIMS and working together to improve the performance of the national emergency management system. We must undertake 

further refi nements of the NRP and NIMS, develop operational plans, and engage in training and exercises to ensure that everyone involved in disaster response understands them 

and is prepared to carry them out. In particular, the NRP should be strengthened to make 

the unity of eff ort concept very clear, so that everyone understands the concept and their 

roles in establishing unity, and there should be clarifi cation of the importance of integrating 

agencies with ESF responsibilities into the ICS, rather than their operating in “stovepipes.”

Th e roles and responsibilities of the Principal Federal Offi cial (PFO) and FCO overlap, and 

were a source of confusion during Hurricane Katrina. Th e Staff ord Act should be amended 

to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the FCO, and the NRP should be revised to 

eliminate the PFO position for Staff ord Act-declared emergencies and disasters. It should 

also be amended to ensure that the Act addresses response to all disasters and catastrophes, 

whether natural or man-made.

Our seventh core recommendation is to improve the nation’s capacity to respond to catastrophic events. DHS should ensure that the Catastrophic Incident Annex (CIA) is fully 

understood by the federal departments and agencies with responsibilities associated with it. 

Th e Catastrophic Incident Supplement (CIS) should be completed and published, and the 

supporting operational plans for departments and agencies with responsibilities under the CIA 

should be completed. Th ese plans should be reviewed and coordinated with the states, and on a 

regional basis, to ensure they are understood, trained and exercised prior to an emergency.

DHS must also develop the national capabilities – especially surge capacity – it needs to 

respond to catastrophic disasters, ensuring it has suffi cient full-time staff , response teams, 

contracting personnel, and adequately trained and suffi ciently staff ed reserve corps to ramp 

up capabilities, as needed. Th ese capabilities must be scalable so that NPRA can draw on the 

appropriate resources from supporting ESF agencies to respond to a disaster irrespective of 

cause, size, or complexity. 
19

Conclusion

Th e Committee’s Report can do justice neither to the human suff ering endured during 

and aft er Katrina nor to the dimensions of the response. As to the latter, we have identifi ed 

many successes and many failures; no doubt there are others in both categories we have 

missed. Th e Committee shares the view expressed by President Bush shortly aft er Katrina 

that our nation can do better.

Avoiding past mistakes will not suffi ce. Our leadership and systems must be prepared for 

catastrophes we know will be unlike Katrina, whether due to natural causes or terrorism. Th e 

Committee hopes to help meet that goal through the recommendations in this Report, because almost exactly four years aft er 9/11, Katrina showed that the nation is still unprepared.

Ruins of apartment building, 

Long Beach, MS 

Denton Herring photo

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Uprepared 
Searchers above the fl ood, 

New Orleans 

Louisiana Army National Guard photo
21

Introduction

I

n the early morning of Monday, August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina came ashore in 

southern Louisiana, changing American history. Since September 11, 2001, when two 

American cities suff ered devastating attacks, the United States had been working to 

better protect itself. Almost four years and billions of dollars later, Katrina destroyed an entire region, killing more than 1,500, leaving hundreds of thousands homeless, and ravaging 

one of America’s most storied cities. 

Katrina revealed that this country remains ill-prepared to respond to a catastrophe. More 

should have been done to prepare before the storm and to mitigate the suff ering that followed: more to save lives; more to evacuate the most vulnerable citizens; more to move the 

victims to safety earlier; more to get aid to aff ected areas sooner.

Before the storm, government planning was incomplete and preparation was oft en ineff ective, inadequate, or both. Aft erward, government responses were oft en tentative, bureaucratic, or inert. Th ese failures resulted in unnecessary suff ering.

Katrina’s damage unnerved even hardened search-and-rescue professionals. “Federal Urban 

Search and Rescue teams that had been to earthquakes in California, 9/11, Oklahoma City, I 

mean, extremely knowledgeable professionals, and even they said they hadn’t seen a disaster 

area that large,” Jim Brinson of the Mississippi Offi ce of Homeland Security recalled. “9/11 

was blocks. [Here] we were talking miles aft er miles aft er miles of complete devastation.” 

Hurricane Katrina laid waste to 90,000 square miles of land, an area the size of the United 

Kingdom. At its fi ercest, the storm extended for 460 miles, nearly the distance from Kansas 

City to Dallas. As the Mississippi Gulf Coast’s Sun-Herald pointed out, “the world’s fastest 

river rapids move at about 10 to 12 feet per second,” challenging even experienced athletes 

protected by kayaks and life jackets. At about only a third of its strength, Katrina’s storm 

surge – the swell of water snowballed by a storm approaching shore – “could have been 

moving as fast as 16 feet per second.”

Th ough Katrina made landfall as a Category 3 storm (on the 1-5 Saffi r-Simpson scale), it 

had begun driving its storm surge in the Gulf of Mexico when it was a Category 5. As a 

result, Katrina brought ashore surge that reached as high as 27 feet above normal sea levels 

in Mississippi and between 18 and 25 feet in Louisiana. By contrast, New Orleans had no 

levees or fl ood walls higher than 17 feet. Th ough levees had begun to breach as early as 

landfall, overtopping of the levees may have caused an equal amount of damage. 

Citizens and government offi cials alike knew that it was only a matter of time before a hurricane inundated the Gulf Coast – especially New Orleans, which lies as much as 10 feet 

below sea level, and continues to sink an inch every three years. (Meanwhile, wave-slowing 

marshlands and barrier islands in coastal Louisiana erode by 10 square miles a year – losing 

the area of a football fi eld every 30 minutes – due to fl ood-control constraints on the Mississippi River, which prevent it from depositing sediments to replenish the subsiding soils.)

For years, meteorologists, emergency-management, and government offi cials had referred 

to it, simply, as the “New Orleans scenario.” In 1965, Hurricane Betsy, also a Category 3, 

had provided a preview of Katrina when, in the memorable words of Louisiana’s then-U.S. 

Senator Russell Long, it “picked up the lake [Pontchartrain] ... and put it inside New Orleans and Jeff erson Parish.” When Hurricane Andrew leveled parts of south Florida in 1992, 

Robert Sheets, Ph.D., then head of the National Weather Service, reminded Congressional 

Chapter 1
Chapter 1

22

investigators that the country had actually been lucky – for a while aft erward, the storm 

looked like it was making its way toward New Orleans. 

“People think Andrew was the big one,” he told the Committee on Governmental Aff airs, 

as it was then named, in 1993. Andrew had come “within a gnat’s eyelash of being our 

nightmare and the big one,” he went on. Sheets displayed a computer projection of what 

Andrew’s storm surge would have done had the hurricane’s track shift ed slightly and hit 

New Orleans directly. It showed the hurricane whipping the waters of Lake Borgne, on the 

eastern side of the city, and Lake Pontchartrain, on the northern edge of the city, over the 

city’s levees. Katrina would follow this very pattern 12 years later. “Th e city will be under 20 

feet of water,” Sheets predicted.

In 1998, Hurricane Georges narrowly missed New Orleans, striking Mississippi and Alabama instead. Roused by the close call, local emergency-management planners began to 

seek federal funding for a massive exercise to consider the potential impact of a direct strike 

on New Orleans by a slow-moving – and, 

therefore, more damaging, by virtue of its 

longer duration – Category 3 hurricane. 

Th at funding did not arrive for fi ve years. 

Th e eff ort, known as the Hurricane Pam 

exercise, fi nally began in 2004, and tried 

to address the consequences of a Katrinalike hurricane as developed by government 

scientists and emergency-management 

offi cials and contractors: Widespread fl ooding; 67,000 dead; 200,000 to 300,000 in need 

of evacuation aft er landfall, and hundreds of 

thousands displaced in need of shelter, exceeding state and local capabilities; hospitals 

and nursing homes overcrowded and short 

on critical resources; and incapacitated fi rst 

responders. Sadly, Katrina proved many of 

these predictions true. 

Katrina formed on August 23, 2005, 200 

miles southeast of the Bahamas. Within 

24 hours, it had been designated Tropical 

Storm Katrina by the National Hurricane 

Center. Two days later, it became a Category 1 hurricane, just two hours before 

striking the Florida coast between Fort 

Lauderdale and Miami. By early aft ernoon 

on Friday, August 26, Max Mayfi eld, the 

director of the National Hurricane Center, 

and fellow forecasters in the Miami headquarters and regional offi ces throughout the Gulf 

Coast believed Katrina might be heading toward New Orleans.

Mayfi eld called his friend Walter Maestri, Ph.D., the emergency-preparedness director of 

Jeff erson Parish, on the western edge of New Orleans. “Th is is it,” Maestri recalled Mayfi eld 

saying. “Th is is what we’ve been talking about all of these years. It’s a 30-90 storm,” Maestri 

said Mayfi eld told him. “Th at’s the longitude and latitude of the city of New Orleans,” Maestri explained. Beginning with that phone call, Mayfi eld and other forecasters embarked on 

Near the beach, Biloxi, MS

Denton Herring photo
Introduction

23

a round of urgent communications with local, state, and federal offi cials to alert them to 

the encroaching threat. 

Ordinary citizens, as well as their leaders in 

local, state, and federal government knew 

that Katrina was coming. But few could 

imagine the impact. By the time Katrina 

subsided, it had taken with it the Gulf Coast 

as its 9.5 million residents knew it. 

“You could easily identify what building 

east of you was [fl oating] by,” recalled D. J. 

Ziegler, the Gulfport, Mississippi, harbormaster, who weathered the storm at a parking garage not far from shore. “You could 

see church pews and knew what church it 

was and you could see doors from the motels 

with room numbers on it.” 

Katrina carried away not only police cruisers 

and homes, but also the instruments of daily 

life. “All our medical records, all the legal 

documents,” Lynn Christiansen, a housewife 

in St. Bernard Parish, recounted. “My safety 

deposit was under water for three weeks.” 

As Jim Brinson, of the Mississippi Offi ce 

of Homeland Security, traveled toward the 

coast from his headquarters in Jackson shortly aft er the storm, he encountered scenes of 

near-apocalyptic destruction and bewilderment. “Going down [Route] 49 and seeing all 

these people just dazed and confused – you 

know, I’ve been to bad areas all over the 

world in the military; I’ve seen, you know, 

entire cities that have been bombed out ... 

and these folks are just dazed. ... Th ey’re 

trying to get anything and everything they 

possibly can. ... Th e further south we went, 

the worse and worse it got.” 

Katrina turned fi rst responders – police, 

medical personnel, etc. – into some of the 

storm’s fi rst victims. As the storm pummeled New Orleans, some 80 police offi cers – 5 

percent of the city’s force – were stranded at home, according to Warren Riley, then Deputy 

Superintendent of the New Orleans Police Department (NOPD). In New Orleans East, Riley 

said, an offi cer named Chris Abbott moved to the attic of his home to avoid the rising water, 

but it continued to climb. Abbott tried to break his way out, but couldn’t. In desperation, 

he attempted to raise colleagues on his police radio even though the storm had knocked out 

most of the region’s communications network.

Abbott lucked out, eventually reaching Captain Jimmy Scott, one of the city’s eight district 

commanders. Captain Scott asked if Abbott had his service weapon and advised him to fi re 

rounds through the base of the attic vent until he could knock it out. Abbott agreed to try, 

Witnesses’ locations, Louisiana

GAO
Chapter 1

24

but then communication ceased. Offi cers listening in on the conversation called for him, 

but there was no reply. Finally, fi ve minutes later, Abbott’s voice broke through the air: 

“I’m halfway out, and I’m going to make it!” Th e water had been chest-high when he fi nally 

scrambled onto his roof, where he was rescued.

Even headquarters could do little. At 7 a.m. on Monday, August 29, just 50 minutes aft er 

the storm had made landfall in Plaquemines Parish, southeast of New Orleans, Deputy 

Superintendent Riley visited the communication section of the department’s emergency 

operations center. “Almost every dispatcher and 911 operator was crying,” he recalled. “I 

did not know that only moments earlier, the Industrial Street Canal levee breached and had 

an almost 200-yard opening and water was now pouring into the Lower Ninth Ward. ... It 

went from nothing to as high as 14 feet within 23 minutes. We had 600 911 calls within the 

fi rst 23 minutes. ... But [the 911 dispatchers and operators] were powerless to assist. ... We 

still had sustained winds in excess of 100 miles per hour.” 

Similar calls were arriving at the fi re department offi ce in St. Bernard Parish, in eastern 

New Orleans, from where Larry Ingargiola, the Parish Director of Homeland Security and 

Emergency Preparedness, was operating a makeshift response center with his wife and his 

secretary. “I am in the attic, I have my child with me in my attic, I need somebody to come 

get me out,” he recalled a typical plea. “And they are crying. Let me tell you, it got to the 

point where my secretary and wife couldn’t answer the phones anymore. ... We knew that 

the majority of these people we are talking to now were going to die and we were the last 

people they were talking to. Th ere was nothing we could do. Nothing physically possible for 

us to do.”

Most of the people in the area, civilians and offi cials alike, could talk to no one at all. Telephone lines were down. Switching stations were fl ooded. Radio and cell-phone towers had 

been knocked out. Some emergency personnel had to rely on runners to relay messages. As 

Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour described it, “My head of the National Guard might as 

well been a Civil War general for the fi rst two or three days, because he could only fi nd out 

what was going on by sending somebody.”

On Saturday, a day before New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin would order the fi rst mandatory 

evacuation of New Orleans in the city’s history, city residents had begun to evacuate using 

a system known as contrafl ow, which converts incoming highway lanes to outbound to 

expedite evacuation. More than a million residents of southeastern Louisiana left the area 

in just over 24 hours, a marked improvement over the 12-15 hour bottlenecks that stalled 

the evacuation before Hurricane Ivan in 2004. Th ose delays, coupled with the fact that Ivan 

– initially a Category 5 storm that came within 135 miles of New Orleans – banked eastward 

at the last moment, persuaded some to remain behind this time. 

Gulf Coast residents call it “hurricane roulette.” Some who had endured 1969’s Category 5 

Hurricane Camille, the region’s benchmark for catastrophic storms, thought that no other 

storm could come close. But Katrina ended lifetimes of successful storm-dodging. Jeff Elder, 

an insurance rep, had ridden out 20 years of hurricanes with his family in a two-story, 

wood-frame home three miles north of the Biloxi, Mississippi, beachfront and 14 feet above 

sea level. “Th e eye of Hurricane Georges passed directly over our home,” he wrote in an 

e-mail, “and, while the bay [just south of the Elders’ home] rose to a level of about ten feet 

above normal, the water never reached our property. In fact, during Hurricane Camille... 

the water in Back Bay only rose to a level approximately 12 feet above normal.” By early 

aft ernoon on Monday, August 29, the day Katrina made landfall, the Elders had six feet of 

water in their living room.
Introduction

25

As Biloxi city spokesman Vincent Creel said of Hurricane Camille survivors lulled into a 

false sense of security, Camille killed more people in 2005 than it did in 1969. 

In many cases, however, hubris or miscalculation had nothing to do with why some stayed 

behind. Katrina struck in the very last days of August, when those living check-to-check 

were running out of their bi-weekly or monthly allotments. Tens of thousands didn’t have 

cars. Even many who did may not have been able to shoulder the costs of evacuation; the 

average cost for three days for a family of four, including lodging, food, and transportation, 

could easily exceed a thousand dollars, according to an analysis of Hurricane Ivan prepared 

for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). For the poor of neighborhoods 

like the Lower Ninth Ward, one of the city’s lowest-lying areas, this was an impossible sum, 

though they had an alternative in the Superdome, the city’s “refuge of last resort.”

Nearly 100,000 New Orleanians either couldn’t or didn’t comply with Mayor Nagin’s evacuation order. Th e city had no plan for evacuating them, and the Louisiana Department of 

Transportation and Development, the state agency responsible for transportation during a 

disaster, had done nothing by the time of landfall. New Orleans’ enterprising health department director, Dr. Kevin Stephens, had begun negotiating agreements with several transportation agencies, but they remained incomplete at the time of landfall. Federal offi cials, 

who had participated in the Hurricane Pam exercise and knew that state and local authorities would need evacuation help, had no plans in place, either.

Witnesses’ locations, Mississippi

GAO
Chapter 1

26

Bobbie Moreau, a legal secretary in Nairn, a small town in Plaquemines Parish, stayed at 

home because she didn’t have the means to evacuate. She was with her daughter Tasha and 

Tasha’s four-month-old daughter, who was born prematurely and required a heart monitor. 

Moreau woke up at 4 a.m. on Monday, just as the wind and storm surge preceding Katrina’s 

eye were reaching shore. “Th e pressure was so bad in the house, I opened a crack in the 

living room window,” she recalled. When she walked into the den, she saw water pouring through the grout in the marble tile that lined a part of the wall. By the time she had 

climbed to the second fl oor, the water had risen halfway up the stairs. Moreau could see her 

living-room furniture fl oating.

“I shut the door upstairs, I guess thinking I could shut the water out,” she said. “From then 

on, it was a nightmare. I held the baby at the foot of the bed fanning her. Th e pressure was 

awful; we thought the windows were going to pop. We got on our knees and prayed and 

begged God to save us. Th en I felt the water under me on the second fl oor. ... I got up and 

walked to the window and the water was right under the window. My legs felt like Jell-O, I 

staggered. My daughter screamed, ‘Mama, what’s wrong?’ I knew at that moment we were 

going to die.”

But “in an instant, survival kicked in.” Moreau tore the canopy from the bed and tied knots 

so that she and Tasha could hold on to each other. She used a belt to create a makeshift 

life jacket for the baby. With the water halfway up the bed, they climbed out onto the roof, 

managing to take along Moreau’s three dogs. “Th e eye of the hurricane was on us,” Moreau 

recalled. “I told my daughter, you will have to swim and get a boat, I am too weak. She said, 

‘Mama, I’m scared.’ Th ere was dead animals fl oating by, snakes, debris, oil. I told her, ‘We 

will die if you don’t.’ She handed me the baby and slipped into the water. ... Th en I lost 

sight of her and called and called because the wind was picking up. And then I knew it was 

the eye. Nothing but silence. I thought she had drowned. I was crying and praying. And 

then I heard an outboard motor start up. And I knew she was alive.

“Where she pulled [up] the boat, the power lines to the house was between us,” Moreau 

continued. “I had to drop the baby through the power lines to her and the dogs and then 

myself. By then, the wind was so hard, we could not control the boat with the motors. ... 

We came to a stop in the top of some little trees. We huddled under the steering wheel with 

the baby because a window was broke out of the cabin. We stayed there for about 6-7 hours. 

Th e wind would almost turn the boat over and we sang and prayed. ... It was so weird. Felt 

like we were the only people left in the world, everything covered by water.”

Around the same time, at Hancock Medical Center in Bay St. Louis, Mississippi, the fi rst 

fl oor was beginning to fl ood. Patients would have to be moved upstairs. Staff ers managed to 

use the elevator to move a 600-pound, non-ambulatory patient to safety before fl ood waters 

damaged the hospital generators. Physicians and service staff carried the remaining patients 

upstairs on their backs. Th e fi rst fl oor quickly fi lled with three feet of water, disabling and 

washing away equipment.

Th e Hancock staff had considered evacuating its 34 patients, but eventually decided to 

“shelter in place.” In the past, patients had deteriorated and even died while languishing in 

evacuation gridlock, some of it in response to storm warnings that turned out to be false 

alarms. But few hospitals had the resources to withstand the assault of a storm like Katrina, 

and, as the Hurricane Pam exercise predicted, became victims themselves. State governments had failed to address the problem prior to the storm. In Louisiana, the Department of 

Health and Hospitals required nursing homes to have evacuation plans, but did not require 

the institutions to actually follow them. 
Introduction

27

On the second fl oor of Hancock, patients were treated in the hall, as wind and rain prevented the use of patient rooms. Because the water pumps failed, staff had to use buckets of 

water to fl ush toilets. Maintenance staff hung multi-colored emergency glow-lights to mark 

the way down corridors and stairwells. Because communications were down, no one knew 

whether their loved ones had made it.

Forty miles away, at Ocean Springs Hospital, physicians struggled with dwindling supplies 

and an increasing number of patients. “We couldn’t sterilize anything because there was 

no power,” said Dr. Bill Passarelli, a cardiologist who was on duty as Katrina came ashore. 

“Th ere were only like two surgical packets left . So unless somebody was absolutely going to 

die, you weren’t going to surgery.”

“It got so hot that the laboratory computers had to be shut down to prevent them from 

overheating,” Dr. Passarelli’s colleague and friend Dr. Jeff Bass, an emergency-room doctor, 

recalled. “We were able to do only extremely basic lab tests. I could not even get a basic test 

of kidney function.” Th e fi rst fatalities arrived at around 5 p.m., before the wind had died 

down. “A friend who was a police offi cer told me that every bayou and every waterway had 

bodies in them, and that they were pulling bodies from the trees. ... Our morgue only holds 

two people. We had living people to worry about. At about 6 o’clock I wrote on [a wipe 

board facing the emergency room door] ‘DON’T BRING US ANY MORE DEAD BODIES. 

WE DON’T HAVE ENOUGH ROOM FOR THE LIVING PEOPLE.’”

“I had always dreamed of working for Doctors Without Borders and going to a Th ird World 

country right aft er a disaster,” Dr. Bass said. “Never in my wildest dreams did I think I 

would experience that without leaving my home.”

At Hancock, survivors who had injured themselves clinging to trees or breaking out of their 

attics were also beginning to trickle in, many aft er walking for miles, others on makeshift 

stretchers, as ambulances had been washed away. Staff treated 850 new patients during the 

next 48 hours. Th ough a Hancock medical specialist had e-mailed the director of the National Disaster Medical System less than 24 hours aft er landfall that county authorities were 

“pulling bodies from trees,” a federal Disaster Medical Assistance Team did not arrive until 

Wednesday evening. It had been pre-staged in Memphis, Tennessee, 350 miles away. Hancock general surgeon Brian Anthony repaired a man’s severed radial artery while a scrub 

tech held a fl ashlight overhead. Coast Guard helicopters refueling between rescues airlift ed 

critical patients to fully functional hospitals further inland. 

Th e Coast Guard performed heroically during Katrina, rescuing more than half of the 

60,000 survivors who were stranded by the storm. (Th e Louisiana Department of Wildlife 

& Fisheries, the state’s lead agency for search-and-rescue, similarly distinguished itself, 

rescuing much of the rest.) Coast Guard rescue swimmer Sara Faulkner’s fi rst rescue was in 

East New Orleans: “My fi rst hoist was down to the second story of [an] apartment building. 

And they handed me their baby like it was nothing, you know. ... And I was so terrifi ed for 

that baby, of him starting to squirm or wiggle, you know, for not knowing any better. And 

making it hard for me to hold him because the rescue, the quick strap is too small for him 

and he didn’t fi t, so you just have to hold him in your arms. And I’m already two stories up 

and I have to go up a hundred feet, you know, on a cable. I was holding on to him so tight, 

I had to check him to make sure I wasn’t crushing him ’cause, you know, I was just holding 

on to him so tight. And, uh, he was fi ne. I don’t even think he was scared. I think he was too 

young to be scared. But the fl ight mech[anic] said when I came out from underneath the 

roof that he got chills because his son was about that same size, same age, so. ... Th at, uh, 

that was bad, that one, but then I did three more and they weren’t as bad as that one, but, 

um, I don’t think I’ll forget that fi rst baby.”
Chapter 1

28

Another typical rescue took place several days later in Gentilly, in north-central New 

Orleans. Coast Guard rescuer Bill Dunbar was leaving to refuel when an older man fl agged 

him down. “Th is guy was 86 years old and had climbed up... two 17-rung straight-up ladders aft er being without water for three or four days,” Dunbar recalled. And he’s laughing, 

he’s in [a] good mood. I thought he was delirious.” Back at the Coast Guard station, the 

man asked Dunbar to call his son Jeff , who was a Marine. “So I 

dialed the phone number and I asked for Jeff and he says, ‘Yeah, 

who’s this?’ and I say, ‘Well, my name is Lieutenant Bill Dunbar 

and I’m calling from the Coast Guard. We just saved your father. 

We just pulled him off a roof.’ And the guy broke down crying. 

And I got a little weepy, ’cause, you know, aft er that you’re a little 

tired. He said that every day of ... 26 years in the Marine Corps 

was worth that one moment knowing that his Dad was alright. 

So we put a little money in his dad’s wallet, put some food in his 

pockets, and we fl ew him out to Armstrong [Airport] and put 

him with a doctor. And the doctor said that he’d make sure he 

got to Houston where his son was coming to meet him to take 

him home.”

But the Coast Guard’s fi rst Katrina rescue, at 2:50 p.m. on the 

day of landfall, came in response to “a Mayday from a frantic 

woman saying that her and her daughter ... and her grandchild were stuck on a small boat in the middle of the city of Port 

Sulphur.” It was Bobbie Moreau, who had managed to use the 

radio in the boat her daughter had found to summon the Coast 

Guard. A direct hoist was impossible because the boat was under 

trees, so rescue swimmer Laurence Nettles was lowered into the 

water by the side of the boat. A Coast Guard video of the rescue 

records what happened next:

Pilot: You want me to come to the right?

Nettles: No, hold position. ... On deck, picking up slack, 

waiting for the survivor to get in basket. Hold position. 

Woman and baby are getting in the basket. Ready for 

pickup. Picking up slack. Start taking the load. ... Clear 

vessel, clear back to the left .

Pilot: Okay, I can move it to the right, if I can.

Nettles: Roger, that’s fi ne. ... Basket’s coming up ... 

basket’s halfway up. ... Roger, she’s got a dog with her, 

too. [Pause]

Pilot: Th at’s fi ne. Let her bring the dog, it’s fi ne.

As for many survivors of Katrina, the rescue hardly brought Moreau’s ordeal to a close. Th e 

Coast Guard crew dropped off her and her family at West Jeff erson Hospital in Jeff erson 

Parish. “Barefoot, no purse, no money, no shoes,” Moreau recalled. “My daughter went in 

with the baby. I sat on the curb crying.” Soon, they were moved to a shelter. “Th ere was over 

100 people in one room. Th e heat was incredible, could not go outside with the baby for 

mosquitoes. We fanned her all night.” Moreau appealed to a National Guardsman, but she 

said he told her they would be at the shelter for another week. “My daughter said, ‘I am not 

going to let my baby die. We are going to walk out of here and get help.’” 

Waiting, New Orleans

AP/Wide World Photo
Introduction

29

According to Moreau, Jeff erson Police tried to prevent her from leaving, presumably for her 

safety, but “I said, ‘Do what you want to do, I have nothing left anyway.’” Moreau and her 

family snuck out when the police were distracted by a scuffl e and hitched a ride to Westwego, on the west bank of the Mississippi River, where a friend lived. He had evacuated. “I 

broke into his house, cooled the baby off , we took a shower and ate can food,” Moreau said. 

“He had left his truck in the driveway. ... [It] had no gas in it, and there was nowhere to buy 

gas, so I siphoned gas out of his boat, two gallons at a time, and put [it] into his truck. I left 

him a letter with my nephew’s phone number [in Arkansas]. Th e only clothes he had that 

would fi t us was boxer shorts and t-shirt, so that is what we left in. ... We went across the 

Sunshine Bridge [across the Mississippi River], got to Prairieville, and my nephew picked us 

up. We had a hard time since then, but we made it.”

In the Lower Ninth Ward, Reverend Leonard Lucas of Light City Church was trying to 

persuade dazed survivors to leave their homes. Parts of the neighborhood had fl ooded to 

the rooft ops aft er weak levees on its west side gave way in two spots to water from Lake 

Borgne rushing down the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet. “We went house to house telling 

people they had to leave,” Reverend Lucas recalled. “Th ey kept coming and coming and 

coming. People were leaving everything and only taking a packed bag and their kids. Some 

people had pets and wouldn’t leave them. I don’t know how many people told me that their 

pet ‘was all they had.’ We kept telling everyone to go to Stallings Park in the Upper Ninth 

[west of the Lower Ninth, across the Industrial Canal]. It was a steady fl ow of people marching like zombies to the park.” Th e less fortunate who were stranded on rooft ops sometimes 

remained there for days awaiting rescue. 

Some of the rescues were performed by volunteers who came to help in the wake of the 

storm. Th e assistance was unorganized and frustrated authorities trying to streamline 

response. Groups of volunteers in civilian clothes converged, frequently armed and without coordination, on the same areas of a sometimes lawless city, adding to the tension. But 

they also performed an invaluable service. Among them was Jeohn Favors, an emergency 

management technician (EMT) from Franklin, an hour west of New Orleans, who joined a 

group of fellow fi refi ghters and police heading to the city.

“Th e fi rst fi ve minutes into New Orleans, someone came out and asked for a medic,” he 

recalled. “[We] rode up to the water’s edge and then waded through water till we got to the 

boat. A R[egistered] N[urse] ... had just fi nished delivering a baby. Th e girl was 16 years 

old, had been taken off her roof, and was having her fi rst child and actually delivered in the 

boat. Th e nurse had just cut the umbilical cord, and they handed me the baby to check it 

out. It was my fi rst delivery.”

Favors’s crew hotwired empty boats, rescuing 350 people from rooft ops by the end of the 

day. By his account, they were the fi rst rescuers in Lakeview, a neighborhood in western 

New Orleans. Th ey traveled through water riddled with six-foot plumes of fl ames rising 

from what must have been gas leaks. Power lines – some still active – hung above the water; 

beneath, submerged obstructions threatened to puncture the boats.

“Th e thing I’ll never forget was the look on people’s faces, you know, Could this really happen?” Favors recalled. “People were so happy to see us there.” He mentioned a boat that ran 

out of gas on its way to a hospital, for a passenger whose blood pressure was dangerously 

elevated. “We gave them gas and tried to direct them to a hospital. ... Th ey had nothing, 

house destroyed, just wearing cutoff s, nothing left , and they tried to pay us for the gas. We 

couldn’t believe it. People were so grateful.” 

Someone like Favors helped Kemberly Samuels, a teacher who sheltered from the storm 

with her husband at a housing development in St. Bernard Parish, where he worked. Th e 
Chapter 1

30

building fl ooded. “You know, everyone heard about all the young gang bangers in New 

Orleans, but you didn’t hear about the young men who came and found us,” she said. “Th ey 

had to be in their teens or early twenties. ... Th ey came ... on Tuesday night with boats. 

Th ey brought us food and drinks. I asked them where they got it from, they said, ‘Don’t 

worry about that, just eat it.’ Th ey also said the boats were ‘borrowed.’”

Th e rescuers took Samuels and her husband to Interstate 610, a highway overpass in 

downtown New Orleans where rescuers had begun depositing survivors. (Local authorities had identifi ed only one offi cial drop-off point, at an intersection of Interstate 10 and 

the Lake Pontchartrain Causeway known as the Cloverleaf, about two miles away. It was 

also the only rescue point where they had positioned food, water, and medicine.) “Th ere 

were people lined up as far as I could see,” Samuels recalled. “I saw one 9-year-old boy try 

to drag his grandmother up the interstate on a blanket. She was too weak to make it on her 

own. I tried to get them help, but none of the offi cials would help them. It was so hot you 

wouldn’t believe. ... We went for a while without water and when it fi nally did get there 

they just started throwing it at the crowd. People were fi ghting over it and I did not want to 

get in the middle of that. Th ey did the same thing with the MREs [Meals Ready to Eat],” the 

military-style rations.

Th ough the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) positioned resources in the 

area before the start of the hurricane season, the food and water – critical supplies when a 

disaster has disrupted local services – were insuffi cient. Mississippi received only a fi ft h of 

the water and ice that state offi cials estimated was necessary; shipments didn’t meet demand 

in Mississippi until September 9, 12 days aft er landfall.

FEMA, the federal government’s primary disaster-response agency, had no eff ective supply-tracking system, so replenishing provisions turned out to be complicated. Planning 

and coordination were so poor that truck drivers didn’t know where to go, and emergencymanagement offi cials didn’t know what was en route, or when it might show up. Phone 

lines were down, so it was hard to clarify. “We’d fi nd [the trucks] parked along [Highway] 

49,” Mike Beeman, FEMA’s liaison to coastal Harrison County in Mississippi, said. “[We’d] 

go over and fi nd out who he was, what he had in the back end, because ... many times 

[we] knew items were sent to us, but we didn’t know where they were. ... We’d fi nally fi nd 

maybe fi ve or six truckloads of water or ice that were sitting off the roadway in some apron 

at a supermarket. ... Some of them sat sometimes two or three days. I found 25 trucks one 

day. ... Th ey were just sitting there, waiting for somebody to tell them where to go. ... I 

have no idea where they came from.”

Th e situation called for occasionally morbid forms of improvisation. In Bay St. Louis, Mississippi, Bill Carwile, FEMA’s lead representative in Mississippi, and Robert Latham, the 

head of the state’s emergency-management agency, encountered a funeral home director 

“in tears. And he says, you know, I have no more room for bodies. ... My funeral home is 

full and I’m fi xing to have to start putting people in the parking lot and on the sidewalk,” 

Latham recalled. FEMA had ordered several refrigerator, or reefer, trucks as temporary 

morgues, but they hadn’t arrived. 

Just then, a tractor-trailer pulled up. “I said, What are you hauling?” Latham continued. 

“[Th e driver] said, Well, I’m hauling ice. ... I said, Well, can I rent your truck? ... We need 

to use it as a morgue. And he said, No, this is the way I make my living. If I give you that, 

I won’t ever be able to use that trailer again for hauling ice or anything else refrigerated. I 

says, can we buy your truck? I’ll buy it. I looked at Bill and I said, Bill, can I do this? He said, 

Yeah, we’re going to do what we have do.” Carwile and Latham negotiated a price ($25,000) 

and started loading bodies. Th e reefer trucks fi nally showed up fi ve days later. 
Introduction

31

Supplies also were 

stretched at the New 

Orleans Superdome, the 

“refuge of last resort” for 

city residents who did not 

evacuate. It saved many 

lives during the hurricane, 

but at a dismaying cost. 

Lighting and plumbing 

failed. As 25,000 evacuees 

waited in heat and humidity for evacuation buses 

that wouldn’t arrive for 

days, the Superdome deteriorated into nightmarish 

squalor. Th ough conditions 

were oft en worse at spontaneous rescue points like 

the one where Kemberly 

Samuels found herself, the 

Superdome became a center of the crisis, a symbol of 

the ways in which America 

failed New Orleans.

Dorothy Stukes rode out 

the hurricane at 1517 

Virginia Marie Place, her home in Gentilly. She didn’t evacuate because her sister, who had 

recently undergone surgery, was at Charity Hospital, in the Central Business District. Aft er 

the storm had passed, she went outside and walked for several miles until city police offi cers 

picked her up and drove her to the Superdome.

“A female offi cer searched us before we went inside,” she recalled. “She took some medicine 

I had, but she also took some insulin from an elderly woman behind me because it was not 

in its proper box. I don’t know how they expected her to make it without her insulin. When 

we got in, we found a chair and just sat there. All I could think about was my daughter. Th e 

last time I talked to her, water was coming through the walls and roof of her house. I didn’t 

know if she was dead or alive. 

“Th e Dome was horrible; it was like jail or something,” she went on. “One guy jumped from 

a balcony and committed suicide. We saw some people having sex under a blanket. Th ere 

were kids all around. Some kids found where they were hiding the ice and stole some of it 

and started selling it. Most of the supplies were going to the people [special-needs patients] 

up in the suites. Some folks found a newborn baby in a trash can; they ended up taking care 

of it. People were sleeping in the halls on cardboard boxes in the middle of all that waste. 

And it stank; it was past stink due to all the urine and feces all over the fl oor. We just sat 

there and put our shirts over our face to mask the smell. We used an empty MRE bag and a 

box to go in. We would try to hide ourselves but you couldn’t really get away. Th ey wouldn’t 

open any extra doors to let us get fresh air.”

Among Stukes’ fellow refugees was Patricia Morris, a home-care nurse who had passed up 

the chance to evacuate to Mississippi with her daughter because she wanted to help at the 

Superdome. “I kept telling [the] National Guard that I’m a registered nurse, and disasterHeading for airlift from the 

Superdome, New Orleans 

U.S. Coast Guard photo
Chapter 1

32

certifi ed,” she said. “Finally they got angry with me, and told me, Look, woman, Red Cross 

didn’t even show,” referring to the Red Cross’ refusal to certify and staff the Superdome 

because it was in the fl ood zone. Morris says she off ered her help to FEMA medics, as well 

as representatives of the state health department. “I could not understand with all the need 

they had how they could refuse help,” she said. (Generally, medical personnel turned away 

volunteers because there was no way to evaluate their skills.) Meanwhile, Morris had to fi nd 

ways around the same indignities as Dorothy Stukes. “Aft er the second day I decided that if 

I didn’t eat, I wouldn’t have to go to the bathroom,” she said. 

As conditions at the Superdome deteriorated, offi cials scrambled to fi nd a way to evacuate 

the population. Prior to landfall, city authorities had failed to position buses outside the 

fl ood zone. Th e Regional Transit Authority, the city’s transit system, pre-positioned two 

fl eets of buses on high ground within New Orleans, but no level of government attempted 

to send drivers until three days aft er landfall. 

On Monday, the day of landfall, Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco had turned to FEMA 

Director Michael Brown with a request for 500 buses. He promised they would come. For 

reasons that have never been explained, those buses did not begin to arrive at the Superdome until Wednesday evening. By Katrina’s impossible clock, two and a half days was a 

lifetime. Waiting, even if because the facts on the ground weren’t clear, was an unconscionable luxury. If ever there was a time to overreact, this was it. 

“We kept being told that the buses were coming,” Dorothy Stukes said. “Th ey promised 

they were coming on Monday, and then Tuesday, and then Wednesday. Th ursday they fi -

nally got us to line up to load on the buses. At fi rst they said [to] make a single-fi le line, and 

then someone said women and children fi rst. Some of the men started snatching kids away 

from women so they could get on the bus.” 

“Aft er we got on the bus they wouldn’t tell us where they were taking us, and they said they 

forgot to load water for us,” Kemberly Samuels recalled. “Once we got settled we started 

reading signs and realized we were going to Houston. We found out that there were kids 

on the bus that had been separated from their parents. Th ere were at least four. I was asked 

to take care of one of them. Once we got to Houston, I took the kid to a Red Cross offi cial 

and let them know that the kid had gotten lost. By that time, a lot of people had gotten sick. 

People were bathing in the sinks. We hadn’t had a bath since Sunday. It was now Friday.”

Th e Louisiana National Guard troops who developed the Superdome evacuation plan were 

assisted by members of a 50,000-strong Guard deployment from all 50 states, as well as the 

District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and Guam. Aft er initiating the Superdome evacuation on Th ursday, they moved on to the Ernest N. Morial Convention Center.

Tuesday evening, Mayor Nagin had opened the Convention Center as an alternate 

refuge. Before landfall, the city had not intended to use the Convention Center for this 

purpose, so no food or water had been positioned, and few law enforcement, medical or 

government personnel were present. Over the next two days, 19,000 people converged on 

the facility, but all levels of government were slow to grasp the gravity of the unfolding 

crisis. Th e fi rst supplies may not have arrived until Th ursday. Th e fi rst media reports of the 

crowds at the Convention Center appeared Wednesday evening; by the next day there was 

video of thousands of stranded, desperate victims chanting “We want help.” 

Th e National Guard moved in on Friday, restoring order, distributing provisions, and 

evacuating the entire population in just over a day. Louisiana National Guard Colonel 

Jacques Th ibodeaux recalled his fi rst encounter with the people inside: “Th e fi rst time I went 

into the building ... groups of people just lying there immobile, and when I say immobile, 
Introduction

33

they assume that several were deceased because they actually kicked a couple to see if they 

were, ‘Hey, are you okay?,’ just to see, to get an assessment, and they didn’t move.” Th e 

people Th ibodeaux saw were alive, but so malnourished that they did not respond to physical stimuli. 

“Th ey’re hot, they’re tired, they’re hungry,” Wendell Shingler, the head of the Federal Protective Service, who assessed the situation at the Convention Center for the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS), recalled. “Th ey had no place to go to the bathroom. Th ey – some 

of these folks could not walk, so they were relieving themselves in their pants, and they had 

just lost their sense of humanity, they had lost their sense of dignity, and that was something that you could just see, they were just so distraught. Th ey had now gone from a retired 

person with a home and probably some income to a homeless person sitting on a sidewalk, 

owning everything they had in the bag.”

Th ough initial reports like Colonel Th ibodeaux’s suggested that as many as a hundred had 

died at the Convention Center, the actual toll was far lower. But this was cold comfort. One 

of Katrina’s most enduring images was that of 91-year-old Ethel Freeman, whose lifeless 

body, partially covered by a poncho, sat in a wheelchair at the Convention Center for days.

Th e evacuation of most of the city was complete by Saturday, when 8,800 active-duty 

ground troops began to arrive. It’s unclear why President Bush waited until Saturday to deploy federal ground troops – whether because of delay in settling command issues with state 

offi cials, because of the Defense Department’s doctrine of relying on National Guard units 

fi rst, because of federal units’ inability to take on law-enforcement duties, or other reasons. 

Th e National Response Plan, the document meant to guide federal response to a disaster 

like Katrina, assigns a supporting role to the Department of Defense, to be called on by 

FEMA as necessary. On Th ursday evening, three and a half days aft er landfall, FEMA asked 

the Department of Defense to take over its logistics operation. By that time, the Department had already begun to mobilize a signifi cant amount of its resources, including ships, 

aircraft , and medical support. Some commanders had seized the initiative to mobilize assets 

so that they would be ready to deploy when the orders fi nally came.

Perhaps the most visible among them was Lieutenant General Russel Honoré, Commander 

of U.S. First Army, based in Atlanta, Georgia. Military commanders have limited authority 

to deploy their troops without orders from above as part of an “exercise.” A native Louisianan who had assisted FEMA during the 2004 hurricane season, Honoré decided to stage 

an “exercise” that took his command element to Camp Shelby, Mississippi. Once Katrina 

subsided, Honoré was ideally positioned to take charge, and was named head of Joint Task 

Force Katrina by U.S. Northern Command, the headquarters for domestic military operations.

“When you landed here, with everybody walking with these red berets, in 45 minutes 

everybody’s attitude changed,” said Colonel Terry Ebbert, a former Marine who was New 

Orleans’ head of Homeland Security when Katrina struck. “Nothing really changed but 

their attitude. Everybody, instantaneously, when they saw these guys walking down the 

street, you know, they’re all good-looking, slim, tough guys that walk with a swagger, and 

it was over. Everybody felt good. Had that response come in on Tuesday,” Colonel Ebbert 

said, the situation may have improved sooner.

Th e Gulf Coast has been trying to fi nd its way back to normalcy. In the days aft er the storm 

“the weather was beautiful, ... but you’d smell rotting fl esh in the air,” Dr. Bill Passarelli, the 

cardiologist from Ocean Springs, Mississippi, recalled. “Whether it was animal or human 

you didn’t know, but it was everywhere. Th e closer you got to water the more intense it was.”
Chapter 1

34

“Just the devastation that was seen, it causes extreme – sudden and extreme duress,” Passarelli 

continued. “And we saw people who had heart attacks just from seeing their houses. One lady 

in particular, my daughter’s Spanish teacher, died that way. She was away for the storm, she 

survived the storm, and two days aft er the storm came back and died on her property.”

“Every little detail of life as I knew it here on the Gulf Coast before the storm has changed,” 

Dr. Jeff Bass, Passarelli’s colleague, wrote in an e-mail to friends in late September. “Th e 

schools are damaged, most of the local businesses are closed, and almost all of the police 

cars are from out of state because virtually all of the local cruisers were washed away. On the 

street, instead of greeting people with, ‘Hi, how are you?’ the greeting is ‘Hi, do you have a 

home, and is it livable?’”

Some 17,000 people lost jobs when the storm wiped out the local off -shore casinos, Bass 

continued. Th e destruction of Keesler Air Force Base in Biloxi unemployed 50,000 more, he 

wrote. “Almost all of the nice local restaurants have been destroyed ... along with many of 

the small Mom and Pop businesses. I doubt that they carried adequate insurance.”

Katrina destroyed or made uninhabitable 300,000 homes and caused as much as $150 billion in damage. In three Mississippi coastal counties alone, it left behind more debris than 

the 9/11 attacks and Hurricane Andrew, the most destructive recent hurricane, combined. 

At Hancock Medical Center, the storm left three-quarters of the staff homeless. Hal Left -

wich, the hospital administrator, and Hank Wheeler, the facilities-services director, spent 

the fi rst two weeks aft er the storm on air mattresses in the business offi ce and the next 

month in patient rooms. Th e numbers were similar at Ocean Springs. In some cases, the 

survivors have chosen to rebuild elsewhere. As of late January, half of New Orleans’ population had not returned.

In the days aft er the magnitude of government’s failure to respond became apparent, the 

Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs Committee initiated an investigation to 

“thoroughly examine what appears to be breakdowns in preparedness for and responses 

to” Hurricane Katrina and to “demand answers as to how this immense failure occurred,” 

according to a statement by Senators Susan Collins and Joseph Lieberman, Chairman and 

Ranking Member, respectively.

For the past seven months, the Committee has worked to discharge this obligation. It has 

held 22 days of hearings, interviewed or heard testimony from more than 400 witnesses, 

and reviewed in excess of 800,000 pages of documents. It has found failings at all levels of 

government. Preparations that were adequate in the past and that might have been suffi cient had Katrina been a “typical” hurricane proved to be grievously inadequate. Th e 

National Response Plan had its fi rst real-world test, revealing shortcomings. Katrina began 

as a human tragedy, but in the weeks aft er the storm, the fecklessness of the government 

response became a story unto itself.

Th is Report is a study of a catastrophe, an “ultra-catastrophe,” in the words of Department 

of Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff . Th e National Response Plan defi nes 

a catastrophe as “any natural or man-made incident, including terrorism, that results in 

extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely aff ecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or government functions.” By defi nition, they are rare, but the age of terrorism and climate change has ensured 

that the next occurrence is mainly a question of how and where, not when.

For that reason, the Committee intends this Report to serve as a catalyst for constructive 

reform before the next catastrophe, whatever shape it might take. Ironically, many of this 
Introduction

35

Report’s fi ndings have an alarming resemblance to the General Accounting Offi ce’s analysis of the government’s inadequate response to 1992’s Hurricane Andrew. Th e Committee 

hopes that this Report will never become part of a compendium of warnings similarly, and 

tragically, ignored. 

Th is is why the Committee’s report includes not only an analysis of the response at all levels 

of government, but assessments and recommendations as well. Th e Committee has found:

• A failure on the part of all levels of government to plan and prepare for the 

consequences of Katrina.

• A failure to heed the warnings of a looming catastrophe during the weekend 

preceding the storm, and a failure on the day of landfall to recognize that the 

worst predictions had come true.

• A failure on the part of government leaders to think “big” before Katrina 

struck and to challenge existing planning assumptions in the face of what was 

known to be a “nightmare scenario.”

• A failure on the part of all levels of government to plan and provide for the 

timely and eff ective evacuation of the elderly, the sick, and the disabled from 

New Orleans, and the evacuation of tens of thousands of able-bodied residents 

who did not have personal transportation.

• A failure to act on the lessons of past catastrophes, both man-made and natural, that demonstrated the need for a large, well-equipped, and coordinated 

law enforcement response to maintain or restore civil order aft er catastrophic 

events. 

• A failure to plan for and provide in a timely manner mass medical care and 

temporary shelter for tens of thousands of Katrina victims that all levels of 

government knew were likely to be impacted by a catastrophic hurricane.

Th e Committee has not used the power to judge lightly. Th is investigation has benefi ted 

from hindsight, which revealed that, for all the warnings and predictions, there had been 

too little foresight, aft er all. Th ough many understood and acknowledged the risks to the 

Gulf Coast, it seems few could imagine a major American city destroyed. 

Th e Committee has not assembled the complete record of what happened before, during, 

and aft er Hurricane Katrina. Areas for further study and clarifi cation remain. Th e issues 

raised by the response to Hurricane Katrina could not be more critical to America’s sense of 

itself in this moment in history, its security, prosperity, and honor.

Revisiting stories like those above recalls that endless week in late August and early September when the entire nation watched with frustration, anger, and despair as the disaster 

unfolded. It is the hope of this Committee that changes prompted by this Report will ensure 

that the anguish that might have been avoided or relieved sooner in America’s response to 

Hurricane Katrina will never come to pass again.
Katrina on the Gulf Coast 

NASA photo
37

Chapter 2

Hurricane Katrina: 

Indicators of Impact

Deaths caused by Hurricane Katrina, as of May 23, 20061 1,577

Deaths caused by 20th century’s most lethal hurricane, 

1935’s “Labor Day Hurricane” in Florida2

 400+

Land area damaged by Hurricane Katrina3

 90,000 sq. miles 

Ratio of area damaged by Katrina to area of United Kingdom 1:1

Homes destroyed or made unlivable by Hurricane Katrina4 300,000

Ratio of homes damaged or made unlivable by Katrina to 

the number similarly aff ected by 1992’s Hurricane 

Andrew, the most destructive recent hurricane5

 10:1

Estimated economic loss related to Hurricane Katrina6

 $125 - $150 billion 

Estimated economic loss related to 20th century’s previous 

most destructive hurricane (Andrew, FL, 1992)7 $48.4 billion (2005 dollars)

Economic losses from 9/11 terror attacks, 20018

 $87 billion (2005 dollars) 

Louisiana unemployment rate, August 2005 5.6 percent9

Louisiana unemployment rate, September 2005 12.1 percent10

Widest extent of Katrina’s tropical-storm force winds the 

day before landfall11 460 miles

Approximate ratio to distance from Kansas City to Dallas 1:1

Sustained-wind speed at landfall, August 29, near Buras, LA12 125 miles per hour

Rainfall accumulation along Gulf Coast from Katrina13 8 to 10 inches 

Storm surges above normal ocean levels, various locations14 20 to 30 feet

Electric customers, all types, left without power by storm15 1.7 million

Gulf of Mexico daily oil output shut down by Katrina16 95 percent

Number of oil spills caused by Katrina17 142

Gallons of oil spilled18 8 million

Gallons of oil recovered by Coast Guard as of Dec. 7, 200519 3.8 million

Estimated debris created by Hurricane Katrina20 118 million cu. yds

Ratio to debris created by Hurricane Andrew21 6:1

Number of children reported displaced/missing22 5,088

Number reunited with families or guardians23 5,088

 

Last date at which bodies have been found in New Orleans24 April 17, 2006

Number of bodies unclaimed or unidentifi ed25 200
Chapter 2

38

Approximate ratio of New Orleans population in 2000 to 

January 200626 3:1 

Ratio of tons of debris created by Katrina in the three coastal 

Mississippi counties, as compared to the combined 

debris of the 9/11 attacks and Hurricane Andrew27 1:1

1 Michelle Hunter, “Deaths of evacuees push toll to 1,577,” New Orleans Times-Picayune, May 19, 2006, p. 1. Th e article 

indicates that the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals added 281 victims to earlier counts on May 18, 2006, 

aft er offi cials concluded from a review of evacuees’ out-of-state death certifi cates that many were Katrina-related, such as 

from stress or loss of access to essential medications. 

2 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), “NOAA’s Top U.S. Weather, Water and Climate Events 

of the 20th Century,” Dec. 13, 1999. http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories/s334c.htm. Accessed on Mar. 26, 2006. 

3 Written Statement of Sec. Michael Chertoff , U.S. Department of Homeland Security, for the U.S. Senate, Committee 

on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Homeland Security Department’s 

Preparation and Response, Feb. 15, 2006, p. 1.

4 Written Statement of Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 2006, p. 1.

5 Written Statement of Walter Isaacson, Vice Chairman, Louisiana Recovery Authority, for the U.S. House, Committee 

on Financial Services, hearing on H.R. 4100, the Louisiana Recovery Corporation Act, Nov. 17, 2005, p. 1.

6 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, “Bank Performance Aft er Natural Disasters: A Historical Perspective,” Jan. 16, 

2006. http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/regional/ro20054q/na/2005_winter01.html. Accessed on Mar. 26, 2006.

7 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, “Bank Performance Aft er Natural Disasters: A Historical Perspective,” Jan. 16, 

2006. http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/regional/ro20054q/na/2005_winter01.html. Accessed on Mar. 26, 2006.

8 Written Statement of Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Director, Congressional Budget Offi ce, for the U.S. House, Committee on 

the Budget, hearing on Aft er the Hurricanes: Impact on the Fiscal Year 2007 Budget, Oct. 6, 2005. 

9 U.S. Department of Labor, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, “State Unemployment Rates in September 2005,” Oct. 24, 

2005. http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2005/oct/wk4/art01.htm. Accessed on Mar. 29, 2006.

10 U.S. Department of Labor, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, “State Unemployment Rates in September 2005,” Oct. 24, 

2005. http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2005/oct/wk4/art01.htm. Accessed on Mar. 29, 2006.

11 Richard D. Knabb, Jamie Rhome, and Daniel Brown, National Hurricane Center, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” Dec. 20, 2005.

12 NOAA, National Climatic Data Center, “Climate of 2005: Summary of Hurricane Katrina,” Dec. 29, 2005. http://

www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/research/2005/katrina.html. Accessed on Feb. 17, 2006.

13 NOAA, National Climatic Data Center, “Climate of 2005: Summary of Hurricane Katrina,” Dec. 29, 2005. http://

www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/research/2005/katrina.html. Accessed on Feb. 17, 2006.

14 NOAA, National Climatic Data Center, “Climate of 2005: Summary of Hurricane Katrina,” Dec. 29, 2005. http://

www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/research/2005/katrina.html. Accessed on Feb. 17, 2006.

15 NOAA, National Climatic Data Center, “Climate of 2005: Summary of Hurricane Katrina,” Dec. 29, 2005. http://

www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/research/2005/katrina.html. Accessed on Feb. 17, 2006.

16 NOAA, National Climatic Data Center, “Climate of 2005: Summary of Hurricane Katrina,” Dec. 29, 2005. http://

www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/research/2005/katrina.html. Accessed on Feb. 17, 2006.

17 Cmdr. Anthony Popiel, e-mail to Jason Yanussi, Senate Committee staff member, Apr. 6, 2006, 2 pm. 

18 Cmdr. Anthony Popiel, e-mail to Jason Yanussi, Senate Committee staff member, Apr. 6, 2006, 2 pm.

19 Cmdr. Anthony Popiel, e-mail to Jason Yanussi, Senate Committee staff member, Apr. 6, 2006, 2 pm.

20 Written Statement of Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 2006, p. 2.

21 Written Statement of Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 2006, p. 2.

22 National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, “National Center for Missing and Exploited Children Reunites 

Last Missing Child Separated by Hurricane Katrina and Rita,” press release, Mar. 17, 2006. http://www.missingkids.

com/missingkids/servlet/NewsEventServlet?LanguageCountry=en_US&PageId=2317. Accessed on Mar. 30, 2006.

23 National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, “National Center for Missing and Exploited Children Reunites 

Last Missing Child Separated by Hurricane Katrina and Rita,” press release, Mar. 17, 2006. http://www.missingkids.

com/missingkids/servlet/NewsEventServlet?LanguageCountry=en_US&PageId=2317. Accessed on Mar. 30, 2006.
Hurricane Katrina: Indicators of Impact

39

24 “Never-ending Sorrow,” New Orleans Times-Picayune, Apr. 19, 2006, p. 6. 

25 Michele Norris, All Th ings Considered, NPR, “New Orleans Seeks Final Home for Nameless Victims,” Feb. 13, 2006, 

9 p.m. Transcript accessed on LexisNexis.

26 City of New Orleans, Emergency Operations Center, Rapid Population Estimate Project, Jan. 28-29, 2006. http://www.

gnocdc.org/reports/NOLAPopEstimate.pdf. Accessed on Apr. 6, 2006.

27 Testimony of Don Powell, Coordinator of Recovery and Rebuilding in the Gulf Coast Region, U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on 

Mississippi’s Recovery from Hurricane Katrina, Jan. 17, 2006.
New Orleans, fl ooded

U.S. Coast Guard photo
41

Chapter 3

Hurricanes and 

the Gulf Coast

How Hurricanes Form

A hurricane is the strongest form of a “tropical cyclone,” 

the term used to describe weather systems that develop 

over tropical or sub-tropical waters with organized thunderstorms and a well-defi ned central “eye.” 

Most Atlantic hurricanes begin as atmospheric waves that 

move westward from Africa across the tropical North 

Atlantic and Caribbean Sea. Th is stretch of ocean is known 

as the main development region. Here, warm sea-surface 

temperatures pass moisture into the atmosphere, increasing humidity levels. Winds moving in from diff erent 

directions collide with the atmospheric waves and force air 

upwards. If there is low wind shear the air will continue 

to rise. Th e storm’s energy comes from the continuous 

exchange of heat between the ocean and the atmosphere, 

which is released through the formation of clouds concentrated in the center of the forming cyclone. 

Th e appearance of a high-pressure system provides the fi nal ingredient. Th e high-pressure 

system fl oats above the storm and draws the warm ocean air upward, pushing it outward 

from the top of the gathering storm in a continuous cycle. At this point the Earth’s rotation 

gives the incoming air a counter-clockwise spin and, propelled by the warm wind currents, 

the storm moves toward the coast.1

Tracking and Predicting Hurricanes

Not all storms in the main development region become hurricanes. Oft en, preexisting 

winds will tear apart the storm as it forms. If conditions are favorable, however, scientists 

will reclassify these “tropical disturbances” into more severe storms as their sustained wind 

speed rises:

• At 23 miles per hour, the disturbance becomes a “tropical depression.”

• At 39 miles per hour, the depression becomes a “tropical storm” and gets a 

name.

• At 74 miles per hour, the tropical storm is classifi ed as a hurricane (in the 

Pacifi c, a typhoon).2

A hurricane needs a constant source of energy. In this case, from June to November, the 

warm, humid waters of the Atlantic fuel the storm as trade winds from the east and ocean 

currents direct its path.3

 Th e storm weakens if it happens to move across cool water or land, 

losing its thermal energy source.4

Th e National Hurricane Center (NHC) in Miami, Florida, determines the track, intensity, 

and landfall eff ects of a storm. Th e NHC issues 72-hour tropical cyclone track and intensity 

forecasts four times a day for all storms in the north Atlantic and northeastern Pacifi c.5

Scouting Katrina from above

U.S. Air Force photo
Chapter 3

42

A hurricane watch is issued 36 hours before hurricane conditions are expected to aff ect 

coastal areas. A warning is issued 24 hours beforehand and may remain in eff ect even if 

wind speeds drop below hurricane force to account for the possibility of hurricane-level 

storm surge.

Storm surge is wind-driven water.6 As a hurricane churns in the atmosphere, its winds 

snowball the water below toward the shoreline. Combined with normal tides, this surge can 

increase the mean water level 15 feet and push up to 100 miles inland.7

 Even if a hurricane 

has weakened by the time it has reached shore, it has been building up storm surge since a 

much earlier time, when it was much stronger. 

Th ough hurricanes are measured by their wind speeds, many scientists have come to believe 

that storm surge is far more deadly than wind, especially considering that the highly populated areas of the Atlantic seaboard and the Gulf Coast lie only 10 feet above mean sea level.8

Hurricane Andrew (1992), which carried a 17-foot storm surge into Miami’s Biscayne Bay, 

illustrated the danger. Its storm surge shoved the Belzona Barge – a 215-foot, 350-ton barge 

that had been deliberately sunk 68 feet below the surface, with a thousand tons of concrete 

resting on deck, off the coast of Florida to establish an artifi cial reef – 700 feet to the west 

along the ocean fl oor.9

 “Th e greatest potential for loss of life related to a hurricane is from 

the storm surge,” according to an offi cial with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).10

Signifi cant progress in hurricane forecasting has prevented major loss of life in areas prone to 

hurricanes.11 Th e National Weather Service (NWS) uses the Sea, Lake, and Overland Surges 

from Hurricanes (SLOSH) computer program to predict the storm surge of an inbound 

hurricane and to map the likely impact of hurricanes of diff erent sizes, speeds, strengths, and 

tracks. Th e SLOSH program uses a storm’s barometric pressure, overall size, forward speed, 

track, and wind speed, as well as prior hurricane information and other models.12

During Hurricane Andrew in 1992, alarmed by scenes in South Florida, approximately 1.2 

million people evacuated from the New Orleans metropolitan area. While the evacuation 

almost certainly saved lives, federal hurricane experts were alarmed that offi cials in New 

Orleans expected 60 to 80 hours’ warning to complete an evacuation. During testimony 

before a Congressional committee in 1993, Robert Sheets, Ph.D., then the director of the 

NHC, warned that “We don’t have the skill meteorologically speaking to provide a suffi cient 

warning for those long lead times. Th ere is no way I am going to have 70 hours of lead time 

for New Orleans to respond to a hurricane.”13

By 2005, advances in technology, such as refi nement of satellite capabilities and improvement of pressure-measuring sensors in reconnaissance planes, had drastically increased 

the NHC’s lead times.14 By 2 p.m. ET Friday, August 26, 65 hours before Katrina made 

landfall, NHC Director Max Mayfi eld, Ph.D., was making calls to emergency offi cials in 

the Gulf Coast alerting them that a rapidly strengthening storm was heading directly for 

New Orleans.15

Hurricanes and the Gulf Coast

Th e same warm waters that give the Gulf Coast its marshy topography and humid climate 

make it a prime target for hurricanes, while demographic and economic trends have multiplied their potential impact.16 In earlier periods of our history, the physical impact of major 

hurricanes in the Gulf was soft ened by swamps, marshes, and barrier islands, while the 

societal impact was limited by its relatively small concentrations of buildings and people.

In more recent times, however, the population in the coastal counties from Texas to the 

Florida Keys has soared. Th e U.S. Census Bureau reports that 9.46 million people live along 
Hurricane and the Gulf Coast

43

the Gulf Coast – 3.5 times the number in 1950 – and their numbers are growing by nearly 7 

percent a year.17 From 1970 to 1994, the Gulf Coast averaged less than one hurricane landfall per season, and the East Coast averaged one hurricane landfall every fi ve years. Th is is 

in sharp contrast to the average of three U.S. hurricane landfalls during very active seasons. 

Unfortunately, decisions about land use, construction standards, etc. were based on an erroneous assumption, growing out of that period, that hurricanes would no longer aff ect the 

United States as frequently or as strongly as they had in earlier decades.18

Besides economic and population growth – including the swelling numbers of retirees 

drawn to warm-winter locales – engineering projects intended to prevent or reduce fl ood 

damage increased the appeal of the Gulf Coast. Here, as in the Southwest and the West 

Coast, “We are pushing toward the very areas where nature puts us most at risk from tropical storms, mudslides, and forest fi res,” Princeton University researcher Edward Tenner 

wrote in 1996. One of Tenner’s examples: “A big storm could leave 20 feet of water in 

downtown New Orleans and fl ood evacuation routes.”19

Ten years before Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans, NOAA saw signs that the Atlantic 

Ocean had entered a 10 to 40-year cycle of intense hurricanes that would present an especially serious threat to the Gulf Coast.20 From 1970 through 1994, the United States enjoyed 

what meteorologists viewed as “normal” Atlantic hurricane seasons, a period of relatively 

Hurricanes Betsy, Camille, 

and Katrina 

Geography and Map Division, 

The Library of Congress
Chapter 3

44

mild activity that had produced few major hurricanes, Th at period averaged fi ve hurricanes 

annually and 1.5 major hurricanes.21

Since 1995, however, hurricane seasons have averaged 7.6 hurricanes each year and 3.6 major hurricanes, with reported increases in their destructive power.22 Historically, the number 

of major hurricanes and the number of Caribbean hurricanes tended to follow the multi-decade cycle, according to a 2001 analysis by a team of hurricane experts, who said: “Th e late 

1920s to the 1960s were very active, while both the 1900s and the 1970s through the early 

1990s were quiescent.” 23

New Orleans was not the only major U.S. population center that was in greater danger of a 

catastrophic storm. Analysis of historical data showed that two regions of the United States 

– the East Coast from South Carolina to Maine and the Gulf Coast from Florida to Texas 

– faced a much greater risk of catastrophic hurricanes and storm surges. 

Marking the beginning of a new multi-decade period of hurricanes activity involves extensive analysis of historical trends, conditions in the Atlantic and the atmosphere.24 Even so, 

there are no guarantees. Catastrophic hurricanes have occurred in years of normal or even 

below-normal hurricane activity. In 1972, Hurricane Agnes never got beyond Category 1 

strength, but still caused 122 deaths in the United States, with severe fl ooding in Virginia 

and the Carolinas.25 Hurricane Andrew, the most damaging hurricane in U.S. history before 

Katrina, formed during a season (and cycle, lasting until 1994) of below-normal activity.26

Between 1995 and 2000, however, the North Atlantic had the highest level of hurricanes 

on record, including several that threatened New Orleans.27 Among them was Hurricane 

Georges in 1998, a Category 3 storm that caused 602 deaths in the Caribbean, set a track for 

New Orleans, but turned toward Mississippi before making landfall. 28 By 2000, hurricane 

experts had concluded that the Atlantic was undergoing “multi-decadal conditions” that 

favored more major hurricanes. Scientists began calling for improvements in hurricane 

preparedness.29 Th e NWS was issuing annual Atlantic Hurricane Outlooks, long-range forecasts of hurricane activity and severity.30 Released each May before the June 1 start of the 

hurricane season, the Outlooks relied on a yardstick known as the Accumulated Cyclone 

Energy (ACE) Index.31

Th e agency’s 2003 Outlook predicted a 55 percent likelihood of above-normal hurricane 

activity, with an estimated range of two to four major hurricanes. However, the projected 

ACE value of the season had a staggering range: 110-180 percent of the median, which was 

much higher than 2002 and the 1971-1994 period.32 Two months later, the agency increased 

the probability for an above-normal hurricane season to 60 percent and projected that three 

to four major hurricanes would threaten the United States.33 Th e assessment was correct: By 

November, the Atlantic had spawned three major hurricanes, including Isabel, a storm that 

reached Category 5 strength before striking North Carolina as a Category 2.34

A year later, the Outlook for 2004 predicted a 50 percent chance of an above-normal hurricane season, with two to four major hurricanes and an ACE index in the range of 100-160 

percent. Th at year, four major storms roared through the Gulf, including Hurricane Ivan. 

Th is Category 5 storm produced at least 34 tornadoes and was the most destructive hurricane to strike the Florida Panhandle and Alabama coast in a hundred years.35

Th e NWS’s 2005 Outlook, issued in May, predicted yet another above-normal hurricane 

season with twice the usual number of major hurricanes.36 Th is time, the pre-season estimate called for three to fi ve major storms and made it clear that the odds of a catastrophic 

storm were increasing. “Th e main uncertainly in this outlook is not whether the season will 

be above normal, but how much above normal it will be,” the report said.37
Hurricane and the Gulf Coast

45

During the next 60 days, the Atlantic spawned seven tropical storms and two major hurricanes, Dennis and Emily.38 On August 2, the NWS issued an update of its 2005 Outlook 

that predicted a “95% to 100% chance” of an above-normal hurricane season and increased 

its estimated range from three to fi ve, to fi ve to seven storms. 39

Twenty-one days later, on August 23, Tropical Depression 12 developed about 175 nautical 

miles southeast of Nassau, in the Bahamas. Th e following day, it was designated Tropical 

Storm Katrina.40

1 Christopher Landsea et al., “Atlantic Basin Hurricanes: Indices of Climatic Changes,” Climatic Change 42:1, May 1999, 

pp. 89-129; Stanley B. Goldenberg et al., “Th e Recent Increase in Atlantic Hurricane Activity: Causes and Implications,” 

Science, July 20, 2001, pp. 475-467 [hereinaft er Goldenberg, “Th e Recent Increase in Atlantic Hurricane Activity”]; and 

Lloyd J. Shapiro and Stanley B. Goldenberg, “Atlantic Sea Surface Temperatures and Tropical Cyclone Formation,” Journal of Climate 11, 1997, pp. 578-590; National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Earth Observatory “Hurricanes: 

Th e Greatest Storms on Earth.” http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Library/Hurricanes/index.html. Accessed on Mar. 31, 

2006 [hereinaft er NASA, “Hurricanes: Th e Greatest Storms on Earth”] (“Hurricanes form over tropical waters (between 

8° and 20° latitude) in areas of high humidity, light winds, and warm sea surface temperatures (typically 26.5°C [80°F] or 

greater). Th ese conditions usually prevail in the summer and early fall months of the tropical North Atlantic and North 

Pacifi c Oceans and for this reason, hurricane ‘season’ in the northern hemisphere runs from June through November.”).

2 NASA, “Hurricanes: Th e Greatest Storms on Earth.” 

Hurricanes are sorted into categories on the Saffi r-Simpson Scale, named for the engineer and the meteorologist who 

developed it in the 1970s. Its fi ve categories are now the standard method for classifying hurricanes:

Category 1 2 3 4 5 

 Wind speed (mi/hr) 74–95 96–110 111–130 131–155 155+ 

 Storm surge (ft ) 4–5 6–8 9–12 13–18 18+

Damage Minimal Moderate Extensive Extreme Catastrophic 

3 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Hurricane Research Division, “When is Hurricane Season?” 

http://www.aoml.noaa.gov/hrd/tcfaq/G1.html. Accessed on Jan. 24, 2006 (“Th e Atlantic hurricane season is offi cially 

from 1 June to 30 November. Th ere is nothing magical in these dates, and hurricanes have occurred outside of these six 

months, but these dates were selected to encompass over 97% of tropical activity. Th e Atlantic basin shows a very peaked 

season from August through October, with 78% of the tropical storm days, 87% of the minor (Saffi r-Simpson Scale categories 1 and 2 – see Subject D1) hurricane days, and 96% of the major (Saffi r-Simpson categories 3, 4 and 5) hurricane 

days occurring then (Landsea 1993). Maximum activity is in early to mid September.”).

4 Technical Data Report: Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Preparedness Study, prepared by U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 

New Orleans District for Federal Emergency Management Agency, Aug. 1994, p. 2–12 [hereinaft er Southeast Louisiana 

Hurricane Preparedness Study, Aug. 1994] (“Most hurricanes weaken aft er landfall because the central pressure increases 

and the radius of maximum winds tends to increase. Th e terrain of southern Louisiana is very low, fl at, and marshy and 

the transition to land from water is not abrupt.”).

5 See: National Weather Service, National Hurricane Center, Tropical Prediction Center. http://www.nhc.noaa.gov.

6 Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Preparedness Study, Aug. 1994, p. 2–2 (“A hurricane moving over the continental shelf 

produces a buildup of water at the coastline which is commonly referred to as storm surge. Storm surge is the increase 

in height of the surface of the sea due to the forces of an approaching hurricane. Storm surge normally occurs over a 

coastline for distances of 100 miles or more. Th e winds associated with a hurricane are the largest single component 

responsible for the buildup of storm surge within a basin. Th e wind blowing over the surface of the water exerts a horizontal force which induces a surface current in the general direction of the wind. Th e surface current, in turn, induces 

currents in subsurface water. Th is process of current creation continues to a depth which is determined by the depth of 

the water and by the intensity and forward motion of the hurricane. For example, a fast moving hurricane of moderate 

intensity may only induce currents to a depth of a hundred feet, whereas a slow moving hurricane of moderate intensity 

might induce currents to several hundred feet. Th ese horizontal currents are impeded by a sloping continental shelf as 

the hurricane approaches the coastline, thereby causing the water level to rise. A wide gently sloping continental shelf 

is particularly conducive to the formation of large storm surges. Th e amount of rise increases shoreward to a maximum 

level at, or some distance inland from the shoreline.”).

7 Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness and Louisiana State Hazard Mitigation Planning 

Committee, State of Louisiana Hazard Mitigation Plan, Apr. 15, 2005, p. I–46 [hereinaft er State of Louisiana Hazard 

Mitigation Plan, Apr. 15, 2005] (“In Louisiana, storm surges are large waves of Gulf waters that sweep across coastlines 

where a tropical storm makes landfall. Generally the more intense the storm, the greater the height of the storm surge; 

the higher the storm surge, the greater the damage to the coastline. Storm surges inundate coastal fl oodplains, wash out 

dunes, cause backwater fl ooding through coastal river mouths, generate large waves that run up and fl ood coastal beach-
Chapter 3

46

es, and can fl ood streets and buildings in coastal communities....Th e coastal bathymetry of southeastern Louisiana, with 

its low, fl at topography and land surface elevations that in many places dip below sea level, can experience storm surges 

up to 100 miles inland. Category 3 storms can bring depths up to 24 feet as far north as the City of New Orleans. Category 5 storms can produce depths as high as 36 feet. Furthermore, lakes along the coast, namely, Lake Maurepas, Lake 

Borgne, and Lake Pontchartrain, exacerbate the eff ects of coastal fl ooding because of wave eff ects that can regenerate 

over inland lakes. It is important to note that the map represents the cumulative storm surges for hundreds of modeled 

hypothetical hurricane tracks; no single hurricane event would produce the inundation pattern depicted on the map.”).

8 National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Preparedness, “Hurricane Preparedness Week.” http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/

HAW2/english/intro.shtml. Accessed on Jan. 16, 2006.

9 Ed Rappaport, National Hurricane Center, Preliminary Report: Hurricane Andrew, 16-28 August 1992, Dec. 10, 1993. 

http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/1992andrew.html. Accessed on Apr. 26, 2006 [hereinaft er Rappaport, Preliminary Report: 

Hurricane Andrew].

10 Brian Jarvinen, National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Preparedness, “Storm Surge.” http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/

HAW2/english/storm_surge.shtml. Accessed on Apr. 27, 2006.

11 Written Statement of Brig. Gen. David L. Johnson, U.S. Air Force (Ret.), Assistant Administrator for Weather Services, and Director, National Weather Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, for the U.S. House 

of Representatives, Committee on Science, hearing on NOAA Hurricane Forecasting, Oct. 7, 2005, p. 3 (“Th e mission of 

the National Weather Service (NWS) is to issue weather, water and climate forecasts and warnings for the protection 

of life and property and the enhancement of the national economy. Nowhere is that more evident than in the hurricane 

program.”). Source: Written Statement of Brig. Gen. Johnson, House Committee on Science hearing, Oct. 7, 2005, p.1. 

In 1943, aircraft reconnaissance of the hurricanes began. In 1959, land-based weather radars were placed at Lake Charles 

and Slidell, Louisiana and Pensacola, Florida. In the 1960s scientists gained the ability to observe tropical storm behavior 

through the use of satellite photography. Source: Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Preparedness Study, Aug. 1994, p. 1-9.

12 Written Statement of Brig. Gen. Johnson, House Committee on Science hearing, Oct. 7, 2005, p. 4 (“Following Hurricane Camille in 1969, NOAA established a group that developed and implemented a storm surge model called SLOSH 

(Sea, Lake, and Overland Surges from Hurricanes) Th e SLOSH model calculates storm surge heights resulting either 

from historical, hypothetical or actual hurricanes. SLOSH incorporates bathymetry and topography, including bay and 

river confi gurations, roads, levees, and other physical features that can modify the storm surge fl ow pattern.”). See also:

Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Preparedness Study, Aug. 1994, p. 2-6 (“In addition to furnishing surge heights for the 

open coast, the SLOSH model has the added capability to compute the routing of storm surge into bays, estuaries, or 

coastal river basins as well as calculating surge heights for overland locations. Signifi cant natural and man-made barriers 

are represented in the model and their eff ects simulated in the calculations of surge heights within a basin.”); State of 

Louisiana Hazard Mitigation Plan, Apr. 15, 2005, p. I–46 (“Storm surge areas can be mapped by the probability of storm 

surge occurrences using Sea, Lake and Overland Surges from Hurricanes modeling (referred to as SLOSH modeling)...

SLOSH models represent the storm surge of hundreds of simulated hurricanes, taking into account storm wind intensities, forward speeds, directions of motion, and radius of maximum winds.”).

13 Testimony of Robert Sheets, Ph.D., Director, National Hurricane Center, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Rebuilding FEMA: Preparing for the Next Disaster, May 18, 1993, p. 45.

14 Written Statement of Max Mayfi eld, Ph.D., Director, National Hurricane Center, for the U.S. House, Select Bipartisan 

Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing on Predicting Hurricanes: 

What We Knew About Katrina and When, Sept. 22, 2005, p. 5. For instance, the NWS used reconnaissance aircraft 

equipped with Stepped Frequency Microwave Radiometer (SFMR) that collects data about hurricane structure, surface 

wind and rain rate. See also: Written Statement of Brig. Gen. Johnson, House Committee on Science hearing, Oct. 7, 

2005, p. 3 NWS also uses hurricane monitoring buoys deployed in the Caribbean.

15 Committee staff interview of Max Mayfi eld, Ph.D., Director, National Hurricane Center, conducted on Jan. 27, 2006, 

transcript pp. 29-40.

16 For a detailed description of topography and economic development of the Louisiana Gulf Coast, see: Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Preparedness Study, Aug. 1994, pp. 1–2 through 1–5.

17 U.S Census Bureau, U.S. Census Bureau News, Newsroom “Almost 10 Million Gulf Coast Residents Bracing for Hurricane Dennis,” press release, July 8, 2005. http://www.census.gov/PressRelease/www/releases/archives/hurricanes_tropical_storms/005345.html. Accessed on Jan. 27, 2006.

18 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “NOAA Attributes Recent Increase in Hurricane Activity to 

Naturally Occurring Multi-Decadal Climate Variability,” NOAA Magazine, Nov. 29, 2005. http://www.magazine.noaa.

gov/stories/mag184.htm. Accessed on Mar. 8, 2006 [hereinaft er NOAA, “NOAA Attributes Recent Increase in Hurricane Activity to Naturally Occurring Multi-Decadal Climate Variability”].

19 Edward Tenner, Why Th ings Bite Back: Technology and the Revenge of Unintended Consequences, New York: Knopf, 

1996, pp. 93-94.

20 Goldenberg, “Th e Recent Increase in Atlantic Hurricane Activity” pp. 474-479 (“Th e years 1995 to 2000 experienced 

the highest level of North Atlantic hurricane activity in the reliable record. Compared with the generally low activity of 

the previous 24 years (1971 to 1994), the past 6 years have seen a doubling of overall activity for the whole basin, a 2.5-

fold increase in major hurricanes ... fi ve-fold increase in hurricanes aff ecting the Caribbean.”).

21 National Weather Service, Climate Prediction Center, “Background Information: Th e North Atlantic Hurricane 
Hurricane and the Gulf Coast

47

Season.” http://www.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov/products/outlooks/background_information.shtm. Accessed on Apr. 6, 2006. 

(“An average hurricane season features ten tropical storms (maximum sustained winds between 39-73 mph), of which 

an average of six become hurricanes (maximum sustained winds of at least 74 mph) and two become major hurricanes 

(maximum sustained winds exceeding 110 mph, categories 3-5 on the Saffi r-Simpson scale).”).

22 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Climatic Data Center, National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service, “Climate of 2005, Atlantic Hurricane Season.” http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/research/2005/hurricanes05.html. Accessed on Apr. 30, 2006. (“Tropical cyclone activity in the Atlantic basin has 

been above normal since 1995. Th is has been largely in response to the active phase of the multi-decadal signal. Th e 

average number of named storms since 1995 has been 13, compared to 8.6 during the preceding 25 years during which 

time the multi-decadal signal was in an inactive phase. An average of 7.7 hurricanes and 3.6 major hurricanes since 1995 

compares to 5 hurricanes and 1.5 major hurricanes from 1970-1994. Characteristics of an active multi-decadal signal in 

the Atlantic include: warmer SSTs in the tropical Atlantic region, an amplifi ed sub-tropical ridge at upper levels across 

the central and eastern North Atlantic, reduced vertical wind shear in the deep tropics over the central North Atlantic, and an African Easterly Jet (AEJ) that is favorable for promoting the development and intensifi cation of tropical 

disturbances moving westward off the coast of Africa. Recent studies also indicate that in addition to this multi-decadal 

oscillation the destructive power of hurricanes has generally increased since the mid-1970s, when the period of the most 

rapid increase in global ocean and land temperatures began.”).

23 Goldenberg, “Th e Recent Increase in Atlantic Hurricane Activity,” pp. 476-477 (“Th e Caribbean Sea has shown 

dramatic changes in hurricane activity – averaging 1.7 occurrences per year during the warm periods compared with 

only 0.5 per year during the cold period (34). Th e current warm period has produced an average of 2.5 occurrences per 

year with an unprecedented (since 1944) six hurricanes in the region during 1996. ... Th is means that during the next 10 

to 40 years or so, most of the Atlantic hurricane seasons are likely to have above average activity, with many hyperactive, some around average, and only a few below average. Furthermore, consistent with experience since the active phase 

began in 1995, there would be a continuation of signifi cantly increased numbers of hurricanes (and major hurricanes) 

aff ecting the Caribbean Sea and basin-wide numbers of major hurricanes.”).

24 Goldenberg, “Th e Recent Increase in Atlantic Hurricane Activity,” pp. 474-479 (“Th e greater activity results from 

simultaneous increases in North Atlantic sea-surface temperatures and decreases in vertical wind shear.”). See also:

NOAA, “NOAA Attributes Recent Increase in Hurricane Activity to Naturally Occurring Multi-Decadal Climate 

Variability” (“Th is era has been unfolding in the Atlantic since 1995, and is expected to continue for the next decade or 

perhaps longer. NOAA attributes this increased activity to natural occurring cycles in tropical climate patterns near the 

equator. Th ese cycles, called ‘the tropical multi-decadal signal,’ typically last several decades (20 to 30 years or even longer). As a result, the North Atlantic experiences alternating decades long (20 to 30 year periods or even longer) of above 

normal or below normal hurricane seasons.”).

25 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, NOAA Coastal Services Center, “Hurricane History.” http://

www.nhc.noaa.gov/HAW2/english/history.shtml. Accessed on Apr. 16, 2006. Agnes was barely a hurricane at landfall 

in Florida, and the eff ects of winds and storm surges were relatively minor. Th e major impact was over the northeastern 

United States, where Agnes combined with the non-tropical low to produce widespread rains of 6 to 12 inches with local 

amounts of 14 to 19 inches. Th ese rains produced widespread severe fl ooding from Virginia northward to New York, 

with other fl ooding occurring over the western portions of the Carolinas. Agnes caused 122 deaths in the United States. 

Nine of these were in Florida (mainly from severe thunderstorms) while the remainder were associated with the fl ooding. Th e storm was responsible for $2.1 billion in damage in the United States, the vast majority of which came from the 

fl ooding. Agnes also aff ected western Cuba, where seven additional deaths occurred.

26 Rappaport, Preliminary Report: Hurricane Andrew (“Andrew was a small and ferocious Cape Verde hurricane that 

wrought unprecedented economic devastation along a path through the northwestern Bahamas, the southern Florida 

peninsula, and south-central Louisiana. Damage in the United States is estimated to be near 25 billion, making Andrew 

the most expensive natural disaster in U.S. history.1

 Th e tropical cyclone struck southern Dade County, Florida, especially hard, with violent winds and storm surges characteristic of a category 4 hurricane (see addendum on upgrade 

to category 5) on the Saffi r/Simpson Hurricane Scale, and with a central pressure (922 mb) that is the third lowest this 

century for a hurricane at landfall in the United States. In Dade County alone, the forces of Andrew resulted in 15 deaths 

and up to one-quarter million people left temporarily homeless. An additional 25 lives were lost in Dade County from 

the indirect eff ects of Andrew. Th e direct loss of life seems remarkably low considering the destruction caused by this 

hurricane.”).

27 Goldenberg, “Th e Recent Increase in Atlantic Hurricane Activity,” pp. 474-479.

28 John L. Guiney, National Hurricane Center, Preliminary Report: Hurricane George, 15 September – 01 October 1998, 

Jan. 5, 1999. http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/1998georges.html. Accessed on Apr. 26, 2006. (“Georges (pronounced Zhorzh) 

was the second deadliest and second strongest hurricane within the Atlantic basin during the 1998 season. Its 17 day 

journey resulted in seven landfalls, extending from the northeastern Caribbean to the coast of Mississippi, and 602 fatalities – mainly in the Dominican Republic and Haiti.”).

29 Goldenberg, “Th e Recent Increase in Atlantic Hurricane Activity” p. 474 (“Th e years 1995 to 2000 experienced the highest level of North Atlantic hurricane activity in the reliable record. Compared with the generally low activity of the previous

24 years (1971 to 1994), the past 6 years have seen a doubling of overall activity for the whole basin, a 2.5-fold increase in 

major hurricanes (≥50 meters per second), and a twofold increase in hurricanes aff ecting the Caribbean. Th e greater activity results from simultaneous increases in North Atlantic sea-surface temperatures and decreases in vertical wind shear. 

Because these changes exhibit a multidecadal time scale, the present high level of hurricane activity is likely to persist for an 

additional ~ 10 to 40 years. Th e shift in climate calls for a reevaluation of preparedness and mitigation strategies.”).
Chapter 3

48

30 See: National Weather Service, Climate Prediction Center, “August 2004 Update to Atlantic Hurricane Season Outlook,” Aug. 10, 2004. http://www.cpc.noaa.gov/products/outlooks/hurricane2004/August/hurricane.html.

31 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Climatic Data Center, “Hurricane Katrina A Climatological Perspective,” Oct. 2005, p. 23 (”Th e Accumulated Cyclone Energy Index is one method to describe trends in 

tropical cyclone activity. Th is index is a combination of the tropical cyclone’s duration in a particular ocean basin, along 

with the strength of each storm.”).

32 National Weather Service, Climate Prediction Center, “NOAA: 2003 Atlantic Hurricane Outlook,” May 19, 2003. 

http://www.cpc.noaa.gov/products/outlooks/hurricane2003/May/hurricane.html. Accessed on April 5, 2006 (“Th is 

expected activity is considerably more than the four hurricanes and ACE value of 74% of the median observed during 

2002. It is also much larger than the seasonal average of fi ve hurricanes and ACE value of 75% of the median observed 

during the relatively quiet period 1970-1994.”).

33 National Weather Service, Climate Prediction Center, “NOAA: 2003 Atlantic Hurricane Outlook Update,” Aug, 7, 

2003. http://www.cpc.noaa.gov/products/outlooks/hurricane2003/August/hurricane.html. Accessed on Apr. 4, 2006.

34 Isabel is considered to be one of the most signifi cant tropical cyclones to aff ect portions of northeastern North Carolina and east-central Virginia since Hurricane Hazel in 1954 and the Chesapeake-Potomac Hurricane of 1933. Jack Bevin 

and Hugh Cobb, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “Tropical Cyclone Report for Hurricane Isabel 6 

– 19 September 2003.” Jan. 16, 2004. http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/2003isabel.shtml. Accessed on Apr. 14, 2006. 

35 Gerald Bell, et al., “Th e 2004 North Atlantic Hurricane Season: A Climate Perspective,” pp. 1-4. http://www.cpc.

ncep.noaa.gov/products/expert_assessment/hurrsummary_2004.pdf#search=’Th e%202004%20North%20Atlantic%20

Hurricane%20Season%3A%20A%20Climate%20Perspective’. Accessed on Apr. 26, 2006 (“Th e 2004 Atlantic hurricane 

season had well above-normal activity, with 15 named storms, 9 hurricanes (H), and 6 major hurricanes [MH, defi ned as 

categories 3-5 on the Saffi r-Simpson scale, Simpson (1974)]. Nine of these systems struck the continental United States, 

three as tropical storms (Bonnie, Hermine, and Matthew) and six as hurricanes (Alex, Charley, Frances, Gaston, Ivan, 

and Jeanne). Th ree of the hurricanes (Charley, Ivan, and Jeanne) hit as major hurricanes... MH Ivan, the strongest of the 

2004 hurricanes, eventually made landfall in Alabama and produced the largest storm total ACE value (70.4 x 104 kt2) in 

the reliable record.”).

36 National Weather Service, Climate Prediction Center, “NOAA: 2005 Atlantic Hurricane Outlook,” May 16, 2005. 

http://www.cpc.noaa.gov/products/outlooks/hurricane2005/May/hurricane.html. Accessed on Apr. 4, 2006; Written 

Statement of Max Mayfi eld, Ph.D., Director, National Hurricane Center, for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Commerce, 

Science, and Transportation, hearing on Th e Life Saving Role of Accurate Hurricane Prediction, Sept. 20, 2005, p. 6 (“Th e 

natural cycles are quite large with on average 3-4 major hurricanes a year in active periods and only about 1-2 major 

hurricanes annually during quiet periods, with each period lasting 25-40 years.”).

37 National Weather Service, Climate Prediction Center, “NOAA: 2005 Atlantic Hurricane Outlook,” May 16, 2005. 

http://www.cpc.noaa.gov/products/outlooks/hurricane2005/May/hurricane.html. Accessed on Apr. 4, 2006.

38 National Weather Service, Climate Prediction Center, “NOAA: August 2005 Update to Atlantic Hurricane Season 

Outlook,” Aug. 2, 2005. http://www.cpc.noaa.gov/products/outlooks/hurricane2005/August/hurricane.html. Accessed 

on Apr. 4, 2006 (“Th e predicted seasonal totals include the considerable activity that has already occurred prior to this 

update (7 tropical storms and 2 major hurricanes)...Of particular relevance to this outlook is that two July tropical systems, Major Hurricanes Dennis and Emily, formed over the eastern Caribbean Sea and over the central tropical Atlantic 

(near 10°N), respectively. It is rare for hurricanes to develop in these regions during July because the wind patterns are 

normally so unfavorable.”).

39 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “August 2005 Update to Atlantic Hurricane Season Outlook,” 

Aug. 2, 2005. http://www.cpc.noaa.gov/products/outlooks/hurricane2005/August/hurricane.html. Accessed on Apr. 4, 

2006 (“Th e updated outlook calls for an extremely active season, with an expected seasonal total of 18-21 tropical storms 

(mean is 10), with 9-11 becoming hurricanes (mean is 6), and 5-7 of these becoming major hurricanes (mean is 2-3). Th e 

likely range of the ACE index for the season as a whole is 180%-270% of the median. Th e predicted seasonal totals include the considerable activity that has already occurred prior to this update (7 tropical storms and 2 major hurricanes). 

Th erefore, for the remainder of the season, we expect an additional 11-14 tropical storms, with 7-9 becoming hurricanes, 

and 3-5 of these becoming major hurricanes. Th e expected ACE range during August-November is 110%-200% of the 

median. Th ese very high levels of activity are comparable to those seen during August-November 2003 and 2004.”).

40 Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel P. Brown, National Hurricane Center, “Tropical Cyclone Report 

Hurricane Katrina 23-30 August 2005,” Dec. 20, 2005, p. 1. http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/TCR-AL122005_Katrina.

pdf#search=’Tropical%20Cyclone%20Report%20Hurricane%20Katrina’. Accessed on Apr. 26, 2006.
584
A city become a lake, New Orleans

U.S. Coast Guard photo
51

Katrina Strikes

Louisiana 

On August 23, 2005, Tropical Depression 12 developed about 200 miles southeast of Nassau. Within 24 hours, it was designated Tropical Storm Katrina.1

 Over the next two days, 

the storm strengthened and set a course for Florida. On August 25, Tropical Storm Katrina 

became a Category 1 hurricane, just hours before striking the Florida coast between Fort 

Lauderdale and Miami.2

 (See Chapter 3 for information about how hurricanes form and 

grow, and other relevant data.)

Katrina’s six-hour march across land diminished its winds, but – atypically – left it with a 

more concentrated eye because it continued taking up heat and moisture as it passed over 

a marshy part of Florida’s Everglades before entering the Gulf of Mexico.3

 Th ere, the storm 

strengthened further, turned north and headed for the Florida Panhandle.4

Friday, August 26

By early Friday morning, August 26, Katrina was well into the Gulf of Mexico, just off the 

Florida Keys, 365 miles southeast of the mouth of the Mississippi River. It continued to 

grow and became more powerful.5

 Until now, the diff erent modeling programs used by the 

National Weather Service’s (NWS) National Hurricane Center (NHC) had projected the 

hurricane’s track making landfall in the Florida Panhandle.6

By midday, however, the models began to converge on a course that showed a marked shift 

westward, toward Louisiana.7

 Th e NHC did not immediately issue a new advisory, but it 

now appeared that the agency’s long-time fear – that New Orleans would take a direct hit 

from a major hurricane – was increasingly likely to come true.8

Th e 5 p.m. NHC advisory made the new track offi cial: Katrina, still growing, had shift ed 

170 miles west.9

 It would soon become a major Category 3 hurricane, and, as reported by 

the NHC, conditions in the Gulf of Mexico “should allow the hurricane to reach Category 4 

status before landfall occurs.”10

Max Mayfi eld, Director of the NHC, phoned Walter Maestri, an old friend and the Emergency Preparedness Director in Jeff erson Parish, Louisiana. Maestri recalled Mayfi eld’s 

words: “Th is is it. Th is is what we’ve been talking about all of these years. You are going to 

take it. ... It’s a 30, 90 storm.” Maestri explained, “Th at’s the longitude and latitude of the 

City of New Orleans.”11 Other forecasters made similar calls to offi cials in Louisiana and 

Mississippi warning that Katrina was shift ing their way.12

Th is new information was shared in a 5 p.m. CT (all subsequent times are Central Time) 

statewide conference call run by Colonel Jeff Smith, Deputy Director of the Louisiana Offi ce 

of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP). Katrina would be striking the eastern portion of the Mississippi coast in approximately 72 hours with Category 4 

winds, a NWS forecaster informed offi cials.13

Th e forecaster reminded emergency managers that landfall was extremely diffi cult to predict 

with precision three days in advance.14 But, the forecaster added, referring to the computer 

model used to measure storm surge, “If you look at a Category 4 storm surge, looking at the 

SLOSH models, you’d get into the 15 to 20-foot range quite easily.”15

Chapter 4
Chapter 4

52

Saturday, August 27 

Th roughout Saturday, August 27, Katrina nearly 

doubled in size. Its tropical storm-force winds extended outward about 160 miles from the center.16

At the NHC, offi cials were increasingly confi dent 

that Katrina would make landfall at or near New 

Orleans; a level of geographic precision was required 

for more accurate predictions of storm surge.17 On 

a 7:30 a.m. conference call, a federal forecaster told 

Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco and state and 

parish emergency offi cials that by 9 a.m. Monday, 

southeast Louisiana could expect hurricane-force 

winds and a storm surge of 15 to 18 feet. Th e latest track prediction put the hurricane “smack dab 

through the metropolitan New Orleans areas.”18

On Saturday evening, Max Mayfi eld made another round of telephone calls to assure himself that local and state offi cials understood what was coming. At approximately 7:25 p.m., 

he spoke with Governor Blanco, who suggested he call New Orleans Mayor C. Ray Nagin. 

Twenty minutes later, he spoke with Governor Haley Barbour in Mississippi. By 8 p.m., he 

had spoken with Mayor Nagin.19

Sunday, August 28

At 7 a.m., August 28, the NHC announced that Katrina was a “potentially catastrophic Category 5 hurricane.”20 Th e storm’s tropical-force winds extended 230 miles from the center, 

“making Katrina not only extremely intense but also exceptionally large.”21 At that point, 

Katrina was twice as wide as 1992’s Hurricane Andrew. Superimposed over the United 

States, it would have reached from Boston to Washington, D.C.

Less than an hour later, at 7:50 a.m., a NWS forecaster advised the St. Bernard Parish Offi ce of Emergency Management to expect a direct strike from the hurricane with “[m]ajor 

overtopping” of the levees. He advised offi cials that “Residents should leave now before the 

onset of tropical force winds and rising tides cut off evacuation routes.”22

Th roughout the aft ernoon and evening, local forecasters advised local emergency managers 

about the intensifying storm. At 4:45 p.m., Hancock County, Mississippi, emergency managers were warned that Category 5 winds could produce a 28-foot storm surge in Waveland, 

on the coast. Th e City of New Orleans was warned to expect 18 to 22 feet.23

By early evening, storm-surge projections had grown more worrying. To underscore the 

danger, the NWS offi ce in Slidell, Louisiana, issued a 5:45 p.m. advisory that called Katrina 

a “catastrophic” Category 5 hurricane and warned that “a few areas may experience storm 

surge fl ooding as high as 28 feet along with large and dangerous battering waves.”24 For the 

fi rst time, the weather agency publicly warned of levee overtopping.25

The Geography of the Metropolitan New Orleans Region 

While the New Orleans metropolitan area has been referred to as a “bowl,” it would be 

more accurately described as three distinct, large, urban bowls, and one very thin, elongated, predominantly rural bowl.

A fl ood-control system surrounds these four areas, known as “polders”: (1) Orleans East 

Bank, (2) New Orleans East, (3) Ninth Ward/St. Bernard, and (4) Plaquemines Parish.

Katrina’s storm track by day, 

time, and severity 

Courtesy of University of Wisconsin Space 

Science and Engineering Center
Katrina Strikes

53

Th e Orleans East Bank polder includes the downtown district, the French Quarter, the Garden District, and several other central New Orleans neighborhoods. It borders Lake Pontchartrain to the north and the Mississippi River to its south; the Industrial Canal forms its 

eastern border. Th ree large drainage canals penetrate the Orleans East Bank polder, emptying 

out into Lake Pontchartrain: the 17th Street, Orleans Avenue, and London Avenue Canals.

Th e New Orleans East polder also borders Lake Pontchartrain to the north; the Industrial 

Canal forms the west edge. To the south is the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway/Mississippi 

River Gulf Outlet (MRGO). Undeveloped swampland contained within the levee ring takes 

up the eastern edge. To the southeast is Lake Borgne.

Th e Ninth Ward/St. Bernard polder also borders the Industrial Canal to the west; the Gulf 

Intracoastal Waterway/MRGO channel is to the north and northeast. Lake Borgne is east, 

separated from the polder by the MRGO channel and undeveloped marshland. Th e polder’s 

primary urban areas are in the south (St. Bernard Parish) and west (Ninth Ward). 

Plaquemines Parish is a thin strip of land along the Mississippi River, which runs southsoutheast from St. Bernard Parish to the mouth of the Mississippi River at the Gulf of 

Mexico. Th is strip, less than a mile wide in many areas, has levees fronting the Mississippi 

River and a second set of hurricane levees on its other side to protect against Gulf waters. 

Th e levees surround several small communities, utilities, and pipelines.26

Monday, August 29

Late Sunday, August 28, hurricane-force winds reached more than 100 miles from Katrina’s 

eye.27 Th e winds and, later, the accompanying storm surge would strike land well before the 

offi cial landfall event of the eye’s arrival. By 5 a.m. on Monday, with the wind fi eld already 

over land, but the eye’s landfall an hour away, Katrina was at Category 4 strength with 

maximum sustained winds of more than 130 miles an hour.28 Th e NHC reported that with 

the storm’s radius of maximum winds extending out roughly 30 to 35 miles from its center, 

“It is possible that sustained winds of Category 4 strength briefl y impacted the extreme 

southeastern tip of Louisiana in advance of landfall.”29

As the eye approached New Orleans, Katrina shoved a 14 to 17-foot storm surge up a “funnel” created by the hurricane protection levees at the convergence of the south bank of the 

MRGO and the north bank of the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway, and focused a torrent of 

water on the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal.30 Th e eye of Hurricane Katrina made landfall 

at Buras, Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana, at 6:10 a.m. Th e storm was at the high end of Category 3 strength, with estimated maximum sustained winds of 127 miles an hour.31 It tore

through the Mississippi River and hurricane protection levees of the Plaquemines Parish 

polder.32 By 10 a.m. the northward-moving eye had reached the mouth of the Pearl River at 

the Louisiana/Mississippi border.33

As the storm continued north – just east of downtown New Orleans – its strongest winds 

likely existed over the Gulf of Mexico to the east of the eye. Winds over the greater New 

Orleans metropolitan area were most likely weaker than Category 3,34 but were probably 

stronger several hundred feet above ground, where brutal wind punched out windows in 

hotels and offi ce buildings.35

As the counterclockwise-moving hurricane passed over Lake Borgne on the eastern side of 

the city with a storm surge estimated at 18 to 25 feet, it shoved water westward onto an edge 

of the levee that protected the northern edge of the Ninth Ward and St. Bernard Parish; 5 to 

10 feet of excess surge easily slid over the levee walls.36 Upon reaching Lake Pontchartrain, 

Katrina’s winds produced a southward surge of lakewater along the northern edges of the 
Chapter 4

54

Orleans East Bank and New Orleans East polders, with overtopping and a breach in New 

Orleans East, adjacent to the Lakefront Airport.37

Th e surge from Lake Pontchartrain and Lake Borgne streamed into the Industrial Canal 

and the MRGO channel. Here, too, the fl oodwaters easily overfl owed the levees. In time, the 

erosion of the earthen levees by overtopping led to numerous breaches that added to the 

torrent of water quickly fi lling the “bowls” that included the New Orleans East and Ninth 

Ward/St. Bernard polders.38

Th e inundation of New Orleans happened in two stages. A “surge funnel” that attacked 

the levees and fl oodwalls along the MRGO, the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway and the Inner 

Harbor Navigation Canal caused the fi rst fl ooding. Th e second stage began when Katrina’s 

storm surge muscled into Lake Pontchartrain.39 “Both events caused overtopping, or fl ow 

over intact levees and fl oodwalls, as well as breaching that resulted in fl ow under and 

through levees and fl oodwalls,”40 according to a report by the Center for the Study of Public 

Health Impacts of Hurricanes at Louisiana State University. “In some cases, overtopping 

preceded or led to breaching, while in other places breaches opened before surge levels rose 

high enough to cause overtopping.”41

A report by the American Society of Civil Engineers and the National Science Foundation 

reached a similar conclusion, noting that “Most of the levee and fl oodwall failures were 

caused by overtopping, as the storm surge rose over the tops of the levees and/or their 

fl oodwalls and produced erosion that subsequently led to failures and breaches.”42

Because the storm surge arrived ahead of the hurricane, some residential areas in the greater New Orleans area began to fl ood just aft er 4 

a.m.43 Between 4 and 5 a.m., minor breaches opened in the levees at the 

intersection of the CSX Railroad and the northern arm of the Industrial Canal (adjacent and parallel to I-10) sending water into the New 

Orleans East polder to the east and the Orleans East Bank polder to 

the west. Th e fl ooding continued for over 12 hours.44 At approximately 

6:50 a.m., the levees along all reaches of the Industrial Canal began to 

be overtopped and water started to pour into the city both to the east 

and the west.45

Between 5 and 7 a.m., the storm surge coming through Lake Borgne struck and destroyed 

several levee reaches along the MRGO channel and the Industrial Canal, fl ooding portions 

of the New Orleans East, Orleans East Bank and the Ninth Ward/St. Bernard polders.46 In 

some places, fl ooding continued for days.47 Levees along several reaches of the Industrial 

Canal were overtopped, resulting in water gushing to the west into the Orleans East Bank 

polder and to the east into the New Orleans East and Ninth Ward/St. Bernard polders. 48

At about 7 a.m., the 18-foot Lake Borgne storm surge peaked and almost certainly caused 

the rapid fl ooding at the Louisiana National Guard’s Jackson Barracks in St. Bernard Parish.49 For years, the Louisiana National Guard had used this compound to deploy a small 

group of soldiers and offi cers close to the area where a major hurricane was likely to strike. 

Th e facility had stood up to numerous strong storms, including 1965’s Hurricane Betsy. 

Brigadier General Brod Veillon, who was in command at Jackson Barracks on the night of 

August 28, said that, by dawn, Jackson Barracks had 6 to 12 inches of water in the parking 

lot, a typical amount from heavy rainfall. Within 30 minutes, however, the compound was 

engulfed by 10 feet of water. “It rose about a foot every 3 minutes. We watched it climb the 

stairs. ... I knew it was signifi cant when the walls of Jackson Barracks, which are brick walls, 

began to collapse.”50

First image of breaching, 

New Orleans

Courtesy of National Geographic Channel’s 

“Explorer: Drowning New Orleans.”

Photo by Paul Hellmers © Paul Hellmers
Katrina Strikes

55

By 7:30 a.m., levees along the 

west side of the Industrial Canal 

(at the railroad yard) failed and 

began a fl ood of the Orleans East 

Bank polder that continued for 

about 12 to 15 hours.51 By this 

time, there was massive fl ooding in much of the city, and the 

pumping stations had died.52

At approximately 7:45 a.m., 

the levees along the east side of 

the southeastern section of the 

Industrial Canal failed, sending 

a wall of water into the neighborhoods of the Ninth Ward/St. 

Bernard polder, especially the 

Lower Ninth Ward.53 Th e National Weather Service reported 

that 3 to 8 feet of fl ooding was 

possible.54 Th en, at 8:30 a.m., a 

continuous wave of storm surge 

poured over a one-mile section 

of levee along Lake Pontchartrain behind the Lakefront Airport. Th e water kept coming for another two to three hours.55

In the Ninth Ward/St. Bernard polder,56 fl oodwaters were reaching the second stories of 

bigger buildings and residents were fl eeing to their attics.57

To the west – along the northern edge of the Orleans East Bank polder – the storm surge 

that hit the southern lakefront of Lake Pontchartrain did not produce waters high enough 

to overtop the concrete fl oodwalls lining the three major drainage canals: the 17th Street, 

Orleans Avenue, and London Avenue Canals. Nevertheless, three major breaches occurred 

along these canals. Based on two very detailed eyewitness accounts in the area, it is estimated 

that the initial breach on the east side of the 17th Street Canal occurred at approximately 6:30 

a.m.,58 and that the catastrophic failure of the levee took place somewhere between 9 and 10 

a.m. 59 Similarly, sometime between 7 and 9:30 a.m., a section on the east side of the London 

Avenue Canal (close to the Mirabeau Bridge) failed;60 sometime between 7:30 and 10:30 a.m., 

a section on the west side of the London Avenue Canal breached, “sen[ding] an 8 foot high 

wall of water cascading into the surrounding neighborhoods.”61 All three of these breaches 

caused catastrophic fl ooding in the Orleans East Bank polder, which includes (among others) 

the Central Business District, Lakeview, Mid City, and Lakewood areas of the city. 

Captains Paul Hellmers and Joe Fincher, two New Orleans Fire Department fi remen located 

at a department refuge in the Lakefront area of the city, videotaped the 17th Street Canal 

breach. In the video, which captures the breach at 11:11 a.m., Capt. Hellmers said:62

You can ... see the water pouring through the [inaudible] wall. Th ere’s a ... 

concrete wall on top of the dirt levee. And you can see that the ... wall is gone 

– you can see the water pouring through, it looks like about a 200-foot section 

of wall that’s gone! Th e water is continuing to rise – very slowly.63

While Capt. Hellmers observed that the water in the entire area was rising “very slowly,” it 

is clear from the video that the water from the 17th Street Canal breach is pouring through 

the gaping hole with enormous pressure and speed.64 A second video of the New Orleans 

A canal breached, New Orleans

Photo © 2005 The Times-Picayune Publishing 

Co., all rights reserved. Used with permission of 

the Times-Picayune
Chapter 4

56

area, shot from a Coast Guard helicopter during the early aft ernoon of August 29, helps 

explain the diff erent impressions.65 From the vantage point of the helicopter’s bay window, 

it is evident that the infl ow from Lake Pontchartrain was spreading out rapidly into a vast 

area of land, so the water level rose slowly despite the power of the fl ow.

Later in the day, between approximately 5:15 and 7 p.m., Marty Bahamonde, a public- affairs offi cial with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) who had spent the 

night at the New Orleans City Hall Emergency Operations Center, joined a Coast Guard 

helicopter crew to conduct a visual inspection. Th e fi rst of his two rides began with a quick 

pass over the 17th Street Canal. A second fl ight of approximately 45 minutes covered most 

of the metropolitan area of New Orleans. Bahamonde described the scene: 

As far as the eye could see in either direction was completely covered with 

water. Th ere was no dry land. I saw no dry land the moment I left , other than 

around the Superdome. ... It was varying in depth. Th ere were houses that 

were completely under water. All you saw was rooft ops. ... It was obvious that 

there was massive fl ooding throughout the city. ... And we went out and fl ew 

over the [I-10] twin span and it was completely destroyed. ... We fl ew over the 

canal area, may have even been the Mississippi, where a huge tanker had been 

run aground. ... Chalmette, the Ninth Ward, all completely fl ooded ... the 

Intracoastal Industrial Canal. You didn’t really know it was a canal because it 

was just one sheet of water. ... And as we got back toward the city, it became 

obvious now that – it’s close to 7 o’clock – that there are literally hundreds of 

people on rooft ops, standing in balconies in apartments, and that there was a 

desperate need for a rescue mission because it was now getting dark.66

Around the same time that Bahamonde was observing the devastation from a Coast Guard 

helicopter, Colonel Richard P. Wagenaar, Commander of the Army Corps of Engineers 

district offi ce in New Orleans, was conducting a similar reconnaissance in a four-wheeldrive vehicle. Col. Wagenaar told the Committee that between 5 and 5:30 p.m. he reached 

an elevated overpass on Interstate 10 near downtown New Orleans: 

Th en we saw the water, and the water was – all you could see were the trees 

sticking out of the water. ... Th at’s probably 10 or 15 feet of water ... a sight to 

behold, because, literally, I mean, you just drive on an interstate and there is a 

lake. I mean, it literally was a lake.” 67

Mississippi

Hurricanes are part of life on the Mississippi Gulf Coast. Every year there are hurricane 

warnings, evacuations, and scares; some years the coast gets hit. Before Katrina, the gold 

standard for storms in the region was Hurricane Camille,68 a Category 5 hurricane that 

struck Mississippi on August 17-18, 1969, killing 143 along the coast, bringing with it about 

10 inches of rain and a storm tide as high as 24 feet.69

Th e area’s familiarity with hurricanes – and with the inevitable false alarms generated as the 

storms wander toward land – gives coastal residents both a healthy respect for storms and a 

degree of nonchalance toward dire warnings. False alarms during previous seasons – including an evacuation in 2004 before Hurricane Ivan, which ultimately veered away from 

the Mississippi coast – may have contributed to this attitude. Surviving Camille, widely 

viewed as the worst storm imaginable, may have led some to believe that future storms 

would be no worse. 
Katrina Strikes

57

Katrina changed all that. As Governor Barbour recounted at a February 2, 2006, hearing of 

the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs Committee:

On Aug. 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck our state a grievous blow. Although the eye of the storm landed at the Mississippi-Louisiana line, that eye 

was more than 30 miles wide, and Katrina completely devastated our entire 

coastline, from Pearlington to Pascagoula. Th e miles and miles of utter destruction is unimaginable. ... But this hurricane wasn’t just a calamity for the 

Mississippi Gulf Coast. Its impact extended inland with hurricane force more 

than 200 miles from the coast. In her wake, Katrina left literally tens of thousands of uninhabitable, oft en obliterated homes; thousands of small businesses 

in shambles; dozens of schools and public buildings ruined and unusable; 

highways, ports and railroads, water and sewer systems, all destroyed.70

The Region

In 2005, the State of Mississippi had a population of approximately 2.9 million people. Th e 

state comprises 82 counties, with three (Hancock, Harrison, and Jackson) located directly 

on the Gulf of Mexico, and three directly to the north of them (Pearl River, Stone, and 

George). Th e three counties that lie directly on the Gulf are generally referred to as the 

Mississippi Gulf Coast, and have a combined population of approximately 374,000 people 

(with populations of 46,000 in Hancock, 193,000 in Harrison, and 135,000 in Jackson). Th e 

Mississippi Gulf Coast extends for some 90 miles between Louisiana and Alabama. With 

the three counties to the north (Pearl River has 52,000, Stone has 14,000, and George has 

21,000), that number rises to 461,000.71

Th e largest cities of the southernmost six counties are Gulfport and Biloxi, both located in 

Harrison County. Th ey are the second and third largest cities in the state aft er the capital, 

Jackson, with populations of 71,000 and 50,000 respectively. Th e next largest in the region 

are the cities of Pascagoula in Jackson County (26,000), Laurel in Jones County (18,000), 

and Long Beach in Harrison County (17,000). Other cities in Hancock County include Bay 

St. Louis (8,000) and Waveland (6,000). 72

Th e Mississippi coastal area had a varied economy before Katrina struck. Major sectors 

included oil-and-gas refi ning and distribution, light manufacturing, and tourism. Th e area’s 

beaches and casino resorts were a mainstay of the tourism industry. Recent years had seen 

development of a number of casino/hotel complexes, including the Hard Rock Casino, the 

Beau Rivage, the Palace Casino, and the Grand Casino. To comply with Mississippi law, the 

casino operations were off shore, on barges arrayed along the coast.73 Th e casino industry 

was an important source of jobs and tax revenue for the region.74

Katrina Approaches 

At about 10 a.m. on Wednesday, August 24, the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency 

(MEMA) activated the state Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Jackson, Mississippi. At 

this point Katrina was just a tropical storm in the Atlantic.75 By 4 p.m. the next day, Katrina 

was bearing down on Florida and its entry into the Gulf of Mexico was increasingly likely.76

At 10 a.m. on Friday, August 26, MEMA’s situation report reported that Katrina was likely 

to make a gradual turn to west-northwest and northwest from Florida and noted, “Th is longer westerly motion is signifi cant in that it indicates an increasing threat farther west along 
Chapter 4

58

the northern Gulf Coast.”77 By 4:30 p.m. that day, MEMA reported, “Landfall is now projected for near the Alabama/Mississippi border on Monday morning” as a Category 4 hurricane.78 On August 26, the Governor declared a State of Emergency and signed Executive 

Order #939, activating the National Guard.79 By 9 a.m. the next day, Katrina was forecasted 

to make landfall in the Mississippi Delta/New Orleans area as a Category 4 hurricane.80

By noon on Saturday, August 27, Harrison County and the City of Pass Christian issued 

Proclamations of Local Emergency.81 Th ese proclamations meant that these localities felt it 

was beyond their capacity to respond to the threat Hurricane Katrina posed and that they required help from other counties and the state.82 By 4 p.m., they had been joined by Hancock 

County and the City of Waveland.83 By 8 a.m. the next day, Jackson County did as well.84

On the morning of Sunday, August 28, MEMA issued a situation report describing Katrina 

as an “extremely dangerous” Category 5 storm and stating that the entire Mississippi coast 

was subject to a hurricane warning.85 By noon that day, Katrina had been upgraded to “potentially catastrophic,” with expected storm surges of up to 25 feet.86

As recounted more fully elsewhere in this report, federal, state, and local governments 

made various preparations and preliminary deployments in the days leading up to Katrina’s 

landfall on August 29. Th e Governor called up Mississippi National Guard units, which had 

begun deploying August 27, with some units positioned in the coastal counties while others 

formed up at Camp Shelby, near Hattiesburg, Mississippi. By noon on Sunday, August 28, 

MEMA’s State Emergency Response Team (SERT) had deployed to Camp Shelby.87 FEMA 

representatives arrived as well. 

The Storm Hits 

Katrina weakened from a Category 5 to a Category 3 storm as it made landfall on the Mississippi Gulf Coast, but its magnitude was still extraordinary. No one the Committee staff 

spoke to had ever seen a comparable storm. On August 29, Katrina’s radius of maximum 

winds stretched out 25 to 30 nautical miles from its center, and hurricane-force winds extended out at least 75 nautical miles eastward from its center, making it a storm of unprecedented size on the Mississippi Gulf Coast.88 

Th e Surge: Witnesses from the Gulf Coast have told of the horrible, overwhelming storm 

surge driven ashore by Katrina, a surge that caused signifi cant fl ooding the length of the 

coast. Yet, as the NWS has observed, “A precise measure of the storm surge . . . is complicated by many factors, including the widespread failure of tide gauges. Additionally, in 

many locations, most of the buildings along the coast were completely destroyed, leaving 

few structures within which to identify still-water marks.”89

Whatever its exact surge level, Katrina battered Mississippi with a deadly and unprecedented 

wall of water. Unoffi cial measurements hint at its power. Th e Hancock County Emergency 

Operations Center recorded a 28-foot storm tide.90 Th e Harrison County emergency director 

estimates that a tidal surge of 25 to 35 feet hit that part of the coast.91 Across the Mississippi 

Gulf Coast in Pascagoula, the Jackson County EOC recorded a high water mark of 16.2 feet.92

Th e NWS reports that Katrina’s ferocity in the Gulf of Mexico, combined with its enormous 

size at landfall, caused the extraordinary surges. “Overall, Katrina’s very high water levels 

are attributable to a large Category 3 hurricane’s storm surge being enhanced by waves 

generated not long before by a Category 5 strength storm.”93
Katrina Strikes

59

Katrina’s waves and high waters lasted for hours, 

compounding the destruction. D.J. Ziegler, the Gulfport Harbormaster, rode out the storm in a parking 

deck near the ocean: 

Th e word “surge” irritates me a little. ... People 

want to act like there’s one sudden ... surge 

that comes in, and it’s not the case. Th e water 

just keeps getting deeper and the swells getting 

larger. So what you really have is a constant 

pounding. ... So it’s more like somebody’s got a 

sledge hammer ... and keeps hitting.94

Th e surge penetrated at least six miles inland along 

many portions of coastal Mississippi, and up to 12 

miles along bays and rivers.95

Th e Rain: Even without the storm surge, Katrina’s 

rain was enough to fl ood many communities along 

the coast. Eight to 10 inches of rain fell across a large 

swath of southwestern Mississippi.96 Estimates gathered by the NWS indicate that Hancock County received more than 10 inches of rain. Even 

Jackson, almost 150 miles north of the coast, still received nearly four inches of rain.97

Th e Wind: Katrina’s winds were strong, broad in reach, and long-lasting. As a Category 3 

hurricane, Katrina had sustained winds of 111 to 130 miles per hour. In Jackson County, 

the reported winds were even higher.98

Katrina’s Reach: Katrina remained a destructive storm well north of the Gulf Coast. It weakened to a tropical storm late in the day on August 29 just northwest of Meridian, Mississippi.99 Winds of over 56 m.p.h. were registered in the state capital of Jackson, and as far north 

as Columbus, Mississippi, there were winds of over 50 m.p.h. 100 Mayor Bob Massengill of 

Brookhaven, Mississippi, located 135 miles northwest of the Mississippi Gulf Coast, recalled 

that his community received wind gusts of up to 85 miles per hour and had several hours of 

sustained winds of over 50 miles per hour. Th is resulted in hundreds of downed trees and 

dozens of severely damaged or destroyed homes.101

As if the destructive force of the hurricane winds alone were not enough, Katrina produced 

a total of 11 reported tornados in Mississippi during August 29 and 30.102 

Immediate Impact on Mississippi 

Within hours, Katrina brought the coast to a halt. By 4 p.m. on Monday, all of Highway 

90 along the Gulf Coast had fl ooded, along with parts of I-10.103 Th e two main bridges on 

Highway 90, the Biloxi-Ocean Springs Bridge and the Bay St. Louis Bridge, collapsed. Th e 

Bay St. Louis Bridge fell into the bay, between supports that had withstood the storm. Th e 

storm rendered roads completely impassable, and rail service was discontinued.104

Th e most basic of community services were totally disrupted, in some cases for weeks. 

Water and sewer service failed. Local schools closed. Gulfport Memorial Hospital and other 

hospitals along the coast were damaged and forced to relocate hundreds of patients.105 Katrina knocked out power to hundreds of thousands of Mississippi residents. At its peak, as 

of August 30, almost one million energy customers were without power.106

Devastated neighborhood, 

Waveland, MS 

Sun Herald news photo, Biloxi/Gulfport, MS
Chapter 4

60

Th e physical damage was staggering. According to estimates, 65,380 homes were destroyed in 

southern Mississippi – over 95 percent of the statewide total of 68,641 destroyed homes. Katrina left 44 million cubic yards of debris and caused billions of dollars in property damage.107

Th e impact on many communities along the coast is diffi cult to conceive. In Waveland and 

Bay St. Louis, communities of thousands of homes on the westernmost part of the Mississippi Gulf Coast, Katrina left only a few dozen habitable residences. Mayor Brent Warr of 

Gulfport estimates that 80 to 90 percent of the residential and commercial properties of his 

city sustained heavy damage or were destroyed.108 In Gulfport and Biloxi, the big casino 

barges so signifi cant to the region’s economy were destroyed. In many instances, the casinos 

were lift ed off of their anchoring stanchions by the powerful water and dumped hundreds 

of yards away. At one casino, boats from nearby Gulfport Harbor were wedged between the 

girders of what was left of the structure, like nails hammered in by some unseen hand.109

According to recent fi gures, 231 identifi ed victims perished in Mississippi as a result of 

Katrina, with 5 other unidentifi ed dead and 67 missing.110

Alabama

While Alabama did not suff er the same level of damage as Louisiana and Mississippi, Hurricane Katrina gave the state a battering, especially coastal Baldwin and Mobile counties. 

Dauphin Island, a barrier island, faced 100 m.p.h. wind gusts; Mobile had gusts exceeding 

80 m.p.h.111 An oil rig under construction along the Mobile River in Alabama was dislodged, fl oated 1.5 miles northward, and struck the Cochrane Bridge, causing signifi cant 

damage just north of downtown Mobile.112 Another off shore oil rig washed up near the 

beach of Dauphin Island. 113 Katrina also reportedly caused signifi cant beach erosion and 

signifi cant tree damage throughout the state. 114

Hurricane Katrina produced a large storm surge along the Alabama coast. A Dauphin 

Island town-council member described the damage:

Th e West End of our island ... was ravaged by Katrina. Visual inspections of 

this area show 190 homes totally swept away, another 96 homes totally destroyed or severely damaged, roads completely obliterated, and water, sewer, 

phone, and power are non-existent. No home was left unscathed by Katrina in 

this area.115

According to a study published by the National Hurricane Center, the storm surge was as 

high as 10 feet as far east as Mobile, Alabama, and caused fl ooding several miles inland from 

the Gulf Coast along Mobile Bay.116 In addition, the Alabama Emergency Management 

Agency (AEMA) reported that the highest storm surge, 15 feet, was in Bayou La Batre, approximately 30 miles south of Mobile on the Gulf Coast. 117

In addition to the storm surge and wind damage, there were four confi rmed tornadoes, in 

Montgomery, Macon, Tallapoosa, and Calhoun counties in the eastern half of the state. 

AEMA described rainfall during Katrina as “insignifi cant.” 118

Two indirect fatalities occurred in Alabama during Hurricane Katrina as a result of a car accident in heavy rain during the storm. Th ese fatalities, Alabama’s only fatalities in Katrina, occurred in Washington County, directly north of Mobile County on the Mississippi border.119

Th e Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) registered a total of 25,454 evacuees in 

the state. Nearly 112,000 individuals registered for federal assistance in the state.120
Katrina Strikes

61

Texas

Despite ominous early signs, Katrina ultimately infl icted minimal direct damage on Texas. 121 In the days that followed, however, Texas took in an estimated 400,000 evacuees, stretching the capacity of shelters and relief workers across the state.122

1 Richard D. Knabb, Jamie Rhome, and Daniel Brown, National Hurricane Center, “‘Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,’ Hurricane Katrina 23-30 Augusta 2005,” Dec. 20, 2005, p. 1. http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/TCR-L122005_

Katrina.pdf. Accessed on Mar. 30, 2006 [hereinaft er NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,”] (“Th e 

complex genesis of Katrina involved the interaction of a tropical wave, the middle tropospheric remnants of Tropical 

Depression Ten, and an upper tropospheric trough” that created a “tropical depression by 1800 UTC 23 August over the 

southeastern Bahamas about 175 nautical miles (n mi) southeast of Nassau” that eventually became “designated Tropical 

Depression Twelve.”).

2 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” Hurricane Katrina,” p. 2 (“Further strengthening ensued, and 

Katrina is estimated to have reached hurricane status near 2100 UTC 25 August, less than two hours before its center 

made landfall on the southeastern coast of Florida.”).

3 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” p. 2 (“In fact, the eye feature actually became better defi ned 

while Katrina moved inland, and it remained intact during its entire track across the peninsula. ... Katrina continued 

west-southwestward overnight and spent only about six hours over land, mostly over the water-laden Everglades.”).

4 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” p. 2 (“Th e center of Tropical Storm Katrina then emerged into the 

southeastern Gulf of Mexico at approximately 0500 UTC on 26 August just north of Cape Sable. Once back over water, Katrina quickly regained hurricane status at 0600 UTC with maximum sustained winds of 65 knots. ... Th e center of Katrina 

continued west-southwestward over the southeastern Gulf of Mexico and away from the southern Florida peninsula.”).

5 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” p. 3 (On August 27, “Katrina became a Category 3 hurricane 

with 100 kt winds at 1200 UTC that morning about 365 n mi southeast of the mouth of the Mississippi River. ... Accompanying the intensifi cation...was a signifi cant expansion of the wind fi eld on 27 August. Katrina nearly doubled in size 

on 27 August, and by the end of that day tropical storm-force winds extended up to about 140 n mi from the center.”).

6 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” p. 3 (“Th e strong middle- to upper-tropospheric ridge that had 

kept Katrina on a west-southwestward track over the Florida peninsula and southeastern Gulf of Mexico began to shift 

eastward toward Florida, while a mid-latitude trough amplifi ed over the north-central United States. Th is evolving pattern resulted in a general westward motion on 27 August and a turn toward the northwest on 28 August when Katrina 

moved around the western periphery of the retreating ridge.”).

7 Committee staff interview of Max Mayfi eld, Ph.D., Director, National Hurricane Center, conducted on Jan. 27, 2005, 

transcript pp. 40-41 (“By that Friday aft ernoon, the models have come into much, much better agreement. ... So when 

all these models started to fi nally converge – I mean, still not on top of each other; I mean, there’s still some scatter, but 

they were in much, much better agreement than we had seen up to that time, and they started converging towards the 

Mississippi and Southeast Louisiana coast, yeah, you bet the alarm bells started sounding.”).

8 Mayfi eld interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 40 (“At least for the 34 years that I’ve been at the National Hurricane Center, we’ve 

always been saying that the greatest concern from a hurricane anywhere in the Gulf of Mexico is Southeastern Louisiana 

and the great New Orleans area.”).

9 National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Advisory, Aug. 26, 2005, 5 p.m.

10 National Weather Service, Hurricane Katrina Discussion Number 14, Aug. 26, 2005, 5 p.m.

11 Committee staff interview of Walter Maestri, Ph.D., Director, Jeff erson Parish Offi ce of Emergency Management, LA, 

conducted on Oct. 25, 2005, transcript p. 119.

12 Mayfi eld interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 35-36 (“And they were doing a very good job, in my opinion, of reaching out. ... 

So they were indeed making their local offi cials aware that, hey, you’re in the cone.”). 

13 Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP), Katrina Conference Call Number 1, 

Aug. 26, 2005, 5 p.m. CT, pp. 4-5. Provided to Committee.

14 LOHSEP, Katrina Conference Call Number 1, Aug. 26, 2005, 5 p.m. CT, p. 5. Provided to Committee. (“Th ere is still a lot 

of uncertainty here, so I don’t want to really say what area has the highest landfall threat. Certainly with Plaquemines Parish

sticking out into the Gulf, it typically has the highest threat, but I don’t want to focus on one specifi c region right now.”).

15 LOHSEP, Katrina Conference Call Number 1, Aug. 26, 2005, 5 p.m. CT, p. 6. Provided to Committee.

16 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” p. 3 (“Accompanying the intensifi cation and the subsequent deterioration of the inner eyewall was a signifi cant expansion of the wind fi eld on 27 August. Katrina nearly doubled in size 

on 27 August, and by the end of that day tropical storm-force winds extended up to about 140 n mi from the center.”).
Chapter 4

62

17 Mayfi eld interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 60 (“Th ere is indeed a storm surge model that the National Weather Service runs. 

We have agreed to do that about 24 hours before landfall to let people see what might happen, what the storm surge 

might be, if we had that perfect forecast.”).

18 LOHSEP, Katrina Conference Call Number 2, Aug. 27, 2005, 7:30 a.m. CT, p. 10. Provided to Committee.

19 Mayfi eld interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 56-57 (“I wanted to make sure that they understood the severity of the situation. 

... And I should say, too, that when I called Governor Blanco, she’s the one that suggested that I call Mayor Nagin, which 

I did. I left a message, and he called me back very quickly. ... Th is is Saturday. Th e log here shows – the HLT log shows 

7:25 Central daylight time, called Governor Blanco.”). See also: National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Katrina Forecast 

Timeline, 2006, p. 3. Provided to Committee [hereinaft er NHC Timeline].

20 National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Advisory, Aug. 28, 2005, 7 a.m. CT. Th e New Orleans NWS offi ce broadcast 

a similar warning at 8 a.m., stating “direct strike of catastrophic hurricane expected ... rush protective measures to 

completion and leave area as soon as possible.” National Weather Service, Hurricane Katrina Local Statement, New 

Orleans, Aug. 28, 2005, 8 a.m. CT.

21 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” p. 3 (“Katrina strengthened from a low-end Category 3 hurricane to a Category 5 in less than 12 h, reaching an intensity of 145 kt by 1200 UTC 28 August. Katrina attained its peak 

intensity of 150 kt at 1800 UTC 28 August about 170 n mi southeast of the mouth of the Mississippi River. Th e wind fi eld 

continued to expand on 28 August, and by late that day tropical stormforce winds extended out to about 200 n mi from 

the center, and hurricane-force winds extended out to about 90 n mi from the center, making Katrina not only extremely 

intense but also exceptionally large.”).

22 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Briefi ng to Committee, Dec. 21, 2005 [hereinaft er NOAA Briefing to Committee].

23 NOAA Briefi ng to Committee, Dec. 21, 2005.

24 National Weather Service, Hurricane Katrina Local Statement, New Orleans, Aug. 28, 2005, 5:45 p.m. 

25 National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Advisory, Aug. 28, 2005, 4 p.m. CT.

26 R. B. Seed et al., ASCE/NSF, Preliminary Report on the Performance of the New Orleans Levee Systems in Hurricane 

Katrina on August 29, 2005, Nov. 2, 2005, pp. 1–2, 1–3 [hereinaft er ASCE/NSF, Preliminary Report].

27 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” p. 3.

28 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” p. 7.

29 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” p. 7.

30 Ivor Ll. van Heerden, G. Paul Kemp, Wes Shrum, Ezra Boyd and Hassan Mashriqui, Louisiana State University, 

Center for the Study of Public Health Impacts of Hurricanes, Initial Assesment of the New Orleans’ Flooding Event during the Passage of Hurricane Katrina, p. 4 [hereinaft er LSU, Initial Assessment of New Orleans Flooding] (“Th e ‘Funnel’ 

eff ects: As the eye of the storm approached the latitude of New Orleans a 14-17 foot surge was pushed into the western 

apex of a triangle known as the ‘Funnel’, so called because the hurricane protection levees that form the south bank of 

the MRGO and the north bank of the GIWW converge from being about 10 m miles apart to a few hundred yards as 

the banks of the GIWW where it separates the East Orleans and St. Bernard polders. Th e Funnel is a 6-mile long section 

of the GIWW where the cross-section was enlarged by a factor of three when the MRGO was built to expand it from a 

barge channel to accommodate ocean-going vessels. At the western end, the funnel focused a jet into the IHNC. Th e US 

Army Corps of Engineers had inadvertently designed an excellent storm surge delivery system – nothing less – to bring 

this mass of water with simply tremendous ‘load’ – potential energy – right into the middle of New Orleans.”).

31 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” p. 3.

32 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” p. 3.

33 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” p. 3.

34 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” p. 8.

35 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” p. 8 (“[W]inds in a hurricane generally increase from the 

ground upward to a few hundred meters in altitude, and the sustained winds experienced on upper fl oors of high-rise 

buildings were likely stronger than the winds at the same location near the ground. For example, on average the 25th 

story of a building would experience sustained winds corresponding to one Saffi r-Simpson category stronger than that 

experienced at the standard observing height of 10 m[eters].”).

36 ASCE/NSF, Preliminary Report, pp. 1–4, 1–5.

37 ASCE/NSF, Preliminary Report, pp. 1–4, 1–10 (Figure 1.4); See also: LSU, Initial Assessment of New Orleans Flooding, p. 7 (“Lake Pontchartrain levee overtopping: Between 8:30 and 11:00 am, fl ood water poured into Orleans East from 

Lake Pontchartrain where a section of concrete levee wall at the Lakefront Airport that strangely was almost two feet 

lower than the earthen walls it was attached to served as a spillway when it was overtopped. Otherwise, no signifi cant 

overtopping occurred anywhere along the south shore of Lake Pontchartrain.”).

38 ASCE/NSF, Preliminary Report, p. 1–5.

39 LSU, Initial Assessment of New Orleans Flooding, p. 1.

40 LSU, Initial Assessment of New Orleans Flooding, p. 1.
Katrina Strikes

63

41 LSU, Initial Assessment of New Orleans Flooding, p. 1.

42 ASCE/NSF, Preliminary Report, p. iv.

43 Ivor van Heerden, Ph.D., Timeline for Hurricane Katrina, 2006. Provided to Committee. Th ere are numerous reports 

and oral refl ections regarding the timing on Monday, August 29, 2005, of the overtopping and breaching of levees and 

fl oodwalls, and subsequent fl ooding, in the metropolitan New Orleans region. Th e Committee, through numerous 

interviews, copious documents, and scientifi c analyses received from experts, has done its best to construct a tentative 

timeline with respect to these events. To this end, the Committee has depended to a large degree on the information provided by van Heerden, and from information contained in the ASCE/NSF, Preliminary Report and U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers, Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force, Performance Evaluation Status and Interim Results, Report 2 

of a Series, Mar. 10, 2006 [hereinaft er IPET, Report 2 of a Series].

Van Heerden is the Deputy Director of the LSU Hurricane Center and the Director of the LSU Center for the Study of 

Public Health Impacts of Hurricanes. Van Heerden was also designated by the State of Louisiana to lead its Forensic 

Data Gathering Team in its eff orts to learn more about the causes of the levee failures in the metropolitan New Orleans 

area. As part of his work, van Heerden and his colleagues at LSU have reviewed video camera footage and conducted 

several fi rst-responder and survivor interviews. Th e team of LSU scientists also implemented the “stopped clock program,” in which they collected stopped battery-operated and mechanical hand-dial clocks from fl ooded homes, noting 

both the time and elevation. Th e data is compiled in a report provided to the Committee entitled, Initial Assessment of 

the New Orleans’ Flooding Event During the Passage of Hurricane Katrina. 

It should also be noted that two scientists who testifi ed before the Committee – Raymond Seed, Ph.D., who led the 

National Science Foundation sponsored forensic gathering and analysis team, and Peter Nicholson, P.F., head of the 

American Society of Civil Engineer’s data gathering team – stated that they not only funneled information regarding 

witnesses’ statements to Dr. van Heerden, but that “Th e time lines described by Dr. van Heerden would make sense with 

the geotechnical observations we see in the fi eld ... they are consistent.” Testimony of Raymond Seed, Team Leader, National Science Foundation, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing 

on Hurricane Katrina, Why Did the Levees Fail?, Nov. 2, 2005. 

Similarly, the IPET observed over 200 high-water marks, contacted over 600 people for eyewitness accounts and interviewed over 175 persons who observed fl ooding induced by Hurricane Katrina. See, IPET, Report 2 of a Series, p. V-5. 

Th e IPET also employed the use of stopped clocks in houses, and gathered videos and still photos. See, IPET, Report 2 of 

a Series, p. V-5.

44 LSU, Initial Assessment of New Orleans Flooding, p. 11; IPET, Report 2 of a Series, p. V–9.

45 LSU, Initial Assessment of New Orleans Flooding, p. 4.

46 Ivor van Heerden, Timeline for Hurricane Katrina, 2006. Provided to Committee; LSU, Initial Assessment of New 

Orleans Flooding, p. 3; IPET, Report 2 of a Series, pp. V–9 through V–11.

47 Van Heerden, Timeline for Hurricane Katrina, 2006. Provided to Committee.

48 Van Heerden, Timeline for Hurricane Katrina, 2006. Provided to Committee; LSU, Initial Assessment of New Orleans 

Flooding, pp. 3-7.

49 LSU, Initial Assessment of New Orleans Flooding, p. 4.

50 Committee staff interview of Brig. Gen. Brod Veillon, Assistant Adjutant General, Louisiana National Guard, conducted on Nov. 29, 2005, transcript p. 18.

51 LSU, Initial Assessment of New Orleans Flooding, p. 11.

52 Col. Terry Ebbert, LOHSEP, Katrina Conference Call Number 10, Aug. 29, 2005, 7:30 a.m. CT, p. 13.

53 Van Heerden, Timeline for Hurricane Katrina, 2006. Provided to Committee; LSU, Initial Assessment of New Orleans 

Flooding, pp. 5, 11.

54 Transportation Security Administration, Katrina Brief, Aug. 29, 2005, 9 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi les as Bates no. 

DHS-HSOC-0002-0000190.

55 LSU, Initial Assessment of New Orleans Flooding, pp. 7, 11.

56 At 9 a.m., the local weather offi ce issued a “Hurricane Katrina Local Statement: “Levees overtopped in Orleans and 

St. Bernard Parishes....Extensive and life threatening storm surge fl ooding occurring along the Louisiana and Mississippi coast at this time....Signifi cant and life threatening storm surge 18 to 22 feet above normal is occurring.” National 

Weather Service, Hurricane Katrina Local Statement, New Orleans, Aug. 29, 2005, 9 a.m. CT.

57 Michael Heath, e-mail to Michael Lowder, Aug. 29, 2005, 10:43 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHSFEMA-0029-0002963.

58 IPET, Report 2 of a Series, pp. V–5 through V–7.

59 LSU, Initial Assessment of New Orleans Flooding, pp. 8, 11. See also: IPET, Report 2 of a Series, p. V–5 through V–7.

60 Van Heerden, Timeline for Hurricane Katrina, 2006. Provided to Committee; and LSU, Initial Assessment of New 

Orleans Flooding, p. 9. See also: IPET, Report 2 of a Series, p. V–5 through V–7.

61 LSU, Initial Assessment of New Orleans Flooding, p. 9. See also: IPET, Report 2 of a Series, pp. V–5 through V–7.

62 Moreover, the NOFD Hurricane Katrina Log (Fire Communications) produced to the Committee by the NOFD, 
Chapter 4

64

refl ects that at 11:15 a.m. CT, the “fi rst report of levee either being breeched [sic] or topped at 17th Ave. Canal.” New 

Orleans Fire Department, Hurricane Katrina Fire Communications Log, 2005. Provided to Committee. 

63 NOFD, Capt. Paul Hellmers, Lake Marina Towers Video, Aug. 29, 2005. Provided to Committee.

64 LSU, Initial Assessment of New Orleans Flooding, p. 8 (“Eye witnesses reported the fl ood waters rose rapidly.”).

65 U.S. Coast Guard, Initial Helicopter Overfl ight Video, Aug. 29, 2005. Provided to the Committee.

66 Committee staff interview of Marty Bahamonde, Region I Director, External Aff airs, FEMA, conducted on Oct. 7, 

2005, transcript pp. 106-110.

67 Committee staff interview of Col. Richard P. Wagenaar, U.S. Army, District Commander, New Orleans District, U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers, conducted on Nov. 15, 2005, transcript pp. 56-58.

68 Written Statement of Robert Latham, Executive Director, Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, for the U.S. 

House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing on 

Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Mississippi, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 1.

69 National Hurricane Center, “Hurricane History.” http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/HAW2/english/history.shtml#camille. 

Accessed on Mar. 30, 2006. Camille is only one of three Category 5 hurricanes to make landfall on the United States 

coast since records have been kept. National Hurricane Center, Th e Saffi r-Simpson Scale. http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/

aboutsshs.shtml. Accessed on Apr. 3, 2006.

70 Written statement of Gov. Haley Barbour, Mississippi, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Role of Governors in Managing the Catastrophe, Feb. 2, 2006, 

p. 1.

71 U.S. Census Bureau, American Factfi nder, 2006. http://factfi nder.census.gov. Accessed on Mar. 30, 2006.

72 U.S. Census Bureau, American Factfi nder, 2006. http://factfi nder.census.gov. Accessed on Mar. 30, 2006.

73 Richard Fausset, “Mississippi Casinos Trump Katrina,” Los Angeles Times, Feb. 25, 2006.

74 Committee staff interview of Mayor A.J. Holloway, City of Biloxi, MS, conducted on Jan. 5, 2006 (untranscribed).

75 Mississippi Emergency Management Agency (MEMA), Hurricane Situation Report: Tropical Storm Katrina, Aug. 24, 

2005, 10 a.m. CT, p. 1. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. MEMA-0010808.

76 MEMA, Hurricane Situation Report: Hurricane Katrina, Aug. 25, 2005, 4 p.m. CT, p. 1. Provided to Committee; fi led 

as Bates no. MEMA-0010820.

77 MEMA, Hurricane Situation Report: Hurricane Katrina, Aug. 26, 2005, 10 a.m. CT, p. 1. Provided to Committee; fi led 

as Bates no. MEMA-0010824.

78 MEMA, Hurricane Situation Report: Hurricane Katrina, Aug. 26, 2005, 4:30 p.m. CT, p. 1. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates no. MEMA-0010828.

79 MEMA, Hurricane Situation Report: Hurricane Katrina, Aug. 27, 2005, noon CT, p. 2. Provided to Committee; fi led 

as Bates no. MEMA-0010832.

80 MEMA, Hurricane Situation Report: Hurricane Katrina, Aug. 27, 2005, 9 a.m. CT. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. MEMA-0010831.

81 MEMA, Hurricane Situation Report: Hurricane Katrina, Aug. 27, 2005, noon CT, p. 2. Provided to Committee; fi led 

as Bates no. MEMA-0010835.

82 Miss. Code Ann. § 33-15-5 (g).

83 MEMA, Hurricane Situation Report: Hurricane Katrina, Aug. 27, 2005, 4 p.m. CT, p. 2. Provided to Committee; fi led 

as Bates no. MEMA-0010838.

84 MEMA, Hurricane Situation Report #5: Hurricane Katrina, Aug. 28, 2005, 8 a.m. CT, p. 2. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates no. MEMA-0010859.

85 MEMA, Hurricane Situation Report #5: Hurricane Katrina, Aug. 28, 2005, 8 a.m. CT, p. 1. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates no. MEMA-0010858.

86 MEMA, Hurricane Situation Report #6: Hurricane Katrina, Aug. 28, 2005, noon CT, p. 1. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates no. MEMA-0010864.

87 MEMA, Hurricane Situation Report #6: Hurricane Katrina, Aug. 28, 2005, noon CT. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates nos. MEMA-0010864 through 0010869.

88 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” p. 9. 

89 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” p. 8. In an interview with Committee staff , Brian Adam, the 

Hancock County Director of Emergency Management, recounted that the Hancock County EOC sits 27 feet above sea 

level but was fl ooded by 3.5 feet of water during Katrina. Committee staff interview of Brian Adam, Director of Emergency Management, Hancock County, MS, conducted on Nov. 16, 2005 (untranscribed). 

90 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” p. 8. 

91 Testimony of Col. Joe Spraggins, Director of Emergency Management, Harrison County, MS, for the U.S. House, Se-
Katrina Strikes

65

lect Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing on Hurricane 

Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Mississippi, Dec. 7, 2005.

92 Committee staff interview of Butch Loper, Emergency Management Director, Jackson County, MS, conducted on 

Dec. 6, 2005, transcript pp. 64-65. 

93 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” p. 9. Th e expected storm surge for a Category 3 hurricane 

would normally be between 9-12 feet, according to the Saffi r-Simpson Hurricane Scale. An introduction to the scale may 

be found at http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/aboutsshs.shtml.

94 Committee staff interview of D.J. Ziegler, Harbor Master, Gulfport Harbor, MS, conducted on Dec. 8, 2005, transcript, p. 30. 

95 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” pp. 8-9.

96 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” p. 10. 

97 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” pp. 27-28. 

98 Loper interview, Dec. 6, 2005, p. 64. Th is is consistent with wind speeds noted in the MEMA situation reports. 

MEMA, Hurricane Situation Report #13: Hurricane Katrina, Aug. 29, 2005, 4 p.m. CT. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. MEMA-0010924.

99 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” p. 4. 

100 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” pp. 27-28. 

101 Written Statement of Mayor Robert V. Massengill, Brookhaven, MS, for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland 

Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Recovering from Hurricane Katrina: Responding to the Immediate Needs 

of Its Victims, Sept. 28, 2005, p. 1.

102 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” p. 10. 

103 MEMA, Hurricane Situation Report #13: Hurricane Katrina, Aug. 29, 2005, 4 p.m. CT, p. 6. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates no. MEMA-0010929.

104 MEMA, Hurricane Situation Report #19 Hurricane Katrina, Aug. 30, 2005 at 4:30 p.m. CT, p. 6. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. MEMA-0010989.

105 MEMA, Hurricane Situation Report #19 Hurricane Katrina, Aug. 30, 2005 at 4:30 p.m. CT, p. 8. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. MEMA-0010990 through 0010991.

106 MEMA, Hurricane Situation Report #20 Hurricane Katrina, Aug. 31, 2005 at 1:30 a.m. CT, p. 9. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. MEMA-0011002.

107 “Mississippi’s Invisible Coast,” Biloxi Sun-Herald, Dec. 14, 2005. http://www.sunherald.com/mld/sunherald/13402585.htm. Accessed on Apr. 24, 2006; MEMA, Red Cross Damage Assessments. http://www.msema.org/redcrossassessments.htm. Accessed on Apr. 24, 2006.

108 Committee staff interview of Bret Warr, Mayor, City of Gulfport, MS, conducted on Jan. 9, 2006 (untranscribed). 

109 Ziegler interview, Dec. 8, 2005, p. 27. 

110 “Mississippi’s Invisible Coast,” Biloxi Sun-Herald, Dec. 14, 2005. http://www.sunherald.com/mld/sunherald/13402585.htm. Accessed on Apr. 24, 2006.

111 Alabama Emergency Management Agency, Hurricane Katrina Situation Report #7, Aug. 31, 2005, 7 p.m. CT.

112 Written Statement of Don Vaughn, Chief Engineer, Alabama Department of Transportation, for the U.S. House, 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, hearing on Rebuilding Transit Infrastructure in the Gulf Coast Area, 

Oct. 27, 2005.

113 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” p. 12. 

114 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” p. 12.

115 Jackie Previto, Dauphin Island, Alabama Town Council Member, letter to Governor Bob Riley, Alabama, Sept. 7, 

2005.

116 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” p. 9.

117 Alabama Emergency Management Agency, Hurricane Katrina Situation Report #7, Aug. 31, 2005, 7 p.m. CT.

118 Alabama Emergency Management Agency, Hurricane Katrina Situation Report #7, Aug. 31, 2005, 7 p.m. CT.

119 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” pp. 10-11; Garry Mitchell, “Massive Storm Damage Found in 

Alabama,” Associated Press Online, Aug. 30, 2005. Accessed on LexisNexis.

120 Garry Mitchell, “Katrina’s painful blow to coast Alabama’s top story in 2005,” Montgomery Advisor, Dec. 21, 2005.

121 Texas State Operations Center, Hurricane Katrina Situation Report #10, Aug. 29, 2005, 4 p.m.

122 Final Report to the Governor, Governor’s Task Force on Evacuation, Transportation, and Logistics, Texas, Feb. 14, 

2006.
Rescued, New Orleans

© 2005 The Times-Picayune Publishing Co., 

all rights reserved. Used with permission of the 

Times-Picayune
67

Hurricane Katrina: 

Timeline of Key Events

Dates (all 2005) and Times (all Central) of Event

Tuesday, August 23

4 p.m.: Tropical Depression 12 develops about 200 miles southeast of Nassau in the Bahamas.1

Thursday, August 25

2:30 p.m.: Th e tropical storm is elevated to a hurricane and is named “Katrina.”2

4 p.m.: Th e National Hurricane Center, for the fi rst time, reports that some models show 

Katrina coming ashore “between Mobile, Alabama, and Grand Isle, Louisiana.” Katrina, still 

about 15 miles east of Florida, is expected to gradually strengthen once in the Gulf of Mexico.3

5:30 p.m.: Katrina makes landfall in Florida as a Category 1 hurricane.4

Friday, August 26

10:30 a.m.: Katrina, still moving westward, is elevated to a Category 2 hurricane, with note 

that the storm “could become a category three or major hurricane on Saturday.”5

11 a.m.: National Hurricane Center offi cials state in a video teleconference that their prediction models indicate a shift in Katrina’s path west “towards New Orleans.” Prior models had 

predicted a probable strike in the Florida panhandle.6

1 p.m.: Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco declares a State of Emergency and activates her 

state’s National Guard.7

Aft ernoon-Evening: Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour declares a State of Emergency and 

activates his state’s National Guard.8

4 p.m.: NHC issues an offi cial forecast shift ing Katrina’s track 170 miles west, predicting a 

probable Category 4 hurricane striking the Mississippi coast near the Alabama border with 

landfall on Monday, August 29.9

10 p.m.: NHC issues a forecast shift ing the track farther west and predicting a probable strike 

at or near the Louisiana-Mississippi border, east of New Orleans, on Monday, August 29.10

Saturday, August 27

4 a.m.: NHC issues a forecast stating that Katrina is a Category 3 hurricane and predicting a 

direct hit on New Orleans.11

6 a.m.: FEMA headquarters begins 24-hour operations in Washington, D.C.12

7:30 a.m.: National Weather Service, in teleconference, informs Louisiana state and local 

offi cials that the probable path of the storm is “smack dab through the metropolitan New 

Orleans area.”13

9 a.m.: Th e fi rst phase of the Louisiana Emergency Evacuation Plan begins. Under Phase 

I, citizens in coastal areas, south of the Intracoastal Waterway, would evacuate 50 hours 

before a Category 3 or stronger hurricane hits.14

Chapter 5
Chapter 5

68

11:41 a.m.: Governor Blanco requests a declaration of a federal state of emergency for Louisiana under the Staff ord Act. President Bush issues the declaration later in the day.15

12 p.m.: Phase II of the Louisiana Emergency Evacuation Plan is initiated.16

1 p.m.: (approximately) New Orleans Mayor C. Ray Nagin, in a joint press conference 

with Governor Blanco, declares a State of Emergency, announces he will issue a voluntary 

evacuation order, and announces that the Superdome will open at 8 a.m. on Sunday as a 

special-needs shelter.17

2 p.m.: Louisiana Emergency Operations Center in Baton Rouge goes to 24-hour operations.18

4 p.m.: Th e fi nal phase of the Louisiana Emergency Evacuation Plan is initiated and contrafl ow evacuation by highway begins.19

7 p.m.: National Weather Service advises City of New Orleans Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness that the New Orleans levees could be overtopped.20

7:25-8 p.m.: NHC Director Max Mayfi eld briefs Governor Blanco, Governor Barbour, 

and Mayor Nagin about Katrina’s potential impact.21 Late evening traffi c from Louisiana’s 

evacuation into Mississippi subsides, allowing Mississippi to issue mandatory evacuations 

for three coastal counties – Hancock, Harrison, and Jackson.22

10 p.m.: NHC issues fi rst offi cial storm-surge forecast for Katrina, predicting surge fl ooding of 15 to 20 feet above normal tides and locally as high as 25 feet. NHC issues Hurricane Warning for north-central Gulf Coast from Morgan City, Louisiana, eastward to the 

Alabama-Florida border, including the City of New Orleans. Hurricane-force winds are 

expected within 24 hours.23

Sunday, August 28

President Bush issues federal emergency declarations for Mississippi and Alabama, and 

declares Florida a federal disaster area.24 Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana Governors 

request Presidential Major Disaster Declarations; they are signed the next day.25

1 a.m.: NHC issues Special Advisory: “Katrina Strengthens to Category 4 with 145 mph 

winds.”26

7 a.m.: NHC issues Special Advisory stating that Katrina is “now a potentially catastrophic 

category 5 hurricane” with maximum sustained winds near 160 mph.27

8 a.m.: Th e Superdome is opened as a special-needs shelter.28

9:30 a.m.: Mayor Nagin orders a mandatory evacuation of Orleans Parish.29

10 a.m.: NHC increases storm-surge forecast to 18 to 22 feet above normal tide levels and 

locally as high as 28 feet.30

11 a.m.: During a daily video teleconference with the President, DHS headquarters, FEMA 

headquarters, FEMA’s regional offi ces, and representatives from Louisiana and Mississippi, 

National Hurricane Center Director Max Mayfi eld states, “I don’t think any model can tell 

you with any confi dence right now whether the levees will be topped or not, but that’s obviously a very, very grave concern.” FEMA Director Michael Brown says, “Just keep jamming 

those lines full as much as you can with commodities.”31

12 p.m.: Th e Superdome is opened as a “refuge of last resort” for the general population.32
Hurricane Katrina: Timeline of Key Events

69

4 p.m.: NHC issues fi rst offi cial forecast addressing New Orleans levees which states, “Some 

levees in the greater New Orleans area could be overtopped.”33

5 p.m.: Contrafl ow highway evacuation in Louisiana ends.34

Monday, August 29

12:47 a.m.: A Department of Homeland Security assessment detailing the storm’s likely 

impact is e-mailed to the White House’s Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC).35

6:10-7 a.m.: On August 29, at approximately 6:10 a.m. CT, Hurricane Katrina’s eye makes 

landfall at Buras on the Louisiana coast between Grand Isle and the mouth of the Mississippi River. Storm surge overtops the levees on the east bank of the river, “crosses” the river, 

overtops the levees on the west bank, and sends additional water into neighborhoods in 

Plaquemines Parish. Th e center of Hurricane Katrina moves ashore into southeast Louisiana just east of Grand Isle.36 Morning Catastrophic fl ooding begins in New Orleans resulting from massive overtopping of levees in east Orleans and St. Bernard Parishes, overtopping and breaking of the Industrial Canal levees, and breaks in the 17th Street and London 

Avenue Canal fl oodwalls.37 Th e Superdome’s roof begins to leak; it loses air conditioning, 

plumbing in all but the fi rst fl oor, and its communication system. A backup generator provides minimal lighting.38

10 a.m.: Hurricane Katrina makes landfall in Mississippi. Storm surge reported 20 feet 

above normal in Biloxi area.39

Aft ernoon: State and local fi rst responders’ communications begin to fail in the Greater New 

Orleans area and Mississippi.42

Mid–aft ernoon: Search-and-rescue operations begin by the U.S. Coast Guard, the New 

Orleans Police and Fire Departments, the Louisiana National Guard, and the Louisiana 

Department of Wildlife and Fisheries.40

2-3 p.m.: Local offi cials in Mississippi begin search and rescue.41

Evening: FEMA Director Brown assures Governor Blanco that FEMA will send 500 buses to 

New Orleans the next day.43

10 p.m.: MEMA search-and-rescue teams arrive and immediately begin life-saving 

operations.44

Tuesday, August 30

Mayor Nagin opens the New Orleans Convention Center as a refuge for the general 

population.45

10:30 a.m.: Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense orders U.S. Northern Command to move 

all necessary assets to the Gulf Coast, giving blanket authority for forces to provide military 

assistance.46

4 p.m.: U.S. Army Lieutenant General Russel Honoré is designated Commander of Joint 

Task Force Katrina.47 Evening Plumbing fails completely at the Superdome. Conditions at 

the stadium deteriorate due to the massive crowds and lack of air conditioning and sanitation.48 DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff declares Katrina an “incident of national signifi -

cance.” Chertoff designates Michael Brown as the Principal Federal Offi cial (PFO) to manage the response and recovery operations for Hurricane Katrina.49
Chapter 5

70

Late evening: Governor Blanco directs the Department of Social Services to fi nd a shelter by 

6 a.m. Wednesday for at least 25,000 people.50

Wednesday, August 31

Health and Human Services Secretary Michael Leavitt declares a public-health emergency 

for Louisiana, Mississippi, Florida, and Alabama.51 Governor Blanco issues an Executive 

Order to commandeer school buses.52

1:30-1:45 a.m.: FEMA, for the fi rst time, mission-assigns DOT to send buses to New Orleans.53

8:30-9:30 a.m.: Governor Blanco calls Governor Rick Perry of Texas to request that the 

Houston Astrodome open to house New Orleans evacuees.54

11 a.m.: Chief of the federal National Guard Bureau directs all state Adjutants General to 

rapidly deploy available National Guard troops to Louisiana and Mississippi.55

2:30 p.m.: Governor Blanco and President Bush discuss by telephone the need for military 

assistance and the Governor’s command of the Louisiana National Guard in a unifi ed-command structure.56

4:11 p.m.: President Bush holds a Cabinet meeting at the White House and speaks publicly 

to outline federal relief eff orts.57

Evening: Some federally contracted buses arrive in New Orleans and begin evacuation of 

overpasses and special-needs shelter.58

Thursday, September 1

10 a.m.: Bus evacuation of the general population begins at the Superdome.59

Late Evening: Colonel Terry Ebbert, New Orleans Director of Homeland Security and Public Safety, requests assistance from Louisiana National Guard commander Major General 

Bennett Landreneau to secure and evacuate the Convention Center in conjunction with the 

New Orleans Police Department.60

Friday, September 2

President Bush makes his fi rst visit to the Gulf States aft er Katrina and meets with the governors of Louisiana, Alabama, and Mississippi; and Mayor Nagin in New Orleans. 61

Late Morning: In a private meeting, the President and Governor Blanco discuss command 

and control for the military response.62

12-12:30 p.m.: 1,000 National Guard forces (LA, TX, OK, NV, and AR) move toward the 

Convention Center and secure the building to begin relief operations.63

11:20 p.m.: White House faxes proposal to Governor Blanco under which there would 

be appointed a dual-status commander who would be an active-duty military offi cer and 

who would exercise command and control on behalf of the Governor over National Guard 

forces and on behalf of the President over federal active-duty forces.64

Saturday, September 3

8:56 a.m.: Governor Blanco declines the White House proposal to appoint a dual-status 

commander and retains sole command of National Guard troops in Louisiana.65

9:06 a.m.: President Bush orders 7,200 active-duty troops to the Gulf Coast.66
Hurricane Katrina: Timeline of Key Events

71

10 a.m.: Convention Center evacuation begins.67

1 p.m.: Superdome evacuation is complete.68

6:30 p.m.: Convention Center evacuation is complete.69

Monday, September 5

I-10 Cloverleaf and Causeway Boulevard evacuations are complete.70 Coast Guard Admiral 

Th ad Allen is appointed Deputy PFO.71

Tuesday, September 6

5 a.m.: Search and recovery eff orts in New Orleans continue.72

1 National Hurricane Center, Tropical Depression 12, Advisory #1, Aug. 23, 2005, 5 p.m. ET. Provided to Committee; 

National Hurricane Center, Tropical Depression 12, Forecast/Advisory #1, Aug. 23, 2005, 2100 Z. Provided to Committee. Both documents fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0037-0000014 through 0000017.

2 National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Katrina Forecast Timeline, 2006, p. 1. Provided to Committee [hereinaft er 

NHC Timeline].

3 National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Katrina Discussion #9, and Hurricane Katrina Advisory #9, both Aug. 25, 2005, 

5 p.m. ET. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0037-0000147 through 0000150.

4 NHC Timeline, p. 1.

5 National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Katrina Special Advisory #13, Aug. 26, 2005, 11:30 a.m. ET. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0037-0000217. 

6 Bill Reed, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 26, 2005, transcript p. 7. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 

DHS-FEMA-0105-0000028; NHC Timeline, p. 1. 

7 Louisiana’s Preparation and Response to Hurricane Katrina, Integrated Timeline, p. 6. Provided to Committee; State 

of Louisiana, Offi ce of the Governor, Proclamation No. 48 KBB 2005, Aug. 26, 2005; Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, 

Response to the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs Document and Information 

Request Dated October 7, 2005 and to the U.S. House of Representatives Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, Overview of Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco’s Actions in Preparation 

for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, Dec. 2, 2005, p. 2 [hereinaft er Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s 

Timeline].

8 State of Mississippi, Offi ce of the Governor, Executive Order No. 939, Aug. 26, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates nos. MEMA 0009765 through 0009766; Mississippi Emergency Management Agency (MEMA), Preparedness and 

Response Timeline – Hurricane Katrina, p. 1. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. MEMA 0010678 [hereinaft er 

MEMA, Hurricane Katrina Timeline].

9 National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Katrina Advisory #14, Hurricane Katrina Discussion #14, and Hurricane 

Katrina Probabilities #14, all Aug. 26, 2005, 5 p.m. ET. Provided to Committee. All documents fi led as Bates nos. DHSFEMA-0037-0000229 through 0000234. See also: National Hurricane Center, “Katrina Graphics Archive,” Aug. 30, 2005. 

http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/archive/2005/KATRINA_graphics.shtml. Accessed on Apr. 30, 2006. 

10 National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Katrina Forecast/Advisory #15, Aug. 26, 2005, 0300 Z; Hurricane Katrina 

Advisory #15, Aug. 26, 2005, 11 p.m. ET; Hurricane Katrina Discussion #15, Aug. 26, 2005, 11 p.m. ET; and Hurricane 

Katrina Probabilities #15, Aug. 26, 2005, 11 p.m. ET. Provided to Committee. All documents fi led as Bates nos. DHSFEMA-0037-0000238 through 0000245; NHC Timeline, p. 2; National Hurricane Center, “Katrina Graphics Archive,” 

Aug. 30, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0037-0000237; National Hurricane Center, “Katrina Graphics Archive,” Aug. 30, 2005. http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/archive/2005/KATRINA_graphics.shtml. Accessed on 

Apr. 30, 2006.

11 NHC Timeline, p. 2; National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Katrina Forecast/Advisory #16, Aug. 27, 2005, 0900 Z; 

Hurricane Katrina Advisory #16, Aug. 27, 2005, 5 a.m. ET; Hurricane Katrina Discussion #16, Aug. 27, 2005, 5 a.m. ET; 

and Hurricane Katrina Probabilities #16, Aug. 27, 2005, 5 a.m. ET. Provided to Committee; Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), National Situation Report, Aug. 27, 2005, 5:30 a.m. Provided to Committee. All documents fi led 

as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0037-0000253 through 0000261; National Hurricane Center, “Katrina Graphics Archive,” 

Aug. 30, 2005. http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/archive/2005/KATRINA_graphics.shtml. Accessed on Apr. 30, 2006.

12 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Situation Report #4, Aug. 27, 2005, 6 a.m., p. 11. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates no. DHS 0001123.
Chapter 5

72

13 Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP), Hurricane Katrina Conference Call 

#2, Aug. 27, 2005, 7:30 a.m. CT, transcript p. 10. Provided to Committee.

14 Louisiana’s Preparation and Response to Hurricane Katrina, Integrated Timeline, p. 10. Provided to Committee; State 

of Louisiana and U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Louisiana Citizen Awareness Disaster and Evacuation Guide 

[hereinaft er Louisiana Citizen Awareness Guide].

15 LOHSEP, Letter to President George W. Bush, Aug. 27, 2005. Provided to Committee; Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, pp. 3-4; Th e White House, “Statement on Federal Emergency Assistance for Louisiana,” press 

release, Aug. 27, 2005. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050827-1.html. Accessed on Jan. 17, 2006.

16 Louisiana’s Preparation and Response to Hurricane Katrina, Integrated Timeline, p. 11; Louisiana Citizen Awareness 

Guide.

17 City of New Orleans, Mayors Press Offi ce, “Mayor Nagin Urges Citizens to Prepare for Hurricane Katrina,” press 

release, Aug. 27, 2005. Provided to Committee.

18 Louisiana’s Preparation and Response to Hurricane Katrina, Integrated Timeline, p. 12. Provided to Committee; 

Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, Emergency Operations Plan, Apr. 2005, p. 5 [hereinaft er Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan]. 

19 Louisiana’s Preparation and Response to Hurricane Katrina, Integrated Timeline, p. 13. Provided to Committee; 

Louisiana Citizen Awareness Guide.

20 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), briefi ng on National Weather Service Products and 

Services During Katrina, given to Senate Committee staff , Feb. 7, 2006, p. 12.

21 NHC Timeline, p. 3; Testimony of Max Mayfi eld, Director, Tropical Prediction Center and National Hurricane Center, National Weather Service, NOAA, before the U.S. House, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation 

for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing on Predicting Hurricanes: What We Knew About Katrina When?, Sept. 

22, 2005; Committee staff interview of Max Mayfi eld, Director, Tropical Prediction Center and National Hurricane 

Center, National Weather Service, NOAA, conducted on Jan. 27, 2006, transcript pp. 57-58.

22 MEMA, Director’s Brief, Aug. 28, 2005, 7 p.m. CT, p. 3. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. MEMA 0010690; 

MEMA, Hurricane Katrina Situation Report #6, Aug. 28, 2005, 8 a.m. CT. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. 

MEMA 0010864 through 0010869.

23 National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Katrina Advisory #19, Aug. 27, 2005, 10 p.m. CT. Provided to Committee; 

National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Katrina Discussion #19, Aug. 27, 2005, 10 p.m. CT. Provided to Committee. Both 

documents fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0037-0000314 through 0000317.

24 Th e White House, “Statement on Federal Emergency Assistance for Mississippi,” press release, Aug. 28, 2005. http://

www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050828.html. Accessed on Nov. 8, 2005; Th e White House, “Statement 

on Federal Emergency Assistance for Alabama,” press release, Aug. 28, 2005. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050828-3.html. Accessed on Nov. 8, 2005; Th e White House, “Statement on Federal Disaster Assistance for 

Florida,” press release, Aug. 28, 2005. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050828-2.html. Accessed on 

Nov. 8, 2005.

25 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Situation Report #9, Aug. 30, 2005, 6 p.m., p. 3. Provided to Committee; fi led 

as Bates no. DHS 0001234.

26 National Hurricane Center, Special Advisory #20, Aug. 28, 2005, 1 a.m. CT. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

nos. DHS-FEMA-0037-0000323 through 0000324.

27 National Hurricane Center, Special Advisory #22, Aug. 28, 2005, 7 a.m. CT. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

nos. DHS-FEMA-0037-0000367 through 0000368.

28 City of New Orleans, Mayor’s Press Offi ce, “Mayor Nagin Urges Citizens to Prepare for Hurricane Katrina,” press 

release, Aug. 27, 2005. Provided to Committee; Mayor Ray Nagin and Kevin Stephens, City of New Orleans Health 

Department, Response to the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on 

Challenges in a Catastrophe: Evacuating New Orleans in Advance of Hurricane Katrina, Jan. 31, 2006, pp. 4-5. 

29 City of New Orleans, Mayor’s Press Offi ce, “Mayor Nagin Issues Mandatory Evacuation,” press release, Aug. 28, 2005. 

Provided to Committee; Mayor Ray Nagin, CNN, “New Orleans Mayor, Louisiana Governor Hold Press Conference,” 

Aug. 28, 2005. http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0508/28/bn.04.html. Accessed on Mar. 17, 2006.

30 National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Katrina Advisory #23, Aug. 28, 2005, 10 a.m. CT. Provided to Committee; fi led 

as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0037-0000379 through 0000380.

31 Max Mayfi eld, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 28, 2005, transcript p. 6. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0105-0000071. Michael Brown, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 28, 2005, transcript p. 

29. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0105-0000094.

32 Louisiana’s Preparation and Response to Hurricane Katrina, Integrated Timeline, p. 1. Provided to Committee; 

Written Statement of Marty Bahamonde, Director, External Aff airs, Region I, FEMA, for the U.S. Senate, Committee on 

Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans: A Flooded City, a Chaotic 

Response, Oct. 20, 2005, p. 1.

33 National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Katrina Advisory #24, Aug. 28, 2005, 4 p.m. CT. Provided to Committee; fi led 
Hurricane Katrina: Timeline of Key Events

73

as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0037-0000395 through 0000396.

34 Committee staff interview of Lt. Col. Mark S. Oxley, Chief of Staff , Louisiana State Police, and Lt. Col. Joseph Booth, 

Deputy Superintendent, Crisis Response and Special Operations, Louisiana State Police, conducted on Dec. 9, 2005, 

transcript pp. 202-204.

35 Andrew Akers, e-mail to HSOC SWO and others, Aug. 29, 2005, 1:47 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. 

WHK 15399 through 15404.

36 National Space and Aeronautics Agency, “Katrina Intensifi es Into a Powerful Hurricane, Strikes Northern Gulf 

Coast,” Aug. 30, 2005. http://www.nasa.gov/vision/earth/lookingatearth/katrina_trmm_0828_0829.html. Accessed 

on Jan. 17, 2006; Richard D. Knabb, Jamie Rhome, and Daniel Brown, National Hurricane Center, “Tropical Cyclone 

Report: Hurricane Katrina,” Dec. 20, 2005, pp. 8-9 [hereinaft er NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina”]; 

MEMA, Hurricane Katrina Situation Report #11, Aug. 29, 2005, 9 a.m. CT. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 

MEMA 0010905.

37 NHC, “Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane Katrina,” p. 9.

38 Louisiana National Guard, Timeline of Signifi cant Events, Hurricane Katrina, Dec. 7, 2005, pp. 4-5. Provided to 

Committee [hereinaft er LANG Timeline]; Committee staff interview of Lonnie Swain, Assistant Superintendent, New 

Orleans Police Department, LA, conducted on Nov. 9, 2005, transcript pp. 49-52.

39 MEMA, Hurricane Katrina Timeline, p. 4.

40 Written Statement of Capt. Bruce C. Jones, U.S. Coast Guard, Commanding Offi cer, Coast Guard Air Station New 

Orleans, for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Always Ready: 

Th e Coast Guard’s Response to Hurricane Katrina, Nov. 9, 2005, pp. 24-25; Committee staff interview of Lt. Col. Keith 

LaCaze, Assistant Administrator, Law Enforcement Division, Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, conducted on Nov. 30, 2005, transcript pp. 46-47; Committee staff interview of Capt. Tim Bayard, Commander, Vice Crimes and 

Narcotics Section, New Orleans Police Department, LA, conducted on Nov. 21, 2005, transcript pp. 30-33; Committee 

staff interview of Capt. Paul Hellmers, Engine 18, Second Platoon, Sixth District, New Orleans Fire Department, LA, and 

Capt. Joseph Fincher, Engine 18, Th ird Platoon, Sixth District, New Orleans Fire Department, LA, conducted on Nov. 7, 

2005, transcript pp. 92-93, 95-96.

41 Committee staff interview of Paul Bennett, Deputy Chief of Police, Gulfport Police Department, MS, conducted on 

Dec. 8, 2005, transcript pp. 32-33.

42 Capt. Bayard interview, Nov. 21, 2005, p. 40; Lt. Col. LaCaze interview, Nov. 30, 2005, pp. 14-17; James L. Barksdale, Governor’s Commission on Recovery, Rebuilding, and Renewal, Aft er Katrina: Building Back Better than Ever, 

Dec. 31, 2005, p. 9; Testimony of Gov. Haley Barbour, Mississippi, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland 

Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Role of Governors in Managing the Catastrophe 

in the Response, Feb. 2, 2006; Written Statement of Gov. Haley Barbour, Mississippi, for the U.S. Senate, Committee on 

Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Role of Governors in Managing the 

Catastrophe in the Response, Feb. 2, 2006, pp. 1-4.

43 Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 7; Testimony of Maj. Gen. Bennett Landreneau, Adjutant 

General, Louisiana, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on 

Hurricane Katrina: Th e Defense Department’s Role in the Response, Feb. 9, 2006; Committee staff interview of Maj. Gen. 

Bennett Landreneau, Adjutant General, Louisiana, conducted on Jan. 11, 2006, transcript pp. 33-34, 140-141, 273-274.

44 Committee staff interview of Pat Sullivan, Chief, Gulfport Fire Department, MS, conducted on Dec. 7, 2005, transcript pp. 97-98.

45 Written Statement of Mayor C. Ray Nagin, City of New Orleans, LA, for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland 

Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Managing the Crisis and Evacuating New Orleans, 

Feb. 1, 2006, p. 4; Penya Moses-Fields, letter to Th e Honorable Susan M. Collins and Th e Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman, Jan. 30, 2006, “Attachment A: Timeline of Mayor Nagin’s Activities, Aug. 26, 2005 – Sept. 6, 2005.”

46 Clair Blong, e-mail to Fema-NRCC and others, Aug. 30, 2005, 10:51 p.m. Provided to Committee; Col. David Rhodes, 

e-mail to Tom Eldridge, Dan Berkovitz, and Eric Andersen, Senate Committee staff members, Apr. 19, 2006, 2:32 p.m.; 

Committee staff interview of Gen. Richard Myers, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , conducted on Feb. 28, 

2006, transcript p. 9.

47 U.S. Department of Defense, First U.S. Army, Joint Task Force Katrina, Hurricane Katrina Chronology. Provided to 

Committee.

48 LANG Timeline, p. 6; Swain interview, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 73.

49 Sec. Michael Chertoff , memorandum to various DHS offi cials, “Designation of Principal Federal Offi cial for Hurricane Katrina,” Aug. 30, 2005. Provided to Committee; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Situation Report #11, 

Aug. 31, 2005, 6 p.m. ET, p. 2. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS 0001266.

50 Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 9; Committee staff interview of Sec. Ann Williamson, Louisiana Department of Social Services, conducted on Dec. 12, 2005, transcript pp. 98-99.

51 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “Disasters & Emergencies: Hurricanes, HHS Declares Public Health 

Emergency for Hurricane Katrina,” Aug. 31, 2005. http://www.hhs.gov/emergency/determination.html. Accessed on 

Dec. 9, 2005.
Chapter 5

74

52 Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 11; State of Louisiana, Executive Order No. KBB 2005-31.

53 U.S. Department of Transportation, Actions for Hurricane Katrina: Annotated Chronology of Signifi cant Events, Oct. 

6, 2005, p. 4. Provided to Committee; FEMA, Tasking Request and Assignment Form, LRC-Katrina-378, Aug. 31, 2005. 

Provided to Committee.

54 Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 10; Sec. Williamson interview, Dec. 12, 2005, pp. 105-106.

55 National Guard Bureau, Aft er Action Review, Hurricane Response September 2005, Dec. 21, 2005, p. 14. Provided to 

Committee.

56 Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, pp. 9-10; Testimony of Gov. Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, 

Louisiana, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane 

Katrina: Th e Role of the Governors in Managing the Catastrophe, Feb. 2, 2006; Committee staff interview of Terry Ryder, 

Executive Counsel, Offi ce of the Governor, LA, conducted on Jan. 10, 2006, transcript pp. 200-203.

57 Th e White House, “President Outlines Hurricane Katrina Relief Eff orts,” press release, Aug. 31, 2005. http://www.

whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050831-3.html. Accessed on Mar. 7, 2006.

58 U.S. Department of Transportation, Actions for Hurricane Katrina, Annotated Chronology of Signifi cant Events, Oct. 

6, 2005, pp. 3-4.

59 U.S. Department of Transportation, Actions for Hurricane Katrina, Annotated Chronology of Signifi cant Events,

Oct. 6, 2005, p. 5; LANG Timeline, p. 7; Committee staff interview of Brig. Gen. Mark Graham, U.S. Army, Deputy 

Commanding General, Fift h U.S. Army, U.S. Department of Defense, conducted on Jan. 12, 2006, transcript pp. 76-80; 

Committee staff interview of Dolph Diemont, Region X Regional Emergency Transportation Representative, Offi ce of 

Intelligence, Security and Emergency Response, U.S. Department of Transportation, conducted on Jan. 6, 2006, transcript pp. 57-59; Committee staff interview of Col. Jacques Th ibodeaux, Joint Director of Military Support to Civilian 

Authorities, Louisiana National Guard, conducted on Jan. 12, 2006, transcript p. 24.

60 LANG Timeline, p. 7; Maj. Gen. Landreneau interview, Jan. 11, 2006, pp. 265-266.

61 Th e White House, “President Heads to Hurricane Katrina Aff ected Areas,” press release, Sept. 2, 2005. http://www.

whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/print/20050902.html. Accessed on Apr. 24, 2006;

Th e White House, “President Remarks on Hurricane Recovery Eff orts,” press release, Sept. 2, 2005. www.whitehouse.

gov/news/releases/2005/09/20050902-8.html. Accessed on Mar. 6, 2006; Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s 

Timeline, p. 14.

62 Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 14; Gov. Blanco, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 2, 2006.

63 Louisiana’s Preparation and Response to Hurricane Katrina, Integrated Timeline, p. 46. Provided to Committee; 

LANG Timeline, p. 8.

64 Th e White House, memorandum to Governor Blanco, “Memorandum of Agreement Concerning Authorization, 

Consent, and Use of Dual Status Commander for JTF-Katrina,” Sept. 2, 2005. Provided to Committee; Ryder interview, 

Jan. 6, 2006, pp. 234-235; Committee staff interview of Andy Kopplin, then Chief of Staff , Offi ce of the Governor, LA, 

conducted on Jan.10, 2006, transcript p. 148.

65 Ryder interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 248-252; Terry Ryder, Handwritten Notes, Sept. 3, 2005. Provided to Committee. 

66 U.S. Department of Defense, Hurricane Katrina/Rita Comprehensive Timeline, p. 16. Provided to Committee; Th e 

White House, “President Addresses Nation: Discusses Hurricane Katrina Relief Eff orts,” press release, Sept. 3, 2005. 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/20050903.html. Accessed on Mar. 6, 2006.

67 Col. Th ibodeaux interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 33-35; Col. Jacques Th ibodeaux, Timeline, p. 9. Provided to Committee; 

Louisiana’s Preparation and Response to Hurricane Katrina, Integrated Timeline, p. 49. Provided to Committee.

68 Louisiana’s Preparation and Response to Hurricane Katrina, Integrated Timeline, p. 49. Provided to Committee.

69 Col. Th ibodeaux interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 34-35; Col. Jacques Th ibodeaux, Timeline, p. 9. Provided to Committee.

70 Louisiana’s Preparation and Response to Hurricane Katrina, Integrated Timeline, p. 52. Provided to Committee.

71 U.S. Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, Th e Federal Response to Hurricane 

Katrina: Lessons Learned. Washington: Government Printing Offi ce, Feb. 2006, p. 47.

72 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Situation Report #22, Sept. 6, 2005, 6 a.m., p. 2. Provided to Committee; fi led 

as Bates no. DHS 0001462.
584
Citizens’ evacuation 

map and message 

from Gov. Blanco 

State of Louisiana
77

Emergency Management: 

Louisiana

The Threat

Like its Gulf Coast neighbor states, Louisiana repeatedly fi nds itself the target of tropical 

storms and hurricanes coming ashore from the Gulf of Mexico. Louisiana has the added 

problems of having large tracts of low-lying land that are sinking while sea levels are rising, 

and of being home to a major city that, on average, lies below sea level.

As the Congressional Research Service (CRS) has noted, “New Orleans’ location on the Gulf 

Coast with water on three sides and below-sea-level terrain makes this densely populated 

section of Louisiana highly susceptible to fl ooding from hurricane storm surges” – not to 

mention the risks it faces from river fl ooding and trapped rainwater.1

Th e need to protect New Orleans is old and pressing. And it is getting more severe. Th ree 

researchers presenting at a U.S. Geological Survey conference observed that “Considering the rate of subsidence [sinking soil levels] and the mid-range estimate of sea-level rise 

during the next 100 years (480 millimeters) [about 1.9 inches] the areas of New Orleans and 

vicinity that are presently 1.5 to 3 meters [about 5 to 10 feet] below mean sea level will likely 

be 2.5 to 4.0 meters [about 8 to 13 feet] or more below mean sea level by 2100.”2

 Like other 

researchers, they also note that the New Orleans area’s vulnerability is “aggravated owing 

to fl ood-protection measures and disruption of natural drainageways that reduce sediment 

deposition” that would otherwise compensate for some of the subsidence.3

Th e desire to protect New Orleans is old and powerful. And it continues. French settlers 

in the early 1700s built earthen levees to protect their high-ground settlement from fl ood 

waters rising in the Mississippi River. Aft er Louisiana had passed into American hands in 

1803, a succession of private landowners, local levee boards, and later the Army Corps of 

Engineers (the Corps) added to the protective works.4

 Th e Corps got its fi rst Mississippi 

fl ood-control mandate from Congress in 1850; its authority expanded through major fl oodcontrol legislation of 1936, 1944, and 1950, among others.5

Most of the current hurricane-protection system around the metropolitan New Orleans area 

has been built since 1879 by local sponsors or by the Corps.6

 Th e most intense and protracted 

program of protection, however, was launched aft er the 1965 assault by Hurricane Betsy. 

On the night of September 9, 1965, Hurricane Betsy made landfall near New Orleans, 

driving before it a storm surge of water that easily overran levees and fl ooded more than 

5,000 square miles of land, including densely populated areas in Orleans and St. Bernard 

Parishes, and more rural areas in Plaquemines Parish. Th e hurricane was the worst up to 

that point in Louisiana’s history: it killed 81 people, injured over 17,600, and drove more 

than 250,000 to shelters.7

President Lyndon Johnson visited New Orleans the next day. He praised the work of state 

and local fi rst responders – “Th e agony and the loss of Louisiana would have been far greater 

without the cooperation, eff ective work of the Weather Bureau, the Civil Defense Authorities 

of Louisiana, the Red Cross and other local groups” – then added, “[Y]ou can be sure that the 

federal government’s total resources, with the help of the fi ne Louisiana Delegation, will be 

turned toward helping this state and its citizens fi nd its way back from this tragedy.”8

Chapter 6
Chapter 6

78

Congress responded with the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project 

in the Flood Control Act of 1965. Th e project envisioned a series of control structures, 

fl oodwalls, and levees to provide hurricane protection to areas around Lake Pontchartrain, 

the large lake lying north of New Orleans. Originally expected to be completed in about 

13 years, the project was delayed by technical issues, environmental and legal challenges, 

and some local opposition that ultimately led to design changes. When Hurricane Katrina 

struck, the project included some 125 miles of levees, and the completion date had been 

extended to 2015. Th e drainage-canal fl oodwalls that failed during Katrina, however, were 

complete at that point.9

During the 40 years of construction that followed the Flood Control Act of 1965, a succession of powerful hurricanes – Camille in 1969, Andrew in 1992, Georges in 1998, Isadore 

and Lili in 2002, and Ivan in 2004 – supplied grim reminders of the need to protect the 

Louisiana coast and the low-lying City of New Orleans, and to perfect evacuation plans to 

remove people from the impact areas.

Th e Army Corps of Engineers had built the New Orleans levee system to handle a “standard 

project hurricane” – a notional, hybrid storm that engineers later described, in terms of the 

Saffi r-Simpson scale adopted in 1977, as “equivalent to a fast-moving Category 3 hurricane.”10 On its fi ve-category scale, the National Weather Service (NWS) classifi es Category 

3, 4, and 5 hurricanes as “major,” and the damage from a Category 5 storm as “catastrophic.”11 Compared to the Saffi r-Simpson standards, the Standard Project Hurricane’s winds 

were as fast as a Category 2 hurricane, its storm surge as high as a Category 3, and its central 

atmospheric pressure as low as a Category 4 – hence the rough description as a fast-moving 

Category 3 storm.12

Assessing the protective strength of the New Orleans-area system was complicated by the 

region’s soil subsidence. Th ough the Corps periodically “lift ed” the levees to compensate for 

subsiding soils, the levels of the lift s varied, resulting in a system as vulnerable as its lowest component. A Corps of Engineers fact sheet of 2003, “How Safe is New Orleans from 

Flooding?” took note of these uncertainties about the Lake Pontchartrain project:

Th is level of protection [against a fast-moving Category 3 hurricane] was based 

on the science of storm prediction as it existed in the 1960s. Th e question remains, however, whether this level of protection would be suffi cient to protect 

the city from a category 4 or 5 hurricane today – or even a category 3 storm 

that lingered over the city [i.e., a “slow-moving” storm]. Since the 1960s, New 

Orleans has been sinking – in some areas at the rate of 1⁄2 inch per year. Th e 

distance from the Gulf Coast to New Orleans has also been shrinking. A century ago, a hurricane would have to cross 50 miles of marshland able to reduce 

the storm’s energy; today only half as much.13

By 2003 – 10 years aft er the start of a new cycle of more active hurricane formation in the 

Atlantic – new research suggested that the combination of sinking soil and rising ocean 

water around the Mississippi Delta meant that even some Category 2 storms could produce 

devastating fl oods in the New Orleans area. Director Marc Levitan of the Louisiana State 

University Hurricane Center wrote a paper analyzing the computerized, multi-storm fl ooding projections of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s SLOSH (Sea, 

Lake, and Overland Surges from Hurricanes) program. Examining the mapping results of 

the program, he wrote, 

clearly demonstrates that New Orleans is at signifi cant risk of fl ooding from 

Category 2 and 3 hurricanes. All locations on the West Bank and many points 

on the East Bank could fl ood even in Category 2 intensity storms from certain 
Emergency Management: Louisiana

79

directions ... locations anywhere within Orleans and Jeff erson Parishes can 

experience signifi cant storm surge fl ooding in a Category 3 storm. ... Th e situation deteriorates rapidly if Category 4 and 5 storms are considered. Any single 

storm can easily fl ood broad areas of both parishes to depths over land of 10 

feet or more.14

Th e historic record shows the concern over extreme or catastrophic storms was not idle 

fretting about some remote possibility. Th e National Hurricane Center’s list of “Most 

Intense Hurricanes in the United States, 1851-2004” includes six hurricanes measured or 

estimated as Category 4 or 5 that have struck Louisiana:

Hurricane Andrew 1992 Category 5

Hurricane Camille 1969 Category 5

Hurricane Audrey 1957 Category 4

Unnamed storm 1947 Category 4

Unnamed storm 1915 Category 4

“Last Island” storm 1856 Category 415

Hurricane Betsy, which devastated New Orleans and other Louisiana communities in 1965, 

had reached Category 5 strength while still in the Gulf of Mexico, though it weakened 

before landfall. Hurricane Katrina reached the same strength in 2005, and faced a protective 

system with newly recognized vulnerabilities.

Just as the hurricane-protection system refl ected coordinated eff orts at diff erent levels 

of government, Louisiana’s response capability for disasters like Katrina is vested in an 

emergency-management system that coordinates preventive and remedial actions by local, 

state, and federal governments. As will be seen, that system had defi ciencies in its structure 

and operation.

The State

Louisiana’s Emergency-Management Structure

Louisiana law entrusts the Governor with “overall responsibility for emergency management in the state.” 16 Th e Governor delegated her authority to direct emergency operations 

to the state Adjutant General.17 As in many other states, when Katrina struck, the Adjutant 

General was serving both as director of the state emergency-preparedness offi ce and as 

commander of the National Guard.

Th e state’s lead agency for emergencies is the Governor’s Offi ce of Homeland Security and 

Emergency Preparedness. From 2003 to March 2006 – and therefore during the Katrina 

disaster – it was known as the Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency 

Preparedness (LOHSEP), and will be referred to by that title in this discussion. Since its 

creation in 1950, the agency has been variously assigned to the Department of Public Safety, 

the Military Department, and fi nally the Governor’s Offi ce.18

LOHSEP says it “has managed over 16 Federal Disaster Declarations and has coordinated 

several hundred State Disaster Declarations authorized under the Governor’s signature” 

since 1990.19 Based in Baton Rouge, LOHSEP was directed at the time of Katrina by the 
Chapter 6

80

Adjutant General of the Louisiana National Guard, Major General Bennett C. Landreneau; 

its current Acting Director is Colonel Jeff Smith. 

Allocation of disaster-response responsibilities is governed primarily by the Louisiana Constitution, the Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act, 

and the State Emergency Operations Plan (EOP).

Th e State’s EOP comprises a 21-page “Basic Plan,” four Attachments, 15 Emergency Support Function (ESF) Annexes, and seven Supplements. Its purpose is to “establish the 

policies and structure for state government management of emergencies and disasters.”20 It 

prescribes phases of emergencies and disasters, and assigns responsibilities for actions the 

state will take to provide for the safety and welfare of its citizens.21

Th e general principles underlying the EOP’s allocation of responsibilities exemplify the 

long-standing, federal-system approach to disaster planning. Th e EOP’s “Assumptions” section reads, in part:

5. Th e initial actions of prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response and 

recovery operations are conducted by local government. Local authorities will 

exhaust their resources, and then use mutual aid agreements with volunteer 

groups, the private sector and/or neighboring parishes.

6. State assistance will supplement local eff orts and federal assistance will supplement State and local eff orts when it is clearly demonstrated that it is beyond 

local and State capability to cope with the emergency/disaster.22

Following the template of the National Response Plan (NRP), the EOP identifi es 15 Emergency Support Functions (ESFs), for which 28 state departments, offi ces and agencies have 

primary and/or supporting roles. LOHSEP has primary responsibility for fi ve ESFs; the 

Department of Agriculture and Forestry, the State Police, and the Department of Transportation and Development have responsibility for two; and 10 agencies have a single primary 

responsibility. Th e National Guard is unique in being assigned supporting responsibility for 

all 15 ESFs, but no primary responsibilities.23

While most of those departments and agencies took their responsibilities seriously, as discussed elsewhere in this report, the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development, which acquired primary responsibility for the emergency support function relating 

to evacuation in 2004, did not. Colonel Smith also acknowledged LOHSEP’s shortcomings 

in this area, saying the agency needed to do more to ensure that all entities assigned lead 

responsibilities for emergency support functions are “completely aware of what those responsibilities mean.”24 

Governor Blanco failed to provide suffi cient resources to LOHSEP. However, the inadequacy of LOHSEP’s resources was a chronic issue, known to Louisiana offi cials well before 

Katrina. LOHSEP had a pre-Katrina staff of 43 to 45, some of whom were detailed from 

other offi ces. Only about 15 agency staff had emergency-management leadership experience.25 Depressed pay scales both prevented the agency from hiring experienced candidates 

and led to high turnover. 26 Planning in particular suff ered. When the New Orleans medical 

director sought to put in place memoranda of understanding with Amtrak and other carriers for pre-landfall evacuation in the summer of 2005, LOHSEP was too short-staff ed to 

help fi nalize the plan.27

When Colonel Smith became Acting Deputy Director in late 2004, General Landreneau directed him to undertake a staffi ng study.28 While the resulting study showed that LOHSEP’s 

staffi ng was only about 60 percent of the national average, eff orts to persuade the legislature 
Emergency Management: Louisiana

81

to fund additional positions – which had the support of the Governor’s staff – met with 

little success. 29

LOHSEP was also well aware long before Katrina that its emergency plan was not adequate 

to deal with a catastrophic hurricane, and that it lacked the resources to remedy that inadequacy. It was that very awareness that led to its eff orts beginning in 1999 to secure federal 

assistance in developing a more comprehensive plan (eventually leading to the Hurricane 

Pam exercise).30 Th e extent of that inadequacy only became more apparent as LOHSEP 

wrestled with the overwhelming problems of responding to the devastation of Katrina.

The State Updates its EOP

In addition to the issues that led to the Hurricane Pam exercise, the state and federal agencies addressed other concerns related to evacuation. 

In 2000, the State’s Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness fi nished an update of the state comprehensive emergency operations plan. It included new evacuation and shelter plans produced by the 12 parishes in the Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Task Force. Some parishes, 

such as Jeff erson, updated their plans; some agencies, such as the New Orleans Fire Department, developed new strategies for a catastrophic storm.31

Th is period also exposed the fundamental weakness of the state’s approach to pre-storm 

evacuation of residents without transportation. Under the state’s plan, the National Guard 

was responsible for transportation, but the agency had no buses and intended to parcel out 

its inventory of troop transport trucks to individual parishes as it had always done.32 Th e 

State’s Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, updated in 2000, left the responsibility for pre-storm evacuation with the parishes. “Th e primary means of hurricane evacuation 

will be personal vehicles,” the plan said. “School and municipal buses, government-owned 

vehicles and vehicles provided by volunteer agencies may be used to provide transportation 

for individuals who lack transportation and require assistance in evacuating.”33

Solving the problem involved more than assembling large numbers of buses, as the 1994 

Hurricane Preparedness Study had emphasized. If no building in New Orleans could serve 

as a hurricane shelter, then all vehicles had a much longer drive to reach shelters, which 

infl uences clearance times. 

A month before the start of the 2002 hurricane season, offi cials from the main state and federal agencies responsible for hurricane evacuations in Louisiana met to discuss the Bi-State 

Hurricane Evacuation Study – an event that underscored the challenges of arranging mass 

evacuations in a hurricane-prone region.34 During the meeting, speakers noted that approximately 30 percent of Louisiana residents would evacuate to or through Mississippi in the 

event of a hurricane and that Louisiana wanted to begin using the contrafl ow land-reversal 

process to route residents eastward into Mississippi – an operation that could confl ict with 

Mississippi’s need to evacuate its own at-risk residents and tourists. 35

By the 2002 hurricane season, the state’s preparedness agency had moved into a new Emergency Operations Center in Baton Rouge that would serve as a command center during 

disasters for state and federal offi cials. In May 2002, the FEMA Region VI offi ce produced 

its own “Hurricane Plan for Louisiana” that refl ected the plans that the state and FEMA had 

developed. 

When Katrina struck, Louisiana was in the process of bringing its emergency-management systems into conformance with the National Incident Management System (NIMS).36

Th e NRP incorporates the NIMS. In its April 2005 revision to the State’s EOP,Louisiana 

adopted a “State of Louisiana Incident Management System” (SLIMS), which is supposed to 
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82

use the same fl exible structure as NIMS “to manage all types of incidents, particularly those 

that require the establishment of Incident Command Posts at or near an incident site.” 

However, in Katrina, a local incident-command post was not put into place until the second 

week of the response. In the fi rst week, the state operated under its pre-SLIMS structure, 

with operations managed through the LOHSEP chain of command. 

Colonel Smith and his operations division chief, Colonel William Doran, had diff erent perspectives on the eff ectiveness of incident command at the local level. Colonel Doran believed 

that the diff erences between the incident-command structure envisioned under NIMS and 

Louisiana’s actual practice were minor: “In our case, we still have a chain of command. It’s 

just – it’s set up just a little bit diff erent, but I think in spirit we’re doing incident command.”37

Colonel Smith, on the other hand, saw a need for LOHSEP to educate parishes on incident 

command, and possibly even for legislation to address the issue:

Some parishes do a better job of understanding the ICS system, the NIMS 

structures. Others don’t do as good a job. ... I will tell you that we have some 

that work together great and we have others that hardly speak to each other.38

LOHSEP’s Chief of Operations testifi ed to “holes” in the state plan in several areas, including state control of aviation; transportation and logistics; and prioritizing competing needs 

for emergency assistance. He saw a need for the state to incorporate the kinds of detail 

(“who, what, where, why, and how”) found in military planning. Th e absence of that kind of 

detail made it necessary, in his opinion, to make plans “on the fl y.”39

However, the plan does show some awareness that people lacking vehicles or having mobility problems could require assistance in evacuating. Two annexes to the State’s EOP, the 

Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Evacuation and Sheltering Plan, and the Louisiana Shelter 

Operations Plan, address that issue. 

Th e former was the creation of the Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Task Force. Th e revised 

plan of January 2000 was published by the State’s Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness, and 

lists 12 parish presidents and the mayor of New Orleans as signatories.40 (In accordance 

with the EOP, LOHSEP required the plan to be updated at least once every four years; 

however, the updating due in 2004 did not occur prior to Katrina due to short staffi ng of the 

LOHSEP planning division.)41

Th e “situations” which the plan is designed to address are described in terms very similar 

to the scenario that served as the basis for the Hurricane Pam exercise. Th ey include the 

following:

1. Th e Greater New Orleans Metropolitan Area represents a diffi cult evacuation problem due to the large population and it’s [sic] unique layout.

2. Th is area is located in a fl oodplain much of which lies below sea level ...

3. Tidal surge, associated with a “worst case” Category 3, 4 or 5 Hurricane ... 

could cause a maximum inundation of 20 feet above sea level in some 

parishes ...

4. Th e area is protected by an extensive levee system, but above normal water 

levels and hurricane surge could cause levee overtopping or failures.42

Th e plan also set forth a list of assumptions, including one directed specifi cally at the need 

for buses and other conveyances to evacuate those that lacked personal vehicles, stating:
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83

Th e primary means of hurricane evacuation will be personal vehicles. School 

and municipal buses, government-owned vehicles and vehicles provided by 

volunteer agencies may be used to provide transportation for individuals who 

lack transportation and require assistance in evacuating.43

While the operational sections of the plan lack detail, and place very little responsibility on 

state government, they clearly envision a role for parish governments in evacuating those 

who cannot self-evacuate. Th ose sections divide responsibilities between risk-area parishes 

(in the hurricane strike zone), host-area parishes (parishes outside the strike zone where 

evacuees may be sheltered), and the state. No transportation obligations are imposed on 

host-area parishes. Th e responsibilities on the other two are further grouped by phases, i.e., 

precautionary/voluntary evacuation; recommended evacuation; and mandatory evacuation.

In a precautionary/voluntary evacuation, the Plan states that in risk-area parishes, “Local 

transportation resources should be marshaled and public transportation plans implemented 

as needed.” Th ere are no requirements for the state to marshal transportation resources.

In a recommended evacuation, the Plan directs risk-area parishes to “Mobilize transportation to assist persons who lack transportation or who have mobility problems.” Th e state is 

directed to “Mobilize State transportation resources to aid in the evacuation of people who 

have mobility and/or health problems.”

In mandatory evacuations, the Plan only directs risk-area parishes to “Assist persons with 

mobility limitations to fi nd last resort refuge [and to m]obilize all transportation resources 

and request assistance from the state as needed.” Th e text is unclear whether the resources are 

to be mobilized solely to transport persons with mobility limitations to last-resort refuges, or 

for broader purposes. Th e obligations of the state are even more limited, and no clearer: Th e 

state is to “Direct the evacuation and shelter of persons having mobility limitations, including 

persons in nursing homes, hospitals, group homes and non-institutionalized persons.”44

Part VI of the plan defi nes the role of staging areas and last resort refuges. It contemplates 

that staging areas will be designated, and transportation will be pre-positioned to transport 

people from those areas to shelters until evacuation routes are closed, at which point the 

staging areas “will become Last Resort Refuges.” Once weather conditions permit, rescue 

teams are supposed to transport evacuees from last-resort refuges to designated shelters. 

Th e plan does not specify who has responsibility to transport people from staging areas to 

shelters, either before evacuation routes are closed or aft er they reopen.45 However, state 

offi cials consistently took the position in staff interviews that transporting evacuees was the 

responsibility of parish or local government.46

Th e Shelter Operations Plan is the creation of the Louisiana Shelter Task Force, made up of 

in-land parishes, i.e., parishes likely to receive evacuees from low-lying or coastal parishes 

during a major hurricane.

Th e plan includes a statement regarding transportation that closely resembles language in 

the Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Evacuation and Shelter Plan:

Th e primary means of hurricane evacuation will be personal vehicles. However, school and municipal buses and, where available, specialized vehicles will be 

used to transport those hurricane evacuees who do not have transportation.47

While this part of the plan is silent on the entity expected to provide the buses and vehicles 

to transport people lacking personal vehicles, Part III identifi es local governments in the 

Southeast and Southwest Hurricane Task Forces as being responsible to transport evacuees to shelters. Th e language suggests that the risk-area parishes were already planning 
Chapter 6

84

to provide that transportation (although they evidently failed to follow through on those 

plans). In a subsection labeled “Individual Evacuee” under Section III.B Reception and Care 

– Planning Considerations, it states:

Most evacuees are expected to relocate using their personal vehicles. Local 

governments of the two Hurricane Task Forces (Southeast and Southwest) 

are expected to assist in evacuating those residents who do not own vehicles. 

Evacuating parishes plan to transport these people to reception areas in Sector 

C of the Shelter Area parishes using school and municipal buses, and special 

purpose vehicles.48

Th e Shelter Operations Plan also required nursing homes to maintain emergency plans that 

address evacuation and sheltering of their patients, and their patients are not allowed into 

special-needs shelters “unless the homes’ prearrangements have utterly failed.”49 Nursing 

homes were to contract in advance with commercial carriers for patients, staff , and staff 

families; the plan cautions that ambulance companies may be overwhelmed with demands 

for service in emergencies; and it directs home health-care agencies to assist the patient or 

his caregivers in making transportation arrangements.50

All organizations that provide care to special-needs people, but do not have enough transportation in emergencies, were required to arrange for supplemental transportation. If 

those arrangements failed, they were to notify local OEPs, and the latter are to notify needs 

in excess of their community capacity to LOHSEP. In turn, LOHSEP was required to report 

these needs to the Louisiana National Guard, which in turn was supposed to meet them 

with its own assets or “arrange for supplemental transportation assistance from other state 

agencies, the Federal Government, private businesses, other organizations, and volunteer 

groups.”51

Finally, Katrina revealed a weakness in LOHSEP’s use of Standard Operating Procedures 

(SOP) in managing emergencies. LOHSEP’s SOP describe the staffi ng of the EOC during 

non-emergency situations as well as progressive levels of threatened emergencies; EOC 

organization in emergencies; information handling procedures; responsibilities of the 

principal functional groups; and certain administrative matters. Attached to it are appendices listing the responsibilities of supporting agencies at each level of EOC activation, EOC 

checklists, and forms for recordkeeping and public notifi cation.

Th e Shelter Operations Plan Checklists identify actions to be taken at each stage of EOC 

activation, and provide a place for a LOHSEP to initialize and note the date and time each 

action is completed. Some of the items are administrative, e.g., faxing forms to parishes and 

requesting kitchen support for the EOC, while others relate to key aspects of preparing for 

disaster response. Examples of the latter category are “LOHSEP Executes Evacuation Shelter 

Plan” and “Begin Mandatory Evacuation Procedures.”52

While the checklist could have served as an important tool to identify shortcomings in preparedness, its eff ectiveness in Katrina was limited because LOHSEP had no means to verify 

the accuracy of input data and information. For example, the list included an important 

action item relating to whether nursing homes were prepared to evacuate their patients. 

Specifi cally, it required the “Louisiana Nursing Home Association EOC Liaison [to] call all 

nursing homes and other custodial care organizations in the risk area to insure that they 

are prepared to evacuate their residents.” A LOHSEP offi cial checked this item off as having 

been done even though, as it turned out, preparations for evacuation of nursing homes were 

far from adequate. As he subsequently acknowledged, the representation of the Nursing 

Home Association liaison that he had called nursing homes provided no assurance that the 

calls were eff ective.53
Emergency Management: Louisiana

85

The Parishes

Parish governments, like the state government, oft en underfunded their emergency-management functions, although in degrees that varied between parishes. As Colonel Smith 

testifi ed, the problem was primarily a matter of competing demands on fi nite resources:

In most cases, not in all, the [parish] emergency-management function does 

take a back seat. I mean they’re interested in roads, they’re interested in bridges, they’re interested in infrastructure and they don’t have the fi nal resources 

to deal with all of those things that they have to deal with on a day-to-day 

basis. So the emergency-support functions a lot of times take a back seat due to 

resourcing primarily.54

Local offi cials have also found it increasingly diffi cult to navigate the regulations associated 

with DHS grants for emergency preparedness and homeland security. “You have to be a 

Philadelphia lawyer and a CPA just to interpret the rules and to get the dollars,” according 

to Colonel Smith.55

Orleans Parish

Funding emergency preparedness has clearly not been a priority in Orleans Parish. Terry 

Tullier, who served in the New Orleans Fire Department (NOFD) before becoming Director of the City’s Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness from 2001 through 2004, noted the 

dramatic diff erence in staffi ng of the two organizations. In the NOFD, he said, there were

probably some 830-840 people who would be happy to say, yes sir, and do 

pretty much anything I needed for them to do. And suddenly I was confronted 

with an organization that had three people in it. ... And I very quickly found 

out that this was going to be a real challenge for me to operate within the confi nes of such a small structure.56

Tullier complained to the city administration about the understaffi ng of his offi ce, noting 

that the OEP in neighboring Jeff erson Parish (under Walter Maestri) was far higher. In 

response, Tullier was told “Well, you’re never going to have a dozen people in your shop 

like Walter does over there and just try and do the best you can.”57 Turnover has also been 

a serious problem at the New Orleans’ OEP: Th ere have been fi ve directors since 1993, and 

the position was vacant from December 2004, when Tullier retired, to March 2005, when 

Matthews was appointed.58

Orleans Parish maintains a Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP) that 

stresses the importance of pre-disaster evacuation. Th e plan acknowledges that “Approximately 100,000 citizens of New Orleans do not have means of personal transportation.”59 It 

also says that “Th e safe evacuation of threatened populations when endangered by a major 

catastrophic event is one of the principle [sic] reasons for developing a Comprehensive 

Emergency Management Plan,”60 and it lists identifi cation of at-risk populations and of 

transportation resources as two of the “primary tasks of evacuation planning.”61 While the 

plan assumes that most people will self-evacuate, it appears to envision active government 

involvement in providing transportation when it says that “Th e City of New Orleans will 

utilize all available resources to quickly and safely evacuate threatened areas. ... Special arrangements will be made to evacuate persons unable to transport themselves or who require 

specifi c life saving assistance.”62 It also says that “Transportation will be provided to those 

persons requiring public transportation from the area.”63

Th e plan also includes a list of assigned tasks for various city personnel and agencies including, among others, the mayor, the OEP, and the Regional Transit Authority (RTA). One 
Chapter 6

86

of the RTA tasks is to “Supply transportation as needed in accordance with the current standard operating procedures and to position supervisors and dispatch evacuation buses.”64

While the plan recognizes the mayor’s authority to issue evacuation orders, and specifi cally 

refers to mandatory evacuation, it does not specify how (or whether) such orders will be 

enforced or whether anyone would be excluded from the orders.65 However, the Louisiana 

Shelter Operations Plan, which is also an Appendix to the New Orleans CEMP, states that 

a mandatory evacuation order is “the fi nal, most serious phase of evacuation. Authorities 

will put maximum emphasis on encouraging evacuation and limiting ingress.”66 Th is suggests that the city (and the state) may not have intended that mandatory orders would be 

legally enforced.

Th e NOFD maintains hurricane guidelines that include a provision for last areas of refuge. 

Th ese refuges are facilities which are multi-level, with a center core stairwell and in strategic locations around the city.67 Each of the NOFD’s eight Districts are required to identify 

facilities which meet the pre-requisites for last areas of refuge, confi rm with the facility that 

fi re personnel can be housed there, and reconfi rm that commitment during pre-season 

preparations.68 Th e plan includes multiple last areas of refuge, with some including back-up 

locations, and notes the contact person and phone number for that facility. Th e descriptions 

of each location also note whether the facility includes adequate space to park department 

apparatus.69 Personnel report to these refuges upon decision by the superintendent, which 

will generally occur when winds reach approximately 40 miles per hour prior to landfall.70

Jefferson Parish

As noted above, Jeff erson Parish has committed far more resources to emergency management than Orleans Parish. It has a Director, Walter Maestri, who has served in that position 

for nine years, and 11 permanent staff .71 During times of emergency, the staff swells to more 

than 100.72 Prior to Katrina, the EOC had approximately 80 land lines into the building, 

with two high-capacity T-1 data-transmission lines that connected to all of the offi ce’s data 

systems.73 Th e Parish had its own 800 megahertz system for fi rst responders and public 

works, together with an 800 megahertz system provided by the state.74 Th e Parish had a 911 

call center, with the calls being routed to four operational units – police, fi re, emergency 

medical, or public works.75 Th e Jeff erson Parish Emergency Operations Plan was one of only 

two EOPs in the State of Louisiana that had been offi cially approved by FEMA. Th e other 

was St. Tammany Parish.76

Th e Parish EOP includes detailed provisions addressing the use of municipal buses to 

transport residents without other means of transportation. 77 It also includes measures for 

establishment of a backup EOC in the event of a Category 4 or higher hurricane.78

Plaquemines Parish

Th e Plaquemines Parish Homeland Security Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness has a full-time 

staff of two – a Director, Jesse St. Amant, and his secretary, who also serves as the 911 supervisor.79 Th e offi ce coordinates with the Parish EMS Department to manage the evacuation of the 

Parish’s special needs population.80 EMS monitors the Parish’s special-needs population and 

arranges for their transportation by ambulance to a regional hospital during emergencies.81

Th e Plaquemines Parish Emergency Operations Plan’s Basic Plan directly mirrors the State 

Basic Plan. It is augmented by 20 appendices setting forth organizational charts, government lines of succession, key facilities and workers.82 A transportation annex notes that 

approximately 12 percent of the population could require public transportation for evacuation, and commits the Parish to provide buses and trucks for evacuation, as well as make 

sure that special-needs populations, including inmates, elderly, and the handicapped, all 

have transportation.83
Emergency Management: Louisiana

87

St. Bernard Parish

Th e St. Bernard Parish Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness also has a 

staff of only two – a director, Larry Ingargiola, and his secretary.84 Th e staff is supplemented 

with about 20 volunteers during emergencies. 85 Parish government has never allowed the 

emergency director to fully open or staff the EOC during a hurricane, including during 

Katrina. 86

Th e St. Bernard Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) also mirrors the State’s EOP and includes 

multiple appendices. Th e evacuation appendix notes the need to address transportation of 

people without personal vehicles, but fails to make provision for that transportation.87

St. Tammany Parish

Th e St. Tammany Parish Offi ce of Emergency Management and Homeland Security is 

staff ed with a director, Dexter Accordo, and two deputy directors.88 Th e Parish EOC is 

unusual for southeast Louisiana in having a state-of-the-art communications system that 

includes a “reverse 911 [system] where you can dial up people by geographic area, and you 

can broadcast an audio message to them, giving them direction of what’s going on.”89 Th e 

EOC also maintains an operations center staff ed by support agencies such as the Louisiana 

National Guard, the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development, the St. 

Tammany Sheriff ’s Department, the Fire Department, and EMS.90 Requests for assistance 

that cannot be met by these agencies are routed to the state as E-Team requests.91

Th e Parish’s Emergency Operations Plan is similar to St. Bernard Parish’s plan in that it 

identifi es evacuation of residents without personal vehicles as an issue, but lacks provisions 

to address it. 92

Federal Involvement

As discussed elsewhere in the Report, the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the 

Army Corps of Engineers have statutory authorization – and appropriations – to assist the 

hurricane planning and response of state and local agencies.93 Many other federal agencies, 

perhaps most notably the U.S. Coast Guard, can get involved early and intensely.

Th ere is no question that eff ective and timely federal assistance in disaster planning and 

response is vital. Local, state, and federal agencies’ response to Hurricane Andrew in 1992 

was widely criticized as poorly coordinated and ineff ective. Th e General Accounting Offi ce 

(GAO, later renamed the Government Accountability Offi ce) concluded later that future 

hurricanes on the scale of Andrew “will quickly outstrip the capacity of all but the federal 

government to respond in the critical fi rst 12 to 24 hours with life-sustaining mass care.”94

On May 18, 1993, nine months aft er Hurricane Andrew and with a new hurricane season 

only two weeks away, National Hurricane Center Director, Robert H. Sheets, Ph.D., testifi ed 

in a U.S. Senate hearing, “Rebuilding FEMA: Preparing for the Next Disaster.” 95

Because of the time it took Andrew to reach the Louisiana coast, authorities had managed 

to evacuate approximately 1.25 million people from the New Orleans metropolitan area. 

Th e process took three days, but offi cials in New Orleans expected 60 to 80 hours warning 

to complete evacuation.96 Sheets knew this was not nearly good enough to prevent mass casualties. “We don’t have the skill, meteorologically speaking, to provide a suffi cient warning 

for those long lead times,” he explained.97

If Hurricane Andrew’s track had shift ed slightly and hit New Orleans directly, the projected 

storm surge into Lake Borgne on the eastern side of the city, and on into Lake Pontchar-
Chapter 6

88

train to the northwest would have overfl owed the levees into New Orleans. “Th e city of New 

Orleans would have gone under 18 to 20 feet of water,” he said.98

Several federal agencies played an important role in the task of improving protections for 

Louisiana.

The Army Corps of Engineers

Th e involvement of the Corps of Engineers refl ected the agency’s long history of dealing 

with the impact of major hurricanes, especially in Louisiana. When Hurricane Betsy fl ooded 

New Orleans in 1965, the Corps was one of the most important federal responders and handled the disaster-assistance missions later transferred to FEMA. 99 Th e Corps designed most 

of the levee system that protected the New Orleans area. By statute, the Corps is authorized 

to assist state and local agencies, upon their request, with disaster preparedness.100 Under 

the Federal Response Plan, FEMA could assign the Corps to conduct search-and-rescue 

missions and supply water, ice, and fuel.101 In the event of severe fl ooding from a hurricane, 

the Corps was responsible for assisting local levee boards in restoring damaged levees and 

in removing fl oodwaters trapped inside them.

Th e relationship between the Corps and local levee boards and agencies was complex and 

not without tension. But in carrying out the dewatering program, the Corps “assumed that 

any emergency response will be fully coordinated with the appropriate levee districts, parish 

drainage departments, and local and state offi cials.” 102

The National Weather Service

Th e National Hurricane Center (NHC) within the National Weather Service (NWS) monitors storms and provides broad-scope advisories on size, track, expected point of landfall, 

height of storm surge, and fl ooding. With its 1996 creation of the Hurricane Liaison Team, 

the NHC also came to serve as a source of situational awareness for emergency managers.103

Phone calls and visits from NWS forecasters who worked in the agency’s four offi ces in 

Louisiana supplement the warnings with specifi c local knowledge.104

Th e NWS was a critical partner with the Corps and FEMA in the Hurricane Evacuation 

Studies process. Th e agency’s scientists provided the storm-surge projections that gave local 

emergency managers guidance on when to order an evacuation, what to evacuate, and where 

it was safe to open shelters. Aft er Hurricane Camille in 1969, the NWS developed the Sea, 

Lake, and Overland Surges from Hurricanes (SLOSH) computer program to estimate the 

surge of an incoming hurricane. Th e SLOSH modeling soft ware could model storm surges 

for hurricanes of many sizes, strengths, and tracks.105 Th e evacuation studies conducted by 

FEMA and the Army Corps of Engineers use the simulated storm surges as a basis.106

The Federal Emergency Management Agency and Hurricane Evacuation Studies

While Louisiana’s Disaster Act affi rmed local and state offi cials’ authority to compel evacuation, safely evacuating more than a million people from the New Orleans area involves a 

complex ballet that ranges over three states and requires the cooperation of dozens of local, 

state, and federal agencies, and the American Red Cross.107

In 1994 this collaboration produced the equivalent of a desk reference for hurricane evacuation decision makers, known as the Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Preparedness Study. It 

established evacuation zones for each parish and provided estimated “clearance times” to 

evacuate each zone based on hurricanes of diff erent sizes, strengths, and forward speeds.108

Th e 1994 study assumed that the levee system “would be subject to overtopping” by storm 

surge from a Category 4 or 5 hurricane, and even by some slow-moving Category 3 hurricanes.109 Th e study showed that no shelter in New Orleans south of Interstate 12 was safe 
Emergency Management: Louisiana

89

from the potential reach of Category 4 or Category 5 storm surge and inundation.110 Th e 

study took note that about 15 percent of New Orleans residents (roughly 75,000 by the 

1994 estimate) had no means of personal transportation, and cautioned, “Th e large number 

of residents reliant on public transportation could create signifi cant problems during an 

evacuation and should be accounted for in the planning process.” 111

Th e 1994 study off ered another caution while explaining the limitations of the SLOSH models of potential hurricane impact:

Th e performance of a levee or fl oodwall depends on many factors (design criteria, construction techniques, maintenance, severity of storm, etc.) and these 

factors cannot be accounted for by the SLOSH model. Th e SLOSH model runs 

performed for the Lake Pontchartrain basin assumed that the levees and fl oodwalls remained intact, even if overtopped. In past storms, such as Hurricane 

Betsy and Hurricane Juan, portions of levees have failed. Th e failure of a levee 

or fl oodwall could signifi cantly increase the extent and degree of fl ooding. 

Emergency-management offi cials should be aware of the potential for a failure 

in the protection and the corresponding impacts.112

Final Warnings

Ten years later, on June 1, 2004, Wilson Shaff er, Ph.D., a SLOSH-model expert, traveled to 

Louisiana to provide an informal briefi ng to parish emergency managers on new SLOSH 

studies that showed a greater number of Category 3 hurricanes would overtop the levees 

in New Orleans.113 In e-mail messages during this period, Brett Herr, the Corps offi cial in 

charge of the Bi-State Hurricane Evacuation Study in New Orleans, said the “new surge 

inundation maps show signifi cant portions of Orleans and Jeff erson Parishes that are susceptible to fl ooding from slow-moving Category 2 and fast Category 3 hurricanes. We had 

previously thought that the city would...fare pretty well for these types of storms. Th e new 

maps will result in signifi cantly longer [evacuation] clearance times for these scenarios.”114

Th e new studies used in the Hurricane Pam exercise of July 2004 provided further pre-Katrina grounds for caution. FEMA and LOHSEP sponsored the exercise for more than 300 

participants, including parish emergency managers, state offi cials, FEMA and NWS representatives, volunteer agencies, and others involved in emergency management. Th e hypothetical Hurricane Pam was posited to be a strong, slow-moving Category 3 storm preceded 

by 20 inches of rain. Th e exercise projected results including over 60,000 deaths, more than 

1 million people evacuated, and 10 to 20 feet of water in New Orleans. Except for the deaths 

fi gure, the Hurricane Pam projections were generally close to the real-life experience of Katrina.115 (See Chapter 8 of this Report for further discussion of the exercise and its results.)

On June 1, 2005, Shaff er returned to Louisiana to present a briefi ng of the latest storm-surge 

estimates for New Orleans. His slide presentation was titled “Hurricanes: Nature’s Weapons of Mass Destruction.” It included a 40-year-old photograph of the severe fl ooding that 

occurred during Hurricane Betsy and a color graphic of fl ooding by a composite of possible 

Category 3 hurricanes. It showed that more Category 3 storms could cause overtopping of 

the levee system than the Army Corps of Engineers had previously stated.116

Another reminder of the deadly potential of hurricanes was given shortly before Katrina’s 

arrival by the Louisiana Water Resources Research Institute at LSU:

If a hurricane approaches New Orleans from any number of tracks from the 

south or southeast, water will be pushed from the Gulf of Mexico into Mississippi Sound, Lake Borgne and Lake Pontchartrain. A FEMA storm surge 

model, NOAA’s SLOSH model, and now ... experimental storm surge models 
Chapter 6

90

based on the most recent levee heights and detailed land elevation data for 

southern Louisiana, have verifi ed that a slow-moving Category 3 hurricane or 

greater of these tracks have the potential to fl ood the New Orleans “bowl.” ...

Recent survey evidence (UNO [University of New Orleans], July 2005) indicates that while many people do feel threatened by Category 4 storms, and will 

evacuate oncoming storms such as Hurricane Ivan (2004), some still do not realize how dangerous even a Category 2 or 3 storm from the right direction can 

be. Because of this they are less likely to evacuate. If you are told by emergency 

offi cials to evacuate any incoming hurricane or even tropical storm, you should 

still go, as early as possible.117 [Emphasis in original]

In August 2005, the NHC updated its chronicle of hurricane activity and highlighted the 

growing potential for catastrophic impact:

Records for the most intense U.S. hurricane in 1935, and the costliest, Andrew 

in 1992, occurred in years which had much below-average hurricane activity. A large death toll in a U.S. hurricane is still possible. ... Continued coastal 

growth and infl ation will almost certainly result in every future major landfalling hurricane (and even weaker hurricanes and tropical storms) replacing one 

of the current costliest hurricanes. ... If warnings are heeded and preparedness 

plans developed, the death toll can be reduced. In the absence of a change of 

attitude, policy, or laws governing building practices (codes and location) near 

the ocean, however, large property losses are inevitable.118

Before the month was out, the soundness of that warning would be apparent.

Flooded New Orleans

U.S. Coast Guard photo
Emergency Management: Louisiana

91

What Were the Emergency-Management Implications of 

Facts About Levees and Hurricanes?

Whether the New Orleans levees and fl oodwalls were in fact built to Category 3 standards 

– much less upgraded to account for sinking soil and rising seas – is an important question. 

But it has limited bearing on judging the reasonableness and adequacy of preparations for 

Katrina.

Th e professional literature on hurricane preparation contained evidence well before Hurricane Katrina that planners would do well to err on the side of caution. A 1990 Army Corps 

of Engineers and FEMA assessment of the relatively low toll of 40 deaths from Hurricane 

Hugo’s strike on the coast of Georgia and the Carolinas in the previous year concluded that:

Much of the success in minimizing loss of life during Hugo can be attributed 

to local directors taking the SLOSH values seriously and evacuating those areas 

that the SLOSH data and associated mapping said would need to be evacuated.

Th e most diffi cult issue regarding Hugo’s hazards characteristics revolved 

around the storms’ reported change from a Category 2 to a Category 4 hurricane in such a short period of time immediately before landfall. Fortunately 

many local directors took action for a Category 3 hurricane and had completed 

evacuation of the coastal barrier islands several hours before landfall. ... Some 

offi cials indicated it may be prudent in some situations to take action for one 

category above that of the threatening hurricane. Th is proved wise on the part 

of local offi cials in Hugo.119

FEMA’s 1994 Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Preparedness Study seconded the advice, citing a Louisiana state agency as one of its sources:

To account for inaccuracies in forecasting the behavior of approaching hurricanes, the National Hurricane Center and the Louisiana Offi ce of Emergency 

Preparedness recommend that public offi cials faced with an eminent [sic] evacuation prepare for the evacuation as if the approaching hurricane will intensify 

one category above the strength forecast for landfall.120

Ten years later, in 2004, two Louisiana State University researchers, John Pine and Hassan 

Mashriqui, off ered the same counsel in a FEMA training session, “Hurricane Storm Surge 

Modeling and Analysis.” Aft er pointing out that “there is always the uncertainty” about 

hurricane intensity at landfall, and uncertainty about its track before landfall, they said:

Th is is why a rule of thumb for emergency managers is to plan for a storm one 

category higher than what is forecast. Th is is a reasonable precaution to help 

minimize the loss of life from hurricanes. ... Th e path and direction of the 

storm can change at any point making the actual area impacted by the storm as 

it makes landfall diffi cult to predict.121

Recent years have given emergency planners more opportunities to prepare for the worst. It is 

generally accepted that an era of more intense Atlantic hurricane activity began in 1995. Th e 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) attributes the activity to naturally occurring cycles in climate patterns near the equator, and says each cycle of “the tropical 

multi-decadal signal” that infl uences storm generation may last 20 to 30 years, or longer.122

During the below-normal hurricane cycle that ran 1970-1994, NOAA reports, “Th e Gulf 

Coast averaged less than one hurricane landfall per season, and the East Coast averaged one 

hurricane landfall every fi ve years. Th is is in sharp contrast to the average of three U.S. hur-
Chapter 6

92

ricane landfalls during very active seasons.” NOAA foresees “many more landfalling tropical storms, hurricanes and major hurricanes in the United States,” with potential impacts 

multiplied by population growth and new construction in coastal areas.123

Whatever the current phase of multi-decadal hurricane variability may be, the NWS has 

pointed out that an element of unpredictability always remains:

No outlook can give certainty as to whether or not a particular locality will be 

impacted by a hurricane in any given year. Residents and government agencies 

of coastal or near-coastal regions should always maintain hurricane preparedness eff orts, regardless of the overall outlook for a given year. ... hurricanespawned disasters can occur even in years with normal (or below normal) 

levels of activity.124

Johns Hopkins University Professor Robert A. Dalrymple, an engineer who represented the 

American Society of Civil Engineers in post-Katrina assessments of the New Orleans levees, 

has recently made the point even more starkly:

Th ere is the possibility of a storm stronger than Katrina. Although a Category 5 

hurricane is perhaps a 500-year event, no one knows when it might occur.125

Of course, Katrina did reach Category 5 status, though it moderated somewhat before landfall. Th e NHC’s 4 p.m. Friday, August 26, Hurricane Discussion Number 14 warned:

Katrina is expected to be moving over the Gulf Loop Current aft er 36 hours ... 

which when combined with decreasing vertical [wind] shear ... should allow 

the hurricane to reach Category Four status before landfall occurs. [Ellipses in 

original.]126

At 10 a.m. Saturday, the NHC warned in Hurricane Advisory Number 17 that “It is not out 

of the question that Katrina could reach category 5 status at some point before landfall.”127

And in fact, by Sunday morning, Katrina’s maximum wind speeds exceeded 170 miles per 

hour; Category 5 is 155 mph or higher. It was not quite as strong as Camille, but much bigger.128 Katrina “made landfall, at the upper end of Category 3 intensity with estimated maximum sustained winds of 110 kt [knots, or about 127 miles per hour], near Buras, Louisiana 

at 1110 UTC [6:10 a.m. CT] 29 August.”129

In other words, with reservations about the ruggedness of New Orleans’ hurricane-protection system already long established, with a historical record of extreme storms, with 

recommendations already in print for a prudent one-category-higher standard for disaster 

planning, with knowledge that a new cycle of more intense hurricane activity was under 

way, with the limits of prediction and the variability of storms understood, and with Katrina 

in the Gulf of Mexico and tagged as early as Friday as a potential Category 4 hurricane, 

offi cials had multiple grounds for anticipating that the coming hurricane could exceed the 

nominal strength of the region’s defenses.

Th e prudence of emergency-management response when an approaching storm threatens 

an area depending on levees is a matter of deep concern beyond Katrina, and beyond Louisiana. It is a national issue, as noted in a recent statement of professional opinion from the 

National Association of State Floodplain Managers:

Levees are only built to a certain level of protection, which will be exceeded at 

some point in the future. Reliance on levees should be an option of last resort. Current levee design and construction standards are inadequate. Levees 

that protect critical facilities, such as hospitals, emergency operations centers, 
Emergency Management: Louisiana

93

police, emergency medical services and fi re stations, major infrastructure and 

large and vulnerable urban centers such as New Orleans must be constructed 

to a higher level of protection than those protecting rural or sparsely populated 

areas. A comprehensive and adequate levee policy would recognize the need 

for these diff erences. Levees in rural areas can utilize the 100 year fl ood (1% 

chance fl ood) level of protection, but only if local land use requirements prevent the area from becoming a highly urbanized area. Existing urban areas and 

critical facilities need protection to at least the 500 year (0.2% chance fl ood, 

and in coastal areas a category 5 hurricane) standard to avoid the catastrophic 

consequences, such as those experienced in the New Orleans area. It is important to recognize that levee failures in the New Orleans area is [sic] simply the 

tip of the iceberg – we have thousands of miles of levees “protecting” large and 

critical urban communities in this nation.130

1 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Protecting New Orleans: From Hurricane Barriers to Floodwalls,” by Nicole T. Carter, Dec. 13, 2005, p. 1.

2 Virginia R. Burkett, David B. Zilkoski, and David A. Hart, “Sea-Level Rise and Subsidence: Implications for Flooding 

in New Orleans, Louisiana,” U.S. Geological Survey Subsidence Interest Group Conference, Nov. 27-29, 2001, p. 63. 

http://www.nwrc.usgs.gov/hurricane/Sea-Level-Rise.pdf. Accessed on Apr. 4, 2006 [hereinaft er Burkett, “Sea-Level Rise 

Subsidence”]. 

3 Burkett, “Sea-Level Rise Subsidence,” p. 63.

4 Michael Grunwald and Susan Glasser, “Th e Slow Drowning of New Orleans,” Th e Washington Post, Oct. 9, 2005, p. 

A01. 

5 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Th e Civil Works Program of the Army Corps of Engineers: A 

Primer, by Nicole T. Carter and Betsy A. Cody, Feb. 3, 2005, pp. 5-6. 

6 Burkett, “Sea-Level Rise Subsidence,” p. 67.

7 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, New Orleans District, Hurricane Betsy, 8-11 September 1965, Aft er Action Report, July 

1966, p. 5. 

8 Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and Museum, University of Texas, “Transcript of audio of President Johnson in New 

Orleans following landfall of Hurricane Betsy, September 10, 1965.” http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/AV.hom/

Hurricane/audio_transcript.htm. Accessed on Apr. 5, 2006.

9 Written Statement of Anu Mittal, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, Government Accountability Offi ce, 

for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Environment and Public Works, hearing on Comprehensive and Integrated Approach 

to meet the Water Resources Needs in the Wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, Nov. 9, 2005, pp. 1, 5. http://www.gao.

gov/new.items/d06244t.pdf. Accessed on Apr. 5, 2006. 

10 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, New Orleans District, “Project Fact Sheet: Lake Pontchartrain, LA. and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project, St. Bernard, Orleans, Jeff erson, and St. Charles Parishes, LA,” May 23, 2005. http://www.mvn.

usace.army.mil/pao/visitor/lkpon1.asp. Accessed on Apr. 5, 2006.

11 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Hurricane Research Division, “How Are Atlantic 

Hurricanes Ranked?” http://www.aoml.noaa.gov/hrd/tcfaq/D1.html. Accessed on Apr. 3, 2006 (“Category 3, 4, and 5 

hurricanes are collectively referred to as major (or intense) hurricanes. Th ese major hurricanes cause over 83% of the 

damage in the USA even though they account for only 21% of tropical cyclone landfalls.”).

12 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, “Frequently Asked Questions.” http://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/IPET_13_Mar_

FAQ_Public.pdf. Accessed on Apr. 26, 2006.

13 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, “How Safe is New Orleans from Flooding?” fact sheet, Sept. 11, 2003. http://www.

usace.army.mil/civilworks/hot_topics/ht_2003/11sep_msy.htm. Accessed on Apr. 5, 2006.

14 Dr. Marc Levitan, “Comparative Analysis of Hurricane Vulnerability in New Orleans and Baton Rouge,” Louisiana 

State University Hurricane Center, Apr. 2003, p. 1. http://www.publichealth.hurricane.lsu.edu/Adobe%20fi les%20for%2

0webpage/LevitanHurrVulnBR&NO.pdf. Accessed on Apr. 5, 2006.

15 National Weather Service, National Hurricane Center, “Th e Most Intense Hurricanes in the United States 1851-

2004,” July 27, 2005. http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pastint.shtml. Accessed on Apr. 5, 2006.

16 Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP), Emergency Operations Plan, Apr. 

2005, Section IV.B, p. 8 [hereinaft er Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan].
Chapter 6

94

17 State of Louisiana, Executive Order KBB 05, Apr. 1, 2005.

18 LOHSEP, “About the Agency,” Mar. 20, 2006. http://www.ohsep.louisiana.gov/agencyrelated/aboutagency.htm. Accessed on Apr. 9, 2006.

19 LOHSEP, “About the Agency,” Mar. 20, 2006. http://www.ohsep.louisiana.gov/agencyrelated/aboutagency.htm. Accessed on Apr. 9, 2006.

20 Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan, Section I, p. 1.

21 Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan, Section I, p. 1. 

22 Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan, Section II, B, pp. 5-6.

23 Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan, Attachment 3.

24 Committee staff interview of Col. Jeff Smith, Louisiana National Guard (Ret.), Acting Deputy Director, Emergency 

Management, LOHSEP, conducted on Jan. 13, 2006, transcript p. 13.

25 Col. Smith interview, Jan. 13, 2006, p. 26; Committee staff interview of Lt. Col. William Doran, Louisiana Air National Guard, Chief, Operations Division, LOHSEP, conducted on Dec. 2, 2005, transcript p. 164.

26 Committee staff interview of Sean Fontenot, former Chief, Preparedness Division, LOHSEP, conducted on Jan. 

10, 2006, transcript p. 124; Committee staff interview of Maj. Gen. Bennett Landreneau, Adjutant General, Louisiana, 

conducted on Jan. 11, 2006, transcript pp. 124-125; Committee staff interview of Terry Ryder, Executive Counsel, Offi ce 

of the Governor, LA, conducted on Jan. 10, 2006, transcript pp. 138-141; Lt. Col. Doran interview, Dec. 2, 2005, pp. 63, 

163; Committee staff interview of Col. Steven Dabadie, former Chief of Staff , Louisiana National Guard, conducted on 

Jan. 12, 2006, transcript p. 45.

27 Lt. Col. Doran interview, Dec. 2, 2005, pp. 191-193.

28 Maj. Gen. Landreneau interview, Jan. 11, 2006, p. 124; Col. Smith interview, Jan. 13, 2006, pp. 23-24.

29 Ryder interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 143.

30 Lt. Col. Doran interview, Dec. 2, 2005, p. 196.

31 Committee staff interview of Capt. Paul Hellmers, Engine 18, Second Platoon, Fift h District, New Orleans Fire 

Department, LA, and Capt. Joe Fincher, Engine 18, Th ird Platoon, Fift h District, New Orleans Fire Department, LA, 

conducted on Nov. 7, 2005, transcript pp. 12-13. Each of the NOFD’s eight Districts is required to identify facilities 

which meet the pre-requisites for a last area refuge, confi rm with the facility that fi re personnel can be housed there, and 

reconfi rm that commitment during pre-season preparations. Source: New Orleans Fire Department, 2005 Hurricane 

Guidelines, p. 2–1; Capt. Hellmers and Capt. Fincher joint interview, Nov. 7, 2005, p. 16. Th e plan includes multiple 

Last Areas of Refuge, with some including back-up locations, and notes the contact person and phone number for that 

facility. Th e descriptions of each location also note whether the facility includes adequate space to park department 

apparatus. Source: New Orleans Fire Department, 2005 Hurricane Guidelines, pp. A2–1 through A6–2. Personnel report 

to these refuges upon decision by the superintendent, which will generally occur when winds reach approximately 40 

miles per hour prior to landfall. Source: Committee staff interview of Charles Parent, Superintendent, New Orleans Fire 

Department, LA, and Bruce Martin, Deputy of Administration, New Orleans Fire Department, LA, conducted on Nov. 

10, 2005, transcript p. 26. In addition to provision of refuges for fi re personnel and equipment, the NOFD guidelines are 

specifi c as to the types of supplies personnel are to bring with them, including toiletries, clothing, a three-day supply of 

water, and three gallons of water. Personnel are also encouraged to bring life jackets and/or boats. Source: New Orleans 

Fire Department, 2005 Hurricane Guidelines, pp. 2–3 through 2–4.

32 Louisiana National Guard, Emergency Procedures Operations Plans for Military Support to Civil Authorities, Oct. 24, 

2001. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 000153. During 2001, the Guard revised its own operating plans in such 

areas of law enforcement in ways that illustrate how its personnel were layered into the ranks of the region’s law enforcement agencies. “Th e concept of this operation provides for a massive joint response 24 hours pre-landfall and 48 hours 

post-landfall of a major hurricane forecasted to strike the Greater New Orleans area,” and outlined the planned distribution of soldiers, helicopters, high profi le trucks, emergency generators, water trailers and other equipment to the Louisiana State Police and local agencies, assigning a total of 420 Guardsmen to the New Orleans Police Department, with 200 

deployed initially at the Superdome, 100 at the Convention Center and 12 at each of eight police district stations.

33 Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan, Supplement 1A, “Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Evacuation and Sheltering 

Plan,” Jan. 2000, p. II-2 [hereinaft er “Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Evacuation and Sheltering Plan”].

34 FEMA, Bi-State Hurricane Evacuation Study, May 2, 2002. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA0058-00001607.

35 FEMA, Bi-State Hurricane Evacuation Study, May 2, 2002, pp. 16-17. 

36 Sean R. Fontenot, e-mail to Arthur W. Adelberg, Senate Committee staff member, Feb. 3, 2006, 11:21 a.m.

37 Lt. Col. Doran interview, Dec. 2, 2005, pp. 143-145.

38 Col. Smith interview, Jan. 13, 2006, pp. 17-19.

39 Lt. Col. Doran interview, Dec. 2, 2005, pp. 147-150.

40 “Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Evacuation and Sheltering Plan,” pp. i-ii.

41 Fontenot interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 115-122.
Emergency Management: Louisiana

95

42 “Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Evacuation and Sheltering Plan,” p. II-1.

43 “Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Evacuation and Sheltering Plan,” p. II-2.

44 “Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Evacuation and Sheltering Plan,” pp. III-1-6.

45 “Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Evacuation and Sheltering Plan,” p. VI-1.

46 Col. Smith interview, Jan. 13, 2006, p. 185; Maj. Gen. Landreneau interview, Jan. 11, 2006, p. 142.

47 Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan, Supplement 1C, “Louisiana Shelter Operations Plan,” July 2000, p. 9. [hereinaft er “Louisiana Shelter Operations Plan”].

48 “Louisiana Shelter Operations Plan,” p. 11-12 (emphasis added).

49 Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan, “Louisiana Shelter Operations Plan,” Annex X, “Special Needs Plan,” Apr. 

2000, pp. 3-4 [hereinaft er Annex X, “Special Needs Plan”].

50 Annex X, “Special Needs Plan,” p. 8.

51 Annex X, “Special Needs Plan,” pp. 7-8. Presumably the National Guard was assigned this responsibility because of its 

role as the primary responsible agency for transportation at the time the SN Plan was draft ed. Had the plan been updated 

aft er Apr. 2005, when DOTD succeeded the Guard as the primary agency responsible for transportation, presumably the 

plan would have assigned the SN transportation responsibility to DOTD. 

52 Louisiana Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness (LOEP), Standard Operating Procedures, EOC Hurricane/Major Event 

Checklist. Th e version produced to the Committee bears the date 10/24/2005. Th e record is unclear as to whether the 

version includes updates through that date. Committee staff interview of James Ballows, Senior Operations Offi cer, 

LOHSEP, conducted on Jan. 4, 2006, transcript pp. 15-16. 

53 Ballows interview, Jan. 4, 2006, pp. 13-14. 

54 Col. Smith interview, Jan. 13, 2006, p. 19; Lt. Col. Doran interview, Dec. 2, 2005, p. 63 (“Some parishes do a great job, 

others don’t. It’s not standardized”).

55 Col. Smith interview, Jan. 13, 2006, pp. 19-21.

56 Committee staff interview of Terry Tullier, former Deputy Director, New Orleans Fire Department and Director, 

New Orleans Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness, LA, conducted on Nov. 22, 2005, transcript pp. 7-8.

57 Tullier interview, Nov. 22, 2005, pp. 10-11.

58 Tullier interview, Nov. 22, 2005, p. 2; Committee staff interview of Chief Joseph Matthews, Director, New Orleans Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness, LA, conducted on Nov. 23, 2005, transcript p. 152. Directors prior to Terry Tullier and 

Chief Joseph Matthews were Brian Giddings, Robert Eichorn, and Frank Hijuelos. Committee staff interview of Saraya 

Flores-Arias, Executive Assistant to the Director, New Orleans Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness, LA, conducted on 

Dec. 19, 2005, pp. 7-9, 14-15.

59 New Orleans Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness, Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, May 2005, p. 19 [hereinaft er New Orleans CEMP].

60 New Orleans CEMP, p. 12.

61 New Orleans CEMP, p. 12.

62 New Orleans CEMP, p. 14.

63 New Orleans CEMP, p. 14. While the term “persons requiring public transportation” is broad enough to include those 

without personal vehicles, the quoted sentence is followed by the parenthetical “(See Special Needs Transportation, ESF 

1).” Precisely what the parenthetical refers to is unclear, but it raises the question whether the sentence was meant only 

to apply to people with special needs. 

64 New Orleans CEMP, p. 18. While the plan does not expressly defi ne “Standard Operation Procedures” or “SOP,” the 

term apparently refers to the provisions of the plan.

65 New Orleans CEMP, p. 13. 

66 New Orleans CEMP; Annex X, “Special Needs Plan,” p. 4 (emphasis added).

67 Capt. Hellmers and Capt. Fincher interview, Nov. 7, 2005, pp. 12-13.

68 Capt. Hellmers and Capt. Fincher interview, Nov. 7, 2005, p. 16.

69 New Orleans Fire Department, 2005 Hurricane Guidelines, pp. A2–1 through A6–2.

70 Parent and Martin interview, Nov. 10, 2005, p. 26.

71 Committee staff interview of Walter Maestri, Ph.D., Director, Jeff erson Parish Offi ce of Emergency Management, LA, 

conducted on Oct. 25, 2005, transcript pp. 11-12.

72 Maestri interview, Oct. 25, 2005, p. 12.

73 Maestri interview, Oct. 25, 2005, p. 40.

74 Maestri interview, Oct. 25, 2005, p. 40.
Chapter 6

96

75 Maestri interview, Oct. 25, 2005, p. 41.

76 Maestri interview, Oct. 25, 2005, pp. 25-27.

77 Jeff erson Parish Offi ce of Emergency Management, Emergency Operations Plan, Aug. 2002, Annex D, p. 13.

78 Jeff erson Parish, Catastrophic Weather Event (“Doomsday”) Plan. Provided to Committee.

79 Committee staff interview of Jesse St. Amant, Director, Homeland Security Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness, 

Plaquemines Parish, LA, conducted on Nov. 9, 2005, transcript pp. 3, 20-21.

80 St. Amant interview, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 15.

81 St. Amant interview, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 15.

82 Plaquemines Parish, Multi-Hazard Emergency Operations Plan, 2003, Basic Plan Appendices.

83 Plaquemines Parish, Multi-Hazard Emergency Operations Plan, 2003, Annex D, p. 6–1.

84 Committee staff interview of Larry Ingargiola, Director, Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, St. Bernard Parish, LA, conducted on Oct. 26, 2005, transcript p. 8.

85 Ingargiola interview, Oct. 26, 2005, p. 7.

86 Ingargiola interview, Oct. 26, 2005, pp. 13-14.

87 St. Bernard Parish, Emergency Operations Plan, June 2004, Annex D, p. D–2.

88 Committee staff interview of Dexter Accordo, Director, Emergency Management and Homeland Security, St. Tammany Parish, LA, conducted on Nov. 10, 2005, transcript p. 19.

89 Accordo interview, Nov. 10, 2005, p. 47.

90 Accordo interview, Nov. 10, 2005, pp. 64-66.

91 Accordo interview, Nov. 10, 2005, p. 71.

92 St. Tammany Parish, Multi-Hazard Emergency Operation Plan, 2004, Annex D, p. D–54. 

93 Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Preparedness Study, prepared by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, for FEMA Region 

VI, Aug. 2004, p. 1-2 [hereinaft er Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Preparedness Study, 1994] (“Th e study authority for the 

Federal Emergency Management Agency is the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-2881, and the study authority 

for the Corps of Engineers is Section 206 of the Flood Control Act of 1960 (Public Law 86-645). Th ese laws authorize the 

allocation of resources for planning activities related to hurricane preparedness.”). 

94 Testimony of J. Dexter Peach, Assistant Comptroller, General Resources, Community, and Economics, before the 

U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Nuclear Deterrance, Arms Control and Defense Intelligence, hearing on Disaster Management: Recent Disasters Demonstrate the Need to Improve the Nation’s Response 

Strategy, May 25, 1993, p. 16.

95 Testimony of Robert Sheets, Ph.D., Director, National Hurricane Center, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Rebuilding FEMA: Preparing for the Next Disaster, May 18, 1993, p. 45.

96 Ed Rappaport, National Hurricane Center, “Preliminary Report Hurricane Andrew 16 - 28 August, 1992” Dec. 10, 

1993, addendum Feb. 7, 2005 – category 5 upgrade (“It is estimated that 1,250,000 people evacuated from parishes in 

southeastern and south-central Louisiana.”).

97 Sheets, Senate Committee on Governmental Aff airs hearing, May 18, 1993, p. 45.

98 Sheets, Senate Committee on Governmental Aff airs hearing, May 18, 1993, p. 45.

99 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, New Orleans District, Hurricane Betsy, 8-11 September 1965, Aft er Action Report, July 

1966, p. 10.

100 Written Statement of Anu Mittal, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, Government Accountability Offi ce, for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: 

Who’s in Charge of the New Orleans Levees?, Dec. 15, 2005, pp. 1-3.

101 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, New Orleans District, Catastrophic Disaster Response Plan, pp. 12-14. 

102 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, New Orleans District, Un-watering Plan, Greater Metropolitan Area, New Orleans, 

Louisiana, Aug. 18, 2000, p. 1.

103 Written Statement of Max Mayfi eld, Ph.D., Director, Tropical Prediction Center and National Hurricane Center, 

National Weather Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, for the U.S. House, Select Bipartisan 

Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing on What Did Offi cials Know 

About Potential Impact of Katrina? When Did Th ey Know It? And, How Was the Information Conveyed to the Public?, 

Sept. 22, 2005, p. 3.

104 Written Statement of Brig. Gen. David L. Johnson, Assistant Administrator, Weather Services, National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration, for the U.S. House, Committee on Science, hearing on NOAA Hurricane Forecasting, Oct. 

7, 2005.

105 Written Statement of Mayfi eld, House Select Committee hearing, Sept. 22, 2005 pp. 2-3.
Emergency Management: Louisiana

97

106 Written Statement of Mayfi eld, House Select Committee hearing, Sept. 22, 2005 p. 3.

107 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Information on Hurricane Evacuation Studies, p. 8. Provided to Committee. 

108 Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Preparedness Study, 1994, pp. 1–2, 1–14.

109 Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Preparedness Study, 1994, p. 5–2.

110 Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Preparedness Study, 1994, p. 5–2.

111 Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Preparedness Study, 1994, p. 4–6.

112 Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Preparedness Study, 1994, p. 2–37.

113 Committee staff interview of Wilson Shaff er, Ph.D., Chief, Evaluations Branch, National Weather Service, National 

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, conducted on Feb. 24, 2006, transcript pp. 45-46.

114 Brett Herr, e-mail to Jay Baker, Mar. 15, 2006, 12:15 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA0025-0002638.

115 Written Statement of Madhu Beriwal, President and Chief Executive Offi cer, IEM, Inc., for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Preparing for a Catastrophe: Th e Hurricane Pam 

Exercise, Jan. 24, 2006, p. 1. IEM was the main contractor that prepared the exercise for FEMA and LOHSEP.

116 Wilson Shaff er, National Weather Service, “Louisiana’s Vulnerability to Hurricane Storm Surge,” PowerPoint presentation, June 1, 2005. Provided to Committee. 

117 Louisiana Water Resources Research Institute, Louisiana State University, “Would New Orleans Really Flood in a 

Major Hurricane? How is that possible?,” 2005.

http://www.publichealth.hurricane.lsu.edu/convert%20to%20tables/Would%20New%20Orleans%20Really%20Floodtf.

htm. Accessed on Apr. 6, 2006.

118 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Technical Memorandum, “Th e deadliest, costliest, and most 

intense United States tropical cyclones from 1851 to 2004 (and other frequently requested hurricane facts),” Aug. 2005, 

pp. 11-12. http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/NWS-TPC-4.pdf. Accessed on Apr. 9, 2006.

119 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and FEMA, “Hurricane Hugo Assessment, Review of Hurricane Evacuation Studies 

Utilization and Information Dissemination,” Jan. 1990, p. 2–2. http://www3.csc.noaa.gov/hes_docs/postStorm/H_

HUGO_ASSESSMENT_REVIEW_UTILIZATION_INFO_DISSEMINATION.pdf Accessed Apr. 5, 2006.

120 Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Preparedness Study, 1994, p. 2–2.

121 John C. Pine, Hassan Mashriqui, LSU Hurricane Center, “Hurricane Storm Surge Modeling and Analysis,” FEMA 

Course Title: Hazard Mapping and Modeling, Session 10, Nov. 18, 2004, p. 16-14. http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/

downloads/Session%2010%20Hurricanes92004111804.doc. Accessed on Apr. 5, 2006.

122 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “NOAA attributes recent increase in hurricane activity to naturally occurring multi-decadal climate variability,” NOAA Magazine Online, Nov. 29, 2005. http://www.magazine.noaa.

gov/stories/mag184.htm. Accessed on Mar. 8, 2006.

123 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “NOAA attributes recent increase in hurricane activity to naturally occurring multi-decadal climate variability,” NOAA Magazine Online, Nov. 29, 2005. http://www.magazine.noaa.

gov/stories/mag184.htm. Accessed on Mar. 8, 2006.

124 National Weather Service, “Atlantic Hurricane Outlook,” Jan. 28, 2003, p. 2. http://products.weather.gov/PDD/

AHO.pdf. Accessed on Apr. 5, 2006. 

125 Louisiana Coastal Wetlands Conservation and Restoration Task Force, “Interview with Robert A. Dalrymple,” WaterMarks, Number 30, Mar. 2006, p. 14. http://www.lacoast.gov/watermarks/2006-03/watermarks-2006-03.pdf. Accessed 

on Apr. 5, 2006.

126 National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Katrina Forecast Timeline, 2006, p. 3. Provided to Committee [hereinaft er 

NHC Timeline].

127 NHC Timeline.

128 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Climatic Data Center, “Climate of 2005: Summary of 

Hurricane Katrina,” Dec. 29, 2005. http://lwf.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/research/2005/katrina.html#rain. Accessed on 

Apr. 26, 2006.

129 Richard D. Knabb, Jamie R. Rhome, and Daniel P. Brown, National Hurricane Center, “Tropical Cyclone Report 

Hurricane Katrina 23-30 August 2005,” Dec. 20, 2005, p. 1. http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/TCR-AL122005_Katrina.

pdf#search=’Tropical%20Cyclone%20Report%20Hurricane%20Katrina’. Accessed on Apr. 26, 2006.

130 Association of State Floodplain Managers, Inc., “Hurricanes Katrina & Rita: Using Mitigation to Rebuild a Safer 

Gulf Coast,” Sept. 9, 2005, pp. 4-5. http://www.fl oods.org/PDF/ASFPM_HurricaneKatrina_WhitePaper_090905.pdf. 

Accessed on Apr. 4, 2006.
Grounded, Mississippi

U.S. Coast Guard photo
99

Emergency Management: 

Mississippi

Mississippi emergency-management law gives the Governor broad powers during disasters, and establishes the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency 

(MEMA) as the agency responsible for carrying out emergency management in 

the state. Th e system places signifi cant, front-line responsibility for disaster preparedness 

and response on local governments. 

State Powers and Responsibilities

Mississippi law provides that a state of emergency exists when a disaster is of a magnitude 

beyond the control of any municipality or county, and “requires combined forces of the 

state to combat.”1 Th e Governor is empowered to declare a state of emergency.2

During a disaster, the Governor serves as a bridge between federal and local governments. 

Mississippi law authorizes the Governor to direct the various state agencies, including the 

Mississippi National Guard, to take measures necessary to combat a disaster and to direct 

local law enforcement in order to keep good order.3

 Th e entity primarily responsible for 

emergency-management planning and direction is MEMA.4

 Th e Governor appoints the 

head of MEMA.5

Mississippi law authorizes the creation of mutual-aid pacts both within the state and 

between Mississippi and other states.6

 Mississippi is a signatory to the state-to-state Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC); MEMA directs its participation.7

 An 

intrastate mutual-aid pact, established in 1995,8

 sets out the mechanism for counties and 

municipalities to contribute, via MEMA, emergency-management assets and personnel to 

disaster-hit areas.9

 All of the coastal counties are part of this agreement.10

Emergency Management: Hurricanes

Th e state hurricane plan details the four key hurricane hazards – storm surge, high winds, 

tornadoes, and fl ooding from rain – and notes the challenge facing emergency managers 

along the Gulf Coast: “Th e tremendous commercial and residential development along the 

coast due to the advent of dockside gambling has greatly increased the potential devastation 

of a major hurricane.”11

Th e Mississippi Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (the Hurricane Plan), created in 1999, correctly assumed that a major hurricane (category 3 or higher) would strike 

the Mississippi coast within the next 10 years.12 It also assumed that residents, as well as 

local and state responders, would be on their own aft er landfall: “Due to multi-state infrastructure damage, assistance will not be available from the federal government or non-affected states for at least 72 hours aft er the hurricane.”13

Th e plan places responsibility for pre- and post-landfall sheltering on local governments, 

encouraging cooperation agreements with local American Red Cross chapters. 

A unique feature of the Hurricane Plan is its provision for pre-landfall deployment of small 

engineering units of the Mississippi National Guard to the coastal counties when a major 

Chapter 7
Chapter 7

100

storm approaches. Th e engineer units’ high-clearance 

equipment and vehicles 

allow them to operate in 

fl ooded areas, especially for 

search-and-rescue missions, 

when local fi rst responders like fi re departments 

cannot do so. Accordingly, 

MEMA and the Mississippi 

National Guard dispatched 

small engineering detachments and other National 

Guard personnel to the 

three coastal counties before 

Katrina hit.14

MEMA hosts an annual 

hurricane conference which 

focuses on the state’s southernmost 12 counties, those 

most exposed to hurricanes. 

Offi cials from Louisiana 

and Alabama oft en attend.15

State programs also include 

twice-yearly training on 

HURREVAC, the computer 

program used to forecast hurricanes, for emergency managers, fi rst responders, staff from 

Mississippi’s Keesler Air Force Base, and other federal personnel on the coast, as well as offi cials from Stennis Space Center, located in southwestern Mississippi.16

Counties and Cities

Under Mississippi’s emergency-management system, local governments and their fi rst responders form the fi rst line of response. Localities must update their response plans at least 

every fi ve years.17 MEMA must review them for consistency with the state’s own plan and 

legal requirements.18

During a disaster, the state activates an emergency operations center (EOC) to guide 

response, working in conjunction with EOCs operated by individual counties.19 Th e state 

plan also allows local governments to proclaim local emergencies, establish their own 

emergency-management systems, and seek support from state and federal governments.20

MEMA directs each locality to appoint an emergency-management coordinator and give 

that coordinator direct, personal responsibility for organizing, administering, and operating 

the local system.21

When Katrina hit, each of the Gulf Coast counties had its own EOC, an emergency-management director, and local responsibilities parceled out according to the 16 emergencysupport functions (ESFs) in the state plan. In the coastal counties, local fi re departments 

and law enforcement (both county sheriff s and municipal police) have lead roles in emergency response. For example, in Harrison County, personnel from the largest fi re departRuined homes, Bay St. Louis, MS

Sun Herald news photo, Biloxi/Gulfport, MS
Emergency Management: Mississippi

101

ments (Gulfport, Biloxi, and Long Beach) and police departments helped staff the county 

EOC, in addition to their responder duties.22

Mass Care 

By Sunday evening, August 28, thousands of people displaced by Katrina were in shelters 

across the region.23 At the peak, September 5, the state had 121 shelters open, with an additional 12 on standby. Over 15,000 people were registered in these shelters – about half of 

their total capacity.24 Th e state was able to provide suffi cient shelter for the special-needs 

population, although it oft en had to move these individuals further inland for appropriate 

accommodations. 

Many residents found shelter conditions quite diffi cult because of shortages of food and 

water and sanitation problems. Some shelters were closed to consolidate operations, 

forcing residents to relocate. Th ough their challenges were formidable, state and local 

governments and the American Red Cross could have prepared better. Planning needed 

to be more detailed for such a catastrophic disaster, during which residents typically need 

longer-term shelter. 

State and Locals Select and Manage Shelters

Federal, state, and local governments worked with the American Red Cross and other nonprofi t organizations and opened or placed on standby at least 133 shelters, with room for 

almost 31,000 people.25 Many of these shelters had been approved by the Red Cross before 

the storm made landfall, which meant that, initially, the Red Cross would staff and manage 

them. Red Cross criteria include a building’s location, at least 18 feet above sea level, and 

its capability to withstand high winds.26 Local Red Cross chapters worked with emergencymanagement and state offi cials to identify and select shelters.27 Th e Red Cross is responsible 

for providing food, water, and ice to its own shelters.

MEMA and the Mississippi Department of Human Service (MDHS), working with local 

governments and the Red Cross, fi rst opened shelters north of Interstate 20, a major eastwest highway that runs through Jackson.28 Th is took evacuees out of the coastal area and 

accommodated evacuees from Louisiana.29 Th e state preferred to open more and smaller 

shelters than fewer and larger ones because, as Jim Craig of the Mississippi Department of 

Health explained, it is more diffi cult to monitor and control illness with a large group of 

people in a single confi ned location.30 

Local governments decided to open additional, non-Red Cross designated shelters to accommodate evacuees who preferred to stay close to home. As Gulfport Police Commander 

Alfred Sexton explained:

Most citizens are of the mindset they’re not going to go far from their homes. ... 

We had offi cers actually stopping and picking up people on the side of the road 

and taking them to the closest shelters ... a lot of people ... historically ... wait 

until they see rain or wind and then they want to move to a shelter.31

Local emergency-management shelters must have met MEMA or local standards. Th ese 

shelters are initially under the direction of the local emergency-management agency and are 

staff ed by county and MDHS personnel. MDHS is notifi ed by MEMA or the county emergency-management agency that its assistance is needed to staff and/or operate a shelter.32 

Local governments are responsible for providing food, water, and ice to non-Red Cross 
Chapter 7

102

designated shelters, though they can request help with operations and supplies from the 

Red Cross and MDHS.

Local organizations such as churches also operated independent shelters. Th ese groups, 

according to state and local offi cials, were “pretty much on their own” for staffi ng, supplying, and managing the shelters.33 Richard Dawkins of the MDHS estimated that about 60-70 

percent of shelters opened for Hurricane Katrina were Red Cross designated; the remainder 

consisted of local emergency-management and independent shelters.34 Residents were notifi ed of shelter locations and capacity levels through the news media. 

Coastal County Shelters Were Options of Last Resort

Shelters of last resort – places protecting from high winds, heavy rains, and storm surge, but 

with little food and water – were needed for those who could not, or chose not to, evacuate. 

On August 27, MEMA urged coastal counties not to open local shelters in order to encourage people to evacuate north. However, Tom McAllister, MEMA’s Director for Response 

and Recovery, estimated that the coast ended up opening a lot of shelters:

Granted, they don’t meet the Red Cross standard ... but it’s better than being 

out on the highway. And we identifi ed a lot of those, school buildings, churches, 

... large community buildings, so we could get people off the road at the last 

minute.35

In some cases, the Mississippi Department of Health (MDH) had to place nurses in shelters 

of last resort because they became special-needs shelters.36

Special-Needs Shelters Posed a Challenge for State and Local Governments

Th e special-needs population on the Gulf Coast includes older adults and individuals with 

disabilities. For example, in Biloxi, a city of about 50,000 people, 26 percent are residents 

with disabilities.37

A special-needs shelter is intended for individuals who have no other resources and who 

need assistance that cannot be guaranteed in a regular shelter (e.g., medication that requires 

refrigeration, oxygen equipment, etc.). It is not intended for patients who need substantial 

or constant medical care.38

Robert Latham, MEMA’s Executive Director, described special-needs sheltering as a “tremendous problem.”

When I took this job in 2000 that was one of the biggest issues. ... How do we 

take care of the special needs population, especially on the Gulf Coast where 

you have a lot of retirees and there are a lot of people with health needs?39

Aft er the 2004 hurricane season, MEMA had asked local emergency managers to designate 

shelters in each county for citizens with special needs. According to MEMA, this would 

have ensured that a location had everything needed for special-needs citizens during an 

evacuation.40 While local offi cials agreed that counties needed such shelters, some counties 

did not have adequate resources to purchase supplies and equipment, such as backup generators, beds, and medical equipment for these facilities.

41 Staffi ng was another challenge; 

special-needs shelters require MDH medical staff with appropriate training.42

Four special-needs shelters were open aft er the storm made landfall, in Lincoln and Jones 

Counties, at Biloxi High School, and at Pearl River Community College in Hattiesburg.43 As 

needs grew, three others were opened on September 2.44 Since many of the coastal counties 

did not have special-needs shelters, these vulnerable populations were forced to go as far 
Emergency Management: Mississippi

103

as Jackson, about 150 miles from the coast.45

Individuals and caregivers faced the diffi cult 

choice between the dangers of evacuation and 

attempting to ride out the storm.

Many of the coastal counties used hospitals or 

other facilities for their special-needs populations. For example, Butch Loper, Director of 

Jackson County’s Emergency Management 

Agency, utilized the county’s two hospitals for 

special-needs patients.46 

Since Katrina, the state has developed a plan 

to provide an additional 1,500 beds for the 

special-needs population, on a more statewide 

basis. During the next disaster, it will utilize 

the state’s 15 community colleges and their 

multiple campuses, as special-needs shelters. 

According to Craig, the Pearl River Community College, because of its ample facilities 

and personnel, including a cafeteria with an 

on-staff nutritionist, water and wastewater 

systems, and a police force, worked very well 

as a special needs shelter for Katrina victims.47

He described it as a self-contained city.

Shelters Suffered From Overcrowding and 

Commodity Shortages

Many residents who took refuge in a public 

shelter found conditions extremely diffi cult. 

Shelters had shortages of food and drinking 

water, sanitation problems, lack of electricity, 

and no running water for bathing. Kristen 

Dellinger, a volunteer, described the shelter 

at Bay St. Louis High School, in Hancock 

County:

Th is “shelter” had no resemblance to 

the “neat cots-in-a-row” kind of place 

that oft en comes to mind. ... Most people had staked out areas on the sidewalks outside under covered walkways. Th ey had thin pieces of blue plastic to 

sleep on. ... Th e school hallways were dark and fi lled with streaks of mud. Th e 

odor was horrendous. Raw sewage, I think.48

Shelters without running water gave doctors concerns about the use of portable toilets, and 

about the lack of equipment to test the safety of drinking water.49 Offi cials in Biloxi suspected an outbreak of dysentery and closed a shelter. About 400 people had been staying 

there, and many ignored warnings to stay away from the water. Although no one developed 

dysentery, many shelter residents had developed the Norwalk virus, an intestinal illness also 

known as the “cruise ship virus.”50 

State and local offi cials acknowledged that conditions at many of the shelters were less 

than ideal. Th e state had problems obtaining some of the supplies and equipment, such as 

Wrecked bridges, Ocean Springs, MS

Sun Herald news photo, Biloxi/Gulfport, MS
Chapter 7

104

generators, that were desperately needed at the shelters given the extreme heat and crowded 

conditions.51

To make matters worse, the Red Cross failed to provide adequate supplies and services at 

both designated and local shelters. According to Gulfport Police offi cers who were providing security at the shelters, many of the shelters ran out of food and water. Th is was a 

chronic problem for the fi rst two weeks aft er landfall.52 

Aft er food and water fi nally arrived in the county, Colonel Joe Spraggins, Harrison County’s 

Emergency Manager, asked Oscar Barnes, the local Red Cross representative why the Red 

Cross was not delivering the items to the shelters and was told that Red Cross volunteers 

and staff were prohibited from driving at night during a disaster.53 In order to get the supplies to the shelters, Gulfport Police took over distribution duties.54

Lack of communication and transportation infrastructure problems made it diffi cult for 

the Red Cross and other agencies to get needed supplies and services to the shelters. Due to 

the severity of Katrina, the larger shelters fi lled up fast, forcing the Red Cross to open up its 

additional shelters on a tiered basis, rather than open all sites simultaneously. Shelters were 

placed in tiers based on their location and were opened from fi rst to fourth tiers consecutively. In some areas, the agency even had to do quick impromptu assessments, using a 

checklist, to validate compliance with criteria before opening up additional shelters. Th is is 

extremely unusual for the Red Cross.55 

Th e magnitude of the disaster may have overwhelmed the Red Cross’ ability to provide 

adequate shelter conditions for an extended period of time. According to Robert Latham, 

MEMA’s Executive Director, the Red Cross was not prepared to handle such a large catastrophe. In Mississippi, organization was extremely short-staff ed and as a result was not able 

to adequately serve all coastal counties. In addition, the Red Cross, like MEMA, suff ered 

from commodity shortages due to logistical problems.56 John McGuire, Red Cross’s interim 

chief, while defending the organization’s performance, said that with Hurricane Katrina, the 

Red Cross’s biggest sin was reacting based on its response to previous hurricanes: “We had 

a failure of imagination. We didn’t think big enough.”57

1 Miss. Code Ann. § 33-15-5(f). 

2 Miss. Code Ann. § 33-15-11(b)(17).

3 Miss. Code Ann. § 33-15-11. 

4 Miss. Code Ann. § 33-15-7. 

5 Among its responsibilities, Mississippi Emegency Management Agency (MEMA) is required to: 

• Prepare a state comprehensive emergency plan to be coordinated with the plans of the federal government and 

other states. Source: Miss. Code Ann. § 33-15-14(2)(a).

• Assign lead and support roles to state agencies and personnel for emergency support functions and other activities. Source: Miss. Code Ann. § 33-15-14(2)(a)(viii)(1).

• Provide for the deployment of state resources in case of disaster, including specifi cally the deployment (and 

pre-disaster deployment in certain circumstances) of the Mississippi National Guard. Direct and support the 

preparation of emergency plans and organizations by local governments. Source: Miss. Code Ann. § 33-15-14 

(2)(a)(v) and (b).

• Provide personnel, equipment, and other resources from state agencies and from other Mississippi localities to 

reinforce areas stricken by disaster. Source: Miss. Code Ann. § 33-15-15(a).

6 Miss. Code Ann. § 33-15-19. 

7 Committee staff interview of Robert Latham, Executive Director, MEMA, conducted on Jan. 27, 2006, transcript p. 11. 
Emergency Management: Mississippi

105

8 MEMA, “Statewide Mutual Aid Compact.” http://www.msema.org/SMAC. Accessed on Feb. 28, 2006.

9 MEMA, Th e State of Missississippi Statewide Mutual Aid Compact (SMAC), June, 2000. Provided to Committee; fi led 

as Bates nos. MEMA-00023847 through 00023857. 

10 MEMA, Th e State of Missississippi Statewide Mutual Aid Compact (SMAC), County and City Members, p. II–B–1. 

Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. MEMA-00028968.

11 MEMA, Mississippi Emergency Operations Plan, Volume II: Mississippi Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan 

(CEMP), May 14, 1999, p. APP B–1. Provided to Committee [hereinaft er Mississippi CEMP, May 14, 1999].

12 Mississippi CEMP, May, 14, 1999, p. APP B–2. 

13 Mississippi CEMP, May 14, 1999, p. APP B–3. 

14 Latham interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 24; Committee staff interview of Lt. Col. Lee Smithson, Director of Military Support, Mississippi Army National Guard, conducted on Jan. 25, 2006, transcript pp. 15-16. 

15 Committee staff interview of Brenda Rembert, Director, Planning, Training and Exercise Bureau, MEMA, conducted 

on Jan. 26, 2006, transcript pp. 27-28.

16 Rembert interview, Jan. 26, 2006, pp. 29-31.

17 Mississippi CEMP, May, 14, 1999, pp. Basic–21 through Basic–22. 

18 Miss. Code Ann. § 33-15-14(2)(d); Mississippi CEMP, May, 14, 1999, p. Basic–21. 

19 Miss. Code Ann. § 33-15-17(c)(3). 

20 Mississippi CEMP, May, 14, 1999, p. Basic–22. 

21 Mississippi CEMP, May, 14, 1999, p. Basic–21.

22 Committee staff interview of Pat Sullivan, Fire Chief, Gulfport Fire Department, MS, conducted on Dec. 7, 2005, 

transcript pp. 58-59. 

23 MEMA, Hurricane Situation Report #8, Hurricane Katrina, Aug. 28, 2005, 9:30 p.m. CT, p. 7. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates no. MEMA-0010884.

24 MEMA, Hurricane Situation Report #40, Hurricane Katrina, Sept. 5, 2005, 2:35 a.m. CT, p. 8. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates no. MEMA-0011290.

25 MEMA, Hurricane Situation Report #40, Hurricane Katrina, Sept. 5, 2005, 2:35 a.m. CT, p. 8. Provided to Committee, 

fi led as Bates no. MEMA-0011290.

26 Jenny Lee Allen, “Don’t Bother Looking for a Red Cross Shelter in Charlotte,” Sarasota Herald-Tribune, Aug. 13, 

2004, p. A4. 

27 Committee staff interview of Tom McAllister, Director of Response and Recovery, MEMA, conducted on Jan. 27, 

2006, transcript pp. 49-50. Th e local American Red Cross will open the shelter and begin the management of it. Department of Human Services is called, in some cases, to help manage and/or staff the shelters. Committee staff interview of 

Richard Dawkins, Program Manager, Division of Economic Assistance, Mississippi Department of Human Services, 

conducted on Dec. 13, 2005, transcript pp. 19-20. 

28 McAllister interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 51-52. “Th e Shelter Resource Directory provides for shelter activation for 

Louisiana evacuees starting in the north end of the state and moving south as they fi ll up, thereby leaving the shelters 

nearest to the Mississippi Gulf Coast accessible to Mississippi residents should the need for coastal evacuation occur.” 

Mississippi CEMP, May 14, 1999, p. ESF–6–2. 

29 Latham interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 108. 

30 Committee staff interview of Jim Craig, Director, Offi ce of Health Protection, Mississippi Department of Health, 

conducted on Jan. 25, 2006, transcript p. 47.

31 Committee staff interview of Alfred C. Sexton, Commander of Administration, Gulfport Police Department, MS, 

conducted on Dec. 8, 2005, transcript pp. 58-60.

32 Emergency management agency designated or approved shelters are initially under the direction of the local EMA 

Director, who would be responsible for opening and staffi ng the shelter, most oft en using MDHS personnel. Dawkins 

interview, Dec. 13, 2005, pp. 5-6. 

33 Dawkins interview, Dec. 13, 2005, p. 56.

34 Dawkins interview, Dec. 13, 2005, p. 58.

35 McAllister interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 50-52.

36 Craig interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 18. 

37 National Council on Disability, NCD Brief on Hurricane Katrina Aff ected Areas, Sept. 2, 2005. http://www.jfanow.

org/jfanow/index.php?mode=A&id=2497. Accessed on Mar. 8, 2006.

38 See e.g.: Harrison County and Hancock County Emergency Medical Services Districts, “Guidelines for Evacuation 

and Management of Individuals with Disabilities and Special Needs During Disasters,” May 28, 2001. Provided to Committee.
Chapter 7

106

39 Latham interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 109.

40 MEMA, “Hurricane Awareness Week May 30 – June 3,” news release, May 28, 2005, p. 3.

41 Committee staff interview of Butch Loper, Emergency Management Director, Jackson County, MS, conducted on 

Dec. 6, 2005, transcript p. 11.

42 Craig interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 14; Dawkins interview, Dec. 13, 2005, p. 14.

43 MEMA, Hurricane Situation Report #20, Hurricane Katrina, Aug. 31, 2005, 1:30 a.m. CT, p. 7. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. MEMA-0011000.

44 Special-needs shelters were opened in Newton, Attala, Clarke, Lauderdale, Lincoln, Harrison, and Forrest Counties. 

MEMA, Hurricane Situation Report #28, Hurricane Katrina, Sept. 2, 2005, 1 a.m. CT, p. 11. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates no. MEMA-0011104.

45 McAllister interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 71. 

46 Loper interview, Dec. 6, 2005, p. 11. 

47 Craig interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 19-20.

48 Kirsten Dellinger, Hurricane Katrina Kirsten Dellinger, Society for the Study of Social Problems, Sept. 5, 2005. http://

www.sssp1.org/index.cfm/pageId/540. Accessed on Apr. 8, 2006.

49 Kellogg Schwab, Ph.D., “Assessing the Aft ermath of Hurricane Katrina,” John Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public 

Health, Sept. 12, 2005, pp. 1-2. http://www.jhsph.edu/Katrina/schwab_aft ermath.html. Accessed on Apr. 8, 2006.

50 Jerry Mitchell, “Biloxi Woman Feels Like Nomad in GA,” Th e Clarion-Ledger, Sept. 23, 2005. http://www.clarionledger.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20050923/NEWS0110/509230373/1260. Accessed on Apr. 8, 2006; “Dysentery 

Fears Closes Shelter in Biloxi,” My DNA, Sept. 4, 2005. http://www.mydna.com/health/digestive/news/resources/

news/200509/news_20050904_dysen.html. Accessed on Apr. 10, 2006; Th e Norwalk virus is passed in the stool of 

infected persons. People get infected by swallowing stool-contaminated food or water and usually recover in 2 to 3 days 

without serious or long-term health eff ects. Directors of Health Promotion and Education, “Norwalk Virus Infection.” 

www.dhpe.org/infect/norwalk.html. Accessed on Apr. 8, 2006.

51 McAllister interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 53-55.

52 Sexton interview, Dec. 8, 2005, pp. 62-65.

53 Committee staff interview of Col. Joe Spraggins, Director, Emergency Management Agency, Harrison County, MS, 

conducted on Nov. 17, 2005, transcript pp. 119-121.

54 Sexton interview, Dec. 8, 2005, pp. 48-51.

55 Committee staff interview of Ellen Noble, Chapters Solution Manager, Southeast Service Area, American Red Cross, 

conducted on Dec. 13, 2005, transcript pp. 29-32.

56 Latham interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 117-120.

57 Jacqueline L. Salmon, “Th e Clock’s Ticking on Red Cross Overhaul,” Th e Washington Post, Mar. 21, 2006, p. A04.
584
New Orleans, 

August 30, 2005 

© 2005 The Times-Picayune 

Publishing Co., all rights reserved. 

Used with permission of the 

Times-Picayune
109

“Hurricane Pam”: 

Warning Flag for Katrina

On the day aft er Hurricane Katrina made landfall, the New Orleans Times-Picayune frontpage banner said it all: “KATRINA: THE STORM WE’VE ALWAYS FEARED.”1

Hurricanes are a fi xture of life on the Louisiana Coast. Years before Katrina, all levels of 

government knew that a large, slow-moving catastrophic hurricane was likely to hit New 

Orleans, fl ood the city, and claim thousands of lives, overwhelming state and local agencies’ ability to respond effectively and requiring assistance from the federal government to 

respond to the disaster.2

Th is understanding prompted eff orts in 1999 to secure federal support to develop a comprehensive plan to respond to a catastrophic hurricane in New Orleans. Following nearly 

fi ve years of delays, in 2004 the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provided 

funding to begin that development.3

 Th e project, “Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan,” confi rmed the limitations of the state and local agencies. It used an exercise 

scenario known as “Hurricane Pam” that incorporated well-founded assumptions about the 

impact of a slow-moving Category 3 hurricane on New Orleans. Based on scientifi c research 

and dozens of emergency-management studies, the Hurricane Pam scenario predicted:

• Widespread fl ooding throughout the city

• 67,000 dead

• 200,000 to 300,000 in need of evacuation aft er landfall

• Hundreds of thousands displaced

• Sheltering and evacuation needs exceeding state and local governments’ 

capabilities

• Hospitals overcrowded with special-needs patients, with backup generators 

running out of fuel or failing before patients could be moved elsewhere

• Incapacitated fi rst responders and parish resources

• Compromised situational awareness4

Despite the comprehensive foreknowledge of the consequences of a catastrophic hurricane 

hitting New Orleans, underscored and amplifi ed by the Hurricane Pam exercise, emergency-management offi cials were not prepared when Katrina struck. Th ey did, however, recognize that Katrina would have many of the consequences anticipated by the Pam exercise. As 

Katrina approached the Gulf Coast on August 27, two days before landfall, FEMA produced 

slides indicating that the impact of this storm could be worse than Pam’s predictions. A 9 

a.m. FEMA briefi ng document said, “Exercise projection [Pam] is exceeded by Hurricane 

Katrina real life impacts.”5

Hurricane Pam was only the most recent study predicting consequences of a catastrophic 

hurricane. To varying degrees, federal, state, and local governments have long been sounding alarms about virtually every problem that became reality with Katrina – for example, 

evacuation, sheltering, law and order, search and rescue, and a need for leadership.

Chapter 8
Chapter 8

110

Th e exercise addressed their concerns and resulted in an improved response to Hurricane 

Katrina. However, the response could have been far better had Hurricane Pam been completed earlier.6

 Th is section details the signifi cance of Pam and its infl uence on the Katrina 

response. Most important, though, it demonstrates that Katrina was not an unpredictable 

catastrophe, but in fact was predicted. 

Hurricane Pam: In the Beginning

Th e threat of a catastrophic hurricane hitting New Orleans has long been contemplated by 

scientists, planners, emergency-management personnel, and managers. In what was oft en 

called the “New Orleans Scenario,” the worst-case event was imagined as a Category 3 or 

higher hurricane hitting the New Orleans metropolitan area with catastrophic impact.7

 Th is 

would be “worst case,” primarily because the storm surge would cause devastating fl ooding 

in an area that is below sea level and whose protective levees would trap the fl oodwater.8

Th e fl ooding, coupled with an immobile population of 100,000 or more, would contribute 

to a situation that would quickly exceed the response capabilities of both local and state 

resources and would require the assistance of federal resources on a scale never before seen.9

In late September 1998, Hurricane Georges wreaked havoc in the Caribbean before heading across southern Florida on a direct path to Louisiana. At the last moment, the hurricane 

veered away, sparing New Orleans from what could have been a devastating blow.10 Th e 

near miss prompted emergency planners to take stock again of how ill-prepared the region 

was for a major hurricane.11

Planners took their fi rst steps in response to Hurricane Georges in the fall of 1999. Colonel 

Michael Brown – no relation to the Michael Brown who directed FEMA as Katrina struck 

– then Assistant Director of the Louisiana Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness, organized 

a meeting with offi cials from FEMA Region VI (the region with emergency-management 

responsibilities over Louisiana), the Army Corps of Engineers, other state agencies, parishes, and his own offi ce to explore the eff ect of Hurricane Georges had it not turned and 

gone north.12

To develop the planning scenario, the group sought input from experts from such institutions as Louisiana State University (LSU) and the Hurricane Prediction Center.13 Th e 

group quickly realized that a slow-moving Category 3 hurricane was suffi cient to cause 

catastrophic damage.14

Over the course of several meetings in the succeeding months, the planning committee put 

together a Statement of Work (SOW, also known as work plan), to be submitted to FEMA 

in support of a request to fund the development of a “working plan for the search and rescue, evacuation, sheltering, provisioning, and infrastructure restoration for the greater New 

Orleans area.”15 On August 14, 2000, Col. Brown requested funding from FEMA. FEMA did 

not respond to the funding request at that time.16

Shortly aft er taking offi ce, President Bush appointed Joe Allbaugh to be the Director of 

FEMA. Allbaugh visited New Orleans in the spring of 2001 and expressed surprise that 

there was no federal plan to respond to a catastrophic hurricane in the region.17 According to one report, Allbaugh pledged to support development of a plan and in August 2001, 

asked the Louisiana Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness and FEMA Region VI offi cials to 

write up a proposal.18

 Th at August, Region VI Director Ron Castleman reiterated to FEMA headquarters the 

urgent need for catastrophic planning, emphasizing that a catastrophic hurricane in the 
Huricane Pam: Warning Flag For Katrina

111

New Orleans area “could aff ect a wide area of Louisiana and neighboring states and would 

present serious response and recovery problems that could exceed collective capabilities.”19

Castleman asserted that the planning proposal “could save many lives.”20

Th e proposal anticipated massive impacts from a major hurricane, including over 1 million 

people evacuating New Orleans, 300,000 to 500,000 people trapped in fl ood areas, a storm 

surge of over 18 feet overfl owing levees and leaving New Orleans under 14 to 17 feet of 

water, rescue operations impeded, hospitals overcrowded with special-needs patients and 

backup generators running out of fuel or failing before patients could be moved.21

Objectives for the work included: (1) plan for direction and control of the response; (2) plan 

for maximizing evacuation; (3) plan for transporting people, supplies, and equipment; and 

(4) plan for rescue and relocation of stranded citizens, hospital patients, and other special 

populations. Th e proposal foresaw the importance of having a plan that took into account 

the thousands that would be unable to leave the area on their own accord, thus it recommended that the future contractor assess existing evacuation plans; recommend changes; 

identify pick up points for people without transportation; identify resources, facilities, and 

services for pre-storm evacuation; and identify additional transportation assets needed.22

An updated SOW was developed in August 2001. Its stated purpose was to enhance “Federal Response Planning activities by focusing on specifi c catastrophic disasters: those disasters 

that by defi nition will immediately overwhelm the existing disaster response capabilities of 

local, state, and federal governments.” It further stated that the “initial area of focus will be 

New Orleans, Louisiana . . . to improve federal, state, local-government, and private-sector ability to respond to a worst-case catastrophic hurricane in the Greater New Orleans 

Metropolitan Area in order to prevent loss of life; minimize the number of injuries; house, 

feed, and protect up to a million survivors and evacuees; and begin long-term recovery in 

the aff ected area.”23

Th is work plan stipulated that the contractor’s work should support eventual development 

of an introductory general plan and sub-plans that would constitute a comprehensive “New 

Orleans Metropolitan Area Catastrophic Hurricane Plan.” Th e top-priority area of analysis 

was identifying the number and location of potential evacuees and assessing existing evacuation plans.24

URS Corporation, a large fi rm specializing in homeland security, was selected as contractor 

for the project in September 2001, and in October, FEMA paid URS $97,000 to gather information to build a thorough understanding of the nature and magnitude of the hurricane 

problem.25 On December 18 and 19, 2001, the project leadership team of state and federal 

representatives held a kickoff meeting.26 One of several issues discussed was the recognition 

that a hurricane could strand 250,000 to 350,000 people in the New Orleans area, 10 percent 

of whom would likely be people with special needs. Th e team also noted that hospitals 

would probably have diffi culty getting people out of the city, and that the Louisiana Offi ce 

of Emergency Preparedness (LOEP) had plans for stranded people to gather on dry stretches of levees or interstate highways where boats or barges could reach them.27

Th e team emphasized that “the fi nal product should be a hurricane operations plan – not 

a mitigation plan.” In essence, it should “[lay] out what the local government can do, what 

the state can do, what the state cannot do, and what the federal government needs to do” 

in response to a catastrophic hurricane.28 Th is operations plan was distinguished from the 

routine response by the federal government in which the government comes in aft er-thefact with a checkbook to pay for damage caused by the storm and the state and locals accept 

the check with the intent of using it to lessen the impact of future storms.29
Chapter 8

112

Th e project moved in “starts and stops” for a year because of budget problems, reassignment of FEMA staff to homeland-security issues, diffi culties in negotiating a subcontract 

with LSU and disagreements between LOEP and FEMA over the scope of work.30 Meanwhile, FEMA collected information from other sources regarding the threat potentially 

facing New Orleans. 

In May 2002, FEMA Region VI published a summary of a Bi-State Evacuation Study that 

unequivocally stated that the metropolitan New Orleans area had very limited evacuation 

routes, and that approximately 100,000 people were without transportation.31 In slides 

dated June 19, 2003, FEMA recognized that a major hurricane striking the New Orleans 

area “would be a disaster of cataclysmic proportion,” and that 250,000 to 350,000 people 

would be stranded. Minutes of a June 2003 meeting regarding the New Orleans scenario at 

FEMA headquarters with FEMA contractors state “that massive federal assistance would be 

expected for this type of event [catastrophic hurricane]. Louisiana won’t be able to deal with 

this. Responders and their families may be the victims themselves.”32

By late July 2003, URS Corporation had made progress on its catastrophic planning work 

for FEMA and the Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness 

(LOHSEP), which was the successor agency to the Louisiana Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness (LOEP). Th e Corporation fi nalized maps showing inundation, elevation and water 

depth. In the fall, URS draft ed a white paper on long-term sheltering.33 Th e premise of the 

paper was that 600,000 people would evacuate New Orleans in the event of a catastrophic 

hurricane, and that long-term shelter could be needed for perhaps 90 percent of the evacuees because de-watering of the city could take up to a year.34 Th ese documents completed 

URS Corporation’s contractual obligation to FEMA and LOHSEP.35

In November 2003, the White House Deputy National Security Adviser, General John A. 

Gordon, went to New Orleans to receive a briefi ng on catastrophic hurricane planning efforts for the region. During the comprehensive, detailed briefi ng, he learned about the catastrophic consequences of a Category 3 hurricane hitting New Orleans.36 General Gordon 

reported to the White House about this meeting.37 About this same time, FEMA Headquarters informed offi cials of Region VI and LOHSEP’s Chief Planner, Sean Fontenot, that an 

unspecifi ed amount of funding had become available.38 Fontenot was uncertain about how 

they received the funding, but recalled that the money was approved in March 2004 and 

had to be spent by September 30, 2004.39

The Work Begins

Working with staff from Region VI, Fontenot developed a proposal for an exercise that 

encompassed 14 elements ranging from pre-landfall evacuation, to emergency response, to 

post-response recovery, and rebuilding matters. While the customary practice in emergency 

planning was to develop a plan, then to test it with an exercise, the planners concluded that 

the six short weeks that they had been given were insuffi cient to proceed in a traditional 

manner. Th us, the sequence was reversed: they designed an exercise from which to create 

the plan.40

At a meeting in early April 2004, FEMA offi cials deemed the proposal too costly, causing 

LOHSEP offi cials to trim pre-landfall evacuation and fi ve other issues. Witnesses stated 

that pre-landfall evacuation was deleted from the Hurricane Pam exercise because the issue 

had been examined by other studies, as well as state and local plans.41 On the other hand, 

post-landfall response planning had received very little attention, so, according to FEMA 

witnesses, the limited FEMA funds would be best applied to post-landfall planning.42 
Huricane Pam: Warning Flag For Katrina

113

In late May 2004, FEMA notifi ed the state that it had selected Innovative Emergency Management, Inc. (IEM), as contractor for this newer phase of the project, which sought the 

actual development of a catastrophic hurricane plan for southeast Louisiana.43 As distinct 

from the information-gathering process conducted by URS, this phase sought to develop 

the actual plan.44

Between late May and mid-July 2004, LOHSEP worked with FEMA Region VI staff , consultants from IEM, Mark Levitan, Ph.D., of the LSU Hurricane Center, and others to fl esh out 

the details of the exercise. Concluding that it was unreasonable to expect to complete a plan 

in the initial series of workshops, they designed the exercise with the expectation that they 

would ask FEMA to support a series of follow-on meetings.45

Th e initial Hurricane Pam workshops took place from July 16 until July 23, 2004. Attendance included over 300 participants from 15 federal agencies, 20 state agencies, 13 

parishes, fi ve volunteer agencies, LOHSEP, FEMA Region VI, FEMA HQ and IEM.46 Th e 

participants focused on issues relating to schools, search and rescue, sheltering, temporary 

housing, temporary medical care, and debris removal.47 IEM compiled the notes from each 

workshop into a draft plan. On August 6, 2004, IEM produced a 120-page draft “Southeast 

Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Functional Plan.”48

Shortly aft er the July sessions, LOHSEP asked FEMA for funding for additional workshops. 

Again, obtaining funding was diffi cult.49 A follow-on session set for September 2004 had to 

be postponed when FEMA could not come up with $15,000 to pay travel expenses for participants.50 FEMA offi cials frequently cited “DHS taxes” as the reason for funding challenges 

that delayed the planned additional exercise sessions.51

Eric Tolbert, FEMA’s former Director of Response, recalled many diffi culties in funding 

the scenario and follow-on sessions.52 Th e turning point, he said, was when FEMA Director 

Brown returned from Asia aft er the disastrous, earthquake-driven tsunami of December 

2004. Tolbert described Brown as being “obsessed with catastrophic events.” Tolbert told 

Brown that a large hurricane hitting New Orleans might produce a higher death toll than 

the tsunami.53 Brown expressed support for funding catastrophic planning. Meanwhile, 

IEM consolidated and published the draft plans from the July 2004 portions of the exercise 

in January 2005.54

Follow-up Sessions55

Two follow-up workshops were eventually held: “Transportation, Staging and Distribution” 

in late July 2005, and “Temporary Medical” just days before Katrina struck.56 Notes from 

the transportation session reveal that while the workshop was supposed to deal with issues 

of commodity logistics, participants focused specifi cally on the need for buses to transport 

rescued people to shelters.57 Th e notes also emphasized the importance of marshalling these 

buses before landfall so that, following the storm, they would be immediately available to 

evacuate those stranded in the area. Notably, the participants also reported that planning 

for distribution of commodities was complete, but was “less than 10% done with transportation planning when you consider the buses and the people.”58

In the same transportation session, New Orleans Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness Chief 

Joseph Matthews told the working group at Pam that the city could not execute a massive 

post-landfall evacuation for two main reasons: (1) they had reserved local transit buses and 

school buses, but lacked drivers qualifi ed to participate in evacuations; and (2) city offi cials 

had not completed negotiations with other transportation companies.59
Chapter 8

114

Consequently, with 

recognition of the need 

to transport many tens of 

thousands of people aft er 

landfall, participants in 

the exercise developed 

a timeline that called on 

the agencies to “PreStage buses and drivers” 

50 hours before landfall 

by providing “600 buses 

(Local/State/Federal) and 

1,200 drivers (Local/State/

Federal/Volunteers).”60

Th e shelter chapter of 

the draft plan that arose 

from the Hurricane Pam 

exercise is slightly more 

detailed on the issue 

of transportation, and 

includes references to 

pre-landfall evacuation. It assumes that while the primary means of pre-landfall evacuation 

would be personal vehicles, “school and municipal buses and, where available, specialized 

vehicles will be used to transport those hurricane evacuees who do not have transportation.”61 Federal, state, and local government representatives were keenly aware of the critical need for buses and the corresponding need for sheltering, yet no level of government 

followed through with arranging for the buses and additional shelters to aid post-landfall 

evacuation.62

On August 23 and 24, 2005, the Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Temporary 

Medical Care Supplementary Planning Workshop was held. From this workshop, the Temporary Medical Care section was updated. Emergency planners refi ned some of the medical 

support techniques eventually used during Hurricane Katrina, such as the use of centralized, medical triage centers (known as TMOSAs or Temporary Medical Operations Staging 

Areas) to provide medical screening and care for Katrina survivors. However, as discussed 

in greater detail in Chapter 24: Medical Assistance, the Hurricane Pam exercise failed to 

identify solutions to key medical problems it had anticipated, including the need to evacuate patients from hospitals and nursing homes trapped by rising fl oodwaters.63

On August 27, 2005, two days before landfall, IEM hastily published and delivered to FEMA 

a draft transportation plan based on the “Transportation, Staging and Distribution” workshops held July 25 through 29, 2005.

Hurricane Pam in Action 

Hurricane Pam 2004 was more than an exercise. It was a unique planning endeavor that 

resulted in functional plans that were considered for and actually put to use in real-life situations before, during, and aft er Hurricane Katrina. Most exercise participants agreed that 

many of the plans were useful even though they were not fi nal. Th ough they needed some 

cleaning up, the resulting draft s were “fi ghtable,” that is, “detailed enough to be implemented and to guide response and recovery operations.”64

“Pam” come true, New Orleans

Clarence Williams/Iris Photocollective photo
Huricane Pam: Warning Flag For Katrina

115

IEM President and CEO Madhu Beriwal echoed this view, saying, “though the plan was 

not fi nished, many elements of Hurricane Pam still proved to be highly useful in response 

and recovery to Hurricane Katrina days, weeks, and months aft er the massive storm struck 

the Gulf Coast.”65 Senior FEMA offi cials requested, reviewed, or referred to Hurricane Pam 

materials to gauge the potential impact of Hurricane Katrina and to plan response actions. 

According to Brown, “Th e Hurricane Pam book was fl ying everywhere. It was all over 

FEMA; it was everywhere.”66

Slides dated 9 a.m., August 27, 2005, at FEMA headquarters stated, “Current projected 

path takes storm directly over New Orleans.” Th ey also cited the Pam exercise prediction of 

60,000 fatalities and 1 million-plus persons displaced, predicting that Pam’s estimates would 

be “exceeded by Hurricane Katrina real life impacts.”67 Also on August 27, Patrick Rhode, 

FEMA’s Acting Deputy Director, was seeking a copy of the Hurricane Pam plan; he learned 

that numerous copies of the plan were being made for distribution to FEMA employees.68

Th e primary Federal Coordinating Offi cer in charge of response operations in Louisiana, 

William Lokey, actually embedded IEM employees in the National Response Coordination 

Center (NRCC) and the State’s Emergency Operations Center (EOC) during the response 

to Hurricane Katrina to use their Hurricane Pam and emergency-management expertise.69

Th e night manager of the National Response Coordination Center (NRCC), the federal hub 

for situation information management, sent an e-mail to her director saying that she and 

others had scoured the Pam plan during their overnight shift on August 28 and found that the 

Hurricane Pam plan had identifi ed a number of tasks for federal entities. It further revealed 

that a number of these assigned tasks had not been addressed thus far in the federal response.70

 In particular, during Hurricane Katrina, a “lily-pad” type of search-and-rescue operation 

was implemented.71 By using this methodology, victims were rescued and transported to a 

safe area of high ground. Th e idea was that from there another group would transport them 

to a Temporary Medical Operations Staging Area (TMOSA). Th ere, the rescued would undergo a medical-triage screening process to determine individuals’ medical-care needs.72

During Hurricane Katrina, search-and-rescue crews successfully retrieved thousands of 

people from harm’s way and deposited them on dry land. In some cases, the rescued individuals were deposited at two of the three TMOSAs envisioned during the Hurricane Pam 

planning workshops.73 Unfortunately, the Hurricane Pam concept was only half successful because many people rescued by the search-and-rescue teams were transported to dry 

ground where there was no system to support them and no ground transportation to take 

them to a better place for days. In other words, they were taken to veritable “islands,” only 

to be left there without food, water, and other critical necessities.74

By late August 2005, FEMA had committed more than $1.5 million to developing the Hurricane Pam exercise.75 Because some offi cials took the initiative to press for signifi cant funding and overcome bureaucratic delays, some important lessons from Hurricane Pam were 

available and were put to good use in responding to Katrina – only a few of which were 

noted above. On the other hand, it is unfortunate that Louisiana allowed relatively small 

funding shortfalls – such as FEMA’s inability to fund $15,000 in travel expenses in September 2004 – to delay progress in further plan development. Given the importance to the state 

of the exercise, Louisiana should have considered using its own funds to fi ll these gaps in 

federal funding.

In any event, far too many of the Hurricane Pam lessons were not applied.Despite this being 

“the storm we’ve always feared,” despite awareness of the impact of such a storm on New 

Orleans, and despite the fact that federal, state, and local agencies came together in July 2004 
Chapter 8

116

to do a “live rehearsal” of a response in such a circumstance as Katrina – over a year before it 

made landfall – too little was done to act on the plans resulting from Hurricane Pam.

1 Bruce Nolan, “Katrina: Th e Storm We’ve Always Feared,” New Orleans Times-Picayune, Aug. 30, 2005, p. A-1. 

2 Committee staff interview of Eric Tolbert, former Director, Response Division, Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA), conducted on Dec. 1, 2005, transcript p. 70 (“In the hurricane business in emergency management, 

all of us have known for years and years about the New Orleans scenario. Th at’s what we refer to it as, the New Orleans 

scenario, which was either the overwash or the failure of the dock system, the levee system. Literally, anybody in this 

business that studied hurricanes, if you fl ew into New Orleans all you were looking for was the levee system. You wanted 

to see it because you had heard so much about it. Th e risk was uniformly known by the emergency management professionals.”). Ed Buikema, Acting Director of Response during Katrina, said that a large hurricane hitting New Orleans was 

considered by FEMA to be one of the worst catastrophes that could ever occur in the United States. Committee staff interview of Edward Buikema, Acting Director, Response Division, FEMA, conducted on Nov. 21, 2005, transcript p. 234. 

3 Committee staff interview of Sean Fontenot, former Chief, Preparedness Division, Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP), conducted on Jan. 10, 2006, transcript pp. 42-43, 71. 

4 LOHSEP, Hurricane Pam and Related Docs (18). Provided to Committee. 

5 FEMA, Tropical Storm Katrina, briefi ng slides, Aug. 27, 2006, 9 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHSFEMA-0055-0002140.

6 Testimony of Madhu Beriwal, President and CEO, IEM, Inc., before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland 

Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Preparing for a Catastrophe: Th e Hurricane Pam Exercise, Jan. 24, 2006. 

Beriwal suggested that the response to Hurricane Katrina could have been greater had the exercise been completed 

earlier: “When Hurricane Katrina struck, the Hurricane Pam planning was not complete. No training or exercises had 

occurred using this planning document. Th e fi rst test was Hurricane Katrina. ... However [...] even though the plans 

and planning were incomplete, Hurricane Pam helped save lives and reduce suff ering aft er the massive catastrophe of 

Hurricane Katrina.” Written Statement of Beriwal, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 24, 2006, p. 8. According to Eric 

Tolbert, “Th e [Pam] exercise was just last year, and then they get hit this year. It takes time to continue developing plans 

and procedures. Th ankfully, we had that exercise last year so that at least federal, state and local had gone through the 

process and had thought about the consequences and had begun draft ing plans or it would not have even gone as well as 

it did.” Tolbert interview, Dec. 1, 2005, p. 76. 

7 Louisiana Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness (LOEP), Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Evacuation and Sheltering Plan, 

Jan. 2000, Part I, A, Summary. 

8 Tolbert interview, Dec. 1, 2005, p. 70. 

9 FEMA, Task Order #125, Statement of Work: Catastrophic Hurricane Planning, New Orleans Metropolitan Area, 

Aug. 22, 2001. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. URS 0000053 [hereinaft er FEMA, Statement of Work, Aug. 22, 

2001].

10 Mark Fischetti, “Drowning New Orleans,” Scientifi c American, Oct. 2001, pp. 78, 84 (“New Orleans is a disaster waiting to happen.”).

11 Fontenot interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 42-43.

12 Committee staff interview of Matt Farlow, Information Technology Division Chief, LOHSEP, conducted on Dec. 1, 

2005, transcript p. 11.

13 Committee staff interview of Wayne Fairley, Response Operations Branch Chief, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 18, 2006, 

transcript p. 7.

14 Fairley interview, Jan. 18, 2006, p. 7.

15 See generally: LOHSEP, Hurricane Pam and Related Docs (18). Provided to Committee. Th e FEMA Statement of 

Work described a scenario of catastrophic consequences from a Category 3, 4, or 5 hurricane:

• Th e City of New Orleans is fl ooded with 14’ to 17’ of water

• Th e metro area is without power, food, water, medicine and transportation

• 250,000 to 350,000 people remain in stranded conditions with limited self rescue capability

• Up to 50,000 persons are stranded in the surrounding river parishes

• Possible 5,000 dead and 15,000 injured within the city

• Shelters are overcrowded and people stranded throughout the rest of the state

• Hazardous materials released throughout the city

• No or limited traditional access to all area
Huricane Pam: Warning Flag For Katrina

117

• All pumping stations inoperable

• Hospitals overcrowded with special needs patients and family members

• Hospitals have no or limited power

16 Farlow interview, Dec. 1, 2005, p. 11-16.

17 Fontenot interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 59.

18 Scott Wells, e-mail to Mark Wallace R6, Gary Jones, Chuck Gregg, Ron Castleman and Brenda Black, Mar. 18, 2004, 

7:51 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0058-0000025 through 0000027.

19 Ron Castleman, memorandum to Lacy Suiter, Aug. 8, 2001. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA0074-0000025. 

20 Castleman, memorandum to Suiter, Aug. 8, 2001; Mr. Fairley stated in his staff interview that a draft of the proposal 

was fi rst sent to Region VI, which returned it with directions to eliminate items outside the scope of FEMA funding. 

Fairley interview, Jan. 18, 2006, pp. 49-50.

21 FEMA and LOEP, Proposal for Development of a New Orleans Metropolitan Area Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, Aug. 

2001. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0074-0000027 through 0000028.

22 FEMA, Statement of Work, Aug. 22, 2001, Bates no. URS 0000055.

23 FEMA, Statement of Work, Aug. 22, 2001, Bates no. URS 0000052.

24 FEMA, Statement of Work, Aug. 22, 2001, Bates no. URS 0000055.

25 Scott Wells, e-mail to Mark Wallace R6, Gary Jones, Chuck Gregg, Ron Castleman and Brenda J. Black, Mar. 18, 

2004, 7:51 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0058-0000025 through 0000027.

26 Fontenot interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 60. According to Fontenot, there was a short delay from the time of contract 

award to URS to the date of the kickoff meeting due to the 9/11 attack and resulting circumstances. 

27 New Orleans Hurricane Preparedness Project, Meeting of Organizing Committee, Dec. 2001. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0058-0001506 through 0001514. 

28 New Orleans Hurricane Preparedness Project, Meeting of Organizing Committee, Dec. 2001. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0058-0001579.

29 Committee staff interview of Sandy Coachman, Federal Coordinating Offi cer, FEMA, conducted on Nov. 16, 2005, 

transcript p. 92. 

30 Scott Wells, e-mail to Mark Wallace R6, Gary Jones, Chuck Gregg, Ron Castleman and Brenda J. Black, Mar.18, 2004, 

7:51 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0058-0000025 through 0000027.

31 FEMA, Bi-State Hurricane Evacuation Study, May 2, 2002. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA0058-0001607. 

32 Chuck Gregg, e-mail to John Gambel, Oct. 21, 2005, 3:22 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHSFEMA-0025-0002597 through 0002598 (the subject is a June 26, 2003 meeting at FEMA headquarters to discuss the 

Strawman Draft .).

33 FEMA, Task Order Number 125, Work Accomplished February 20, 2004 through March 5, 2004. Provided to Committee, fi led as Bates nos. URS 0000115 through 0000116.

34 Long-Term Sheltering Following a Catastrophic Hurricane in Southeast Louisiana, prepared by URS Corporation for 

FEMA, Jan. 2004. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. URS 0000232 through 0000244.

35 Dale Lehman, letter to Carrie Ouellettee, Mar. 5, 2004. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. URS 0000059.

36 Fontenot interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 68-69. 

37 Tony Robinson, e-mail to Wayne Fairley and Mark Wallace R6, May 17, 2004, 1:46 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led 

as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0058-0000077 through 0000078.

38 Fontenot interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 71-72.

39 Fontenot interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 71-72.

40 Fontenot interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 72-73.

41 Fontenot interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 88-90; Beriwal, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 24, 2006.

42 Fontenot interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 88-91; Fairley interview, Jan. 18, 2006, pp. 2, 57-58. During his interview with 

HSGAC staff ers, Fairley explained why pre-landfall evacuation was not part of the Pam planning: “We, over the course a 

time, working with the state, discussed transportation for evacuation. Th at’s always been something that was recognized 

as a need. Th e state, however, felt that they had that segment in hand. Th e state had a evacuation plan, evacuation routes, 

evacuation maps.” Fairley interview, Jan. 18, 2006, p. 23.

43 Testimony of Sean Fontenot, former Chief, Preparedness Division, LOHSEP, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on 

Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Preparing for a Catastrophe: Th e Hurricane Pam Exercise, 

Jan. 24, 2006.
Chapter 8

118

44 Fontenot interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 87-88; Fontenot, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 25, 2006.

45 Fontenot interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 78-80.

46 FEMA, Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Planning Project, Matrix of Planning Topics and ESFs, Dec. 8, 2004. 

Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0058-0000377; IEM, Inc., 2004 Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane 

Planning Exercise, Executive Summary. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. IEM/TEC04-081. 

47 FEMA and IEM, Inc., Hurricane Pam 2004, Breakout Room Topics. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS 

0001998.

48 IEM, Inc., Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Functional Plan, Draft , Aug. 6, 2004. Provided to Committee. 

49 Tolbert interview, conducted on Dec. 1, 2005, transcript pp. 135-136 (“I think lack of funding contributed signifi -

cantly. I was under no pressure to continue with it because I didn’t have money anyway. ... We had a set budget, all the 

money that we could scrape together out of my operating budget and that was the limit. ... Had we had more money, we 

probably would have expanded it.”).

50 Fontenot interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 79-80.

51 Tolbert interview, Dec. 1, 2005, pp. 57-58.

52 Tolbert interview, Dec. 1, 2005, pp. 71-72, 80. Notes of a March 30, 2004 teleconference indicate a concern about 

moving forward quickly to avoid the hurricane season: “Tolbert: Can timeframe slip? To September 30? Sean Fontenot: 

Probably not. And unless Contractor for Exercise can be secured by April 12, Exercise likely not happen because of hurricane seasons.” LOHSEP, Response No. 8, Mar. 30, 2004 Eric Tolbert Teleconference. Provided to Committee. 

53 Tolbert interview, Dec. 1, 2005, pp. 85-86.

54 IEM, Inc., Memorandum, Re: Development of the Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan Documentation, 

Sept. 5, 2005. Provided to Committee. 

55 IEM, Inc., Memorandum, Re: Development of the Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan Documentation, 

Sept. 5, 2005. Provided to Committee. 

56 IEM, Inc., Memorandum, Re: Development of the Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan Documentation, 

Sept. 5, 2005. Provided to Committee.

57 IEM, Inc., Louisiana Catastrophic Planning Phase 1B: Unifi ed Command Final Briefi ng Highlights, July 29, 2005. 

Provided to Committee.

58 IEM, Inc., Louisiana Catastrophic Planning Phase 1B: Unifi ed Command Final Briefi ng Highlights, July 29, 2005. 

Provided to Committee. Director Joseph Matthews of the New Orleans Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness also pointed 

out at this meeting that the City had a problem with the lack of qualifi ed drivers for buses that could be used in an evacuation. Committee staff interview of Joseph Matthews, Director, Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness, City of New Orleans, 

LA, conducted on Nov. 23, 2005, transcript pp. 67-68.

59 Matthews interview, Nov. 23, 2005, pp. 196-200.

60 A FEMA offi cial at the workshop suggested to the other participants that 5,000 buses per day would needed. Committee staff interview of Jules Hurst, Transportation Supervisor, Logistics Branch, FEMA, conducted on Dec. 27, 2006, 

transcript p. 34 (“At fi rst we were told that – I said you got to give me a number to work with here, and when they said 

how many buses do we need, they said, okay, 75,000 refugees a day – refugees? Evacuees a day for 10 days. And they said, 

What do you need? And I said 5,000 buses a day.”).

61 Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, prepared by IEM, Inc. for FEMA and LOHSEP, Aug. 6, 2005, p. 72 

[hereinaft er Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, Aug. 6, 2005]. 

62 Transportation needs are also addressed in the Search and Rescue chapter, albeit in more cursory terms. Th e section 

describing the execution of the plan includes the notation that post-landfall operations will include “coordination and 

evacuation of the rescued persons.” While there are general references to the possibility that parishes may be so severely 

damaged that they are incapable of even asking for support, the text does not specify whether state or federal support for 

transporting rescued victims will be relied on, stating merely that “ESF-1 [the emergency support function dealing with 

transportation] will provide transportation of rescued victims.” Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, Aug. 

6, 2005, pp. 72, 75.

63 Committee staff interview of James Aiken, M.D., Medical Director for Emergency Preparedness, Medical Center 

of Louisiana, City of New Orleans, LA, conducted on Jan. 11, 2006, transcript pp. 66-68; EST_ESF08, e-mail to Robert 

Jevec, Jack Beall, and MST-1, Aug. 29, 2005, 5:30 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0098-

0003758 through 0003759 (“Advanced planning was never completed on how the patients left in the hospital will be 

evacuated aft er the event. Th e use of boats to support the other ESFs has been fairly comprehensive, and ESF #8 has yet 

to be completed.”).

64 FEMA, Louisiana Project, Phase I-B Proposed Schedule, Jan. 25, 2005, p. 5. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 

DHS-FEMA 0058-0002144. Madhu Beriwal, the president of IEM, told HSGAC staff during a briefi ng that the premise 

of the planning workshops was that the participants were developing actual plans and that IEM’s role was to simply 

clean up the products from the workshop, compile and present them in a fi nal formatted plan.

65 Written Statement of Madhu Beriwal, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 24, 2006, p. 5.
Huricane Pam: Warning Flag For Katrina

119

66 Committee staff interview of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 23, 2006, transcript p. 215.

67 FEMA, Tropical Storm Katrina, briefi ng slides, Aug. 27, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA0055-0002140 (“Exercise projections exceeded by Hurricane Katrina real life impacts.”). 

68 William Lokey, e-mail to Patrick Rhode and David Garratt, Aug. 27, 2005, 9:07 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0085-0003860.

69 Committee staff interview of William Lokey, FEMA, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, conducted on Nov. 4, 2005, transcript p. 185 (“One of the things we did do, the contract planners from IEM-I’m 

not sure what IEM stands for, but our contractor we have for catastrophic planning-I got them activated on Saturday to 

embed them, [they] showed up Sunday to help remind people what people had agreed to in the planning process we had 

done in the Hurricane Pam scenarios.”). 

70 Richard Harmon, e-mail to EST-DIR [Mary Ann Lyle], Aug. 28, 2005, 4:07 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

no. DHS-FEMA-0132-0001814.

71 Beriwal, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 24, 2005.

72 Th e Temporary Medical Care section detailed the concepts of search and rescue bases of operations (SARBOOs) 

and temporary medical and operations staging areas (TMOSAs). As stated in Chapter 24, Medical Assistance: “Th e 

plan called for search-and-rescue teams to drop people at Search-and-Rescue Bases of Operations (SARBOOs) near 

the fl ooded areas, where paramedics would perform initial triage. Rescuees would then be transported to Temporary 

Medical-and-Operations Staging Areas (TMOSAs), larger areas with temporary medical facilities, for care and triage.” In 

response to Hurricane Katrina, the SARBOO/TMOSA approach proved crucial to being able to provide medical services 

when hospitals were fi lled. 

73 Committee staff interview of Jimmy Guidry, M.D., Medical Director and State Health Offi cer, Louisiana Department 

of Health and Hospitals, conducted on Dec. 20, 2005, transcript pp. 21-22.

74 Committee staff interview of Lt. Col. Keith LaCaze, Assistant Administrator, Law Enforcement Division, Louisiana 

Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, conducted on Nov. 30, 3005, transcript pp. 55-63. 

75 FEMA, Amendment of Solicitation of Contract, Sept. 21, 2004. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHSFEMA-0076-0000038 through 0000043.
Coastal Louisiana’s 

changing lands

U.S.Geological Survey
121

Chapter 9

Eff ects of Environmental 

and Engineering Changes

Avital part of the Hurricane Katrina story lies in nearly two centuries of natural and 

man-made changes to the Louisiana coastline. When New Orleans was settled 

in 1718, the primary fl ood threat was from the Mississippi River, not the Gulf of 

Mexico. An expansive coastal landscape separated the city from the Gulf and served as a 

buff er from any storms moving ashore.1

Th at protective landscape no longer exists. Th e ever-changing and disappearing coastline 

has left New Orleans more susceptible to hurricanes and contributed to the damage infl icted by Katrina. Should this trend continue, New Orleans and the rest of coastal Louisiana 

will become even more vulnerable to damage from future storms, and eff orts to protect the 

city with levees and fl oodwalls will be undermined. 

While a comprehensive analysis of coastal Louisiana’s environmental challenges and potential remedies is beyond the scope of this report, this chapter briefl y examines some of the 

potential impacts of Louisiana’s altered landscape on hurricane protection.

Louisiana’s Changing Coastal Landscape is Increasing Hurricane Vulnerability

Th e Louisiana coastline is changing more rapidly than any other part of the country and, as 

a result, is becoming more vulnerable to hurricanes. Over the last 70 years, Louisiana has 

lost more than 1,900 square miles of coastal land – an area roughly the size of Delaware.2

 At 

the peak of the trend in the 1960s and 1970s, Louisiana was losing 40 square miles of coastal 

land per year.3

 Th is loss has slowed in recent years, primarily because the most vulnerable 

lands have already disappeared, but Louisiana is still losing 10 square miles of coastal land 

per year.4

 As a civil-engineering magazine put it, “in southeastern Louisiana a football fi eld 

worth of wetlands sinks into the sea every 30 minutes.”5

Th ese coastal lands primarily consist of wetlands, including extensive cypress swamps and 

grass marshes. But Louisiana’s barrier islands (an elongated chain of islands running parallel to the coast and serving as a barrier against waves) and even many higher ridges, which 

were formed by large amounts of sediment piling up along past banks of the Mississippi 

River, are also disappearing. Th e U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) projects that an additional 

700 square miles could be lost by 2050 if no further actions are taken to halt or reverse current processes.6

Th e Mississippi River is the single most important factor in sustaining coastal Louisiana.7

Th e river brings water, sediments, and nutrients from 41 percent of the land area of the 

contiguous U.S. to the coast of Louisiana. Prior to the extensive building of levees and dams 

along the Mississippi, the river carried nearly 400 million tons of sediment to the Louisiana 

Coast every year – enough to cover 250 square miles of land a foot deep in sediment.8

 Th e 

growing wetlands fed by the accumulating sediments, nutrients, and fresh water of the Mississippi have added 9,600 square miles of land to the Louisiana coastline over the last 6,000 

years – a rate of 1.25 square miles per year.9

 At its peak, this land, known as the Mississippi 

deltaic plane, accounted for nearly 20 percent of the land area of present-day Louisiana, 

including New Orleans.

Major causes of land loss in Louisiana have been identifi ed.10 Dams and diversions along 

the Mississippi River and its tributaries have greatly reduced the amount of sediment that 

reaches coastal Louisiana, and levees force the remaining sediment so far off shore that it falls 
Chapter 9

122

directly onto the outer continental shelf and beyond, where it no longer contributes to sustaining or building coastal lands.11 By blocking natural fl ooding cycles, levees prevent fresh 

water and nutrients from the Mississippi River from nourishing and sustaining wetlands.12

Ten major navigation canals and more than 9,000 miles of pipelines servicing approximately 

50,000 oil-and-gas production facilities in coastal Louisiana result in a large direct loss of 

land and also contribute to wetland loss from saltwater intrusion and dredging.13

In addition, the Louisiana deltaic plane is essentially sinking, in a process known as subsidence, which occurs naturally as sediments deposited by the Mississippi are compacted over 

time.14 Oil and gas production further contribute to subsidence, potentially causing local 

subsidence three times greater than the highest natural subsidence rates.15 Finally, sea level 

is rising, primarily as a result of global warming.16

Th e deterioration of Louisiana’s coastal landscape of barrier islands, wetlands, and higher 

ridges, and the eff ects of subsidence have made coastal communities more vulnerable to 

hurricane fl ooding.17 New Orleans, in particular, is widely considered to be more vulnerable 

to hurricanes both because land in the city has subsided and because much of the barrier 

islands and wetlands that once surrounded the city has disappeared.18

Many of the mechanisms by which barrier islands, shoals, marshes, forested wetlands, and 

other features of the coastal landscape protect against hurricanes are well known. Geologic 

features such as barrier islands or the land mass associated with wetlands can block or channel fl ow, slow water velocities, and reduce the speed at which storm surge propagates. Th ese 

eff ects can signifi cantly restrict the volume of water available to inundate the mainland.19

Forested wetlands can greatly diminish wind penetration, reducing surface waves and storm 

surge. Shallow water depths weaken waves via bottom friction and breaking, while vegetation provides additional frictional drag and further limits wave buildup. Where wetlands 

and shallow waters lie in front of levees, they absorb wave energy and reduce the destructiveness of storm waves on the levees.20

Depending on the rate of relative sea-level rise, healthy coastal wetlands can maintain a 

near-sea-level landscape by trapping sediments or accumulating organic material, thus 

helping to counter subsidence and global sea-level rise. In contrast, when Louisiana’s coastal 

wetlands deteriorate and disappear, the land held in place by the wetlands undergoes wave 

erosion, eventually washing away and leaving behind open water 10 to 12 feet deep.21

On the other hand, the quantitative impact of wetlands and other coastal features on hurricane protection is poorly known. Anecdotal data accumulated aft er Hurricane Andrew 

suggests a storm-surge reduction along the Louisiana coast of about three inches per mile 

of marsh.22 During Hurricane Katrina, bottom friction and breaking reduced the average 

height of the highest one-third of waves from 55 feet in deep water (with peak waves above 

80 feet), to 18 feet in shallower water outside of the barrier island east of New Orleans,23 to a 

fraction of that height in protected areas. 

Researchers at the Louisiana State University (LSU) Hurricane Center found that, during Hurricane Katrina, levees protected by wetlands had a much higher survival rate than 

those bordering open water. For example, large sections of the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet 

(MRGO) levees that had little or no wetland separating them from Lake Borgne disintegrated, while the nearby 20-Arpent Canal levee, protected by a buff er of marsh and wooded 

wetlands, remained standing. According to LSU researchers, an area about the size of a 

football fi eld with the tree density equal to that found in most Louisiana swamps would 

reduce wave energy in a storm by 90 percent. Th ese researchers further found that friction 
123

Emergency Management: Mississippi

from marsh grasses and shrubs reduced water speed from Hurricane Katrina in some places 

from seven feet per second to three feet per second.24

Subsidence is also contributing substantially to hurricane vulnerability. Subsidence occurs 

across the entire region, and therefore impacts not only natural features such as wetlands 

and barrier islands, but also man-made structures such as buildings and levees. According 

to a recent report by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) Interagency Performance 

Evaluation Task Force (IPET), which examines the hurricane-protection levee system, the 

average rate of subsidence across the area is 0.6 feet over a decade.25

Th e rate of subsidence is frequently greater under cities and towns than under natural features: when areas are drained in order to prepare them for buildings, organic material in the 

soil decomposes and leads to further subsidence. In addition, the levees themselves further 

subside due to their own weight pressing down on the unstable soils of the New Orleans 

area. As a result, the eff ectiveness of the levee system deteriorates over time as both the levees and the region subside. Th e IPET report concluded that some portions of the hurricane 

protection system around New Orleans are almost two feet below their original elevations,26

further increasing their own vulnerability, and that of the areas they are designed to protect, 

to the power of hurricanes. 

Th e changes to Louisiana’s coastline have serious implications for the long-term sustainability of the region. Land subsidence and predicted global sea-level rise during the next 

100 years mean that areas of New Orleans and vicinity now 5 to 10 feet below mean sea 

level will likely be 8 to 13 feet or more below mean sea level by 2100.27 At the same time, the 

loss of wetlands, barrier islands, and other natural features could eliminate protection from 

waves and allow for higher and faster moving storm surges.28 According to the National 

Academy of Sciences, these trends will make much of Louisiana’s southern delta uninhabitable without substantial new engineering projects.29

In the long term, New Orleans and other regions of the Louisiana deltaic plane cannot be 

protected without taking proper account of the tremendous change that is continuing to 

occur to Louisiana’s coastal landscape. 

The Mississippi River Gulf Outlet’s Contribution to Damage from Hurricane Katrina

Congress authorized construction of the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MRGO) in 1956 to 

facilitate commercial shipping access to the Port of New Orleans from the Gulf of Mexico. 

Upon its completion in 1965, the MRGO provided a route 40 miles shorter than the alternative up the Mississippi River. Th e MRGO also provides a connection from the Gulf of 

Mexico to the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway (GIWW), which is a recreational and commercial waterway running east-west from Texas to Florida. Th ough the MRGO produced commercial benefi ts, those benefi ts came at a cost to the environment. Th e Corps estimates that 

the construction of the channel led to substantial loss of wetlands, which, as noted above, 

help slow and decrease the power of storms before they hit populated areas. 

Th e MRGO also contributed to a potential “funnel” for storm surges emerging from Lake 

Borgne and the Gulf into the New Orleans area.30 Th e “funnel” was created by the intersection of the MRGO from the southeast and the GIWW from the northeast into the confi ned 

channel, referred to as the GIWW/MRGO that separates New Orleans East and the Ninth 

Ward/St. Bernard Parish. Th e levees on the south side of the MRGO and the levees on the 

north side of the GIWW converge from being about 10 miles apart where they straddle 

Lake Borgne to a few hundred yards apart where the MRGO merges into the GIWW.31 Th e 

western part of the “funnel” is a six-mile-long section of the combined GIWW/MRGO, 

which was enlarged by a factor of three when the MRGO was built in order to expand it 

from a barge channel to accommodate ocean-going vessels.32
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Chapter 9

Prior to Hurricane Katrina, many warned that the potential funnel would accelerate and 

intensify storm surges emerging from Lake Borgne and the Gulf into the downtown New 

Orleans area. Th e funnel had been described as a “superhighway” for storm surges or the 

“Crescent City’s Trojan Horse” that had the potential to “amplify storm surges by 20 to 40 

percent,” according to some storm modeling.33 Researchers at LSU believed that in creating this funnel, “the US Army Corps of Engineers had inadvertently designed an excellent storm surge delivery system – nothing less – to bring this mass of water with simply 

tremendous ‘load’ – potential energy – right into the middle of New Orleans.” 34

Th e extent to which MRGO, and the funnel it helped create actually contributed to the hurricane’s damage is still being investigated, but there have been some preliminary fi ndings. A 

recent report issued by the Corps’ IPET concluded that the portion of MRGO running from 

the GIWW to the Gulf (called “Reach 2”) did not signifi cantly impact the height of Katrina’s 

storm surge, not because the “funnel” eff ect was nonexistent, but because the storm was so 

great it nullifi ed the impact of either the wetlands or the intersection of the MRGO and the 

GIWW – the funnel – at the height of the surge.35

While the IPET report concluded that the Reach 2 portion of MRGO had little impact on 

Katrina’s storm surge, it did fi nd that the six-mile combined section of the GIWW/MRGO 

(called “Reach 1”) carried the storm surge from Lake Borgne into New Orleans. Th e 

combined GIWW/MRGO served as a link between Lake Borgne and Lake Pontchartrain, 

enabling the storm surge in one lake to aff ect the storm surge in the other. During Katrina, 

a 14 to 17-foot surge coming from Lake Borgne into the funnel between MRGO and the 

GIWW was as much as 10 feet above water levels in Lake Pontchartrain.36 Th is large diff erence in the water levels between the two lakes increased the fl ow of water in the direction of 

the city and eventually into Lake Pontchartrain.

To address this problem, the IPET report recommended that fl ow through the combined 

channels “must be dramatically reduced or eliminated,” either by a permanent closure or a 

structure that can be selectively used to block storm surges fl owing between Lakes Pontchartrain and Borgne along the combined GIWW/MRGO.37

Researchers at the LSU Hurricane Center who have looked at models of Katrina have concluded that it is not just the volume of water that is important, but also the velocity. Th ese 

researchers found that the funnel accelerated the speed of the water when the larger volume 

in the funnel, and especially the water in the MRGO, was forced into the single merged 

GIWW/MRGO channel.38 Th e increased velocity of the water as it made its way through 

the channel pounded on the fl oodwalls lining the sides,39 weakening them and making them 

more vulnerable to the overtopping and scouring that occurred during the storm. Maximum current velocities in the combined GIWW/MRGO channel were greater than eight 

feet per second, which is nearly three times the velocity necessary to cause serious potential 

for erosion in the soils of the adjacent levee.40

Investigations continue into MRGO’s contribution to damage caused by Katrina, but there 

is general agreement that the presence of the MRGO destroyed wetlands that otherwise 

would have provided additional defenses. Th is happened because the MRGO served as 

a conduit for saltwater from the Gulf of Mexico to intrude into the freshwater wetlands. 

Th e saltwater damaged and destroyed wetlands, which resulted in the loss of land that had 

served as part of the city’s defenses against hurricanes and other storms.41 According to the 

National Academy of Sciences, MRGO has resulted in “tremendous environmental damage, 

including saltwater intrusion, land loss, and worsening the eff ects of wave damage during 

hurricanes and storms.”42
Effects of Environmental and Engineering Changes

125

Over the past 40 years, the erosion from the saltwater has contributed to the widening of the 

MRGO from 600 feet to 2,000 feet, an average of 35 feet per year, and the loss of more than 

19,000 acres of land.43 Had there been no wetlands at all east of the MRGO and the GIWW, 

preliminary storm modeling has shown, the Katrina storm surge may have been anywhere 

from three to six feet higher along St. Bernard Parish/Ninth Ward and New Orleans East.44

Continued wetland loss will increase the vulnerability of the city, making overtopping by 

storm surges even more likely in the future.45

Th e building of MRGO and the combined GIWW/MRGO resulted in substantial environmental damage, including a signifi cant loss of wetlands that had once formed a natural 

barrier against hurricanes threatening New Orleans from the east. MRGO and the GIWW/

MRGO provided a connection between Lake Borgne and Lake Pontchartrain that allowed 

the much greater surge from Lake Borgne to fl ow into both New Orleans and Lake Pontchartrain. Th ese channels further increased the speed and fl ow of the Katrina surge into 

New Orleans East and the Ninth Ward/St. Bernard Parishes, increasing the destructive 

force against adjacent levees and contributing to their failure. As a result, MRGO and the 

combined GIWW/MRGO resulted in increased fl ooding and greater damage from Hurricane Katrina. 

1 Working Group for Post-Hurricane Planning for the Louisiana Coast, “A New Framework for Planning the Future 

of Coastal Louisiana aft er the Hurricanes of 2005,” Jan. 26, 2006, p. 8 [hereinaft er Working Group for Post-Hurricane 

Planning, “A New Framework”].

2 Working Group for Post-Hurricane Planning, “A New Framework,” p. 8.

3 Working Group for Post-Hurricane Planning, “A New Framework,” p. 8.

4 Working Group for Post-Hurricane Planning, “A New Framework,” p. 9.

5 Greg Brouwer, “Th e Creeping Storm,” Civil Engineering Magazine, June 2003, p. 10.

6 A study by the United States Geological Survey “forecasts that an additional 448,000 acres could be lost by 2050 if no 

further actions are taken to halt or reverse current processes.” 448,000 acres is the equivalent of 700 square miles. Source: 

U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Coastal Louisiana: Attempting to Restore an Ecosystem, by Jeffrey Zinn, Oct. 25, 2004, p. 5 [hereinaft er CRS, Coastal Louisiana: Attempting to Restore an Ecosystem].

7 National Academy of Sciences, Drawing Louisiana’s New Map: Addressing Land Loss in Coastal Louisiana. Washington: National Academies Press, 2006, p. 11 [hereinaft er NAS, Drawing Louisiana’s New Map].

8 NAS, Drawing Louisiana’s New Map, pp. 22-27. Tons converted to square miles using 1.5 tons per cubic yard. Source:

Sherwood M. Gagliano, “Th e Life and Times of Mississippi River Sediment,” presented at the Workshop on River Resources Management in the 21st-century, Feb. 20, 2003.

9 Working Group for Post-Hurricane Planning, “A New Framework,” p. 1.

10 CRS, Coastal Louisiana: Attempting to Restore an Ecosystem, p. 5.

11 CRS, Coastal Louisiana: Attempting to Restore an Ecosystem, p. 5. See also: NAS, Drawing Louisiana’s New Map, p. 

31; Virginia Burkett, David B. Zilkoski, and David A. Hart, “Sea-Level Rise and Subsidence: Implications for Flooding 

in New Orleans, Louisiana,” Subsidence Interest Group Conference, Proceedings of the Technical Meeting, Nov. 27-29, 

2001, p. 64.

12 John W. Day, Jr., et al., “Pattern and Process of Land Loss in the Louisiana Coastal Zone: An Analysis of Spatial and 

Temporal Patterns of Wetland Habitat Change,” Estuarine Research Federation, 1999, pp. 193-200.

13 NAS, Drawing Louisiana’s New Map, p. 30.

14 CRS, Coastal Louisiana: Attempting to Restore an Ecosystem, p. 5.

15 Robert A. Morton and Noreen A. Purcell, U.S. Geological Survey, “Wetland Subsidence, Fault Reactivation, and 

Hydrocarbon Production in the U.S. Gulf Coast Region,” Sept. 2001. 

16 James G. Tituse and Vijay K. Narayanan, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Th e Probability of Sea Level Rise,” 

Sept. 1995, p. iii. According to the Environmental Protection Agency, “[t]here is new and stronger evidence that most of 

the warming over the last 50 years is attributable to human activities” and that the “warmer temperatures are expected to 

raise sea level by expanding ocean water, melting mountain glaciers, and melting parts of the Greenland Ice Sheet.” U.S. 

Environmental Protection Agency, “Global Warming – Climate, Future Climate,” Jan. 7, 2000. http://yosemite.epa.gov/
Chapter 9

126

OAR/globalwarming.nsf/content/ClimateFutreClimate.html. Accessed on Apr. 17, 2006; U.S. Environmental Protection 

Agency, Global Warming – Climate, Climate, Jan. 7, 2000. http://Yosemite.epa.gov/OAR/globalwarming.nsf/content/climate.html. Accessed on Apr. 17, 2006.

17 Working Group for Post-Hurricane Planning, “A New Framework,” p. 9; U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional 

Research Service, Protecting New Orleans: From Hurricane Barriers to Floodwalls, by Nicole T. Carter, Jan. 26, 2006, p. 10 

[hereinaft er CRS, Protecting New Orleans: From Hurricane Barriers to Floodwalls].

18 CRS, Protecting New Orleans: From Hurricane Barriers to Floodwalls, p. 10.

19 Working Group for Post-Hurricane Planning, “A New Framework,” p. 15.

20 Working Group for Post-Hurricane Planning, “A New Framework,” p. 15.

21 Working Group for Post-Hurricane Planning, “A New Framework,” p. 16.

22 Working Group for Post-Hurricane Planning, “A New Framework,” p. 15.

23 Abby Sallenger, e-mail to David Hunter, Senate Committee staff member, Mar. 14, 2006, 3:51 p.m.

24 Bob Marshall, “Studies Abound on Why the Levees Failed. But Researchers Point out that Some Levees Held Fast 

Because Wetlands Worked as Buff ers During Katrina’s Storm Surge,” New Orleans Times-Picayune, Mar. 23, 2006, p 1.

25 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force, Performance Evaluation Plan and 

Interim Status, Report 2 of a Series, Mar. 10, 2006, p. III–6 [hereinaft er IPET, Report 2 of a Series].

26 IPET, Report 2 of a Series, p. I–2.

27 Virginia Burkett, David B. Zilkoski, and David A. Hart, “Sea-Level Rise and Subsidence: Implications for Flooding in 

New Orleans, Louisiana,” Subsidence Interest Group Conference, Nov. 2001, p. 63.

28 Working Group for Post-Hurricane Planning, “A New Framework,” pp. 15-18.

29 NAS, Drawing Louisiana’s New Map, p. 38.

30 IPET, Report 2 of a Series, p. E–7.

31 Ivor L. van Heerden, G. Paul Kemp, Wes Shrum, Ezra Boyd and Hassan Mashriqui, Louisiana State University, Center for the Study of Public Health Impacts of Hurricanes, Initial Assessment of the New Orleans’ Flooding Event during 

the Passage of Hurricane Katrina, p. 4 [hereinaft er LSU, Initial Assessment of New Orleans Flooding].

32 LSU, Initial Assessment of New Orleans Flooding, p. 4.

33 Michael Grunwald, “Canal May Have Worsened City’s Flooding; Disputed Project Was a ‘Funnel’ for Surge, Some 

Say,” Th e Washington Post, Sept. 14, 2005, p. A21.

34 LSU, Initial Assessment of New Orleans Flooding, p. 4.

35 IPET, Report 2 of a Series, p. E–7.

36 LSU, Initial Assessment of New Orleans Flooding, p. 4.

37 IPET, Report 2 of a Series, p. E–7.

38 Hassan S. Mashriqui et al., “Experimental Storm Surge Simulations For Hurricane Katrina,” Coastal Hydrology and 

Processes (publication pending) [hereinaft er Mashriqui, “Experimental Storm Surge”].

39 Mashriqui, “Experimental Storm Surge”; Matthew Brown, “MRGO’ing, going, gone? Most everyone wants to close 

the shipping channel. But how closed is close?” New Orleans Times-Picayune, Nov. 27, 2005, p. 1.

40 Mashriqui, “Experimental Storm Surge.”

41 NAS, Drawing Louisiana’s New Map, p. 30.

42 NAS, Drawing Louisiana’s New Map, p. 38.

43 NAS, Drawing Louisiana’s New Map, pp. 38-39.

44 Working Group for Post-Hurricane Planning, “A New Framework,” p. 16.

45 Working Group for Post-Hurricane Planning, “A New Framework,” p. 16.
584
Greater New Orleans’s defenses

Graphic © 2005 The Times-Picayune Publishing 

Co., all rights reserved. Used with permission of 

the Times-Picayune
129

Chapter 10

Levees: Who’s in Charge?

An Overview of Levees in Southeast Louisiana

Levees are large embankments, usually of earth or stone, that make up part of the fl oodcontrol system designed and built to protect New Orleans from hurricanes and fl oods. Levees line the Mississippi River, the shores of Lake Pontchartrain, and the Mississippi River 

Gulf Outlet (MRGO), and are part of the protective rings around New Orleans East and St. 

Bernard Parish. 

Other structures may also be used to protect an area from fl ooding. Th e Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps), sometimes in concert with local and state government and sometimes 

on its own, built fl oodwalls, drainage canals, pumps, and fl oodgates to control the fl ow of 

excess water in and around the city.

• Floodwalls, which are high vertical walls built of concrete and steel, are used 

in more urban areas because they do not require as much space as earthen 

levees with their wide foundations.

• Because fl oodwater will fi nd its way through any breaks in the levees, massive 

gates are located throughout the system wherever there are openings for streets 

or railroads. Th ese gates are closed in anticipation of “high-water” events such 

as very high tides, fl oods, and hurricanes.

• Because many parts of the region are at or below sea level, many areas also 

have a system of pumps and canals to remove rain and fl oodwater from areas 

protected by the levee system.1

All of these systems – more than 200 gates and 125 miles of levees and fl oodwalls – worked 

together to form the fl ood-control system that was designed to protect metropolitan New 

Orleans from storms like Hurricane Katrina.2

The Roles and Responsibilities of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 

the Orleans Levee District, and the Louisiana Department of 

Transportation and Development

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

Levee systems of the size needed to protect the New Orleans area are oft en collaborative 

eff orts between federal and local governments.3

 Th e federal role in such projects is carried 

out by the Corps, an agency within the Department of Defense (DOD) charged with both 

military and civilian missions.4

 Military missions are assigned within the military command 

structure, while civilian fl ood-control projects are authorized by Congress in legislation.5

Flood-control projects usually begin when a community feels a need for protection and 

contacts the Corps. If the Corps does not already have the statutory authority to respond, 

then Congress may grant it. Aft er initial studies, the Corps may enter into a project-cooperation or assurance agreement with a local sponsor acting on behalf of the community. Th e 

assurance agreements for projects generally set forth roles of the parties, including payment 

obligations, design and construction responsibilities, and operations-and-maintenance 

(O&M) duties before and aft er the project is complete.6
Chapter 10

130

Th e levee system that protects most of New Orleans, including areas that experienced major 

breaches and fl ooding during Katrina – such as the 17th Street and London Avenue Canals, New Orleans East, and most of St. Bernard Parish – is a Corps project called the Lake 

Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project (Lake Pontchartrain Project). 

Th ere are several other federal cost-shared projects that protect other parts of southeastern 

Louisiana.7

 Th e Corps’ involvement in these projects was mostly through its New Orleans 

District, one of the Corps’ largest with more than 1,200 employees, and part of the Corps’ 

Mississippi Valley Division headquartered in Vicksburg, Mississippi.8

 When Katrina made 

landfall, the New Orleans District was under the command of Colonel Richard P. Wagenaar, who had assumed control only six weeks before.9

Th e assurance agreements for the Lake Pontchartrain Project made the Corps responsible 

for designing and constructing the project. Local sponsors provided the land for levee 

construction and rights-of-way, and agreed to share the cost. Th e Corps was to turn the 

completed project over to the local sponsors for O&M consistent with the Corps’ standards, 

i.e., making sure the fl ood-control system actually works on a day-to-day basis and protects 

those living inside the system.10 To help the local sponsor do this, the Corps is required by 

its rules and regulations to provide the local sponsor with an operations manual11 and then 

conduct annual inspections to be sure the local sponsor is doing what it is supposed to do.12

In addition to its authority to build fl ood-control projects, the Corps also has statutory 

authority in federal cost-share fl ood-control projects like the Lake Pontchartrain Project to 

act in anticipation of, or response to, fl ood emergencies. In this role, the Corps may help 

the local sponsors deal with the fl ood threat to the levee system, and aid state and local 

governments trying to prevent fl ood damage. Th is “fl ood-fi ghting” authority is authorized 

by Public Law 84-99, also known as the “Flood Act.”13 In the days following Katrina, the 

Corps used its Flood Act authority to close off the levee breaches at the 17th Street and 

London Avenue Canals, which were fi lling the city with water, and to make other emergency repairs.14

The Orleans Levee District 

One of the local sponsors for the Lake Pontchartrain Project was the Orleans Levee District, 

one of the fi rst fi ve levee districts created by the state in 1879. Th e levee districts, which were 

established to be a funding source for and to ensure local involvement in levee construction and operation,15 all had the same general duty: to do what was necessary to “insure the 

thorough and adequate protection of the lands of the district from damage by fl ood ... for 

the adequate drainage control of the district.”16

Like the Corps under the Flood Act, the levee districts have broad statutory obligations in 

addition to their obligations under their assurance agreements on individual levee projects. 

For example, regardless whether a project was being designed and constructed by the Corps 

or had been turned over for O&M to the local sponsor, state law charged the levee districts 

with adopting rules and regulations for maintaining a “comprehensive levee system.”17 State 

law authorized them to obtain engineering assistance from the Louisiana Department of 

Transportation and Development (LA DOTD) in Baton Rouge if they needed additional 

technical expertise.18 State law also required levee-district board members to attend once 

during their term in offi ce an educational program on how to care for and inspect levees.19

To carry out their primary duty of fl ood control, state law not only authorized the levee 

districts to serve as local sponsors for federal cost-share projects, but also to raise money 

pursuant to taxing and bonding authorities. Th e Orleans Levee District, uniquely, was 

also authorized to engage in various business enterprises,20 making it an entity with some 

governmental qualities (taxing and bonding authority) and some corporate qualities – the 
Leves: Who’s in Charge?

131

authority to engage in for-profi t businesses like operating the Lakefront Airport, running 

two marinas along Lake Pontchartrain, and leasing dock space to a riverboat casino.21

Th e revenues the Orleans Levee District earned from the businesses and its taxing and 

bonding authority were substantial. Th e Orleans Levee District fi nancial statements for the 

fi scal year ending June 30, 2005, show it collected more than $24 million from property 

taxes and $14 million from its business-type activities in the previous 12 months.22 Th e 

same report said the district had $21 million in unallocated general funds and $13 million in 

a “special levee improvement fund.”23 Th e levee improvement fund, according to the levee 

district’s former president, James Huey, could “only be used for fl ood protection projects 

and/or fl ood-related projects.”24

Although the levee district’s primary responsibility was fl ood protection, it spent large 

amounts on non-fl ood related activities (e.g., licensing a casino, or operating an airport and 

marinas, or leasing space to a karate club, beautician schools or restaurants) rather than 

applying the money to fl ood protection or emergency preparedness.25 For example, the 

Orleans Levee District’s Emergency Operations Center (EOC) sat outside the protection of 

the levee system at the Lakefront Airport, vulnerable to the very hurricanes the levee system 

was designed to protect against.26 For years the district had studied moving its EOC inside 

the fl ood protection system, but never did.27 Th e levee district’s Chief Engineer, Stevan 

Spencer, described the situation as a “very bad joke” that dated back to at least 1998, when 

Hurricane Georges fl ooded the airport.28 Spencer said “there was never funding” to move 

the EOC.29 Yet in 2003, the Orleans Levee District spent $2.4 million to repair the “Mardi 

Gras Fountain” in a park near Lake Pontchartrain.30 When Katrina made landfall, Orleans 

Levee District staff had to be rescued, mostly by boat, from the fl ooded EOC at the airport31

before they could survey damage or assist with repair eff orts at the 17th Street and London 

Avenue Canals.

Th e Orleans Levee District was also aware of a levee in New Orleans East that was considered to be three feet below its design height.32 Levee-district board minutes and conversations with Corps personnel suggest that paying for repairs to this low levee was considered 

to be the Corps’ responsibility.33 Federal funding was unavailable, but instead of paying 

for the repairs itself and asking for reimbursement from the Corps, as it had with previous 

projects,34 the levee district merely sent letters to its Congressional delegation asking for 

federal funding.35

Pressed to explain how the Orleans Levee District made spending decisions, Huey off ered 

no direct explanation, but focused on the district’s multiple obligations – not only was the 

district responsible for fl ood control, but it also had statutory requirements to maintain 

recreational space and was authorized by state law to engage in non-fl ood related business 

ventures.36 A review of the levee-district board minutes of recent years revealed that the 

board and its various committees spent more time discussing its business operations than it 

did the fl ood-control system it was responsible for operating and maintaining.37

The Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development (LA DOTD)

Th ough not a party to the assurance agreements for the Lake Pontchartrain Project, LA 

DOTD and its Offi ce of Public Works (OPW) have statutory responsibilities to assist and 

oversee certain levee district functions. State law tasks LA DOTD with approving any activity that might compromise the levees,38 and with administering training sessions to leveedistrict board members and their inspectors on caring for and inspecting levees.39

To the extent training sessions were held, they were organized by the Association of Levee 

Boards of Louisiana, an organization that lists Edmund Preau as its Secretary-Treasurer.40
Chapter 10

132

Preau is an Assistant Secretary in LA DOTD and leads the OPW within the Department, 

which is responsible for LA DOTD’s levee-related activities.

When James Huey, who served on the levee district’s board for more than 13 years (nine as 

president), was read the section of state law describing the training requirement, he said it 

was the fi rst he had heard of it.41 Huey explained: “You know what that is? Th at’s going up 

to a workshop for a weekend and having a crawfi sh boil up here and hear a couple people 

talk about some things and they get a little piece of paper and they honored the law.”42

Huey was then asked whether the Association sessions addressed how to inspect levees. He 

responded, “No, nothing.”43

LA DOTD also had the statutory responsibility to “review” each levee district’s emergencyoperations manual every two years.44 According to Preau, this review entailed checking 

whether relevant contact information had been updated and whether the levee district had 

included any new fl ood-control systems within its jurisdiction in its planning.45 Th e review 

entailed no assessment of whether the levee district had stockpiled materials or had the personnel necessary to assess an emergency and respond accordingly.46 Preau said he assumed 

any more elaborate review would have been done by the Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland 

Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP).47

Louisiana’s Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) made the LA DOTD the primary state 

agency overseeing Emergency Support Function (ESF-3), Public Works and Engineering. 

ESF-3 encompassed critical infrastructure in the state, including the “construction, maintenance and repair of state fl ood control works.”48 ESF-3 also dictated that, “When an emergency is imminent, the ESF 3 Coordinator [who is to be designated by LA DOTD Secretary 

Johnny Bradberry] will assess the potential impact of the threat on the state’s infrastructure 

and work with other authorities to ensure that any necessary immediate repairs or arrangements for critical structures and facilities are initiated.”49 ESF-3 also said, “As the emergency 

progresses, the coordinator will monitor the status of the infrastructure and eff ect emergency repairs where needed and feasible.”50

Th e LA DOTD did not acknowledge or accept its responsibility under ESF-3. Preau told 

Committee investigators that he didn’t think the provision applied to LA DOTD: “I’m not 

sure what that means, because we don’t have any state fl ood control works. State doesn’t 

own any fl ood control works.”51 By Preau’s reading, a levee project was covered only if it was 

owned by the state, not simply if it was in the state. As Preau read it, LA DOTD had no responsibility to coordinate with levee districts on critical facilities like the Lake Pontchartrain 

Project. Th is response is problematic: the responsibilities articulated under ESF-3 are specifi -

cally delegated to the LA DOTD, and the plain language employed by the State’s Emergency 

Operations Plan cannot be unilaterally dismissed as meaningless by the people it covers.

Th e result was that neither LA DOTD nor any state agency made sure that the state’s levee 

districts were integrated into the state’s emergency-planning process, much less genuinely 

prepared for an emergency. As a result, when Katrina made landfall, no Orleans Levee 

District personnel were located at, or in contact with, emergency managers in Baton Rouge; 

nor was any mechanism in place to request additional support from the state.

Notwithstanding Preau’s insistence that the LA DOTD had no responsibilities under ESF-3 

for the levee system, LA DOTD ultimately played an active role in eff orts to close levee 

breaches in New Orleans in the aft ermath of Katrina.

Design and Construction of the Lake Pontchartrain Project

During Katrina, levees and fl oodwalls were overwhelmed throughout the New Orleans area, 

and in several places were breached. Some of these failures occurred in parts of the Lake 
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133

Pontchartrain Project. Understanding the link between the breaches and the nature and 

organization of the Lake Pontchartrain Project requires some background. 

Congress authorized the Lake Pontchartrain Project in the Flood Control Act of 1965 to 

provide hurricane protection to areas around Lake Pontchartrain in Orleans, Jeff erson, St. 

Bernard, and St. Charles Parishes.52 Th e project called for design and construction of about 

125 miles of levees and fl oodwalls to be completed by 1978 at a cost of $85 million. Th e 

project was still not complete when Katrina hit, and its cost had grown to more than $750 

million as of 2005.53

As authorized by Congress, the project was to protect the area from what the Corps called 

the “Standard Project Hurricane” (SPH), a model storm “based on the most severe combination of meteorological conditions considered reasonably characteristic of that region.”54

Th e SPH was developed in 1959 by what was then called the United States Weather Bureau, 

which updated the SPH aft er the devastating impact of Hurricane Betsy in 1965. Th e SPH 

was revised again in 1970, 1977, and 1979 by the Weather Bureau’s successor, the National 

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).55 Th ere is no evidence that design 

parameters of the Lake Pontchartrain Project were modifi ed in light of NOAA’s changes to 

the reference-model storm.56

Nevertheless, the Corps has repeatedly maintained that the SPH was the equivalent of a 

fast-moving Category 3 storm on the Saffi r-Simpson scale – a measurement scale that rates 

the strength of hurricanes on a scale of Category 1 to Category 5, with Category 5 being the 

most intense. For example, at a press conferences immediately aft er the storm, Lieutenant 

General Carl Strock, the Commander of the Corps and its Chief of Engineers, explicitly said 

that the Corps “knew” that the levee system “would protect from a Category 3 hurricane,”57

and the page on the Lake Pontchartrain Project on the Corps’ website aft er Katrina said, 

“Th e SPH is equivalent to a fast-moving Category 3 hurricane.”58

Th is claim is misleading: the Saffi r-Simpson scale was not adopted until 1977, 12 years aft er 

the Lake Pontchartrain Project was authorized. Al Naomi, the Corps’ Senior Project Manager for the project, acknowledged that the Corps never conducted a formal study comparing 

the SPH to the Saffi r-Simpson scale, so the claim that the Lake Pontchartrain Project provided Category 3 protection was at best a rough estimate, and at worst, simply inaccurate:

SPH has ... wind speed, central pressure, and surge. You go in and say what is 

my wind speed for an SPH? You look at it. It’s a very high Category 2 storm on 

the Saffi r-Simpson Scale. I look at my central pressure for SPH. I go to the Saffi r-Simpson Scale, it’s a mid-range Cat 4. I say, what is my surge? SPH surge in 

the lake at 11 and a half [feet] on the Saffi r-Simpson, that is a Category 3 range. 

What am I going to tell the Rotary Club? What do I have? Generally in talking to the hydrologist, you can say it’s about equivalent to a fast-moving Cat 3. 

It’s not really that, but for their understanding that is what you can say. Th at 

is what we say. What happens is the press gets this and it says we have Cat 3 

protection. Th at is not really true. It’s SPH protection which may be equivalent 

to a fast-moving Cat 3 storm.59

However, the view that the hurricane protection system could protect the greater New Orleans region from a moderate and/or fast-moving Category 3 storm was widely held within 

the Corps’ New Orleans District. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, the New Orleans District 

issued numerous news releases to the general public (some of which are referenced below), 

stating that the hurricane-protection system provided some level of Category 3 protection:
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• December 19, 2001, N.O. hurricane bridge contract awarded, Corps, Levee 

Board will fl oodproof two bridges in Gentilly: “Th e bridge fl oodproofi ng will 

protect neighborhoods along the London Avenue, Orleans Avenue and 17th 

Street Canals from storm surges from Lake Pontchartrain. Th e system of 

levees, fl oodwalls and bridges is designed to protect against fast-moving Category 3 hurricanes.”60

• May 27, 2003, Cross Bayou Drainage Structure to reduce fl ooding in St. 

Charles Parish: “Th e structure is part of the Lake Pontchartrain Hurricane 

Protection Project and is the second of fi ve such structures to be built in St. 

Charles Parish. ... Th ese contracts, to be completed in 2004, will result in a 

levee system that provides protection from a Category 3 storm for St. Charles 

Parish.”61

• August 21, 2003, Filmore Bridge in Gentilly will reopen on Friday, Aug. 22. 

Mirabeau Bridge is closing Wednesday, Aug. 27 for hurricane fl oodproofi ng: 

“Th e systems of levees, fl oodwalls and bridges is designed to protect against 

fast-moving Category 3 hurricanes.”62

Th is view was also held by the Corps’ New Orleans District Commander (Colonel Wagenaar63) and the District’s Emergency Manager (Michael Lowe64). Th e same representations 

were made in more substantive Corps written materials.65

Moreover, the Lake Pontchartrain Project, as it stood in the path of Katrina, was still not 

complete as designed. Some portions were still under construction, and soil subsidence 

(sinking) had left portions of the project with less elevation above sea level than intended. In 

other words, some elements of the project were not even high enough to protect against the 

Standard Project Hurricane, let alone a genuine Category 3 hurricane.

Th e Corps was well aware of this fact. As Jerry Colletti, the New Orleans District’s Manager 

for Completed Works explained, the Corps never tried “to provide full-level protection on 

an annual basis . . . we just can’t raise everything to the design height for each storm that 

would come through.”66

Meanwhile, the National Weather Service (NWS) concluded from a new model of projected 

storm surges that the Lake Pontchartrain Project would be more vulnerable to hurricanes 

than previously thought – that more Category 3 and even certain Category 2 hurricanes 

would overtop parts of the levee system and produce fl ooding.67 Dr. Wilson Shaff er, who 

studies storm surges at NWS, said this discovery was shared with the Corps, perhaps as early as 2003, but certainly by 2004. Th e fi ndings were also shared with LOHSEP and with state 

and local emergency managers at the Louisiana Emergency Preparedness Association’s June 

conferences in 2004 and 2005.68 At a minimum, this information should have prompted a 

fresh look at the adequacy of the Lake Pontchartrain Project, but like the NOAA updates to 

the Standard Project Hurricane in the 1970s, it does not appear that either the state or the 

Corps took any action to respond to the new information.

Effect of Subsidence on the Level of Protection

As noted earlier, the level of protection provided by the levee system was aff ected not only 

by its design, but also by geologic subsidence, or soil sinking. Th e entire coastal region of 

Louisiana had been subsiding for millions of years, as the enormous weight of the sediments 

continually deposited by the Mississippi River enters the Gulf of Mexico, pushing down 

on the earth’s crust. Human activities like extracting oil and natural gas, pumping water, 

raising buildings, and even adding to levees and fl oodwalls all accelerate subsidence. (See

Chapter 9.) As the entire region subsides, the eff ective height of the levees above sea level, 
Leves: Who’s in Charge?

135

and thus the level of protection they provide, decreases.69 A recent report concluded that a 

section of levee that was overtopped and failed during Katrina was nearly three feet below 

its design height.70

All of these factors should have persuaded the Corps to reconsider its public claims that the 

Lake Pontchartrain Project provided Category 3-level protection. 

Operation and Maintenance (O&M)

Maintaining a fl ood-control system is essential, but is complicated in southeast Louisiana 

by the recurring need to rebuild levees to compensate for subsidence. Th e Corps is not 

supposed to turn over a project until it is complete; until then, the Corps is responsible 

for O&M.71 Once a project is turned over, the local sponsor must conduct O&M to Corps 

standards “to obtain maximum benefi ts.”72 Th is includes checking for “undue settlement” 

of the levee, water seeping through or under it, and growth of damaging brush, and taking 

immediate action to address potential emergencies.73

Because the Lake Pontchartrain Project was not complete, according to the Corps’ Senior 

Project Manager for the project, Alfred Naomi, it had been formally turned over to the local 

sponsor, but remained in an “interim” status:

Th ere are still pieces that have to be done. We are not going to turn over a 

piece of the project until every piece in that ring of protection is completed. 

If there is one little thing left to do I think by regulation – I could be wrong. I 

think we have to have the entire system 100 percent complete so we turn over 

the entire segment that is protected, a certain area of the city.74

Nonetheless, the Corps did nominally turn over parts of the project to local sponsors to 

maintain when it determined that construction on that particular part or “reach” was complete.75 Th e Corps sent letters to the Orleans Levee District and others to this eff ect, informing each district that it now had O&M responsibility for that unit.76 Personnel within the 

Corps’ New Orleans District referred to these letters as “turnover letters” even though they 

were not the “offi cial total project completion turnover” letters.77 Th e Orleans Levee District 

did not respond to these letters or even acknowledge their receipt.78

When the Committee asked for copies of the de-facto turnover letters, it received only a 

limited response. Th e letters submitted did not cover the entire project, and some were pre1965, before the project was even authorized.79 In short, the exact legal status of the project 

segments and the degree to which the Corps and local sponsors like the Orleans Levee 

District were truly responsible for maintenance is at best uncertain.

Other confl icting and irregular procedures in the turnover process went beyond the turnover letters. Th e Corps was supposed to require local sponsors to report semi-annually to 

its District Engineer on inspection and O&M for the fl ood-control system.80 Colletti, the 

Corps’ Operations Manager for Completed Works, explained that the Corps unilaterally 

decided not to require the Orleans Levee District to provide the report.81 In addition, for 

each completed work, the Corps is required to give the local sponsor an operations manual.82 Colletti said his offi ce gave no such manual to the Orleans Levee District for levees and 

fl oodwalls, but merely provided a one-page set of guidelines similar to a part of the Code of 

Federal Regulations that detailed obligations of local sponsors.83

Th e Corps’ observance of rules and regulations for completed projects took the form of 

a required annual inspection conducted around June 1 – the start of hurricane season 

– by representatives from the Corps, the Orleans Levee District, the LA DOTD, and other 

interested parties (e.g., the City and the Port of New Orleans).84 Th ese inspections appear to 
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136

have taken about four hours, covered at least a hundred miles of levees and fl oodwalls,85 and 

would usually involve a motorcade that would stop at pre-determined spots to allow the 

group to look over an area and discuss issues.86 Th e purpose of the inspections, according to 

the Corps, was to ensure O&M compliance by the local sponsor, but not to test the system’s 

actual structural integrity or measure whether it was at design height.87 Perhaps the most 

colorful explanation of the annual inspection was off ered by former Orleans Levee District 

president Huey, who suggested that the event was more of a social occasion than a genuine 

technical inspection:

Th ey normally meet and get some beignets [pastries] and coff ee in the morning 

and get to the buses. And the colonel and the brass are all dressed up. You have 

commissioners, they have some news cameras following you around and you 

have your little beignets and then you have a nice lunch somewhere or whatever. And that’s what the inspections are about.88

Ineffective Inspection Regime

Th e weaknesses of this inspection approach can be seen in the last pre-Katrina annual inspection of the Lake Pontchartrain Project in May 2005. It apparently did not address some 

known vulnerabilities. Th e W-30 Floodgate along the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal had 

been destroyed by a train accident in 2004 by the New Orleans Public Belt Railroad.89 Th is 

gate was intended to close off the levee at a point where the railroad track passed through 

it. Th e railroad had provided money for repairs,90 but the fl oodgate was still broken when 

Katrina struck, even though Huey, then board president, told an April 5, 2005, levee-district 

board meeting that he considered the broken gate to be an “emergency.”91 Under state law, 

Huey had the authority to address such emergencies without going through the standard 

contracting process.92 Asked why he did not use his emergency authority to repair the gate 

before hurricane season, Huey simply said, “I do not know. My bottom-line, straightforward answer: I don’t know.”93

Another problem apparently not dealt with in the annual inspection was a levee in New 

Orleans East that was three feet short of its design height. Like the W-30 fl oodgate, the 

problem remained unaddressed when Katrina made landfall, even though Naomi, the 

Corps’ Senior Project Manager, considered repair “vital” to protecting the city.94 In addition, Corps rules and regulations for completed works require local sponsors, like the 

Orleans Levee District, to fi x defects promptly.95 Finally, the Corps’ rules on levees require 

local sponsors to ensure that “No trees exist, the roots of which might extend under the wall 

and off er accelerated seepage paths.”96 However, one of the forensic teams investigating the 

levees’ failure, and Corps offi cials, found trees growing along the 17th Street and London 

Avenue Canals.97 In spite of the major defects requiring repairs, the Orleans Levee District’s 

Chief Engineer said he expected the district to get “an outstanding review in regards to the 

maintenance of the levees” from the 2005 inspection.98

Th e Committee learned during its investigation that the 17th Street and London Avenue 

Canal fl oodwalls weren’t part of the 2005 inspection because they were inaccessible by car. 

It appears likely that they were never inspected by the Corps aft er construction was fi nished 

in the early 1990s,99 partially because the fl oodwalls abutted private property, which made 

them diffi cult, but certainly not impossible, to access.100 It seems likely that the only physical 

inspections they received would have been conducted by Orleans Levee District personnel 

mowing the grass, making visual inspections, and identifying problems like holes dug by 

wild animals, signifi cant erosion, etc. Th e personnel responsible for this work received no 

specialized training on care or inspection of levees and fl oodwalls,101 and supporting documentation of these inspections comprised nothing more than worker timesheets indicat-
Leves: Who’s in Charge?

137

ing the work conducted, such as mowing the grass, the location of the work, and the hours 

spent doing the job.102

When asked who was responsible for fi xing problems once they were identifi ed, Orleans 

Levee District leadership explained that there was an undocumented understanding that “major” problems would be brought to the attention of the Corps and “minor” problems would 

remain the responsibility of levee district personnel.103 However, and as noted by the Orleans 

Levee District Chief Engineer, Stevan Spencer, the district’s total in-house, engineering expertise amounted to three engineers104 – a level of expertise not on par with the challenges posed 

by the hurricane protection system within the jurisdiction of the Orleans Levee District.

Th e only other inspection the Orleans Levee District claims to have made of the levees was 

a fi eld survey of fl oodwall heights every two to three years to check for subsidence.105 If 

the Orleans Levee District did, in fact, conduct these surveys, it did not identify the severity of the subsidence along the 17th Street and London Avenue Canals documented by the 

Corps’ forensic team.106 Th e Orleans Levee District certainly did not conduct any structural 

analysis of the fl oodwalls; nevertheless, when asked by the Committee about the quality of 

the Orleans Levee District’s operations and maintenance regime over the years, Colletti said 

that the Corps “felt that they’ve done an outstanding job.”107

Th e Orleans Levee District’s O&M practices and the passive oversight by the Corps did not 

meet what experts consider to be the standard of care for a fl ood control system like the 

Lake Pontchartrain Project. For example, in a letter to the Committee, Dr. Ernst G. Frankel 

of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology explained that visual surveys are not suffi cient 

because potentially catastrophic voids can occur well below the surface of the levees. To 

expose internal degradation, holes must be drilled in the levees to retrieve core samples for 

analysis. Acoustic equipment can be used to scan the density of material layers at various 

depths.108 No entity conducted such an analysis of the New Orleans fl ood-control structures,109 nor were eff orts made by the Levee District to obtain equipment to improve its 

inspection regime.110 Professor Frankel added that inspection of levees below the waterline 

was also necessary to detect hidden threats to their integrity. Th e Orleans Levee District’s 

simple visual inspections failed in this respect as well. 

Lack of Coordination with the Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans 

Because New Orleans and surrounding parishes are below sea level and ringed by levees, 

rain and fl ood waters that enter must be pumped out. Th e Sewerage and Water Board of 

New Orleans (the Water Board) has the responsibility for maintaining a system of pumps 

and canals for this purpose. (Th e Water Board also runs the municipal water and sewer 

systems.) Floodwalls along two of these drainage, or outfall, canals sustained major breaches 

– the 17th Street and London Avenue Canals. However, the Orleans Levee District and the 

Corps, at least to the extent the Corps had not turned over the entire project to the local 

sponsor, are responsible for the fl oodwalls that line these canals.

In the aft ermath of Katrina, the New Orleans Times-Picayune newspaper reported that six 

months before Katrina, several residents near the 17th Street Canal told the Water Board 

that they had found water in their yards.111 (A similar story was carried by National Public 

Radio.)112 Following the Times Picayune report, the Water Board conducted an inquiry into 

these allegations and concluded that the water reported by these property owners was coming from a water-service line and not from the canal. Th is conclusion was documented in a 

letter from the Water Board to the Times-Picayune and provided to the Committee.113

Th e 17th Street Canal fl oodwall broke within several hundred feet of where the water seepage was reported. Th e Committee was not able to independently confi rm either the news 

reports or the Water Board’s explanation. However, it is clear that the Water Board had no 
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plan in place or arrangement with either the Corps or the Orleans Levee District to address 

this sort of situation. Th e Water Board’s Executive Director, Marcia St. Martin, explained 

how her organization dealt with such situations:

What we do is if a person says that there’s water that’s ponding in front of my 

house, we look to see whether or not a Board asset, which is the water meter, 

has a defect or a leak. If we determine it has a defect or a leak, we repair it. If we 

determine it’s not coming from the Board’s asset, we say to the customer, “It has 

to be a private property leak and you need to seek the services of a plumber.”114

Th e Corps has relied on local residents to inform it about these types of problems, but had 

no public outreach program to urge residents to do so.115 When the Corps did receive reports 

of seepage or other issues, it had no process to formally document and address the issues.116

Likewise, the Orleans Levee District had no plan to reach out or communicate with residents 

to encourage the identifi cation or the sharing of reports of leakage or other problems.117

Emergency Response

Louisiana law requires levee districts to have emergency plans. Th e Orleans Levee District 

had such a plan, but the plan did not contemplate repairing major breaches like those 

experienced along the 17th Street and London Avenue Canals.118 Instead, the levee district 

assumed that, consistent with the informal distinction it used in classifying O&M problems 

– that minor problems were its responsibility and major problems were the Corps’ responsibility – fi xing any breach in the system would be the Corps’ responsibility because it would 

be “major.”119 Th e Corps, meanwhile, was under the impression that the Lake Pontchartrain 

Project had been turned over to the levee district and so it was the levee district’s responsibility to be the fi rst responders for any emergency, regardless of the size.120 Th e confl icting 

expectations resulted in a breakdown in the preparation for and response to Katrina among 

all involved – the Corps, the LA DOTD, and the Orleans Levee District. 

At the Committee’s December 15, 2005 hearing, “Hurricane Katrina: Who’s in Charge of 

the New Orleans Levees?” the parties involved had no agreement on emergency responsibilities. Chairman Susan Collins asked the witnesses – Colonel Wagenaar, head of the 

Corps’ New Orleans District; Preau, LA DOTD’s Assistant Secretary for the Offi ce of Public 

Works; and James Huey, former President of the Orleans Levee Board on August 29, 2005 

– about their responsibilities. Chairman Collins received three diff erent answers:

Colonel Wagenaar (Corps of Engineers): Senator, my original thought was 

that it was the Orleans Levee District.121

Mr. Preau (Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development): 

Originally, levee districts are supposed to be fi rst responders on situations like 

this. If it is beyond their control, beyond their resources, then it would move 

up to the state level to take over. I think it was beyond the state’s resources at 

that point. We looked towards the federal government, who had a lot more resources than we did, and who we’ve relied upon in the past to do major repairs. 

If you read the project agreements, most major repairs are to be undertaken by 

the Corps of Engineers on federal projects.122

Mr. Huey (former President, Orleans Levee Board): First of all, it is unequivocally, I would say, the Corps of Engineers.123

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Plans and Preparations

Th e Corps eventually assumed responsibility on September 1 – three days aft er the storm 

– for closing the 17th Street Canal and London Avenue Canal breaches, but institutional 
Leves: Who’s in Charge?

139

confusion over who was in charge and inadequate preparations delayed its taking the lead 

on repairs. On the morning of Katrina’s landfall, August 29, as explained to the Committee, 

Colonel Wagenaar was under the impression that the Orleans Levee District was responsible for the Lake Pontchartrain Project and for responding to emergencies.124 Consistent 

with this understanding, Colonel Wagenaar explained to the Committee that his command 

did not pre-position personnel to survey possible breaches or material to fi ll a possible 

breach beyond what was already available through the Corps’ routine operations.125 Moreover, the Corps did not have any standing contracts with contractors to respond to an 

emergency situation.126

Th e Corps’ New Orleans District did not suff er from a lack of available emergency plans, 

though it is unclear whether any were complete, ready for implementation, or followed. For 

example, the New Orleans District had an Emergency Operations Plan and an accompanying letter of July 2005 from Colonel Wagenaar affi rming that the plan was in eff ect should it 

be needed; but, when asked whether the Corps’ New Orleans District followed the Emergency Operations Plan when it responded to Katrina, he responded, “Yeah. I mean, probably was. I don’t know.”127

Th e District had other plans as well. Versions of an “All Hazards Contingency Plan,” a 

“Continuity of Operations Plan,” a “Catastrophic Disaster Response Plan” and various versions of an unwatering plan128 for removing fl oodwater from the city were all provided to 

the Committee in response to its document requests for any emergency plans in eff ect on 

August 23. Th e Corps’ Emergency Manager in New Orleans explained that the Corps was 

considering combining the plans or perhaps shortening them. He said that the District was 

asking questions like, “Do we go from fl ood plan to hurricane plan to all hazards plan? Does 

it become too cumbersome? Should we have smaller plans so people actually read them? I 

think we were moving back to a specifi c hurricane plan.”129 It does not appear that any of 

the plans were complete, let alone followed. 

In Colonel Wagenaar’s defense, the Mississippi Valley Division’s Hurricane Contingency 

Plan (Contingency Plan) contemplated a hurricane of Katrina’s strength hitting the city and 

rendering the New Orleans District a victim, incapable of executing Corps missions or obligations under the assurance agreements for the Lake Pontchartrain Project, the National 

Response Plan (NRP) or the Flood Control Act.130 Th e Contingency Plan called on other 

Corps districts within the Mississippi Valley Division like St. Louis, Vicksburg, and Memphis to carry out the New Orleans District’s missions.131 For example, the Contingency Plan 

stated that the Corps’ St. Louis District would perform civil-works missions, which include 

project inspections, emergency repair of damaged facilities, and any Flood Act activities.132

Despite the decision by Colonel Wagenaar to evacuate his personnel before landfall in accordance with the plan, there appears to have been confusion and delay in pre-positioning 

the resources of the other districts or reassigning the New Orleans district’s responsibilities 

to the other districts within the Mississippi Valley Division. In fact, the commander of the 

Mississippi River Division did not issue the order implementing the Contingency Plan until 

September 3, nearly fi ve days aft er the storm and two days aft er the Corps took control of 

the repair eff orts along the 17th Street Canal and London Avenue Canal.133

Closing the Breaches – Confl ict and Confusion

With Katrina approaching, and even though the Contingency Plan provided that his district 

be considered a victim of the storm, Colonel Wagenaar chose to personally wait out the 

hurricane with a small staff in the New Orleans District’s hurricane bunker. On the morning of August 29, Colonel Wagenaar said he was notifi ed about possible breaches as early as 

5 a.m.134 Around 2 or 3 p.m., aft er the weather calmed, he tried to make his way to the 17th 

Street Canal by four-wheel drive vehicle: no helicopters were immediately available, and no 
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140

pre-storm eff orts had been made to secure one.135 Because of damage to the area, Colonel 

Wagenaar was only able to reach the intersection of I-10 and I-610, just north of Metairie 

Cemetery and just a few blocks east of the 17th Street Canal, where he was able to view the 

fl ooding fi rst hand. He saw:

people everywhere, and then we saw the water, and the water was – all you 

could see were the trees sticking out of the water, so I knew that – I mean, 

that’s probably 10 or 15 feet of water. ... I knew we had a problem. Th is water 

had to come from somewhere. I didn’t know where, but I knew that we had a 

problem.136

 Th roughout the previous night and the following day, Colonel Wagenaar encountered diffi culties with communications. His satellite phone worked sporadically and e-mail became 

inoperable when the servers shut down.137 However, Colonel Wagenaar was able to send an 

e-mail later Monday evening aft er his failed attempt to reach the 17th Street 

Canal to his commander at the Mississippi Valley Division. He informed Brigadier General 

Robert Crear that he had seen “15+ feet of water” and that there were unoffi cial reports 

that more than 40,000 homes were underwater in East Orleans and St. Bernard Parishes.138

Colonel Wagenaar had no dedicated communications with the Orleans Levee District, the 

LA DOTD or even the Coast Guard. In fact, Colonel Wagenaar was unaware that the Coast 

Guard was fl ying missions over the city on August 29 – “Th e fi rst time I knew they fl ew over 

the city was when I got back [to the District offi ce] and was watching the news [video footage of the fl ooding] and going, ‘Where the hell did that come from?’”139

At about 7:15 the next morning, August 30, Colonel Wagenaar sent two members of his 

staff to assess the breaches.140 Th ough the Corps believed that the levee districts would be 

the fi rst responders for any breaches,141 Colonel Wagenaar proceeded to discuss ways to repair the fl oodwall breaches with the New Orleans District’s Chief of Engineering. Any plans 

that were discussed were hampered by not having materials, personnel, or aircraft pre-positioned to survey the damage and make repairs.142 Colonel Wagenaar was not able to carry 

out an air survey of the New Orleans area until late Tuesday morning.143

Also on Tuesday and carrying over to Wednesday, LA DOTD employees surveyed the 

breaches and began working with the West Jeff erson Levee District – a neighboring levee 

district, not directly impacted by the fl ooding, that had volunteered material and personnel 

to help – and whatever Orleans Levee District personnel were available to devise a way to 

close the breaches. Th ey generally agreed upon a plan to dump as much broken-up concrete 

as possible into the holes in the fl oodwalls.144 Th e Corps’ personnel who were able to make it 

to the scene believed it would be more effi cient to drive sheet pile (long steel sheets) across 

the mouth of the canal itself to prevent more water from entering the canal and making its 

way through the breaches.145 Th e levee districts, the LA DOTD, and the Water Board opposed closing off the canal and insisted on moving forward with their original plan, which 

included building a road to access the breaches to dump the concrete. Colonel Wagenaar 

was asked about the disagreement:

Who was doing it, who was in charge, you know, and what parish was what 

and who could build what road and what trucks could be used and what equipment could be used, you know. ... I mean, the issue was, is the. ... [West Jefferson] Levee District had like fi ve trucks, dump trucks and an excavator. And 

here we bring in a contractor that’s ready to go that’s got 20 trucks. ... I mean, 

we’re bringing federal contractors – we’re bringing the federal government to 

bear on the problem. And they [the West Jeff erson Levee District] were like, 

“Well, you can’t do that, that’s our road.” Th ey were working on building this 
Leves: Who’s in Charge?

141

road back there. “Well, you can’t” – you know, “We’re building the road, you 

can’t do that.” ... I mean, all – pretty much a turf war almost. ... And it just 

got to the point where, you know, we were mobilizing contractors . . . and they 

wouldn’t let us operate on the bridge [the Hammond Highway Bridge]. Mike 

Stack [with LA DOTD] and – you know, Giuseppe [with the West Jeff erson Levee District] blocked some of our equipment from moving with his vehicles.146

Th is disagreement illustrated the overall confusion among federal, state, and local entities 

over who was responsible for the Lake Pontchartrain Project. As mentioned above, Colonel 

Wagenaar thought the levee districts were responsible for the repairs,147 but the Orleans Levee District did not have the personnel or the material available to address the situation. Th e 

leadership vacuum was fi lled by LA DOTD personnel who assumed command of the initial 

repair eff orts.148 Th at eff ort, too, proved inadequate, at least according to Colonel Wagenaar, 

who thought it was best that the Corps take over149 – “[W]e had a bunch of dysfunctional 

stuff going on out there, and we fi gured if we didn’t do it and take over and marshal federal 

resources at this problem, that we’d be here for quite a while trying to fi x this hole.”150

Th e levee districts and the LA DOTD personnel on the scene did not agree with Colonel 

Wagenaar’s decision, so ultimately, on Th ursday, September 1, LA DOTD Secretary Johnny 

Bradberry, and the Corps’ Director of Civil Works, Major General Don Riley, resolved the 

dispute, concluding that the repair eff ort would be a Corps-directed operation.151 Colonel Wagenaar explained that, in pressing for control of the repair eff ort, he was relying on the Corps’ 

authority under the Flood Act, an authority the Corps had regardless of who was in charge of 

the Lake Pontchartrain Project, to act independently of the assurance agreements and any action the Corps had taken to turn over the fl oodwalls to the Orleans Levee District for O&M.152

When General Crear issued his order implementing the Mississippi Valley Division’s Hurricane Contingency Plan on September 3, he, too, cited the Corps’ Flood Act authority as the 

basis to “provide critical emergency support to the people of the aff ected areas.”153

Conclusion

Resolving the dispute over who was in charge of the repair eff ort and the full-scale eff orts 

to fi ll the breaches took three days. No such dispute should have occurred, and resolution 

should not have taken so long. Responsibilities among the levee districts, the LA DOTD, and 

the Corps should have been understood and documented. An interagency emergency response plan should have been in eff ect. Th e Corps should have pre-positioned personnel and 

material from either the New Orleans District, or the other districts within the Mississippi 

Valley Division and identifi ed in the Division’s Hurricane Contingency Plan, to assess and repair immediate problems. In the end, neither the Corps, the LA DOTD, nor the levee districts 

had any plan in place, nor had they determined or planned in advance who would be responsible for, and have the assets nearby, to address a major breach of the levees or fl oodwalls.

1 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force, Performance Evaluation Plan and 

Interim Status, Report 2 of a Series, Mar. 10, 2006, pp. IV–1 through IV–39 [hereinaft er IPET, Report 2 of a Series].

2 Testimony of Max Hearn, Director, Orleans Levee District, LA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland 

Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Who’s in Charge of the New Orleans Levees?, Dec. 15, 

2005.

3 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Th e Civil Works Program of the Army Corps of Engineers: A 

Primer, by Nicole T. Carter and Betsy A. Cody, Dec. 9, 2005, p. 3 [hereinaft er CRS, Th e Civil Works Program].

4 CRS, Th e Civil Works Program, p. 1. 
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5 Congressional direction usually comes through authorization legislation like the Water Resources Development Act, 

which Congress tends to consider every two years, or as part of the annual appropriations process. U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service, Water Resources Development Act (WRDA): Army Corps of Engineers Authorization Issues in the 109th Congress, by Nicole T. Carter. Mar. 13, 2006, p. 2.

6 Supplemental Agreement Between the United States of America and the Orleans Levee District for Local Cooperation 

at Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity High Level Plan, June 21, 1985. Th is agreement included a common O&M provision that could be found in other assurance agreements. It stated, in part, that the Orleans Levee District was required 

to “[m]aintain and operate all features of the project in accord with regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Army, 

including levees, fl oodgates and approach channels, drainage structures, drainage ditches, or canals, fl oodwalls, and 

stoplog structures.” 

7 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, New Orleans District, “Mississippi Valley Division Work Flood Control Act Project 

Maps,” last updated on June 10, 1998. http://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/eng2/edsd/proj_maps/pmap_fcp2.htm. Accessed 

on Apr. 11, 2006.

8 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, New Orleans District, “Who We Are.” http://www.mvn.usace.mil/pao/whoweare/index/asp. Accessed on Apr. 21, 2006.

9 Committee staff interview of Col. Richard Wagenaar, District Commander, New Orleans District, U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers, conducted on Nov. 15, 2005, transcript p. 16.

10 A common provision in the assurance agreements for the Lake Pontchartrain Project required the Orleans Levee District to “[m]aintain and operate all features of the project in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the 

Army, including levees, fl oodgates and approach channels.” Various Assurance Agreements for Lake Pontchartrain and 

Vicinity Protection Project, dates vary. Provided to Committee; Written Statement of Anu K. Mittal, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, Government Accountability Offi ce, for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Who’s in Charge of the New Orleans Levees?, Dec. 15, 2005, pp. 1-2.

11 33 C.F.R. § 208.10.

12 Committee staff interview of Jerry Colletti, U.S. Army, Operations Manager for Completed Works, New Orleans 

District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, conducted on Nov. 22, 2005, transcript, pp. 19-27.

13 33 U.S.C. § 701n.

14 Col. Wagenaar interview, Nov. 15, 2005, pp. 114-115; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Mississippi Valley Division, 

Operations Order 01-05 (Hurricane Katrina), MVD Hurricane Contigency Plan 18 May 2005, Sept. 3, 2005. Provided to 

Committee [hereinaft er, Mississippi Valley Division, Operations Order 01-05, Sept. 3, 2005].

15 Edmond J. Preau, Jr., Association of Levee Boards of Louisiana,“Th e History and Function of Louisiana’s Levee 

Boards,” PowerPoint presentation. http://www.albl.org/workshops.php. Accessed on Mar. 22, 2005.

16 La. R.S. 38:306.

17 La. R.S. 38:306 (B).

18 La. R.S. 38:306 (B) and (C).

19 La. R.S. 38:301 (B).

20 La. Const. Art. VI, § 39; La. Const. Art. VI, § 41; La. R.S. 38:307; La. R.S. 38:335.

21 La. R.S. 38:306 (B). As of June 2005, there were estimates that the casino lease generated about 20 percent of the 

Orleans Levee District’s revenue. Orleans Levee District, Basic Financial Statement, June 30, 2005, p. ix; Committee 

staff interview of Steven Spencer, U.S. Army, Chief Engineer, Orleans Levee District, U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, 

conducted on Nov. 14, 2005, transcript pp. 123-124.

22 Orleans Levee District, Basic Financial Statements, June 30, 2005, p. 14. Provided to Committee.

23 Orleans Levee District, Basic Financial Statements, June 30, 2005, p. 16. Provided to Committee.

24 Committee staff interview of James Huey, former President, Orleans Levee Board, LA, conducted on Nov. 29, 2005, 

transcript p. 19.

25 Orleans Levee District, Basic Financial Statements, June 30, 2005, p. 14. See also: Testimony of James Huey, former 

President, Orleans Levee Board, LA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Who’s in Charge of the New Orleans Levees?, Dec. 15, 2005 (“[Senator Collins:] ... 

And, in fact, when we reviewed the minutes of the board’s meetings, we found that a majority of the meeting time was 

actually spent discussing these commercial enterprises, whether it was the licensing of the casino or the operations of 

the airport or the marinas or the commercial leases with the karate business and the beauty shop and the restaurants. 

Do you think it is appropriate for the board to be involved in these commercial activities? Do those business activities 

detract time and attention from what is truly the mission of the board, which is to ensure the safety, the maintenance, 

the operations of the levees?” “[Mr. Huey:] Yes and no.”). 

26 Spencer interview, Nov. 14, 2005, pp. 66-67; Committee staff interview of Max Hearn, Executive Director, Orleans 

Levee District, LA, conducted Nov. 14, 2005, transcript pp. 59-60.

27 Hearn interview, Nov. 14, 2005, pp. 59-60.

28 Spencer interview, Nov. 14, 2005, p. 67.
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143

29 Spencer interview, Nov. 14, 2005, p. 67.

30 Money for the fountain came from the levee district’s capital projects fund which was supported by funding from 

property taxes. Frank Donze, “Lakeside Legacy Lives,” New Orleans Times-Picayune, July 12, 2004, Metro, p. 1.

31 Hearn interview, Nov. 14, 2005, pp. 31-32.

32 Orleans Levee District, Minutes of Joint Finance and Planning, Engineering and Construction Committee Meeting, 

July 5, 2005, p. 2. Provided to Committee [hereinaft er Orleans Levee District, Minutes of Committee Meeting, July 5, 

2005].

33 Orleans Levee District, Minutes of Committee Meeting, July 5, 2005, p. 2. 

34 Hearn, Senate Committee hearing, Dec. 15, 2005.

35 Orleans Levee District, Minutes of Committee Meeting, July 5, 2005, p. 2.

36 Huey interview, Nov. 29, 2005, pp. 30-33.

37 La. R.S. 38:306. 

38 La. R.S. 38:213; Committee staff interview of Edmund Preau, Assistant Secretary, Public Works and Inter-Modal Transportation, Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development, conducted on Nov. 17, 2005, transcript p. 38.

39 La. R.S. 38:301(B).

40 Huey interview, Nov. 29 2005, pp. 100-105; Association of Levee Boards of Louisiana, “About ALBL.” http://www.

albl.org/about_us.php. Accessed on Mar. 22, 2006.

41 Huey interview, Nov. 29, 2005, p. 101.

42 Huey interview, Nov. 29, 2005, p. 104.

43 Huey interview, Nov. 29, 2005, p. 105; Hearn interview, Nov. 14, 2005, pp. 44-45.

44 La. R.S. 38:319. 

45 Preau interview, Nov. 17, 2005, pp. 41-42.

46 Preau interview, Nov. 17, 2005, pp. 41-42.

47 Preau interview, Nov. 17, 2005, pp. 44-45.

48 Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, Emergency Operations Plan, Apr. 2005, p. ESF3-1 [hereinaft er Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan, Apr. 2005].

49 Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan, Apr. 2005, p. ESF–3–2.

50 Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan, Apr. 2005, p. ESF–3–2.

51 Preau interview, Nov. 17, 2005, pp. 91-92.

52 Written Statement of Mittal, Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works hearing, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 2.

53 Written Statement of Mittal, Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works hearing, Nov. 9, 2005, “What 

GAO Found,” and pp. 1-2.

54 Written Statement of Mittal, Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works hearing, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 4.

55 IPET, Report 2 of a Series, p. IV–13. 

56 Th ough the level of protection that the Lake Pontchartrain Project was supposed to provide did not change once it 

was underway, the plan for building the project did. Th e initial design authorized in 1965 followed what was called the 

“Barrier Plan.” Th is plan called for the construction of a barrier on the eastern edge of Lake Pontchartrain for the purpose of preventing storm surges from entering Lake Pontchartrain. Th is would have lowered the threat of storm surges 

rising in the lake and threatening the lake front levees and the communities they protected. However, in 1977, a federal 

district court issued a ruling enjoining the Crops from pursuing the Barrier Plan until the Corps addressed problems 

with the project’s environmental impact statement. Source: Written Statement of Mittal, Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works hearing, Nov. 9, 2005, pp. 1-9. 

In 1984, the Corps commissioned a reevaluation study to analyze the continued feasibility of the Barrier Plan and 

whether the Corps should opt for an alternative design called the “High-Level Plan.” Th e High-Level Plan, which had 

been considered in 1965 and rejected, called for raising and strengthening the levees and fl oodwalls that would be affected by a storm surge from Lake Pontchartrain rather than building the barrier. Th e reevaluation study concluded that 

the High-Level Plan was more feasible and served as the impetus for changing the design of the project. Source: Written 

Statement of Mittal, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005, pp. 1-9. 

During Katrina, there were several breaches along levees and fl oodwalls constructed as part of the High-Level Plan. In 

the aft ermath of Katrina, there has been debate as to whether the Barrier Plan would have been more eff ective in fending 

off the storm surge. Th e position of the Corps of Engineers is that plans would have provided the same level of protection because they both would have been designed to the same standard – the Standard Project Hurricane – and would 

not have materially altered the outcome. As explained in recent Senate testimony by Daniel Hitchings, an offi cial with 

the Mississippi Valley Division of the Corps:

I would also like to correct one statement that was made earlier, I believe was related to the previously 
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144

proposed Barrier Plan, in that it would not have made any diff erence. Th at statement I believe is accurate, but it is accurate not because it was an inadequate plan, and not because the storms would have 

gone up the MRGO [Mississippi River – Gulf Outlet – a shipping channel that connects to the Gulf of 

Mexico] anyway. It would not have made a diff erence because its authorized level was still the standard 

project hurricane. 

Source: Testimony of Daniel Hitchings, Director, Task Force HOPE, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Environment and Public Works, hearing to “Evaluate the Degree to Which the Preliminary Findings 

on the Failure of the Levees are Being Incorporated Into the Restoration of Hurricane Protection,” Nov. 17, 2005. 

57 Lt. Gen. Carl Strock, Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, “Defense Department Special Briefi ng on Eff orts to 

Mitigate Infrastructure Damage from Hurricane Katrina,” press briefi ng, Sept. 2, 2005.

58 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, New Orleans District, Project Fact Sheet, “Lake Pontchartrain, LA. and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project, St. Bernard, Orleans, Jeff erson, and St. Charles Parishes, LA.” Last updated on May, 23, 2005. 

http://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/pao/response/HURPROJ.asp?prj=lkpon1. Accessed on Apr. 11, 2006.

59 Committee staff interview of Alfred Naomi, Senior Project Manager, Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project, New Orleans District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, conducted on Nov. 16, 2005, transcript pp. 50-51.

60 Army Corps of Engineers, New Orleans District, “N.O. hurricane bridge contract awarded, Corps, Levee Board will 

fl oodproof two bridges in Gentilly,” news release, Dec. 19, 2001.

61 Army Corps of Engineers, New Orleans District, “Cross Bayou Drainage Structure to reduce fl ooding in St. Charles 

Parish,” news release, May 27, 2003.

62 Army Corps of Engineers, New Orleans District, “Filmore Bridge in Gentilly will reopen on Friday, Aug. 22. Mirabeau Bridge is closing Wednesday, Aug. 27 for hurricane fl oodproofi ng,” news release, Aug. 21, 2003.

63 Col. Wagenaar interview, Nov. 15, 2005, p. 94 (“But, I mean, I knew that the city – I’d been briefed, you know, hurricane protection-wise, that generally the city could take a fast-moving Category 3, and anything else could be catastrophic. I mean, I was told that.”). 

64 Committee staff interview of Michael Lowe, Emergency Manager, New Orleans District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, conducted on Nov. 16, 2005, transcript p. 74 (“My understanding of the level of protection in the New Orleans 

area is a fast moving Category 3 hurricane on the Saffi r-Simpson Scale. How I came about saying that, or my understanding of that, is mainly what I hear from the project manager who is deal – working on the hurricane systems.”). See 

also: Lowe interview, Nov. 16, 2005, pp. 73-77, 81.

65 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, New Orleans District, Un-Watering Plan, Greater Metropolitan Area, New Orleans, 

Louisiana, Aug. 18, 2000, p. 3. See also: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Hurricane Protection, Louisiana, June 28, 2002, p. 9.

66 Colletti interview, Nov. 22, 2005, transcript p. 22.

67 Committee staff interview of Wilson Shaff er, Ph.D., Chief, Evaluations Branch, National Weather Service, conducted 

on Feb. 24, 2005, transcript pp. 38-41.

68 Shaff er interview, Feb. 24, 2006, pp. 37, 61-67.

69 Written Statement of Roy K. Dokka, Ph.D., Director, Louisiana Spatial Reference Center and Center for GeoInformatics, Louisiana State University, for the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Water Resources and Environment, hearing on Expert Views on Hurricane and Flood Protection 

and Water Resources Planning for a Rebuilt Gulf Coast, Oct. 20, 2005, pp. 2-6.

70 IPET, Report 2 of a Series, p. I–2

71 Mittal, Senate Committee hearing, Dec. 15, 2005; Naomi interview, Nov. 16, 2005, pp. 18-21.

72 33 C.F.R. § 208.10(a)(1).

73 33 C.F.R. § 208.10.

74 Naomi interview, Nov. 16, 2005, pp. 19-20. Mr. Hearn agreed that the Lake Pontchartrain Project had not been formally turned over to the Orleans Levee District. Hearn interview, Nov. 14, 2005, p. 76.

75 Colletti interview, Nov. 22, 2005, pp. 11-16.

76 Colletti interview, Nov. 22, 2005, pp. 11-16.

77 Colletti interview, Nov. 22, 2005, pp. 16-17.

78 Colletti interview, Nov. 22, 2005, p. 17.

79 In preparation for the Committee’s December 15 hearing on the levee system, the Committee asked GAO to investigate whether parts or all of the Lake Pontchartrain Project had been turned over. Th e GAO report stated that, according 

to the Corps and the task force charged with rebuilding the levee system –Task Force Guardian, all but three sections of 

the Lake Pontchartrain Project in New Orleans had been turned over to the Orleans Levee District. Th e criteria used by 

the Corps and Task Force Guardian to make this determination were: (1) if the project unit was at its design height; (2) 

whether portions of the project was being operated and maintained by the Orleans Levee District; and (3) if the portion 

of the project had passed the annual inspection for completed works in accordance with Corps regulations. Neither the 

Corps nor Task Force Guardian relied on the turnover letters to make their determinations. Moreover, the assessment 

by the Corps and Task Force Guardian as to whether the Orleans Levee District was conducting daily O&M ignored the 
Leves: Who’s in Charge?

145

fact that the levee district had obligations to look aft er fl ood control projects under state law separate and apart from 

the its role as a local sponsor under the assurance agreements. Source: Written Statement of Mittal, Senate Committee 

hearing, Dec. 15, 2005. Moreover, reliance on whether a part of the project passed the annual inspection is a canard. As 

discussed in more detail below, the Corps gave the Orleans Levee District passing grades for the annual inspections even 

though the inspections did not involve geotechnical studies assessing the strength of the system, analyses of whether 

the project was at its design height, or even stopping at the fl oodwalls along the 17th Street and London Avenue Canals 

because they were inaccessible by car, the mode of transportation generally used for the annual inspections. Moreover, 

the passing grades were given even though there were known vulnerabilities in direct contravention of the Corps’ rules 

and regulations: vegetation was growing along the fl oodwalls, a railroad gate near the Inter Harbor Navigation Canal 

remained broken for more than a year, and there was a levee well below its design height in New Orleans East.

80 33 C.F.R. § 208.10(a)(6).

81 Colletti interview, Nov. 22, 2005, pp. 50-53.

82 33 C.F.R. § 208.10(a)(10).

83 Colletti interview, Nov. 22, 2005, p. 68.

84 Spencer interview, Nov. 17, 2005, pp. 10-12.

85 Hearn interview, Nov. 14, 2005, p. 43.

86 Spencer interview, Nov. 17, 2005, pp. 10-12.

87 Colletti interview, Nov. 22, 2005, pp. 20-28.

88 Huey interview, Nov. 29, 2005, pp. 108-109.

89 Orleans Levee District, Minutes of Joint Finance and Planning, Engineering and Construction Committee Meeting, 

Apr. 5, 2005, p. 6. Provided to Committee [hereinaft er Orleans Levee District, Minutes of Committee Meeting, Apr. 5, 

2005].

90 Huey interview, Nov. 29, 2005, p. 58.

91 Orleans Levee District, Minutes of Committee Meeting, Apr. 5, 2005, p. 6. 

92 La. R.S. 38:2211.

93 Huey interview, Nov. 28, 2005, pp. 64-65.

94 Orleans Levee District, Minutes of Committee Meeting, Mar. 5, 2005, p. 7. 

95 33 C.F.R. § 208.10(a)(8).

96 33 C.F.R. § 208.10(c)(1)(iii).

97 U.S. House, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, A 

Failure of Initiative, Washington: Government Printing Offi ce, 2006, p. 92. See also: Ann Carrns, “Long Before Flood, 

New Orleans System was Prime for Leaks,” Th e Wall Street Journal, Nov. 25, 2005, p. A1. 

98 Orleans Levee Board, Minutes of Joint Finance and Planning, Engineering and Construction Committee, May 31, 

2005, p. 6. Provided to Committee.

99 Colletti interview, Nov. 22, 2005, pp. 82-83; Hearn interview, Nov. 14, 2005, p. 48; Huey interview, Nov. 29, 2005, p. 

107. 

100 Colletti interview, Nov. 22, 2005, pp. 40-43.

101 Hearn interview, Nov. 14, 2005, pp. 45-48. 

102 Hearn interview, Dec. 8, 2005, pp. 3-8.

103 Hearn interview, Nov. 14, 2005, pp. 11-12.

104 Spencer interview, Nov. 14, 2005, p. 45.

105 Hearn, Senate Committee hearing, Dec. 15, 2005.

106 Hearn, Senate Committee hearing, Dec. 15, 2005. See also: IPET, Report 2 of a Series, pp. I–2, III–6, III–26 through 

III–29, III–32 through III–40.

107 Testimony of Jerry Colletti, Manager for Completed Works, New Orleans District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 

before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: 

Who’s in Charge of the New Orleans Levees?, Dec. 15, 2005.

108 Ernst G. Frankel, letter to the Honorable Senator Susan Collins, Dec. 14. 2005. 

109 Committee staff interview of Jerry Colletti, Manager for Completed Works, New Orleans District, U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers, conducted on Dec. 9, 2005, transcript p. 20.

110 Hearn, Senate Committee hearing, Dec. 15, 2005.

111 Bob Marshall, “Levee leaks reported to S&WB a year ago; Lakeview residents’ complaints fell between the cracks,” 

New Orleans Times-Picayune, Nov. 18, 2005, National, p. 1.
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112 Frank Langfi tt, “Residents Say Levee Leaked Months Before Katrina,” National Public Radio, Nov. 22, 2005. http://

www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5022074. Accessed on Apr. 10, 2006.

113 Marcia A. St. Martin, letter to the editor, New Orleans Times-Picayune, Dec. 5, 2005. Provided to Committee.

114 Committee staff interview of Marcia A. St. Martin, Executive Director, New Orleans Sewerage and Water Board, 

conducted on, Dec. 9, 2005, transcript p. 32.

115 Colletti interview, Nov. 22, 2005, pp. 59-60.

116 Colletti interview, Nov. 22, 2005, pp. 56-57.

117 Huey interview, Nov. 28, 2005, pp. 118-119.

118 Hearn interview, Nov. 14, 2005, pp. 54-55.

119 Spencer interview, Nov. 14, 2005, p. 56.

120 Testimony of Col. Richard Wagenaar, Chief Engineer, New Orleans District, Army Corps of Engineers, before the 

U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Who’s in 

Charge of the New Orleans Levees?, Dec. 15, 2005.

121 Col. Wagenaar, Senate Committee hearing, Dec. 15, 2005.

122 Testimony of Edmond Preau, Assistant Secretary, Public Works and Intermodal Transportation, Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 

Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Who’s in Charge of the New Orleans Levees?, Dec. 15, 2005.

123 Huey, Senate Committee hearing, Dec. 15, 2005.

124 Col. Wagenaar, Senate Committee hearing, Dec. 15, 2005.

125 Col. Wagenaar interview, Nov. 15, 2005 pp. 77-78; Lowe interview, Nov. 16, 2005, pp. 18-19.

126 Lowe interview, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 90.

127 Col. Wagenaar interview, Nov. 15, 2005, pp. 14-15.

128 Col. Richard P. Wagenaar, memorandum on the New Orleans District, Emergency Operations Plan, July, 2005; 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, New Orleans District, All Hazards Contingency Plan, August, 2005; U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers, New Orleans District, Continuity of Operations Plan (Redacted); U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, New Orleans 

District, Catastrophic Disaster Response Plan. Since 2000, the New Orleans District has recognized that New Orleans 

would sustain extensive fl ooding in a major hurricane and has had a plan, known as the Un-watering Plan, to evacuate 

water from the city and surrounding parishes in such an event. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, New Orleans District, 

Un-Watering Plan, Greater Metropolitan Area, New Orleans, Louisiana, Aug. 18, 2000.

129 Lowe interview, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 29. 

130 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Mississippi Valley Division, Hurricane Contingency Plan (CONPLAN), May 18, 2005, 

p. 1. Provided to Committee [hereinaft er Mississippi Valley Division, CONPLAN].

131 Mississippi Valley Division, CONPLAN, pp. 3-4. 

132 Mississippi Valley Division, CONPLAN, p. 4. 

133 Mississippi Valley Division, Operations Order 01-05, Sept. 3, 2005.

134 Col. Wagenaar interview, Nov. 15, 2005, p. 52.

135 Col. Wagenaar interview, Nov. 15, 2005, pp. 54, 61-63.

136 Col. Wagenaar interview, Nov. 15, 2005, p. 57.

137 Col. Wagenaar interview, Nov. 15, 2005, p. 28.

138 Col. Richard P. Wagenaar, e-mail to Robert Crear, SITREP:29 August 2005, Aug. 29, 2005, 7:49 p.m. Provided to 

Committee.

139 Col. Wagenaar interview, Nov. 15, 2005, p. 69.

140 Col. Wagenaar interview, Nov. 15, 2005, pp. 62-63.

141 Col. Wagenaar interview, Nov. 15, 2005, p. 113; Lowe interview, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 5. 

142 Col. Wagenaar interview, Nov. 15, 2005, pp. 77, 80-81.

143 Col. Wagenaar interview, Nov. 15, 2005, pp. 62-65.

144 Committee staff interview of Michael J. Stack, Engineer, New Orleans District Design Water Resources, Louisiana 

Department of Transportation and Development, conducted on Nov. 17, 2005; Hearn interview, Nov. 14, 2005, pp. 71-73.

145 Committee staff interview of Kenneth Crumholt, Resident Engineer, Construction Division, West Bank Hurricane 

Protection Project, New Orleans District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and Richard Pinner, Section Chief, Geotech 

Branch, Engineering Division, New Orleans District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, conducted on Nov. 16, 2005, transcript pp. 23-24. 

146 Col. Wagenaar interview, Nov. 15, 2005, pp. 105-107. See also: Col. Wagenaar interview, Nov. 15, 2005, pp. 122-123 
Leves: Who’s in Charge?

147

(“I mean, so – I mean, just all these data points, and I’m relatively – I’m new, I mean, I don’t – I mean, this whole Levee 

District/Sewer and Water Board concept was relatively new to me. But just these data points of: Who is in charge? I 

mean, where’s the Parish President? Where is the Mayor? And then the State, ‘Well they work for DOTD.’ I’m like, 

‘Okay. Who is in charge?’ Th at was my view. I still have that view. I mean, so at some point, I mean -- you know, there is 

an old local – there is an old saying in the Army: When in charge, take charge. And I know I was in charge of the Corps 

of Engineers, the district, so I mean, at some point, you know, you’ve got to make stuff happen. Because this was a bad 

situation.”).

147 Col. Wagenaar interview, Nov. 15, 2005, pp. 111-113 (“I knew the levee districts were in charge, it was their project, 

that they had the responsibility to do the repair. ... It’s just a general operating principle here. I mean, we don’t have 

O&M of these projects once we turn them over. ... But no, I knew it was their job to fi x these originally. We tended to 

want to let it go that way until – I mean, until it was obvious that it needed federal involvement.”).

148 Hearn interview, Nov. 14, 2005, pp. 71-73.

149 Col. Wagenaar interview, Nov. 15, 2005, pp. 111-113.

150 Col. Wagenaar interview, Nov. 15, 2005, pp. 104-105.

151 Col. Wagenaar interview, Nov. 15, 2005, pp. 104-108.

152 Col. Wagenaar interview, Nov. 15, 2005, p. 114.

153 Mississippi Valley Division, Operations Order 01-05, Sept. 3, 2005.
Dry vs. wet: canal breach, 

New Orleans

Commercial satellite imagery provided 

by GeoEye, www.geoeye.com
149

“Th e New Orleans Scenario”: 

State and Local Preparations

Preparations by Louisiana State Government

Th e seeds of Louisiana’s failure to prepare were sown long before Hurricane Katrina approached the state. As detailed in other chapters,1

 Louisiana had been on notice of its 

vulnerability to catastrophic hurricanes for decades, but over the long term had never fully 

upgraded its emergency-response systems to the level necessary to protect its citizens from 

those events. Based on its own models and experience, it could have foreseen the inadequacy of many of its plans and resources, particularly its plans to evacuate people without 

personal transportation and the staffi ng of its state emergency-preparedness offi ce.2

In short, when it received warnings of Katrina’s approach, the state had reason to know that 

its emergency response systems were likely to fail, however diligently they were implemented. And fail they did. 

Th e National Response Plan (NRP) makes clear that responsibility for seeing that state 

response systems function properly lies with the Governor. Th e plan states, “As a State’s 

Chief Executive, the Governor is responsible for the safety and welfare of the people of that 

State. ... [and] for coordinating State resources to address the full spectrum of actions ... to 

prepare for [and] respond to ... natural disasters.”3

Th e days before Katrina struck showed a state striving to mount an eff ective response with 

stretched resources. State offi cials had monitored the storm since its birth as a tropical 

depression.4

 Terry Ryder, Governor Blanco’s Executive Counsel, had standing instructions from the Governor to notify her whenever he learned of a tropical depression. Ryder 

informed Governor Blanco about Katrina sometime prior to August 26, before the storm 

even had an offi cial name.5

 Th e State’s Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (W&F), its lead 

agency for search and rescue, also started preparing early, reviewing emergency-preparedness manuals and “boarding up the hatches, bringing in the equipment that needed to be 

brought in and immovable equipment we tied down as best we could.”6

Th e Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP) activated a team to coordinate emergency response at 2 p.m., Th ursday, August 25.7

 Twenty 

minutes later, LOHSEP issued an electronic alert warning state agencies and parish emergency offi cials about the approach of Katrina.8

 Th e LOHSEP coordination team began 

working with state and local offi cials to organize evacuations and sheltering of special-needs 

patients.9

 Th e Louisiana National Guard also began preparations on Th ursday aft ernoon, 

positioning fuel tankers at Hammond Airport, about 30 miles northwest of New Orleans.10

Preparations accelerated on Friday, August 26. At 11:30 that morning, a senior offi cial 

of Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD), the agency with 

primary responsibility for transportation out of a disaster area for people in need, instructed 

agency staff to prepare and be on standby for hurricane response.11

Shortly before 4 p.m. on Friday, Major General Bennett Landreneau’s Chief of Staff , Colonel 

Steven Dabadie of the Louisiana National Guard, notifi ed senior Guard offi cials of a conference call to take place at 6 p.m. to review support requirements and activate the Guard’s 

response operations.12 At 4 p.m., Governor Blanco declared a state of emergency, placing 

the National Guard and state agencies on full alert.13 At 5 p.m., the fi rst conference call of 

the southeast Louisiana Hurricane Task Force, which included emergency-management ofChapter 11
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150

fi cials from all the southeastern parishes, took place.14 Th e Louisiana State Police gave notice 

that it would open its Emergency Operations Center (EOC) the next morning.15 LOHSEP 

said that it would activate its Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Baton Rouge at “Level 

III,” implying full staffi ng, by early Saturday morning.16

On Saturday, August 27, the Louisiana National Guard set up its Joint Operations Center 

(JOC) at Jackson Barracks, its permanent state headquarters in the Lower Ninth Ward of 

New Orleans; established backup JOCs at two other bases; and began coordinating the arrival of advance National Guard parties from Florida and Texas.17 Governor Blanco, who 

had set up her base of operations at the LOHSEP EOC Saturday morning, spent the weekend commuting between the LOHSEP EOC and the Greater New Orleans EOC to meet 

with public offi cials and the press and survey the evacuations.18

On both Saturday and Sunday, Governor Blanco sent letters to President Bush requesting 

federal assistance under the Federal Staff ord Act19 and its implementing regulations.20 Th ose 

authorities contain separate provisions for “emergencies” and “natural disasters;” the latter 

are considered more signifi cant and justify higher levels of assistance. Th e letter sent on 

Saturday requested that the President issue an “emergency” declaration, specifying $9 million in anticipated support needs.21 It also contained some notable errors, such as omitting 

Orleans Parish from the list of parishes wishing to receive federal assistance.22

With predictions of increasingly severe storm damage, the letter sent on Sunday sought an 

“expedited natural disaster” declaration, with a request of $130 million in aid; this letter 

corrected the previous letter and added Orleans Parish to the list of parishes needing assistance.23

Both letters included statements, required for funding under the Staff ord Act, that the 

Governor anticipated an incident “of such severity and magnitude that eff ective response is 

beyond the capabilities of the state and aff ected local governments.”24 Neither letter asked 

for transportation assets to assist in the evacuation, or for any other assets that might be 

useful for emergency response. President Bush promptly issued both of the requested declarations.25

While Governor Blanco’s letter sounded a note of urgency, she and other state offi cials 

missed other critical opportunities over the weekend to convey the extent to which the 

state’s response capabilities were likely to be overwhelmed. Most important, in a video 

teleconference of federal, state, and local offi cials on Saturday, Colonel Jeff Smith, Acting 

Deputy Director of LOHSEP, answered a question from former FEMA Director Michael 

Brown of whether the state had “any unmet needs, anything that we’re not getting to you 

that you need” in the negative:

Mike Brown: Any questions? Colonel, do you have any unmet needs, anything that we’re not getting to you that you need or —

Colonel Smith: Mike, no. [Inaudible] resources that are en route, and it looks 

like those resources that are en route are going to – to be a good fi rst shot. 

Naturally, once we get into this thing, you know, neck deep here, unfortunately, or deeper, I’m sure that things are going to come up that maybe some of 

even our best planners hadn’t even thought about. So I think fl exibility is going 

to be the key.26

Brown later testifi ed that he was seeking information from the state on what it needed 

at that moment only,27 and Colonel Smith later tried to downplay the signifi cance of his 

response.28 But his remarks refl ect an underestimation of the state’s level of unprepared-
The New Orleans Scenario: State And Local Preparations

151

ness. Given the frenzied eff orts over the 

weekend to get hold of the incomplete 

draft s of plans under development from 

the Hurricane Pam exercise, it should 

not have taken Louisiana’s “best planners” to identify shortfalls in ongoing 

preparations.

Th roughout the weekend, LOHSEP 

invoked its standard operating procedures, which included a lengthy checklist for coordination of state agencies, 

non-governmental organizations (such 

as the American Red Cross), and parish authorities.29 State Police, National 

Guard, and DOTD offi cials concentrated on evacuation eff orts, which 

began in earnest on Saturday morning.30

Evacuation using contrafl ow – a system 

that expedites evacuation by converting 

incoming highway lanes to outgoing 

– began at 4 p.m. on Saturday. New 

Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin issued his 

mandatory evacuation order, with the 

Governor’s support, on Sunday morning. (See Chapter 16 for more about 

pre-storm evacuations.) 

As Katrina approached the Gulf Coast, 

the National Guard had 5,700 troops in 

Louisiana, most of whom were reservists; by landfall all would be on alert. 

Additional members of the Louisiana 

Guard were due to return from Iraq 

shortly.31 (Previously, the Louisiana National Guard’s largest hurricane-related 

deployment – 2,500 troops – was prior 

to Hurricane Andrew in 1992.) 32

By Sunday aft ernoon, General Landreneau, Adjutant General of Louisiana, established a 

command structure for the National Guard’s response activities (Task Force Pelican) with 

General Gary Jones in charge. General Landreneau placed fi ve separate task forces under 

General Jones’ command to address each major responsibility: aviation, security, search and 

rescue, logistics, and engineering.33

Th e National Guard’s emergency-response plan requires key troops to be positioned at key 

locations around the state. It can be amended as needed by fragmentary orders or “fragos.”34

As National Weather Service (NWS) reports provided updated guidance on Katrina’s severity and direction, “constant order production FRAGO mode” kept refi ning the pre-positioning of Guard units.35 Th e Guard also actively staged vehicles and aviation assets to be ready 

for search-and-rescue activities, movements of commodities, and evacuation assistance.36

Lining up at the Superdome

FEMA photo
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152

Preparations by Local Government

Preparing the Superdome as a Special-Needs Shelter

Th e City of New Orleans has used the Superdome as a special-needs shelter since Hurricane 

Georges in 1998.37 Th e Louisiana Department of Social Services has been responsible for 

running special-needs shelters in eight of nine defi ned regions in the state,38 but the City of 

New Orleans Health Department has run the special-needs shelter in the Superdome39 as 

part of its general municipal responsibilities. Th e city agreed to the special-needs eligibility 

criteria in the Region 1 plan for Orleans, Jeff erson, St. Bernard, and Plaquemines Parishes.40

Th e Region 1 special-needs shelter plan defi nes special-needs people as those who are able 

to provide for their own basic care but have a medical condition requiring occasional assistance, intermittent access to electricity for medical treatments, or refrigeration of medications. Th e plan warns that “It is not appropriate to admit individuals to these shelters who 

require constant care or who require constant electricity to support machines necessary to 

maintain their life.”41

Neither the Health Department nor any other city agency had compiled a comprehensive 

list of Orleans Parish (which has the same boundaries as the City of New Orleans) residents 

who qualifi ed with special needs.42 Planning at the special-needs shelter was determined 

by previous experience and Superdome capacity. Th e Region 1 plan called for preparations 

to receive 200 to 400 special-needs individuals.43 Each was expected to bring a caregiver, 

meaning a total of 400 to 800 individuals.44 Hurricanes Isidore and Ivan had each resulted 

in about 30 special-needs people, plus caregivers.45 As a result of the plan, past experience, 

and the capacity of the Superdome, Dr. Kevin Stephens, Director of the City’s Health Department, set up the shelter to accommodate approximately 1,200, comprising 600 specialneeds people plus their caregivers. 46

Preferring that special-needs patients leave the city entirely, the city issued a press release 

directing such individuals to two special-needs shelters outside New Orleans; toll-free telephone numbers were provided so citizens could call for information.47 In a second release, 

Mayor Nagin added that the Superdome would not open for special-needs individuals until 

8 a.m. on Sunday.48 Th e release instructed special-needs citizens to call a special telephone 

number to confi rm their eligibility.49

Both press releases added: “Anyone planning to spend time in a shelter should bring three 

to four days’ worth of food, sleeping gear, and medical supplies including oxygen, medicine, 

and batteries for any necessary devices.”50 Th e releases also gave contact information for six 

ambulance services for non-emergency transportation.51

Pre-landfall preparations included staffi ng the shelter and checking inventory to determine 

what supplies would be needed.52

Th roughout Saturday, City Health Department offi cials staged supplies – including cots, 

water, food, medications, phone lines, and generators – at the Superdome.53 Provisions 

included ready-to-eat foods like peanut butter, crackers, water, juice, and cereal; the sheriff ’s 

department agreed to provide hot food as long as was feasible.54

Saturday evening, city and state personnel operated a 10-line telephone triage service for 

potential special-needs individuals,55 guiding callers to the Superdome for evaluation, hospitals, or other destinations.56 Callers with transportation were encouraged to leave the city.57

At about 6 p.m., Saturday, Stewart Simonson, Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency Preparedness, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), called Dr. 

Stephens to see if he needed help. Dr. Stephens said he did not.58
The New Orleans Scenario: State And Local Preparations

153

At 8 a.m. on Sunday, the Superdome opened, as planned, for special-needs patients.59

Approximately 1,000 special-needs patients arrived throughout the day,60 plus an undetermined number of caregivers. Colonel Pat Prechter, Deputy Commander of the National 

Guard’s Louisiana Medical Command, noticed that some patients arriving in the shelter, 

following processing through registration and triage, required dialysis or constant oxygen, 

which would normally disqualify them as candidates for special-needs shelter admission.61

Following this observation, and at the city’s request, National Guard medical offi cials began 

assisting with triage.62 Of the approximately 1,000 individuals who arrived at the specialneeds shelter, 450 to 500 of the most critical were evacuated63 to a special-needs shelter in 

Baton Rouge.64

Despite the pre-staging of substantial assets, offi cials realized on Sunday that additional 

supplies were necessary.65 Th e city provided more medical oxygen66 and large quantities of 

other supplies ranging from saline solution to adult diapers.67 When Simonson called again 

on Sunday, Dr. Stephens accepted the help,68 which included a FEMA Disaster Medical 

Assistance Team (DMAT) and material from the HHS’s Strategic National Stockpile of 

emergency medical supplies.69 While FEMA was able to get military-style rations, water, 

and ice to the Superdome, the DMAT had to stop in Baton Rouge because the Texas State 

Police had denied two requests for police escorts; once in Louisiana, the team met worsening weather conditions.70 Th e team didn’t make it to the Superdome before landfall.

Preparing the Superdome as a Refuge of Last Resort

In prior hurricanes, the Superdome had served as a refuge for those needing to ride out 

the storm for a few hours before returning home.71 During Katrina, thousands would stay 

for days.

Sheltering in the Superdome

FEMA photo
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154

Long-Term Planning for the Superdome as a Shelter of Refuge or Last Resort

For at least three years before Katrina hit, the city had initiated critical measures to prepare 

the Superdome for longer stays, but failed to follow through. Long-term planning began 

with an eff ort to get more people out of the city in the fi rst place to ease eventual demands 

on the Superdome.72 Soon aft er his inauguration in 2002, Mayor Nagin unsuccessfully urged 

New Orleans and Louisiana’s Congressional delegation to fi nd a way to develop a $200 

million light-rail network to evacuate the 100,000 city residents without their own means 

to leave.73 City offi cials also worked throughout 2004 and 2005 to develop memoranda of 

understanding (MOUs) between the city and transportation providers, but those initiatives 

were not completed before Katrina. (See Chapter 16.)

Limited shelter space outside the city placed additional pressure on the Superdome as well. 

Th e American Red Cross decided not to set up shelters south of I-10, the east-west interstate running north of two-thirds of New Orleans, because they would have been too close 

to what the Red Cross deemed a fl ood zone.74

 In 2004, recognizing the need for greater shelter capacity, Mayor Nagin requested $850,000 

from the New Orleans Congressional delegation for “a study ... to determine the feasibility of upgrading the Louisiana Superdome, or any other facility, to serve as a refuge of last 

resort.”75 Th e city made similar requests to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in 2005.76 Th ese funding requests 

were denied, although the record does not indicate why. Th e city did not appeal to the state 

because of the perception that the state lacked the capability to help, and the city was planning on upgrading the Superdome under FEMA – not state – regulations.77 Th e upgrade 

would have taken at least two more years (and cost $7 million to $17 million).78

The Superdome with its 

storm-damaged roof

U.S. Coast Guard photo
The New Orleans Scenario: State And Local Preparations

155

The City Prepares and Opens the Superdome as a Refuge of Last Resort

Fearing that announcing the Superdome’s availability too early might dissuade citizens 

from leaving the city,79 the city waited until Saturday to announce that the Superdome 

would open on Sunday as a refuge of last resort.80 Since 2004’s Hurricane Ivan, the city’s 

plan has been to use Regional Transit Authority (RTA) buses to deliver those without transportation to the Superdome.81 Bus service began on Sunday at noon.82 City offi cials believe 

that the majority of the population at the Superdome before landfall had come by bus.83

By late Sunday evening, about 10,000 people had shown up at the Superdome.84 Th e 

Louisiana National Guard had pre-positioned 900,000 Meals Ready to Eat (MREs) rations 

and water for its staff ’s needs (though most were ultimately given to the storm victims).85

Offi cials realized that even that cache would need augmenting, and rushed out requests 

for 350,000 additional MREs from the city and additional food and water from the state.86

FEMA and the Louisiana National Guard were able to move in more rations and water 

before landfall.87

No one had made arrangements for portable toilets, however.88 Dr. Stephens tried to contract directly with individual vendors on Saturday, August 27, but could not reach them.89

Several Superdome witnesses interviewed considered this omission a central failure in prestorm planning.90

Th e large number of people at the Superdome also required a signifi cant security presence.91

Th e New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) under Deputy Chief Lonnie Swain, was in 

charge, fi rst with 40 offi cers and later with double that number.92 In support of NOPD, the 

Louisiana National Guard pre-positioned considerable troops to assist with security, as well 

as other missions, such as engineering functions, communications, and food distribution.93

Pre-landfall security mainly entailed screening walk-ins and bus arrivals, searching for 

weapons.94 When the downpour started around 6 p.m. Sunday, security screening moved 

inside the building.95 Th is made it harder for city police to ensure that no one entered with 

a weapon.96 Th e National Guard also pre-positioned about 10 high-water vehicles at the Superdome.97 Th ese trucks proved invaluable aft er many of the streets around the Superdome 

fl ooded.

When the Superdome opened to the general population, National Guard offi cers there 

asked the LOHSEP and the Texas and Florida National Guards for additional support. 

NOPD Deputy Chief Swain also requested additional police offi cers to assist at the Superdome.98

At Katrina’s landfall on Monday morning, August 29, the Superdome’s special-needs shelter and refuge of last resort housed over 10,000 people who would ride out the storm in its 

cavernous interior.99

1 See: Chapter 6: Emergency Management: Louisiana, and Chapter 16: Pre-Storm Evacuations.

2 See: Chapter 6: Emergency Management: Louisiana.

3 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan. Washington: Government Printing Offi ce, Dec. 2004, 

p. 8 [hereinaft er NRP].

4 Committee staff interview of Col. Henry Whitehorn, Superintendent, Louisiana State Police and Deputy Secretary, 

Department of Public Safety Services and Corrections, LA, conducted on Nov. 29, 2005, transcript p. 25.

5 Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Response to the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 

Aff airs Document and Information Request Dated October 7, 2005 and to the U.S. House of Representatives Select 
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156

Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, Overview of Gov. Kathleen Babineaux 

Blanco’s Actions in Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, Dec. 2, 2005, p. 1 [hereinaft er Louisiana Offi ce 

of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline].

6 Committee staff interview of Sec. Dwight Landreneau, Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, conducted on 

Nov. 30, 2005, transcript pp. 17-20. 

7 Louisiana’s Preparation and Response to Hurricane Katrina Integrated Timeline, p. 5. See also: Committee staff 

interview of Lt. Col. William Doran, Louisiana Air National Guard, Chief, Operations Division, Louisiana Offi ce of 

Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP), conducted on Dec. 2, 2005, transcript p. 32.

8 LOHSEP Chronology, p. 4. Provided to Committee.

9 Lt. Col. Doran interview, Dec. 2, 2006, p. 32.

10 Louisiana National Guard, Timeline of Signifi cant Events for Hurricane Katrina, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 2. Provided to Committee.

11 Louisiana Integrated Timeline, p. 6; LOHSEP, Emergency Operations Plan, Apr. 2005, p. ESF–1–1.

12 Louisiana Integrated Timeline, p. 7; Committee staff interview of Col. David Aycock, Operations Offi cer, Louisiana 

Army National Guard, conducted on Jan. 4, 2006, transcript pp. 91-93.

13 Committee staff interview Andy Kopplin, former Chief of Staff , Offi ce of the Governor, LA, conducted on Jan. 6, 

2006, transcript p. 30; Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 2.

14 Louisiana Integrated Timeline, p. 7. See also: Committee staff interview of Sean Fontenot, former Chief, Preparedness 

Division, LOHSEP, conducted on Jan. 10, 2006, transcript p. 109.

15 Louisiana Integrated Timeline, p. 7.

16 Louisiana Integrated Timeline, p. 8. LOHSEP activation levels range from I to V, with levels of staffi ng for emergencies increasing as the activation level decreases. Level III staffi ng consists of a “Crisis Action Team” on 24-hour call 

augmented with additional staffi ng as required. Louisiana Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness, EOC Standard Operating 

Procedures, May 28, 2002, p. 2 [hereinaft er LOEP, Standard Operating Procedures].

17 Committee staff interview of Col. Glenn Curtis, Chief of Staff , Louisiana Army National Guard, conducted on Dec. 6, 

2005, transcript pp. 62-63; Col. Aycock interview, Jan. 4, 2006, pp. 95, 100-102, 105; LANG Timeline, p. 4.

18 Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 3; Committee staff interview of Denise Bottcher, Press 

Secretary, Offi ce of the Governor, LA, conducted on Jan. 9, 2005, transcript pp. 46-53.

19 “Robert T. Staff ord Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act,” (P.L. 93-288), 42 U.S.C. § 5121 et seq. [hereinaft er 

“Staff ord Act,” 42 U.S.C. § 5121]. Th e purpose of the Act is “to provide an orderly and continuing means of assistance 

by the Federal Government to State and local governments in carrying out their responsibilities to alleviate the suff ering 

and damage which result from such disasters.” – Staff ord Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5121(b).

20 44 C.F.R. §§ 206.31-206.48.

21 Gov. Kathleen Blanco, letter to President George Bush, Aug. 27, 2005. Provided to Committee. Neither this letter 

nor a similar letter of August 28, 2005, from Governor Blanco to the President requesting declaration of an “expedited 

major disaster” for Louisiana and raising the requested Staff ord Act aid total to $130 million, requested federal military 

assistance. 

22 Gov. Kathleen Blanco, letter to President George Bush, Aug. 27, 2005. Provided to Committee.

23 Gov. Kathleen Blanco, letter to President George Bush, Aug. 27, 2005. Provided to Committee.

24 Gov. Kathleen Blanco, letter to President George Bush, Sept. 20, 2005. Provided to Committee.

25 70 Fed. Reg. 53238 (Sept. 7, 2005) (Louisiana; Emergency and Related Determinations); 70 Fed. Reg. 53803 (Sept. 7, 

2005) (Louisiana; Major Disaster and Related Determinations).

26 Michael Brown, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 28, 2005, transcript pp. 18-19. Provided to Committee.

27 Committee staff interview of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, conducted on Feb. 23, 2006, transcript pp. 

62-67.

28 Col. Perry Jeff Smith (Ret.), affi davit, Feb. 8, 2006, p. 8. Provide to Committee.

29 Committee staff interview of James Ballow, Senior Operations Offi cer, LOHSEP, conducted on Jan. 4, 2006, transcript 

p. 6; LOEP, Standard Operating Procedures, EOC Hurricane/Major Event Checklist, pp. 1-10. 

30 Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 2; Lt. Col. Doran interview, Dec. 2, 2005, p. 38.

31 Col. Curtis interview, Dec. 6, 2005, p. 60. Roughly 40 to 50 percent of Louisiana’s National Guard troops were in Iraq 

at that time. Source: Testimony of Gov. Kathleen Blanco, Louisiana, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Role of the Governors in Managing the Catastrophe, 

Feb. 2, 2006; Committee staff interview of Col. FG Dowden, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.), Regional Liaison, New Orleans 

Department of Homeland Security and Public Safety, LA, conducted on Nov. 11, 2005, transcript p. 91. On Saturday 

morning, Governor Blanco approved the fi rst call up of 2,000 Guardsmen; by landfall, all 5,700 would be called up. 

Source: Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Overview of Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco’s Actions in Preparation 
The New Orleans Scenario: State And Local Preparations

157

for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, pp. 5-6 (Dec. 2, 2005). A National Guard summary dated Sept. 1, 2005, indicated 

that the then current committed forces included 5,176 Louisiana Guard troops. Th e reason for the discrepancy between 

that fi gure and the 5,700 troops reported by the Governor as having been called up by August 29 is unknown. Source: 

Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, pp. 5-6.

32 Committee staff interview of Lt. Col. Jacques Th ibodeaux, Joint Director of Military Support to Civilian Authorities 

and Branch Chief, Louisiana National Guard, conducted on Dec. 6, 2005, transcript p. 68. 

33 Committee staff interview of Brig. Gen. Gary Jones, Assistant Joint Forces Commander, Louisiana Army National 

Guard, conducted on Dec. 7, 2005, transcript pp. 5-6, 61-62. 

34 Col. Curtis interview, Dec. 6, 2005, pp. 14-15. 

35 Col. Curtis interview, Dec. 6, 2005, pp. 79-80.

36 Col. Curtis interview, Dec. 6, 2006, pp. 152-54 (stating that the Guard pre-deployed high water vehicles, boats, and 

aviation assets, including helicopters). Col. Curtis explained the potential use for these assets: “Th ey’re pre-positioned for 

whatever the mission becomes. I mean, it can be search and rescue, it can be, you know, commodities, delivering food 

and water, that type thing. It can be not search and rescue, but it can be evacuation where people are caught behind, you 

know, in high water that they can’t drive out of and et cetera. And we’ll drive in, pick them up and bring them out, which 

a lot of that happened.” Col. Curtis interview, Dec. 6, 2006, p. 154. 

37 Col. Pat Prechter, Louisiana National Guard Medical Command, recalls responding to the Superdome to help staff 

the Special Needs Shelter for Hurricane Georges [in 1998]. Committee staff interview of Col. Pat Prechter, State Chief 

Nurse, Louisiana Army National Guard and Deputy Commander, Louisiana Medical Command, conducted on Jan. 6, 

2006, transcript p. 8.

38 Committee staff interview of Kitty Lapeyrolerie, Regional Manager, Louisiana Rehabilitative Services and Emergency 

Preparedness Coordinator, Louisiana Department of Social Services, conducted on Dec. 20, 2005, transcript pp. 51-52.

39 Committee staff interview of Avis Gray, Regional Administrator, Region I, Offi ce of Public Health, Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, conducted on Dec. 8, 2005, transcript p. 48.

40 Committee interview of Kevin Stephens, M.D., Director, New Orleans Health Department, LA, conducted on Nov. 

9, 2005, transcript p. 16. See also: City of New Orleans, City of New Orleans Special Needs Shelter Plan, Mar. 2003, p. 2 

[hereinaft er Region 1 Plan, Mar. 2003]

41 It should be noted that the plan’s defi nition of “special needs” diff ers at the margins with other city and state offi cials’ 

interpretations of the defi nition. For example, Dr. Stephens defi ned special needs patients as those “who require electricity on an intermittent basis for sustaining life – not a continuous basis – patients who require additional special care to 

sustain their life.” Source: Dr. Stephens interview, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 6. Louisiana Secretary of Health and Hospitals Dr. 

Fred Cerise said: “Th ose shelters are for individuals who basically have special health care needs and are not – would 

not be adequately taken care of in the general shelters...people with chronic medical conditions. We see people that are 

on medications that would need assistance with that. We have people who are on oxygen at home and who would need 

some special assistance. People that may be on dialysis and so they would need a place to go and coordinate that care. So 

people that can take care of themselves at home but require some assistance.” Source: Committee staff interview of Sec. 

Fred Cerise, M.D., Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, conducted on Dec. 7, 2005, transcript p. 16. A Region 

1 offi cial, Avis Gray, off ered this defi nition: “Special needs population are those individuals that are at home and are able 

to be cared [for] at home but they have health care issues that maybe they can’t go in a regular shelter. Th is could be a 

diabetic who can’t medicate themselves or people with some respiratory who don’t need continuous O2.” Source: Gray 

interview, Dec. 8, 2005, p. 24.

42 Dr. Stephens interview, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 32.

43 Dr. Stephens interview, Nov. 9, 2005, pp. 46-47. 

44 Contemplation of a caretaker accompanying each patient is found in: Written Statement of Kevin Stephens, M.D., 

Director, New Orleans Health Department, LA, for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Challenges in a Catastrophe: Evacuating New Orleans in Advance of Hurricane 

Katrina, Jan. 31, 2006, p.3; Gray interview, Dec. 8, 2005, p. 25; Region 1 Plan, Mar. 2003, p. 3.

45 Dr. Stephens interview, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 48. 

46 Dr. Stephens interview, Nov. 9, 2005, pp. 46-49 (“I don’t want to plan for 30 and 40 ... and have six hundred show up, 

and then you’re totally overwhelmed.”). 

47 City of New Orleans, Mayor’s Press Offi ce, “Mayor Nagin Urges Citizens to Prepare for Hurricane Katrina,” press release, Aug. 27, 2005. Provided to Committee [hereinaft er Mayor’s Press Offi ce, “Mayor Nagin Urges Citizens to Prepare 

for Hurricane Katrina.”]. On Saturday, August 27, the State of Louisiana opened two special -needs shelters outside of the 

City of New Orleans, in Alexandria and Monroe. Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, timeline. Provided to 

Committee.

48 City of New Orleans, Mayor’s Press Offi ce, “Mayor Nagin Urges Citizens to Evacuate If Possible,” press release, Aug. 27, 

2005. Provided to Committee [hereinaft er Mayor’s Press Offi ce, “Mayor Nagin Urges Citizens to Evacuate If Possible.”].

49 Mayor’s Press Offi ce, “Mayor Nagin Urges Citizens to Evacuate If Possible.” 

50 Mayor’s Press Offi ce, “Mayor Nagin Urges Citizens to Prepare for Hurricane Katrina”; Mayor’s Press Offi ce, “Mayor 

Nagin Urges Citizens to Evacuate If Possible.” 
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158

51 Mayor’s Press Offi ce, “Mayor Nagin Urges Citizens to Prepare for Hurricane Katrina”; Mayor’s Press Offi ce, “Mayor 

Nagin Urges Citizens to Evacuate If Possible.” 

52 Ninety-six hours prior to landfall of Hurricane Katrina, Dr. Stephens convened a staff meeting to create a preparations time line for the special-needs shelter at the Superdome. Th e staff reviewed the updated Region 1 Hurricane Plan 

and began an inventory of supplies the Department needed to operate the shelter. Source: Dr. Stephens interview, Nov. 

9, 2005, pp. 11, 13-14. Staffi ng plans for the SNS included 50 Health Department employees, 25 to 30 personnel from Region 1, and approximately 200 National Guard medics and armed personnel for security. Source: Dr. Stephens interview, 

Nov. 9, 2005, p. 48. Col. Pat Prechter, Deputy Commander of the Guard’s Louisiana Medical Command, was ordered 

to provide 71 medical personnel to the SNS beginning at 8 a.m. on Sunday, August 28. Source: Col. Prechter interview, 

Jan. 6, 2006, pp. 29-30. Col. Prechter provided the following break-down of LANG personnel assigned to the SNS: 41-42 

from Medical Command (MedCom), 18 from the 159th Air Guard (medical unit), and 11-12 from Company A1-11. 

Source: Col. Prechter interview, Jan. 6, 2006, p. 28. 

53 Dr. Stephens interview, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 30.

54 Dr. Stephens interview, Nov. 9, 2005, pp. 61-62. Kitty Lapeyrolerie, the Emergency Preparedness Coordinator for the 

Louisiana Department of Social Services, also noted that the city’s prison was supposed to provide food for the Superdome’s special-needs shelter and did so before landfall. As a result, the Louisiana Department of Social Service offi cials said 

they did not ask for more food, even aft er the Superdome was opened to the general population on Sunday, because they 

expected the prison to continue to provide food for the special-needs shelter. But the prison was ultimately fl ooded and 

thus unable to provide any more food aft er landfall. Lapeyrolerie interview, Dec. 20, 2005, pp. 103, 137. 

55 Written Statement of Dr. Stephens, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 31, 2005, p. 5. 

56 Gray interview, Dec. 8, 2005, p. 168.

57 Gray interview, Dec. 8, 2005, pp. 97-98.

58 Committee staff interview of Stewart Simonson, Assistant Secretary, Offi ce of Public Health and Emergency Preparedness, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, conducted on Feb. 16, 2006, transcript pp. 37-38. 

59 Written Statement of Dr. Stephens, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 31, 2005, p. 5 (photo of white board). See also: 

Dr. Stephens interview, Nov. 9, 2005, pp. 59, 72. City and state personnel registered, triaged, and evaluated arrivals and 

a fl oor plan was developed to designate SNS areas for certain patients, such as asthmatic or congestive heart failure 

patients. 

60 Dr. Stephens, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 67. Th e SNS plan didn’t include sheltering nursing-home residents, who were supposed 

to be handled through nursing homes’ evacuation plans. One nursing home sent a busload of residents without a staff 

manager to the Superdome. While wondering why the bus hadn’t headed out of the city instead, the SNS staff accepted 

the people in view of the worsening weather. Committee staff interview of Irby Hornsby, former Special-Needs Shelter 

Manager, New Orleans Region, Louisiana Department of Social Services, conducted on Jan. 5, 2006, transcript pp. 21-22, 

86-88.

61 Col. Prechter interview, Jan. 6, 2006, pp. 42-43. Th ere appears to be confusion regarding whether dialysis patients 

would be admitted. According to a transcript of Mayor Nagin’s press conference on August 28, the Mayor stated, “Th is 

morning, the Superdome has already opened for people with special needs. If you have a medical condition, if you’re on 

dialysis or some other condition, we want you to expeditiously move to the Superdome.” Source: “New Orleans Mayor, 

Louisiana Governor Hold Press Conference,” CNN Breaking News, Aug. 28, 2005, 10 a.m. ET. http://transcripts.cnn.

com/TRANSCRIPTS/0508/28/bn.04.html. Accessed on Apr. 11, 2005 [hereinaft er “Mayor Nagin and Gov. Blanco Hold 

Press Conference” Aug. 28, 2005.]

62 Col. Prechter interview, Jan. 6, 2006, p. 40.

63 Dr. Stephens interview, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 70.

64 Written Statement of Dr. Stephens, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 31, 2006, p. 5.

65 Col. Prechter interview, Jan. 6, 2006, p. 45.

66 Both Dr. Stephens and Col. Prechter noted the need for oxygen. Dr. Stephens interview, Nov. 9, 2005, pp. 65-67; Col. 

Prechter interview, Jan. 6, 2006, p. 43.

67 Col. Prechter interview, Jan. 6, 2006, p. 45.

68 Simonson interview, Feb. 16, 2006, p. 39.

69 Simonson interview, Feb. 16, 2006, pp. 39-40. 

70 Simonson interview, Feb. 16, 2006, p. 59. With regard to the DMAT, Ronald Martin with FEMA/NDMS-1, noted 

that the Oklahoma DMAT, which reported to Houston, was dispatched from Houston to the Superdome of Sunday, 

August 28, but did not reach the Superdome until Monday night for a number of reasons: (1) Two requests to the Texas 

State Police to provide a police escort for the caravan were denied; (2) the Houston City Police, which provided escort 

aft er the Texas State Police did not, could only get the team as far as the interstate; (3) the Louisiana State Police escort, 

which picked up the caravan at the Louisiana state line, and the DMAT had to stop in Baton Rouge due to deteriorating 

weather conditions, including high winds. Committee staff interview of Ronald Martin, Deputy Commander, Management Support Team, National Disaster Medical System, FEMA, conducted on Feb. 13, 2006, transcript pp. 35-42.

71 Committee staff interview of Col. Terry Ebbert, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.), Director, New Orleans Offi ce of Homeland 
The New Orleans Scenario: State And Local Preparations

159

Security, LA, conducted on Jan. 10, 2006, transcript pp. 8-9 (defi ning refuge of last resort as follows: “Th e refuge of last 

resort is a concept that we instituted full well knowing that we were going to have – all the studies showed us that we 

were not going to get everybody out of this town in the number of hours that we had, and there were going to be naysayers who would wait, expecting a change, and the eleven hour when it didn’t change, lives would be at risk. So the concept 

of refuge of last resort is a facility that will insure that when the eye of the hurricane passes and the storm goes away, you 

will be alive. Th at’s the only integral important item that the refuge of last resort brings with it.”); Col. Ebbert interview, 

Jan. 10, 2006, p. 9 (distinguishing the refuge of last resort from a shelter: “It was not a shelter, we weren’t going to provide services. We knew we couldn’t do that. But the refuge of last resort was set up to insure that those people were in a 

location where they would survive the water and the wind and the brunt of the hurricane. And we knew that if we had a 

bad hurricane, we were going to have a second phase of evacuation, that was a known fact.”).

72 Evacuation needs to be the number one priority in advance of a catastrophic hurricane. Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 

10, 2006, pp. 41-43 (“evacuation is your number one priority and is where you need to concentrate your eff orts because 

everybody that’s out of here is a nonproblem for us.”).

73 Mayor C. Ray Nagin, letter to the Honorable Sen. Mary Landrieu, Oct. 1, 2002, p. 2 (recognizing that as many as 

100,000 people in New Orleans “have no means of transportation, rendering it impossible for them to evacuate the City” 

and requesting $200 million to develop a light rail system, which the Mayor deemed “necessary to facilitate the evacuation”); Garey Forster, e-mail to Julie Harris and others, “Landrieu Letter: Isidore,” Sept. 29, 2002, 6:15 p.m. (urging staff 

to draft a letter on behalf of Mayor Nagin to Sen. Landrieu to refl ect the points he made to her and Sen. Jim Jeff ords, 

including the need for “Light Rail to exit 100k people.”). Th e Committee does not know whether the city received 

responses to these letters.

74 Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 34 (stating that one of the “specifi c problems” with sheltering that hindered 

the city was “the abandonment at the federal and state level of sheltering south of I-10,” which he described as “a pretty 

arbitrary decision.”). Additional shelters inside New Orleans and just outside of it would have eased the strain at the 

Superdome, but it is not clear that those additional shelters would have fared much better in Katrina or some other 

catastrophic hurricane approaching New Orleans. On the one hand, Col. Ebbert claimed “there are buildings [south of 

I-10] that can sustain Cat 4 and Cat 5 hurricane hits.” Source: Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 34 (“All you have to 

do is look around the city and know that the engineering is pretty suffi cient in some of these.”). On the other hand, Col. 

Ebbert could not say with confi dence that the Mississippi River levees would hold in subsequent storms, thereby jeopardizing certain structures which the city might consider as potential shelters or refuges, such as the Morial Convention 

Center. Source: Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 41 (“Mother Nature could sink the Titanic, it can do away with 

most anything we can design.”). See also: Committee staff interview of Kay Wilkins, Chief Executive Offi cer, Southeast 

Louisiana Chapter, American Red Cross, conducted on Dec. 20, 2005, transcript p. 14-18.

75 Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 52-53 ( “the lesson I took from Pam is that we had to have a way to shelter 

people, and we did.”). In October 2004, the Mayor sent letters to the City’s Congressional delegation: “New Orleans faces 

the reality that it is impossible to conduct a mandatory evacuation in advance of a Category 3, 4 or 5 hurricane. Even 

under the best conditions evacuation will leave at least 150,000 people in harm’s way. Currently, no city shelters are designated for a major hurricane and neither the Red Cross nor any other agency provides shelters.” Source: Mayor C. Ray 

Nagin, letters to Honorable Mary Landrieu, Honorable John Breaux, Honorable David Vitter, Honorable Richard Baker, 

Honorable Rodney M. Alexander, Honorable William J. Jeff erson, Honorable Jim McCrery, Honorable Chris John, and 

Honorable W.J. “Billy” Tauzin, Oct. 27, 2004 [hereinaft er Mayor Nagin, letters to Louisiana Congressional delegation, 

Oct. 27, 2004]. Th e City’s Offi ce of Homeland Security and Public Safety projected that the study would cost $850,000. 

Source: City of New Orleans, FY2006 Funding Request to Congress, Emergency Response Shelter/Plan Homeland 

Security Appropriations. Provided to Committee (requesting FY06 funding of $850,000 for “fi nal feasibility and planning and design eff orts for upgrading the Louisiana Superdome, or any other facility, to serve as a refuge of last resort 

for major hurricane and other natural and manmade disaster events”). See also: Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, 

pp. 53-68 (stating that the city requested this funding from the federal government); Mayor Nagin, letters to Louisiana 

Congressional delegation, Oct. 27, 2004 (“Th e study should include, but not be limited to: upgrading and elevation of 

back up power systems with capacity to power all internal systems, structural hardening for Category 3 or higher winds, 

upgrade of elevated enclosed HVAC systems, upgrade of water and sewer systems to be able to function with loss of city 

water and power, expanded elevated parking to house larger city emergency vehicles, expanded storage areas to hold 

stockpiled emergency equipment and supplies, other security, pumping command and control requirements.”); Brenda 

Hatfi eld, e-mail to Col. Terry Ebbert, Sept. 28, 2004, 9:42 a.m. (discussing eff ort to seek “funding to retrofi t the Super 

Dome as a shelter of last resort”).

76 City of New Orleans, FY2006 Funding Request to Congress, Emergency Response Shelter/Plan Homeland Security 

Appropriations. Provided to Committee; Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 53-58, 65.

77 Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 62-63 (“Th e state really doesn’t have any – that’s a commission. Th ey barely 

live off of the maintenance that they make on the lease on that building, so the state didn’t have any capability to do that, 

and they’re not going to have any capability to do it in the future because we’re going to rebuild it under FEMA regulations. Again, this is where you get caught up. Why do you have a system that hampers me from improving the capability 

and spending millions of dollars fi xing the Superdome, but I can’t bring it up one dollar better than it was before on the 

28th of August? And that’s what – you know, that still doesn’t make any sense to me. And I can cite you fi ft een examples 

of that. You want me to put my same old broken radio system in because I’m going to spend millions of dollars on an 

old radio system rather than putting millions of dollars into a new radio system.”). 

78 Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 66 (stating that implementation of the plan would have cost between $7 million and $17 million.). Since it would have taken at least two years to enact the appropriation for the $850,000 that would 
Chapter 11

160

have funded the plan, work on the implementation of the could not have begun until that time.

79 Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 63, 79 (“if you opened that Dome up on Saturday, you’d have had 65,000 

people in there and nobody would have gotten on the highways and left .”).

80 Committee staff interview of Sally Forman, Communications Director, Offi ce of the Mayor, City of New Orleans, LA, 

conducted on Jan. 10, 2006, transcript pp. 28-29, 31. According to the press releases that accompanied the 1 p.m. and 

5 p.m. press conferences on Saturday, August 27, 2005, and the internal talking points for both press conferences, the 

only notations regarding the Superdome refer to it as a special needs shelter and do not mention that it might or will be 

opening at any point as a refuge of last resort. Source: Mayor’s Press Offi ce, “Mayor Nagin Urges Citizens to Prepare for 

Hurricane Katrina”; Mayor’s Press Offi ce, “Mayor Nagin urges Citizens to Evacuate if Possible”; City of New Orleans, 

Mayor’s Press Offi ce, “Event: Katrina Update, Talking Points Follow,” Aug. 27, 2005, 1 p.m. Provided to Committee; City of New Orleans, Mayor’s Press Offi ce, “Event: Katrina Update, Talking Points Follow,” Aug. 27, 2005, 5 p.m. 

Provided to Committee. During the press conference on Sunday morning, August 28, Mayor Nagin announced: “Th is 

morning, the Superdome has already opened for people with special needs. If you have a medical condition, if you’re on 

dialysis or some other condition, we want you to expeditiously move to the Superdome. At noon today, the Superdome 

will then be opened up as a refuge of last resort, where we will start to take citizens that cannot evacuate.” Source: “Mayor 

Nagin and Gov. Blanco Hold Press Conference” Aug. 28, 2005.

81 Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 81; Committee staff interview of Terry Tullier, former Deputy Director, New 

Orleans Fire Department and Director, New Orleans Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness, LA, conducted on Nov. 22, 

2005, transcript pp. 44-45 (stating that – dating back to Ivan – the city planned to stage buses “to move people to the 

Superdome and potentially even to the Convention Center, although I had some serious misgivings about whether or 

not that building would hold up.”).

82 “Mayor Nagin and Gov. Blanco Hold Press Conference” Aug. 28, 2005.

83 Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 81-82.

84 Committee staff interview of Lonnie Swain, Assistant Superintendent, New Orleans Police Department, LA, conducted on Nov. 9, 2005, transcript p. 39 (“Dome management was able to tell us that we now have everybody sitting in 

these seats, we don’t have any more people standing outside, we don’t have any more around the concourse, standing or 

whatever, we have about 10,000 people.”).

85 Th e Louisiana National Guard had pre-positioned stock to be able to provide “some limited support to some special 

needs people. But the bulk of what [the National Guard] had there was for our troops. Brig. Gen. Jones interview, Dec. 7, 

2005, pp. 86-87. 

86 When NOPD Deputy Chief Lonnie Swain arrived at the Superdome on Sunday, he immediately called the City’s 

Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness and requested food and water, which Deputy Chief Swain said the Louisiana National 

Guard ultimately delivered before landfall. Swain interview, Nov. 9, 2005, pp. 44-47; Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, 

p. 113 (“We made a request [for food and water], and the National Guard brought it in when they came and brought in 

both water and food into the Dome the night before the storm.”). 

87 Louisiana National Guard offi cials stated that their requests for additional food and water before landfall were met. 

Source: Committee staff interview of Col. Douglas Mouton, Commander, 225th Engineering Group, Louisiana National 

Guard, conducted on Dec. 1, 2005, transcript pp. 69-74 (“Th ere was a quantity of food and water. I can’t tell you exactly 

how much it was. ... I believe it got there by 18-wheeler, and it was unloaded by the combination of guardsmen and Superdome management personnel.”). Gen. Jones quickly put out a call for MREs and found enough from nearby National 

Guard contingency stocks to supply people with two servings a day until Tuesday aft ernoon. Source: Brig. Gen. Jones 

interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 88. LANG Col. Glenn Curtis recalled that on “Sunday we (LANG) delivered 9,792 MREs and 

13,440 one-liter bottles of water of our contingency stock to the Superdome in support of shelter operations.” Source: 

Col. Curtis interview, Dec. 6, 2005, pp. 128-130. 

88 Dr. Stephens interview, Nov. 9. 2005, p. 94; Hornsby interview, Jan. 5, 2006, p. 31.

89 Dr. Stephens interview, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 94.

90 Swain interview, Nov. 9, 2005, pp. 112-113, 127; Testimony of Marty J. Bahamonde, Regional Director, External Affairs, Region I, FEMA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on 

Hurricane Katrina: How is FEMA Performing Its Mission at Th is Stage of Recovery?, October 20, 2005 (“Imagine no toilet 

facilities for 25,000 confi ned people for fi ve days. Women and children were forced to live outside in 95-degree heat 

because of the horrid smell and conditions inside. Hallways and corridors were used as toilets, trash was everywhere, and 

amongst it all children – thousands of them. It was sad, it was inhumane, it was heart-breaking, and it was so wrong.”). 

91 Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 114 (“Most of the security operation [at the Superdome] deal with the refuge 

of last resort.”).

92 Swain interview, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 32; Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 112-113. Th e offi cers commanding 

Louisiana National Guard (LANG) troops at the Superdome before and aft er landfall agreed that NOPD was the lead 

agency at the Superdome, and LANG was at the Superdome to support NOPD. Col. Mouton interview, Dec. 1, 2005, p. 

64 (“I clearly saw our role to support the New Orleans Police Department, because this was a civil authority’s shelter and 

we were augmenting their eff orts.”); Committee staff interview of Col. Th omas Beron, Commander, 61st Troop Command, Louisiana Army National Guard, conducted on Dec. 1, 2005, transcript, p. 65 (“Th at is the relationship ... that we 

support the NOPD there.”).

93 Committee staff interview of Col. Douglas Mouton, Commander, 225th Engineering Group, Louisiana National 
The New Orleans Scenario: State And Local Preparations

161

Guard, and Col. Th omas Beron, Commander, 61st Troop Command, Louisiana National Guard, conducted on Dec. 1, 

2005, transcript pp. 48, 64-65; Committee staff interview of Col. Steve Dabadie, former Chief of Staff , Louisiana National 

Guard, conducted on Jan.12, 2006, transcript pp. 67-68; Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 113-117. Ultimately, the 

total LANG pre-landfall presence comprised 71 medical offi cers, 140 Army National Guard, 140 Air National Guard, 

and 46 Special Response Team members. Source: Col. Mouton interview, Dec. 1, 2005, p. 48-50 (“For the security missions, we have a requirement to provide soldiers to the Superdome, about 140, from the 527th engineering battalion ... 

the most important place I felt I needed to be was in the Dome because that’s where the most activity was because not 

only was it the 140 engineer soldiers, it was 140 air guardsmen, our 40- or 50-man SRT team was there ... and about 90 

from ... the medical command); Col. Beron interview, Dec. 1, 2005, p. 50 (stating that LANG sent 46 Special Response 

Team members to the Superdome); Col. Prechter interview, Jan. 6, 2006, pp. 9-10 (“Th e plan calls for us to provide 

manpower, so like this year, we were to supply ... 71 personnel to work alongside the City Health Department people to 

help man the Special Needs section, and that’s what traditionally we have done. We have provided manpower to work 

alongside the City, and the State, I’m sure has been there, too, but the City is who I have known.”). Col. Doug Mouton 

was in command of the National Guard security forces before landfall. Source: Swain interview, Nov. 9, 2005, pp. 40-41; 

Col. Mouton interview, Dec. 1, 2005, p. 61.

94 Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 36, 114.

95 Swain interview, Nov. 9, 2005, pp. 35-39 (“Gotta get these people on the inside; can’t leave ’em out here getting wet. 

You can’t leave ’em out here in the wind. So we tried to speed up the process as much as possible, but it became apparent 

that we can’t get these people into the Dome as quickly as we need to based on the conditions that are out here. ... Once 

the weather really starts to deteriorate, we brought ‘em in and looped ‘em around on that concourse on the inside. Th ey 

were not allowed to go into ... the seating area of the Dome until they were actually checked for weapons.”). 

96 Swain interview, Nov. 9, 2005, pp. 35-39.

97 Col. Mouton interview, Dec. 1, 2005, p. 116.

98 Swain interview, Nov. 9, 2005, pp. 48-49 (“I had to request additional personnel, and once those individuals came in, 

determined who exactly they are, make sure that they are teamed up with supervisors and put everything in place and again 

coordinate that with the National Guard and to ensure that we were able to get all these evacuees into the Dome as quickly 

as possible and to make sure that we searched ‘em and did all the necessary things to ensure their safety as well as ours.”).

99 LOHSEP, Sitrep, Executive Summary, Hurricane Katrina, Aug. 29, 2005, 10 a.m. CT. Provided to Committee (stating 

that 10,342 were in the Superdome); Sally Forman, Communications Director, New Orleans Offi ce of the Mayor, Timeline 

and Notes, Aug. 28, 2005. Provided to Committee (“Dome opens as shelter of last resort – 10,000 gather”); Forman interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 62 (stating that Col. Ebbert told her 15,000 to 20,000 people were at the Superdome before landfall.); 

Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 52, 112 (estimating 12,000 to 15,000 were in the Superdome before landfall).
Sheltered and waiting

AP/Wide World Photos
163

Chapter 12

Federal Preparations

The National Response Plan (NRP) was intended to form the basis of the federal 

government’s response to disasters and for its interaction with state and local governments during such events. Th e response to the Hurricane Katrina disaster varied 

across the federal government. 

Th e Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which is charged with preparing for and 

responding to domestic incidents, whether terrorist attacks or natural disasters, failed to 

lead an eff ective federal response to Hurricane Katrina. DHS did not fully adapt or adequately train to meet its obligations under the NRP before Hurricane Katrina. Nor did the 

Department address the known defi ciencies of the Federal Emergency Management Agency 

(FEMA), such as staffi ng shortages, inadequate training, poor commodities tracking, and 

insuffi cient plans for post-disaster communications. In the critical days before landfall, DHS 

leadership mostly watched from the sidelines, allowed FEMA to take the lead, and missed 

critical opportunities to help prepare the entire federal government for the response. 

Th e Coast Guard – like FEMA, a DHS component – prepared well, largely on its own initiative, due to its well-developed and well-exercised hurricane plans and a commitment to 

deploying assistance without waiting for requests. 

Under the NRP, the Department of Defense has a supporting role for all Emergency Support Functions, and provides help as requested by FEMA. Traditionally, DOD’s policy has 

been to step in only when local, state, and federal resources have been overwhelmed. DOD 

took modest steps to prepare before Katrina, deploying liaison personnel to coordinate the 

response and establishing administrative processes so that it was fully prepared to handle 

FEMA requests once they arrived.

Th e Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) began to mobilize U.S. Public 

Health Service offi cers days before the storm, but poor planning meant that some never 

arrived, while others got no further than Jackson, Mississippi. Th ough HHS ordered additional medical supplies from the Strategic National Stockpile the day before landfall so that 

they could arrive at the New Orleans Superdome before Katrina struck, they didn’t arrive 

until the day of landfall. 

Department of Homeland Security 

DHS and its leaders failed to prepare the nation adequately for the unprecedented devastation of Hurricane Katrina. As discussed in Chapter 27, DHS failed to fully adapt and 

appropriately train to meet the requirements of the NRP in the nine months between its 

promulgation and Hurricane Katrina. Nor did the Department address FEMA’s defi ciencies 

such as staffi ng shortage, weaknesses in commodities tracking, and insuffi cient plans for 

post-disaster communications. 

Th is chapter examines the steps DHS leaders took in the critical days before Katrina made 

landfall, and what they could have done diff erently to speed and coordinate the federal 

response and thereby reduce victims’ suff ering. As Katrina was bearing down on the Gulf 

Coast, they failed to take reasonable steps during that period to create a full awareness and 

a sense of urgency across the federal government about the impending catastrophe. DHS’s 

actions and inactions during the days immediately prior to landfall had consequences in the 

days that followed. 
Chapter 12

164

Besides DHS’s failure to organize, train, and equip its personnel under the NRP, poor 

preparation, and missed opportunities led to responders’ improvising actions because they 

had no clear plan to guide them. Th e failures of the response fl owed logically from these 

mistakes made before landfall. 

DHS Leadership in the Days Before Landfall

Th e job of leading the federal response to a catastrophe rests with the Secretary of DHS.1

In the days before Katrina made landfall, DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff ’s eff orts in this 

regard fell short of what was reasonably expected of him.

Secretary Chertoff testifi ed that he saw his role as “lead[ing] the entire Department, imparting strategic guidance and direction based upon the plan developed, priorities established, 

and information provided. I also work with the President and other Department heads and 

deal with governors, members of Congress and other offi cials.”2

Secretary Chertoff testifi ed that over the course of the weekend before landfall, he “followed 

planning activities closely” and “stayed in continual contact with senior DHS and FEMA 

offi cials and my experienced advisors.”3

On the Saturday before landfall, Secretary Chertoff was at home working on unrelated matters, and his only apparent Katrina-related activity was to receive a briefi ng about that day’s 

FEMA video teleconference (VTC).4

 Th ese video teleconferences are a means by which key 

federal and state personnel involved in emergency management share information about 

their disaster preparations, including the latest weather forecasts, the progress of evacuations, and the pre-positioning of commodities.

On Sunday, Secretary Chertoff participated in the FEMA VTC. He heard assurances from 

then-FEMA Director Michael Brown and others that preparations were well in hand. For 

instance, Brown told attendees on the conference call “I want that supply chain jammed up 

as much as possible. ... Just keep jamming those lines full as much as you can with commodities” and “get to the edge of the envelope ... if you feel like you [missing] go ahead and 

do it. I’ll fi gure out some way to justify it.”5

Secretary Chertoff off ered to assist Brown in enlisting aid from other DHS components: “If 

there’s anything that you need from Coast Guard or any other components that you’re not 

getting, please let us know.” 6 Brown told Secretary Chertoff , “I appreciate it ... the Coast 

Guard and ICE [Immigration and Customs Enforcement] and all of the others have been 

incredibly good to us.” Secretary Chertoff also asked, “Are there any DOD assets that might 

be available? Have we reached out to them [DOD], and have we I guess made any kind of 

arrangement in case we need some additional help from them?” Brown responded that 

there were DOD assets at the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Baton Rouge 

that were “fully engaged.”7

Secretary Chertoff testifi ed that he did not second-guess statements he heard on the Sunday 

VTC – including those by state emergency managers and state National Guard offi cials 

who, as he termed it, “express[ed] very clearly their satisfaction with the state of aff airs.”8

During the August 28 conference call, Brown asked the Acting Deputy Director of the 

Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP), Colonel 

Jeff Smith, if there were “any unmet needs, anything that we’re not getting to you that you 

need” to which Colonel Smith responded, “Mike, no . . . it looks like those resources that are 

en route are going to – to be a good fi rst shot.” Colonel Smith also cautioned that, “Naturally, once we get into this thing ... I’m sure that things are going to come up that maybe some 

of even our best planners hadn’t even thought about. So I think fl exibility is going to be the 

key.” He also stated that it would be important to “cut through any potential red tape when 
165

Emergency Management: Mississippi

those things do arise.”9 Th e Mississippi representative on the call said “FEMA has been 

great. You’re leaning forward, and we appreciate that.” He later said, “We’ve got everything 

that we need from the federal government.”10 Secretary Chertoff thought the emergencymanagement offi cials on that call had hundreds of years of combined professional experience managing hurricanes.11

Secretary Chertoff also spoke with Governors Barbour of Mississippi, Blanco of Louisiana, 

and Riley of Alabama that day.12

Th e Secretary and other senior leaders did not take affi rmative steps prior to landfall, beyond his statements on the Sunday VTC, to ensure that DHS components with operational 

responsibilities under the NRP were prepared to respond.13 Instead, the evidence suggests 

that Secretary Chertoff and DHS responded to Katrina as if DHS headquarters had no special responsibilities outside the normal course of operations. 

Despite assurances and lack of affi rmative requests from the governors of the Gulf states, 

the Secretary still should have taken additional steps to better prepare his Department for 

the coming storm. 

From all corners, the message throughout the weekend, especially at the Saturday and Sunday VTCs, was that a catastrophe was about to strike the Gulf Coast, and the greater New 

Orleans area in particular. Th e head of the National Hurricane Service, Max Mayfi eld, had 

been making calls to leaders in parishes, cities, states, and the federal government. Th e Hurricane Pam exercise in 2004 had predicted that fl ooding from a catastrophic storm – what 

had been known for years among meteorologists and government offi cials as the “New 

Orleans scenario” – might kill as many as 60,000. In the weekend conference call, Brown 

referred to the approaching storm as the “big one.”14 As Mayfi eld said, “I think the wisest 

thing to do here is plan on a Category 5 hurricane ... no matter where it hits it’s going to 

have an impact over a very, very large area. ... I don’t think any model can tell you with any 

confi dence right now whether the levees will be topped or not, but that’s obviously a very, 

very grave concern.”15

During the weekend, as Katrina neared New Orleans, there was a need for initiative, for recognition of the unprecedented threat and the equally unprecedented response it required. 

Leadership – direction, encouragement, a sense of purpose and urgency – was needed. 

Secretary Chertoff did not provide it. 

For example, he did not ask specifi cally what preparations were under way, how much 

material was being pre-positioned, and whether it would be enough.16 And though the DHS 

Inspector General had issued a draft report in June 2005 stating that FEMA’s logisticsmanagement systems had performed poorly during the four Florida hurricanes in 2004,17

Secretary Chertoff did not inquire whether the system could handle the expected impact of 

Katrina. Th e Committee has found no evidence to suggest that anyone, including Secretary 

Chertoff , attempted to determine if the system could handle the expected impact of Katrina. 

Similarly, a DHS study had concluded that FEMA’s procurement offi ce was understaff ed.18

Yet the Secretary did not ask whether this important offi ce was up to the coming task.

Although he has stated repeatedly that he relied on Brown as his “battlefi eld commander,”19

aside from on the Sunday VTC, according to Brown, Secretary Chertoff did not talk to his 

“commander” directly over the weekend, either while Brown was in Washington or aft er 

he left for the Gulf on Sunday aft ernoon.20 In view of Secretary Chertoff ’s testimony that he 

stayed in contact with “senior DHS and FEMA offi cials and [his] experienced advisors,”21 this 

omission is particularly inexplicable. Because Secretary Chertoff was placing so much faith in 

Brown to lead the preparations and response, it was incumbent on the Secretary to do more 
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than just have a brief conversation with him in front of dozens of state, local, and federal 

offi cials – including the President of the United States – on a VTC. Secretary Chertoff should 

have called Brown privately to discuss in more detail the status of preparations and the level 

of cooperation Brown was getting from DHS and other government departments. 

Conversely, Brown failed to inform the Secretary of the FEMA defi ciencies that he has since 

claimed in testimony and media interviews to have known about at the time. Th ese two 

key players’ failure to communicate is evidence of the profound dysfunction then existing 

between DHS and FEMA leadership.

Additionally:

• Th ere should have been a plan to maintain situational awareness at the 

Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC). Th e Director of DHS’ Operations Center, Matthew Broderick, testifi ed “there was no plan.”22 Th e HSOC 

plans months in advance for events such as the Super Bowl, yet no eff ort was 

being made to identify sources of information specifi c to New Orleans and 

the Gulf Coast, such as local National Weather Service stations or local media 

outlets. Rather, the intention was to rely exclusively on FEMA offi cials and the 

very state and local entities that would be bearing the brunt of the storm’s fury 

to provide situational awareness. Secretary Chertoff bears ultimate responsibility for ensuring that there is such a plan.23 (See Chapter 19 for further information on situational awareness.)

• Th e National Communications System (NCS) never developed a plan to 

restore communications to emergency responders, such as the police and fi re 

departments, aft er a catastrophic disaster. Instead, the NCS intended to rely 

solely on the private sector to restore communications capabilities.24 Additionally, Peter Fonash, the Director of NCS, was not familiar with the “New 

Orleans scenario,” until the day before landfall.25 Th e Secretary bears ultimate 

responsibility for this lack of preparation. 

• Th e investigation uncovered no evidence that anyone coordinated with the 

Department of Justice (DOJ) to determine which agency was going to take the 

lead under Emergency Support Function 13, Public Safety and Security.26 (See 

Chapter 25, Public Safety and Security.) Th ere was no DOJ representative at 

the Public Safety and Security desk at the FEMA National Response Coordination Center (NRCC),27 FEMA’s national operations center in charge of overall 

coordination of the response at the national level. Each of the Emergency 

Support Functions is represented there to coordinate activities in their area of 

expertise. Additionally DOJ did not have a response plan (either for itself or 

to coordinate with DHS) to execute Public Safety and Security responsibilities 

following a natural disaster.

• Th e investigation uncovered no evidence that senior DHS leadership contacted the leadership of Immigration and Custom Enforcement (ICE), Customs 

and Border Patrol (CBP), Federal Protective Service (FPS) or the Secret Service 

to assess their planning and preparation – or even to determine if they were 

planning and preparing. Th ere was confusion over staffi ng the Public Safety 

and Security desk at the NRCC – FPS had attempted to send a representative 

to the desk, only to be rebuff ed by FEMA.28 Moreover, ICE was going forward 

with a previously scheduled conference in Baltimore for its Special Agents in 

Charge (SACs), and the New Orleans SAC was still planning to fl y out Sunday 
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167

morning to attend the conference rather than remain in the area to lead his 

offi ce’s response eff orts aft er the storm had passed.29

In addition, the Secretary has broader responsibilities that reach across the federal government.30 Yet, there is no evidence, nor any testimony by the Secretary, that he reached out 

to other Cabinet secretaries to assess their level of preparedness, to determine if they were 

coordinating eff orts with DHS, or to ensure that they responded quickly and fully to any 

requests that might come from DHS or FEMA.31

Finally, it is reasonable to expect that the Secretary would be engaged with the President 

during critical times in a catastrophe. Th e Committee was unable to develop any record 

as to whether the Secretary was in fact keeping the President informed in the pre-storm 

period. 

Th e lack of plans to maintain situational awareness, the lack of coordination in the deployment of federal law enforcement assets, and the communications problems at all levels of 

government all resulted in part from some of the pre-landfall inaction described above.

Much was expected of Secretary Chertoff , and there were things that only he, as a Cabinet secretary, could do. In his testimony before the Committee, U.S. Comptroller General 

David Walker (the head of the non-partisan Government Accountability Offi ce, which is 

commonly referred to as the investigative arm of Congress) described the unique leverage 

Inspecting: General Landreneau, 

Mayor Nagin, Michael Brown, 

Senator Landrieu (behind Brown), 

President Bush, Senator Vitter 

U.S.Coast Guard photo
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of such a position: “No matter how capable the person [leading the response eff ort] might 

be, level matters in this town, unfortunately, especially with regard to certain departments 

and agencies like the Department of Defense. Hierarchy is real.”32

What DHS Should Have Done

Th e evidence suggests that neither Secretary Chertoff nor DHS leaders fully understood 

the Department’s responsibilities under the NRP. But he had at his disposal other mechanisms that could prompt greater coordination of response and recovery eff orts, as well as 

to convey an increased sense of urgency. He did not take advantage of them. Th ree of these 

mechanisms warrant greater scrutiny.

What DHS Should Have Done: The Catastrophic Incident Annex

Th e NRP-Catastrophic Incident Annex (NRP-CIA) exists to create a “proactive national 

response to a catastrophic incident.”33 For a “typical” disaster, the standard practice is that 

the federal government does not extend aid until a state requests assistance. During a catastrophe, however, NRP-CIA activation prompts the government to help without waiting for 

requests. 34 Secretary Chertoff did not activate the NRP-CIA, as he had the authority to do.

None of the senior DHS offi cials interviewed recalled considering activating the NRP-CIA 

pre-landfall,35 and it isn’t clear from Secretary Chertoff ’s testimony whether he considered doing so.36 Secretary Chertoff has since stated that he believed that Katrina “was not 

the type of event contemplated by the CIA”37 because, in his view, the NRP-CIA was for 

“no-notice or short-notice incidents where anticipatory preparation and coordination with 

the state under the Staff ord Act [which authorizes the federal government to play a role in 

emergency response] are not possible.”38 Th is interpretation is not imposed by the Staff ord 

Act and is illogical. As Comptroller General Walker testifi ed to the Committee, “Th e idea 

that we would be less proactive in dealing with a known natural disaster just defi es common 

sense.”39

Th e NRP-CIA refers to the Catastrophic Incident Supplement (NRP-CIS) for specifi c operational details such as what “incident-specifi c ‘packages’” the various federal agencies will 

be expected to deploy once the NRP-CIA is activated.40 Th e Supplement was still in draft 

when Katrina made landfall.41 Th e draft Supplement provides that it should be used when 

the “Secretary determines that an incident has resulted or will result in a mass victim/mass 

evacuation situation.”42 Th e Committee believes that a major hurricane bearing down on a 

major American city lying below sea level qualifi es as an event that is likely to result in “extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage or disruption severely aff ecting the population, 

infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or government functions.”43

It does appear that the issue was at least raised to a FEMA offi cial. Janet Benini, a former Director for Response and Planning for the White House Homeland Security Council, worked 

on developing the Catastrophic Incident Supplement and a planning scenario that included 

a catastrophic hurricane striking Louisiana.44 On Saturday, August 27, Benini e-mailed 

David Garratt, Deputy Director of FEMA’s Recovery Division, to ask whether there was 

“any talk of implementing the Catastrophic Plan.” Benini noted that “with a Cat 4 heading 

directly into New Orleans this might be the time.” Garratt responded that he had heard no 

such discussion.45

Apart from any practical benefi ts, activating the NRP-CIA pre-landfall would have changed 

the tenor of federal preparation eff orts, prompting federal agencies to anticipate state and 

local needs instead of waiting for requests from overwhelmed offi cials in Louisiana and Mississippi. Brown said: “[I]n every disaster we push, because we pre-positioned supplies and 

equipment, but in this case we should have started the push system that never stopped. You 
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169

know, we pre-positioned and then tried to see what was going to happen and then started it 

back up again. We should have just kept pushing.”46

Obviously, the precise eff ect of such an activation is diffi cult to quantify, and the NRP-CIA 

is not a panacea. As noted above, its operational component – the Catastrophic Incident 

Supplement – was not yet complete or in eff ect, nor had federal agencies trained or exercised its use. Nevertheless, the Committee believes that activating the NRP-CIA could have 

led to the mobilization and deployment of some additional assets before they were requested through normal NRP protocols. 

Activating the NRP-CIA also could have accelerated the involvement of the Department of 

Defense. Under the NRP, DOD is a supporting agency to all 15 Emergency Support Functions. As discussed elsewhere in the report (see Chapter 26, Military Operations), the day 

aft er landfall, DOD took the initiative and activated forces, deploying troops and resources 

without waiting for requests for assistance from FEMA or the aff ected states. DOD eventually deployed over 20,000 active-duty military personnel and coordinated deployment of 

50,000 National Guard troops, as well as hundreds of helicopters, and numerous ships.47

Activating the NRP-CIA may have accelerated DOD planning even further, resulting in 

earlier pre-positioning of helicopters and deployment of ships, which did not sail from Norfolk, Virginia, until August 31, two days aft er landfall.48

While speculative, these examples illustrate how the disaster response may have proceeded 

more effi ciently had DHS acted with a greater sense of urgency and activated the NRP-CIA 

before landfall.49

What DHS Should Have Done: Appointment of a PFO

Secretary Chertoff did not appoint a Principal Federal Offi cer (PFO) until the evening 

of Tuesday, August 30, approximately 36 hours aft er landfall.50 Th e position is provided 

for in the NRP so that the Secretary will have an on-the-ground representative to oversee 

the federal response. It is designed to support the unifi ed command structure and be the 

primary point of contact and situational awareness for the Secretary in a disaster area.

51

Th e Secretary appointed a PFO months in advance for events such as the Super Bowl.52 Yet 

DHS waited until the day aft er landfall to appoint one for what many government offi cials 

– including Brown – feared was a potential catastrophe.

Secretary Chertoff testifi ed that he did not appoint a PFO on Saturday, when the President 

issued the emergency declaration for Louisiana, because the PFO “doesn’t exercise command authority; it is a coordinating authority.” He also stated that he believed Brown had 

all the authority he needed to coordinate the federal eff ort by virtue of his rank within DHS. 

Th e Secretary elaborated: 

Given the fact that Michael Brown was an Under Secretary of the Department, 

so he was the third ranking member of the Department, at least in terms of 

level, and given the fact that he and the team working on this had been working together for a week, I frankly didn’t think it was necessary at that point to 

add an additional title or additional measure of authority.53

Th e Committee disagrees that Brown’s rank in DHS was a substitute for PFO designation. 

With other duties to perform, and with no way of knowing whether Katrina would be the 

only disaster in store, Brown was in no position to commit to the 100 percent on-scene 

focus required in a PFO. Th e Committee believes Secretary Chertoff should have appointed 

a PFO in conjunction with the President’s declaration on Saturday, August 27.54 Doing so 

could have laid the groundwork for a unifi ed approach to preparation and signaled strongly 

that DHS and the federal government was stepping forward with all available assets. Ap-
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pointment before landfall could have allowed the individual appointed to bring together 

state, local, and other federal offi cials in the region and to put in place coordinated plans for 

a response in advance of the storm rather than trying to establish control in the midst of the 

response. Defi ciencies, such as the failure to evacuate special-needs individuals or the lack 

of planning for post-landfall evacuation of the general population, might have been identifi ed earlier. None of this happened.55

Th at said, it’s unclear that appointing Brown PFO prior to landfall would have improved 

the response. Brown has made it very clear that he did not want to be appointed PFO. In 

fact, he thought the entire concept “silly,”56 as he felt it added an unnecessary layer of bureaucracy. Th e choice of Brown as PFO – whether before landfall or aft er – was poor, even 

if for no other reason than his animosity toward the PFO concept, the NRP, and DHS, not 

to mention his lack of emergency-management training and experience. Perhaps Secretary 

Chertoff , who was in his position for less than seven months, wasn’t aware of Brown’s attitudes or was poorly advised. Or perhaps he chose Brown in the hope that he would rise 

above policy diff erences in the face of catastrophe. 

One of the PFO’s main responsibilities is to keep DHS leadership informed of the situation on the ground,57 but Brown, who has expressed disdain for this structure as ineffi cient,

refused to communicate with the Secretary, circumventing the chain of command to communicate directly with the White House. His actions were inexcusable – not only insubordinate, but disruptive to DHS’s awareness of the threats and problems that it was facing.

Brown was a poor choice for another reason. Even when appointed PFO, Brown remained 

the Director of FEMA, an apparent violation of the NRP’s requirement that a PFO not be 

“‘dual hatted’ with any other roles or responsibilities that could detract from their overall 

incident-management responsibilities.”58 According to DHS Deputy Secretary Michael 

Jackson, “for the incident of a hurricane, PFO and Director of FEMA, ‘macht Nichts’ [German: ‘amounts to nothing’]: they both have the same capacities, capabilities, performance 

capabilities in managing the events.”59 Th ere is, however, a practical reason why a PFO 

should have no other responsibilities: the PFO has to be focused entirely on the catastrophe 

at hand. But just as DHS and Secretary Chertoff had responsibilities that were broader than 

Katrina, so, too, did FEMA and its Director. On Th ursday, September 1, a minor earthquake occurred in California.60 Had this earthquake been more severe – or had there been 

wildfi res, fl ooding, or another disaster elsewhere – it remained FEMA’s responsibility to respond, and the FEMA Director’s job to see that it did so. Either Brown shouldn’t have been 

appointed PFO, or someone else should have become Acting Director of FEMA. Neither 

happened.

What DHS Should Have Done: Activating the IIMG 

Th e Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG) brings together senior-level offi cials 

from multiple agencies, in theory to assist the Secretary of Homeland Security in managing national incidents. Th e IIMG was formally activated at 11:30 a.m., Tuesday, August 

30.61 Over the weekend, the Director of the IIMG, Robert Stephan, consulted twice with 

Matthew Broderick, who, as the Director of the Homeland Security Operations Center, the 

primary hub for domestic incident management, operational coordination and situational 

awareness, was charged with recommending activation to the Secretary. Stephan recalled 

asking Broderick whether there was “anything signifi cant at this point in time that we need 

to be worried about and that would cause us to bring in the IMG [sic] this evening? And 

the answer was no.”62 Each time the two consulted, they decided that the FEMA and HSOC 

structures were “robust” enough without the IIMG.63 Instead, prior to landfall, members of 

the IIMG were told to be ready to convene on 90 minutes’ notice.64
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It’s unclear whether early activation of the IIMG might have resulted in a more eff ective 

federal response. Th ough the IIMG was designed to be a mechanism by which to share information, identify available resources, and coordinate government eff orts, some witnesses 

criticized the IIMG as ineff ective in practice. One witness derisively called it the “bright idea 

brigade.”65 Th e FEMA designee to the IIMG said that it actually hindered response eff orts 

aft er its activation in Hurricane Katrina by meddling in operational details.66 One emergency-preparedness offi cer said that “It became a huge animal you have to feed information 

to.”67

Since the IIMG was not activated until recovery was under way, it’s unclear whether 

response eff orts would have improved if it had been activated pre-landfall. However, the 

decision not to activate the IIMG prior to landfall suggests that DHS leadership did not fully 

recognize the potential scope of the damage Katrina presented, or its obligation to lead the 

federal response in accordance with the NRP. While the performance of the IIMG appears 

to have been mixed aft er landfall, things might have gone more smoothly if it had been activated sooner and been allowed before the height of the crisis to work through issues associated with its fi rst use since the implementation of the NRP.68 Alternatively, if activating the 

IIMG before landfall was not called for in an incident the magnitude of Katrina, this calls 

into the question the utility of the organization itself and suggests that consideration should 

be given to abolishing it and distributing its functions to operating elements.

Conclusion

Despite knowledge that Katrina was a looming “nightmare scenario,”69 DHS and Secretary 

Chertoff failed to adequately prepare the federal government for what became one of the 

most destructive natural disasters in the nation’s history. As Katrina approached the Gulf 

Coast, those in the top ranks of DHS failed to understand the potential scope of the pending 

catastrophe and FEMA’s limited capacity to address an event of this magnitude.

Equally important, DHS failed to carry out its own responsibilities under the NRP and associated Presidential Directives.70 A November 2005 report by the DHS Inspector General 

regarding an April 2005 training exercise (“TOPOFF 3”) found that “Th e exercise highlighted – at all levels of government – a fundamental lack of understanding for the principles 

and protocols set forth in the NRP.”71 Others in government – most notably then-FEMA 

Director Michael Brown – simply refused to accept the NRP, choosing instead to proceed as 

if the NRP did not exist.

Secretary Chertoff testifi ed that he believed his role as chief executive of the Department 

was to impart strategic guidance and deal with senior offi cials, not be a “hurricane operator.” But Secretary Chertoff came up short by his own yardstick. A chief executive should 

understand the responsibilities of the organization he runs. In the days before Katrina, 

Secretary Chertoff appeared not to have fully understood the broader role of DHS under the 

NRP. A strategic leader chooses capable subordinates and provides those subordinates with 

guidance, works eff ectively with other key government offi cials, and, in DHS’s case, cooperates eff ectively with states. Even judging the Secretary by his own criteria, his performance 

in the nation’s worst domestic disaster fell short of reasonable expectations.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency

FEMA Pre-Landfall

Before landfall, Scott Wells, Deputy Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Katrina in New Orleans, called Edward Buikema, FEMA’s Acting Director of Response. “I don’t think we’re 
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thinking big enough,” he told Buikema. “[Katrina] is bigger than how we normally do 

things.”72

Wells was exactly right. Despite knowing for years the catastrophic impact that a large 

hurricane could have on New Orleans, despite the predictions of the exercise known as 

Hurricane Pam, and despite FEMA’s own internal slides showing projections that Katrina 

could be worse than Pam’s predictions of 60,000 fatalities – FEMA just wasn’t thinking big 

enough for Katrina. 

DHS is the central federal entity for preparing for and responding to disasters. FEMA is 

one of the agencies within DHS charged with responsibilities under the NRP. FEMA is the 

lead agency for fi ve of the 15 Emergency Support Functions under the NRP.73 Despite these 

obligations, FEMA did not prepare adequately for Hurricane Katrina. 

Th is section analyzes FEMA’s preparations in the days during which Katrina was moving 

toward land.

FEMA offi cials knew the threat a large hurricane posed to New Orleans. Buikema testifi ed 

that FEMA considered a large hurricane hitting New Orleans to be one of the worst catastrophes that could occur in the United States.74 Eric Tolbert, FEMA’s Director of Response 

until February 2005, testifi ed that while at FEMA, the hurricane threat to New Orleans was 

his top priority and that FEMA knew a hurricane Category 3 or stronger could breach or 

overtop the levees.75 (Th ere is a more detailed discussion of FEMA’s knowledge of the threat 

posed to New Orleans by a hurricane in Chapter 8.) 

Despite this knowledge, FEMA’s leadership failed to ensure that the federal government’s 

preparations for the response were adequate. Its leaders didn’t compel the federal government to think bigger than usual. Th ey failed to ask the right questions to make sure FEMA’s 

response was big enough. Th ey did not utilize all available resources. FEMA seemed to be 

following pages from its regular playbook instead of a playbook made for “the big one.” 

Some of FEMA’s pre-landfall failures had to do with FEMA’s systematic weaknesses, discussed in Chapter 14 . Th ey included insuffi cient staff ; limited ability to track commodities; 

unexercised, untrained, under-equipped emergency-response teams; unprepared disasterassistance workforce; lack of operating procedures; and lack of necessary funding. FEMA 

Director Michael Brown sought additional funding to address many of these problems, 

but DHS did not provide suffi cient additional funding. Th e failure to address or solve these 

many problems cast the die even before Katrina moved towards the Gulf Coast.

As early as Saturday morning, August 27, Michael Lowder, FEMA Deputy Director of 

Response, e-mailed several FEMA employees: “If [this] is the ‘New Orleans’ scenario, we 

are already way behind. Let’s don’t hold back. Let’s make sure that all of our Emergency 

Support Functions are fully engaged and ramped up, everything turned on, etc. Th is may be 

IT!”76 Because of the inadequate preparations, even before landfall, the federal government 

was already behind in fi ghting Katrina’s terrible wrath. 

Weather Warnings in the Days Before Landfall 

In the days as Katrina moved through the Gulf of Mexico, FEMA was repeatedly warned 

that it was a potentially catastrophic hurricane headed toward the Gulf Coast. Despite these 

warnings, Brown has admitted that the federal government’s level of preparedness wasn’t 

adequate for the big one.77 William Lokey, FEMA’s Federal Coordinating Offi cer in Louisiana during Katrina, agreed: “Communications and coordination was lacking, preplanning 

was lacking. We were not prepared for this.”78
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173

Th e warnings began early. Th e 5 p.m. National Weather Service (NWS) report on Th ursday, August 25, said some models showed Hurricane Katrina moving to the west, bringing 

it “inland between Mobile, Alabama, and Grand Isle, Louisiana [southeastern Louisiana],” 

although the National Hurricane Center (NHC) model did not show it moving that far 

west.79 Six hours later a new NWS report predicted that Katrina was expected to strengthen 

and that “Katrina will be a dangerous hurricane in the northeastern Gulf of Mexico in about 

3 days.”80

By 11 a.m., Friday, August 26, the NWS report said that Katrina’s track should “fl atten out 

in a more westward direction.” It reported some models showing the storm going west over 

Louisiana, but most showing Katrina going inland over the northeast Gulf Coast. Th e report 

warned, “Strengthening to a major hurricane is expected.”81 On a noon video teleconference 

between federal and state offi cials hosted by FEMA, Max Mayfi eld, NHC Director, warned: 

“Right now we’re forecasting it to be a strong Category 3 hurricane. It’s going to be stronger 

than that.”82 Another NHC offi cial said that Katrina “has defi nitely shift ed well to the west 

towards New Orleans ... we’ve really got to pay attention all the way from Louisiana over 

into the Florida Gulf Coast.”83 

Th us, at least as early as Th ursday evening, FEMA was aware of a dangerous hurricane 

forming in the Gulf of Mexico and by noon Friday was aware that Katrina was shift ing west 

toward New Orleans. Th is awareness did not provoke action. On Friday, August 27, when 

asked, Brown permitted Acting Response Division Director Buikema to go to Alaska for a 

previously scheduled emergency-management conference even though “Th e predictions 

are now Katrina will turn into a Cat 4.”84 Buikema ultimately cut his trip short and returned 

from Alaska, arriving at FEMA headquarters on Sunday around 11 a.m.85 As a result, however, he was unavailable until Sunday morning to oversee his division’s preparations as the 

storm moved toward landfall.86

A Friday morning e-mail to Lokey from William Irwin of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the lead agency for Emergency Support Function 3 (ESF-3) (which includes executing contracts for ice and water) under the NRP, expressed concern that FEMA was moving 

too slowly: “FEMA Region IV [covering Alabama and Mississippi, among other states] is 

reluctant to make a decision to provide mission assignments [the mechanism by which 

FEMA requests other federal agencies to provide support during a disaster response] for 

a possible Alabama hit. ... Th e storm will speed up and rapidly strike on Monday and if 

FEMA/Alabama wants to have ESF#3 support ... the trigger needed to be pulled already.”87

On Friday, FEMA’s national operations center and its Region IV operations center in Atlanta were operating at a moderate level of readiness.88 Th e Texas-based Region VI operations center that covered Louisiana remained at its lowest state of readiness, for no known 

threat of disaster, on Friday.89 Although by Friday morning the National Weather Service 

began predicting that Katrina was shift ing towards the west, FEMA did not activate the national operations center to its highest readiness level until Saturday at 7 a.m.90 Th e regional 

operations centers were activated to the highest level at noon Eastern Time on Saturday.91

By Saturday, warnings were growing even more grave. FEMA’s 5:30 a.m. National Situation 

Report stated that Louisiana’s Governor Kathleen Blanco had declared a state of emergency, 

noting that New Orleans was “of particular concern because much of that city lies below sea 

level. According to Governor Blanco, Lake Pontchartrain is a very large lake that sits next to 

the city of New Orleans and if the hurricane winds blow from a certain direction, there are 

dire predictions of what may happen in the city.”92 By early Saturday morning, the projected 

path of the storm was directly over New Orleans. FEMA briefi ng slides dated 9 a.m., August 

27, 2005, at FEMA headquarters, stated: “Current projected path takes storm directly over 

New Orleans.”93 Th e briefi ng slides also noted that the Pam exercise predicted 60,000 fatali-
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ties and 1 million-plus persons displaced, and that Pam’s estimates are “exceeded by Hurricane Katrina real life impacts.”94 (See Chapter 8.)

Also on Saturday morning, FEMA distributed copies of the Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, also known as the Hurricane Pam plan, to its employees.95

On Saturday morning, the State of Louisiana requested an emergency declaration under 

the Staff ord Act – the federal law that provides a framework for federal assistance and 

reimbursement to states struck by declared disasters – so that it could better prepare for 

the storm. President Bush granted Louisiana’s request Saturday evening.96 Mississippi and 

Alabama requested emergency declarations on Sunday; the President granted them the 

same day.97 Th is unusual declaration of emergencies before landfall ensured that the federal 

government would fi nance many pre- and post-landfall actions taken by state and local 

offi cials.98 Th is had only been done once in the previous 15 years, when President Clinton 

issued four pre-landfall declarations, all for Hurricane Floyd in 1999.99

By late Saturday and very early Sunday, the weather projections became even more severe, 

warning that Katrina could become a very intense and dangerous Category 5 hurricane, and 

that the storm surge could be as high as 25 feet in some areas.100 Another Sunday weather 

report, from the Slidell, Louisiana, offi ce of the National Weather Service, stated that “devastating damage expected ... a most powerful hurricane with unprecedented strength ... 

most of the area will be uninhabitable for weeks ... perhaps longer.”101

FEMA’s Sunday morning National Situation Report warned:

Katrina could be especially devastating if it strikes New Orleans because the 

city sits below sea level and is dependent on levees and pumps to keep the water out. A direct hit could wind up submerging the city in several feel of water. 

Making matters worse, at least 100,000 people in the city lack the transportation to get out of town.102

Also on Sunday, DHS released a report, stating, “Any storm rated Category 4 or greater ... 

will likely lead to severe fl ooding and/or levee breaching. Th is could leave the New Orleans 

area being submerged for weeks or months. ... Th e magnitude of this storm is expected to 

cause massive fl ooding.” Th is report was circulated to the White House’s situation room, 

throughout DHS, and to all agencies in DHS’s HSOC.103

Brown testifi ed that he spoke to White House offi cials at least 30 times during the weekend 

prior to landfall, repeatedly warning them about Katrina.104 Brown said he spoke directly 

to the President on Saturday, August 27, and warned that Katrina could be catastrophic.105

Brown later called to ask that the President contact Governor Blanco and “do everything 

he could within his persuasive powers to convince [Louisiana offi cials] to do a mandatory 

evacuation.”106 Brown testifi ed that he told both Chief of Staff Andy Card and Deputy Chief 

of Staff Joe Hagin prior to landfall that he was concerned about how bad Katrina could be, 

saying he thought Katrina could be the catastrophic “big one.”107

On the Sunday before landfall, President Bush and Hagin both participated in FEMA’s 

noon video teleconference (VTC), where Max Mayfi eld, Director of the National Hurricane Center, predicted Katrina would be a “very dangerous hurricane” and warned, “I 

don’t think any model can tell you with any confi dence right now whether the levees will be 

topped or not, but that’s obviously a very, very grave concern.”108 Although the President 

appeared on the VTC, promised federal government assistance, and thanked Governor 

Blanco and Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour for heeding these warnings, and doing all 

they could possibly do to prepare for this storm, the President did not ask any substantive 
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questions.109 On that call Colonel William Doran, operations division chief for LOHSEP, 

noted that the State of Louisiana was “way ahead of the game there” with catastrophic planning “thanks to the help of FEMA, when we did the Hurricane Pam exercises.”110 Colonel 

Smith said Louisiana’s evacuations were going “much better than it did during Ivan.”111

Aft er the Sunday noon VTC, Brown had another conversation with Hagin in which he 

said he again raised his concerns about the storm and complained that he had never been 

allowed to do the catastrophic planning that was necessary for FEMA to be prepared for 

a storm like Katrina that he had pushed to be able to do.112 “I [was] just adamant that they 

understand my concern about New Orleans,”113 Brown described the call.

FEMA’S Preparation for Katrina 

FEMA’s many failures in preparing for Katrina include: (1) multiple failures involving deployment of personnel; (2) not taking suffi cient measures to deploy communications assets; 

(3) insuffi cient planning to be prepared to respond to catastrophic events, (4) not pre-staging enough commodities; (5) failures associated with deployment of disaster medical assistance teams and search and rescue teams; (6) failures involving evacuation; (7) failure to 

establish a joint fi eld offi ce quickly enough; and (8) failure to take measures prior to landfall 

to ensure proper security for emergency response teams. All of these contributed to FEMA’s 

failed response, which will be discussed in later chapters. 

FEMA’s Deployment of Personnel for Katrina

FEMA went to war without enough troops. Unlike many other disasters, hurricanes provide 

emergency managers with advance warning. Th us, FEMA should also begin its preparations, such as personnel deployment, in advance of a storm. With each passing day, FEMA 

had more accurate information about the strength and path of the storm. FEMA’s limited 

staff – it had only approximately 2,250 permanent, full-time employees in November 2005 

and around a 17 percent vacancy rate when Katrina struck114 – and resources require that its 

leadership be fl exible and adaptable to changing predictions. As Katrina developed, FEMA 

was forced to choose how to allocate its limited staff across at least three states. 

As early as Th ursday, August 25, before landfall, FEMA was aware that Katrina would likely 

make a second landfall somewhere on the Gulf Coast. On Friday, FEMA decided to move 

an Advance Emergency Response Team (ERT-A) from the West Coast to Mississippi.115

William Carwile was notifi ed that he would be the Federal Coordinating Offi cer (FCO) in 

Mississippi. He arrived there on Saturday, August 27, to take charge of FEMA’s response 

to what he later described as “the worst disaster to strike the United States in recent history 

from a response standpoint.”116

By Friday aft ernoon, Katrina was shift ing westward and was being projected to make landfall as a Category 4 hurricane. FEMA leadership discussed deploying the National Emergency Response Team (ERT-N), but deployed no teams to Louisiana until noon, Saturday, August 27.117 ERT-N teams are emergency-response teams designed for high-impact events.118

Shortly aft er September 11, 2001, ERT-N teams had about 125 to 175 members, but FEMA 

had gradually reduced their size to the current level of about 25 members.119 While the NRP 

states that the Secretary of Homeland Security “determines the need for ERT-N deployment, coordinating the plans with the aff ected regions,” Secretary Chertoff played no role 

in deploying the team.120 Th e decision was made by FEMA senior leadership.121 Th e team’s 

Saturday deployment was simply too late, but it’s unclear whether the Secretary’s personal 

involvement would have sped it up. To make matters worse, once deployed, many team 

members were slow to reach the aff ected area, arriving only aft er landfall. Also, the deployed ERT-N went into service as a combination of the two national teams, rather than a 
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176

pre-selected team, because of a shortage of FEMA employees and because some available 

team members were already deployed in the Gulf region.122

FCO Lokey arrived in Baton Rouge between 6 and 7 p.m. on Saturday, meeting Deputy 

FCO Scott Wells at the State EOC.123 Lokey admitted that key positions on the ERT-N were 

not fi lled prior to landfall.124 According to Lokey, by Saturday, only fi ve ERT-N members 

had arrived, and by Sunday night only 12 to 15 ERT-N members were there.125 Prior to 

landfall, then, only about half of the ERT-N members were in place. 

According to Mike Hall, a leader of one of FEMA’s ERT-N teams, team members are supposed to deploy immediately once activated.126 Carwile said it is “very important” that an 

ERT-N arrive in a timely matter.127 However, FEMA does not dictate how quickly those 

team members should arrive since they are coming from diff erent parts of the country.128

Carwile said that the ERT-N teams used to have procedures to speed their arrival, but that 

they had been discarded.129

FEMA deployed an ERT-A team from Region I, which is headquartered in Boston, to the 

Region VI center in Denton, Texas, on Sunday, August 28. Phil Parr, the leader of this team, 

arrived on Sunday late aft ernoon or early evening; his team arrived in staggered fashion, 

some arriving on Sunday, others on Monday, the day of landfall.130 Of the 20 to 25 members assigned to his ERT-A team, about 10 eventually deployed.131 On Saturday, Texas was 

not within the cone of the projected path of the hurricane.132 According to a Parr e-mail, 

Parr agreed the storm was not headed to Texas.133 On Monday, FEMA redirected Parr and 

some of his team members to Louisiana. Parr and his team members did not arrive in New 

Orleans until Tuesday, August 30.134

FEMA also did not have available the kind of fi rst-responder teams it was supposed to have 

under the NRP. Th e First Incident Response Support Teams (FIRST teams) were not available when Katrina made landfall because FEMA had not yet hired staff for them.135 FIRST 

teams are designed to arrive quickly to assess the situation and identify potential requirements for federal help, provide advice on protective actions, coordinate response activities, 

and assist with critical life saving measures. Th e teams are supposed to deploy with sophisticated communications equipment to support state and local fi rst responders.136 Several 

witnesses said these teams would likely have been a major asset in responding to Katrina.137

Prior to landfall, Marty Bahamonde, a FEMA public-aff airs staff er, was the only FEMA employee deployed to New Orleans.138 He arrived in New Orleans at 11 p.m. Saturday to prepare for VIP visits to the area. By chance, he rode out the storm in the New Orleans EOC, 

located near the Superdome.139 On Sunday aft ernoon, there was a growing realization that 

more people were heading to the Superdome than offi cials had anticipated. Offi cials at the 

Orleans Parish EOC were becoming concerned. Bahamonde took pictures of the gathering 

crowds at the Superdome and sent them back to FEMA headquarters. Th roughout Sunday, 

Bahamonde continued to provide information to FEMA headquarters about the growing 

numbers of people and the deteriorating conditions.140

Brown arrived in Baton Rouge on Sunday evening. He was accompanied by two FEMA 

press employees, a FEMA congressional-relations liaison, security detail, and his personal 

assistant, but no operations experts.141 Th ey traveled on military aircraft ; FEMA’s operational personnel took commercial fl ights.142 Once in Baton Rouge, Brown went to dinner and to 

the hotel, but did not go to the state EOC.143

As discussed more fully in Chapter 14, FEMA suff ered from staffi ng shortages, lack of 

training, and diffi culties with its disaster-surge workforce. Moreover, the teams deployed 
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177

were unprepared, unequipped, and (aside from many members participating in a simulated 

hurricane tabletop exercise the previous June) had not trained together as a team.144 Carwile 

believed that his Mississippi team, though not an ERT-N, was actually more experienced 

and better-trained than the ERT-N team members sent to Louisiana.145

Staffi ng shortages and inadequacies contributed to FEMA’s failure to prepare for Katrina.146

Wells admitted that FEMA didn’t have the staff to run a 24-hour operation in Katrina. 

People were working, he said, “50 hours over 2 days.”147 Carwile agreed:

Th e inability to fi eld experienced personnel in Mississippi had a major impact 

on our operations there. FEMA needs many more trained people who can 

deploy to disasters. Both career professionals and temporary disaster assistance 

employees (DAEs) [used by FEMA to quickly increase staffi ng during disasters] performed their jobs well in Mississippi, especially in the fi rst chaotic days 

aft er landfall. However, there were not enough trained people to adequately 

staff all of the positions. Of all the shortfalls that I had to manage as FCO this 

was the most diffi cult. Th is paucity of qualifi ed personnel hurt us in both the 

response and recovery phases of the operations.148

To make matters worse, FEMA had few personnel specifi cally devoted to response activities.149 For instance, although there are generally pre-arranged rosters for emergency-response teams, oft en those members are in other jobs or working on other disasters and are 

not available when a new disaster hits. Th erefore, the teams consist of individuals who have 

not necessarily previously served in these positions, who have not trained, worked, practiced, or planned together, and who are sometimes not qualifi ed for the job. Wells referred 

to the way positions are fi lled on emergency response team as the “hey-you roster” and said 

that under this system “you get people that are not qualifi ed for the job. It’s secondary jobs 

for everybody. ... I can probably count on my hand the number of people that their primary 

job is go out in the fi eld and do these things. Th is is not a team that goes out that is trained 

and worked and planned and operated together.”150

In addition to full-time FEMA personnel, FEMA uses temporary employees, called Disaster 

Assistance Employees (DAEs), to surge up for disasters. According to Marie Sloan, director 

of the DAE program, fewer than half of the DAEs were available when Katrina made landfall – a typical availability rate.151 Records show that FEMA was also slow to deploy available 

DAEs for Katrina. For instance, of the approximately 4,000 DAEs, only 25 were deployed 

on Friday, 116 on Saturday, and 53 on Sunday. FEMA spread these DAEs over four states 

to respond to Katrina’s fi rst landfall in Florida, and to its expected second-landfall states of 

Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama.152

DAEs and other FEMA personnel were also delayed in arriving at the actual disaster sites 

because of FEMA’s policy that all personnel deployed to a disaster must fi rst visit a “mobilizations center” in Florida or Georgia for things like badge issuance and briefi ngs.153 While 

some DAEs may have needed this check-in process in order to be better prepared, several 

FEMA leaders complained that this requirement delayed the deployment of workers to 

the disaster. For example, on the day aft er landfall, one FEMA employee complained that 

she had had “zero” DAE requests fi lled and that the DAE deployment process is “killing 

us. Th ere has been no consistent guidance and not only are we unable to lean forward, we 

can’t even stand up! ... this will bring us to our knees.”154 A few days aft er landfall, FEMA 

changed the policy to allow at least some personnel to deploy directly to the disaster.155

FEMA did not deploy operations personnel in or near the New Orleans metropolitan area 

prior to landfall. Central to FEMA’s ability to provide assistance to state and local responders is to have trained personnel in the fi eld prior to landfall. Th ese individuals can provide 
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invaluable situational awareness, serve as liaisons with the state and local offi cials, and 

help identify needs and coordinate the response. Yet, FEMA didn’t deploy anyone to New 

Orleans, and in fact it actually evacuated qualifi ed personnel out of New Orleans prior to 

landfall.156

In contrast, prior to landfall in Mississippi, FEMA deployed personnel to EOCs in several 

counties most likely to be impacted by the hurricane.157 Th ese liaisons provided valuable onthe-ground information and assistance to locals in the crucial hours immediately following 

landfall and were invaluable in helping to coordinate the response in Mississippi. FEMA has 

a longstanding policy of not putting its emergency responders in the path of a storm, so that 

they will not be in need of rescue themselves. Lokey, however, testifi ed that he would have 

liked to put some individuals in local EOCs prior to landfall, just as Carwile did in Mississippi, but that he didn’t have enough personnel to do so.158 Instead, the only FEMA offi cial 

in New Orleans was Bahamonde, the public aff airs offi cer sent to prepare for eventual VIP 

visits. Ultimately, Bahamonde served in some operations capacities, such as providing critical situational awareness, including the notice of broken levees.159 In Louisiana, FEMA’s 

response was adversely impacted by the failure to put personnel in or near New Orleans in 

advance of the storm.

Communications

FEMA neglected to adequately pre-stage communication assets and suffi ciently equip its 

personnel. In fact, Lokey said that he “still lose[s] sleep over” the fact that prior to landfall, 

more measures could have been taken to provide for communications.160 “We obviously did 

not bring enough or plan enough satellite or cell phones or alternative technology,” he said. 

“And once it all went bad, we scrambled to get it, but as I was the FCO, I should have, but 

... I obviously didn’t.” It was “a step I missed.”161

Lokey found a safe place in Baton Rouge to park the “Red October,” FEMA’s large, mobile command center with signifi cant communication assets and conference space, and on 

Saturday evening requested that Red October be placed there prior to landfall.162 His request 

was denied,163 because then-FEMA Director Michael Brown had reportedly reserved the 

center.164 Lokey therefore had no communications vehicle available to him at the EOC on 

landfall, though one arrived the following day.165

FEMA did pre-stage communications vehicles, prior to landfall, at Barksdale Air Force Base 

in Shreveport, Louisiana, which off ered a secured site out of the storm’s immediate path and 

was a convenient place to stage.166 Th is put the vehicles about 350 miles from New Orleans 

and about 250 miles from Baton Rouge, however. Th is distance, and the fact that FEMA did 

not request that the assets be deployed from Shreveport until over 24 hours aft er landfall, 

meant they took some time to reach their new locations for response work.167 In at least some 

instances, this delay may have prevented the assets from being placed where most needed.

For example, even though the area around the Superdome did not fl ood until around noon 

on Tuesday, FEMA was not able to get the Red October into the area because of fl ooding; 

Red October did not get to Baton Rouge until Wednesday.168 Besides not placing communications vehicles at the EOC169 and not adequately equipping its employees with communications assets, FEMA also did not place any communications assets in the Superdome prior 

to landfall. As discussed in Chapter 18, the failure to have communications assets in the 

Superdome cut the eff ectiveness of FEMA’s on-site response team by 90 percent.170

As discussed below, there was vast devastation to the land-line and cellular communications networks aft er Hurricane Katrina, which made communications very diffi cult. Indeed, 

Wells said the lack of communications at the EOC made it like a “black hole.”171 Lokey 

referred to it as a “vacuum” and said it was “very diffi cult to have a good operational picture 

of all that was going on.”172 Th is hindered the response. 
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Catastrophic Planning 

FEMA had long known it needed to do general catastrophic planning for responding to 

large disasters, but had problems getting necessary funding. Requests for $100 million for 

catastrophic planning and an additional $20 million for catastrophic housing planning in 

fi scal year 2004 and fi scal year 2005, respectively, were denied by DHS.173 

Although catastrophic planning for southeast Louisiana was recognized as a priority by 

FEMA regional staff and the State of Louisiana in 1999, funding shortages, staffi ng changes, 

and competing priorities delayed the planning. Funding shortages also aff ected the scope of 

the planning. Some areas that the Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency 

Preparedness (LOHSEP) had identifi ed as topics it wanted to address, such as pre-landfall 

evacuation, as well as other areas, were dropped.174 Follow-up workshops were also postponed. Lack of funding also prevented implementation of the Hurricane Pam plan.175 

Despite these setbacks, FEMA attempted to use the Pam plan in responding to Katrina. 

Copies of the Pam documents were circulated throughout FEMA on Saturday, August 

27. Additionally, Lokey ordered the contractor for the Pam project to come to the EOC in 

Baton Rouge to assist FEMA employees in implementing Pam.176 In responding to Katrina, 

however, FEMA failed to follow some aspects of Pam. For example, the draft Pam plan said 

Region VI would activate its regional coordination center when the NWS advised that a 

hurricane or tropical storm posed a threat to Louisiana.177 It also said the FEMA headquarters would deploy an evacuation team.178 However, Region VI did not activate the RRCC 

until Saturday morning and FEMA appears not to have sent an evacuation team to Louisiana.179 It also appears that FEMA also failed to identify buses and drivers and pre-stage 

buses and drivers pre-landfall as suggested in Pam.180

While it is impossible to know whether completing the Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic 

Hurricane Plan sooner would have resulted in a better response to Katrina, it is clear that 

FEMA had failed to do enough catastrophic planning. FEMA wasn’t prepared. Th is lack 

of planning inevitably led to mistakes in the response. As Secretary Chertoff said, Katrina 

“tested our planning, and our planning, I think, fell short.”181

Commodities

At the beginning of the 2005 hurricane season, FEMA had pre-positioned commodities in 

the Gulf Coast region as a way to speed up the response to hurricanes.182 Th e eff ort included 

30 tractor-trailer loads of water, 17 trailer loads of ice, and 15 trailer loads of MRE military 

rations at Camp Beauregard, a federal staging area in central Louisiana.183

However, preparations for a hurricane should not have ended with that initial pre-positioning, and the supplies pre-positioned were not enough for a storm as strong as Katrina. Ken 

Burris, FEMA’s Acting Chief Operating Offi cer, confi rmed that the initial pre-positioning was only a start, and that the specifi cs of a storm dictate whether FEMA should move 

more supplies to the area or move commodities closer to the predicted landfall.184 While 

some supplies already staged in the region were moved to Mississippi or Alabama, records 

indicate that relatively few additional truckloads arrived in FEMA’s staging areas in the days 

before landfall.185 Indeed, FEMA documents show that FEMA did not get any additional 

commodities to the Camp Beauregard, Louisiana, staging area as Katrina moved through 

the Gulf of Mexico.186 Th e record is not clear whether additional supplies were moved into 

the region bypassing FEMA’s staging areas. With Katrina bearing down on the Gulf Coast 

as a catastrophic storm, FEMA should have gotten additional supplies to its staging areas in 

Mississippi and Louisiana. Additionally, although FEMA tried to place some commodities 

in the Superdome prior to landfall, it was only able to get part of the quantities it intended 

there as its contractors stopped trucking due to weather conditions.187 
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180

Despite eff orts to move some commodities into Mississippi, there were major defi ciencies. 

Carwile wrote several e-mails on Sunday in which he expressed concern with commodities issues.188 FEMA had ordered 400 trucks of ice, 400 trucks of water, and 250 trucks of 

MREs for the Meridian Naval Air Station in Mississippi before the storm made landfall. 

Although FEMA and state offi cials in Mississippi were never able to discover exactly how 

many truckloads actually arrived pre-landfall,189 according to Tom McAllister, Director 

of Response and Recovery at MEMA the amount of supplies FEMA pre-positioned was 

“nowhere near what we asked for,” leaving Mississippi “critically shorthanded” for the fi rst 

few days.190

Some senior leadership at FEMA lacked a basic understanding of commodities. Patrick 

Rhode, then Acting Deputy Director of FEMA, received information on quantities of 

pre-staged supplies on Friday aft ernoon, two and a half days before landfall.191 Rhode later 

told interviewers that he did not believe the amount was adequate, but admitted he did not 

know how much was in a truckload, and had no idea for the amount of commodities he believed should be pre-staged.192 “I don’t know if I would have said specifi cally that we needed 

to provide more,” Rhode said. “I was concerned as to whether or not our experts believed 

that we were doing everything that we could.”193

FEMA’s poor planning for transportation was a key factor in the problems with commodities. Gary Moore, FEMA’s Director of Logistics, said FEMA had diffi culty moving commodities during Katrina.194 For instance, on Saturday aft ernoon, FEMA realized it did not have 

enough truck drivers to deliver commodities and equipment and started reviewing resumes 

to hire additional drivers.195 By Sunday aft ernoon, records show that FEMA was short 68 of 

the 94 drivers who would be needed to move commodities for a short response eff ort and 

short 162 drivers needed for a longer response.196 To make matters worse, FEMA’s transportation contractor, Landstar, does not own any vehicles. Instead, it locates independent 

drivers only aft er FEMA asks it to move commodities, which can also lead to delays.197

FEMA had to compete against Landstar for drivers to hire198 – a task made more diffi cult 

because it took place over a weekend.199

FEMA’s failure to pre-stage more commodities prior to landfall contributed to the human 

misery caused by commodities shortages aft er landfall. 

FEMA Deployment of Disaster Medical Assistance Teams

Th e National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) comprises specialized emergency-medical and response teams who are federal fi rst responders in a medical emergency. FEMA 

activated the NDMS on the Th ursday before landfall. Although a number of teams were 

mobilized and began moving into the Gulf region, this eff ort fell far short of needs. By the 

night before landfall, only four complete Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs), two 

partial teams, and a few small fi ve person strike teams – a total of about 250 personnel – 

were staged in the entire Gulf region, and only one team was deployed in Louisiana.200 Th us, 

fewer than 10 percent of FEMA’s 52 DMAT teams were in the region. Moreover, though 

activating NDMS four days before Katrina’s arrival was prescient, NDMS’s decision to place 

teams far from Katrina’s path meant the teams faced hundreds of miles and hours of travel 

to reach areas in need aft er landfall. Th e NDMS teams were plagued by other inadequacies, 

including that no deployed team possessed a full inventory of medical supplies.201

Search and Rescue

As more thoroughly discussed in Chapter 21, FEMA failed to take appropriate action 

pre-landfall to prepare for search and rescue operations. FEMA offi cials knew that a major 

hurricane striking New Orleans could cause widespread fl ooding throughout the metropolitan New Orleans area. Yet prior to landfall, FEMA pre-positioned only three of its 28 Urban 
Federal Preparations

181

Search and Rescue (USAR) teams in Shreveport, Louisiana, and two others in Meridian, 

Mississippi.202

Despite the expectation of fl ooding, FEMA did not pre-position boats for its USAR teams.203

One USAR team manager said later: 

I don’t recall that, that we were thinking about, gee, we’re going to need a lot of 

boats down here. Actually, when the hurricane went through there, the news 

was saying, it’s not a big deal. It spared the city. Th at’s kind of the impression 

we were getting from watching the news on there, so we were not thinking 

about massive amounts of boats and things like that at that time, that I can 

recall. I’m sure we had some discussions about it.204

Finally, FEMA pre-staged the teams in Shreveport205 – approximately 340 miles from New 

Orleans. Lokey made this choice because he wanted to be sure they would be out of harm’s 

way while the storm’s path was uncertain.206 However, this distance meant that FEMA 

USAR teams did not reach New Orleans until Monday night, and did not begin rescue missions until Tuesday morning207 – 14 hours aft er the Coast Guard and state and local teams208

began rescuing people. FEMA’s teams were too few, too late, and boatless. 

Evacuation

Th e evacuation of the Gulf Coast was one of the most critical and controversial issues addressed during the investigation. For a discussion of any role or responsibility FEMA may 

have had in planning for the pre- or post-landfall evacuation, see Chapters 16 and 22.

Establishing a Joint Field Offi ce

A Joint Field Offi ce (JFO) is a coordination center that FEMA sets up, where federal, state, 

and local organizations with primary responsibility for disaster response can work together 

and coordinate the response. FEMA did not take adequate steps to set up the JFO before 

landfall.209 While the preparatory step toward a JFO – an Initial Operating Facility (IOF) 

– was opened pre-landfall,210 the JFO was not fully operational until 12 days aft er landfall.211

In a disaster, FEMA’s Mobile Emergency Response Systems employees are responsible 

for setting up the JFO. Lokey was told that the JFO would be operating within 72 hours.212

Th e nine-day delay past that 72-hour period in completing JFO set-up was mostly due to 

diffi culty in establishing Internet connectivity for the state’s computer system.213 Th e state 

could not move into the JFO until the technology issues were fi xed.214 Until the second week 

in September, members of the JFO coordination group in Louisiana were located at several 

diff erent locations while lacking reliable communications and the many benefi ts of co-location. FEMA employees working at borrowed space at the state EOC shared limited communications equipment, had limited access to computers, and worked in cramped conditions.215 FEMA employees held many meetings in hallways for lack of other space. Th ese 

cramped conditions and delays in setting up the JFO made it very diffi cult for FEMA to 

coordinate and operate with the state offi cials, which impeded a unifi ed response.216 Coordination greatly improved once the JFO was fully functional.217

Some of the problems caused by delays in setting up the JFO might have been alleviated if 

Lokey had had regular access to a command vehicle in which he could hold meetings with 

state and local offi cials.218 As noted, then-FEMA Director Michael Brown had reserved the 

Red October command center.219 Lokey did not request another command vehicle because 

he was told the JFO would be operational in three days aft er landfall.220
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Security

Th e Federal Protective Service (FPS) generally provides security for FEMA assets and 

personnel at FEMA’s request. Even without the threat of violence, DMAT teams may 

require security because they arrive with a cache of prescription drugs. Similarly, FEMA’s 

search-and-rescue teams come with substantial and valuable equipment. However, FEMA 

sent DMAT and USAR teams into the fi eld without security and without coordinating with 

other agencies to provide for their security. Historically, the FPS “take[s] over the ESF-13 

[public safety and security] in the event that FEMA does declare an emergency.” 221

It wasn’t until the morning of August 30 that FEMA issued the fi rst in a series of mission 

assignments to the FPS to provide security for its responders. Even then, FEMA’s assignment did not mention the Superdome. Th e fi rst request for support at the Superdome was 

not created until mid-aft ernoon on August 30.222 Th e following day, FPS received an additional mission assignment to send 14 offi cers to the Superdome to provide crowd control 

for the evacuation.223 By then, although it was reported to those in the Superdome complex 

that there were 14 FPS offi cers just a couple of blocks away on the overpasses, the offi cers 

“couldn’t fi nd a way into the Dome,” probably because of the fl ooding. 224

As early as Sunday, August 28, the Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) – federal law-enforcement assets at DHS’s disposal – placed a 100-agent deployment element on full standby.225

Th e availability of this unit was reported in the CBP’s twice-daily situation reports to DHS, 

although it is not clear where they were located. It was not until Wednesday, August 31, that 

these federal law-enforcement personnel were called up for deployment, and another 18 

hours passed before they arrived in Louisiana, “to assist National Guard with crowd control 

and evacuation of 25 to 30 thousand individuals from the New Orleans Superdome.” 226

FEMA issued each of these assignments too late to ensure a timely arrival of FPS personnel. 

By the time of the earliest FPS mission assignment,227 DMAT personnel and equipment had 

already staged at the Superdome complex with water quickly fl ooding all around them.

In the absence of FPS, or of any other dedicated security contingent, FEMA personnel in 

the Superdome found themselves forced to choose between their mission and their security.228 Th e responders’ concerns for their safety increasingly distracted them from delivering 

medical care. On Th ursday morning, September 1, concerned for their own safety, FEMA’s 

DMAT and ERT-A teams left the Superdome, leaving behind the team’s “cache, equipment, 

and rental vehicles”229 – not to mention patients and others taking shelter there. When these 

teams left , FEMA no longer had a presence at the Superdome, and the medical burden on 

remaining state and local health-care professionals increased. 

Department of Defense 

Perhaps one of the most obvious consequences of FEMA not “thinking big enough” was its 

delay in asking the Department of Defense to apply its resources. Brown conceded that he 

should have spoken with DOD Secretary Donald Rumsfeld prior to landfall to request assets.230 So, too, should have Secretary Chertoff , as discussed above. As discussed in Chapter 

26, DOD was surprised by the early silence from FEMA.231

Th e pre-landfall need for DOD assets such as helicopters, boats, and communications 

equipment, was considered but not acted upon by FEMA or DHS leadership. On the August 28 VTC, Secretary Chertoff inquired, “Are there any DOD assets that might be available? Have we reached out to them, and have we, I guess, made any kind of arrangement 

in case we need some additional help from them?”232 Brown replied that “We have DOD 

assets over [here] at the EOC. Th ey are fully engaged.”233 Apparently, Brown was referring 

to DOD liaisons to the EOC, known as Defense Coordinating Offi cers (DCOs); in this case, 

two individuals, rather than tangible resources that could be positioned or readied. Secre-
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183

tary Chertoff accepted this reply, telling Brown, “good job.” Neither Brown nor Secretary 

Chertoff sought to ascertain or understand what specifi c capabilities DOD might bring to 

the response, nor did they seek to call upon those capabilities before landfall. 234

Conclusion

FEMA’s mistakes in preparing for Katrina were many, and, as we will see, contributed to 

its overall defi cient response. Despite knowing for years the catastrophic impact a hurricane could have on New Orleans, FEMA’s leadership failed to move far enough beyond 

its normal modes of operation as “the big one” moved to shore. Th ose ordinary operating 

protocols were inadequate for a catastrophic disaster, and did not make enough use of the 

assets at the agency’s disposal. Th e words of one FEMA employee are telling: “We kind of 

assumed it was going to be just a regular, normal response to a disaster.” FEMA’s pre-landfall preparations fell far short of what the situation called for. FEMA was simply not “thinking big enough.” 

U.S. Coast Guard 

As discussed in other sections, the Coast Guard performed well in the response to Hurricane 

Katrina. Any problems were due mostly to the poor preparation of other DHS components.

Unlike their counterparts in other DHS components, Coast Guard personnel were quite 

familiar with the NRP. Th ey also had detailed plans for evacuation and continuity of government, had a clear mission statement, and were familiar with state and local offi cials and geography from their daily work as fi rst responders and from their disaster planning. Although 

DHS failed to take advantage of the Coast Guard’s intelligence-gathering capability in the 

critical hours aft er landfall, overall, the Coast Guard’s advance moves were exemplary. 

Th e Coast Guard is unique among federal agencies involved in emergency response in that 

it has military, law-enforcement, and fi rst-response obligations.235 Rigorous planning, training, and exercising are key elements in the Coast Guard’s approach to disaster response.236

In the spring of 2005, as in every spring prior to the start of the hurricane season, the 8th 

Coast Guard District – which stretches from the Appalachians, to the Rockies, south of the 

Great Lakes, and to part of Florida – and all its subordinate units, including Sector New 

Orleans, exercised their hurricane plans.237 Because personnel turnover in the New Orleans 

District runs about one-third each year, the exercise provides a good opportunity to bring 

new personnel into the Coast Guard’s culture of operations on the Gulf Coast, including 

how to make hurricane plans for their own families.238

Th e exercise involved a simulation of a hurricane hitting New Orleans. As Rear Admiral 

Robert Duncan, the Commander of the 8th District, commented, “We take them through a 

timeline of the storm approaching, the storm getting close, the storm hitting, and the recovery piece.”239 During the exercise, Coast Guard offi cials visited state, municipal, and other 

EOCs, as well as their own pre-designated primary and secondary “safe havens” for prelandfall evacuations.240 Th ey also confi rmed critical phone numbers241 and reviewed their 

Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) to ensure they could maintain essential services 

without interruption:242

Sector New Orleans will provide search and rescue support, restore essential 

aids to navigation, respond to hazardous material spills, manage waterways 

including traffi c and safety or security zones, provide transportation of victims, provide essential waterborne and airborne logistics support, deliver vital 

supplies and materials, provide access to storm damaged areas to key response 

personnel, and perform any and all acts necessary to rescue and aid persons 

and protect and save property.243
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Th ree days before the storm hit, Sector New Orleans sent out warnings to the port community, maritime industry, and the public at large urging them to take necessary precautions.244

Staff established the Sector’s alternative incident-command post in Alexandria, Louisiana, 

and evacuated their personnel and family members from New Orleans and nearby areas 

in the projected path of the storm.245 Sector Mobile moved its command to Maxwell Air 

Force Base, Alabama.246 Following its hurricane evacuation plan, the 8th District Command 

moved to St. Louis.247

Th e Coast Guard pre-positioned patrol boats, river tenders, and small boats and crews away 

from their exposed home ports.248 Th ey deployed the medium-endurance cutter USCGC

Spencer from the East Coast to the Louisiana area so it could later act as a command-andcontrol platform.249 Th ey alerted a C-130 aircraft and crew in Clearwater, Florida, that they 

would be needed aft er landfall to assess damage to the off -shore oil facilities in the Gulf of 

Mexico.250

On August 27, the Coast Guard positioned its fi ve search-and-rescue helicopters from Sector New Orleans in Houston, Texas, and Lake Charles, Louisiana, just out of the hurricane’s 

path, so they could fl y in behind the storm.251 As they fl ew out of New Orleans that day, 

Captain Bruce Jones, the Commander of Coast Guard Air Station New Orleans, told his 

fl ight crews, “Take a last look folks, because when you come back, it will be under twenty 

feet of water.”252

Coast Guard liaison offi cers were positioned at the State EOC in Baton Rouge and at the 

City EOC in New Orleans.253 Admiral Duncan called Governors Blanco and Barbour and 

advised them of Coast Guard preparations for the storm.254 At noon on Sunday, August 28, 

the Coast Guard closed the Mississippi River to all vessel movements, ceased cargo operations, and sent out fi nal advisories to the maritime industries on necessary precautions to 

safeguard property.255

As it became clear that Katrina would make landfall in heavily populated areas, Coast 

Guard units in other stations around the country prepared to deploy following landfall,256

though there were no orders to do so. As Coast Guard Vice Admiral Vivien Crea described 

Coast Guard culture, “Th ere’s just an understanding and a predisposition that ... if something happens and you’re in the way, you either hunker down or move out of the way so 

you can come in behind. If you’re not in the target zone and it’s bad enough, you better be 

prepared to go there and help out.”257

At 2:50 p.m. on Monday, August 29, Coast Guard helicopters made their fi rst rescue in the 

New Orleans area.258

As further discussed in Chapter 21, the Committee’s investigation established that several 

factors contributed to the Coast Guard’s success in preparing for Hurricane Katrina. First, 

rigorous planning, training, and exercising are key elements in the Coast Guard’s approach 

to disaster response. Second, the Coast Guard’s plans and exercises help personnel develop 

and maintain close ties to state and local offi cials, with whom they coordinated closely during the Katrina response eff ort. Th ird, the Coast Guard has a clearly articulated response 

mission understood by all personnel. Fourth, the Coast Guard notifi es public- and privatesector partners of storm risks and of necessary safety precautions. Fift h, the Coast Guard 

aggressively moves personnel and assets out of the storm’s path, but positions them to 

maximize their utility in the response eff ort. Finally, the Coast Guard plans for and rapidly 

deploys additional assets from outside the aff ected area without signifi cant bureaucratic 

hurdles, owing to an institutional commitment to providing assistance whenever possible. 

Th e Coast Guard’s eff orts – including the rescue of over 33,000 people – demonstrate the 

eff ectiveness of proactive planning for disaster response.259
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185

Unfortunately, DHS, which had extremely poor situational awareness of the storm’s impact, 

failed to make use of the Coast Guard’s early presence in the area. Coast Guard helicopter 

pilots were fl ying missions over the city as early as 3 p.m. on landfall day, Monday, August 

29, and were probably the fi rst federal offi cials to see the breach in the 17th Street Canal. 

Admiral Duncan was the highest-ranking federal offi cial to see New Orleans on August 29, 

when he fl ew over the city at approximately 6 p.m. in a Coast Guard Falcon jet to perform a 

damage assessment, and saw widespread fl ooding. However, as discussed in Chapter 20, it 

does not appear that any eff ort was made to harness this information-gathering apparatus 

in service of the broader DHS mission.

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 

and FEMA’s National Disaster Medical System

On Th ursday, August 25, four days prior to landfall, FEMA Response Division Chief Edward Buikema wrote a memo to his Operations Branch Chief, William Lokey, activating 

the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) – a system of medical and specialty teams 

designed to respond to medical emergencies.260 Th e basic unit of NDMS is the Disaster 

Medical Assistance Team (DMAT). FEMA “leaned forward” on the premise that Katrina 

presented a potentially catastrophic event, and began to mobilize and pre-position teams 

without state requests. (See Chapter 27 for a discussion of situations when the NRP empowers the federal government to off er help without waiting for requests.) Th ey made these 

decisions based on senior leadership experience and the need to avoid delay, Beall said:

We front-loaded those resources, and then as the state would request ESF-8 – we need a 

team down at this hospital, that hospital – the resource was there. In the past, they would 

ask, and I would have to get a team rostered, get transportation, try to fl y the resource, 

and get it. A lot of times it could get there, but you needed it yesterday, not two days from 

now.261

Mick Cote, the NDMS state representative in Region VI, which covers New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas, Arkansas, and Louisiana, expressed the urgency felt by NDMS leadership in 

an e-mail to NDMS Director Jack Beall on August 27:

40+ medical facilities in the 11-Parish impact zone. Models predict up to 20 

ft . of water in those 11 parishes with little hope of removing it in less than 2 

months. Th e catastrophic plan predicts 7,500 casualties per day over a 5-day 

period and 60,000 fatalities. In addition, estimates place critical care patients, 

staff , families and refugees sheltered in hospital at 10,000+.262

Cote went on to inform Beall that the State of Louisiana had identifi ed three medical staging areas to handle victims of the hurricane. Th ese sites were expected to be outside of the 

storm path but close enough to send care quickly: Louisiana State University (LSU) in Baton Rouge (80 miles from New Orleans), Southeast Louisiana University in Hammond (58 

miles), and Nichols State University in Th ibodaux (67 miles). Cote communicated Louisiana’s need to Beall: “Based on the casualty estimates, the plan calls for three full DMATs at 

each medical staging site and two medical strike teams263 to be located at each of four Search 

and Rescue Bases of Operations.” 264 Beall replied, “Mick, by 1800 hours tomorrow night, I 

will have 9 DMATS, 9 [fi ve]-person strike teams, 2 MSTs [Management Support Teams].”265

Yet, by 6 p.m. on August 28, the night before Katrina’s landfall, NDMS logs indicate that 

there were only four complete DMATs and two partial teams staged in the entire Gulf 

region, and only one of them deployed within Louisiana.266 Th at team, Oklahoma-1 DMAT, 

had been directed to the Superdome not by NDMS, but at the request of U.S. Department 

of Health and Human Services (HHS) Assistant Secretary Stewart Simonson.267 Under the 
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186

NRP, HHS is the federal agency responsible for coordinating federal medical care in an 

emergency. 

Aft er a Sunday-morning phone conversation with New Orleans’s Health Director, Dr. 

Kevin Stephens, Assistant Secretary Simonson requested that two DMATs deploy to the 

Superdome before landfall.268 FEMA sent only one team (Oklahoma-1), which did not manage to reach the Superdome before landfall.269 It appears from the NDMS status reports that 

Oklahoma-1 was the only DMAT actually available to be deployed to the Superdome at that 

time.270

Aside from Oklahoma-1, which diverted to the Louisiana State University on Sunday night 

when it could not reach the Superdome, NDMS did not stage its DMATs at the Louisiana 

sites identifi ed by Cote on August 27 or at any other locations in Louisiana or Mississippi. 

Instead it staged them outside these states: at the Hyatt Regency in Houston, Texas (350 

miles from New Orleans); at the Noble Training Site in Anniston, Alabama (312 miles from 

Mobile, AL); and at the Marriot Hotel in Memphis, Tennessee (379 miles from Biloxi, Mississippi).271

It is not clear why NDMS chose these sites for the pre-staging of DMATs, especially aft er 

Louisiana apparently requested that the teams be brought closer. Under the NRP, ESF-8 

(which is the interagency coordinating group for health care) is tasked with making decisions about the deployment of medical response assets.272 On Sunday, August 28, Beall 

wrote an e-mail to Lokey asking “Bill, I am hearing the State of [Louisiana] is requesting 

DMATs be moved closer within the state. Can you advise?”273 Lokey responded in ambiguous terms. “ESF 8 is working with state on a plan. No visibility on the outcome.”274 NDMS 

team status reports show that no NDMS teams were ever moved to Louisiana or Mississippi 

before landfall except for Oklahoma-1.275

In sum, while FEMA’s Response Division deserves credit for activating the NDMS four days 

before Katrina’s arrival, the NDMS decision to place teams so far away from Katrina’s path 

meant they were hundreds of miles and hours of travel from areas in need. When HHS asked 

for two DMATs to go to the Superdome, FEMA apparently was unable to muster two teams 

to respond. Th e one team that actually arrived at one of Louisiana’s three medical staging 

areas – Oklahoma-1 – was there by “mistake,” because it couldn’t reach the Superdome.

Assistant Secretary Simonson directed that HHS deploy its own assets to the Superdome as 

well. Th e morning of Sunday, August 28, Simonson directed the Offi ce of Force Readiness 

and Deployment (OFRD) within HHS to assemble a team of 50 U.S. Public Health Service 

(USPHS) offi cers from Washington, D.C., and an additional team from the Atlanta area to 

provide medical support for the Superdome. 276 OFRD is the offi ce that is responsible for 

deploying USPHS personnel.

OFRD had already begun to plan for Hurricane Katrina when it was still a tropical storm. 

On August 25, OFRD had been asked to roster a team of 100 USPHS offi cers for pre-deployment to the Gulf Coast. OFRD staff sent a mass e-mail to these 100 offi cers and then 

also tried to contact many via phone. Each time a USPHS team is needed, the team is created on an ad-hoc basis because USPHS offi cers are scattered across the nation and are not 

a part of pre-existing teams.277

By Saturday evening, Rear Admiral John Babb, the OFRD chief, reported that OFRD had 

been able to assemble 55 offi cers, who were waiting for travel orders.278 (In such situations, 

offi cers reach their destinations by commercial fl ights; at this point, however, OFRD had 

not received the deployment destinations.279) When Assistant Secretary Simonson directed 
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187

that a team be assembled to go to the Superdome, this 55-person team could simply not 

get there before landfall.

As a result, on Sunday, Admiral Babb and his 

staff had to essentially start from scratch to 

assemble a new team that could be fl own in 

by charter aircraft . Th ey called hundreds of 

telephone numbers to reach USPHS offi cers 

in Washington, D.C., and Atlanta, but could 

only connect with 38 offi cers.280 Eventually, 

37 offi cers boarded the chartered fl ights arranged by Babb; a shortage of seats forced 

one offi cer to stay behind.281

Due to the late hour and deteriorating 

weather, the fl ights were routed to Jackson, 

Mississippi. Th e Health Service team got to 

Louisiana on the Tuesday aft er landfall, and 

was assigned to help staff the state’s medical 

staging facility at Louisiana State University 

in Baton Rouge.282

Assistant Secretary Simonson also directed the HHS offi ce that manages the Strategic 

National Stockpile (SNS) (a stockpile of medical supplies that can be provided to states in 

medical emergencies) in Atlanta, Georgia, to dispatch a shipment of supplies to the Superdome.283 Assistant Secretary Simonson based his request on an initial list dictated to him by 

Dr. Stephens, the New Orleans health director, on Sunday. Assistant Secretary Simonson 

e-mailed the director of the Strategic Stockpile around 1 p.m. that aft ernoon:

I need to get the following to N[ew] O[rleans] before the H[urricane] strikes: 

Gloves, bandages, blanked [blanket], blood pressure cuff s, adult diapers, Ace 

wraps, slings, gauze, hot and cold packs, [glucometers] and sticks, oxygen and 

other basic medical supplies. Th ey are expecting something like 50,000 people 

in the Super Dome. Any ideas about how to handle dialysis. What about 

oxygen, do we have any supplies? Please get this together asap and tell me how 

much we can send.284

Offi cials at the Strategic National Stockpile advised Assistant Secretary Simonson that they 

had located almost all of the materials and dispatched the shipment.285 However, they were 

unable to transport the materials into New Orleans: “At this point, we believe cannot safely 

move to New Orleans prior to the hurricane so are making preparation to transport to 

Barksdale A[ir ]F[orce ]B[ase] [in northwest Louisiana] which FEMA indicates will be their 

logistics staging area.”286 Th ese supplies did not reach Louisiana until mid-day on Monday, 

aft er landfall, and were turned over to the State of Louisiana late the same day.287

Department of Defense

Under the NRP, the Department of Defense (DOD) is assigned a supporting role for all 

Emergency Support Functions (ESFs), and can also be requested to provide assistance in 

support of those functions by FEMA. 

Zephyr Field staging area, Louisiana

U.S. Coast Guard photo
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188

 At the headquarters level – the civilian Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Homeland Defense (OASD-HD) and the uniformed Joint Directorate of Military Support 

(JDOMS) within the Pentagon’s Joint Staff – offi cials took several actions in anticipation of 

receiving requests from FEMA, and monitored FEMA’s teleconferences. When Hurricane 

Katrina appeared as a tropical depression on August 23, DOD offi cials took an inventory 

of available commodities, and identifi ed medical facilities and potential staging bases for 

FEMA.288 DOD offi cials at the Pentagon did not alter their usual asset-inventory process as 

Katrina strengthened and moved toward the Gulf Coast.289 However, on the Sunday before 

landfall, JDOMS established a 24-hour “crisis action cell” to allow for rapid processing once 

they began to receive requests from FEMA.290

Military commanders have a limited authority to deploy assets without orders from their 

superior offi cers or authorization from the DOD – if commanders label the deployment an 

“exercise.” 

Within the Army, Lieutenant General Russel Honoré, Commander of the U.S. First Army 

based in Atlanta, Georgia, had provided assistance during the destructive 2004 hurricane 

season. As a Louisiana native, Lt. Gen. Honoré understood the potential damage Katrina 

could infl ict on the Gulf Coast. In coordination with U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) in Colorado Springs, Colorado, the headquarters for command and control of domestic military operations, he prepared to deploy himself and his staff on an “exercise mission” to Camp Shelby, an Army base in southern Mississippi. He also requested that assets 

he thought would be required in the immediate hours aft er landfall, including helicopters, 

small boats, and communications gear, be identifi ed and alerted to speed their deployment 

in response to an eventual request.291

Within the Marine Corps, several generals began to assess the availability of helicopters 

and engineering equipment.292 In the Navy, the Commander of the Second Fleet recognized 

that the USS Bataan, a helicopter-bearing ship in port in Texas, was well-positioned to 

provide assistance and ordered the ship to get underway on August 28 and steam in behind 

the hurricane.293 Th e Bataan had been deployed to the area on an exercise, so the fl eet 

commander was acting within his authority. As a result, once Katrina made landfall, the 

Bataan’s helicopters were among the fi rst active-duty aircraft to conduct search-and-rescue 

missions beginning on Tuesday.294 Nonetheless, DHS personnel questioned the admiral’s 

forethought and authority, and were reportedly angered that the Navy had acted in advance 

of a request.295

At NORTHCOM, the Operations Directorate commenced daily teleconferences on August 

24.296 On August 19, as a general measure for the hurricane season, the Secretary of Defense 

had granted authority for NORTHCOM to take several specifi c measures prior to landfall.297

Beginning on August 26, NORTHCOM used this authority to deploy coordinating personnel fi rst to Florida, then to Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. Th e Louisiana representatives arrived the night of August 27. Under this authority and in response to a request from 

FEMA, NORTHCOM designated two military bases in Mississippi and Louisiana as federal 

staging facilities.298

Th e preparations by the commanders were not always coordinated with DOD, and on at 

least one occasion, met with resistance from a DOD headquarters component. General 

Honoré’s request on the eve of landfall that certain assets be identifi ed for immediate use299

was not answered by the Joint Staff ,300 despite the fact that the NORTHCOM Director of 

Operations made the same request by personally contacting the Director of JDOMS. 301

Several witnesses explained that, traditionally, the Pentagon will only take disaster-assistance action with a specifi c request from FEMA and once the actual requirement has been 
Federal Preparations

189

verifi ed,302 though as noted above, several commanders took the initiative to mobilize and 

alert assets in advance of FEMA requests. 

Although DOD was prepared to receive and process requests, it received very few requests 

from FEMA prior to landfall. In addition to staging bases, FEMA requested that DOD 

provide helicopters for rapid needs assessment prior to landfall; JDOMS only approved this 

request 12 hours aft er landfall, a sign, according to some witnesses, of its initial reluctance 

to provide assistance without the conditions described above.303 And although the Department’s preparations for Katrina were consistent with its procedures and prior practices in 

civil-support missions, they were not suffi cient for a storm of Katrina’s magnitude. Additional preparations in advance of specifi c requests for support could have enabled a more 

rapid response.

1 Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 clarifi es the responsibilities given to DHS by the Homeland Security Act 

by formally designating the Secretary of Homeland Security as the “principal federal offi cial for domestic incident management.” Th e NRP further affi rms the preeminent role of the DHS Secretary in coordinating the federal response to a 

disaster. Th us, the authority of the DHS Secretary is derived from the President in HSPD-5 within the framework of the 

NRP. Th e White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5: Management of Domestic Incidents, Feb. 28, 2003.

2 Questions for the Record of Sec. Michael Chertoff , U.S. Department of Homeland Security, for the U.S. Senate, 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Homeland Security 

Department’s Response, Feb. 15, 2006, p. 15.

3 Questions for the Record of Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 2005, p. 15.

4 Testimony of Sec. Michael Chertoff , U.S. Department of Homeland Security, before the U.S. House, Select Bipartisan 

Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e 

Role of the Department of Homeland Security, Oct. 19, 2005.

5 Michael Brown, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 28, 2005, transcript p. 37. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0105-0000102.

6 Sec. Michael Chertoff , FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 28, 2005, transcript p. 38. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0105-0000103. 

7 Sec. Chertoff , VTC, Aug. 28, 2005, p. 38. 

8 Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee Hearing, Feb. 15, 2006.

9 Col. Jeff Smith, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 28, 2005, transcript pp. 18-19. Provided to Committee; fi led 

as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0105-0000083 through 0000084.

10 FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 28, 2005, transcript p. 21. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHSFEMA-0105-0000086. Brown testifi ed that by his questions, he was seeking information from the state on what it needed 

at that moment only. Committee Staff interview of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, conducted on Feb. 23, 2006, 

transcript pp. 62-67. 

11 Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 2006. Sec. Chertoff also testifi ed that he relied on FEMA’s experience and expertise: “If there is nothing else that FEMA is an expert in, it is hurricanes.” Source: Sec. Chertoff , Senate 

Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 2006. However at the time of Katrina, only one individual in FEMA’s front offi ce, Acting 

Chief Operating Offi cer Ken Burris, had emergency management experience before joining FEMA. Prior to joining 

FEMA, Brown had been working as a Commissioner for the International Arabian Horse Association for approximately 

10 years. Acting Deputy Director and Chief of Staff Patrick Rhode, Policy Director Brooks Altshuler, Acting Deputy 

Chief of Staff Scott Morris, and Special Assistant Michael Heath all had no prior emergency management experience. 

Source: Committee staff interview of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 23, 2006, transcript pp. 

219-220. 

12 Questions for the Record of Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 2005, p. 15.

13 In his response to one of the Committee’s post-hearing questions, Sec. Chertoff described his activities over the 

weekend as follows: “In the weekend before landfall, I followed planning activities closely and I stayed in continual contact with senior DHS and FEMA offi cials and my experienced advisers. I participated in the noontime FEMA VTC on 

Sunday, August 28, at which time I explicitly asked Mr. Brown if he required any additional assistance from other DHS 

components, and if he was getting everything he needed from DOD. Louisiana offi cials also noted at that time that they 

were satisfi ed with the level of pre-positioning of assets and cooperation that they were receiving from FEMA. I was also 

in direct personal contact with each of the governors of the aff ected states that day, and repeatedly thereaft er.” Source:

Questions for the Record of Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 2005, p. 15; Committee staff interview 
Chapter 12

190

of John Wood, Chief of Staff , U.S. Department of Homeland Security, conducted on Jan. 27, 2006, transcript pp. 59-60 

(“I mean, I think that there was certainly informal communication in which he was, you know, briefed about the status 

of things and to which he may have given, you know, feedback, but I don’t recall, you know, memos or specifi c, you 

know, orders and things like that; not to say there weren’t any, but I don’t recall.”); Committee staff interview of Michael 

Jackson, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, conducted on Jan. 27, 2006, transcript pp. 60-61; 

Committee staff interview of Matt A. Mayer, Counselor to Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 

conducted on Jan. 26, 2006, transcript pp. 74-75; Committee staff interview of Robert Stephan, Assistant Secretary for 

Infrastructure Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, conducted on Jan. 13, 2006, transcript pp. 50-51.

14 Brown, VTC, Aug. 28, 2005, p. 38. 

15 Max Mayfi eld, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 28, 2005, transcript pp. 3-6. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0105-0000068 through 0000071.

16 Although Sec. Chertoff has stated that over the course of the weekend before landfall he “followed planning activities 

closely” and “stayed in continual contact with senior DHS and FEMA offi cials and my experienced advisors,” Source:

Questions for the Record of Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 2006, p. 15. Th e Secretary has provided 

no more detail about these discussions, so it is unclear what he learned or what questions he asked. Aside from the 

foregoing, the Committee’s investigation has uncovered no other evidence regarding the specifi cs of such inquiries 

– no e-mails referring to Sec. Chertoff ’s inquiries and no communications with anyone outside his senior staff at DHS. 

UnderSecretary Brown testifi ed that he did not recall speaking directly with Sec. Chertoff the weekend before landfall. 

Source: Brown interview, Jan. 23, 2006, p. 88. Deputy Sec. Jackson did speak with Brown over the weekend. Brown testifi ed that he told Deputy Sec. Jackson that he was concerned that Katrina could be a catastrophic event, but did not ask 

Deputy Sec. Jackson for any additional assistance from DHS because he believed FEMA could and would make those 

requests through the Emergency Support Functions or directly to other DHS components. Source: Brown interview, Jan. 

23, 2006, pp. 88, 96, 105.

17 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Offi ce of Inspector General, “Emergency Preparedness and Response Could 

Better Integrate Information Technology with Incident Response and Recovery,” Sept. 2005. In an August rebuttal to the 

draft report, Brown disputed its fi ndings and argued that FEMA had responded successfully to the hurricanes. Th e IG responded that Brown “incorrectly equate[d] the agency’s ability to meet the disaster challenges to date with eff ective and 

effi cient IT management. While we state in our report that [FEMA] was able to get through the 2004 hurricanes, we also 

recognize that FEMA’s accomplishments were not necessarily because of its IT systems, but oft en in spite of them. Users 

across [FEMA] consistently told us that they did not use the headquarters-supplied systems, but instead relied upon 

alternative methods, such as creating ad hoc spreadsheets and databases or resorting to manual methods, to perform 

their jobs. Where IT systems were used, they oft en did not operate eff ectively.” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 

Offi ce of Inspector General, “Emergency Preparedness and Response Could Better Integrate Information Technology 

with Incident Response and Recovery,” Sept. 2005, pp. 23, 35.

18 Committee staff interview of Pat English, Chief Procurement Offi cer, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 5, 2006, transcript 

pp. 64, 81-84 (“I know he [DHS Chief Procurement Offi cer Greg Rothwell] briefed senior management in DHS, the 

Under Secretary, the DepSec, and on that scorecard, FEMA[’s procurement offi ce] was red, which indicated, you know, 

understaff ed.”).

19 Sec. Chertoff , House Select Committee hearing, Oct. 19, 2005; Questions for the Record of Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 2006, pp. 44, 84.

20 Brown interview, Jan. 23, 2006, p. 88; Questions for the Record of Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 

2006, p. 15

21 Questions for the Record of Sec. Chertoff , Feb. 15, 2006, p. 15. 

22 Committee staff interview of Brig. Gen. Matthew Broderick, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.), former Director, Homeland 

Security Operations Center, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, conducted on Jan. 19, 2006, transcript pp. 81-82. 

23 Broderick interview, Jan. 19, 2006, p. 82.

24 Committee staff interview of Peter Fonash, Ph.D., Director, National Communication System, U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security, conducted on Jan. 27, 2006, transcript pp. 49-52.

25 Fonash interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 120-21.

26 Questions for the Record of Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 2006, p. 15; Wood interview, Jan. 27, 

2006, pp. 56-57; Mayer interview, Jan. 26, 2006, pp. 76-77; Brig. Gen. Broderick interview, Jan. 19, 2006, pp. 208-210; 

Jackson interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 69-71. 

27 An “ATF Summary of Signifi cant Activity” produced by the ATF said that on Sept. 2, 2005, the “ATF established 

point of contact at the ESF 13 Desk and the NRCC and at the IIMG.” Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Summary of Signifi cant Activity. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. ATF 0000000009.

28 Committee staff interview of Wendell Shingler, Director, Federal Protective Service, U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security, conducted on Jan. 31, 2006, transcript pp. 54-55.

29 John Clark, e-mail to Gary Lang and others, Sept. 1, 2005, 5:58 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHSICE-1-0002-0000550.

30 Th e White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8: National Preparedness, Dec. 17, 2003; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan. Washington: Government Printing Offi ce, Dec. 2004, pp. 9, 15 
Federal Preparations

191

[hereinaft er NRP]. 

31 Questions for the Record of Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 2006, p. 15.

32 Testimony of David Walker, U.S. Comptroller General, Government Accountability Offi ce, before U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Recommendations for Reform, 

Mar. 8, 2006. 

33 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan, Catastrophic Incident Annex. Washington: Government Printing Offi ce, Dec. 2004, p. CAT–1 [hereinaft er NRP-CIA].

34 NRP-CIA, p. CAT–5.

35 Stephan interview, Jan. 13, 2006, p. 35; Broderick interview, Jan. 19, 2006, p. 37.

36 Although the Secretary provides several reasons why it was not a mistake not to have activated the CIA, the Secretary 

never explicitly states that he considered and rejected this alternative. Th e NRP-CIA also was not activated for Hurricane 

Rita, but the federal government’s preparation was more proactive pre-landfall than was the case for Hurricane Katrina. 

37 Questions for the Record of Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 2006, p. 3.

38 Questions for the Record of Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 2006, p. 3.

39 Walker, Senate Committee hearing, Mar. 8, 2006. Secretary Chertoff argued that in the case of Katrina there was a 

great deal of coordination with the states, and the President’s pre-landfall declarations had opened “the legal and strategic fl oodgates to allow as much information – as much resources and as many assets to be pushed into the theater of 

engagement as possible.” He added that “If there is a diff erent view of the Annex, I am always ready to consider clarifying the text.” Source: Questions for the Record of Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 2005, p. 4.

40 NRP-CIA, p. CAT–1 (“Accordingly, upon designation by the Secretary of Homeland Security of a catastrophic incident, Federal resources – organized into specifi c “packages” – deploy in accordance with the NRP-CIS and in coordination with the aff ect State and incident command structure.”).

41 In his response to one of Committee’s questions, the Secretary asserted that more assets than those that were called 

for under the CIS were in fact pre-positioned. Source: Questions for the Record of Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee 

hearing, Feb. 15, 2005, pp. 3-4. Any suggestion that the CIS was followed de facto is not accurate, since two of the actions 

called for by the CIS pre-landfall – appointing a PFO pre-landfall and activating the IIMG – were not carried out in that 

timeframe. Committee staff interview of David Garratt, Acting Director of Recovery, FEMA, Jan. 9, 2006, pp. 8-13.

42 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan, Catastrophic Incident Supplement, Draft for Offi cial 

Use Only, Sept. 2005, p. 10. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0109-0000010 [hereinaft er Catastrophic Incident Supplement].

43 NRP-CIA, p. CAT–1.

44 Garrett interview, Jan. 9, 2006, pp. 36-37. Janet Benini, e-mail to Eric Tolbert and Ron Castleman, July 1, 2004, 4 p.m. 

Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0058-0000261.

45 Janet Benini, e-mail to David Garret, Aug. 27, 2005, 12:30 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHSFEMA-0096-0000395.

46 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, p. 167.

47 Testimony of Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, 

before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina and 

the Defense Department Response, Feb. 9, 2006.

48 U.S. Northern Command, USNORTHCOM Hurricane Katrina Timeline (Draft ), pp. 9-11. Provided to Committee; 

U.S. Fleet Forces Command, briefi ng slides, “Hurricane Katrina Nay Mission: Providing Rescue and Civil Support Relief 

from the Sea, Air and Land,” Nov. 14, 2005, p. 8. Provided to Committee.

49 Two emergency management experts, Chuck Mills and John Harrald, both told committee staff that they believe that 

invoking the NRP-CIA would have made a diff erence by instilling a “sense of urgency” in the response. Committee staff 

interview of Chuck Mills, Vice President, Emergency Management Services International, Inc., and John Harrald, Ph.D., 

Co-Director, Th e George Washington University Institute for Crisis, Disaster, and Risk Management, conducted on Feb. 

14, 2006 (untranscribed). 

50 Sec. Michael Chertoff , memorandum to Deputy Secretary and others, Aug. 20, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates nos. DHS 0002822 through 0002824. 

51 NRP, p. 33.

52 Committee staff interview of Ken Kaiser, Special Agent in Charge, Boston Field Offi ce, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Jan. 25, 2006, transcript p. 46.

53 Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 2006, p. 40.

54 Some witnesses saw the appointment of a PFO as important to a coordinated eff ort. For example, Admiral Th ad Allen 

– who would ultimately be named to replace Mike Brown as PFO and was widely praised for his eff orts in that role – sent 

an e-mail to Chief of Staff John Wood on the day of landfall suggesting that a PFO should be appointed. Source: Committee staff interview of Vice Adm. Th ad Allen, Chief of Staff , U.S. Coast Guard, conducted on Feb. 3, 2006, transcript 

pp. 113-114. And, although it occurred aft er landfall, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense Paul McHale 
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told staff in an interview that he asked his Deputy Peter Verga to call DHS Tuesday morning, August 30, regarding the 

lack of a PFO. McHale stated that he thought that naming a PFO “would be an important initial step in triggering the 

capabilities available under the NRP.” Source: Committee staff interview of Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Homeland Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, conducted on Jan. 4, 2006, transcript p. 131.

55 Hurricane Rita demonstrated the diff erence that early appointment of a qualifi ed PFO can make. Th ere, an early, 

massive and coordinated federal eff ort was led by a PFO appointed two days before landfall. Th e federal government 

provided over 650 buses for general evacuation and arranged for ambulances and aircraft to evacuate thousands of 

special needs individuals. While there is no doubt that much of the federal government’s pre-Rita steps were a result 

of lessons learned from Katrina, and though the Rita evacuation as a whole was far from perfect, the federal eff ort was 

coordinated, in no small part because a PFO was in place to lead it at a very early point.

56 Brown interview, Jan. 23, 2006, p. 70. 

57 NRP, p. 33 (“Th e PFO provides a primary point of contact and situational awareness locally for the Secretary of 

Homeland Security”).

58 NRP, p. 33.

59 Jackson interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 41.

60 FEMA Operations Center, e-mail to Brooks Altshuler and others, Sept. 1, 2005, 10:07 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS 0003138. Th e e-mail was also sent to Michael Brown and indicated that a “light” earthquake 

measuring 4.8 on the Richter Scale had occurred in California. 

61 Under the NRP, the decision to activate the IIMG rests with the Secretary, but Stephan testifi ed that he took the 

action because he knew the Secretary was traveling and was concerned that he would be diffi cult to reach. Stephan interview, Jan. 13, 2006, pp. 44-45.

62 Stephan interview, Jan. 13, 2006, p. 68.

63 Stephan interview, Jan. 13, 2006, p. 57.

64 Stephan interview, Jan. 13, 2006, p. 23.

65 Committee staff interview of Col. Don Harrington, National Guard, Liaison to National Response Coordination 

Center, U.S. Department of Defense, conducted on Jan. 6, 2006, transcript pp. 17-18.

66 Committee staff interview of Gil Jamieson, Acting Director, National Incident Management System Integration Center, FEMA, conducted on Dec. 20, 2005, transcript pp. 81-85.

67 Committee staff interview of Capt. Michael McDaniel, Navy Emergency Preparedness Liaison to FEMA, U.S. Navy 

Reserves, conducted on Dec. 2, 2005, transcript p. 112.

68 Th e IIMG was activated for Hurricane Isabel in September 2003 and several times when the government’s alert level 

was raised to “orange.” Broderick interview, Jan. 19, 2006, pp. 48, 99-100. Katrina, however, was the fi rst major test of 

the IIMG since the NRP was completed. 

69 In testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee investigating the preparation for and response to 

Hurricane Katrina, Sec. Chertoff stated “We went into this situation the weekend before with an understanding and with 

warnings that this was potentially the nightmare scenario that I think people have talked about for years in terms of New 

Orleans.” Sec. Chertoff , House Select Committee hearing, Oct. 19, 2005.

70 Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 clarifi es the responsibilities given to DHS by the Homeland Security Act 

by formally designating the Secretary of Homeland Security as the “principal federal offi cial for domestic incident management.” Th e NRP further affi rms DHS’s responsibilities: “During actual or potential Incidents of National Signifi cance, 

the overall coordination of Federal incident management activities is executed through the Secretary of Homeland Security. Other Federal departments and agencies carry out their incident management and emergency response authorities 

and responsibilities within this overarching coordinating framework.” 

71 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Offi ce of Inspector General, “A Review of Top Offi cials 3 Exercise,” Nov. 

2005, p. 6.

72 Committee staff interview of Scott Wells, Deputy Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, 

FEMA, conducted on Nov. 14, 2005, transcript p. 118, 129. 

73 FEMA is the lead agency for ESF–3 (Public Works and Engineering), ESF–5 (Emergency Management), ESF–6 (Mass 

Care, Housing and Human Services), ESF–9 (Urban Search and Rescue) and ESF–14 (Long Term Community Recovery 

and Mitigation. NRP, p. ESF–v.

74 Committee staff interview of Edward Buikema, Acting Director of Response Division and Regional Director, Region V, 

FEMA, conducted on Nov. 21, 2005, transcript p. 234.

75 Committee staff interview of Eric Tolbert, former Director, Response Division, FEMA, conducted on Dec. 1, 2005, 

transcript pp. 137-38.

76 Michael Lowder, e-mail to EST-DIR and others, Aug. 27, 2005, 8:58 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 

DHS-FEMA-0068-0000257. 

77 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, transcript p. 99.

78 Testimony of William Lokey, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, FEMA, before the 
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193

U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Urban Search 

and Rescue in a Catastrophe, Jan. 20, 2006.

79 National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Katrina Discussion #9, Aug. 25, 2005, 5 p.m. ET, http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/archive/2005/dis/al122005.discus.009.shtml?. Accessed on Sept. 5, 2005.

80 National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Katrina Discussion #10, Aug. 25, 2005, 11 p.m. ET. http://www.nhc.noaa.

gov/archive/2005/dis/al122005.discus.010.shtml?. Accessed on Sept. 5, 2005.

81 National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Katrina Discussion #12, Aug. 26, 2005 11 a.m. ET. http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/

archive/2005/KATRINA.shtml?. Accessed on Sept. 5, 2005. See also: FEMA, National Situation Report, Aug. 27, 2005, 

5:30 a.m., p. 2. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0037-0000262.

82 Max Mayfi eld, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 26, 2005, p. 4. Provided to the Committee; fi led as Bates no. 

DHS-FEMA-0105-0000025.

83 Bill Reed, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 26, 2005, p. 7. Provided to the Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHSFEMA-0105-0000028.

84 Michael Brown, e-mail to Edward Buikema, Aug. 26, 2005, 12:41 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 

DHS-FEMA-0028-001396. Patrick Rhode recommended that Buikema return to headquarters “with anyone else who 

is needed – vs. fi shing in Alaska.” Source: Patrick Rhode, e-mail to Brooks Altshuler and Michael Health, Aug. 26, 2005, 

9:26 a.m. Provided to Committee, fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0085-0004035.

85 Buikema interview, Nov. 21, 2005, pp. 128-129.

86 Buikema interview, Nov. 21, 2005, pp. 128-129. Buikema admitted that most of the preparations for the storm were 

done by others, but he was in communication with both his deputy Michael Lowder and Undersecretary Michael Brown. 

Source: Buikema interview, Nov. 21, 2005, p. 238.

87 William Lokey, e-mail to Michael Lowder, Aug. 26, 2005, 3:03 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHSFEMA-0028-0000245.

88 ESFs activated at the National Operations Center included Transportation (1), Public Works and Engineering (3), 

Firefi ghting (4), Emergency Management (5), Resource Support (7), External Aff airs (15) and a military liaison. At the 

region IV level, ESFs activated included Transportation (1), Public Works and Engineering (3), Firefi ghting (4), Resource Support (7), Long-Term Recovery and Mitigation (14), External Aff airs (15), and Department of Defense. Source:

FEMA, National Situation Report, Aug. 26, 2005, 5:30 a.m., p. 2. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA0037-0000191. Alabama’s own activation of its EOC was also at its lowest level of activation on August 26 at noon and 

they did not plan to raise it to the highest level until 9 a.m. the following day. Source: FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, 

Aug. 26, 2005, p. 10. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0105-0000031.

89 FEMA, Shift Change Briefi ng, Aug. 27, 2005, 7 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0055-

0000548.

90 National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Katrina Discussion #12, Aug. 26, 2005 11 a.m. ET. http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/

archive/2005/KATRINA.shtml? Accessed on Apr. 25, 2006. See also: FEMA, National Situation Report, Aug. 27, 2005 

5:30 a.m., p. 2. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0037-0000262.

91 FEMA, Region VI Regional Response Coordination Center, Situation Report 1, Aug. 27, 2005, p. 1. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0073-0000118; FEMA, Region VI Status Briefi ng, Aug. 27, 2005, p.1. Provided to 

Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0073-0000197.

92 FEMA, National Situation Report, Aug. 27, 2005, 5:30 a.m., p. 2. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHSFEMA-0037-0000262.

93 FEMA, “Tropical Storm Katrina,” Aug. 27, 2005, 9 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0055-

0002139.

94 FEMA, “Tropical Storm Katrina,” Aug. 27, 2005, 9 a.m., pp. 1-3. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHSFEMA-0055-0002139 through 0002141.

95 Sharon Blades, e-mail to Michael Pawlowski and others, Aug. 27, 2005, 10:35 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0028-0000455.

96 70 Fed. Reg. 53238 (Sept. 7, 2005); Col. Jeff Smith, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 27, 2005, p. 10. Provided 

to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0105-0000049.

97 70 Fed. Reg. 54061-62 (Sept. 13, 2006); 70 Fed. Reg. 53239 (Sept. 7, 2005). 

98 “Robert T. Staff ord Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.” (P.L. 93-288), 42 U.S.C. § 5191.

99 64 Fed. Reg. 51975-01; 64 Fed. Reg. 51976-02; 64 Fed. Reg. 52316-02; 64 Fed. Reg. 52318-01.

100 National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Katrina Advisory #19, Aug. 27, 2005, 10 p.m. CT. http://www.nhc.noaa.

gov/archive/2005/pub/al122005.public.019.shtml? Accessed on Sept. 5, 2005; National Hurricane Center, Hurricane Katrina Special Discussion # 20, Aug. 28, 2005, 2 a.m. ET. http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/archive/2005/dis/al122005.discus.020.

shtml?. Accessed on Sept. 5, 2005. 

101 Michael Lowder, e-mail to Michael Brown and others, Aug. 28, 2005, 2:06 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. DHS 0002487.
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102 FEMA, National Situation Report, Aug. 28, 2005, 5:30 a.m., p. 2. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHSFEMA-0037-0000354.

103 Jon MacLaren, e-mail to William Flynn and others, Aug. 28, 2005, 2:49 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

nos. DHS-INFP-0003-0001949 through 0001950; William Flynn, e-mail to Bob Stephan and others, Aug. 28, 2005, 6:39 

p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-INFP-0003-0001850; Frank DiFalco, e-mail to HSOC.HSIN and 

others, Aug. 28, 2005, 8:31 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-HSOC-0002-0000059 through 0000099; 

Lon Biasco, e-mail to HSOC-All-Desks, Aug. 28, 2005, 10:33, p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHSHSOC-0002-0000114; Andrew Akers, e-mail to HSOC SWO and others, Aug. 29, 2004, 1:47 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. WHK–15894. 

104 Testimony of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Roles of the DHS and FEMA Leadership, Feb. 10, 2006.

105 Brown, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 10, 2006.

106 Brown, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 10, 2006; Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, pp. 33-34. 

107 Brown interview, Jan. 23, 2006, p. 91.

108 Mayfi eld, VTC, Aug. 28, 2005, pp. 2, 6. On that same call, the National Hurricane Center discussed storm surges: 

“Well obviously where it’s headed you’re at the worst possible locations for storm surge. You remember Camille and 

its 26 feet. I would advise all the folks that are in the potential path of this storm to be looking at their maximum off the 

surge models, the meows and whatnot off of a Category 4 or 5 storm, and plan accordingly. Source: Bill Ryder, FEMA 

Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 28, 2005, pp. 4-5. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0105-

0000044 through 0000045. Joe Hagin, White House Deputy Chief of Staff , was on the VTC, listening to these warnings. 

Source: Joe Hagin, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 27, 2005, p. 24. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 

DHS-FEMA-0105-0000063.

109 FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 28, 2005, pp. 13-15. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHSFEMA-0105-0000066 through 0000104.

110 Col. William Doran, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 28, 2005, p. 17. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

no. DHS-FEMA-0105-0000082.

111 Col. Smith, VTC, Aug. 28, 2005, p. 17. 

112 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, p. 34. 

113 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, p. 36. 

114 FEMA, Employee Count as of Nov. 12, 2005. Provided to the Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0082-

0000208; Committee staff interview of Michael Hall, Acting Director, Human Resources, FEMA, conducted on Nov. 28 

2005, transcript p. 61. 

115 Written statement of William Carwile III, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Mississippi, FEMA, 

for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Perspectives of FEMA’s Operations Professionals, Dec. 8, 2005, pp. 1-2.

116 Written Statement of William Carwile III, Senate Committee Hearing, Dec. 8, 2005, pp. 1-2.

117 FEMA, National Situation Report, Aug. 28, 2005, 5:30 a.m., p. 2. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHSFEMA-0037-0000355.

118 NRP, p. 40.

119 Committee staff interview of William Lokey, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, 

FEMA, Jan. 20, 2006, transcript pp. 197-198; Committee staff interview of William Carwile III, Federal Coordinating 

Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Mississippi, FEMA, conducted on Dec. 6, 2005, transcript p. 78.

120 NRP, p. 40.

121 Questions for the Record of Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 2006, p. 61; Lokey interview, Nov. 4, 

2005, pp. 32-33. 

122 According to William Lokey, “When Mr. Brown decided to dispatch the ERT-N on Saturday morning, because we 

don’t have a lot of people and a number of the ERT–N ... were already deployed to Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, and 

in Louisiana, out of their respective regions, what I asked was that [we] activate both the Red and Blue team and fi ll the 

rosters with whoever called back fi rst. So we in essence had a plaid response of people.” Lokey interview, Nov. 4, 2005, 

pp. 32-33.

123 Lokey interview, Nov. 4, 2005 pp. 42-43.

124 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 200.

125 Lokey interview, Nov. 4, 2005, p. 41.

126 Hall interview, Dec. 1, 2005, p. 218. 

127 Carwile interview, Dec. 6, 2005, pp. 78-80.

128 Hall interview, Dec. 1, 2005, pp. 217-220.
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195

129 Carwile interview, Dec. 6, 2005, p. 79.

130 Parr interview, Nov. 16, 2005, pp. 10-11, 102.

131 Parr interview, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 11.

132 Additionally during the Saturday video teleconference the National Weather Service offi cial stated that although it 

couldn’t “totally rule out the possibility” of the storm hitting Texas, “there’s nothing we’re looking at now . . . that would 

take it that far west.” Source: Bill Reed, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 27, 2004, p. 8. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0105-0000047. See also: National Hurricane Center, Katrina Graphics Archive, Aug. 27, 

2005, 4 p.m. CT and 10 p.m. CT, http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/archive/2005/KATRINA_graphics.shtml. Accessed on Apr. 

25, 2006. 

133 Philip Parr, e-mail to James Russo, Aug. 27, 2005, 2:57 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA 

0073-0000174. Gary Jones, Director of FEMA Region VI said that a team was sent to Texas in case the hurricane took 

a turn towards Texas. Source: Committee staff interview of Gary Jones, Acting Regional Director, Region VI, FEMA, 

conducted on Jan. 11, 2006, transcript p. 44; Phil Parr, e-mail to James Russo, Aug. 27, 2005, 2:57 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0073-0000430 through 0000432.

134 Parr interview, Nov. 16, 2005, pp. 28-29.

135 Buikema interview, Nov. 21, 2005, p. 110.

136 Buikema interview, Nov. 21, 2005, p. 109; Tolbert interview, Dec. 1, 2005, p. 54.

137 Buikema interview, Nov. 21, 2005, p. 113; Committee staff interview of Michael Lowder, Deputy Director of Response, FEMA, conducted on Nov. 10, 2005, transcript p. 79. See also: Tolbert interview, Dec. 1, 2005, p. 54 (discussing 

the response capabilities of FIRST teams).

138 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, p. 19.

139 Committee staff interview of Marty Bahamonde, Director, External Aff airs, Region I, FEMA, conducted on Oct. 7, 

2005, transcript pp. 39-40.

140 Bahamonde interview, Oct. 7, 2005, pp. 45-47.

141 Committee staff interview of Tom Bossert, former Deputy Director of Legislative Aff airs, FEMA, conducted on Dec. 

20, 2005, transcript pp. 27-28

142 Marshall Sanders, e-mail to Michael Heath and others, Aug. 27, 2005, 7:55 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0086-0002291 through 0002293.

143 Bossert interview, Dec. 20, 2005, pp. 60-61.

144 Committee staff interview of Bob Fenton, Response Branch Chief for Region IX and Operations Chief, FEMA, conducted on Dec. 22, 2005, transcript pp. 20-22; Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 47-48, 197-198.

145 Carwile interview, Dec. 6, 2005, pp. 111-112.

146 FEMA exacerbated its lack of qualifi ed personnel by deploying the trained staff it did have as late as Friday and 

Saturday before landfall on Monday. 

147 Wells interview, Nov. 14, 2005, pp. 67-68. Wells also said “Th is was a catastrophic disaster. We don’t have the structure; we don’t have the people for a catastrophic disaster. It’s that simple.” Source: Wells interview, Nov. 14, 2005, p. 69.

148 Written Statement of Carwile, Senate Committee hearing, Dec. 8, 2005, pp. 6-7. 

149 Wells interview, Nov. 15, 2005, p. 59.

150 Wells interview, Nov. 14, 2005, pp. 55-56, 70.

151 Committee staff interview of Marie Sloan, Section Chief, Disaster Workforce Response Division, FEMA, conducted 

on Mar. 1, 2006, transcript pp. 8-9; Hall interview, Nov. 28, 2005, pp. 24-25; FEMA, “Daily Disaster and Post Disaster 

and Other Travel Deployments (DAEs only).” Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0055-0000209 

through 0000211.

152 FEMA, “Daily Disaster and Post Disaster and Other Travel Deployments (DAEs only).” Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0055-0000159 through 0000160.

153 Hall interview, Dec. 1, 2005, pp. 171-172.

154 Nancy Ward, e-mail to William Carwile, Aug. 30, 2005, 7:50 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHSFEMA-0083-0000490. 

155 Michael Hall, e-mail to Mary Lynne Miller, Gary Jones, and Teresa Gauger, Aug. 31, 2005, 6:11 p.m. Provided to 

Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0069-0000490.

156 Sandy Coachman, FEMA FCO, was in New Orleans working a previous disaster. On Sunday, she was ordered to 

evacuate New Orleans prior to the storm’s landfall. Source: Committee staff interview of Sandy Coachman, Federal 

Coordinating Offi cer, Region VI, FEMA, conducted on Nov. 15, 2005, transcript p. 7. Scott Wells testifi ed that it was 

“contrary to our policy” and “doctrine” to have placed personnel in New Orleans prior to landfall. Source: Wells interview, Nov. 14, 2005, pp. 172-173.

157 Carwile interview, Dec. 6, 2005, transcript pp. 97-99. However, Scott Wells testifi ed that there is general reluctance 
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by states to allow FEMA liaisons in the states. Source: Wells interview, Nov. 14, 2005, p. 131.

158 Lokey interview, Nov. 4, 2005, pp. 91-92.

159 Bahamonde interview, Oct. 7, 2005, pp. 126-129.

160 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006 pp. 31-32.

161 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 21,18.

162 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 23. 

163 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 23.

164 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 23. 

165 Committee staff interview of William Milani, Chief, Mobile Operations Section, Logistics Branch, FEMA, conducted 

on Jan. 12, 2006, transcript p. 59.

166 Committee staff interview of James Attaway, Telecommunications Specialist, Mobile Emergency Response System, 

Region VI, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 13, 2006, transcript pp. 97-99. 

167 Milani interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 59, 70 

168 Milani interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 59.

169 FEMA did not ask MERS, FEMA’s communications unit, to deploy to the EOC pre-landfall. Source: Milani interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 54-55.

170 Committe staff interview of Philip Parr, Federal Coordinating Offi cer, Region I, FEMA, conducted on Nov. 16, 2005.

171 Wells interview, Nov. 15, 2005, p. 116

172 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 173.

173 Tolbert interview, Dec. 1, 2005, pp. 28-29; Ron Castleman, e-mails to Patrick Rhode and Michael Brown, Dec. 29-

30, 2003. Provided to Committee. Despite these denials, funding for catastrophic planning for New Orleans was found 

elsewhere in the Response Divisions budget. DHS authorized money for fi scal year 2006 for FEMA’s catastrophic planning initiative. FEMA requested $20 million for this initiative, but as of February 2006, only $65,000 had been obligated. 

Questions for the Record of Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 2006, p. 65.

174 Committee staff interview of Wayne Fairley, Branch Chief, Response Operations Region VI, FEMA, conducted on 

Jan. 18, 2006, transcript pp. 129-132; Committee staff interview of Sean Fontenot, Former Chief, Preparedness Division, Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, conducted on Jan. 10, 2006, transcript pp. 

52-58, 89-92. According to witnesses, with the need to narrow the project scope, pre-landfall evacuation was eliminated 

because, unlike other subjects, it had frequently been the subject of planning over the years. Source: Testimony of Madhu 

Beriwal, President and CEO, Innovative Emergency Management Inc., before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland 

Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Preparing for a Catastrophe: Th e Hurricane Pam Exercise, Jan. 24, 2006; 

Fontenot interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 57-58, 89-92.

175 Testimony of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, before the U.S. House, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing on Th e Role of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Sept. 27, 2005. 

176 Lokey interview, Nov. 4, 2005, pp. 184-187. At 8:19 a.m. on Aug. 27, 2005, FEMA’s Acting Deputy Director Patrick 

Rhode e-mailed the Acting Director of Response a request for a copy of the New Orleans Catastrophic Plan. Source: Patrick Rhode, e-mail to David Garratt and others, Aug. 27, 2005, 8:19 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHSFEMA-0085-0003866. At 9:07 a.m. William Lokey replied to Rhode, Brown, and other that “Copies are being made as 

we speak.” Source: William Lokey, e-mail to Patrick Rhode, David Garratt and others, Aug. 27, 2005, 9:07 a.m. Provided 

to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0085-0003860. At 10:35 a.m. Sharon Blades e-mailed 25 FEMA personnel 

including William Lokey, Tony Robinson, Gary Jones, and Wayne Fairley an electronic version of the plan, and told 

them that copies were being printed. Source: Sharon Blades, e-mail to Michel Pawlowski and others, Aug. 27, 2005, 10:35 

a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0085-0003570. Later that aft ernoon Deputy Chief of Staff 

Brooks Altshuler e-mailed twice asking for additional copies for the front offi ce. Source: Brooks Altshuler, e-mail to Sharon Blades and others, Aug. 27, 2005, 3:36 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0085-0003325. 

A few minutes later he received a reply that 50 copies were being printed. Source: Michel Powlowski, e-mail to Brooks 

Altshuler and others, Aug. 27, 2005, 3:42 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0085-0003570. At 

8:37 p.m. that night Sharon Blades again e-mails Altshuler: “We have printed up more plans and they are on the mezz 

in Area A. We are also printing copies of the latest draft s and a preface explaining the planning process and the various 

documents because they all have not been fi nalized and assembled into one document. Th is will, we hope, avoid confusion.” Source: Sharon Blades, e-mail to Brooks Altshuler and others, Aug. 27, 2005, 8:37 p.m. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0085-0003325.

177 Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, prepared by IEM, Inc. for LOHSEP and FEMA, Sept. 2005, p. 2 

[hereinaft er Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, Sept. 2005].

178 Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, Sept. 2005, p. 4.

179 Tony Robbins, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 27, 2005, p. 15. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 

DHS-FEMA-0105-0000054; Wells interview, Nov. 15, 2005, p. 66.
Federal Preparations

197

180 Wells interview, Nov. 15, 2005, p. 66.

181 Sec. Michael Chertoff , Th e Charlie Rose Show, PBS, Jan. 9, 2006, 11 a.m. ET. Transcript accessed on LexisNexis.

182 Committee staff interview of Gary Moore, Director, Logistics, FEMA, conducted on Dec. 9, 2005, transcript p. 30.

183 Robbins, VTC, Aug. 27, 2005, pp. 16-17. See also: FEMA, Commodities Status as of Aug. 29, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0127-0010528.

184 Committee staff interview of Kenneth Burris, Acting Director of Operations, FEMA, Dec. 29, 2005, p. 16.

185 FEMA, FEMA LC’s, PPS, TSS & Ice Storage, Commodity Status as of Aug. 26, 2005, 9:30 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0127-0014017. See also: FEMA, Commodities Status as of Aug. 29, 2005. Provided to 

Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0127-0010528.

186 Federal Operational Staging Area Camp Beauregard, LA Situation Report as of 1900 28 Aug. 2005. Provided to 

Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0080-0000005; FEMA, FEMA LC’s, PPS, TSS, & Ice Storage, Aug. 26, 2005, 

Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0127-0014017. 

187 Ernest Hudson e-mail to Wayne Fairley et al., Aug. 29, 2005, 11:47. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHSFEMA-0080-000003; Brooks Altshuler, e-mail to Patrick Rhode and others, Aug. 28, 2005, 5:56 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0085-0004937.

188 Michael Lowder, e-mail to Gary Moore and others, Aug. 28, 2005, 1:03 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

no. DHS-FEMA-0083-0000716; Michael Lowder, e-mail to William Carwile, Aug. 28, 2005, 12:37 p.m. Provided to 

Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0083-0000718; Gary Moore, e-mail to Michael Lowder and others, Aug. 28, 

2005, 1 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0068-0001236 through 0001237; Michael Lowder, 

e-mail to William Carwile, Aug. 28, 2005, 12:31 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0083-

0000722.

189 Committee staff interview of Tom McAllister, Director of Response and Recovery, MEMA, conducted on Jan. 25, 

2006, transcript p. 8.

190 McAllister interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 8-9.

191 Committee staff interview of Patrick Rhode, former Acting Deputy Director, FEMA, conducted on Dec. 22, 2005, 

transcript pp. 40-42.

192 Rhode interview, Dec. 22, 2005, pp. 42-47. 

193 Rhode interview, Dec. 22, 2005, pp. 53.

194 Moore interview, Dec. 9, 2005, p. 37. 

195 Teresa Gauger, e-mail to Lisa Williams, Marie Sloan, and Michael Hall, Aug. 27, 2005, 11:33 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0069-0001575. See also: Sloan interview, Mar. 1, 2006, pp. 31-33.

196 Kerry Young, e-mail to Jules Hurst and Mary Ann Veitch, Aug. 28, 2005, 3:08 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0127-0011518.

197 Moore interview, Dec. 9, 2005, p. 35.

198 Moore interview, Dec. 9, 2005, pp. 35-37. Moore testifi ed that FEMA’s transportations system “catastrophically...

broke down” because of the disaster. Source: Moore interview, Dec. 9, 2005, p. 83.

199 Moore interview, Dec. 9, 2005, p. 36. 

200 FEMA, NDMS Resource Status, Aug. 28, 2005, 8 p.m. ET. Provided to Committee.

201 Committee staff interview of Jack Beall, Chief, National Disaster Medical System, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 10, 

2006, transcript pp. 10-13.

202 Lokey interview, Nov. 4, 2005, pp. 66-67, 72-83, 90.

203 Lokey interview, Nov. 4, 2005, pp. 67-68, 80.

204 Committee staff interview of James Strickland, Team Member, Urban Search and Rescue, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 

25, 2006, transcript pp. 38-39.

205 Strickland interview, conducted on Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 33-34. 

206 Lokey interview, Nov. 4, 2005, pp. 88-90.

207 Strickland interview, conducted on Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 44-45, 82-83.

208 Testimony of Capt. Bruce C. Jones, U.S. Coast Guard, Commanding Offi cer, Air Station New Orleans, before the 

U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Always Ready: Th e Coast Guard’s 

Response to Hurricane Katrina, Nov. 9, 2005.

209 Attaway interview, Jan. 13, 2006, pp. 77-78. Aft er he learned the city was fl ooding and it was a major catastrophe, 

MERS took steps to get additional resources and supplies. “I went about having our guys locate the local communications...and establishing accounts with them. We actually started ordering supplies. I got into the building next door and 

started doing a survey of the building to layout the facility that we wanted to put in there. We did quite a lot of work 

right quick.” Source: Attaway interview, Jan. 13, 2006, pp. 77-78.
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198

210 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 8-9. “A JFO does not exist until the facility is fully functional. Until that time, the

people may be working in the building and it is called an Initial Operating Facility (IOF).” Th e IOF in Louisiana began 

operating pre-landfall and was rapidly ramped over the course of 12 days until a designation as JFO on September 9. 

“So as other Federal agencies started arriving, by a couple of days, there were several hundred people there. Th ere were a 

thousand people there within a week.” Source: Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 10. However, state employees could not 

move into the JFO until the technology issues were addressed, thus although federal agencies were at the IOF, because 

the state employees could not be there, it was harder to coordinate the response. 

211 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 101; Committee staff interview of Lucy Brooke, Emergency Management Program 

Specialist, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 24, 2006, transcript p. 16; Committee staff interview of Mark Misczak, Individual 

Assistance Branch Chief, Region VI, FEMA, conducted on Nov. 14, 2005, transcript p. 12. 

212 Lokey interview, Nov. 4, 2005, p. 30. 

213 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 9-10.

214 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 30; Committee interview of William King, Branch Chief, Region V, Radiological 

Emergency Preparedness Program, Technical Services Branch, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 17, 2006, transcript p. 93. 

215 For example, the FEMA Director of Planning in Louisiana, Bill King, said the EOC only had one computer dedicated 

to FEMA. Source: King interview, Jan. 17, 2006, p. 91. One FEMA employee who worked in EOC until the JFO opened 

explained: “You’re limited. I mean, we had a – it was a little offi ce. ... [Th ere was] one telephone in there that the Comm 

Center knew that number and knew that was a room where FEMA people were working, and so every call that came in 

got funneled in there, no matter who it was for or who was calling. And people would come in and use that phone – the 

search and rescue guys or whatever – come in and use that phone and leave that number for [them] to call, so it was kind 

of telephone central when it’d work.” Source: Brooke interview, Jan. 24, 2006, p. 54.

216 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 25.

217 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 28. 

218 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 24-25.

219 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 17, 23.

220 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 23-24.

221 Shingler interview, Jan. 31, 2006, p. 11.

222 “Need 10-12 FPS offi cers to escort NDMS teams assigned to Louisiana Super Dome in New Orleans. Twenty-four 

hour coverage required NDMS teams are comprised of 35 members.” Source: FEMA, Mission Assignment, 1603DR-LAFPS-02, Sept. 30, 2005, p. 1. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0035-0000023.

223 “Request (14) FPS [Federal Protective Service] offi cers to deploy to LA Superdome to assist in crowd control during 

Superdome evacuation. Must be equipped with crowd control weaponry.” FEMA, Mission Assignment, 1603DR-LAFPS-04, Sept. 31, 2005, p. 1. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0035-0000143.

224 Parr interview, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 93.

225 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Commissioner’s Situation Room, Aug. 29, 2005, 2:30 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-CBP1-0001-0000003.

226 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Commissioner’s Situation Room, Aug. 31, 2005, 3 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-CBP1-0001-0000029.

227 “Request (29) Federal Protective Service (FPS) personnel to provide physical security to assure the safety of personnel and equipment of NDMS teams (i.e., DMAT, DMORT, VMAT) deployed and staged in Region 6” to provide 

24-hour coverage/escort for NDMS teams and equipment assigned to multiple locations aff ected by Hurricane Katrina. 

FEMA, Mission Assignment, 1603DR-LA-FPS-01, Sept. 30, 2005, p. 1. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHSFEMA-0035-0000015.

228 But contrast with the National Guard testimony in the Superdome that there was no security problem. Committee staff interview of Col. Pat Prechter, State Chief Nurse, Louisiana Army National Guard and Deputy Commander, 

Louisiana Medical Command, conducted on Jan. 6, 2006, transcript pp. 63-68, 100-103; Committee staff interview of 

Brig. Gen. Gary Jones, Assistant Joint Forces Commander, Louisiana Army National Guard, conducted on Dec. 7, 2005, 

transcript pp. 81-82, 171-175, 222-223. 

229 Gary Sirmons, e-mail to Gerald Gomes, Sept. 1, 2005 11:09 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHSFEMA-0136-0000021. Later on CCN, DMAT personnel thought that they “saw looters ... going through the [team] CA6’s personal belongings.” Source: Gerald Gomes, e-mail to Gary Sirmons and others, Sept. 2, 2005, 3:53 p.m. Provided 

to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0136-0000021. “Th e team commanders were not comfortable moving into 

the arena [Th ursday night]. We discussed the situation at length, but I was not able to assuage their fears. Further, the 

FPS Regional Director decided he wouldn’t take the teams in until tomorrow morning.” Source: William Lokey, e-mail 

to Steven Posner, Gary Simons, and Joan Harding, Sept. 1, 2005, 10:08 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 

DHS-FEMA-0136-0000022.

230 Brown, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 10, 2005.

231 Committee Staff interview of Gen. Richard Myers, U.S. Air Force (Ret.), former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff , conducted on Feb. 28, 2006, transcript p. 9.
Federal Preparations

199

232 Sec. Chertoff , VTC, Aug. 28, 2005, p. 38. 

233 Brown, VTC, Aug. 28, 2005, pp. 38-39. 

234 Sec. Chertoff , VTC, Aug. 28, 2005, pp. 38-39. 

235 Written Statement of Rear Adm. Robert Duncan, U.S. Coast Guard, Commander, 8th Coast Guard District, for 

the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Always Ready: Th e Coast 

Guard’s Response to Hurricane Katrina, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 2. Th e Coast Guard is “a law enforcement authority as well as an 

armed force.” Testimony of Rear Adm. Robert Duncan, Commander, 8thCoast Guard District, before the U.S. Senate, 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Always Ready: Th e Coast Guard’s Response to 

Hurricane Katrina, Nov. 9, 2005.

236 U.S. Coast Guard, “U.S. Coast Guard: America’s Maritime Guardian,” Jan. 1, 2002, pp. 55-56 (“Successful mission 

execution begins with a thorough understanding of the environment in which we operate. Based on that understanding, 

we develop operational concepts, acquire appropriate equipment, and put our people through rigorous formal training. 

We build on that foundation by continuous training and drills, by improving our personal skills and by maintaining our 

equipment at the highest state of readiness. In short, consistently successful performance requires thorough preparation.”).

237 Written Statement of Rear Adm. Duncan, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 2. In fact, Coast Guard Air 

Station New Orleans exercised its hurricane plan several times each season. Testimony of Capt. Bruce C. Jones, U.S. 

Coast Guard, Commanding Offi cer, Air Station New Orleans, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Always Ready: Th e Coast Guard’s Response to Hurricane Katrina, Nov. 9, 2005.

238 Rear Adm. Duncan, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005.

239 Scott R. Gourley, “Th e Coast Guard and Hurricane Katrina,” Homeland Security, Jan. 2006.

240 Written Statement of Rear Adm. Duncan, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 2.

241 Written Statement of Rear Adm. Duncan, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 2.

242 Written Statement of Rear Adm. Duncan, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 2.

243 Testimony of Capt. Frank Paskewich, U.S. Coast Guard, Commander, Coast Guard Sector New Orleans, before the 

U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Always Ready: Th e Coast Guard’s 

Response to Hurricane Katrina, Nov. 9, 2005.

244 Capt. Paskewich, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005.

245 Capt. Paskewich, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005; Committee staff interview of Capt. Frank Paskewich, 

Commander Coast, U.S. Coast Guard, Guard Sector New Orleans, conducted on Oct. 6, 2005 (Captain Paskewich told 

staff there were no Coast Guard dependents left in the city of New Orleans prior to landfall).

246 U.S. Coast Guard, Hurricane Katrina: Response and Recovery, Sept. 7, 2005, p. 4.

247 Written Statement of Rear Adm. Duncan, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 3; Committee staff interview 

of Capt. Bruce Jones, U.S. Coast Guard, Commanding Offi cer, Coast Guard Air Station New Orleans, conducted on Oct. 

6, 2005.

248 Capt. Paskewich, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005. For example, the Seagoing Buoy Tender Coast Guard 

Cutter Cypress, home ported in Mobile, Alabama, was pre-staged in Houston, Texas and loaded with as many Aids to 

Navigation supplies as “she could physically carry.” Source: Written Statement of Rear Adm. Duncan, Senate Committee 

hearing, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 3. 

249 Written Statement of Rear Adm. Duncan, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 3. Vice Adm. Vivian Crea, the 

Coast Guard Atlantic Area Commander, authorized this movement. Source: Written Statement of Rear Adm. Duncan, 

Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 3. Th e cutter Spencer arrived in New Orleans two days aft er landfall. Source:

Written Statement of Rear Adm. Duncan, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 3.

250 Rear Adm. Duncan, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005; Capt. Jones interview, Oct. 6, 2005. In fact, this C-130 

was later used by the Coast Guard as a communication platform relaying messages to and from the helicopter search and 

rescue crews operating over the city. Source: Captain Jones interview, Oct. 6, 2005.

251 Capt. Jones interview, Nov. 2, 2005.

252 Capt. Jones interview, Nov. 2, 2005.

253 Committee staff interview of Lt. Cmdr. Shari Ben-Iesau, U.S. Coast Guard, Public Aff airs Offi cer, Coast Guard 

Sector New Orleans, Oct. 18, 2005, transcript pp. 2-3; Committee staff interview of Lt. Valerie Boyd, U.S. Coast Guard, 

Command Center Watch Offi cer, 8th District Offi ce Headquarters, New Orleans, conducted on Nov. 7, transcript pp. 

4-6. 

254 Rear Adm. Duncan, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005.

255 Capt. Paskewich, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005.

256 Written Statement of Rear Adm. Duncan, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 3.

257 Committee staff interview of Vice Adm. Vivien Crea, U.S. Coast Guard, Commander, Coast Guard Atlantic Area, 

conducted on Jan. 3, 2006, transcript p. 16.
Chapter 12

200

258 Capt. Jones, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005.

259 Th e Department of Defense deployed in support of the Coast Guard and rescued 2,911 people. FEMA also ran 

search and rescue missions, and saved over 6,000 people. 

260 National Disaster Medical System, 2006. www.oep-ndms.dhhs.gov. Accessed on Apr. 24, 2006; U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security, Current NDMS Overview, Jan. 6, 2006.

261 Beall interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 29.

262 Mick Cote, e-mail to Jack Beall, Aug. 27, 2005, 6:24 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA0098-0004489 through 0004490.

263 Strike teams are small, four to fi ve person medical treatment teams which are deployed where or when a full 35 

person Disaster Medical Assistance Team is not needed.

264 Mick Cote, e-mail to Jack Beall, Aug. 27, 2005, 6:24 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA0098-0004489 through 0004490.

265 Jack Beall, e-mail to Mick Cote, Aug. 27, 2005, 5:29 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA0098-0004489.

266 FEMA, NDMS Resource Status, Aug. 28, 2005, 10 p.m. ET. Provided to Committee.

267 Committee staff interview of Stewart Simonson, Assistant Secretary, Offi ce of Public Health and Emergency Preparedness, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, conducted on Feb. 16, 2006, transcript pp. 57-59.

268 Simonson interview, Feb. 16, 2006, pp. 37-39, 57-59.

269 Simonson interview, Feb. 16, 2006, pp. 58-59.

270 FEMA, NDMS Resource Status, Aug. 28, 2005, 4 p.m. ET. Provided to Committee.

271 FEMA, NDMS Resource Status, Aug. 28, 2005, 4 p.m. ET. Provided to Committee; Rand McNally, Maps & Directions, www.randmcnally.com. Accessed on Apr. 24, 2006.

272 NRP, pp. ESF #8-1 through ESF #8-13.

273 Jack Beall, e-mail to William Lokey, Aug. 28, 2005, 11:53 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHSFEMA-0098-0003831.

274 William Lokey, e-mail to Jack Beall, Aug. 28, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0098-

0003831.

275 FEMA, NDMS Resource Status, Aug. 29, 2005, 10 a.m. ET. Provided to Committee.

276 Committee staff interview of Rear Adm. John Babb, Director, Offi ce of Force Readiness and Deployment, U.S. 

Department of Health and Human Services, conducted on Feb. 8, 2006, transcript pp. 5, 22-26.

277 Rear Adm. Babb interview, Feb. 8, 2006, pp. 14-15, 22-23.

278 John Babb, e-mail to Kenneth Moritsugu, Aug. 28, 2005, 6:06 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. OSG 

186.

279 Rear Adm. Babb interview, Feb. 8, 2006, p. 23.

280 Rear Adm. Babb interview, Feb. 8, 2006, p. 24.

281 Rear Adm. Babb interview, Feb. 8, 2006, p. 24; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, PHS Katrina Response: Baton Rouge Deployment Alpha Team, Oct. 16, 2005. Provided to Committee.

282 U.S. Public Health Service, briefi ng on Hurricane Katrina: PHS Response, Team Alpha, given to Senate Committee 

staff , Jan. 12, 2006.

283 SNS OPS Center Lead, e-mail to KC Decker, Aug. 28, 2005, 6:14 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. 

OPHEP 471 through 472. Th ese supplies were dispatched by truck from Atlanta and Tennessee on the aft ernoon of 

September 28 and arrived at Camp Beauregard, LA aft er landfall.

284 Stewart Simonson, e-mail to Steven Adams and others, Aug. 28, 2005, 1:07 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. OPHEP 27780.

285 SNS OPS Center, e-mail to Stewart Simonson and others, Aug. 28, 2005, 4:37 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. OPHEP 27150.

286 SNS OPS Center, e-mail to Stewart Simonson and others, Aug. 28, 2005, 4:37 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. OPHEP 27150.

287 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Flash Report #4 – Hurricane Katrina, Aug. 29, 2005, 8:30 a.m. ET. 

Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. OPHEP 28247 through 28248; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Flash Report #5 – Hurricane Katrina, Aug. 29, 2005, 3 p.m. ET. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. OPHEP 

28249 through 28251; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Flash Report #6 – Hurricane Katrina, 3 a.m. ET, 

Aug. 30, 2005, p. 2. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. OPHEP 28252 through 28254; SNS OPS Center Lead, email to EOC Report and others, Aug. 29, 2005, 7:54 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. CDC 2899.

288 Committee staff interview of Col. Richard Chavez, U.S. Air Force, Senior Military Advisor for Civil Support, Offi ce 
Federal Preparations

201

of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, conducted on Nov. 9, 2005, transcript, pp. 36-37.

289 Col. Chavez interview, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 41.

290 Committee staff interview of Col. Darryl L. Roberson, U.S. Air Force, Assistant Deputy Director for Antiterrorism 

and Homeland Defense, Operations Directorate, Joint Staff , conducted on Nov. 10, 2005, transcript p. 31.

291 First U.S. Army, Message to U.S. Northern Command, “Request for Force Capabilities (Title X) ISO possible DSCA 

operations as a result of Hurricane Katrina,” Aug. 5, 2005, 2816 Z. 

292 Committee staff interview of Lt. Gen. James Amos, U.S. Marine Corps, Commander, Second Marine Expeditionary 

Force, conducted on Dec. 14, 2005, transcript, p. 9; Committee staff interview of Maj. Gen. Douglas O’Dell, U.S. Marine 

Corps, Commander, Fourth Marine Division, conducted on Dec. 14, 2005, transcript pp. 16-18.

293 Committee staff interview of Vice Adm. Mark Fitzgerald, U.S. Navy, Commander, U.S. Second Fleet, conducted on 

Nov. 15, 2005.

294 Committee staff interview of Capt. Rick Snyder, U.S. Navy, Executive Offi cer, USS Bataan, conducted on Nov. 14, 

2005. 

295 Michael Ritchie, e-mail to Anthony Capra, Aug. 29, 2005, 1:14 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as no. MMTF 

00418-05.

296 Committee staff interview of Col. Th omas Muir, U.S. Army, Deputy Chief of Current Operations, U.S. Northern 

Command, conducted on Dec. 6, 2005, transcript p. 14.

297 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , Message to Commander, U.S. Northern Command, et al., “CJCS EXORD,” 

Aug. 5, 2005, 1923 Z.

298 U.S. Northern Command, USNORTHCOM Hurricane Katrina Timeline (Draft ), pp. 2-3. Provided to Committee.

299 First U.S. Army, Message to U.S. Northern Command, “Request for Force Capabilities (Title X) ISO possible DSCA 

operations as a result of Hurricane Katrina,” Aug. 5, 2005, 2816 Z . 

300 Committee staff interview of Maj. Gen. Richard Rowe, U.S. Army, Director of Operations, U.S. Northern Command, conducted on Jan. 20, 2006, transcript pp. 31-32.

301 Maj. Gen. Richard Rowe, e-mail to NC-JOC – Director – OMB and others, Aug. 28, 2005, 5:31 p.m. Provided to 

Committee; fi led as MMTF00452-05.

302 Maj. Gen. Rowe interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 31; Committee staff interview of Capt. Michael McDaniel, U.S. Navy, 

Navy Emergency Preparedness Liaison Offi cer to FEMA, conducted on Dec. 2, 2005, transcript p. 156; Col. Harrington 

interview, Jan. 6, 2006, p. 89.

303 Th e Defense Department intends to broaden the actions it takes in advance of a hurricane’s landfall. According to 

several witnesses, the Joint Staff is considering broadening the Severe Weather Order to allow NORTHCOM to designate or position helicopters, boats, and communications gear prior to landfall. Source: Committee staff interview of Maj. 

Gen. Terry Scherling, U.S. Air Force, Director of the Joint Staff , National Guard Bureau, conducted on Jan. 19, 2006, 

transcript p. 81; Maj. Gen. Rowe interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 29. Col. Richard Chavez, the Senior Military Advisor in the 

Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, explained that in the future he intends to include shallow-draft 

boats among the assets that he inventories prior to landfall. Source: Col. Chavez interview, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 27. In light of 

the lack of situational awareness experienced by almost all entities within the Department during the fi rst 24 hours aft er 

landfall, many witnesses have attested to a need to deploy information-gathering assets – including National Technical Means – so as to gain timely and accurate information in the fi rst critical hours aft er a disaster. Source: McHale 

interview, Jan. 4, 2006, p. 136. Because the issue raises questions of domestic intelligence-gathering and dissemination of 

potentially classifi ed material, the Department has yet to determine an appropriate solution. 
Secretary Chertoff, left, with President 

and Lt. Gen. H. Steven Blum

National Guard photo
203

Department of 

Homeland Security: 

Roles and Responsibilities

General Authorities and Responsibilities

Both in design and in fact, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the central 

federal entity for preparedness and response to disasters, including catastrophic 

events like Hurricane Katrina. Th e Homeland Security Act of 2002 established the 

Department and provides that one of DHS’s missions is “acting as a focal point regarding 

natural and manmade crises and emergency planning.”1

 DHS was created to bring together multiple, disparate agencies to create synergy and ensure a coordinated approach to 

preventing, preparing for, and responding to catastrophes, whether caused by terrorism or 

nature.2

Since DHS’s creation, several executive actions have further articulated its role. Homeland 

Security Presidential Directive 5, issued by President Bush on February 28, 2003, formally 

designated the Secretary of Homeland Security as the “principal federal offi cial for domestic incident management.”3

 It also made the Secretary responsible for developing and 

administering the National Response Plan (NRP) and the National Incident Management 

System (NIMS), a system for enabling responders from diff erent jurisdictions to work 

together.4

 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8), issued on December 17, 

2003, further designated the Secretary as “the principal Federal offi cial for coordinating the 

implementation of all-hazards preparedness in the United States,” and gave the Secretary, in 

cooperation with other Federal departments and agencies, responsibility for “coordinat[ing] 

the preparedness of federal response assets, and the support for, and assessment of, the 

preparedness of state and local fi rst responders.”5

In addition, DHS has assumed responsibilities under the Robert T. Staff ord Relief and 

Emergency Assistance Act (Staff ord Act).6

 Among other things, the Staff ord Act authorizes 

and provides the administrative mechanisms for the federal government to assist state and 

local governments in disasters.7

 Th e President, or the Secretary of Homeland Security as 

his delegate, has the authority to provide “assistance essential to meeting immediate threats 

to life and property resulting from a major disaster.”8

 Th is authority specifi cally allows the 

Secretary to do any work essential to saving lives or preserving public health and safety, 

including search and rescue, emergency medical care, emergency mass care, emergency 

shelter, and provision of food, water, medicine, and other essential needs, including movement of supplies or persons.9

 In addition, the Homeland Security Act gives the Secretary, 

through the Under Secretary for Emergency Management and Response, the responsibility 

for “providing the federal government’s response to terrorist attacks and major disasters,”10

and charges FEMA with conducting emergency operations to save lives and property 

“through positioning emergency equipment and supplies, through evacuating potential victims, through providing food, water, shelter, and medical care to those in need, and through 

restoring critical public services.”11

On February 28, 2003, the day before the new Department began operating and FEMA 

became part of DHS, President Bush modifi ed Executive Order 12148, delegating most 

Presidential responsibilities under the Staff ord Act to the Secretary of Homeland Security, 

rather than to the Director of FEMA, as had previously been the case.12

Chapter 13
Chapter 13

204

Th e NRP further confi rms DHS’s central role in disaster preparedness and response. Th e 

Plan, reviewed by the White House’s Homeland Security Council and signed by the heads 

of 30 federal agencies, states that: 

During actual or potential Incidents of National Signifi cance, the overall coordination of federal incident management activities is executed through the Secretary of Homeland Security. 

Other federal departments and agencies carry out their incident management and emergency 

response authorities and responsibilities within this overarching coordinating framework.13

Practically, these authorities invested DHS with at least four categories of responsibility:

1. Leadership. Th e Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security has clear 

duties to lead and manage the federal response to disasters such as Katrina. 

He carries ultimate responsibility for managing FEMA and other DHS components and is charged with coordinating overall federal operations.14 Among 

his many responsibilities, the Secretary must marshal federal resources, decide 

whether to appoint a Principal Federal Offi cial to lead the federal response 

on the ground,15 and decide whether to implement the Catastrophic Incident 

Annex, which provides for an accelerated, proactive national response to a 

catastrophic incident.16

New Orleans family 

Photo © 2005 The Times-Picayune 

Publishing Co., all rights reserved. Used 

with permission of the Times-Picayune
Department of Homeland Security: Roles and Responsibilities

205

2. Coordination and Support. DHS can use various structures and resources to 

coordinate and support the overall response eff ort. Among these, the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) is supposed to act as a hub for situational awareness and incident management in a disaster. Some 45 agencies 

staff the HSOC to facilitate information fl ow among agencies;17 during Katrina, 

the HSOC distributed situation reports twice a day that were widely disseminated throughout the government. Th e Interagency Incident Management 

Group (IIMG) is also housed at DHS. Comprising senior-level representatives 

of a variety of agencies, the IIMG is supposed to coordinate federal resource 

and operational requirements and make strategic recommendations to the Secretary, who has the power to activate the IIMG based on the nature, severity, 

magnitude, and complexity of a threat or incident.18

3. Operational Responsibilities. DHS has signifi cant, ground-level operational 

responsibilities in responding to disasters. DHS and its component agencies 

are primary or coordinating agencies for nine of the 15 Emergency Support 

Functions (ESFs) in the NRP – categories of federal capabilities that can be 

brought to bear to provide support in domestic incidents – including public 

safety and security, communications support, and emergency management.19

DHS components such as the Coast Guard also have signifi cant missions and 

statutory responsibilities independent of the NRP.20 FEMA also controls the 

activation and movement of search and rescue and directs the National Disaster Medical Support System.

4. Preparedness. Besides its response roles, DHS has primary responsibility for 

strengthening national preparedness – including the planning, training, and 

equipment necessary to prevent, respond to, and recover from major domestic 

incidents – under HSPD-8 and the Homeland Security Act.21 Section 502 of the 

Homeland Security Act gives the Secretary, acting through the FEMA Director, 

responsibility for “helping to ensure the eff ectiveness of emergency response 

providers to terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.”22 Th e 

Department has authority over primary grants and training programs for state 

and local fi rst responders and emergency managers.23 Pursuant to HSPD8, DHS has developed a National Preparedness Goal, establishing national 

emergency-management and preparedness priorities.24 DHS ties its preparedness requirements to grant funding, requiring that all states submit emergency 

plans in order to get funding and that the money be used to meet the capabilities and priorities set forth by the National Preparedness Goal.25

Title VI of the Staff ord Act also places signifi cant responsibilities for national emergency 

preparedness on the FEMA Director and, through the Homeland Security Act, on DHS,26

providing, among other things, that the federal government is to provide the necessary 

direction, guidance, and assistance “so that a comprehensive preparedness system exists for 

all hazards.”27

The Role of the Federal Government

Our nation has a system of dual sovereignty. Th e federal government has limited, enumerated powers, and state governments retain primary responsibility to protect the public’s 

health and safety, so-called “police powers.”28 Th is is commonly known as “federalism.” 

Traditionally, state and local offi cials have managed the response to an incident in the fi rst 

instance, and the federal government for the most part provides assistance only as request-
Chapter 13

206

ed. Th is approach makes sense: during an emergency, states typically have authority to exercise extraordinary powers to commandeer resources, control property, order evacuations, 

suspend laws, and take other extreme measures.29 In addition, state and local authorities 

have large numbers of public-safety employees that are fi rst responders to every emergency. 

Th e individuals closest to an emergency incident generally know the locality best, and are 

wholly accountable to the local electorate for their actions.

Congress established the Staff ord Act to provide assistance “by the federal government to 

state and local governments in carrying out their responsibilities to alleviate the suff ering 

and damage which result from . . . disasters.”30 Th e Staff ord Act respects the state’s role in 

determining when it is overwhelmed and the assistance that it wants from the federal government. Th e Staff ord Act requires that the governor of a state request the President declare 

a major disaster for a portion or all of a state. Such requests include a description of how the 

state’s resources are overwhelmed.31 Th e President then can decide to declare a major disaster and determine the federal assistance that will be provided “in support of state and local 

assistance eff orts.”32 Th us, the Staff ord Act provides for consultation with state offi cials prior 

to the provision of federal assistance in the fi rst instance. Th e subsequent federal government response is cognizant of underlying concerns for the state’s continued authority over 

the direction of the response eff orts and respects state autonomy under our federal system 

of government. Traditionally, FEMA has required that states make requests not only for the 

initial declaration of a disaster or emergency but also for specifi c types of assistance such as 

the provision of commodities or assistance with search and rescue eff orts.

In a catastrophic situation, however, the traditional mode of operation under the Staff ord 

Act may not serve the Act’s purposes because state and local governments may become so 

overwhelmed that they can’t eff ectively make specifi c requests for assistance. In such circumstances, the federal government may have to act without a request from a state. 

Th e NRP explicitly provides for a proactive federal response in the Catastrophic Incident 

Annex (NRP-CIA).33 Th e NRP defi nes a catastrophic event as “any natural or manmade 

incident, including terrorism, that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely aff ecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, 

national morale, and/or government functions.”34 According to the NRP, only the Secretary of Homeland Security or the Secretary’s designee may initiate implementation of the 

NRP-CIA.35

Th e NRP-CIA recognizes that, in a catastrophe, “federal and/or national resources are 

required to augment overwhelmed state, local, and tribal response eff orts” and therefore 

provides for the identifi cation and rapid deployment of essential resources expected to be 

urgently needed to save lives and contain incidents.36 Th e NRP-CIA provides that standard 

procedures regarding requests for assistance “may be expedited or, under extreme circumstances, temporarily suspended” in the aft ermath of a catastrophe.37

At the same time, the NRP-CIA is sensitive to concerns for state autonomy. Th us, notifi cation and coordination with states are still to occur, though “the coordination process should 

not delay or impede the rapid mobilization and deployment of critical federal resources.”38

And federal resources are generally deployed to mobilization centers close to the incident 

scene “until requested by state/local incident command authorities,”39 though in certain 

circumstances, they may be deployed directly to the incident scene to assist in responding to 

the incident.
Department of Homeland Security: Roles and Responsibilities

207

1 “Th e Homeland Security Act of 2002.” (P.L. 107-296), 6 U.S.C. § 111(b).

2 U.S. House, Homeland Security Act of 2002, S. Rept. 107-609, July 24, 2002, p. 63. Among the 22 pre-existing entities 

that were brought together as part of DHS were FEMA, the U.S. Coast Guard, the Transportation Security Administration, the National Communications System (which coordinates emergency communications), and law enforcement 

entities such as the U.S. Secret Service and the Federal Protective Service. Prior to becoming part of the Department of 

Homeland Security, FEMA was a stand-alone agency. Most of the other entities that were incorporated into DHS were 

transferred from other cabinet departments: for example, the Coast Guard had previously been part of the Department 

of Transportation and the Secret Service had been part of the Treasury Department.

3 Th e White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5: Management of Domestic Incidents, Feb. 28, 2003, 

Section 4. 

4 Th e White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5: Management of Domestic Incidents, Feb. 28, 2003, 

Sections 15-16.

5 Th e White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8: Domestic Preparedness, Dec. 17, 2003, Section 4. 

All-hazards preparedness is defi ned in the Directive as “preparedness for domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and 

other emergencies.” Source: Th e White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8: Domestic Preparedness, Dec. 

17, 2003, Section 2(a). Preparedness is defi ned as “the existence of plans, procedures, policies, training, and equipment 

necessary at the Federal, State, and local level to maximize the ability prevent, respond to, and recover from major events.” 

Source: Th e White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8: Domestic Preparedness, Dec. 17, 2003, Section 2(h).

6 “Robert T. Staff ord Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.” (P.L. 93-288), 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206. FEMA’s 

responsibilities were delegated to the Department of Homeland Security by Executive Order 13286, Feb. 28, 2003, 68 

Fed. Reg. 10619 (Mar. 3, 2003).

7 “Staff ord Act,” 42 U.S.C. § 5170a.

8 “Staff ord Act,” 42 U.S.C. § 5170b. 

9 “Staff ord Act,” 42 U.S.C. § 5170b; 42 U.S.C. § 5170b(a)(3). Th is is the authority pursuant to a major disaster declaration. Under an emergency declaration, the authority is similar but phrased more generally, providing that “Whenever 

the federal assistance provided under subsection (a) of this section with respect to an emergency is inadequate, the 

President may also provide assistance with respect to eff orts to save lives, protect property and public health and safety, 

and lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe.” “Staff ord Act,” 42 U.S.C. § 5192(b).

10 “Homeland Security Act,” 6 U.S.C. § 312(3).

11 “Homeland Security Act,” 6 U.S.C. § 317(a)(2)(c).

12 Executive Order 13286, 68 Fed. Reg. 10619 (Mar. 5, 2003), Section 52. Executive Order 12148, July 20, 1979, (Federal 

Emergency Management), as amended, is further amended by: (a) striking “the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency” whenever it appears and inserting “the Department of Homeland Security” in lieu thereof; and (b) striking “the 

Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency” wherever it appears and inserting “the Secretary of Homeland Security” in lieu thereof. See also: Executive Order 12673, 54 Fed. Reg. 12573 (Mar. 28, 1989), Section 1 (amending 

Executive Order 12148).

13 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan. Washington: Government Printing Offi ce, Dec. 

2004, p. 15 [hereinaft er NRP].

14 NRP, p. 9 (“Pursuant to HSPD-5, the Secretary of Homeland Security is responsible for coordinating Federal operations within the United States to prepare for, respond to and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other 

emergencies.”).

15 NRP, p. 33.

16 NRP, Catastrophic Incident Annex, p. CAT–1.

17 NRP, p. 24.

18 NRP, p. 22.

19 NRP, ESF Annex, p. ESF–v.

20 As discussed in greater detail in subsequent sections, DHS itself shares the lead responsibility for supporting public 

safety and security (ESF-13) with the Department of Justice, and its component, the National Communications System 

(NCS), is supposed to take the lead in providing communications support (ESF-2) during a disaster. FEMA has the lead 

responsibility for emergency management under ESF-5, which includes central responsibilities for domestic incident 

management as well as management and administrative support for the National Response Coordination Center 

(NRCC), Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC), and Joint Field Offi ce (JFO), according the NRP. Also under 

the NRP, FEMA serves as the primary and/or coordinating agency for Public Works and Engineering (ESF-3); Mass 

Care, Housing and Human Services (ESF-6); Urban Search and Rescue (ESF-9); Long-Term Community Recovery 

and Mitigation (ESF-14); and, in conjunction with DHS, External Aff airs (ESF-15). Th e Coast Guard, in addition to its 

responsibilities under the NRP for oil and hazardous material response (ESF-10), has the statutory authority to save lives 

and property imperiled by fl ood by performing any and all acts necessary to rescue and aid persons and protect and save 

property...at any time and any place at which the Coast Guard facilities and personnel are available and can be eff ectively 

utilized. 14 U.S.C. § 88(a)(1) and (b).
Chapter 13

208

21 “Homeland Security Act,” 6 U.S.C. 312(1); Th e White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8: Domestic 

Preparedness, Dec. 17, 2003. 

22 “Homeland Security Act,” 42 U.S.C. § 502(1); 6 U.S.C. § 312(1).

23 See e.g.: “Homeland Security Act,” 6 U.S.C. § 238; Th e White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8: 

Domestic Preparedness, Dec. 17, 2003; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Interim National Preparedness Goal, 

Mar. 31, 2005.

24 Th e White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8: Domestic Preparedness, Dec. 17, 2003, Section 5. 

25 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Preparedness Directorate, Offi ce of Grants and Training, Financial Management Guide, Jan. 2006, p. 11.

26 “Staff ord Act,” 42 U.S.C. §§ 5195-5197(g); “Homeland Security Act,” 6 U.S.C. § 112(a)(3) (vesting all functions of 

all offi cers, employees, and organizational units of the Department of Homeland Security in the Secretary of Homeland Security). In fulfi lling these responsibilities, the Director of FEMA may conduct or arrange training programs for 

emergency-preparedness offi cials, and may provide fi nancial contributions to the states for emergency preparedness. 

“Staff ord Act,” 42 U.S.C. § 5131.Moreover, under Section 201 of the Staff ord Act, the President is authorized to establish 

a program of disaster preparedness that includes: (1) preparation of disaster preparedness plans for mitigation, warning, 

emergency operations, rehabilitation, and recovery; (2) training and exercises; and (3) coordination of federal, state, and 

local preparedness programs. “Staff ord Act,” 42 U.S.C. § 5131(a).

27 “Staff ord Act,” 42 U.S.C. § 5195. Under the Act, the term “emergency preparedness” is defi ned to mean all those 

activities designed to minimize the eff ects of a hazard upon a civilian population. “Staff ord Act,” 42 U.S.C. § 5195. Th ese 

activities include “the establishment of appropriate organizations, operational plans, and supporting agreements, the 

recruitment and training of personnel, the conduct of research, the procurement and stockpiling of necessary materials, 

and supplies, the provision of suitable warning systems, the construction or preparation of shelters, shelter areas, and 

control centers, and, when appropriate, the non-military evacuation of the civilian population.” “Staff ord Act,” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 5195(a)(3)(A).

28 See e.g.: Gregory v. Ashcroft , 501 U.S. 452, 457-60 (1991).

29 See e.g.: La R.S. 29:721 et seq. (Louisiana Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act).

30 “Staff ord Act,” 42 U.S.C. § 5121(b).

31 “Staff ord Act,” 42 U.S.C. § 5770.

32 “Staff ord Act,” 42 U.S.C. § 5170(a)(1).

33 NRP, Catastrophic Incident Annex, p. CAT–1. 

34 NRP, p. 43; Catastrophic Incident Annex, p. CAT–1.

35 NRP, Catastrophic Incident Annex, p. CAT–1.

36 NRP, Catastrophic Incident Annex, p. CAT–1. See also: NRP, Catastrophic Incident Annex, p. CAT-3 (“Th e response 

capabilities and resources of the local jurisdiction ... may be insuffi cient and quickly overwhelmed. Local emergency 

personnel who normally respond to incidents may be among those aff ected and unable to perform their duties.”).

37 NRP, p. 44; Catastrophic Incident Annex, p. CAT–4.

38 NRP, Catastrophic Incident Annex, p. CAT–4.

39 NRP, Catastrophic Incident Annex, p. CAT–2.
584
Flooding, Louisiana

© 2005 The Times-Picayune Publishing Co., all rights 

reserved. Used with permission of the Times-Picayune.)
211

Chapter 14

Th e Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA)

Assessing FEMA’s status as Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast is fundamental to determining whether the federal government was prepared to respond to a 

catastrophic event.

Th e Committee’s investigation found systemic and leadership failures, displayed in both the 

preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina, at both the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) and FEMA. Th ese failures contributed to human suff ering and the loss of 

life. Th e causes of many of these failures were known long prior to Katrina and had been 

brought repeatedly to the attention of both DHS and FEMA leadership.Despite warnings, 

leadership failed to make vital changes. 

In August 1992, Hurricane Andrew struck Florida as a Category 5 hurricane.1

 Its $43.7 

billion bill of damages (in 2005 purchasing power) was the worst ever recorded in the U.S. 

until Hurricane Katrina.2

 A post-storm study by the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) revealed failures in the response to Andrew that would repeat themselves 

in the response to Katrina, such as the erroneous initial assumption that heavily populated 

areas were spared the brunt of the storm, which delayed response when those assumptions 

turned out to be wrong.3

 In evaluating the response, NAPA concluded that FEMA was “a 

patient in triage,” adding that the “President and Congress must decide whether to treat 

it or let it die ... FEMA has been ill-served by congressional and White House neglect, a 

fragmented statutory charter, irregular funding, and uneven quality of its political executives ... the agency remains an institution not yet built.”4

 Th e report found that FEMA had 

inadequate leadership.5

 It recommended a limit on the number of presidential appointees 

and fi lling leadership positions with the most qualifi ed FEMA employees.6

 Th e report also 

found that FEMA needed to do far more to develop state and local emergency-management 

capacity.7

 If the key changes it recommended were beyond reach, the report added, more 

dramatic action – such as “abolishing FEMA” – should be taken.8

Aft er President Clinton took offi ce, he appointed James Lee Witt as FEMA Director. Witt 

had been the Director of Arkansas’ Offi ce of Emergency Services. In March 1994, NAPA 

reviewed FEMA’s reforms in response to its post-Andrew recommendations. Th e new report opened, “Th e greatest plus for the emergency management function and for FEMA has 

been the appointment of James Lee Witt, an experienced emergency manager, as director 

of FEMA.”9

Following Andrew, FEMA appeared to improve. A study by George Mason University’s 

Mercatus Center found that, since its reorganization in 1993, “FEMA has signifi cantly improved its ability to deal with disasters,” highlighting several improvements to recovery and 

mitigation programs, as well as employee training.10 Th e report concluded that FEMA had 

shown “major improvement in both performance and cost-eff ectiveness” achieved through 

“a collection of management actions that transformed a bureaucratic, process-driven organization into a responsive, results-driven organization.”11 Another study pointed to agency 

leadership: “An example of a best practice in agency transformation is the revitalization of 

... FEMA under the leadership of Director James Lee Witt. FEMA serves as an instructive 

case study of how to transform a troubled organization.”12 Th e report commended the selection of senior offi cials with emergency-management experience and found that the experi-
Chapter 14

212

ence resulted in improvements.13 Th at being said, the report noted that “the agency is still 

not free of problems.”14

In 2001, Joe Allbaugh succeeded Witt as Director and took a diff erent approach to restructuring FEMA. Shortly aft er he became Director, Allbaugh testifi ed to House and Senate 

committees: 

Many are concerned that federal disaster assistance may have evolved into an 

oversized entitlement program. ... Expectations of when the federal government should be involved and the degree of involvement may have ballooned 

beyond what is an appropriate level. We must restore the predominant role of 

state and local response to most disasters. Federal assistance needs to supplement, not supplant, state and local eff orts.15 

Allbaugh acknowledged FEMA’s successful transformation, but off ered a new vision when 

he explained FEMA’s budget in Senate testimony: “Today, FEMA is being called a model of 

government success due to the hard work and dedication of the career employees, ... however, FEMA is not free from problems.”16

In March 2001, the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, a 

congressionally mandated independent commission set up to study our nation’s security 

challenges issued a report (the Hart-Rudman report) that recommended sweeping changes 

in our nation’s approach to securing the homeland. It found that “the United States is today 

very poorly organized to design and implement any comprehensive strategy to protect the 

homeland.”17 Among other things, the Hart-Rudman report recommended that Congress 

create a new homeland-security agency with responsibility for planning, coordinating, and 

integrating various U.S. government activities involved in homeland security.18

Th e report saw a prominent role for FEMA within the new homeland-security agency, and in 

fact proposed building the new agency “upon the capabilities of. ... FEMA.”19 Th e homelandsecurity agency “would be legislatively chartered to provide a focal point for all natural and 

manmade crisis and emergency planning scenarios. It would retain and strengthen FEMA’s 

10 existing regional offi ces as a core element of its organizational structure.”20 Th e report 

considered FEMA to be a “necessary core” of the proposed homeland security-agency.21

Th e Hart-Rudman report envisioned a homeland-security agency that would “employ 

FEMA’s principle of working eff ectively with state and local governments, as well as with 

other federal organizations, stressing interagency coordination.”22 It said that “much of [the 

agency’s] daily work will take place directly supporting state offi cials in its regional offi ces 

around the country.”23

Th e largest terrorist attack on U.S. soil prompted Congress to take the Hart-Rudman report 

to heart: In the wake of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Congress passed the 

Homeland Security Act, which created the DHS in an eff ort to better organize and coordinate our nation to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks, while maintaining the varied 

responsibilities of the 22 agencies merged into the new Department. Th is was the largest 

reorganization of government since the creation of the Department of Defense in 1947. Th e 

main objective behind the creation of DHS was to consolidate our assets relevant to homeland security so that our homeland-security eff orts could be more coordinated and effi cient. 

Consistent with the Hart-Rudman recommendations, the Homeland Security Act transferred FEMA, its responsibilities, assets, and liabilities to the Emergency Preparedness and 

Response Directorate of the new Department. FEMA retained its name and its director 

was named Under Secretary of Emergency Preparedness and Response. Th ough formed 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency

213

in the wake of 9/11, DHS’s primary mission included carrying out all functions of entities 

transferred to the Department, “including by acting as a focal point regarding natural and 

manmade crisis and emergency planning.”24

Among other things, the Act makes the Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the 

Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response, responsible for 

helping to ensure the eff ectiveness of emergency response providers to terrorist 

attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies, providing the federal government’s response to terrorist attacks and major disasters, ... aiding in the recovery from terrorist attacks and major disasters, ... building a comprehensive 

national incident management system with federal, state, and local government 

personnel, agencies, and authorities to respond to such attacks and disaster, 

... [and] developing comprehensive programs for developing interoperable 

communications technology, and helping to ensure that emergency response 

providers acquire such technology.25

FEMA, within DHS, was an important part of Congress’s vision to making our nation safe. 

Consistent with the Hart-Rudman report, DHS was to build upon FEMA’s strengths, and 

FEMA, the center of the Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate, could better 

coordinate our nation’s vast assets to be prepared to respond to any disaster, whether natural or manmade. One of the fundamental reasons for bringing together multiple agencies 

was to create synergy, molding individual capabilities into a stronger, more eff ective and 

more coordinated approach to preventing and responding to catastrophes, whether caused 

by terrorism or nature. 

Not long aft er DHS was formed, DHS leadership started taking critical functions from 

FEMA and moving them to other places within DHS. In January 2004, then-Secretary Tom 

Ridge removed numerous preparedness-grant programs from FEMA and placed them in another offi ce within DHS.26 Secretary Chertoff later removed from FEMA all of its preparedness activities – essentially formalizing Ridge’s January 2004 actions27 – and consolidated 

preparedness activities into a single directorate led by an Undersecretary for Preparedness.28

Prior to the January 2004 changes, preparedness was one of FEMA’s essential roles. 

FEMA Was Not Prepared to Respond to the Catastrophic Effects of 

Hurricane Katrina

Former FEMA Director Michael Brown has said that he knew the weekend before Katrina’s 

landfall that neither the federal government nor New Orleans was prepared for the “big one.”29 

DHS Secretary Chertoff conceded, 

Although FEMA pre-positioned signifi cant numbers of personnel, assets and 

resources before the hurricane made landfall, ... we now know that [FEMA’s] 

capabilities were overwhelmed by the magnitude of the storm. ... Th e people 

did what they could. It was a question of whether they had the tools and capabilities that they needed in order to do the job properly.30

Brown testifi ed that he repeatedly told White House offi cials that FEMA was not prepared 

to handle a catastrophe. He gave the same warnings to DHS offi cials.31

Th e investigation explored several reasons for FEMA’s lack of preparedness, including 

unqualifi ed political leadership, budget shortages, inadequate workforce, FEMA’s inclusion 

within DHS, and underdeveloped and inadequate response capabilities. 
214

Chapter 14

FEMA’s Senior Leadership

Brown and most of his front-offi ce staff had little or no emergency-management experience 

prior to joining FEMA.32 While it is unclear that emergency-management experience alone 

is the single qualifi er for senior leadership at FEMA, the leadership at the time of Katrina 

also lacked basic management experience and the leadership ability required to coordinate 

the entire federal government’s response to a catastrophic event. Brown advocated to DHS 

and the White House to address FEMA’s needs, but he was generally unsuccessful. He 

presided over the agency as morale plummeted. He refused to operate within the chain of 

command in which FEMA resided. He failed to work collaboratively with state offi cials in 

Louisiana during Hurricane Katrina, the most signifi cant disaster during his tenure. 

Brown became DHS Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response, and 

therefore FEMA Director, in early 2003.33 Brown fi rst joined FEMA as General Counsel34 in 

February 2001, and from there progressed quickly to front-offi ce duties. By the fall of 2001, 

then-Director Joseph Allbaugh named him Acting Deputy Director for FEMA.35 Prior to 

joining FEMA, Brown had little to no prior relevant emergency-management experience.36

Early in his career, he had some experience with municipal government, including municipal management,37 and had been a Commissioner for the International Arabian Horse 

Association for about 10 years. 

Patrick Rhode joined FEMA in 2003 as Chief of Staff for Brown.38 Prior to coming to 

FEMA, Rhode had no experience in emergency management.Aft er communications work 

in business and government, Rhode did advance work for George Bush’s 2000 presidential campaign.39 Aft er the election, Rhode did advance work for the White House and then 

briefl y worked as a White House liaison for the Department of Commerce.40 Rhode then 

accepted a position as the Associate Administrator of the Small Business Administration, 

and remained there until his move to FEMA.41 Brown named Rhode Acting DeputyDirector of FEMA in the summer of 2005,42 and Rhode was therefore in charge at headquarters as 

Brown traveled to the Gulf Coast just before Katrina struck. 

Rhode and Brown were not the only FEMA offi cials lacking emergency-management experience. With the exception of a FEMA employee who joined Brown’s front offi ce staff as 

Acting Director of Operations about a year aft er Brown became Under Secretary, none of 

the other individuals in the front offi ce during the entire time he served as Under Secretary 

had any prior emergency-management experience.43 Indeed, several FEMA leaders came 

from campaign rather than emergency-management backgrounds.44 Additionally, a review 

of the biographies by by Committee staff of FEMA regional directors since 2001 show that 

many of them had little or no emergency-management experience as well. 

Eric Tolbert, Director of Response at FEMA until February 2005, said: 

Th e impact of having politicals [appointees] in the high ranks of FEMA ... that’s 

what killed us, was that in the senior ranks of FEMA there was nobody that even 

knew FEMA’s history, much less understood the profession and the dynamics 

and the roles and responsibilities of the states and local governments.45

FEMA’s senior managers did include some experienced emergency-management personnel. For example, Ed Buikema, Acting Director of the Response Division at the time Katrina 

struck, had 26 years of experience with the state police in Michigan, 15 of them in their 

emergency-management division.46 Michael Lowder, Deputy Director for Response, spent 

over 31 years as a fi rst responder or emergency manager.47 Ken Burris, the Acting Director 

of Operations, was a fi refi ghter for 23 years before joining FEMA in 1999.48 Gary Moore, 

FEMA’s Director of Logistics, was a police offi cer for 26 years, fi nishing as second-rank-
The Federal Emergency Management Agency

215

ing member of the Maryland State Police before assuming federal emergency-management 

positions in the Department of Health and Human Services and DHS in 1992.49

In January 2005, MITRE, a non-profi t consulting fi rm, completed an assessment to identify 

problems preventing FEMA from dealing quickly with disasters. Th e assessment was based 

on confi dential interviews of FEMA’s 11 senior executives.50 Key themes that emerged from 

the interviews included the number of, and lack of qualifi cations of, political appointees, the 

number of temporary and acting staff , and frequent lack of operational experience as reasons why FEMA was underperforming.51 A few of the unattributed statements made during 

interviews included:

• “Th e void is in leadership. Th ere’s none. ... It’s reactions to politics and hot 

potatoes.”52

• “None of the senior leadership understand the dynamics of how response and 

recovery actually works. ... Th is administration doesn’t understand the value 

and importance of emergency management.”53

• “Patrick [Rhode] is purely political; he thinks White House.”54

In evaluating the failures in Hurricane Andrew, NAPA had concluded that “FEMA has had 

insuffi cient leadership ... necessary to create a high-performance, high-reliability institution.”55 History seemed to be repeating itself.

Budget Issues

Several witnesses testifi ed that FEMA’s capabilities were harmed by limited funding and resources. For instance, some expressed concern that FEMA’s ability to respond to Hurricane 

Katrina was harmed by fees levied by DHS to cover costs associated with “membership” 

Porter Avenue, Biloxi, MS

Sun Herald news photo, Biloxi/Gulfport, MS
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within the Department. Th ese witnesses complained that DHS “taxed” FEMA – essentially 

redirecting funds Congress appropriated to FEMA to DHS. Director Brown testifi ed that 

$77.9 million had been lost in this way between fi scal year 2003 and fi scal year 2005, a 14.8 

percent decrease in FEMA’s discretionary spending account since joining DHS.56

In interviews with Committee staff , DHS Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson and Chief 

Financial Offi cer Andrew Maner disputed the idea that a DHS tax harmed FEMA, though 

Maner conceded DHS had taken a total of $25 million from FEMA’s base.57 Jackson explained that the “taxes” are actually consolidated costs designed to procure services for all 

component agencies at a lower unit cost (e.g., maintenance contracts for copiers or overnight package delivery contracts).58 However, Ken Burris, FEMA’s Acting Chief Operating 

Offi cer, said that in order to pay DHS’s contributions or “taxes,” FEMA could no longer 

aff ord to refi ll personnel positions when they became vacant.59

Regardless of the reason for it, numerous FEMA witnesses testifi ed that because of a lack of 

resources, FEMA simply could not completely perform its mission. Brown and other FEMA 

employees testifi ed that FEMA sought additional funding on several occasions, but that 

generally, DHS or the Offi ce of Management and Budget (OMB) denied his requests. 

One area for which FEMA sought additional funding was catastrophic planning. In fi scal 

year 2004 FEMA sought $100 million for catastrophic planning, and in fi scal year 2005, 

sought $20 million to develop a catastrophic housing plan and $80 million to improve 

FEMA’s national response teams. DHS, however, denied these requests.60 Th en-FEMA 

Director of Response Eric Tolbert believed that planning for New Orleans was important 

enough to set aside funding from other parts of the response budget, though the planning 

was delayed in part by funding shortages.61 FEMA has not done enough planning to be prepared for a catastrophic disaster.

FEMA’s budget shortages manifested themselves in several ways, thus hindering FEMA’s 

ability to be adequately prepared for and respond to a catastrophe. Some of those ways will 

be further discussed below. 

Personnel Shortages

FEMA is a small agency with approximately 2,500 permanent full-time employees. Over the 

last few years, FEMA has suff ered numerous personnel problems, hindering its ability to 

prepare for and respond to a catastrophic event. While it had previously enjoyed a dedicated, Senior Executive Service level of experienced emergency managers, a “brain drain” 

sapped this core expertise.62

Over the last few years, FEMA has operated with a 15 to 20 percent vacancy rate; many 

positions cannot be fi lled because of budget shortages.63 FEMA tried to get additional funding from DHS, but the requests were generally denied. Th e personnel shortages negatively impacted FEMA’s ability to achieve its mission.64 For example, due to staffi ng shortages, William 

Lokey, the Chief of Operations in the Response Division, said that FEMA had not completed 

a fi nal Concept of Operations for its National Emergency Response Teams (ERT-N); the 

Incident Management Handbook, which would explain procedures for managing disasters to 

those working in disasters; or a fi nal Concept of Operations for the 2005 hurricane season.65

Because of personnel needs, FEMA relies heavily on two types of temporary employees 

hired under the Staff ord Act: Disaster Temporary Employees (DTEs), whose one-year 

appointments may be extended an unlimited number of times; and a Cadre of On-Call Response and Recovery Employees (CORE employees), whose four-year appointments may be 
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extended an unlimited number of times, in two-year increments. DTEs are not eligible for 

certain employer-paid benefi ts.66

Initially, FEMA intended that these temporary appointments would provide it with the 

fl exibility needed for readiness during disaster operations.67 However, a July 2004 report 

by the U.S. Offi ce of Personnel Management (OPM) found that under FEMA’s staffi ng 

practices at the time of the report – which still refl ected the agency’s needs in 1996 – some 

DTE and CORE employees appeared to have worked for FEMA continuously for 10 years 

or longer with few, if any, breaks in service.68 Th e report found that FEMA’s extensive use 

of these two categories of temporary employees indicates that such employees are not being 

used for temporary purposes, but rather to fi ll critical needs and provide a stable, baseline 

workforce.69 Th e report criticized FEMA for this practice because, although DTE and CORE 

employees are working side by side with permanent employees, doing the same work, the 

appointments are starkly diff erent, including the provision of benefi ts.70 OPM found that 

these practices had indirectly created a tier-based workforce and had hurt morale.71 OPM 

made several recommendations to remedy these problems.72 To date, FEMA has not implemented OPM’s recommendations.73 

Staffi ng shortages impeded FEMA’s ability to prepare for a catastrophe. Additionally, as will 

be described in several other chapters, FEMA’s inadequate numbers of trained staff also had 

a negative impact on the response to Katrina. 

FEMA’s Response Capabilities

FEMA has responsibilities in both disaster response and recovery. Response includes actions taken during or aft er an emergency. Recovery involves short-term activities to return 

life-support systems aft er an emergency – such as rebuilding and assisting victims in dealing 

with damage caused by a disaster. 

Several FEMA Federal Coordinating Offi cers (FCOs) said that FEMA is capable of handling 

small and medium-size disasters, but is not organized for large response operations. As 

FCO Scott Wells said, “FEMA is not trained, FEMA is not equipped, FEMA is not organized to do very large response operations. ... If you want big capability, you got to make a 

big investment. And there is no investment in response operations for a catastrophic disaster.”74 FCO Phil Parr said that FEMA focuses on recovery rather than response.75

FEMA offi cials identifi ed problems with FEMA’s performance during the 2004 hurricane 

season and went to DHS seeking funding to correct the problems. Because of these recognized problems, in January 2005 FEMA began initiatives in seven areas: (1) logistics; (2) 

enhancement of the disaster-workforce surge system; (3) enhancement of National Disaster 

Medical System; (4) enhanced catastrophic-disaster planning and exercises; (5) National 

Emergency Operations Center and Regional Operations Center upgrades; (6) enhanced 

individual-assistance and public-assistance programs to expedite services delivery; and 

(7) disaster-communication upgrades.76 Th e approval process required FEMA to submit 

“business cases” to OMB to obtain funding to undertake the initiative. According to emails, 

revised business cases for four of the initiatives were due on August 26, 2005, but were 

extended a few days because of Hurricane Katrina’s landfall.77

Inadequate Surge Workforce

FEMA must have the ability to quickly expand its staff in order to perform the many tasks 

required for an eff ective disaster response. To fi ll these vital jobs, the agency relies on a cadre of reservists called Disaster Assistance Employees (DAEs). Th e reliance on this temporary 

workforce also severely undermines response capabilities, as these frequently inexperienced 

and untrained individuals usually make up the bulk of FEMA’s workforce in a disaster.
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Since 1992, 12 studies have found problems with the DAE system.78 An assessment in early 

2004 found many problems, including a “lack of experienced and well-trained Reservists to 

answer the immediate call” during disasters.”79 It concluded that a need exists to redesign 

the disaster workforce and hire and recruit more people as the “increasing threat of terrorism and other man-made crises along with potential requirements of multiple deployments 

to major disasters necessitates a renewed focus on readiness capabilities.”80 DAEs undergo 

the majority of their training in the fi eld during disaster response.81 Because of funding 

shortages, none of the recommendations in the 2004 study has been implemented.82 A May 

15, 2005, FEMA report also confi rmed the problems with the DAE workforce.83

Additionally, according to Wells, FEMA designates only 8 percent of the reservist cadre 

for response; the rest is devoted to recovery.84 Wells added that most of the reservists were 

simply not cut out for response operations.85 Because many are retirees, Wells said, most 

“don’t belong in response operations where they have to work 18 to 24 hours a day and 

sleep ... on concrete.”86 FEMA’s reliance on this cadre once again during Katrina undermined its response. 

When the storm struck, there were about 4,000 DAEs in FEMA’s cadre.87 As usual, only 40 

to 50 percent were available.88 Prior to Katrina, FEMA had put a hiring freeze on reservists 

and because of budget limits had capped the number of DAEs that could be on the rolls.89

Days aft er Katrina, the hiring freeze was lift ed, and FEMA has since added over 4,000 

DAEs.90 Th is isn’t the fi rst time FEMA has been caught in a big disaster without an adequate 

workforce. Because of the number of individuals needed to respond to 2004 hurricane 

season, when four hurricanes hit Florida, FEMA had to greatly ramp up its workforce and 

hired a lot of new people.91 At the end of the season, FEMA released them.92

Th e DAEs let go aft er the 2004 hurricane season could have been valuable in the Katrina 

response. Wells testifi ed there were not enough people in the reservist cadre to assist 

FEMA in responding to Hurricane Katrina, and those that were present did not have the 

specifi c training necessary for the type of response required on the Gulf Coast.93 Michael 

Hall, Acting Director of Human Resources, agreed with Wells’ assessment. Hall calls the 

DAE system “broken.”94

Having enough qualifi ed people to work in a disaster is a necessity for an eff ective response. 

FEMA’s current surge-workforce system is plagued with problems that impeded the response. 

Emergency Response Teams

FEMA uses emergency-response teams to respond to events. National Emergency Response 

Teams (ERT–Ns) are designed for high-impact events. Th e readiness and strength of these 

teams have declined dramatically since 9/11; at the time of Katrina they were inadequately 

trained, exercised, and equipped. Before 9/11, ERT-Ns had training and leadership meetings at least once a year;95 aft er the attacks, they had three or four major training exercises.96

But starting in 2004, there was no more money forthcoming for the teams and, according 

to a FEMA offi cial in charge of one of the ERT–Ns, the teams could not meet for exercises.97

Moreover, although the NRP calls for having three ERT-Ns and a fourth National Capitol 

Region Team to be able to respond to incidents, DHS currently has only two ERT–Ns.98

Th e National Capitol Region Team does not exist. 

Post-9/11, the ERT–N teams had about 125 to 175 members; now each has about 25.99 Th e 

team deployed to New Orleans was newly formed, had not trained or exercised together as 

a team, and lacked equipment.100 Because of these inadequacies, William Carwile, a FEMA 

FCO and former ERT–N leader, referred to the teams as “theoretical.”101 FEMA’s draft concept of operations states that all ERT–N team members will be fully trained by June 1, 2006. 

Lokey described this goal as nothing more than “wishful thinking.”102
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A June 30, 2004, memo from FEMA’s cadre of FCOs to Brown listed a series of the agency’s 

problems, including inadequate funding for the ERT-Ns. Th e memo stated that FEMA’s 

ERT–Ns were “unprepared” because they had “zero funding for training, exercises, or team 

equipment.”103 It also stated that there was a lack of training and policy guidance and standards for the operations section of the emergency response team.104 It said that resources 

were needed “in order to rebuild the teams to levels appropriate for them to manage the 

next big one.”105 Brown did not respond, and no changes were made.106 Brown said he could 

not obtain funding for the needed changes.107 It was in this sub-par state that an ERT-N 

responded to Katrina. 

According to the NRP, FEMA is also supposed to be able to deploy rapid-response Federal 

Incident Response Support Teams (FIRST) to establish an immediate federal presence at 

the scene of an Incident of National Signifi cance.108 But no FIRST teams existed at landfall.109 Indeed, FEMA did not advertise to hire team members until the summer of 2005.110

Witnesses testifi ed that FIRST teams could have provided helpful assistance had they been 

deployable for Katrina.111

FEMA’s other emergency-response teams are also unprepared. According to Wells, emergency-response teams generally have not planned and worked together.112

National Disaster Medical System

Th e National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) contains a number of specialized emergency medical and response teams, called Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs), 

who are the federal government’s fi rst responders in a medical emergency. Prior to Katrina, 

NDMS had signifi cant problems. For example, when Katrina made landfall, the DMATs 

were not fully prepared. Of the 52 teams, FEMA considered only 27 fully operational at 

the time of Katrina and lacked criteria to determine levels of readiness for veterinary and 

mortuary teams.113

FEMA had no centrally managed and integrated NDMS training/exercise program for the 

teams.114 NDMS lacked adequate management support at both the headquarters and fi eld 

levels.115 Funding issues limited FEMA’s ability to bring the teams to full strength and to 

expand the number of teams despite geographic disparities in their availability; in fact, 

NDMS had no long-range strategic plan to develop new teams.116 None of the teams had a 

fully supplied equipment cache when they deployed to Katrina.117 One longstanding team 

member said that he believed that morale among NDMS teams had never been lower than 

it was at the time they mobilized for Katrina.118 Recognizing many of these problems with 

NDMS, FEMA sought to make improvements in January 2005 by naming NDMS as one of 

its Disaster Support Initiatives.

Urban Search and Rescue Team

Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) teams are another type of team FEMA has available for 

response. USAR teams provide life-saving assistance. Before Katrina, FEMA’s USAR teams 

lacked the plans, funds, personnel, and equipment to respond to a catastrophe. According 

to Eric Tolbert, former FEMA Director of Response, USAR funding was “grossly inadequate and the teams are held together on a shoestring budget.”119 Until 9/11, the USAR program operated disaster-to-disaster, using hand-me-down equipment and oft en purchasing 

equipment and supplies at the time of the disaster.120 Until Congress appropriated funds in 

2004, USAR had no vehicles and had to rent trucks in order to mobilize for emergencies.121

Th e USAR teams also have no water-rescue capabilities, even though urban areas can fl ood. 

Th is translated to a serious lack of USAR capabilities in Hurricane Katrina. 
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Lack of Operational Doctrine

FEMA has not developed operational doctrine for responding to disasters in over four 

years. According to Carwile: 

Th ere is no clear understanding of the responsibilities of each level (Washington, the Regions, deployed Emergency Response Teams) and how they are 

to interact. Th is lack of operational doctrine results in unacceptable levels of 

overlap, double, and triple ordering of resources, and interminably long video 

teleconferences and conference calls. While some of these are necessary, they 

can disrupt fi eld operations.122

Th e MITRE study discussed above also found that standard operating procedures were nonexistent, outdated, or inconsistent, and recommended that FEMA develop a clear concept 

of operations and train employees on the procedures.123 Despite the fact that one interviewee said, “Our biggest impediment is lack of command and control, not fully defi ning 

our standard operating procedures so everyone understands and adheres to them,” FEMA 

had not completed a concept of operations by the time Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf 

Coast.124 MITRE also recommended that FEMA establish a full-time planning function.125

Poor Contracting and Procurement Practices 

Long before Katrina even began to develop into a storm, FEMA’s procurement capability 

was stressed beyond its limts. Th ough FEMA’s procurement offi ce was “authorized” to have 

55 full-time employees, it had not been provided funding for that number for several years.126

When Katrina hit, the staff was only 36.127 For the six years before Katrina, FEMA’s Chief 

Ruins of the 9th Ward, 

New Orleans

GAO photo
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Procurement Offi cer, Patricia English, had split her time between two FEMA assignments, 

working as either Acting Chief Financial Offi cer or Deputy Chief Financial Offi cer, in addition to her procurement duties.128 Th is level of staffi ng was inadequate – and known to be so. 

In early 2005, DHS conducted a study of the agency’s procurement capabilities, and concluded that the condition of FEMA’s procurement offi ce was “red” – understaff ed – and that 

a staff of somewhere between 95 and 125 was necessary for the workload in a normal year.129

Th e results of this understaffi ng were predictable. English testifi ed that “Th ere’s not enough 

staffi ng to do the day-to-day activities required by the agency just through our normal appropriation. When disasters hit, it just expands the problem.”130 Major contracts – such as 

for delivering assistance directly to disaster victims – were slow to be fi nalized and were not 

complete as Katrina approached the Gulf Coast.131 In the face of Katrina, FEMA cut short 

the planned procurement process and issued non-competitive contracts to the four primary 

companies it had been interviewing.132 Tolbert testifi ed, “Th at’s the reason all these contracts 

are done as emergency contracts that are never complete because there’s no capability in 

FEMA to do procurement. It is overwhelmed day to day, much less going into a disaster, and 

that’s just the facts. ... We could never get procurement done.”133 His assessment of FEMA’s 

procurement capacity was stark: “Th e procurement capability in FEMA also is dead.”134

English is emphatic that staffi ng has to be improved: “I cannot go through another hurricane season with the limited staff that I have.”135 FEMA’s procurement offi ce is now beginning to look for more staff , but is fi nding it diffi cult to fi nd qualifi ed individuals.136

FEMA in the Department of Homeland Security 

Removing Functions from FEMA

Aft er Congress merged FEMA into DHS, DHS leadership took actions that fundamentally 

changed FEMA’s functions. 

Kathleen Tierney, Director of the Natural Hazards Center at the University of Colorado, 

testifi ed that post 9/11, DHS made some crucial, if understandable, mistakes in its eff orts to 

meet the new threat of terrorism. Th ese include rejecting the principle of “integrated emergency management,” while simultaneously failing to implement an approach commonly 

referred to as “all-hazards” preparedness.137

Th e cycle of emergency management – called “integrated emergency management” – involves four basic phases:

1. Mitigation: activities taken to eliminate or reduce risks to life and property 

from natural and man-made hazards;

2. Preparation or preparedness: activities taken in advance of an emergency 

that develop capabilities for an eff ective response in the event of an emergency;

3. Response: actions taken during or aft er an emergency; and

4. Recovery: a short-term activity to return vital life-support systems aft er an 

emergency.

Th is cycle of integrated emergency management holds that preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation require synergy and must be managed within the same basic structure. 

Traditionally, FEMA has had the responsibility for performing each of these functions – responsibilities that were recognized in the Homeland Security Act.138 However, in January 
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2004, then-Secretary Ridge removed numerous preparedness-grant programs from FEMA 

and placed them in another offi ce within DHS, over Brown’s objections. 139 In July 2005, 

Secretary Chertoff announced that he was stripping from FEMA all preparedness activities – essentially formalizing former Secretary Ridge’s January 2004 action, which removed 

grant programs from FEMA as well as removing any of the other remaining preparedness 

responsibilities from FEMA.140 Th ese changes, part of Secretary Chertoff ’s “Second Stage 

Review,” took eff ect in October 2005.

By removing preparedness functions from FEMA, DHS leadership departed from the concept of integrated emergency management described above. In support of its action, DHS 

argued that the establishment of a Preparedness Directorate was meant to “synthesize the 

functions of state and local liaisons, relationships, grants, training and the like. We expect to 

gain greater synergies through this integration.”141

Several witnesses before the Committee opined that splitting preparedness from response 

was a serious mistake. Bruce Baughman, President of the National Emergency Management 

Association and Director of the Alabama State Emergency Management Agency, testifi ed 

that the ability to make grants provided the mechanism for FEMA to be involved in the development of plans and the exercising of those plans. Otherwise, he added, “Th e only time 

we see the FEMA staff is when we have a disaster. Th ey are not involved.”142 Tolbert agreed 

that preparedness should not be split from response.143

DHS gave the responsibility for FEMA’s preparedness-grant programs to the Offi ce of Domestic Preparedness (ODP) within the Offi ce of State and Local Government Coordination 

and Preparedness, a law-enforcement, terrorism prevention-focused organization formerly 

part of DOJ.144 Ed Buikema, the Acting Director of Response, said FEMA had little visibility 

into the state preparedness activities coordinated by ODP, and that there should have been 

much better communication and coordination between ODP and FEMA.145 Th e Offi ce of 

State and Local Government Coordination also assumed the primary liaison role with the 

states, diminishing the preparedness role of FEMA regions even further.146 Professors Herman Leonard and Arnold Howitt of Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, 

believe that this separation 

may hamper necessary alignment between the way in which preparedness has 

been designed and the way in which response needs to operate. At a minimum, it 

makes maintaining alignment diffi cult; at worst, it will result in serious mismatch 

between what has been prepared and the actions the responders want to take.147

Leonard testifi ed that the most critical alignment for high performance is that between “the 

way you prepared to respond and your ability to execute that,” and said it is “very hard to 

understand” why you would separate them.148

A consequence of this separation was that FEMA’s role in preparing for disasters was eliminated. Th e separation also meant that FEMA ceased providing fi nancial assistance to states for 

preparedness activities. Th us, FEMA was no longer able to infl uence activities tied to funding 

the states, including training, planning and exercising, or providing evaluation of such activities. Th is limitation of FEMA’s role has hindered FEMA’s relationship with the states. DHS’s 

decision to separate preparedness from response was a mistake that hampered the alignment 

between the way preparedness is designed and the way response should operate. 

FEMA’s Placement in DHS 

Th e Committee found no evidence that the placement of FEMA into DHS itself was a problem. Indeed, the Committee found that the placement of FEMA’s functions within DHS can 

enhance our nation’s emergency-management system. 
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As explained more thoroughly above, DHS was created to bring together federal assets 

relevant to defending our homeland. Preparing for and responding to disasters – either 

manmade or natural – is an important part of this function. Some of the assets brought 

into DHS included elements of Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement, Coast Guard, and substantial communications assets.149 Th ere is a synergy 

created by bringing together these assets within the Department that can be brought to 

bear under DHS leadership in the event of a disaster. Th e Committee agrees that if FEMA 

were moved out of the Department, we would lose that synergy.150 Taking FEMA back out 

of DHS would move it further away from the substantial assets within DHS that can be 

brought to bear in responding to catastrophes.

Th e additional resources within DHS that can be applied to emergency management are a 

major advantage. What was formerly the responsibility of a small, 2,500-person independent agency is now the responsibility of a large department. DHS has more internal resources than FEMA had when it was an independent agency. With these additional resources, 

more responsibilities in a response to an emergency are housed under one department. For 

example, when FEMA was an individual agency, under the Federal Response Plan, the plan 

that existed before the NRP became eff ective in 2005, FEMA was the lead for only two of the 

12 Emergency Support Functions (ESFs), the incident-specifi c response processes.151 Under 

the NRP, DHS is either the coordinator or has lead responsibility for nine of the 15 ESFs.152

DHS also houses the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC), which is designed to 

continually monitor potential emergencies and incidents.153 Additionally, DHS’s employees 

off er a pool of potential employees for deployment to disasters. Indeed, DHS employees 

were called to support some of FEMA’s functions during Katrina. 

Taking FEMA out of DHS would also “stovepipe” preparedness activities. It makes no 

sense to have one agency doing preparedness for terrorist attacks and another agency doing preparedness for natural disasters, as many of the required steps are the same.154 Th is 

bifurcation would lead to ineffi ciencies and duplication of eff ort. Bifurcated, competing preparedness systems could also confuse state and local offi cials, who would have to hook into 

one system to prepare natural disasters and another system to prepare for terrorists. Frank 

Cilluff o, Associate Vice President for Homeland Security and Director of the Homeland 

Security Policy Institute at George Washington University, agreed and testifi ed that moving 

FEMA out of DHS would simply obscure the real issues: 

In my opinion, to re-create FEMA as an independent agency further obfuscates 

and bifurcates an already too complex systems-to-systems approach. ... To have 

state and local government and fi rst responders plug into one system to respond 

to bad weather and another system to respond to bad people is unrealistic. 

Th ere is no reason to have competing systems in an environment of limited 

resources. Th e problem is not really one of organizational design. Th e requisite 

policy in law exists. Th e challenge is one of management and leadership.155

While pulling FEMA out of DHS might be a politically expedient quick fi x – a reshuffl ing 

of the boxes to suggest the problem is being fi xed – this would simply not get to the core of 

problems of the federal government response in Katrina. Although FEMA certainly is an 

agency that has problems, DHS Inspector General Richard Skinner correctly observed that 

“transferring FEMA out of the department, in my opinion, would be a major mistake. We 

[would be] simply transferring the problem.”156

Others agreed that FEMA’s problem was not a rsult of its placement in DHS. For example, 

David Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, testifi ed: 
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I would respectfully suggest that the quality of FEMA’s leadership – and that 

is more than one person, I might add – as well as the adequacy of FEMA’s resources will probably have more to do with their ultimate success than whether 

or not they are in the Department of Homeland Security. Let us keep in mind 

that the Coast Guard is part of the Department of Homeland Security. And so 

merely because one is or is not in the Department of Homeland Security is not, 

in and of itself, I would respectfully suggest, dispositive.157

Professors Leonard and Howitt also testifi ed that preparedness and response need not be 

separated from DHS. In written testimony to the Committee, they state:

Th e task of preparation against disasters seems a natural fi t with the overall 

mission of DHS. If the Department is to be held accountable for enhancing 

security for Americans and the American way of life, and takes seriously the 

broad array of possible threats, then preparing against natural disasters (and 

operating the response mechanisms in the event of a crisis) should fi t as well as 

preparation against and response to other threats.158

Professors Leonard and Howitt contend that preparing for and responding to natural disasters like Katrina can be handled either well or poorly either inside or outside of DHS. Th ey 

write: “Provide leadership that understands and assesses the full range of threats to security 

and that knows how to help its constituent organizations develop excellence, and there is no 

reason why preparation for and response to disasters needs to be in its own enclave (or in a 

diff erent agency).”159

In short, the problems in DHS’s response to Katrina must be fi xed, not transferred. Th e 

benefi ts of the placement of FEMA’s functions in DHS must be realized, not undermined. 

Our nation’s emergency-management system will benefi t the most if FEMA’s functions 

remain within DHS.

Discussions Regarding FEMA’s Capabilities

Brown testifi ed that within the Administration, he repeatedly made his views known that 

FEMA had problems. Brown stated that he had alerted DHS offi cials that FEMA did not 

have the capability to respond to a catastrophe,160 telling DHS offi cials that “FEMA’s on the 

verge of failures; we’re stretching personnel.”161 Brown said he discussed his concerns about 

FEMA’s capabilities with various DHS offi cials: Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson, thenSecretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge, then Deputy Secretary Admiral James Loy, 

Under Secretary for Management Janet Hale, and Chief Financial Offi cer Andy Maner. 162

Brown testifi ed that at the end of a meeting on another subject, he informed President Bush 

that FEMA did not have the ability to respond to a catastrophe like the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 2004 that hit Asia.163 Th e conversation occurred at a “100,000-foot level,” 

telling the President that we are not prepared, that we are not doing the kind of planning 

and exercises that we need to do for housing, response, and medical care in this country 

if we have that kind of natural disaster. In a subsequent media interview, Brown said the 

President responded “Well, go get ready.”164

Brown also testifi ed he repeatedly told Andy Card, White House Chief of Staff , Joe Hagin, 

Deputy Chief of Staff , and Josh Bolten, then Deputy Chief of Staff , that FEMA did not have 

the capabilities to respond adequately to a catastrophe, and sought additional resources.165

Brown said that he told these offi cials several times that “DHS was not really following the 

Homeland Security Act and giving [FEMA] the muscle that it was supposed to have.”166 It is 
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225

diffi cult to fully assess Brown’s testimony: despite requests from the Committee, the White 

House has not provided information regarding Brown’s allegations.

Conclusion

Prior to Katrina’s landfall, FEMA suff ered from a number of problems: unqualifi ed senior 

political leadership, budget shortages, personnel shortages, and inadequate response capabilities. FEMA simply was not prepared. Although some have argued that FEMA’s merger 

into the DHS weakened FEMA, there is no evidence that the merger itself was indeed the 

problem. Instead, decisions made by DHS leadership weakened FEMA and impeded its 

ability to respond to disasters. 

Th ese weaknesses notwithstanding, Brown testifi ed on September 24, 2003, before a Senate 

Environmental and Public Works subcommittee, that FEMA was taking steps to reduce 

disaster- response times so that “disaster teams will be able to respond anywhere in the 

country within 12 hours and disaster logistics packages, commodities, and equipment can 

be delivered anywhere within 24 hours.”167 By any measure, FEMA’s response capabilities 

fell short of this goal when Hurricane Katrina made landfall. 

1 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Climactic Data Center, “Hurricane Katrina, A Climatological Perspective,” Oct. 2005, p. 21. http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/reports/tech-report-200501z.pdf. Accessed Mar. 20, 

2006.

2 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Climactic Data Center, “Hurricane Katrina, A Climatological Perspective,” Oct. 2005, p. 21. http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/reports/tech-report-200501z.pdf. Accessed Mar. 20, 

2006.

3 Coping with Catastrophe: Building an Emergency Management System to Meet People’s Needs in Natural and Manmade 

Disasters, prepared by National Academy of Public Administration for U.S. Congress and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Feb. 1993, pp. vii, 1 [hereinaft er Coping with Catastrophe].

4 Coping with Catastrophe, p. ix. 

5 Coping with Catastrophe, pp. 50-51.

6 Coping with Catastrophe, pp. 64-66.

7 Coping with Catastrophe, p. 88.

8 Coping with Catastrophe, p. x.

9 Review of Actions Taken To Strengthen the Nation’s Emergency Management System, prepared by National Academy of 

Public Administration for U.S. Congress and FEMA, Mar. 1994, p. 3. 

10 Jerry Ellig, “Learning From the Leaders: Results-Based Management at the Federal Management Agency,” 

Mar. 29, 2000, pp. 2, 5. 

11 Jerry Ellig, “Learning From the Leaders: Results-Based Management at the Federal Management Agency,” 

Mar. 29, 2000, p. 33.

12 R. Steven Daniels and Carolyn L. Clark-Daniels, “Transforming Government: Th e Renewal and Revitalization of 

the Federal Emergency Management Agency,” Apr. 2000, p. 6 [hereinaft er Daniels and Clark-Daniels, “Transforming 

Government”].

13 Daniels and Clark-Daniels, “Transforming Government,” p. 7.

14 Daniels and Clark-Daniels, “Transforming Government,” p. 18.

15 Written Statement of Joe M. Allbaugh, then Director, FEMA, for the U.S. House, Committee on Appropriations, 

Subcommittee on Veterans Aff airs, Housing and Urban Development and Independent Agencies, hearing on VA and 

HUD Appropriations, May 17, 2001. 

16 Written Statement of Allbaugh, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Veterans Aff airs, Housing 

and Urban Development and Independent Agencies hearing, May 17, 2001. 

17 United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, “Road Map for National Security, Imperative for 

Change,” Mar. 15, 2001, p. 10 [hereinaft er “Road Map for National Security”].
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18 “Road Map for National Security,” pp. 14-15.

19 “Road Map for National Security,” p. 14.

20 “Road Map for National Security,” p. 14.

21 “Road Map for National Security,” p. 14.

22 “Road Map for National Security,” p. 17.

23 “Road Map for National Security,” p. 17.

24 “Th e Homeland Security Act of 2002.” (P.L. 107-296) 6 U.S.C. § 101.

25 “Th e Homeland Security Act of 2002.” (P.L. 107-296) 6 U.S.C. § 502.

26 Ridge transferred the following programs in this action: Assistance to Firefi ghters program, Emergency Management 

Performance Grant program, fi rst responder counter-terrorism training assistance, state and local all-hazards emergency 

operations planning, Citizens Corps, interoperable communications equipment, Community Emergency Response 

Teams, and Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS). 

27 Besides formalizing what had already been transferred, Chertoff transferred the U.S. Fire Administration, hazardous 

material training, the chemical stockpile, the radiological emergency preparedness programs, and Bioshield. 

28 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Secretary Michael Chertoff , U.S. Department of Homeland Security Second 

Stage Review Remarks,” July 13, 2005, p. 7.

29 Committee staff interview of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, conducted on Feb. 23, 2006, transcript p. 99.

30 Written Statement of Sec. Michael Chertoff , U.S. Department of Homeland Security, for the U.S. House, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: 

Th e Role of the Department of Homeland Security, Oct. 19, 2005, p. 3. See also: Testimony of Sec. Michael Chertoff , U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security, before the U.S. House, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation 

for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Role of the Department of Homeland Security, 

Oct. 19, 2005.

31 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, pp. 137-138, 141, 143, 145. 

32 Remarkably, two FEMA witnesses, Patrick Rhode and Brooks Altshuler, pointed to experience on a presidential advance team as relevant training to manage a disaster. Committee staff interview of Patrick Rhode, former Acting Deputy 

Director, FEMA, conducted on Dec. 22, 2005, transcript p. 74; Committee staff interview of Brooks Altshuler, former 

Acting Deputy Chief of Staff and Policy Director, FEMA, conducted on Dec. 15, 2005, transcript pp. 27-30.

33 Committee staff interview of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 23, 2006, transcript p. 7. 

Since the fall of 2001, Brown had been serving as the Acting Deputy Director of FEMA. In Aug. 2002, President Bush 

appointed him to the Transition Planning Offi ce for the newly established DHS, to serve as the transition leader for the 

Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP&R) Division. Brown resigned from FEMA on Sept. 12, 2005.

34 Brown interview, Jan. 23, 2006, p. 7. Brown received his JD from Oklahoma City University School of Law. See also: 

Th e White House, “President Bush Announced his Intention to Nominate,” press release, Jan. 10, 2003. http://www.

whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030110-6.html. Accessed on Oct. 15, 2005.

35 Brown interview, Jan. 23, 2006, p. 7.

36 On the biography provided to the Committee during his confi rmation to be Deputy Director of FEMA, Brown listed 

that from 1975 to 1978 he was “Assistant City Manager, Police, Fire & Emergency Services for the City of Edmond, 

Oklahoma.” See: U.S. Senate, Committee on Governmental Aff airs, Hearing to Consider the Nomination of Michael D. 

Brown to be Deputy Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, June 19, 2002. Brown’s attorney described 

this as a “distinction without a diff erence” and points to an affi davit from the former City attorney for the City of 

Edmond stating that Brown’s job as Assistant to the City Manager included responsibility for several emergency management related activities. Th e White House never sent Brown’s nomination to be Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response to the Senate. Instead, the White House simply elevated Brown from the Deputy Director to the 

Under Secretary position. Th e White House asserted it had the authority to do so under Section 1511 of the Homeland 

Security Act of 2002. Th e Committee disputes the appropriateness of this action.

37 Brown has a degree in public administration and political science from Central State University, now called University of Central Oklahoma. While still in college, in 1977 Brown began an internship with the planning department of the 

City of Edmond, a suburb of Oklahoma City. Upon completion of his internship, Brown became a full-time employee of 

the City of Edmond, serving as an assistant to the city manager. Late in his tenure with the City of Edmond, Brown assisted in the development of an emergency operations center for the city. Brown left the City of Edmond to join the Senate Finance Committee for the Oklahoma Legislature. Brown entered the private practice of law in which he represented 

municipalities in various matters. Brown interview, Jan. 23, 2006, pp. 5-6. 

38 Rhode interview, Dec. 22, 2005, p. 7. Rhode left FEMA in Jan. 2006.

39 Rhode interview, Dec. 22, 2005, pp. 6-7.

40 Rhode interview, Dec. 22, 2005, pp. 6-7.

41 Rhode interview, Dec. 22, 2005, pp. 6-7.

42 Rhode interview, Dec. 22, 2005, pp. 10-11.
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43 Brown interview, Jan. 23, 2006, pp. 119-220.

44 For example, Brooks Altshuler, former FEMA Policy Director and former Acting Deputy Chief of Staff , did not have 

any emergency-management experience prior to working at FEMA but had worked on the Bush-Cheney 2000 presidential campaign. Source: Altshuler interview, Dec. 15, 2005, pp. 6-7. Scott Morris, Director, Florida Long Term Recovery 

Offi ce and Former Chief of Staff , had no known emergency-management experience prior to working at FEMA, but 

had worked for Maverick Media as a media strategist for the Bush-Cheney 2000 presidential campaign. Source: FEMA, 

“About FEMA, Scott R. Morris, Deputy Chief of Staff .” http://www.fema.gov/txt/pao/impact/2004_july_Aug.txt (website 

no longer available).

45 Committee staff interview of Eric Tolbert, former Director of Response, FEMA, conducted on Dec. 1, 2005, transcript 

p. 33.

46 Committee staff interview of Edward Buikema, Acting Director of Response Division and Regional Director, Region V, 

FEMA, conducted on Nov. 21, 2005, transcript pp. 4-7.

47 Committee staff interview of Michael Lowder, Deputy Director of Response, FEMA, conducted on Nov. 10, 2005, 

transcript pp. 4-5. 

48 Committee staff interview of Ken Burris, former Acting Director of Operations, FEMA, conducted on Dec. 29, 2005, 

transcript pp. 5-7.

49 Committee staff interview of Gary Moore, Director, Logistics Branch, FEMA, conducted on Dec. 9, 2005, transcript 

pp. 3-5.

50 Th e 11 executives interviewed were: Brooks Altshuler, Director of Policy; Michael Brown, Under Secretary; Ed Buikema, Regional Director/Acting Director of Response; Ken Burris, Director of Operations; William Carwile III, Federal 

Coordinating Offi cer; Dan Craig, Director of Recovery; Mike Lowder, Supervisory Program Specialist; Gary Moore, 

Logistics Branch Chief; Patrick Rhode, Chief of Staff ; Eric Tolbert, Director of Response and Scott Morris, Deputy Chief 

of Staff . Source: MITRE Corp., Center for Enterprise Modernization, Initial Assessment of EP&R. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 000194.

51 MITRE Corp., Center for Enterprise Modernization, Initial Assessment of EP&R. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. 000172.

52 MITRE Corp., Interviews conducted at EP&R/FEMA, Jan. 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 000246.

53 MITRE Corp., Interviews conducted at EP&R/FEMA, Jan. 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 000242.

54 MITRE Corp., Interviews conducted at EP&R/FEMA, Jan. 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 000220. 

Other statements made during interviews conducted for the MITRE study include: “OK to have political appointees but 

there should be criteria. Th ey are well meaning but they are clueless.” Source: MITRE Corp. Interviews conducted at 

EP&R/FEMA, Jan. 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 000193; “You’ve got a bunch of amateurs that don’t 

understand the seriousness of their decisions. Th ey’re more into the politics and culture of FEMA than the outcome of 

the response capability. ... Th e entire senior management is political. Subject to the whims every four years. If FEMA 

is to survive, must do a better job of recruiting, supporting, developing and moving them, an investment in people.” 

Source: MITRE Corp., Interviews conducted at EP&R/FEMA, Jan. 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 

000243; “[Political appointees] don’t have the skills, and haven’t been trained [...] true also for career employees, they 

aren’t trained.” Source: MITRE Corp., Interviews conducted at EP&R/FEMA, Jan. 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. 000216.

55 Coping with Catastrophe, p. 48. 

56 Testimony of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, before the U.S. House, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Role of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency, Sept. 27, 2005. 

57 Brown produced some documents related to FEMA budget issues that DHS did not produce. To the extent DHS did 

not provide all documents requested by the Committee, the Committee does not have a complete picture on budget issues. Committee staff interview of Michael Jackson, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 

conducted on Jan. 27, 2006, transcript pp. 109-110. Committee staff interview of Andrew Maner, Acting Chief Financial 

Offi cer, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, conducted on Feb. 2, 2006, transcript p. 46. 

58 Jackson interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 109-110. 

59 Burris interview, Dec. 29, 2005, pp. 195-196.

60 Ron Castleman, e-mail to Patrick Rhode, Michael Brown and others, Dec. 30, 2003, 11:07 a.m. Provided to Committee.

61 Ron Castleman, e-mail to Patrick Rhode, Michael Brown and others, Dec. 30, 2003, 11:07 a.m. Provided to Committee.

62 MITRE Corp., Center for Enterprise Modernization, Initial Assessment of EP&R. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. 000146. See also: Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, p. 96 (mentioning the brain drain).

63 Brown interview, Jan. 23, 2006, pp. 125-127 (stating that at one time, FEMA had 500 positions that could not be 

fi lled because of funding shortages); Committee staff interview of Michael Hall, Acting Director of Human Resources, 

FEMA, conducted on Nov. 28, 2005, transcript pp. 71-78. Th is vacancy rate is compounded by the fact that 50 percent 
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of FEMA’s current workforce is eligible for retirement within the next fi ve years. See also: FEMA, Administration and 

Regional Operations, Fiscal Year 2007, Congressional Justifi cation, p. 9.

64 Hall interview, Nov. 28, 2005, pp. 71-78. Hall testifi ed that for the last 11⁄2 years, FEMA had run a 17 percent vacancy 

rate: “You know, now when you run a 15% vacancy rate and every person you detail means one more against that talent 

pool that you’ve got there, so a 2,300 person staff , when you slice that, that’s already sliced pretty thin. It obviously has 

an impact . . . instead of doing the top seven things, you’re only going to get to do the top four things or fi ve things right 

now.” Region VI was also greatly in need of staff . Th e investigation revealed memos written by Region VI Acting Director Gary Jones seeking to fi ll vacancy positions. In each of those memos, Jones wrote: “Region VI is one of the busiest 

Regions in the country with regard to disaster activity and has the potential for a number of catastrophic events including catastrophic hurricane along the Louisiana and Texas Coast, with southeast Louisiana being our biggest concern.” 

Several of these positions were for the response division. Gary Jones, memorandum to Ron Castleman, May 7, 2003. 

Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0074-0000007 through 0000008; Gary Jones, memorandum to 

Ron Castleman, May 8, 2003. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0074-0000009 through 0000010.

65 Committee staff interview of William Lokey, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, 

FEMA, conducted on Jan. 20, 2006, transcript pp. 58-59, 188-190.

66 U.S. Offi ce of Personnel Management (OPM), Report of the 2004 Disaster Temporary Employees Review, July 2004, 

p. 1. 

67 OPM, Report of the 2004 Disaster Temporary Employees Review, July 2004, p. 2. 

68 OPM, Report of the 2004 Disaster Temporary Employees Review, July 2004, p. 2. 

69 OPM, Report of the 2004 Disaster Temporary Employees Review, July 2004, p. 2. 

70 OPM, Report of the 2004 Disaster Temporary Employees Review, July 2004, p. 2. 

71 OPM, Report of the 2004 Disaster Temporary Employees Review, July 2004, p. 2. 

72 OPM, Report of the 2004 Disaster Temporary Employees Review, July 2004, p. 3. 

73 Hall interview, Nov. 28, 2005, pp. 70-71. Indeed, it is unclear if FEMA is working to implement such recommendations as Michael Hall, Acting Director of Human Resources suggested that implementation was not being handled by his 

offi ce, but instead through some disaster support initiatives, which are being led by Marie Sloan. Marie Sloan, however, 

said that the Human Resources Division was handling the recommendations. See also: Committee staff interview of 

Marie Sloan, Section Chief, Disaster Workforce, Response Division, FEMA, conducted on Mar. 1, 2006, transcript, p. 65.

74 Committee staff interview of Scott Wells, Deputy Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, 

conducted on Nov. 15, 2005, transcript p. 58.

75 Committee staff interview of Phil Parr, Federal Coordinating Offi cer, Region I, FEMA, conducted on Nov. 16, 2005, 

transcript pp. 145-146.

76 Michael Brown, memorandum to various FEMA offi cials, Jan. 3, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. 

DHS-FEMA-0079-0000093 through 0000094.

77 Patricia Stahlschmidt, e-mail to Edward Buikema and others, Aug. 29, 2005, 4:49 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led 

as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0068-0000009 through 0000010. 

78 Sloan interview, Mar. 1, 2006, p. 56. Some of the problems found in a 2002 assessment included: (1) the means to 

keep DAE’s informed on general information, training opportunities, policy and procedure updates is “spotty at best 

and nonexistent at worst”; (2) problems with the capabilities of the technology for the deployment system; and (3) issues 

with the training of the DAE’s. See also: Maj. Gen. John R. D’Araujo, Jr., “Disaster Workforce Assessment, 7 Jan 02 

through 8 Feb 02.” Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0095-0000287 through 0000291.

79 FEMA, Response Division/Recovery Division, “Disaster Workforce Redesign,” Apr. 10, 2004, p. 31. Provided to 

Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0095-0000063.

80 FEMA, Response Division/Recovery Division, “Disaster Workforce Redesign,” Apr. 10, 2004, pp. 3, 31. Provided to 

Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0095-0000035, 0000063.

81 Hall interview, Nov. 28, 2005, pp. 44-45.

82 Sloan interview, Mar. 1, 2006, pp. 65-66. 

83 FEMA, “Monthly RAMP Report: Remedial Action Management Program,” May 15, 2005. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0095-0000590.

84 Wells interview, Nov. 15, 2005, p. 59.

85 Wells interview, Nov. 15, 2005, p. 59. 

86 Wells interview, Nov. 15, 2005, p. 59.

87 Sloan interview, Mar. 1, 2006, p. 51.

88 FEMA, DAE Availability Report. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0055-0000210. See also: 

Sloan interview, Mar. 1, 2006, p. 9; Hall interview, Nov. 28, 2005, p. 22; Hall interview, Dec. 1, 2005, p. 173.

89 Sloan interview, Mar. 1, 2006, pp. 57-58; Hall interview, Nov. 28, 2005, pp. 24-25. 
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90 Sloan interview, Mar. 1, 2006, pp. 8, 25, 61. 

91 Sloan interview, Mar. 1, 2006, pp. 60-61. 

92 Sloan interview, Mar. 1, 2006, pp. 60-61.

93 Wells interview, Nov. 15, 2005, pp. 60-63 (explaining that response operations were a “diff erent animal . . . [T]hat 

takes special training. Th at takes teamwork ... [DAEs] only come on for actual disasters. I can’t bring them on just to do 

training and stuff ; or if they can, it’s hard to get them.”).

94 In an e-mail message to Michael Hall, Acting Director of Human Resources, on Aug. 31, 2005, Justin DeMello, 

FEMA FCO, writes, “Th e whole DAE system is broken ... we need to abandon it and move to something better . . . Hall 

responds “You are preaching to the choir my friend!!” Michael Hall, e-mail to Justin DeMello, Aug. 31, 2005, 10:50 a.m. 

Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0069-0001283.

95 Committee staff interview of William Carwile III, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Mississippi, 

FEMA, conducted on Dec. 6, 2005, transcript p. 59.

96 Carwile interview, Dec. 6, 2005, p. 46.

97 Carwile interview, Dec. 6, 2005, p. 59.

98 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan. Washington: Government Printing Offi ce, Dec. 

2004, p. 40 [hereinaft er NRP]. See also: Lokey interview, Nov. 4, 2005, p. 11.

99 Carwile interview, Dec. 6, 2005, p. 77; Lokey interview, Nov. 4, 2005, p. 11.

100 Carwile interview, Dec. 6, 2005, pp. 47-48, 111-112; Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 197-198. 

101 Carwile interview, Dec. 6, 2005, pp. 22-23.

102 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 191-192.

103 Federal Coordinating Offi cers, memorandum to Michael Brown, Jun. 30, 2004, p. 3. Provided to Committee.

104 Federal Coordinating Offi cers, memorandum to Michael Brown, Jun. 30, 2004, p. 3. Provided to Committee.

105 Federal Coordinating Offi cers, memorandum to Michael Brown, Jun. 30, 2004, p. 3. Provided to Committee.

106 Brown interview, Jan. 23, 2006, pp. 151-152. Testimony of William Carwile III, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for 

Hurricane Katrina in Mississippi, FEMA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 

Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Perspectives of FEMA’s Operations Professionals, Dec. 8, 2005.

107 Brown interview, Jan. 23, 2006, p. 150.

108 NRP, p. 41.

109 Hall interview, Nov. 28, 2005, p. 76.

110 Hall interview, Nov. 28, 2005, p. 76.

111 Buikema interview, p. 113. Committee staff interview of Eric Tolbert, former Director, Response Division, FEMA, 

conducted on Dec. 1, 2006, pp. 53-54, 115. 

112 Wells interview, Nov. 15, 2005, pp. 55-56.

113 FEMA, “Business Case, NDMS Section/Operations Branch/Response Division.” Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0098-0004751.

114 FEMA. “Business Case, NDMS Section/Operations Branch Response Division.” Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0098-0004751.

115 FEMA. “Business Case, NDMS Section/Operations Branch/Response Division.” Provided to Committee, fi led as 

Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0098-0004768. Committee staff interview of Jack Beall, Chief, National Disaster Medical System, 

FEMA, conducted on Jan. 10, 2006, transcript p. 7.

116 FEMA, “Business Case, NDMS Section/Operations Branch/Response Division.” Provided to Committee, fi led as 

Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0098-0004759.

117 Beall interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 11.

118 Committee staff interview of Capt. Art French, Deputy Chief Medical Offi cer, Disaster Medical Assistance Team 

PHS-1, National Disaster Medical System, FEMA, conducted on Mar. 2, 2006, p. 104.

119 Tolbert interview, Dec. 1, 2005, pp. 40-41.

120 Tolbert interview, Dec. 1, 2005, p. 40.

121 Tolbert interview, Dec. 1, 2005, pp. 40-41.

122 Written Statement of William Carwile III, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Mississippi, 

FEMA, for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: 

Perspectives of FEMA’s Operations Professionals, Dec. 8, 2005, p. 9.

123 MITRE Corp., Center for Enterprise Modernization, Initial Assessment of EP&R, Mar. 7, 2005, p. 3. Provided to 

Committee. Th e assessment stated “When the next terrorist events happen, ER&R will be called on operationally. Th e 
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[concept of operations] would be designed for this realize and put the elements in place for EP&R to be better positioned 

to carry the day.”

124 MITRE Corp., Center for Enterprise Modernization, Initial Assessment of EP&R, Mar. 7, 2005, p. 9. Provided to 

Committee; Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 189-90. 

125 MITRE Corp., Center for Enterprise Modernization, Initial Assessment of EP&R, Mar. 7, 2005, p. 12. Provided to 

Committee. 

126 Committee staff interview of Pat English, Chief of Procurement and former Acting CFO, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 

5, 2006, transcript pp. 17-18.

127 English interview, Jan. 5, 2006, pp. 17-18.

128 English interview, Jan. 5, 2006, p. 75.

129 English interview, Jan. 5, 2006, pp. 64, 81-84. Senior DHS leaders were briefed about this. “I know he [DHS Chief 

Procurement Offi cer Greg Rothwell] briefed senior management in DHS, the Under Secretary, the DepSec, and on that 

scorecard.”

130 English interview, Jan. 5, 2006, p. 18.

131 English interview, Jan. 5, 2006, pp. 31-33, 44-46.

132 English interview, Jan. 5, 2006, pp. 34-39, 43-44.

133 Tolbert interview, Dec. 1, 2005, p. 130. 

134 Tolbert interview, Dec. 1, 2005, p. 130. 

135 English interview, Jan. 5, 2006, p. 29.

136 English interview, Jan. 5, 2006, pp. 86-87.

137 Written Statement of Kathleen J. Tierney, Director, Natural Hazards Center, for the U.S. Senate, Committee on 

Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Recommendations for Reform, Mar. 8, 

2006, p. 5.

138 6 U.S.C. § 317.

139 Brown argued that the removal of preparedness functions from FEMA was a mistake and wrote then-DHS Secretary 

Tom Ridge in September 2003 that the shift left the agency without fi rst-responder or emergency-management funding 

to distribute – a factor Brown believes hurt FEMA’s ability to fulfi ll its responsibilities to help state and locals prepare for 

disasters. Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, pp. 80-81. 

140 Sec. Chertoff , letter to Congress, July 8, 2005 (as required by Section 872 of the Homeland Security Act).

141 Questions for the Record of Sec. Michael Chertoff , U.S. Department of Homeland Security, for the U.S. Senate, 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Homeland Security 

Department’s Response, Feb. 15, 2006, p. 14.

142 Testimony of Bruce P. Baughman, President, National Emergency Management Association and Director, Alabama 

State Emergency Management Agency, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 

Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Recommendations for Reform, Mar. 8, 2006.

143 Baughman, Senate Committee hearing Mar. 8, 2006. Eric Tolbert, Former Director of Response, agreed that splitting preparedness from response was a mistake. Tolbert interview, Dec. 1, 2005, pp. 49-50 (People observed that FEMA 

should have been better prepared, should have had a higher level of readiness, but then you strip the very people out 

who were responsible for conducting and planning exercises and establishing national standards. You strip them out 

and put them in another directorate that doesn’t even have accountability to the FEMA director or the undersecretary. 

In my opinion, it’s a huge mistake. You have to defi ne preparedness. Th at’s the problem. In my mind, preparedness is 

readiness, could be better defi ned as readiness. Th at’s investment in capability that’s going to respond to an event. Th e 

department’s defi nition of preparedness includes that but it’s also prevention. So a lot of the money in the homeland 

security funding programs, the grant funding, has shift ed from the initial two years of being almost exclusively the consequence capability over to preventing. So now there are huge investments in the prevention and the readiness posture 

funding has gone signifi cantly down.).

144 Dr. John Harrald, e-mail to Michael Alexander, Senate Committee staff member, Mar. 28, 2006.

145 Buikema interview, pp. 61, 68. 

146 Dr. John Harrald, e-mail to Michael Alexander, Senate Committee staff member, Mar. 28, 2006.

147 Questions for the Record of Herman B. Leonard, Ph.D., Professor of Public Management, John F. Kennedy School 

of Government and Professor of Business Administration, Harvard Business School, Harvard University and Arnold M. 

Howitt, Ph.D., Executive Director, Taubman Center for State and Local Government, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing 

on Hurricane Katrina: Recommendations for Reform, Mar. 8, 2006, p. 2.

148 Testimony of Herman B. Leonard, Ph.D., Professor of Public Management, John F. Kennedy School of Government 

and Professor of Business Administration, Harvard Business School, Harvard University, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Recommendations for Reform, 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency

231

Mar. 8, 2006.

149 “The Homeland Security Act of 2002.” (P.L. 107-296).

150 Testimony of Richard Skinner, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, before the U.S. Senate, 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Recommendations for 

Reform, Mar. 8, 2006.

151 FEMA, Federal Response Plan, Apr. 1999, p. 14.

152 NRP, ESF Annexes, ESF–v through ESF–vi.

153 NRP, p. 24.

154 Skinner, Senate Committee hearing, Mar. 8, 2006.

155 Testimony of Frank J. Cilluff o, Associate Vice President for Homeland Security and Director of the Homeland 

Security Policy Institute, George Washington University, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Recommendations for Reform, Mar. 8, 2006.

156 Skinner, Senate Committee hearing, Mar. 8, 2006.

157 Testimony of David Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on 

Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Recommendations for Reform, Mar. 8, 

2006.

158 Written Statement of Herman B. Leonard, Ph.D., Professor of Public Management, John F. Kennedy School of 

Government and Professor of Business Administration, Harvard Business School, Harvard University, before the U.S. 

Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Recommendations 

for Reform, Mar. 8, 2006.

159 Written Statement of Leonard, Senate Committee hearing, Mar. 8, 2006. 

160 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, p. 137. 

161 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, p. 145. 

162 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, pp. 144-146. For example, Former Under Secretary Brown produced a Mar. 16, 2004 

letter to DHS Deputy Secretary Admiral Loy where he stated that FEMA was struggling because of serious budget shortages. Brown wrote that “preparations for the future are being mortgaged or deferred indefi nitely.” Th e letter explained 

that OMB had designated two-thirds of FEMA’s budget as “non-homeland security” funds and that “non-homeland 

security funds” would be held to zero budget growth beginning in FY 2006. Th is paints a grim picture for FEMA’s future. 

Although solid targets have not yet been released by CFO’s shop, we have been told to expect to reprogram our FY 2006 

budget plans to absorb a cut of $100 million. ... It is quite clear that many if not most of our current un-funded requirements and shortfalls will have to be deferred in favor of more Homeland Security (terrorism) priorities.

163 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, p. 141.

164 Paul Singer, “Brown’s Flood of Criticism,” National Journal, Mar. 10, 2006. 

165 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, p. 143. 

166 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, p. 138. Brown testifi ed that he had so many conversations with White House offi cials telling them that FEMA was not prepared for a catastrophe that it reached a point that his staff had to tell him to 

back off . 

167 Written Statement of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Environment and 

Public Works, Subcommittee on Clean Air, Climate Change and Nuclear Safety, hearing on FEMA Oversight, Sept. 24, 

2003, p. 4.
Grounded, Louisiana

U.S. Coast Guard photo
233

Government Response: 

Th e Role of the White House

Acatastrophic event requires decisive leadership at all levels – from the aff ected locality, to the state government, to federal agencies, and to the White House. Hurricane 

Katrina was a test in leadership. Th ere were warnings. But there was not enough 

done to prepare. Th ere was the catastrophe. But on the day it struck, there was uncertainty 

and a lack of awareness as to the extent of the damage. Th ere was a response. But it was, 

initially, halting and not up to a disaster of such consequence.

Th ere was leadership, but not the measure Americans expected as they witnessed the devastation and human suff ering Katrina left in her wake. Th ough it was not alone, the White 

House failed to meet these expectations in at least three respects:

• Actual or Constructive Knowledge: Th e White House knew or should have 

known that Katrina could turn into the long-feared “New Orleans Scenario,” 

and could wreak devastation throughout the Gulf Coast region. Th e White 

House also may have been aware that FEMA was not prepared for such a 

catastrophe;

• Lack of Situational Awareness: Despite receiving information from multiple 

sources on the extent of the damage in New Orleans, the White House does 

not appear to have been aware that levees had broken and the city was fl ooding on the day of the storm and, indeed, appears to have remained for some 

time under the misimpression that the levees did not break until the day aft er 

Katrina made landfall; and,

• Inadequate Initial Response: Th e initial response to Katrina was halting and 

inadequate, in part due to poor situational awareness. Ultimately, the President 

and his team brought the full resources of the federal government to bear on 

the catastrophe.

Advance Knowledge of a Catastrophic Scenario, FEMA’s 

Shortcomings, and the Approach of the Storm

Katrina’s devastation should not have been a surprise to the White House.

In early 2004, the White House Deputy National Security Advisor, General John A. Gordon, went to New Orleans to receive a briefi ng on catastrophic-hurricane planning eff orts 

for the region. Th e detailed briefi ng covered the catastrophic consequences of a Category 3 

hurricane hitting New Orleans. General Gordon reported this to the White House, which 

may have infl uenced the funding that resulted in the Hurricane Pam exercise.1

 In addition, 

another White House aide, Janet Benini,2

 attended the Hurricane Pam exercise. Benini also 

chaired the group that developed the National Planning Scenarios, a set of 15 plausible, 

high-consequence events used by the federal government to come up with preparedness 

goals and lists of emergency response capabilities that federal, state, and local responders 

should have. One event included among the scenarios is modeled on a hurricane hitting 

New Orleans.

Chapter 15
Chapter 15

234

Th ere were also ample warnings specifi c to Hurricane Katrina. Th e National Weather 

Service, FEMA, other Department of Homeland Security components such as the National 

Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center, and state offi cials warned the White House 

repeatedly over the weekend before landfall that Katrina was likely to be a catastrophe.3

Th e documents the White House provided to this Committee show that prior to and aft er 

landfall, the White House Homeland Security Council (HSC)4

 received large amounts of 

information from DHS’s Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC), as well as other 

federal agencies and departments, including the National Guard Bureau, the Department of 

Energy, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration concerning the situation that could develop. Th e American Red Cross and other organizations were also briefed. 

Moreover, as Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff said, the President was 

“acutely aware of Katrina and the risk it posed” during the weekend before landfall.5

 “We 

went into the weekend before,” Chertoff said, “with an understanding and with warnings 

that this was potentially the nightmare scenario that I think people have talked about for 

years in terms of New Orleans.”6

On the Saturday before the storm made landfall, FEMA Director Michael Brown relayed to 

state, local, and federal offi cials – including the White House – his fears of the devastation 

Katrina could cause. During FEMA’s August 277

 noon video-conference call, Brown voiced 

the following concerns: 

I know I’m preaching to the choir on this one, but I’ve learned over the past 

four and a half, fi ve years, to go with my gut on a lot of things, and I’ve got to 

tell you my gut hurts on this one. It hurts. I’ve got cramps. So, we need to take 

this one very, very seriously.8

Joe Hagin, White House Deputy Chief of Staff , participated on the same conference call 

while in Crawford, Texas, and listened to the warnings presented by Brown and others. He 

asked no questions and off ered only the following statement: “We’re here, and anything we 

can do, obviously, to support you, but it sounds like the planning, as usual, is in good shape, 

and good luck to the states and just know that we’re watching, and we’ll do the right thing 

as fast as we can.”9

Th e warnings continued through the night: At 11:24 p.m., the White House received a 

National Hurricane Center report stating: “Th e bottom line is that Katrina is expected to be 

an intense and dangerous hurricane heading towards the North Central Gulf Coast and this 

has to be taken very seriously.”10

At noon on Sunday, August 28, President Bush participated from his ranch in Crawford, 

Texas, with FEMA, Department of Homeland Security, and state offi cials in a video-conference call in which Max Mayfi eld, Director of the National Hurricane Center, predicted 

Katrina would be a “very dangerous hurricane”: 

Th e problem that we’re going to have here — remember, the winds go counterclockwise around the center of the hurricane. So if the really strong winds 

clip Lake Pontchartrain, that’s going to pile some of that water from Lake 

Pontchartrain over on the south side of the lake. I don’t think any model can 

tell you with any confi dence right now whether the levies will be topped or not, 

but that’s obviously a very, very grave concern. ... And, quite frankly, for the 

folks in Louisiana, if you can’t get people out, you know, if you’re ever going 

to, you know, talk about vertical refuge [sheltering in the upper stories of tall 

buildings], this is the time to do it.11
Government Response: The Role of the White House

235

During the same call, Brown stated: “My gut tells me — I told you guys my gut was that this 

(missing) is a bad one and a big one,” and that Katrina could be “a catastrophe within a catastrophe.”12 Th e State of Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness’ Chief of Operations, Bill Doran, also informed the President on the same call that the 

state was doing “catastrophic planning” for Katrina.13 Th e President asked no questions, but 

made the following statement: 

I want to assure the folks at the state level that we are fully prepared to not only 

help you during the storm, but we will move in whatever resources and assets 

we have at our disposal aft er the storm to help you deal with the loss of property. And we pray for no loss of life, of course. 

Unfortunately, we’ve had experience at this in recent years, and I — the FEMA 

folks have done great work in the past, and I’m confi dent, Mike, that you and 

your team will do all you can to help the good folks in these aff ected states. 

Again, I want to thank Governor Blanco and Governor Riley and Governor 

[Barbour], Governor Bush of Florida, for heeding these warnings, and doing all you can possibly do with your state folks and local folks to prepare the 

citizenry for this storm. 

In the meantime, I know the nation will be praying for the good folks in the 

aff ected areas, and we just hope for the very best.14

In addition to the conference call, the White House continued to receive additional warnings of the storm’s projected force and fury throughout the day.

Th e White House also may have received warnings that FEMA lacked the support and 

capability to prepare for and respond to a Katrina-like catastrophe. Brown claims to have 

warned President Bush, White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card, and White House 

Deputy Chief of Staff Joe Hagin as early as January 2005 that “We [FEMA] weren’t getting 

the money we needed [and] we weren’t getting the personnel that we needed,” and that, 

consequently, FEMA was not ready to handle a disaster like a tsunami.15

It is not clear what, if anything, the White House did to address these concerns and to help 

ensure that FEMA was ready when disaster struck. But the concerns appear to have gone 

unheeded by the White House and DHS in the period prior to Katrina.

On the other hand, the President did take signifi cant steps in preparation for the storm. On 

Saturday evening, in response to Governor Blanco’s request earlier that day, President Bush 

took the unusual step of issuing an emergency declaration for the State of Louisiana, which 

the White House described as being “indicative of the recognition that Katrina had the 

potential to be particularly devastating.”16 Th e declaration eff ectively assured the state that 

the federal government would pay for costs associated with evacuating residents prior to the 

storm.

In addition to authorizing funds to help with the pre-storm evacuation, President Bush 

urged that an evacuation take place. On Sunday, August 28, President Bush spoke with 

Governor Blanco to encourage her to order a mandatory evacuation of New Orleans.

While these steps were important and commendable, the White House could have marshaled federal resources more proactively in advance of the storm. Katrina was a hurricane 

that the White House knew or should have known could cause massive devastation in and 

around New Orleans. Th e preparations simply were not proportionate to the likely imminent catastrophe.
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236

Lack of Situational Awareness

Th e record indicates that as early as 11:13 a.m. ET, on Monday, August 29, the White House 

Homeland Security Council circulated to, among others, Homeland Security Advisor Frances Townsend, Deputy White House Chief of Staff Joe Hagin, Deputy Homeland Security 

Advisor Ken Rapuano, and White House Counsel Harriet Miers, a report indicating the 

following:

• A levee in New Orleans had broken;

• Th rough a report from the Homeland Security Operations Center, water was 

rising in the city’s Lower Ninth Ward; 

• Th rough a report from the State of Louisiana, water was rising at one foot per 

hour; and

• Th rough a report from Mayor C. Ray Nagin of New Orleans, problems with a 

pumping station were causing fl ooding in New Orleans.17

Brown claims that, also on Monday, he reported to Deputy Chief of Staff Hagin on the 

developing catastrophe in New Orleans.18 Brown told the Committee that, by no later than 

6 p.m. CT on the day of landfall, Hagin knew the 17th Street levee in New Orleans had broken, and that the city was fl ooding.19

Still, the White House does not appear to have been cognizant that Katrina was fl ooding the 

streets, homes, and hospitals of New Orleans on Monday, the day of the storm’s landfall. 

President Bush later characterized the mindset on Monday, August 29, aft er learning that 

President Bush greeting Mayor 

Nagin, Secretary Chertoff

Photo © 2005 The Times-Picayune Publishing Co., 

all rights reserved. Used with permission of the 

Times-Picayune
Government Response: The Role of the White House

237

Katrina did not hit New Orleans directly: “a sense of relaxation.”20 In addition, as late as 

Friday, September 2, the President expressed the belief that the levees broke on Tuesday, the 

day aft er landfall, even though they had broken on Monday.

On Tuesday, August 30, the White House received confi rmation that Katrina was an undeniable catastrophe. At 12:02 a.m. ET, the White House received a report from the Homeland Security Operations Center that included the following statement by FEMA’s lone 

offi cial in New Orleans that day, Marty Bahamonde: “Th ere is a quarter-mile [breach] in the 

levee near the 17th Street Canal about 200 yards from Lake Pontchartrain allowing water to 

fl ow into the City – an estimated 2/3 to 75% of the city is under water.”21

At 6:33 a.m. ET, Tuesday morning, the White House received a Department of Homeland 

Security situation report confi rming the extent of damage and fl ooding in New Orleans:

Widespread and signifi cant fl ooding has occurred throughout the city of New 

Orleans, extending eastward, across the Mississippi gulf coast into coastal 

Alabama. Th e following fl ood reports have been received for the city of New 

Orleans:

• Industrial Canal at Tennessee St.: levee has been breached with water to a 

depth of 5 feet at Jackson Barracks;

• 17th St. at Canal Blvd.: levee has been breached – breach extends several 100 

meters in length;

• Much of downtown and east New Orleans is underwater, depth unknown at 

this time.

Th e U.S. Army Corps of Engineers estimates are in progress and project that it could take 

months to dewater the City of New Orleans.22

A report at 10:23 a.m. ET on Tuesday, from the Homeland Security Operations Center detailed the location of the breached levees and noted specifi c concerns about the 17th Street 

Canal and Tennessee Street levees.23

Brown also told the Committee of a secure telephone call he said was held on Tuesday aft ernoon with President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary Chertoff , and Deputy Chief of 

Staff Karl Rove. Brown claims to have told them that at least 90 percent of the city’s population had been displaced and he “needed military assets [because] this was the big one.”24

Brown also told them that he “needed the help of the entire cabinet ... DOD and HHS and 

everybody else,” and that there was a “discussion about convening the cabinet.”25 Brown 

opined that, up until that conversation took place, he believed that the White House had 

failed to comprehend fully the catastrophic nature of Hurricane Katrina.26

A Hesitant Response

Despite these reports of a catastrophe, the White House failed to grasp the gravity of the 

situation as it unfolded. As a result, the White House’s initial response appeared halting 

and inadequate. Th roughout Monday, the day of the storm, the President maintained his 

regular schedule. In the morning, he celebrated Senator John McCain’s birthday at Luke Air 

Force Base near Phoenix, Arizona.27 Later that morning, the President had a “Conversation 

on Medicare” at the Pueblo El Mirage RV Resort and Country Club in nearby El Mirage, 

Arizona.28 He also spoke to the people in the Gulf Coast region, off ering that, “When the 
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238

storm passes, the federal government has got assets and resources that we’ll be deploying to 

help you.”29

Likewise, on Monday aft ernoon, the President fl ew to California and gave a speech in Rancho Cucamonga on Medicare and the new prescription-drug benefi t. Th ere, he reassured 

his audience that the government was prepared to respond to Katrina.30 But this did not 

turn out to be the case.

Th e hesitancy continued into the following day. Despite mounting reports on the extent of 

the catastrophe, no one from the White House participated in FEMA’s intergovernmental 

conference call on Tuesday at noon.

At noon ET that day, the President stood at a naval base in San Diego and off ered a picture 

of a fully prepared federal government that was ready to respond to Katrina: “Our teams 

and equipment are in place and we’re beginning to move in the help that people need.”31

On the same day, White House Press Secretary Scott McClellan announced the President 

would return to Washington, D.C., the following day in order to “oversee the response efforts from there.”32

Th ereaft er, the White House began to chart a more aggressive course of response to Katrina. 

At a 5:11 p.m. briefi ng Wednesday evening, President Bush, surrounded by his Cabinet, 

addressed the nation from the Rose Garden and announced that he had called the Cabinet 

together, and had “directed Secretary of Homeland Security Mike Chertoff to chair a Cabinet-level task force to coordinate all our assistance from Washington.”33

Th e task force demanded a list of available resources from each federal agency assigned 

responsibility under the National Response Plan.34 For example, the White House asked 

FEMA on Wednesday for “the inventory of all department agency operations/activity ... 

are there any Federal powers or other processes that could be implemented to expedite 

the response or make it more effi cient ... [w]hat are the plans for providing housing to ... 

displaced people?”35 Had these questions been asked and this sense of urgency imparted 

earlier, vital federal help might have arrived sooner.

Th e more vigorous response continued throughout the week. For example, despite reports 

of lawlessness in New Orleans and the need for federal assistance, there were only a handful 

of FBI and other Department of Justice law-enforcement offi cers in the New Orleans area 

as of Th ursday morning. As DOJ continued to formulate a response plan, President Bush 

discussed with the Attorney General the situation in New Orleans, and DOJ offi cers began 

to deploy that day. Likewise, on Saturday, the President ordered thousands of active-duty 

military forces to deploy to the region to assist in what he saw was an unacceptable response 

to the suff ering of thousands of Katrina victims in various locations around the city.

1 Committee staff interview of Gary Jones, Acting Regional Director, Region VI, Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA), conducted on Jan. 11, 2006, transcript pp. 48-49, 149-152; Committee staff interview of Wayne Fairley, 

Response Operations Branch Chief, Region VI, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 18, 2006, pp. 2, 57-58; Ron Castleman, e-mail 

to Patricia English, May 17, 2004, 10:11 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA 0058-0000097.

2 Janet Benini was Director of Response and Planning for the White House Homeland Security Council prior to Hurricane Katrina’s landfall. She did not work at the White House during the Katrina response.

3 Th e White House does not dispute that the President received these warnings and communications before landfall: 

“Th e President received regular briefi ngs, had countless conversations with Federal, State, and local offi cials, and took 

extraordinary steps prior to landfall.” U.S. Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, Th e 
Government Response: The Role of the White House

239

Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned. Washington: Government Printing Offi ce, Feb. 2006, pp. 28-29 

[hereinaft er Th e White House, Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned]. But the White House did not detail in either its report, Th e Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned, Frances Fragos Townsend’s February 13, 2006 speech 

at the NEMA’s mid-year conference, or elsewhere, any specifi c details about the briefi ngs or conversations. Th e White 

House, Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned, pp. 28-29, 174. 

4 Th e White House, Homeland Security President Directive-1: Organization and Operation of the Homeland Security 

Council, October 29, 2001. HSPD-1 states that the White House Homeland Security Council (HSC), is a unit within the 

White House responsible for coordination of homeland security activities between all federal departments and agencies. 

Th e HSC also is responsible for circulating information throughout the White House during a catastrophe. As stated during a Committee briefi ng conducted by the White House on February 3, 2006, the HSC handles preparedness issues and 

immediate response issues. It also serves as a gate-keeper to mitigate duplicative information requests to other agencies.

5 Testimony of Sec. Michael Chertoff , U.S. Department of Homeland Security, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on 

Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Homeland Security Department’s 

Preparation and Response, Feb. 15, 2006.

6 Testimony of Sec. Michael Chertoff , U.S. Department of Homeland Security, before the U.S. House, Select Bipartisan 

Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e 

Role of the Department of Homeland Security, Oct. 19, 2005.

7 White House Briefi ng given to Committee, conducted by Kenneth Rapuano, Deputy Assistant to the President for 

Homeland Security, Dec. 13, 2005.

8 Michael Brown, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 27, 2005, transcript p. 22. Provided to Committee. 

9 Joseph Hagin, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 27, 2005, transcript p. 24. Provided to Committee.

10 Andrew Akers, e-mail to Homeland Security Operations Center Senior Watch Offi cer and others, Aug. 27, 2005, 

11:24 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. WHK 0005865 through 0005867. Th e other addressees for the 

e-mail are DC-NSC-WHSR, Bethany Nichols, Elliot Langer, Kirstjen Nielsen, Joel Bagnal, Elizabeth Farrell, Julie Bentz, 

Daniel Kaniewski and copied to Matthew Broderick, Frank DiFalco, Bob Stephan, John Chase, Tom Dinanno, Edward 

McDonald, Gail Kulish, Tom Paar, Michael Jackson, John Wood, National Interagency Coordination Center, Secretary 

Briefi ng Staff , HSOC.HSIN. 

11 Max Mayfi eld, Ph.D., FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 28, 2005, transcript pp. 6, 10. Provided to Committee.

12 Michael Brown, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 28, 2005, transcript p. 37. Provided to the Committee. 

During his staff interview on February 23, 2006, Brown discussed a telephone call with Joe Hagin aft er the Noon VTC. 

He described the conversation as follows: “And Hagin and I were having a conversation just about how bad this one was 

going to be and, you know, dad-gamut all the – I mean, I was really bitching at Hagin about all of the planning I’d been 

asking for and you know, the catastrophic planning we’d been wanting to do, you know, now – and now here we are, 

and, you know, saying to him, you know, dad-gamut, why didn’t I quit earlier – then, you know, you guys knew I wanted 

to quit. I mean, we’re having this sparring match about all of this stuff that I was really mad about because I knew I was 

walking into this hornets’ nest, I’m really ticked off , because I know how bad this thing’s going to be.” Brown further described the conversation: “I’m just adamant that they understand my concern about New Orleans. I mean, I don’t know 

how to get this across to people that I have pushed and pushed for catastrophic disaster planning; we had chosen New 

Orleans as the fi rst place to do catastrophic disaster planning; and now, damn it, here was a, you know, a Cat 5 bearing 

down on – on New Orleans.” Committee staff interview of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, conducted on Feb. 

23, 2006, transcript pp. 34, 36-37.

13 Bill Doran, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 28, 2005, transcript pp. 16-17. Provided to Committee.

14 President George Bush, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 28, 2005, transcript pp. 14-15. Provided to Committee. Th e Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned describes the President as actively engaged the weekend 

prior to landfall, communicating with state and local offi cials and off ering federal resources. 

15 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, pp. 137-139, 141. Brown testifi ed that he had put the White House on notice of 

FEMA’s lack of capabilities to respond adequately to a catastrophe before Katrina approached the Gulf. Brown interview, 

Feb. 23, 2006, p. 143. In addition, Brown suggested that he spoke with the White House earlier than January, 2005 

regarding his concerns for FEMA. Specifi cally, when Brown was asked whether it was fair to say he was communicating 

with the White House during his tenure as Undersecretary and “expressing to them that FEMA was not ready; FEMA 

needed more resources.” Brown replied and discussed a letter sent to Sec. Tom Ridge in Sept. 2003, regarding FEMA’s 

integration in the Department of Homeland Sec. Although he said he raised this letter with Clay Johnson and Joe Hagin, 

and the fact that FEMA would fail if many of the proposed changes occurred, he also suggested that he spoke to Clay 

Johnson generally about the problems with FEMA. When asked what he expressed to Johnson, and whether they were 

the same kinds of concerns previously described, Brown stated: “Th e same kind of concerns but probably in more detail 

with Clay at times because Clay was heading up the transition team for DHS, and so he really understood kind of what 

we should be doing and shouldn’t be doing. And I would have a lot of conversations with Clay about it.” Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, pp. 139-141. Brown did not address these concerns publicly or in writing with Congress. However, 

during his appearance before the U.S. House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate Preparation for and Response 

to Hurricane Katrina hearing on Sept. 27, 2005, Brown alluded to having had some conversations with members of 

Congress, though not with any members of this Committee regarding the state of FEMA. When asked about the emaciation of FEMA, Brown suggested that for several years, he privately discussed how FEMA would become extremely 

limited in both personnel and fi nancial resources hindering its capacity to handle a disaster. In response to a question 
Chapter 15

240

about Brown expressing his concerns about FEMA privately, but not publicly, Brown stated: “I can go to bed at night 

and sleep because I know I fought that battle.” In addition, later in the hearing when asked why he expressed his views 

about FEMA’s problems privately versus publicly, Brown testifi ed that he wanted to work within the system to make the 

needed changes. Brown, House Select Committee hearing, Sept. 27, 2005. Apparently, those eff orts failed.

16 Th e White House, Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned, p. 27.

17 Daniel Kaniewski, e-mail to Dan Bartlett and others, Aug. 29, 2005, 11:13 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

no. OVP 004795. Th e other addressees are Todd Beyer, Bill Burck, Trent Duff y, Joseph Hagin, Brian Hook, Brett Kavanaugh, Emily Kropp, William McGurn, Stephen McMillin, Harriet Miers, Bruce Miller, Susan Ralston, Kenneth Rapuano, 

Scott Sforza, Kristen Silverberg, Heidi Smith, Frances Townsend, and copied to Steven Atkiss, Jessica Bennett, Stephen 

Black, Jamie Brown, John Burke, Shannon Burkhart, John Currin, Robert DeServi, DL-HSC-BTS, DL-HSC-CHEM-BIO, 

DL-HSCEXECSEC, DL-HSC-Front, DL-HSC-PPR, DL-NSC-WHSR, Lindsey Drouin, Debbie Fiddelke, Erin Healy, 

Taylor Hughes, Lauren Kane, Karyn Richman Kendall, Matthew Kirk, Ross Kyle, Jeannie Mamo, Christopher Michel, 

Alexander Mistri, John Mitnick, Derrick Morgan, Erin Nagle, Neil Patel, Dana Perino, Douglas Pitkin, Heather Roebke, 

Daniel Wilmot, Candace Wysocki, DeWitt Zemp (“Flooding signifi cant throughout the region and a levee in New 

Orleans has reportedly been breached sending 6 to 8 feet of water throughout the 9th Ward area of the city. Per the Governor, water is rising at 1 foot per hour and the New Orleans mayor reports problems with a pumping station, causing 

fl ooding. HSOC reports that due to the rising water in the 9th Ward, residents are in their attics and on their roofs.”). Th e 

President’s knowledge of when New Orleans’ levees breached has been the subject of much media attention. In the week 

aft er landfall, the President himself made statements regarding the levee breaches. For instance, on Friday, September 2, 

2005, during a press conference in Biloxi, Mississippi, the President stated: “Th e levees broke on Tuesday in New Orleans. 

On Wednesday, we – and Th ursday we started evacuating people. A lot of people have left that city. A lot of people have 

been pulled out on buses. It’s – I am satisfi ed with the response. I’m not satisfi ed with all the results. Th ey started pulling people off roofs immediately. Th ey started rallying – we started rallying choppers to get people off rooft ops, started 

savings lives. I mean, thousands of peoples’ lives have been saved immediately, and that’s good news. Th is is one of the 

worst storms in our nation’s history. New Orleans got hit by two storms, one the hurricane, and then the fl ood. And it’s 

going to take a monumental eff ort to continue moving forward, but we will.” Th e White House, “President Tours Biloxi, 

Mississippi Hurricane Damaged Neighborhoods,” press release, Sept. 2, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. 

WHK 01656, 01658. As set forth herein, several pieces of evidence show the levees breached on Monday.

18 On the noon video teleconference, Brown said he spoke with President Bush at least twice on the day of landfall, likely 

prior to noon. Brown stated: “I talked to the President twice today, once in Crawford and then again on Air Force One.” 

Michael Brown, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 29, 2005, p. 14. Provided to Committee. Brown also testifi ed 

that he spoke to Hagin on at least two occasions on the day of landfall. Testimony of Brown, Senate Committee hearing, 

Feb. 10, 2005. See also: Andy Card, e-mail to Michael Brown, Aug. 29, 2005, 9:51 p.m. Provided to Committee (showing 

that Brown spoke with Hagin on August 29 to provide updates of the situation in New Orleans). When asked whether 

he spoke directly to the President on the night of landfall concerning Bahamonde’s over fl ight, Brown said he could not 

recall if he spoke to the President then. Brown stated: “I really don’t recall if the President got – normally during my 

conversations with Deputy Chief of Staff [Hagin], sometimes the President would get on the phone for a few minutes, 

sometimes he wouldn’t, and I don’t recall specifi cally that night whether he did or not.” Brown, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 10, 2006.

19 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, pp. 24-25 (“Question: Is there any reason for us to doubt that aft er you talked to Joe 

Hagin 5 or 6 o’clock on Monday evening, August 29, that he then knew from you that the 17th Street Canal levee had 

broke and the city was fl ooding? Answer: I don’t think there is any reason for any of us to doubt that they knew that. 

Question: Okay. And that they knew that at least in part from your phone conversation with Joe Hagin, correct? Answer: 

Th at’s correct.”). Brown said he spoke with Hagin on Monday evening to discuss Bahamonde’s report of his New 

Orleans fl yover over New Orleans, but could not recall whether he specifi cally told Hagin in that call that the levees had 

broken. Source: Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, p. 21 (“I think I used the phrase to Joe that, you know, our – the worst 

nightmare is occurring. I can’t recall all of the words I used other than, this is, you know, our worst – this is the worst 

scenario; this is, you know my worst fears are coming true. You know, I used the phrase, you know we have breaches 

of the canals”); Brown, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 10, 2006, (“I think I told him that we were realizing our worst 

nightmare, that everything we had planned about, worried about, that FEMA, frankly, had worried about for 10 years, 

was coming true.”) Brown said he told Hagin or White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card about the levee breaches late 

in the aft ernoon on Monday because he recalled they were “debating” at the state Emergency Operations Center whether 

the levees were breached or overtopped. Source: Brown, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 10, 2006; Deposition of Michael 

Brown, before the House Katrina Select Committee staff , Feb. 11, 2006, pp. 113-114. Brown also received an e-mail from 

Card at 9:51 p.m., Monday, in which Card acknowledged Brown’s continued contact with Hagin and said: “Joe Hagin 

has kept me well-informed of your reports.” Source: Andy Card, e-mail to Michael Brown, Aug. 29, 2005, 9:51 p.m. Provided to Committee. Brown responded and stated: “Th anks for writing, Andy. Th is is a bad one.” Source: Michael Brown, 

e-mail to Andy Card, Aug. 29, 2005, 10 p.m. Provided to Committee.

20 Th e White House, “President, Lieutenant General Honoré Discuss Hurricane Relief in Louisiana,” press release, Sept. 

12, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. WHK 01723, 01725.

21 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, HSOC Spot Report #13, Aug. 29, 2005, 10:30 p.m. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates no. WHK-07159. Th e Report further stated: “Only one of the main pumps is reported to still be working 

but cannot keep up with the demand and its longevity is doubtful.” Th e White House received this report at 12:02 a.m., 

Tuesday, Aug. 30, 2005. Michael Izner, e-mail to HSOC.HSIN and others, Aug. 30, 2005, 12:02 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. WHK 07158 through WHK 07160. Th e other addressees for the e-mail are DL-NSC-WHSR, 

the National Interagency Coordination Center, as well as the following offi cials, Bethany Nichol, Elliott Langer, Kirstjen 
Government Response: The Role of the White House

241

Nielsen, Joel Bagnal, Elizabeth Farrell, Julie Bentz, Daniel Kaniewski, Richard Davis, Michael Barton and copied to Matthew Broderick, Frank DiFalco, Bob Stephan, John Chase, Tom Dinanno, Edward McDonald, Gail Kulish, Tom Parr, 

Michael Jackson, and John Wood. 

22 Michael Izner, e-mail to DL-NSC-WHSR, Aug. 30, 2005, 6:33 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. WHK 

06264. Th e other addressees of the e-mail are Bethany Nichols, Elliott Langer, Kirstjen Nielsen, Joel Bagnal, Elizabeth 

Farrell, Julie Bentz, Daniel Kaniewski, Richard Davis, Michael Barton, and copied to Matthew Broderick, Frank DiFalco, 

Bob Stephan, John Chase, Tom Dinanno, Edward McDonald,

Gail Kulisch, Tom Paar, Michael Jackson, (DepSec), John Wood, (COS), National Interagency Coordination Center 

Secretary Briefi ng Staff , HSOC.HSIN, HSOC.SWO. 

23 Insung Lee, e-mail to DL-NSC-WHSR and others, Aug. 30, 2005, 10:23 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

nos. WHK 07910 through WHK 07913. Th e other addressees of the e-mail are Bethany Nichols, Elliott Langer, Kirstjen 

Nielsen, Joel Bagnal, Elizabeth Farrell, Julie Bentz, Daniel Kaniewski, Richard Davis, Michael Barton, Matthew Broderick, Frank DiFalco, Bob Stephan, John Chase, Tom Dinanno, Edward McDonald, Gail Kulisch, Tom Paar, Michael 

Jackson, John Wood, (COS), National Interagency Coordination Center, Secretary Briefi ng Staff ; HSOC.HSIN, HSOC.

SWO, HSOC.FEMA, HSOC.DOD, HSOC.State&Local

24 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, pp. 89-90. Brown also testifi ed about this conversation before a closed-session with 

the House. On pages 111-112, when asked what he said in the secure call, he responds: “Th at probably 90 percent of 

the population of New Orleans had been displaced, that we had a true catastrophic disaster on our hands, that this 

was probably one of the most serious things that the country had faced; that it was. We needed to be doing everything 

possible.” Deposition of Michael Brown before the House Katrina Select Committee, Feb. 11, 2006, pp. 111-112.

25 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, p. 90.

26 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, pp. 97-98.

27 Th e White House, Photo Gallery, Aug. 29, 2005. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/images/20050829-5_p082905pm-0125-515h.html. Accessed on Mar. 2, 2006.

28 Th e White House, “President Participates in Conversation on Medicare,” press release, Aug. 29, 2005. http://www.

whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050829-5.html. Accessed on Mar. 7, 2006.

29 Th e White House, “President Participates in Conversation on Medicare,” press release, Aug. 29, 2005. http://www.

whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050829-5.html. Accessed on Mar. 7, 2006.

30 Th e White House, “President Discusses Medicare, New Prescription Drug Benefi ts,” press release, Aug. 29, 2005. 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050829-11.html. Accessed on Mar. 7, 2006.

31 Th e White House, “President Commemorates 60th Anniversary of V-J Day,” press release, Aug. 30, 2005. http://www.

whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050830-1.html. Accessed on Mar. 11, 2006.

32 Th e White House, “Press Gaggle by Scott McClellan, Naval Air Station North Island, San Diego, California,” Aug. 30, 

2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. WHK 01632 through 01633 (QUESTION: Th is is more - this is more 

symbolic. Cutting short his vacation is more symbolic because he can do all this from the ranch, right? McCLELLAN: 

No, I think – no, I disagree. Like I said, this is one of the most devastating storms in our nation’s history, and the President, aft er receiving a further update this morning, made the decision that he wanted to get back to D.C. and oversee the 

response eff orts from there.”).

33 Th e White House, “President Outlines Hurricane Katrina Relief Eff orts,” press release, Aug. 31, 2005. Provided to 

Committee; fi led as Bates nos. WHK 01636 through 01637.

34 Committee staff interview of Laurence Broun, Departmental Emergency Coordinator, U.S. Department of Interior, 

conducted on Mar. 21, 2006, transcript pp. 15-16.

35 Insung Lee, e-mail to Homeland Security Operations Center, Senior Watch Offi cer and others, Aug. 31, 2005, 12:41 

p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. WHK 12588 through 12598. Th e other addressees of the e-mail are 

DL-NSC-WHSR, Bethany Nichols, Elliott Langer, Kirstjen Nielsen, Joel Bagnal, Elizabeth Farrell, Julie Bentz, Daniel 

Kaniewski, Richard Davis, Michael Barton, Matthew Broderick, Frank DiFalco, Bob Stephan, John Chase, Tom Dinanno, Edward McDonald, Gail Kulisch, Tom Paar, Michael Jackson, (DepSec), John Wood, (COS); National Interagency 

Coordination Center; Secretary Briefi ng Staff ; HSOC.HSIN; IMD.
Contrafl ow evacuation map 

Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness
243

Pre-Storm Evacuations

Louisiana

Louisiana’s successful evacuation of about one million people from greater New Orleans 

through phased movements and the one-way “contrafl ow” use of highways was a great 

improvement over the Hurricane Ivan evacuation a year earlier. Still, offi cials expected that 

100,000 to 150,0001

 persons would be unable or unwilling to evacuate the region before 

Hurricane Katrina struck.

Th is included those with special needs, such as the elderly and infi rm; the poor, those lacking means to leave; and those simply refusing to evacuate, regardless of reason or means, 

and choosing to take their chances in “hurricane roulette.”2

Some of those responsible for the evacuation argue that those who wished to leave the city 

prior to landfall did so. Th e Director of Homeland Security for the City of New Orleans, 

Terry Ebbert, stated that of the “100,000 left behind, most of that 100,000 chose to stay 

behind. Th at’s a big diff erence.”3

 Th is view seems to depend on an expansive defi nition of 

“evacuation.” As Joseph Matthews, Director of the New Orleans Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness (OEP) noted, offi cials may have considered “transporting [people] to the Superdome” evacuation as well.4

In any case, there was long-standing recognition that 100,000 to 150,000 people would 

remain in the city following an evacuation order, and that some of them would remain only 

because they could not move themselves. Offi cials explored means of moving people out 

of the city, but the issue took a back seat to plans to use the Superdome as a special-needs 

shelter and a refuge of last resort.

Before Landfall, Louisiana, Mississippi, and the Aff ected Southeast Louisiana 

Parishes Agreed to and Successfully Executed Louisiana’s Contrafl ow Plan 

Even before catastrophe strikes, evacuations are not simple. 

Careful planning is essential to a successful pre-landfall evacuation because of the problems 

that traffi c congestion and timing pose for the evacuees. Evacuation from the greater New 

Orleans area faces unique challenges for at least four reasons. First, evacuating the area requires at least a 45 to 80-mile trip (as compared to the 10 to 15-mile trip out of the aff ected 

areas in Mississippi). Second, there are only two or three ways out of the area. Th ird, one 

of those ways out of the area runs into Mississippi, requiring that state’s cooperation. And 

fourth, because of the limited number of ways to exit the metropolitan area, the northernmost parishes within the area (Orleans and Jeff erson) must wait patiently for the southernmost parishes within the area (St. Bernard and Plaquemines) to evacuate fi rst; otherwise, 

the northern parishes will choke off the southern parishes’ ability to evacuate. When these 

problems go unaddressed, thousands of people might be precluded from evacuating or 

delayed in Hurricane Ivan- or Rita-like traffi c jams extending for hundreds of miles.

Aft er the pre-landfall evacuation for Hurricane Georges fi rst exposed these problems in 

September 1998, the 13-parish Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Task Force asked the Louisiana Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness5

 (LOEP) to solve these problems by creating a 

“contrafl ow” plan.6

Chapter 16
Chapter 16

244

Generally speaking, contrafl ow turns all highway lanes in one direction, creating additional 

roadways for the execution of evacuation. Louisiana’s contrafl ow plan applied to Interstates 

10, 12, 55, and 59, so that all lanes of those highways would be heading out of New Orleans 

either upstate or east to Mississippi. 

Louisiana did not use its contrafl ow plan until the pre-storm evacuation for Hurricane Ivan 

in September 2004. In that initial experiment, the state and the parishes encountered serious 

problems with the execution of the contrafl ow plan, including disagreements among parishes 

as to which parishes should evacuate fi rst and the emergence of traffi c choke points in Baton 

Rouge and Slidell, Louisiana.7

 Th ese problems resulted in delays of 12-15 hours for people 

evacuating from the New Orleans metropolitan area,8

 as well as the deaths of nursing-home 

residents who died on the road in the heat and chaos of evacuating for Hurricane Ivan.9

To address the problems with contrafl ow that arose before Hurricane Ivan made landfall, 

the Governor ordered the Louisiana State Police (LSP) and the Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD) to develop a better evacuation plan.10 Th ose agencies 

assembled a task force and worked with private consultants, traffi c engineers, parish leaders, 

and local law-enforcement organizations in the relevant communities and conducted focus 

groups with residents to revise the plan.11

What resulted from this eff ort was the state’s 2005 contrafl ow plan, known as the Southeast 

Louisiana Emergency Evacuation Plan (LEEP). Th e plan resulted from cooperation between 

the governors and state police forces of Louisiana and Mississippi, as well as the state’s successful brokering of an agreement signed in April 2005 by the 13 parishes of the Southeast 

Louisiana Hurricane Task Force.

Th e LEEP addressed the problems identifi ed during Hurricane Ivan by (1) directing as 

much traffi c as possible away from what had been chokepoints at Baton Rouge and Slidell,12

(2) creating special procedures for coordination between Louisiana and Mississippi,13 and 

(3) requiring Jeff erson and Orleans Parishes to wait to evacuate their residents until aft er 

their neighboring parishes announced the evacuation of their residents.14

As to the last point, the LEEP seeks to manage the order in which parishes evacuate by 

establishing three phases for the pre-storm evacuation, based on geographic location and 

the time in which tropical storm force winds are forecasted to reach the aff ected area. Under 

the plan, Phase 1 of the evacuation begins at the 50-hour mark before landfall of a Category 

3 or higher hurricane, but contrafl ow only begins in Phase 3, once Jeff erson and Orleans 

Parishes have ordered evacuations, at around the 30-hour mark before landfall and aft er.15

Once the Governor fi nalized the plan in the spring of 2005, the state initiated a media blitz 

and public education campaign, with media outlets, the American Red Cross, and businesses like Wal-Mart, Home Depot, and Lowe’s all helping to distribute more than 1.5 million 

copies of the “Louisiana Citizen Awareness & Disaster Evacuation Guide.”16

Governor Blanco initiated contrafl ow at 4 p.m. on Saturday, August 27, and ended it at 5 p.m. 

on Sunday, August 28, with no vehicles waiting in queues to leave the potential impact area.17

By all accounts, Louisiana, Mississippi, and the Southeast Louisiana parishes successfully 

executed the 2005 LEEP, before Hurricane Katrina made landfall. With that plan, Louisiana 

evacuated approximately 1 million people before landfall.18

Th e post-Ivan revisions to the plan also contributed to the success of the pre-landfall evacuation, as traffi c jams exceeded two to three hours at most before Katrina made landfall, compared to the 12 to 15-hour traffi c jams evacuees experienced before Ivan made landfall.19
Pre-Storm Evacuations

245

Th ere was also close consultation between Louisiana and Mississippi offi cials, including 

conversations between Governor Blanco and Governor Barbour, which resulted in coordination between the two states on the execution of the pre-landfall evacuation.20 

Despite the success of the revamped contrafl ow plan, some offi cials saw opportunities for 

more improvement. Major John Miller, from the Mississippi Department of Public Safety, 

said that he would have state troopers stand farther back from the road next time: “[E]very 

third or fourth car has to stop and ask him a question,”21 snarling traffi c. Other suggestions 

included diverting some traffi c to avoid the bottlenecks at the northern ends of I-55 and I59,22 and working for better state-to-state communications interoperability.23

St. Bernard, Plaquemines, St. Tammany, and Jeff erson Parishes successfully followed and 

executed the LEEP. 

In St. Bernard Parish, Larry Ingargiola, the Director of Homeland Security and Emergency 

Preparedness for St. Bernard Parish, stated that he called for an evacuation of St. Bernard 

Parish – albeit something short of an actual mandatory evacuation – during the late evening 

of Friday, August 26.24 He recalled mentioning on the news that “We strongly recommend 

that you leave now because I don’t believe I have enough body bags to cover the people that 

stay.”25 Th e following evening, Saturday, August 27, the parish “called for mandatory evacuation, strongly recommended evacuation.”26 Between Friday and Saturday, he said, all television channels in Orleans, Jeff erson, Plaquemines, and St. Bernard Parishes ran scrolling 

news “zippers” noting the type of evacuation called for at the time.27 Moreover, Ingargiola 

described some of his parish’s concern about issuing a mandatory evacuation as follows:

Th e big decision on mandatory evacuation is monetary, the businesses themselves. When you do a mandatory evacuation, the businesses are required to 

close down. Th e refi neries are required to close down. We have three very large 

refi neries down [here]. ... It takes them roughly 8 to 12 hours to close down 

the refi nery. Every time they close it down, it’s over a million dollars to close it 

down and another million to bring it up. ... It’s not something you do easy.28

Furthermore, when asked whether St. Bernard’s evacuation of Saturday night was coordinated with other parishes, Ingargiola responded that it was not, because of concern that 

other parishes would act unilaterally:

No. We had a problem with Ivan because Jeff erson Parish pulled the plug before everybody else for mandatory evacuation and contrafl ow was in [eff ect] ... 

If the other parishes, Orleans and Jeff erson, pull the plug and we get contrafl ow, we are stuck. We can’t exit because we have one exit, Parish Road. You 

can’t go. You are not going to send your people through New Orleans because 

they are doing the same thing you’re doing. Th ey are going to sit in another 

parking lot.29

Despite these challenges, Ingargiola noted that St. Bernard Parish was able to successfully 

evacuate 92 percent of its population30 of approximately 66,000.31 When asked whether he 

felt his Friday night call for evacuation was early enough, Ingargiola said it might have been 

wiser to do so on Th ursday.32 But Th ursday, he noted, was a sunny day – had he called for 

an evacuation then, “Th e people would have thought I was crying wolf. Th at is your biggest fear, believe me. Somebody in my position, you will call it and somebody will just not 

believe what you call.”33

In Plaquemines Parish, Jesse St. Amant, Director of the Plaquemines Parish Homeland Security Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness, described its pre-storm evacuation policy and results:
Chapter 16

246

People like myself, as emergency managers, should not be thinking, if I make a 

mandatory declaration and I make that recommendation to the governor, that 

he hesitates to do that because it might cost too much, you’re putting a dollar 

value on [a life].

And in my business, if you ask how much it costs to do something, you’re in 

the wrong business cause you could in fact cost someone their life.

You have to do what you must do to save life, and promise, and I take it very 

seriously. I’ll give you an example. By declaring a mandatory evacuation, it cost 

Philips Conoco millions of dollars to safely shut down a petrochemical facility, 

and then it cost millions of dollars to start it up. Th e two most dangerous kinds 

of petrochemical facilities is the shutdown and the start-up of that facility. Very 

dangerous; very costly. Yet I don’t hesitate to advise parish presidents. He does 

not hesitate to support me. I have his ear. He has – since I’ve been here, he has 

– he hired me. And let me suggest this to you ... I will relate success. We had 

a 93 percent evacuation rate, one [of] the highest in the area, probably in the 

whole state. But we know we’re also the most vulnerable. So the options aren’t 

that great. You have to be out of this high-risk area.

Th e other issue that we do is we do – we’re probably the fi rst jurisdiction in the 

State of Louisiana to [start the evacuation process] that because we extend in 

the Gulf of Mexico.34

Plaquemines Parish issued a mandatory evacuation on Saturday, August 27.35

In St. Tammany Parish, Dexter Accordo has been the Director of Emergency Management 

and Homeland Security since July 18, 2004.36 He said St. Tammany used the EarthCall notifi cation system – a “reverse 911 [system] where you can dial up people by geographic area, 

and you can broadcast an audio message to them, giving them directions of what’s going 

on”37 – to warn residents to leave. When you order a mandatory evacuation, Accordo said, 

“At no point for the most part is it logistically feasible to go and knock on everybody’s door, 

reach in and grab that person and yank them out of their house.”38 So a broader program of 

education is called for:

We reinforce it with the brochure [of evacuation maps], we reinforce it with 

the phone calls, we reinforce it with the outreach program training, we reinforce it with other forms of media ... If I tell you, you need to do this, you’re 

going to probably hesitate, but if you know why because we educate you why 

you need to do it, then there’s a stronger probability you’re going to do it.39

Accordo also spoke to the unique geography of St. Tammany Parish. He stated that the 

parish “represent[s] about two-thirds of the evacuation routes” for the metropolitan area, 

specifi cally the twin spans (I-10), the Causeway, and the “old highway” (highway 90) on 

the east side of St. Tammany and Orleans Parishes.40 Th ese plans have a large impact on St. 

Tammany Parish:

We get the biggest push probably through our area. We have to be cognizant 

of that because long before that 30-hour moment [i.e., the third phase of the 

State’s evacuation plan], we’re starting to feel the impacts of all this traffi c.41

Th e number of evacuees from St. Tammany parish is uncertain. Accordo estimated that 

several hundred people were evacuated to a large special-needs shelter at Covington High 

School,42 that 4,000 to 6,000 more were housed in other parishes’ shelters,43 and that about 
Pre-Storm Evacuations

247

127,000 were evacuated from the parish entirely, subject to check against a University of 

New Orleans post-storm study.44

In Jeff erson Parish, Walter Maestri, Ph.D., is the Director of Emergency Management and 

Homeland Security.45 Maestri recalls that Jeff erson Parish President Aaron Broussard announced to the parish residents on late Friday aft ernoon, August 26, “that they should be 

ready to go [i.e., evacuate] Saturday morning.”46 He believes that about 70 to 80 percent of 

the residents of Jeff erson Parish evacuated prior to the storm,47 a “successful evacuation.”48

Maestri noted that Broussard’s call for a parish evacuation on Friday aft ernoon to take eff ect 

the following Saturday morning was not a call for a mandatory evacuation:

None of the Southeast Louisiana parishes, the larger ones, Orleans, Jeff erson, 

St. Tammany, make mandatory evacuations. Th e reason for it, guys, is it’s unenforceable. You can’t do it. ... Now as you know, Mayor Nagin later changed 

that. He went to mandatory, aft er fi rst going to recommended. But the bottom 

line is that we did not and never will in Jeff erson call mandatory because you 

can’t do it.49

With respect to the 20 to 30 percent of persons who did not evacuate the parish, Maestri 

thinks “they got extremely lucky,” because the parish only got a “glancing blow.”50 He notes 

that what hit Jeff erson parish was primarily a “wind event ... and that’s why the fatalities 

are as low as they are. But the water is the killer. And we didn’t get the water in Jeff erson.”51

Moreover, Maestri said about half of the residents that did not evacuate before the storm 

moved to refuges of last resort within the parish, and the other half stayed in their homes.52

Lastly, Maestri indicated that the parish’s refuges of last resort were stocked with food, water, and fi rst-aid supplies.53 Maestri noted that he has a professional level, full-time person 

on his staff – the Shelter Coordinator – who has the responsibility to oversee and operate all 

of the parish shelters and refuges.54 

Th e City of New Orleans Failed to Prepare a Draft Mandatory Evacuation 

Order Before Katrina Approached the Gulf Coast

Although it can never be known what impact earlier issuance of a mandatory-evacuation 

order would have had on the pre-landfall evacuation of New Orleans, it is clear that the city 

did not resolve all issues incident to a mandatory-evacuation order and did not have one 

prepared before Katrina approached the Gulf Coast.

On Friday, August 26, Mayor Nagin held a press conference at City Hall to announce that 

city offi cials were monitoring Hurricane Katrina. 

On Saturday, August 27, Mayor Nagin joined Governor Blanco, and other offi cials for 

a press briefi ng at 1 p.m., during which the Mayor advised, according to talking points 

prepared for that briefi ng, that citizens should prepare for the storm, to include checking 

on neighbors and particularly the elderly, and announced the city would be calling for a 

voluntary evacuation later that aft ernoon or the morning of August 28 to coincide with the 

initiation of contrafl ow.55

According to a press report, Mayor Nagin said, “Th is is not a test. Th is is the real deal. 

Th ings could change, but as of right now, New Orleans is defi nitely the target for this hurricane,” later adding, “We want you to take this a little more seriously and start moving 

– right now, as a matter of fact.”56 Th e Mayor also recommended that residents of Algiers, 

the Lower Ninth Ward, and low-lying areas begin evacuating. Citizens were also advised 

that there were two special-needs shelters open in the state in Alexandria and Monroe.
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248

When Mayor Nagin issued a mandatory-evacuation order on Sunday, August 28, at approximately 9:30 a.m. CT,57 it was the fi rst time the City of New Orleans had ever issued a 

mandatory-evacuation order, 58 even though state law authorizes any parish to issue one.59

He had ordered his staff to begin working on the order at noon on Saturday, August 27. According to witnesses, the city took nearly 24 hours to issue the order because it fi rst needed 

to resolve legal and logistical questions.60

Chief among the issues to resolve was the determination of which classes of individuals would be exempted from the order. As initially draft ed, there were four categories of 

exceptions: essential personnel of the city, regulated utilities, hospitals (including patients), 

and operating hotels (including guests).61 Aft er this draft was circulated to senior staff for 

review and comment, the list of exceptions was expanded to include the media and essential personnel of nursing homes (including residents). But then Colonel Terry Ebbert, New 

Orleans’ Director of Homeland Security and Public Safety, recommended that the city not 

except nursing homes.62

Th e fi nal order included the following exceptions: essential personnel of the United States 

of America, State of Louisiana and City of New Orleans; essential personnel of regulated 

utilities and mass-transportation services; essential personnel of hospitals and their patients; 

essential personnel of the media; essential personnel of the Orleans Parish Criminal Sheriff ’s 

Offi ce and its inmates; and essential personnel of operating hotels and their patrons.63

In addition to these issues, the city was also concerned about how it would enforce the mandatory-evacuation order, and what transportation resources it had at its disposal to facilitate 

execution of the order.64

Long-term planning and preparation by the city before Katrina approached the Gulf Coast 

could have obviated this nearly 24-hour eff ort to resolve these issues. 

Nevertheless, Governor Blanco insisted that Mayor Nagin’s planning had been adequate, 

pointing out that evacuation was well underway before the mandatory-evacuation order 

was issued.65

Th e New Orleans Health Director, Who Initiated Draft Agreements to 

Provide Transportation for New Orleanians Without the Means to Evacuate, Deserves Credit for His Ingenuity and Eff ort, but the City’s Director of 

Homeland Security and Public Safety Should Have Finalized Th ese Agreements Before and During the 2005 Hurricane Season

Although the city’s emergency plans anticipated at least 100,000 people without the means to 

evacuate aft er a catastrophic natural disaster,66 the city’s top offi cials failed to plan and prepare 

adequately for the pre-landfall evacuation of this less-mobile segment of the population. 

When Terry Tullier, the former Director of the New Orleans Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness, who served in that position from May 2001 to his retirement in 2004, realized “that 

the city did not have the resources and at the time ... perhaps not even the political will”67

to move this segment of the population, he began exploring other transportation options. 

One was a volunteer program called Operation Brother’s Keeper, which would enlist private 

citizens to help those who lacked transportation to evacuate.68 A second involved informal 

discussions with the Regional Transportation Authority (RTA), the Orleans Parish School 

Board, and Amtrak to determine whether they would agree to provide transportation for a 

pre-landfall evacuation of New Orleans.69

Operation Brother’s Keeper (OBK) was a faith-based initiative developed in collaboration 

with Kay Wilkins, the area’s local Chapter Director of the American Red Cross. Th rough 
Pre-Storm Evacuations

249

the program, churches would identify those within their congregations who did not have 

the means or ability to leave the city and match them with those who could help. Tullier 

recalled briefi ng Mayor Nagin and Col. Ebbert, with Wilkins, about the initiative: “Mayor 

Nagin said in no uncertain terms, anything that the city can do to support you, I’m all 

for this initiative.”70 Th ere was apparent fi nancial support for OBK, including a grant of 

$216,000 from a private organization.71

Although Operation Brother’s Keeper was in place before landfall, it was not fully developed as logistical issues such as rally points and destinations had not been determined.72

Th e second of these initiatives, seeking alternative transportation from a variety of providers, was developed in late 2004, when Dr. Kevin Stephens, Director of the New Orleans 

Health Department, resumed Tullier’s work aft er he stepped down as the City’s Director of 

Emergency Preparedness (OEP), leaving the post vacant for almost six months.73 Between 

Tullier’s retirement in December 2004 and the appointment of Chief Matthews in March 

2005, the OEP director’s position was vacant. During this time, Dr. Stephens entered the 

breach and went to work on securing transportation for an evacuation of the city. Dr. Stephens explained why he saw the need to contract for transportation and shelters:

All of our plans had primarily been [to] evacuate [to] the Superdome. And so 

I just thought that maybe as a general shelter, refuge of last resort, we should 

probably try to get some places outside the city and not at the Superdome because of the limitations of the Superdome. ... So I called Amtrak and I called the 

school board and RTA and other guys ... and asked them would they be willing 

to transport people out of the city, and they said sure, we’d be happy to.74 

Dr. Stephens prepared draft memoranda of understanding (MOUs) among the City of New 

Orleans and Amtrak, the RTA, the Orleans Parish School Board, and the Cities of Baton 

Rouge and Hammond, Louisiana, contemplating use of various transportation resources to 

evacuate people from New Orleans prior to a hurricane. Th ese draft s, with the exception of 

the Amtrak MOU, were internal documents, not shared with the other named entities.75

Responsibility for the MOUs returned to the City’s OEP shortly aft er the Mayor appointed 

Chief Matthews to replace Tullier as Director in March 2005.76

Th roughout the spring and summer of 2005, logistical obstacles dogged planning for the 

MOUs. Once people were evacuated from the city, was there enough shelter space to accommodate them? Once Amtrak delivered them to the Hammond train station, how would 

they be moved to state shelters? Most importantly, in the view of Chief Matthews, there was 

a shortage of drivers qualifi ed to participate in an evacuation.77

However, the City’s OEP, part of the City’s Offi ce of Homeland Security and Public Safety, 

did not follow through suffi ciently to ensure execution of a single one of those agreements.78

Shortly thereaft er in June 2005 – three months before Katrina made landfall – the City’s 

Director of Homeland Security and Public Safety, Colonel Ebbert, eff ectively decided to halt 

the negotiations on these MOUs, based on the following rationale: “June starts the hurricane season. You can’t go to war still draft ing you[r] plan, so you have to make decisions of 

what you’re going to do this season.”79 With that decision, Colonel Ebbert lost opportunities to push his subordinate, Chief Matthews, to close these deals, and to ask the Mayor, the 

state, and the federal government for assistance in brokering these agreements.80 Th e Committee disagrees with Colonel Ebbert that the city would be incapable of continuing work 

on long-term preparations for a catastrophic storm in the midst of hurricane season, as was 

evidenced by the city’s participation in a July 2005 workshop on transportation staging and 

distribution of commodities.
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Th e Director of the City of New Orleans Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness 

Turned Down Off ers of Assistance With the Pre-landfall Evacuation From 

the Regional Transit Authority (RTA)

Using federal funding granted in 2004,81 the New Orleans Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness 

composed a Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (the plan) to establish procedures to prepare the city for an emergency such as a hurricane. Th e plan divided emergency 

response into the standard Emergency Support Functions (ESFs), designating the Regional 

Transit Authority (RTA) as the primary agency82 for transportation during an evacuation.83

Specifi cally, the plan required the RTA to: “Supply transportation as needed in accordance 

with the current Standard Operating Procedures; place special vehicles on alert to be 

utilized if needed; position supervisors and dispatch evacuation buses; and if warranted by 

scope of evacuation, implement additional service.”84 Th e plan listed the following entities as supporting agencies under ESF-1: Orleans Parish School Board (OPSB), Louisiana 

Department of Transportation, Louisiana National Guard, and Amtrak.85

It was the understanding of James Tillie, RTA’s Chief Operating Offi cer, that the city would 

direct the RTA “to transport the citizens of the city from one location to safe harbor,” although for Katrina that meant the Superdome and not shelters outside of New Orleans.86

Th e city’s plan required the New Orleans OEP to coordinate and facilitate preparedness 

and planning for the plan’s designated response agencies, such as the RTA.87 Th e plan also 

required the OEP to direct and control those agencies with ESF responsibilities, such as 

the RTA, during emergency response operations.88 Although RTA is not a city agency, the 

Director of the Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness, Chief Matthews, acknowledged that 

the RTA, as the primary agency for ESF-1, would answer to and receive direction from the 

City’s OEP.89

Before Katrina made landfall, the RTA owned 372 buses and employed 650 drivers.90 RTA 

offi cials estimated that each bus could transport 40 people and their luggage out of the city 

during an evacuation.91 Of the drivers, approximately 100 volunteered for evacuation duty. 

(Th e number who remained in the city post-landfall was slightly lower, because some were 

prevented from returning to the city aft er driving special-needs evacuees to Baton Rouge 

because, consistent with the contrafl ow plan, the roads were closed a few hours before 

landfall.)92

Notwithstanding the RTA’s role under the City’s Emergency Operations Plan, RTA assets 

were not fully utilized in the pre-landfall evacuation because the Director of the New Orleans OEP, Chief Matthews, turned down the RTA’s off ers of assistance on the Saturday and 

Sunday before landfall, citing a lack of identifi able shelters as the reason.93

Th e City of New Orleans, the State of Louisiana, and the Federal Government 

Failed to Retain Drivers for the Pre-landfall Evacuation, Aft er City Offi cials 

Informed State and Federal Offi cials of Th is Need Over a Month Before 

Landfall

Although the New Orleans OEP Director, Chief Matthews, informed state and federal 

offi cials – over a month before Katrina hit – that New Orleans lacked bus drivers for a prelandfall evacuation,94 that need went unaddressed before landfall. 

Th e city had apparently designated buses from the RTA and the Orleans Parish School 

Board (the School Board), but the City’s Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness was having diffi -

culty getting them to agree to provide the city with bus drivers for the evacuation.95 Both the 

RTA and the School Board are independent creatures of state law and do not report directly 
Pre-Storm Evacuations

251

to the city, although the city – through its majority representation on the School Board 

– has the opportunity to exert control over it.96

At the July 2005 transportation, staging, and commodities distribution workshop (which 

was part of the Hurricane Pam planning project), Chief Matthews alerted state and federal 

offi cials of this hole in the city’s planning for the pre-landfall evacuation.97 Although he did 

not request assistance from the state and federal offi cials for buses or drivers,98 the federal 

offi cials who participated in the workshop understood that the city needed drivers: FEMA 

representative Jules Hurst recalled the local offi cials reporting that “they didn’t know if 

they could get the drivers to report.”99 A U.S. Department of Transportation representative, 

Dan Prevo, also recalled, based on the Pam discussions, that there was “no certainty that 

the drivers – if the buses would be made available, that the drivers would be available . . . a 

whole lot of research had to be done with regard to how many drivers would be available, or 

the liability issues that might be faced for the buses and for the drivers.”100

Informed of this need for drivers for over a month before Katrina hit, state and federal offi -

cials failed to explain why they did not take steps to recruit and retain drivers to participate 

in the pre-landfall evacuation. Th is inertia on the part of the state and federal government, 

which had been on notice of the city’s inability to muster drivers on their own, added to the 

city’s failures and resulted in a paucity of drivers available to participate in the pre-landfall 

evacuation – indeed, only 100 RTA drivers volunteered for duty. 101

Th e State’s Lead Agency for Transportation, the Louisiana Department of 

Transportation and Development, Failed to Meet its Responsibility Under 

the State’s Emergency Operations Plan for Identifying, Mobilizing, and Coordinating Transportation to Assist With a Pre-Landfall Evacuation

Th e state failed to provide any transportation to New Orleans for the pre-landfall evacuation mainly because the Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Transportation and 

Development (LA DOTD) chose to ignore the Department’s responsibility under ESF-1 

(transportation) of the April 2005 Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan to take the lead for 

coordinating transportation for the evacuation of at-risk populations.102

In January 2005, Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness 

(LOHSEP) offi cials explicitly told Gordon Nelson, LA DOTD Assistant Secretary for Operations, and Joseph Modicut, the Department’s emergency services coordinator, that primary 

responsibility for Emergency Support Function 1 (ESF-1) would likely be shift ed from the 

Louisiana National Guard to the LA DOTD to make the state’s plan consistent with the National Response Plan, which in December 2004 assigned the U.S. Department of Transportation to be the lead agency for ESF-1.103 Th ey also told the LA DOTD offi cials that their role 

in an emergency would be to coordinate obtaining buses from other sources, recognizing 

that LA DOTD did not maintain a fl eet of its own.104 Despite this notice and despite having 

signed the state plan in April, thereby binding the Department to assigned responsibilities 

within it, LA DOTD Secretary Johnny Bradberry and his Department took no steps to fulfi ll 

that responsibility. Bradberry said he assumed, albeit incorrectly, that the National Guard 

would handle mass bus transportation.105

Testifying before the Committee, Secretary Bradberry attempted to defend his agency by 

saying that the plan was “in transition,” and that he signed the plan to “keep things moving,” meaning he did not want to hold up the state’s overall emergency-operations planning 

process because of this issue. Nevertheless, he didn’t “necessarily agree with the idea that the 

Department of Transportation needs to have this transportation function.”106
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Because he felt that the city was addressing the evacuation of its citizens,107 Secretary Bradberry said that he had never had a conversation with Mayor Nagin, Colonel Ebbert, or Chief 

Matthews, about the evacuation of New Orleans residents without their own means to do 

so. Secretary Bradberry said: “We have done nothing to fulfi ll this responsibility ... we put 

no plans in place to do any of this.”108

Despite the January meeting with LOHSEP offi cials and the April signing of the plan by 

Secretary Bradberry, Nelson claimed he did not learn about the Department’s new responsibility until a July 2005 workshop, and Modicut said he did not learn about the new duty 

until the weekend before Katrina made landfall.109 Nelson disagreed with the assignment 

because the Department did not have an in-house stable of transportation resources, but 

he said nothing at the time.110 Th e Committee fi nds no reasonable explanation of why, for 

more than four months, the Department’s Assistant Secretary for Operations and Chief of 

Emergency Services were unfamiliar with a fundamental shift in the Department’s operational responsibilities under the state’s revised plan. Th ese offi cials, like Secretary Bradberry, 

did not advise state offi cials that DOTD signed a plan that it did not intend to follow, choosing to remain silent. 

In a letter to the U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs Committee, 

Secretary Bradberry commented on his Department’s lack of ESF–1 planning: 

To criticize the Louisiana Department of Transportation for failure to have a 

plan in place for transportation assets which were never requested is wholly 

unfair and unjust. Yes, DOTD should have acted sooner transitioning into the 

new responsibilities under the 2005 State Emergency Operations Plan, but the 

fact remains that DOTD did not receive any requests for transportation prior 

to Hurricane Katrina.111

Secretary Bradberry’s defense that there were no requests for transportation prior to Katrina rings hollow. Th e city discussed their lack of buses and drivers needed for a successful evacuation with state and federal offi cials at the July 2005 transportation, staging and 

commodities distribution workshop. Had LA DOTD taken meaningful steps to develop a 

plan, they would quickly have seen the inability of local government to manage its evacuation needs as a potentially catastrophic hurricane approached. Moreover, the state was not 

required to wait – and should not have waited – for a request from the city before off ering 

assistance, particularly when a catastrophe was imminent. 

As Katrina approached, some state offi cials were “leaning forward in the foxhole with 

[their] fi nger on the trigger.”112 Secretary Bradberry was not one of those offi cials. 

Th e Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness 

Did Not Exercise Suffi cient Oversight to Ensure that Louisiana Department 

of Transportation and Development Would Fulfi ll its Responsibilities Under 

the State’s April 2005 Plan

Th e Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan assigned LOHSEP primary responsibility for “all 

emergency activities conducted by state, local and parish governments ... before, during 

and aft er natural and technological disasters.”113 Included within the scope of this charge 

is “planning and preparations before emergencies.”114 Th is imposed the duty on LOHSEP 

to ensure that other agencies carry out their assigned responsibilities under the plan.115

LOHSEP failed to discharge this duty in the case of LA DOTD’s ESF–1 responsibilities for 

transportation under the state plan.
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253

As noted earlier, LA DOTD offi cials Modicut and Nelson met with senior LOHSEP and 

Louisiana National Guard offi cials in January 2005 to discuss a possible shift of assigned 

responsibility for ESF–1 from the Louisiana National Guard to LA DOTD.116 At this meeting and in subsequent correspondence, LOHSEP’s Chief of Planning, Sean Fontenot, said 

that LA DOTD understood the responsibilities it would be accepting, and he attempted to 

provide some initial guidance regarding expectations for planning:

DOTD, the biggest concern ... was they had no resources. Th ey didn’t own 

buses. Th ey didn’t own [trucks], but the Guard owns trucks. ... You go to the 

Guard and say, “We need trucks,” the Guard will give you trucks if they have 

them to give you. Th e buses, I mean, DOTD has relationships with organizations and agencies like Louisiana Motor Transit Authority Association. Use 

some of your – this is what I told them, use some of your contacts, use some of 

your relationships to build these databases, and things of that nature, and they 

agreed and they understood that, and we moved on.117

Based on Fontenot’s statement that Modicut and Nelson were at the meeting, both should 

have been aware of the issue and, presumably, aware that the state was going to be looking 

to DOTD to meet this need.118

Despite this meeting and subsequent correspondence, once the plan was signed in April 

2005, there was no substantive follow-up by LOHSEP offi cials to ensure that DOTD was 

undertaking planning to fulfi ll the new responsibilities assigned to it under the plan. As 

Flooded school buses, New Orleans

AP/Wide World Photo
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254

Louisiana National Guard commander Major General Bennett Landreneau acknowledged, 

the need for LOHSEP to ensure that DOTD met its planning responsibilities “slipped 

through the cracks.”119

Governor Blanco Did Not Request Transportation Resources From the Federal Government for Pre-landfall Evacuation

Although it is unclear precisely what transportation assets the state could have mobilized 

over the weekend to assist the city with the pre-landfall evacuation, neither the Governor 

nor any other state offi cial off ered to provide transportation to assist with the pre-landfall 

evacuation or requested federal assistance.

On August 27, the Governor sent President Bush a letter, requesting $9 million for assistance for emergency protective measures under the Staff ord Act, the federal law that coordinates federal disaster assistance to states.120 Although the Governor, in this letter, requested 

that $2.5 million be directed to evacuation needs, she did not specify a need for transportation.121 Th e President issued an emergency declaration the same day, eff ectively granting the 

Governor’s request.

During video teleconferences with local, state, and federal offi cials on Saturday, August 27, 

and on Sunday, August 28, state offi cials discussed the success of contrafl ow,122 but did not 

raise the issue of additional transportation assets, despite the long-standing realization that 

100,000 people in New Orleans lacked transportation. Although LOHSEP Acting Deputy Director Colonel Jeff Smith noted on that call that the Governor “is very appreciative of the federal resources that have come into the state and the willingness to give us everything you’ve 

got because, again, we’re very concerned with this,” neither he nor the Governor made a 

specifi c request of the federal government for transportation resources before landfall.123

Th is lamentable failure by the Governor to request transportation resources shows not only 

a lack of initiative, but also a failure of leadership. 

Mississippi

Before Katrina reached the Gulf Coast, thousands of Louisiana and Mississippi residents 

evacuated to other states, including Texas and Oklahoma. In Mississippi, localities declared 

mandatory evacuations as the hurricane approached. Th ese were carried out relatively well, 

but some residents chose to disregard the orders. Many had already complied with two falsealarm evacuations over the last year.124 Others had disagreeable evacuation experiences. Still 

others, approaching the end of the month, no longer had enough money to support themselves and their families on the road. State and local governments performed their roles well 

in evacuating those who agreed to leave, but must do better by those without the means.

Evacuations of General Population Went Relatively Well

Th e Mississippi Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) and the Mississippi Department 

of Transportation (MDOT) worked together to develop a hurricane evacuation guide that 

provides residents with a hurricane disaster checklist, information on evacuation routes, 

contrafl ow plans,125 traffi c control information, and emergency contact information.126

Th ough local governments must ultimately decide whether to order an evacuation,127 the 

state participates in the decision making process.128 Th is coordination is critical because 

once the city or county declares an emergency evacuation, the state becomes responsible 
Pre-Storm Evacuations

255

for managing traffi c fl ow and maintaining shelters.129 In preparing for Katrina, state offi cials 

worked with: the liaisons MEMA dispatched to the lower six counties along the Mississippi 

Gulf Coast; the Forrest County Emergency Operations Center in Hattiesburg; and the Louisiana Emergency Operations Center (because of contrafl ow agreements between Mississippi 

and Louisiana that provide for evacuations out of Southeast Louisiana to Mississippi).130 

Th e Mississippi Emergency Management Agency began monitoring the storm’s path and 

strength on August 24 – fi ve days before landfall – and issued its fi rst hurricane situation 

report that day.131 Two days later, another MEMA report notifi ed state and local agencies 

that the storm was now projected to make landfall near the Alabama/Mississippi border 

on Monday morning as a Category 4 hurricane.132 As a result, Governor Barbour declared 

a state of emergency which, according to Darryl Neely, the Governor’s Policy Advisor, 

prompted locals to begin evacuating coastal residents. State agencies met that aft ernoon 

at the state Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Jackson, Mississippi,133 and MEMA 

informed the three coastal counties of the storm’s path and projected landfall.134

When Robert Latham, the Executive Director of MEMA, which is located in Jackson, headed to the coast on August 27 to meet with county emergency managers to discuss storm 

preparations, he was worried that many would ignore evacuation orders.135

Latham and other state offi cials, who had reports of low traffi c counts on many evacuation 

routes and of residents having hurricane parties on the beach, 136 encouraged local offi cials 

to begin issuing mandatory, coordinated evacuation orders.137 Th ough many local governments had already issued strongly recommended,138 or mandatory evacuations,139 and were 

beginning to evacuate areas threatened by Hurricane Katrina throughout Friday evening 

and Saturday, some cities and counties were “slow to get them to come around,”140 according to the MEMA’s Response and Recovery Director: 

We were trying to make them understand that this was a bad storm and they 

didn’t want to move aggressively enough with the evacuation orders ... they 

should have called for a mandatory evacuation much earlier ... based on the 

information ... they had ... we felt that they should have called for mandatory 

evacuations of a larger area earlier and gotten the people out of there.141

According to Latham, emergency managers had a tough call to make in terms of evacuating 

residents: 

Th ey did understand how serious [the storm] could be ... aft er you’d already 

been through two or three evacuations, ... you go to your mayor or your 

supervisor and say, we’ve got to do this evacuation, ... then it falls back on the 

mayor or the board to ... stand up to public scrutiny when ... nothing happens. ... Th ey have to get reelected ... that’s just an unfortunate part of it.142

Because Katrina continued to intensify, National Hurricane Center Director Max Mayfi eld 

personally began calling state and local offi cials in the evening of August 27 to emphasize 

the threat.143 Mayfi eld also briefed Governor Barbour,144 comparing Katrina to Camille, 

the Category 5 storm that struck Mississippi in 1969. Governor Barbour and Latham felt 

the comparison to Camille would resonate, and asked Mayfi eld to convey the gravity of 

Katrina to the public.145 According to state and local offi cials, Mayfi eld and the Governors’ 

press and public announcements had the desired eff ect. Traffi c counts on evacuation routes 

began increasing.146
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Mandatory Evacuations Declared

Five Mississippi counties – Hancock, Jackson, Harrison, Stone, and Pearl River147 – issued mandatory-evacuation orders on or before August 28 for specifi c areas148 or zones in 

their counties and/or those living in mobile homes.149 Residents were told to travel north 

or northeast to avoid incoming traffi c from Louisiana and to use public shelters north of 

I-10.150

Many Residents Disregarded the Mandatory Evacuation Orders Due to 

Complacency, Poor Evacuation Experiences, and Insuffi cient Financial Resources to Support Th emselves and Th eir Families on the Road

State and local offi cials issued news releases, made appearances on local television and radio 

stations, used public address systems and, in certain neighborhoods, even went door-to-door 

to inform coastal residents about evacuation orders. Major Wayne Payne, Harrison County’s 

Deputy Sheriff , said that offi cers were particularly concerned about residents in the Henderson Point and D’Iberville areas, where the houses are built on stilts or are near water:151

Henderson Point here, we went door to door. We said, this is a bad one, you all 

need to get out. ... Th ese are houses on stilts. I mean, they’re 10, 15 feet off the 

ground and they’re gone. Th ey’re wiped out.152

Because offi cers did not have the authority to “drag people out of their homes” in places 

like Gulfport,153 they were forced to resort to more psychological forms of persuasion. If 

a resident refused to evacuate in Harrison County, an offi cer asked him to fi ll out a form 

indicating next of kin, which seemed to have the intended eff ect.154 In Waveland and Bay 

St. Louis, fi rst responders asked holdouts to make sure to have Social Security numbers on 

their body in permanent marker for easy identifi cation aft er the storm. Police compiled lists 

of locals who were determined to stay in their homes, recording names, birth dates, Social 

Security numbers, and next of kin.155 Th ese tactics proved eff ective in persuading residents 

to leave their homes.

Several factors contributed to resistance to evacuation. Evacuations earlier in the summer 

preceding a tropical storm and Hurricane Dennis, which largely turned out to have been 

false alarms, fostered skepticism.156 Others who had made it through 1969’s Hurricane 

Camille, the Category 5 storm that was the region’s benchmark for catastrophic storms until 

Katrina hit, thought they would see no worse. Harrison County’s Deputy Sheriff , Major 

Payne, explained:

I had a cousin that stayed in his house, and he said, Well, Camille only put a 

foot of water in my house. He stayed ... and had to climb in the attic to survive. Water got within six inches of his attic ... During Hurricane Camille, the 

tracks [railroad embankments] pretty well stopped the water. [With Katrina] 

we had storm surge on the Interstate.157

More than two-thirds of Katrina’s casualties in Mississippi were of retirement age, complicating evacuation. Others feared that looters would strike if they abandoned their homes.158

As the end of August neared, some residents had insuffi cient resources to support their 

families on the road. Latham explained:

People on fi xed income had ... paid their rent, they paid the utilities, bought 

their food for the month. ... I mean, a lot of people live check to check. And 

this is the 29th. And people ... said, look I don’t have money to evacuate.159
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257

Th e average cost of evacuation for three days for a family of four, including lodging, food 

and transportation, could easily exceed a thousand dollars. Many county residents had 

already evacuated several times that summer and simply could not aff ord it. Colonel Joe 

Spraggins, Director of Harrison County’s Emergency Management Agency recalled the 

explanation of one resident:

I’m single and have two children. ... I already evacuated ... twice when you 

all called before. And I had a choice. Because I am behind on everything now 

because I had to pay to go do that, and I have low income, and I had a choice, 

do I feed my children next month and pay the house rent or do I evacuate?160

State and local offi cials say that negative evacuation experiences in the past also contributed 

to residents’ reluctance to leave. Th e evacuation before Hurricane Ivan had stalled in and 

around Hattiesburg, where major evacuation routes converge, tripling the three-hour drive 

from the Gulf Coast to Jackson.161 As a result, Governor Barbour had asked Mississippi 

Public Safety Commissioner George Phillips to develop a plan that would provide additional law-enforcement offi cers to expedite evacuations, especially in the Hattiesburg area.162

According to state offi cials, the plan,163 completed prior to the 2005 hurricane season, was 

executed fl awlessly when residents evacuated during Katrina.164

By late Saturday and early Sunday – the day before landfall – Mississippi Department of 

Transportation offi cials reported “consistently high” traffi c counts and a “continuous increase in traffi c” in contrafl ow areas (I-55 and I-59).”165 By late Sunday evening, traffi c along 

the evacuation routes had decreased substantially.166 MDOT and MEMA offi cials stated that 

the evacuations went relatively well. According to MDOT’s Law Enforcement Coordinator, the biggest problem was residents’ waiting until the last minute to evacuate and then 

expecting traffi c to be minimal.167

Residents who, for a variety of reasons, ignored evacuation orders faced a greater set of 

problems than those evacuating. State and local governments performed effi ciently and effectively in evacuating those residents who agreed to leave, and persuading those who were 

undecided. Nevertheless, these agencies could have done better by the many residents of 

their communities who didn’t make it out not because of intransigence, but because they 

didn’t have the means. State and local offi cials have an obligation to help evacuate those 

who need assistance and should have specifi c plans to do so.

The Federal Government

Th e Federal Government Did Not Reach Out to State or Local Authorities 

About Transportation Alternatives for Th ose Lacking Means for Pre-Landfall Evacuation

In public-hearing testimony, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Michael 

Chertoff acknowledged the critical importance of pre-landfall evacuation: “In a situation 

like a fl ood in Katrina or an earthquake, the critical, the number-one most important thing 

is to get people out of the area in advance. Once the event has occurred, it’s going to be very 

diffi cult to rescue people.”168

As noted earlier, while Governor Blanco asked President Bush for and received the government’s help in paying the costs of contrafl ow, among other pre-storm needs, she did not 

ask for transportation from the federal government to assist the state with the pre-landfall 

evacuation. Th us, in an eff ort to obtain transportation assistance, the Governor did not 
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258

initiate the longstanding practice of making a formal request of the federal government for 

assistance. 

Th e federal government played no role in providing transportation for pre-landfall evacuation. Both in the run-up to Katrina and subsequent interviews, federal offi cials provided the 

same explanation: they were accustomed to the longstanding practice of generally deferring 

to the primary emergency response to state and local governments.169 Although the National Response Plan (NRP) does not specifi cally address evacuations, a “basic premise of the 

NRP is that incidents are generally handled at the lowest jurisdictional level possible,” and 

that in “some instances, a Federal agency in the local area ... may provide direction or assistance consistent with its specifi c statutory authorities and responsibilities.”170 (See Chapter 

12 and 27 for a fuller discussion of the NRP and the specifi c statutory authorities.)

Th roughout the weekend of August 27 and 28 it had become increasingly clear to federal, 

state, and local offi cials that Hurricane Katrina would be a catastrophe. Mayor Nagin took 

the unprecedented step (albeit with some hesitation) of calling for a mandatory evacuation 

of New Orleans. Both President Bush and Governor Blanco actively encouraged that step. 

Th ere was no question that evacuation before landfall was the highest priority.

While the widespread support for mandatory evacuation is laudable, it is unfortunate that 

the federal government did not take a greater interest in the practicality of that evacuation 

in a city widely known to have made no arrangements for evacuation of the thousands of 

its citizens lacking personal transportation. Federal offi cials had participated actively in the 

Hurricane Pam exercise (See Chapter 8), which predicted that some 100,000 New Orleanians would lack means of evacuation.171 Federal offi cials did not need to wait for a request 

before off ering help. 

Although time would not have been on their side in the last two days before landfall, the 

DHS had a window – however slim – within which to act. But it does not appear that DHS 

leaders asked about what the state and the city were doing to evacuate the 100,000 people 

without transportation. Nor did they ask whether it would be useful for the federal government to mobilize and deploy buses or drivers to Southeast Louisiana.172 Nor did they ask 

whether it would be helpful to use the weight of the federal government to urge railroads, 

airlines, transit systems, or cruiselines to become engaged in the pre-landfall evacuation. 

Further, as the Committee found in Chapters 12 and 27, Secretary Chertoff failed to activate 

the Catastrophic Incident Annex (CIA) to the National Response Plan before landfall. Had 

Secretary Chertoff activated the CIA, it would have sent a clear message to federal agencies 

that they should be pushing assets, including transportation assets, forward to mobilization 

centers close to the disaster or in certain circumstances directly to the incident scene.

During the Hurricane Pam exercise, and follow-up July 2005 workshop, federal offi cials had 

heard state and local offi cials openly discuss their shortage of buses and other resources to 

evacuate that population.173 While there is some disagreement as to the fi rmness of federal 

commitment, federal offi cials evidently discussed at least the possibility of providing the 

buses that the state lacked.174 Participants in the July 2005 Pam workshop on transportation, 

staging, and commodities distribution even agreed on a timetable to pre-stage buses ahead 

of landfall, to be prepared for post-landfall evacuation needs.175 Even though this planning 

wasn’t complete by the time Katrina struck, federal offi cials were aware of evacuation challenges for state and local governments.

With no plans to supplement state and local transportation resources, federal options were 

limited. Getting buses from distant sources to New Orleans, as it did aft er landfall, may not 

have been realistic, depending on when the eff ort was initiated over the weekend. On the 
Pre-Storm Evacuations

259

other hand, there were many transportation assets either in the area (such as municipal 

buses, riverboats and cruise ships) or accessible (such as trains and airplanes) that the federal government could have helped to make available. Th e post-landfall resourcefulness of 

many offi cials who arranged for transportation alternatives suggests what could have been 

easily attempted before landfall.

Th ere is other evidence that the federal government can mobilize transportation resources 

for evacuation when it chooses to do so. Pursuant to a request from the State of Louisiana, 

the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) contracted for 1,100 buses and two drivers 

per bus for post-landfall evacuation during Katrina. Federal offi cials also staged a major air 

evacuation.176 Later, in preparation for Hurricane Rita, DOT reached out to transit agencies 

from Texas to Georgia to Florida.177 Four days before Hurricane Rita made landfall, FEMA, 

through DOT, ordered immediate staging outside of New Orleans of 650 buses “for use in 

evacuation of New Orleans and Southern parishes.”178 Also before Hurricane Rita made 

landfall, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) evacuated 1,204 patients and people with 

special needs before landfall, between 7 a.m. on September 21, when they received the mission assignment and noon on September 23.179

Th e DOT’s Federal Transit Administration (FTA) is in a uniquely strong position to coordinate privately and publicly owned buses. Th e FTA has close relationships with regional 

transit authorities through emergency preparedness operations. For instance, New Orleans’ 

RTA is a 92 percent federally funded agency and has extensive relationships with the regional 

offi ce of DOT.180 Also, DOT situation reports show that the FTA was keeping close tabs 

before landfall on the Baton Rouge transit system buses.181 Although the state was late asking 

the Baton Rouge transit system to participate in the post-landfall evacuation of New Orleans, 

it appears that the DOT did not ask the Baton Rouge transit system to participate at all.

Federal offi cials were both aware of state and local shortfalls, and had both the capacity and 

opportunities to help. But in the absence of adequate plans and policies, federal offi cials 

were paralyzed to act.

At 10:15 a.m. Sunday, August 28, the day before landfall, FEMA’s Acting Deputy Director 

Patrick Rhode, sent an e-mail to other FEMA offi cials, conceding that time had run out to 

help New Orleans with pre-landfall evacuation.182 Contrafl ow ended at 5 p.m. that day.183

Whether that seven-hour interval off ered any opportunity for useful federal action is unclear, but federal offi cials did not engage state and locals on the issue.

During a noon video-teleconference call the same day, then-FEMA Director Michael Brown 

asked Colonel Smith if there were “any unmet needs, anything that we’re not getting to 

you that you need” to which Colonel Smith responded, “Mike, no.” Brown testifi ed that he 

was seeking information from the state on what it needed at that moment only.184 As with 

Rhode’s e-mail, by noon on Sunday, time was limited for the federal government to help 

New Orleans with its pre-landfall evacuation. 

Secretary Chertoff was right when he said that evacuation was the primary mission before 

landfall.185 A concentrated eff ort by the federal, state, and local governments to eff ect a more 

complete evacuation of New Orleans before landfall would have likely reduced the number 

of people to care for at the Superdome, the Convention Center, and other collection sites; 

eased the burden of the search-and-rescue eff ort; lessened the challenge of the post-landfall 

evacuation; and reduced the number of critical supplies, medical support, and law enforcement that were needed in New Orleans aft er landfall. 
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Th e Federal Government Had the Authority to Assist With Pre-Landfall 

Evacuation, Even in the Absence of a Request for Assistance from State and 

Local Governments

Due to disagreement among offi cials as to whether, when, and to what extent the federal 

government could assist with a pre-landfall evacuation, it is helpful to examine the law and 

policy directing the way in which federal offi cials could have assisted with the pre-landfall 

evacuation.

 Federal law imposes no requirement for the federal government to aid pre-landfall evacuations. Such a requirement would be inconsistent with the principle that local and state authorities have primary responsibility for emergencies, receiving federal assistance only when 

their own resources are overwhelmed. However, federal law does not prohibit the federal 

government from extending assistance, even without a request from the state, when preparing for or responding to an imminent catastrophe such as Hurricane Katrina. 

Th e Robert T. Staff ord Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Staff ord Act) 

gives the federal government the authority to assist the state and local governments with an 

evacuation. Congress made clear in the Staff ord Act that its purpose was to “vest responsibility for emergency preparedness jointly in the Federal government and the states and 

their political subdivisions.”186 Included within the Staff ord Act’s defi nition of “emergency 

preparedness” is any measure “undertaken in preparation for anticipated hazards,” such as 

“the non-military evacuation of the civilian population.”187

Th e Staff ord Act also authorizes the President – and, through Executive Orders, the Secretary of Homeland Security188 – to direct federal agencies to “provide assistance essential to 

meeting immediate threats to life and property resulting from a major disaster,” including 

but not limited to the “movement of supplies or persons” and the “reduction of immediate 

threats to life, property, and public health and safety.”189 A common-sense reading of this 

language would indicate that the Staff ord Act authorized the President to direct a federal 

agency to help state and local governments move people out of New Orleans both before 

and aft er landfall to meet the “immediate threat” of Katrina.

Th e Homeland Security Act of 2002 enumerates FEMA’s functions which include assistance with evacuations. Under the Act, FEMA’s mission is “to reduce the loss of life and 

property and protect the Nation from all hazards by leading and supporting the Nation in 

a comprehensive, risk-based emergency management program,” including the responsibility for mitigation of risk to people and property, planning, and responding “to save lives ... 

through evacuating potential victims.”190

FEMA’s mission under the Homeland Security Act was to take steps to mitigate the risks to 

people that could arise from Katrina; plan to help offi cials prepare for Katrina and similar 

catastrophic storms; plan for an evacuation in the event of a catastrophic storm; respond to 

Katrina by “evacuating potential victims”; and coordinate eff orts by other offi cials.191

Th e Catastrophic Incident Annex (CIA) to the NRP delineates federal policy on a more 

proactive response to catastrophes. Th ese issues are discussed in Chapters 12 and 27. 

Provisions for Household Pets

Hurricane Katrina revealed that consideration of the needs of those with pets should be a 

factor in emergency planning for evacuations and sheltering.
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Th e City of New Orleans’ plans do not refer to pets, but the State of Louisiana’s EOP 

includes an appendix entitled, “Animal Management in Disasters,” which directs veterinarians, animal control personnel, and humane society volunteers to, among other things, “coordinate with the Louisiana Shelter Task Force on the sheltering of companion animals.”192

Th e NRP does not address the implications of evacuation and sheltering for pets, but has 

scattered references to animals. Most of these references relate to preventing outbreaks of 

disease through animals.193

More than 50 percent of U.S. households have pets.194 In the aft ermath of Katrina, the media 

brought to light many stories of individuals who refused to evacuate without their animals.195 One study revealed that childless households with pets were twice as likely to fail to 

evacuate as households with children. In other words, in childless households, owners “were 

apparently willing to jeopardize their lives to stay with their pets.”196 In his aft er-action 

report on Hurricane Katrina, Captain Mark Willow of the Homeland Security Division of 

the New Orleans Police Department wrote that “Some of the fatalities in New Orleans and 

surrounding areas may be attributable to the fact victims would not leave their pets at home 

or would not consider leaving without them.”197

Evacuation with pets before the storm was diffi cult for many since emergency shelters usually prohibit animals. Th e American Red Cross did not allow animals in its shelters.198 Animals can cause allergic reactions for some residents of the shelter, increase hygiene problems, and may become dangerous or unruly in the stressful setting of a shelter.199 Even aft er 

the storm passed, the media reported on many individuals unwilling to leave their homes 

despite dangerous conditions unless rescuers agreed to rescue their pets as well.200

Th e national organization of the American Red Cross works cooperatively with animal 

welfare organizations to develop procedures for stationing animal shelters close to its own 

shelters.201 In this way, owners are able to evacuate with their pets and maintain contact 

aft er arrival at the shelter. Th e American Red Cross implements this policy by encouraging 

local chapters to work with animal organizations to establish local agreements.202 However, 

Gulf Coast victims did not have pet accommodations inside or in close proximity to many 

of the available shelters.203 In particular, the New Orleans Superdome, the city’s refuge of 

last resort, had no pet shelter facilities inside or close by, and the Committee has seen no 

evidence of formal arrangements for Superdome refugees’ pets.204

During Katrina, the Lamar-Dixon Expo Center in Gonzales, Louisiana, (approximately 30 

miles from Baton Rouge) was designated as an animal shelter. Typically used for 4-H events 

and rodeos, it has almost 1,000 horse stalls and thus was able to serve both large and small 

animals.205 During Katrina, the Center handled approximately 8,500 rescued animals.206

For Katrina, FEMA activated all four of its Veterinary Medical Assistance Teams (“VMAT”) 

to the Gulf Coast.207 Th is involved more than 200 veterinarians and was FEMA’s largest 

simultaneous deployment of veterinary relief.208 Th e National Guard and Louisiana State 

Police assisted in collecting stray dogs.209 On September 2, 2005, the American Society for 

the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA) and the Humane Society of the United 

States (HSUS) began a coordinated campaign with a dozen local organizations and volunteers from across the country to rescue animals from the aft ermath of Katrina. 

For Katrina, no standardized system for tracking rescued animals was in place. Th e website 

Petfi nder.com came to play an important role in allowing owners to fi nd rescued pets. 210
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1 Th e number 100,000 is cited during numerous interviews including: Committee staff interview of Terry Tullier, then 

Director, New Orleans Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness, LA, conducted on Nov. 22, 2005, transcript p. 18. See also: 

City of New Orleans, Emergency Response Shelter/Plan appropriations request, FY2006, p. 1 (Col. Terry Ebbert is the 

point of contact, “Th e city of New Orleans faces the reality that it is impossible to conduct a mandatory evacuation in 

advance of a Category 3, 4, or 5 hurricane, as well as respond to other disasters including terrorism. Even under the 

best conditions that currently exist in terms of emergency response in the New Orleans region, evacuation would leave 

150,000 people in harm’s way.”).

2 Some attribute the reason for choosing not to leave as cultural. Both Col. Terry Ebbert and former Offi ce of Emergency 

Preparedness Director Terry Tullier expressed this sentiment in interviews. Col. Ebbert noted: “But these people hadn’t 

seen a Cat 3 since Betsy, 1965. So you’re talking about people who don’t think it’s going to hit them. Ivan last year bored 

down on us until it got to the mouth of the Mississippi and it turned. ... And I think it’s a cultural thing that’s been 

brought along.” Source: Committee staff interview of Col. Terry Ebbert, Director, New Orleans Offi ce of Homeland 

Security, LA, conducted on Oct. 13, 2005, transcript p. 97. Tullier said, “Th e fi rst thing is a public offi cial has to convince 

this cultural masses [sic] that have accumulated this cultural philosophical viewpoint over 40 years, has to convince them 

it is in their best interests [inaudible] to leave.” Source: Tullier interview, Nov. 22, 2005, p. 216. 

3 Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 44.

4 Committee staff interview of Joseph Matthews, Director, New Orleans Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness, LA, conducted on Nov. 23, 2005, transcript p. 193.

5 In 2003, the state renamed this offi ce the Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness. 

6 Committee staff interview of Sean Fontenot, former Chief, Preparedness Division, Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland 

Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP), conducted on Jan. 10, 2006, transcript pp. 108-109 (“Aft er Hurricane Georges in ’98, local government in Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Task Force, which is comprised of the thirteen 

parishes in the southeast corner of the state ... went to the state and said, ‘we need help with this. We need Contrafl ow. 

We need you to do this.’”).

7 During the Hurricane Ivan evacuation, traffi c ground to a halt in Baton Rouge as I-10 and 1-12 converged. Sheila Grissett, “Evacuation decision expected today for metropolitan area,” New Orleans Times-Picayune, July 8, 2005. http://www.

nola.com/news/t-p/frontpage/index.ssf?/base/news-3/1120800310204660.xml. Accessed on May 15, 2006.

8 Committee staff interview of Sec. Johnny Bradberry, Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development, 

conducted on Nov. 17, 2005, transcript pp. 38-39.

9 Committee staff interview of Joseph Donchess, Executive Director, Louisiana Nursing Home Association, conducted 

on Jan. 9, 2006, transcript pp. 64-65.

10 Committee staff interview of Henry Whitehorn, Superintendent, Louisiana State Police, conducted on Nov. 29, 2005, 

transcript p. 19.

11 Whitehorn interview, Nov. 29, 2005, pp. 20-21.

12 Th e plan established three corridors out of New Orleans on I-55 North, I-10 West, and I-10 East and excluded I-12 

as a route to Baton Rouge, with hopes of directing as many people away from Baton Rouge as possible. Source: Committee staff interview of Bob Chapman, Emergency Services Manager, Mississippi Department of Transportation, and 

William Huff , Director, Enforcement, Mississippi Department of Transportation, conducted on Dec. 14, 2005, transcript 

pp. 28-30. Starting contrafl ow requires stopping traffi c in the lanes heading into the evacuation area. Th is process takes 

about 30 minutes. Once contrafl ow is initiated, the routes leading out of the area are limited to help alleviate congestion 

caused by people who might otherwise try to turn or change routes. At a specifi c point, on I-10 West, I-10 East, and I-55 

North, traffi c must follow designated routes which end up either west of Baton Rouge or in Mississippi. As depicted on 

the Louisiana Citizens Awareness & Disaster Evacuation Guide, I-10 West will have eight lanes of traffi c leading out of 

New Orleans, but at mile marker 209, those traveling on the eastbound lanes will be diverted onto the westbound lanes 

of I-10 and will continue west on I-10 toward Baton Rouge; those on the westbound lanes will be forced to go on to I-55 

North to travel to Mississippi. If evacuees take I-10 East, they will also eventually wind up on I-51 traveling to Mississippi passing through Slidell. To alleviate congestion caused by entering or exiting traffi c, traffi c is “laned,” meaning that 

once on the route the evacuee is dedicated for some extended period of time. Source: Louisiana State Police, Louisiana 

Department of Transportation and Development, and LOHSEP, Overview of the Louisiana Emergency Evacuation Plan, 

2005 [hereinaft er Overview of the Louisiana Emergency Evacuation Plan].

13 Under the plan, if contrafl ow into Mississippi is needed, the Louisiana governor will contact the Mississippi governor, 

who will make the decision whether to implement contrafl ow. Source: Chapman and Huff interview, Dec. 14, 2005, pp. 

69-71. Th e improved LEEP has two possible contrafl ow route operations: Option 1, Louisiana contrafl ow to state line, 

which is full-lane reversal only within the borders of Louisiana; and Option 2, Mississippi contrafl ow to I-59 mile marker 

and to I-55 mile marker 31. Mississippi requests four hours advance notice for contrafl ow to the state line, three additional hours advance notice to start I-55 and I-59 contrafl ow operations if the state line operation is already in place, and 

seven hours notice to go straight into I-55 and I-59 contrafl ow operations. Th ese points were chosen to end contrafl ow 

because of concerns about manpower and the desire to get traffi c fl owing normally prior to arrival at a major metropolitan area, particularly Hattiesburg. Source: Mississippi Department of Transportation, Contrafl ow Plan for Interstate 

Hurricane Evacuation Traffi c Control, Aug. 2005, pp. 7, 20, 22, 37, 39; Chapman and Huff interview, Dec. 14, 2005, p. 50. 

14 Committee staff interview of Lt. Col. Mark Oxley, Chief of Staff , Louisiana State Police and Lt. Col. Joseph Booth, 

Special Projects Deputy Superintendent, Louisiana State Police, conducted on Dec. 9, 2005, transcript pp. 33-34. Phase 
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three of LEEP includes areas on the East Bank of the Mississippi River in the New Orleans metropolitan area, which are 

within the levee protection system but remain vulnerable to a slow moving Category 3 or any Category 4 or 5 storm. 

Source: Overview of the Louisiana Emergency Evacuation Plan. Following Hurricane Dennis, during which Jeff erson Parish evacuated out of plan order, Jeff erson Parish President Aaron Broussard sent a letter in July 2005 to Governor Blanco 

criticizing part of the state’s evacuation plan. According to the Jeff erson Parish Director of Emergency Management, 

Dr. Walter Maestri, the plan put a tremendous burden on local law enforcement to get people through parish neighborhoods and onto the Interstates. Further, because of Jeff erson Parish’s geographic boundaries, citizens of the parish, 

depending on what part of the parish they reside, fall in Phase 1, Phase 2, and Phase 3 zones. So, “If we follow the State 

plan perfectly one of our three groups has got to leave at night in the dark.” Source: Committee staff interview of Walter 

Maestri, Ph.D., Director, Jeff erson Parish Offi ce of Emergency Management, LA, conducted on Oct. 25, 2005, transcript 

pp. 90-92. It should be noted that Jeff erson Parish followed the State Plan for the Katrina evacuation, although it helped 

matters for Jeff erson Parish that the state operated the evacuation on a “compressed time line.” While a “compressed 

time line” was in place for Hurricane Katrina, Jeff erson Parish was criticized in Hurricane Dennis for compressing the 

time line of their evacuation. Source: Maestri interview, Oct. 27, 2005, pp. 20-21. 

15 Th e LEEP is based on a phased evacuation process which calls for specifi c action by specifi ed location at certain designated times before the scheduled landfall of a Category 2 or greater hurricane: (1) Phase 1 – at 50 hours before the onset 

of tropical storm winds, areas south of the intracoastal waterway may evacuate; (2) Phase 2 – at 40 hours before the onset 

of tropical storm force winds, areas south of the Mississippi River which are levee protected but remain vulnerable to 

Category 2 or higher storms may evacuate; (3) Phase 3 – at 30 hours before the onset of tropical storm force winds, areas 

along the East Bank of the Mississippi River in the New Orleans metropolitan area which are within the levee protection 

system but remain vulnerable to a slow moving Category 3 or any Category 4 or 5 storm may evacuate. Th e contrafl ow 

plan, reversing highway lanes so that all traffi c can fl ow away from the potential impact area, is implemented during 

Phase 3. Overview of the Louisiana Emergency Evacuation Plan. 

16 Whitehorn interview, Nov. 29, 2005, pp. 18-22.

17 Oxley and Booth interview, Dec. 9, 2005, pp. 167, 203.

18 Mayor Nagin, in testimony before the Committee on Feb. 1, 2006 stated, “Our region had one of the most successful 

mass evacuations in the history of the United States. Over 90% of our residents evacuated. Over one million people left 

the region within 24 hours.” Source: Testimony of Mayor C. Ray Nagin, City of New Orleans, LA, before the U.S. Senate, 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Managing the Crisis and 

Evacuating New Orleans Feb. 1, 2006. In testimony before the Committee on Feb. 2, 2006, Governor Blanco stated that 

“1.3 million people” were moved to safety “through our contrafl ow plan.” Source: Written Statement of Gov. Kathleen 

Blanco, Louisiana, for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Role of Governors in Managing the Catastrophe, Feb. 2, 2006, p. 1.

19 Bradberry interview, Nov. 17, 2005, pp. 38-39. 

20 Testimony of Gov. Haley Barbour, Mississippi, before the U.S. House, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the 

Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing on Hurricane Katrina Preparedness and Response by the 

State of Mississippi, Dec. 7, 2005.

21 Committee staff interview of Maj. John Miller, Highway Safety Patrol, Public Safety Department, MS, conducted on 

Dec. 14, 2005, transcript p. 18.

22 Maj. Miller interview, Dec. 12, 2005, p. 19.

23 Maj. Miller interview, Dec. 12, 2005, p. 31.

24 Committee staff interview of Larry Ingargiola, Emergency Manager, St. Bernard Parish, LA, conducted on Oct. 26, 

2005, transcript p. 69-70.

25 Ingargiola interview, Oct. 26, 2005, p. 69.

26 Ingargiola interview, Oct. 26, 2005, p. 64.

27 Ingargiola interview, Oct. 26, 2005, p. 79.

28 Ingargiola interview, Oct. 26, 2005, p. 65.

29 Ingargiola interview, Oct. 26, 2005, p. 68.

30 Ingargiola interview, Oct. 26, 2005, p. 66. Mr. Ingargiola noted that it is his belief that it takes between 36 to 48 hours 

to evacuate that percentage of people from St. Bernard Parish. Source: Ingargiola interview, Oct. 26, 2005, p. 73. Additionally, Mr. Ingargiola stated that he was happy with this percentage, noting that, “I would have loved to see more 

people get out, but I don’t think we would have been able to get more people out than what we did.” Source: Ingargiola 

interview, Oct. 26, 2005, p. 100. “Th e ones that were left that we had to evacuate wouldn’t have left no matter what. I 

don’t think. We would have had to personally drag them out.” Source: Ingargiola interview, Oct. 26, 2005, p. 153.

31 U.S. Census Bureau, “QuickFacts: St. Bernard Parish, Louisiana,” 2004. http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/

states/22/22087.html. Accessed on Mar. 27, 2006.

32 Ingargiola interview, Oct. 26, 2005, p. 75.

33 Ingargiola interview, Oct. 26, 2005, p. 75.

34 Committee staff interview of Jesse St. Amant, Director, Plaquemines Parish Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness, con-
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ducted on Nov. 9, 2005, transcript p. 23-25.

35 Louisiana, Preparation and Response to Hurricane Katrina Integrated Timeline, p. 13. Provided to Committee.

36 Committee staff interview of Dexter Accordo, Emergency Manager, St. Tammany Parish, LA, conducted on Nov. 10, 

2005, transcript pp. 3-4.

37 Accordo interview, Nov. 10, 2005, p. 47.

38 Accordo interview, Nov. 10, 2005, p. 50.

39 Accordo interview, Nov. 10, 2005, p. 50.

40 Accordo interview, Nov. 10, 2005, pp. 94-95.

41 Accordo interview, Nov. 10, 2005, p. 95.

42 Accordo interview, Nov. 10, 2005, pp. 96-97.

43 Accordo interview, Nov. 10, 2005, p. 97.

44 Accordo interview, Nov. 10, 2005, pp. 108-109.

45 Maestri interview, Oct. 25, 2005, p. 7.

46 Maestri interview, Oct. 25, 2005, p. 102.

47 Maestri interview, Oct. 25, 2005, pp. 75-76; Committee staff interview of Walter Maestri, Ph.D., Director, Jeff erson 

Parish Offi ce of Emergency Management, LA, conducted on Oct. 27, 2005, transcript p. 37. Maestri stated that this 

estimation is based on the analysis conducted by the Survey Research Center of the University of New Orleans. Maestri 

interview, Oct. 27, 2005, p. 37.

48 Maestri interview, Oct. 25, 2005, pp. 98-99. Moreover, Maestri stated, “We defi ne that as everybody who wanted to go 

had the opportunity to go in Jeff erson [parish]. So from my perspective that was a success.” Maestri interview, Oct. 25, 

2005, p. 99.

49 Maestri interview, Oct. 25, 2005, pp. 102-103.

50 Maestri interview, Oct. 25, 2005, p. 76.

51 Maestri interview, Oct. 25, 2005, p. 76.

52 Maestri interview, Oct. 25, 2005, p. 166.

53 Maestri interview, Oct. 27, 2005, pp. 49-51.

54 Maestri interview, Oct. 25, 2005, p. 20.

55 City of New Orleans, Mayor’s Press Room, Katrina Update, Talking Points, Aug. 27, 2005, 1 p.m. Provided to Committee.

56 “Mayor Urges Storm Preparations,” New Orleans Times-Picayune, Aug. 27, 2005. http://www.nola.com/newslogs/

breakingtp/index.ssf?/mtlogs/nola_Times-Picayune/archives/2005_08.html. Accessed on Mar. 21, 2006.

57 Gordon Russell, “Nagin orders fi rst-ever mandatory evacuation of New Orleans,” New Orleans Times-Picayune, Aug. 

28, 2005. www.nola.com/newslogs/breakingtp/index.ssf?/mtlogs/nola_Times-Picayune/archives/2005_08.html. Accessed 

on Apr. 15, 2006. When announcing the mandatory evacuation, the Mayor said, “I am this morning, declaring that we 

will be doing a mandatory evacuation,” and “I wish I had better news for you. But we are facing a storm that most of us 

have feared. I do not want to create panic. But I want the citizens to understand that this is very serious. ... We sent out 

a fax to all the churches that we could this morning, basically alerting them to exactly what we’re doing, and asking them 

to buddy up, to fi nd members in their congregations, to check on the senior citizens or a citizen who may not ... have 

the means and is totally reliant upon public transportation to get around.” Th e Mayor noted that the Superdome would 

open to the general public as a refuge of last resort at 12 p.m. Th ere were 12 locations identifi ed by the Regional Transit 

Authority (RTA) and announced by the Mayor as designated pick-up points for individuals in need of transport to the 

Superdome. Th e locations were: (1) E.J. Morris Senior Center, 1616 Caffi n Ave.; (2) Frantz, 9th Ward, 3811 N. Galvez St.; 

(3) Warren Easton, Mid-City, 3019 Canal St.; (4) Augustine, Mid-City, 425 S. Broad St.; (5) S. Williams, Uptown, 5712 

S. Claiborne Ave.; (6) Rabouin, CBD, 727 Carrondelet St.; (7) Arthur Monday Center, 1111 Newton St.; (8) O. Perry 

Walker H.S., West Bank, 2832 General Meyers; (9) Abramson, New Orleans East, 5552 Read Blvd.; (10) N.O. Mission, 

1130 Oretha Castle Halley Blvd.; (11) McMain Uptown, 5712 South Claiborne; (12) Sarah T. Reid High School, New 

Orleans East, 5316 Michoud Blvd. Mayor C. Ray Nagin, “New Orleans Mayor, Louisiana Governor Hold Press Conference,” Aug. 28, 2005. http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0508/28/bn.04.html. Accessed on Mar. 27, 2006. 

58 Mayor Nagin, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 1, 2006.

59 Louisiana Statute 29:724D(5) authorizes the Governor to direct and compel the evacuation of all or part of the population from any stricken or threatened area within the state if he deems this action necessary for the preservation of life 

or other disaster mitigation, response, or recovery. Louisiana Statute 29:727F(5) authorizes parish presidents to direct 

and compel the evacuation of all or part of the population from any stricken or threatened area within the boundaries of 

the parish if he deems this action necessary for mitigation, response, or recovery measures.

60 Th e policy of the city’s previous mayoral administration was to shun mandatory evacuation orders because they 

would be “diffi cult to enforce” in a city the size of New Orleans. Source: Tullier interview, Nov. 22, 2005, p. 16. But 

Mayor Nagin testifi ed that his main concern with issuing a mandatory evacuation order was whether the city would have 
Pre-Storm Evacuations

265

adequate legal authority to do so. Source: Mayor Nagin, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 1, 2006. According to Sally Forman, communications Director for Mayor Nagin, the Mayor made a decision on Saturday morning, Aug. 27, to call for 

a mandatory evacuation: “Th e Mayor said it in the Saturday morning meeting, make it happen. Saturday morning. He 

said if there is any way to make this happen, make it happen. I don’t care what you have to do, make it happen.” Source: 

Committee staff interview of Sally Forman, Communications Director, Offi ce of the Mayor, City of New Orleans, LA, 

conducted on Jan. 10, 2006, transcript p. 18.

61 Sherry Landry, e-mail to Mayor Nagin and others, Aug. 27, 2005, 11:31 p.m. CT. Provided to Committee. Th e subject 

line is: Mandatory Evacuation Order and the text reads, “Th is is just a draft of a mandatory evac order. Please review. 

Are there any other exceptions that should be made?” Th e text of the draft follows this question. Another copy of the email, a response from Col. Terry Ebbert to Sherry Landry and others, dated Aug. 27, 2005, shows the time of the Landry 

e-mail as 22:30:32 hours (or 10:30 p.m.). Th e reason for this time stamp discrepancy is not clear. 

62 About an hour aft er the nursing-home exception was added to the draft order, Col. Terry Ebbert sent an e-mail to the 

city attorney to warn, “Many of the facilities are in single level buildings with marginal electrical back up. I recommend 

we not give them a opportunity to stay.” Terry Ebbert, e-mail to Sherry Landry, Aug. 28, 2005, 12 a.m. CT. Provided to 

Committee. 

63 Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, Promulgation of Emergency Orders, Aug. 28, 2005. Provided to Committee.

64 Testimony of Col. Terry Ebbert, Director, New Orleans Offi ce of Homeland Security, LA, before the U.S. Senate, 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Challenges in a Catastrophe: Evacuating New Orleans in Advance of Hurricane Katrina, Jan. 31, 2006 (“Th e delay was basically designed in 

and occurred because of the diffi culties with doing something that [we had not] done before. And that is one of the 

challenges that we face this year is we have to, ahead of time, one, decide, what mandatory evacuation means. Two, what 

measures, legal measures, are we going to utilize to carry it out? Are we going to force people with police out of their 

particular homes? And then, three, ensure that when we issue that, that we have the capability to move these people.”). 

65 Testimony of Gov. Kathleen Blanco, Louisiana, before the U.S. House, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate 

the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by 

the State of Louisiana, Dec. 14, 2005; Maestri interview, Oct. 25, 2005, p. 109 (“[Th e Mayor of New Orleans] has a large 

population that doesn’t have the resources to evacuate on their own. Th ey either don’t have vehicles or their vehicles are 

not roadworthy. And that’s a real problem, if you take non-roadworthy vehicles onto the interstate and onto the evacuation plan you stop it, you halt it. Nobody is going to be able to get out if these cars all start breaking down. So you have 

got to have this plan to deal with that.”).

66 Mayor Ray Nagin, letter to the Honorable Mary Landrieu, Oct. 1, 2002 (“As many as 100,000 residents of New 

Orleans have no means of transportation, rendering it impossible for them to evacuate the City.”); City of New Orleans, 

FY2006, Funding Request to Congress, Emergency Response Shelter/Plan Homeland Security Appropriations, Attachment: “Th e Louisiana Superdome: Refuge of Last Resort.” Provided to Committee. 

67 Tullier interview, Nov. 22, 2005, p. 18. Tullier served as Interim Director beginning in May 2001 and became Director 

shortly aft er Mayor Nagin was elected to offi ce. Tullier interview, Nov. 22, 2005, pp. 5-6.

68 Our Brother’s Keeper (OBK) was a faith-based initiative developed in collaboration with Kay Wilkins, local chapter 

director of the American Red Cross. Tullier interview, Nov. 22, 2005, pp. 18-20, 78-80.

69 In addition to OBK, Tullier had informal conversations with representatives from the Regional Transportation 

Authority, the Orleans Parish School Board, and Amtrak about using their transportation assets to move people out of 

high-risk areas. Source: Tullier interview, Nov. 22, 2005, p. 22. No formal agreements emerged, but in preparation for 

Hurricane Ivan, RTA buses had been staged to deliver citizens to the Superdome from assembly points throughout the 

city. Source: Tullier interview, Nov. 22, 2005, p. 20.

70 Tullier interview, Nov. 22, 2005, p. 81.

71 Committee staff interview of Kay Wilkins, Chief Executive Offi cer, Southeast Louisiana Chapter, American Red 

Cross, conducted on Dec. 20, 2005, transcript p. 27.

72 Wilkins interview, Dec. 20, 2005, p. 92 (“You had to fi rst identify a lot of other intricacies. How are we going to meet, 

where are we going to go, how are we going to be sure who picks them up at the right time, bring them back at the right 

time? What about food, sitting in traffi c? All of that takes a very simple solution and makes it extremely complex and 

challenging.”).

73 Committee staff interview of Kevin Stephens, M.D., Director, New Orleans Health Department, conducted on Nov. 9, 

2005, transcript p. 25.

74 Dr. Stephens interview, Nov. 9, 2005, pp. 21-22. In addition to Amtrak, RTA, and the Orleans School Board, also 

made contact with the Delta Queen river boat.

75 Dr. Stephens interview, Nov. 9, 2005, pp. 26-28.

76 Recognizing that the city would need to make contact with other parishes regarding the MOUs, in April or May 2005, 

Dr. Stephens provided the draft s to the Director of the Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness, Joseph Matthews. Source: Dr. 

Stephens interview, Nov. 9, 2005, pp. 23-24. Th e draft MOUs became part of the discussion on a larger, comprehensive 

evacuation plan for the city. Matthews said he started conversations with various agencies, including Amtrak, RTA, and 

the school board, sometime between March and May 2005, adding, “It was basically my offi ce taking the lead.” Source: 
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Matthews interview, Jan. 10, 2005, pp. 14, 30. Matthews did not know whether conversations with these entities had 

begun before his tenure. Source: Matthews interview, Jan. 10, 2005, p. 13. 

77 Matthews interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 43-44.

78 Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 44

79 Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 44 

80 Matthews interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 36 (“We brought the state in on the end. ... Th e state – we were planning on 

bringing other entities in as we went along. First we were going to try locally, then reaching out, getting the MOUs, and 

then moving forward.”). Also, the record is not clear as to the level of contact Dr. Stephens made with the state government to help the city execute these MOUs. Once the Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP) became aware in late May 2005 that the city was working on a plan to obtain outside transportation, 

LOHSEP offi cials sought to meet with the City’s Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness. Source: Fontenot interview, Jan. 10, 

2006, pp. 133-135 (indicating that Dr. Stephens had discussed these MOUs with Dr. Jimmy Guidry, Medical Director, 

Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, and the State Health Offi cer for Louisiana). According to the then-Chief 

of Planning for LOHSEP, Sean Fontenot, the newly appointed New Orleans Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness Director, 

Matthews, told LOHSEP offi cials in late May that he was not aware of what Dr. Stephens was doing. Source: Fontenot 

interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 133-135.

81 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Detailed Project Report by Project Type, Aug. 22, 2005, pp. 3, 13.

82 New Orleans Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness, Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, May 2005 [hereinaft er 

New Orleans CEMP]. Th e Plan defi nes the role of the primary agency as follows:

 An ESF primary agency is responsible for:

1. Coordinating response eff orts within the functional area in order to achieve the specifi ed desired 

outcome;

2. Providing an appropriate level of staffi ng for eff ective operation;

3. Activating and subtasking support agencies;

4. Managing mission assignments and coordinating tasks with support agencies; 

5. Supporting and keeping other ESF primary agencies and organizational elements informed of ESF 

operational priorities and activities;

6. Obtaining equipment, supplies, and services as required following established regulations, policies, 

and procedures;

7. Coordinating response eff orts with appropriate regional, state, and federal responders and support 

agencies, and volunteer support organizations;

8. Supporting planning for short and long term emergency and disaster operations. 

New Orleans CEMP, Appendix: Emergency Support Functions. 

83 New Orleans CEMP, Appendix: Emergency Support Functions, p. 3. 

84 New Orleans CEMP, Annex I: Hurricanes, p. 18.

85 Th e Plan defi nes the role of a supporting agency as:

An ESF support agency is responsible for:

1. Supporting the ESF primary agency by conducting operation using its authority, capabilities, and 

resources;

2. Supporting the ESF primary agency mission assignments;

3. Providing status and resource information to the primary agency; 

4. Supporting planning for short and long term emergency and disaster operations. 

New Orleans CEMP, Appendix: Emergency Support Functions, p. 3.

86 Committee staff interview of James Tillie, Safety Director, Regional Transit Authority, City of New Orleans, LA, 

conducted on Dec. 19, 2005, transcript p. 18. As a political sub-division of the State of Louisiana, the RTA does not 

report directly to the Mayor. As a quasi-governmental agency, it is funded by local taxes, fares collected on the buses and 

federal funding sources. Committee staff interview of William Deville, General Manager and Chief Executive Offi cer, 

Regional Transit Authority, City of New Orleans, LA, conducted on Nov. 22, 2005, transcript pp. 5-6.

87 New Orleans CEMP, pp. 2-3.

88 New Orleans CEMP, pp. 9-10.

89 Matthews interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 9-10.

90 Deville interview, Nov. 22, 2005, pp. 40, 42. 

91 Tillie interview, Dec. 19, 2005, p. 11. 

92 Deville interview, Nov. 22, 2005, p. 64. 
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267

93 James Tillie, e-mail to William Deville, Oct. 23, 2005, 11:29 a.m. Provided to Committee. Th e e-mail had a cc to Pat 

Judge and was in regard to RTA Activities for Hurricane Katrina.(“Nothing signifi cant occurred on Saturday, August 27, 

2005 as it relates to the RTA. I asked Chief Matthews, Director of the OEP if RTA would be required to evacuate citizens 

from the CITY OF NEW ORLEANS. Chief Matthews stated that shelters had not been identifi ed. Th erefore, RTA was 

not needed on Saturday, August 27, 2005. On Sunday, August 28, 2005 at about 9:00 a.m. I had another conversation 

with Chief Matthews relative to evacuating citizens from the CITY OF NEW ORLEANS. I advised him that RTA had approximately 100 operators and buses at Canal Station available to evacuate citizens out of town. Chief Matthews advised 

me that they still had not identifi ed shelters to receive evacuees.”). Th e Orleans Parish School Board (the School Board) 

designee to the EOC reported that he left a voice-mail message for the Director of the Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness on Friday, August 26, to ask if the School Board’s buses and drivers would be needed to evacuate the city, but said 

he never heard back and assumed the School Board’s buses weren’t needed. Source: Committee staff interview of Ed 

Johnson, Safety and Training Manager, New Orleans Public Schools, LA, conducted on Nov. 29, 2005, transcript pp. 

10-11, 20-21. It is unclear how useful the School Board’s off er on Friday would have been since that same School Board 

employee reported that the school buses were not moved to high ground because there were too few bus drivers working 

on a pay-day Friday aft ernoon. Source: Johnson interview, Nov. 29, 2005, pp. 33-34.

94 Matthews interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 20-21, 44 (“It was a well known fact that drivers were the impediment.”); Col. 

Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 50 (stating that the city’s need for evacuation drivers “was always a constant discussion”).

95 Matthews interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 43-44 (“Q: Did you have buses? A: Well, yes, that’s what we were told by RTA 

and the New Orleans public school system that there were busses. Th ey had identifi ed a number of buses, but as always, 

drivers were the problem. I think it was like 350 buses or something like that that were identifi ed.”). Despite this assertion, as noted in above endnote, RTA and OPSB offi cials assert that they off ered buses and drivers.

96 Under Louisiana law, the Orleans Parish School Board (the School Board) is a constituted corporate body, and is 

funded by local taxes and state and federal funding sources. Source: La. R.S. 15:51. Th e School Board had 324 functional 

buses and approximately 250 drivers, available at least on a part-time basis. Source: Committee staff interview of Marva 

White, Director, Transportation Department, Orleans Parish School Board, LA, conducted on Nov. 23, 2005, transcript 

p. 12. Approximately 260 buses were lost to fl ooding. Source: White interview, Nov. 23, 2005, p. 14. Th ese resources 

presumably could have been utilized if emergency planners had arranged for drivers, fuel, and destinations for evacuees, 

and resolved liability issues, employment contract concerns, and logistical issues. 

97 Matthews interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 22-25 (“We have buses, we have everything but drivers.”). However, other state 

and federal offi cials, who participated in that workshop, recalled the city informing them of a need for buses, as well: 

According to the notes from the July 2005 workshop, Don Day of the U.S. Department of Transportation said, “We’re 

less than 10% done with this trans[portation] planning when you consider the buses and the people,” and Col. William 

Doran of the Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness said, “buses we are tapping will be 

from the Parish. Might not be able to get a driver. Orleans Parish might be RTA buses. Drivers not provided.” Source: 

IEM, Inc., notes from Unifi ed Command Final Briefi ng, July 29, 2005, p. 4.

98 Matthews interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 22-25 (Interview question: “At any time prior to Hurricane Katrina did you 

make a request for assistance from the state or federal government for drivers?” Matthews answer: “No.”).

99 Committee staff interview of Jules Hurst, Transportation Supervisor, Logistics Branch, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 27, 

2006, transcript p. 37. 

100 Committee staff interview of Dan Prevo, former Region VI Regional Emergency Transportation Representative, U.S. 

Department of Transportation, conducted on Jan. 17, 2006, transcript pp. 12-14. 

101 Deville interview, Nov. 22, 2005, p. 50.

102 Under the state’s plan, LA DOTD was responsible for “identifying,” “mobilizing,” and “coordinating” transportation 

for the evacuation of at risk populations. Under the LA EOP ESF #1, DOTD is charged with the following:

Under ESF #1, I. Purpose: ESF 1 provides transportation out of a disaster area for people in need, and provides transportation essential to support emergency response in the event of a disaster.

Under ESF #1, II. Scope: Th e State services provided under this ESF will include the identifi cation, mobilization and coordination of available state owned, private industry and volunteer transportation equipment, manpower and technical 

expertise to meet the requirements of providing essential emergency response in the event of an emergency or disaster.

Under ESF #1, III.A. Concept of Operations, Mitigation: Th e Secretary of [DOTD] will designate an ESF 1 Emergency 

Transportation Coordinator to organize and coordinate transportation services.

Under ESF #1, III.B.1. Concept of Operations, Preparedness: Th e Coordinator will develop plans and procedures to 

mobilize transportation to support emergency evacuation for at risk populations and to support other operations of 

State Agencies.

Under ESF #1, III.B.2. Concept of Operations, Preparedness: Th e Coordinator will maintain information about transportation resources, with particular emphasis on resources in or near state risk areas.

Under ESF #1, III.C.1. Concept of Operations, Response: Th e Coordinator will process requests for transportation and 

arrange for National Guard, state agency, private industry and volunteer resources to be allocated to the highest priority 

missions.

Under ESF #1, III.C.2. Concept of Operations, Response: Th e Coordinator will continue to acquire, allocate and monitor 

transportation resources as the emergency continues.
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Under ESF #1, IV.A. Organization and Responsibilities: Th e [DOTD] has the Primary Responsibility for Emergency 

Transportation. Th at responsibility includes coordinating with support agencies to make sure that they develop and 

maintain plans and procedures.

Under ESF #1, VIII. Plan Maintenance: Th is ESF 1 Transportation Coordinator is responsible for developing, maintaining and coordinating plans, procedures, arrangements and agreements in support of this ESF. Louisiana Offi ce of 

Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, Emergency Operations Plan, Apr. 2005, ESF-1 [hereinaft er Louisiana 

Emergency Operations Plan].

It should also be noted that DOTD is listed as a supporting agency under the New Orleans OEP Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan. New Orleans CEMP, Emergency Support Functions Appendix, p. 3. 

103 Fontenot interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 22-23.

104 Fontenot interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 25-26.

105 Sec. Bradberry interview, Dec. 21, 2005, p. 68.

106 U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Challenges in a Catastrophe: 

Evacuating New Orleans in Advance of Hurricane Katrina, Jan. 31, 2006.

107 Sec. Bradberry interview, Nov. 17, 2005, pp. 47-48 (“I had a confi dence level that the city was addressing that issue.”).

108 Sec. Bradberry interview, Dec. 21, 2005, pp. 84-85.

109 LA DOTD’s Assistant Secretary for Operations, Gordon Nelson, said he fi rst became aware that the State was 

expecting LA DOTD to be responsible for ESF-1 Transportation, specifi cally, buses for an evacuation, at a July 2005 

meeting of the Southeast Louisiana Task Force in St. Charles Parish. Committee staff interview of Gordon Nelson, Assistant Secretary for Operations, Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development, conducted on Jan. 6, 2006, 

transcript pp. 52-55. Committee staff interview of Joseph Modicut, Emergency Services Coordinator, Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development, conducted on Jan. 5, 2006, transcript pp. 38-39.

110 Nelson interview, Jan. 6, 2006, pp. 58-59.

111 Sec. Johnny Bradberry, letter to the Honorable Susan Collins and the Honorable Joseph Lieberman, Re: Supplemental Testimony, Feb. 14, 2006. Provided to Committee.

112 Committee staff interview of James Ballow, Senior Operations Offi cer, LOHSEP, conducted on Jan. 4, 2006, transcript p. 151.

113 Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan, p. ESF-5–1.

114 Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan, p. ESF-5–1.

115 Ballow interview, Jan. 4, 2006, p. 154.

116 Fontenot interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 22-23 (Discussing Jan. 2005 meeting, attended by Modicut, Nelson, LOHSEP 

Acting Deputy Director Col. Jeff Smith, and LOHSEP Chief of Planning Sean Fontenot, regarding LOHSEP’s intention 

to reassign ESF-1 responsibilities to LA DOTD.).

117 Fontenot interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 24-25.

118 As Col. Jeff Smith stated, “Well, they [DOTD] signed off on the plan, so you know, the assumption has to be that 

they understood that that was the role or I would assume they wouldn’t have signed off on the plan.” Committee staff 

interview of Col. Jeff Smith, Acting Deputy Director, LOHSEP, conducted on Jan. 13, 2006, transcript pp. 171-172.

119 Committee staff interview of Maj. Gen. Bennett Landreneau, Adjutant General, Louisiana, conducted on Jan. 11, 

2006, transcript p. 154 (Responding affi rmatively to a question whether LOHSEP’s discharge of its duty to ensure that 

LA DOTD met its responsibilities under ESF-1 “slipped through the cracks.”).

120 Gov. Kathleen Blanco, letter to President George Bush, Aug. 27, 2005, pp. 2 and Enclosure.

121 In the letter to President Bush, Governor Blanco sought the following distribution of funds to assist the state with 

the coordination of the evacuation, but she did not specify a request for transportation resources: 

Louisiana State Police (LSP): Costs to support evacuations (Providing support for the phased evacuation of the coastal areas) – $300,000 for a non-direct landfall.

Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries (WLF): Costs to support evacuations (Supporting the 

evacuation of the aff ected population and preparing for search and rescue missions) – $200,000 for a 

non-direct landfall.

Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD): Costs to support evacuations 

(Coordinating traffi c fl ow and management of the evacuation routes with local offi cials and the state of 

Mississippi) – $2,000,000 for a non-direct landfall. 

Letter from Governor Blanco to President George Bush, Aug. 27, 2005, pp. 2 and Enclosure. 

122 Col. Jeff Smith, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 28, 2005, p. 17. Provided to Committee (“I’ll just tell you 

that the evacuation process is going much better than it did during Hurricane Ivan. Nobody anticipated that it would be 

easy. Nobody anticipated that there wouldn’t be traffi c jams. But by and large, it has gone much better than it did with 

Ivan.”). 
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269

123 Col. Jeff Smith, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 28, 2005, p. 16. Provided to Committee.

124 Committee staff interview of Darryl Neely, Policy Advisor, Offi ce of the Governor, Mississippi, conducted on Jan. 

21, 2006, transcript p. 12-14.

125 Contrafl ow is a program designed for quick emergency evacuation of an area. Some incoming highway lanes to a 

city are changed to outbound lanes.

126 Mississippi Department of Transportation, Mississippi Hurricane Evacuation Guide, 2006. http://www.mdot.state.

ms.us/cetrp/ms_coastal_hurricane_05_01_06.pdf. Accessed on May 5, 2006. 

127 Harrison County, Standard Operating Procedures for Hurricane Evacuation, May 2003, p. 1. Harrison County’s 

Standard Operating Procedures for Hurricane Evacuation state that a number of factors must be considered in deciding 

whether to order an evacuation. Among them are “the characteristics of the hurricane itself. Magnitude, intensity, spread 

of onset, and duration are all signifi cant elements to be considered. Th ese will determine the number of people to be 

evacuated and the time and distance of travel necessary to insure safety. Another important facet is the availability of 

evacuation routes, their capacities, and their vulnerability to hurricanes. Mode of transport is also very signifi cant and 

provisions must be made for those persons unable to supply their own transportation.” 

128 Committee staff interview of Robert Latham, Executive Director, Mississippi Emergency Management Agency 

(MEMA), conducted on Jan. 27, 2006, transcript pp. 51-52, 56.

129 Committee staff interview of Robert Chapman, State Transportation Emergency Coordinator, Mississippi Department of Transportation, conducted on Dec. 13, 2005, transcript p. 32. Testimony of Robert Latham, Executive Director, 

MEMA, before the U.S. House, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Mississippi, Dec. 7, 2005. 

130 Latham interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 25. Latham, House Select Committee hearing, Dec. 7, 2005.

131 MEMA, Hurricane Situation Report, Aug. 24, 2005, 10 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. MEMA0010808.

132 MEMA, Hurricane Situation Report, Aug. 26, 2005, 4:30 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. MEMA0010828.

133 MEMA, Hurricane Situation Report, Aug. 27, 2005, 12 noon. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. MEMA0010834. State agencies also began preparing for the evacuation of Louisiana residents. On Saturday, Louisiana’s 

Department of Transportation informed Mississippi’s Department of Transportation that it would begin implementing 

contrafl ow (which reverses the fl ow of traffi c on some inbound highway lanes) later that aft ernoon. State law enforcement offi cers were deployed along the routes and in communities to assist evacuation operations. Mississippi had revised 

its evacuation plan aft er encountering traffi c problems during Hurricane Ivan in 2004. Chapman and Huff interview, 

Dec. 14, 2005, pp. 12-20; Neely interview, Jan. 21, 2006, pp. 5-7.

134 Robert Latham, e-mail to various Mississippi offi cials, Aug. 26, 2005, 3:46 p.m. Provided to Committee.

135 Robert Latham, e-mail to various Mississippi offi cials, Aug. 26, 2005, 3:46 p.m. Provided to Committee (“Th e big 

question now is will our citizens evacuate if they are asked to do so? I plan to go to the coast tomorrow.”).

136 Latham interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 37-39. 

137 MEMA’s emergency operations plan emphasizes the importance of coordinating evacuations within and among 

counties. Source: MEMA, Mississippi Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, 1999, Section ESF-1–4. MEMA’s 

Executive Director, Robert Latham, told committee staff that aft er Hurricane Dennis, he was concerned about lack of 

clarity in evacuation orders. Offi cials, particularly in Harrison County, had considered evacuating by fl ood zone, whereas 

many coastal residents didn’t know in which zone they lived. Latham met with coastal emergency management offi cials 

to streamline the process. “If you are doing a mandatory in one area and the county next to you or the city next to you is 

only doing a recommended ... it gets confusing.” Source: Latham interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 32-33.

138 Local governments currently make evacuation decisions without criteria on the conditions that need to be in place 

for a “recommended” evacuation, “strongly recommended” evacuation and “mandatory” evacuation.

139 MEMA, Hurricane Katrina Situation Report, Aug. 28, 2005, 4 p.m. 

140 Committee staff interview of Tom McAllister, Director, Response and Recovery, MEMA, conducted on Jan. 27, 

2006, transcript p. 37.

141 McAllister interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 36-40.

142 Latham interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 43.

143 Committee staff interview of Max Mayfi eld, Ph.D., Director, National Hurricane Center, conducted on Jan. 27, 2006, 

transcript p. 56.

144 Mayfi eld said that he had only made such a call to warn a governor once before in his career. He stated that “I just 

wanted to be able to go to sleep that night knowing I had done everything I could do.” John Pain, “Federal Forecasters 

Got Hurricane Right,” Associated Press Online, Sept. 16, 2005. 

145 Latham interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 36. 54.

146 Latham interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 36-37. Committee staff interview of Maj. Wayne Payne, Deputy Sheriff , Harrison County, MS, conducted on Dec. 6, 2005, transcript p. 25.
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270

147 Th e three Mississippi coastal counties are Hancock, Harrison, and Jackson, commonly referred to as the “Mississippi 

Gulf Coast.” Pearl River, Stone, and George lie directly to the north.

148 Since many residents weren’t sure in what zone they lived, Jackson County decided to call for evacuation by 

topographical area. Committee staff interview of Butch Loper, Emergency Management Director, Jackson County, MS, 

conducted on Dec. 6, 2005, transcript pp. 39-40.

149 MEMA, Director’s Brief, Aug. 29, 2005, 5:02 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 0010700.

150 See Chapter 24, Medical Assistance, for a discussion of nursing home evacuations.

151 Maj. Payne interview, Dec. 6, 2005, pp. 5, 25. 

152 Maj. Payne interview, Dec. 6, 2005, p. 25.

153 Committee staff interview of Paul Bennett, Deputy Chief of Police, City of Gulfport, MS, conducted on Dec. 8. 2005, 

transcript p. 8.

154 Ryan LaFontaine, “Police Issued Life-or-Death Directive,” Sun Herald, Feb. 18, 2006; Joshua Norman, “Why Did 

Th ey Stay,” Sun Herald, Feb. 18, 2006.

155 Ryan LaFontaine, “Police Issued Life-or-Death Directive,” Sun Herald, Feb. 18, 2006; Joshua Norman, “Why Did 

Th ey Stay,” Sun Herald, Feb. 18, 2006.

156 Neely interview, Jan. 21, 2006, pp. 13-14.

157 Maj. Payne interview, Dec. 6, 2005, p. 23-27.

158 Ryan LaFontaine, “Police Issued Life-or-Death Directive,” Sun Herald, Feb. 18, 2006; Joshua Norman, “Why Did 

Th ey Stay,” Sun Herald, Feb. 18, 2006.

159 Latham interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 39. 

160 Committee staff interview of Col. Joseph Spraggins, Director, Harrison County Emergency Management Agency, 

MS, conducted on Nov. 17, 2005, transcript, pp. 65-66.

161 Chapman interview, Dec. 13, 2005, pp. 39-40.

162 Latham, House Select Committee hearing, Dec. 7, 2005. 

163 In addition, MDOT now publicizes alternative routes, coordinates the traffi c signals on Highway 49, and has published a brochure on evacuation guidelines. Chapman interview, Dec. 13, 2005, pp. 38-40.

164 Chapman interview, Dec. 14, 2005, p. 34. Chapman interview, Dec. 13, 2005, p. 33. Latham, House Select Committee 

hearing, Dec. 7, 2005. 

165 MEMA, Director’s Brief, Aug. 28, 2005, 7 p.m.

166 MEMA, Director’s Brief, Aug. 29, 2005, 4:30 p.m..

167 Committee staff interview of Willie Huff , Law Enforcement Coordinator, Mississippi Department of Transportation, 

conducted on Dec. 14, 2005, transcript pp. 34-35.

168 Testimony of Sec. Michael Chertoff , U.S. Department of Homeland Security, before U.S. House, Select Bipartisan 

Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e 

Role of the Department of Homeland Security, Oct. 19, 2005. 

169 During an interview with HSGAC staff , the Federal Commanding Offi cer for Baton Rouge affi rmatively responded 

that the federal government did not begin evacuations until the state made the request. Committee staff interview of 

William Lokey, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 20, 2006, 

transcript p. 124. At the Orleans Parish level, Col. Terry Ebbert noted, “Pre-landfall evacuation was a city, state, region 

function.” Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 109.

170 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan. Washington: Government Printing Offi ce, Dec. 

2004, p. 15 [hereinaft er NRP].

171 IEM Inc., 2004 Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Planning Exercise, Executive Summary. Provided to Committee.

172 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 62.

173 U.S. Department of Transportation, Regional Transportation Representative, Region 6, Don Day, transcript of Unifi ed Command Final Briefi ng, July 29, 2005, p. 4 (“600 buses needed just to move people from collection points. ... We 

need to pre-identify the sources for these buses and have them lined up and ready. Th ere are plans to evacuate buses and 

operators out before the storm. Requires forethought, prior action. We have never looked into what it takes to make a bus 

staging/dispatch area. ... We’re at less than 10% done with this trans planning.”). It also became known to DOT offi cials 

that the city lacked drivers for the buses. Source: Prevo interview, Jan. 17, 2006, pp. 12-14. (Stating that based on the Pam 

discussions, there was “no certainty that the drivers — if the buses would be made available, that the drivers would be 

available ... a whole lot of research had to be done with regard to how many drivers would be available, or the liability 

issues that might be faced for the buses and for the drivers.”); Hurst interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 37 (Recalling that local offi cials in the Pam follow up workshops reported “they didn’t know if they could get the drivers to report.”). From discussions at the transportation working group, state and local offi cials expected that the federal government would help the 

state and locals with the evacuation. Source: Committee staff interview of Dolph Diemont, Region X, Regional Emergency 

Transportation Representative, U.S. Department of Transportation, conducted on Jan. 6, 2006, transcript pp. 30-31 (“Th e 
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271

people that were involved in that work group must have sensed the same thing that I did, that there was a large reliance 

on the federal team coming in and fi xing everything. ... Th e state and locals had some plan in place for evacuation with 

buses, school buses and other buses, and they knew that FEMA would have to augment that in some way.”). 

174 Diemont interview, Jan. 6, 2006, pp. 30-31.

175 In September 2005, aft er Katrina had made landfall, IEM (FEMA’s contractor for the Hurricane Pam exercise) 

published and distributed a transportation annex to the Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, and this 

transportation annex refl ected the upshot of conversations had during the Hurricane Pam July 2005 transportation 

working group meetings. Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, prepared by IEM, Inc. for LOHSEP and 

FEMA, Sept. 2005, Appendix 1, p. 1(Noting that “local/state/federal” offi cials “pre-landfall” should “identify/validate ... 

600 buses [and] 1,200 drivers”). 

176 U.S. Department of Transportation, Hurricane Katrina-Situation Report, Sept. 3, 2005, 5 p.m., p. 2. Provided to 

Committee; U.S. Department of Transportation, Actions for Hurricane Katrina, Annotated Chronology of Signifi cant 

Events, Oct. 6, 2005, p. 8. 

177 Committee staff interview of Vincent Pearce, Manager, National Response Program, Department of Transportation, conducted on Jan. 6, 2006, transcript p. 46 (“We looked at Atlanta. We actually – they actually called and talked 

to transit fl eets, the phrase I remember was “all the way East to Jacksonville,” and I know all the way West to El Paso, to 

determine what those fl eets had, what their plans were, how they might be able to participate in an evacuation if it were 

to be needed.”).

178 FEMA, MA Task Order Form, Sept. 20, 2005, p. 1. Provided to Committee.

179 Air Mobility Command, Aeromedical Evacuation Inputs NDMS Patient Movement AAR, briefi ng slides, Dec. 12-

13, 2005. http://www1.va.gov/emshg/page.cfm?pg=111. Accessed on Mar. 15, 2006. 

180 Deville interview, Nov. 22, 2005, pp. 136, 143 (“Th ey’re responsible for oversight on all of our grants and our 

projects. Th ey meet with us quarterly to review all of our projects and the way we – plus they’re also responsible, doing 

procurement reviews and fi nancial reviews, triennial reviews. I mean, they’re really reviewing the books. We see ’em 

quite oft en. So I got to know Bob [USDOT] pretty well in that regard.”).

181 U.S. Department of Transportation, Hurricane Katrina-Situation Report, Aug. 29, 2005, 5 p.m., pp. 5-6. Provided to 

Committee.

182 Patrick Rhode, e-mail to Edward Buikema, Michael Lowder and Ken Burris, Aug. 28, 10:16 a.m. Provided to Committee (“Have we asked all eoc’s via emac or esf (transportation) to make transportation assets available to assist New 

Orleans today with evacuations? I know we need 72 hours to do this – we don’t have it – not sure what state is applying 

if someone can get some granularity on this issue.”).

183 Oxley and Booth interview, Dec. 9, 2005, p. 203.

184 Committee staff interview of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, conducted on Feb. 23, 2006, transcript pp. 

62-67.

185 Sec. Chertoff , House Select Committee hearing, Oct. 19, 2005. Others agreed: FEMA’s logistic branch transportation supervisor Jules Hurst, who recalled having a discussion about pre-landfall evacuation during the Pam planning 

sessions, testifi ed: “Pre-landfall is defi nitely desirable to post-landfall, because the population being evacuated obviously 

doesn’t suff er the eff ects of the storm, at least hopefully.” Source: Hurst interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 54. Th e city’s Director 

of Homeland Security and Public Safety similarly testifi ed that in a catastrophe, “evacuation is the number one priority.” 

Source: Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 41.

186 42 U.S.C. § 5195 (“Th e Congress recognizes that the organizational structure established jointly by the Federal government and the States and their political subdivisions for emergency preparedness purposes can be eff ectively utilized 

to provide relief and assistance to people in areas of the Untied States struck by a hazard. Th e Federal government shall 

provide necessary direction, and guidance, and shall provide necessary assistance, as authorized in this title so that a 

comprehensive emergency preparedness system exists for all hazards.”).

187 42 U.S.C. § 5195a(3)(A).

188 On February 28, 2003, President Bush modifi ed Executive Order 12148, delegating most presidential responsibilities 

under the Staff ord Act to DHS (rather than to FEMA, as had previously been the case). 68 Fed. Reg. 10619 (Feb. 28, 2003), 

Sec. 52. (“Executive Order 12148 of July 20, 1979 (‘Federal Emergency Management’), as amended, is further amended by: 

(a) striking ‘the Federal Emergency Management Agency’ whenever it appears and inserting ‘the Department of Homeland Security’ in lieu thereof; and (b) striking ‘the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency’ wherever it 

appears and inserting ‘the Secretary of Homeland Security’ in lieu thereof.”). See also: Executive Order 12673, 54 Fed. Reg. 

12573 (Mar. 28, 1989), Sec. 1 (amending Executive Order 12148). 

189 42 U.S.C. § 5170b(a)(3).

190 6 U.S.C. § 317(a).

191 6 U.S.C. § 317(a).

192 Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan, Apr. 2005, Appendix 3, Animal Management in Disasters.

193 NRP, pp. 14, 41, ESF-11. Neither the Hurricane Pam exercise nor the resultant Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic 

Hurricane Plan contemplated the shelter and transportation of pets. 
Chapter 16

272

194 Sebastian E. Heath, Phillip H. Kass, Alan M. Beck, and Larry T. Glickman, “Human and Pet-related Risk Factors for 

Household Evacuation Failure During a Natural Disaster,” American Journal of Epidemiology, 153:7, p. 659.

195 See e.g.: Stephen Nohlgren, “Without Fido, some won’t fl ee,” St. Petersburg Times, Aug. 26, 2005. http://www.

sptimes.com/2005/08/26/news_pf/Weather/Without_Fido_some_wo.shtml; See also: “Katrina survivors face dilemma 

over pets,” Reuters, Sept. 8, 2005. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9260578/did/9260578/print/1/displaymode/1098/; 

Maryann Mott, “Katrina Pet Rescue Eff orts Off er Lessons for the Future,” National Geographic News, Sept. 21, 2005. 

(http://news/nationalgreographic.com/news/2005/09/0921_050921_disaster_pet_tips.html. Accessed on Apr. 24, 2006.

196 Sebastian E. Heath, Phillip H. Kass, Alan M. Beck, and Larry T. Glickman, “Human and Pet-related Risk Factors for 

Household Evacuation Failure During a Natural Disaster,” American Journal of Epidemiology, 153:7, pp. 662-663.

197 New Orleans Police Department, Initial (30-day) Aft er Action Report-Summary. Provided to Committee. See also: 

Matthews interview, Oct. 14, 2005, pp. 37-38 (“A lot of people would not evacuate because a pet is part of their family. If 

their pet can’t go with them, then they chose not to leave.”).

198 American Humane Association, Summary Report of the National Emergency Animal Management Summit, Jan. 8-9, 

2006, p. 11.

199 Maryann Mott, “Katrina Pet Rescue Eff orts Off er Lessons for the Future,” National Geographic News, Sept. 21, 2005. 

http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2005/09/0921_050921_disaster_pet_tips_2.html. Accessed on Apr. 24, 2006. 

Quoting Red Cross spokesman Nick Shapiro, “Th e Red Cross shelters must be designed to accommodate everybody. ... 

We can’t add the risk of animal bites, fl eas, other insects, and hygiene issues to an already stressful environment like a 

mass care shelter.” See also: American Humane Association, Summary Report of the National Emergency Animal Management Summit, Jan. 8-9, 2006, p. 6 (Discussing the risk of disease and contamination for volunteers at animal shelters 

and the need to periodically assess the likelihood that particular animal will bite.). 

200 “Katrina Survivors Face Dilemma over Pets,” Reuters, Sept. 8, 2005. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9260578/

did/9260578/print/1/displaymode/1098/. Accessed on Apr. 24, 2006; Maryann Mott, “Katrina Pet Rescue Eff orts 

Off er Lessons For the Future” National Geographic News, Sept. 21, 2005. http://news.nationalgeographic.com/

news/2005/09/0921_050921_disaster_pet_tips_2.html. Accessed on Apr. 24, 2006.

201 American Humane Association, Summary Report of the National Emergency Animal Management Summit, Jan. 8-9, 

2006, p. 11.

202 American Humane Association, Summary Report of the National Emergency Animal Management Summit, Jan. 8-9, 

2006, p. 11.

203 “Katrina Survivors Face Dilemma over Pets,” Reuters, Sept. 8, 2005. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9260578/

did/9260578/print/1/displaymode/1098/. Accessed on Apr. 24, 2006.

204 Matthews interview, Oct. 14, 2005, pp. 37-38.

205 Stu Hudson, “Katrina’s Stranded Pets Spur Massive Aid Eff ort,” National Geographic News, Sept. 9, 2005. http://

news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2005/09/0909_050909_katrina_petrescrue.html. Accessed on Apr. 24, 2006.

206 William Wan, “A Lesson from Katrina: Pets Matter; Disaster Plans Include First Aid, Evacuation Options for FourLegged Victims,” Th e Washington Post, Jan. 2, 2006, p. B01.

207 VMAT is part of the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) and “will supplement the relief eff orts already underway by local veterinarians and emergency responders.” American Veterinary Medical Association, “Animal Health.” 

http://www.avma.org/disaster/vmat/default.asp. Accessed on May 8, 2006.

208 William Wan, “A Lesson from Katrina: Pets Matter; Disaster Plans Include First Aid, Evacuation Options for FourLegged Victims,” Th e Washington Post, Jan. 2, 2006, p. B01. 

209 Carl Sullivan, “Pets in Peril,” Newsweek, Sept. 15, 2005. www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9326408/site/newsweek/print/1/

displaymode/1098/. Accessed on May 8, 2006.

210 American Humane Association, Summary Report of the National Emergency Animal Management Summit, Jan. 8-9, 

2006, p. 5.
584
Hauling sandbags, 

New Orleans 

U.S. Army photo
275

Why the New Orleans 

Levees Failed

What makes the New Orleans levees unusual is the high stakes involved in 

terms of the population being protected. ... In a system with several hundred 

miles of levees, it is very diffi cult to do suitable investigation and basically to 

nail all the details. ... If you leave one detail unnailed, you leave a vulnerability 

which may in the end bring the whole system down.1

— Raymond Seed, Ph.D., National Science Foundation-sponsored 

Independent Levee Inspection Team (ILIT), University of California, Berkeley

The fl ooding of the metropolitan New Orleans area challenged emergency response 

at all levels. Th is fl ooding was largely caused by failures of the levees and fl oodwalls 

in and around New Orleans. An examination of why the levees failed to protect 

New Orleans is critical,2

 and several teams of scientists of varied affi liation are presently 

conducting massive studies of the mechanisms responsible for the fl ooding. Topics of forensic analysis include:

• Levee breaches along the 17th Street, London Avenue, and the Inner Harbor 

Navigation Canals 

• Overtopping of various levees and fl oodwalls

• Design and construction issues

• Proper levee/fl oodwall oversight

• Subsidence in the metropolitan New Orleans area

• Th e impact of the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MRGO)

The Levee Breaches Along the 17th Street and London Avenue Canals

Th ree levee breaches along the major stormwater drainage, or “outfall,” canals of central 

New Orleans – one breach on the east side of the 17th Street Canal and two others along the 

London Avenue Canal (on the east and west) – caused catastrophic fl ooding in the heart of 

the city. Th ese canals are part of the city’s drainage system and allow rain and fl ood waters 

to be pumped out of the city into Lake Pontchartrain.

Breaches in the fl oodwalls along these canals caused water from Lake Pontchartrain to fl ood 

into, among other areas, the Central Business District, the blocks surrounding the Superdome, Lakeview, Mid City, the area around Tulane University, and Lakewood.3

 It was this 

fl ooding that made the humanitarian and rescue eff orts at the Superdome and Convention 

Center so diffi cult.

Scientists have confi rmed that these levee and fl oodwall breaches were unlike the failures 

of levees and fl oodwalls in other areas of the metropolitan New Orleans region, which were 

overtopped by Katrina’s storm surge. Th ere is scientifi c consensus that the fl oodwalls along 

the 17th Street Canal (and the London Avenue Canal) were not, prior to failure, overtopped 

by the storm surge from Lake Pontchartrain.4

 A report by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force (IPET) – an academically diverse 

group of scientists examining, among numerous other issues, the type of failure in the 17th 

Street Canal breach – gave two causes for the breach.

Chapter 17
Chapter 17

276

First, the concrete fl oodwall, which stood 

erect at the crest of the earthen levee and was 

supported by steel sheetpiles driven into, and 

below, the earthen levee, was pushed away 

from the canal by waters rising toward the 

protected land side. As it was pushed away, a 

gap was created between the fl oodwall (along 

with the sheetpile upon which it was supported) and the adjacent levee embankment soils. 

Th is allowed fl ood waters to rush into the 

gap, apply pressure against the lower sheetpiles supporting the fl oodwall underground, 

and push the embankment section aside. 

Once the embankment began to be pushed 

aside, a second failure mechanism combined 

to produce a catastrophic failure of the wall. 

Th is second mechanism was the failure of an 

unusually weak layer of clay at the foundation 

or “toe” of the levee. Under pressure from 

fl oodwaters pressing on the wall, this layer gave way and allowed the “lateral translation,” 

or movement, of the earthen levee supporting the fl oodwall along the “failure plain” in the 

weak clay layer. Th ese combined mechanisms resulted in the violent sideways heave of the 

entire embankment section.5

While the forensic teams generally agree that the 17th Street Canal breach was the result 

of structural failure, they disagree whether the original design anticipated this problem. 

Th e IPET report said that it did not.6

 However, in the National Science Foundation-sponsored Independent Levee Inspection Team’s (ILIT) Initial Comments on Interim (70%) 

IPET Study Report, Raymond B. Seed, Ph.D., and Robert G. Bea, Ph.D., took issue with the 

IPET’s assertion – a concern also raised by the American Society of Civil Engineers External 

Review Panel.7

 Th e ILIT stated that the Corps of Engineers had a “masterful knowledge and 

understanding of the complex and challenging geology of this region in the 1950’s,”8

 and 

“should not claim that the weak foundation soil strata at the 17th Street Canal breach site 

were unexpected, and that no prior publications would have disclosed this possibility.”9

Th e ILIT scientists also referenced a test conducted prior to the construction of the 17th 

Street Canal, which, according to Seed and Bea, foreshadowed the catastrophic failure at the 

breach site. Th ey say a Corps fi eld test of a levee and sheetpile-supported fl oodwall in 1985, 

just south of Morgan City, LA, predicted exactly the sort of failure that occurred at the 17th 

Street Canal. Th e model levee embankment and the sheetpile-supported concrete fl oodwall were sized and built to simulate conditions expected for the 17th Street, Orleans, and 

London Avenue Canals, as well as major portions of the Inner Harbor Navigational Canal. 

“Th us,” the NSF team concluded, “there would seem to be little justifi cation for the contention that the sheetpile failure mode disclosed by the IPET analyses had not previously been 

seen, or published, and that it could not have been anticipated.”10

Th e two breach sites along the London Avenue Canal appear to have been the result of 

foundational instability near the fi ne sand and clay substratum layers at the site.11

Overtopping of Various Levees and Floodwalls

As noted, the fl ooding in the heart of the city was caused by the breaches along the 17th 

Street and London Avenue Canals. But most of the levee and fl oodwall failures in the metropolitan New Orleans area – including New Orleans East, the Lower 9th Ward, St. Bernard 

Breached fl oodwall, New Orleans

Marty Bahamonde photo
Why the New Orleans Levees Failed

277

Parish, and Plaquemines Parish – “were caused by overtopping, as the storm surge rose over 

the tops of the levees and/or their fl oodwalls and produced erosion that subsequently led to 

failures and breaches.”12 One report described the overtopping as follows:

Overtopping was most severe on the east side of the fl ood protection system, 

as the waters of Lake Borgne were driven west towards New Orleans, and also 

farther to the south, along the lower reaches of the Mississippi River. Signifi -

cant overtopping and erosion produced numerous breaches in these areas. Th e 

magnitude of overtopping was less severe along the Inner Harbor Navigation 

Canal (IHNC) and along the western portion of the Mississippi River Gulf 

Outlet (MRGO) channel, but this overtopping again produced erosion and 

caused additional levee failures.13

Finally, as described more fully in the design and construction subsection below, one report 

notes that, “it appears that many of the levees and fl oodwalls that failed due to overtopping 

might have performed better if relatively inexpensive details had been added and/or altered 

during their original design and construction.”14

Design and Construction Issues

Understanding the design and/or construction shortcomings of protective structures is 

critical as the Corps of Engineers proceeds with the rebuilding of the New Orleans region’s 

hurricane protection system.

As one report observes, the protective system is a 

“piecemeal” assemblage of elements that “evolved 

over a long period of time.”15 By contrast, a proper 

system “would integrate components and ... 

would contain a level of redundancy suffi cient 

that, if a levee failed, all would not be lost.”16

For the most part, the reports reviewed by the 

Committee have revealed the following critical 

design and construction issues: (1) I-wall vs. T-wall 

design; (2) vulnerable “transition points” within 

the protective system; (3) accessibility to breach 

sites; and (4) enhanced protection.

I-wall vs. T-wall Design

“I-wall” fl oodwalls run along the top of earthen levees and are supported by metal sheetpiles 

driven into, and below, the earthen levees to various depths. As noted above, the erosion of 

soils on the protected land side of these fl oodwalls was caused by water cascading over the 

tops of the structures themselves, reducing the walls’ resistance to pressure from the water 

side.17 Th is type of failure was “most dramatic” along the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal next 

to the Lower Ninth Ward.”18

Th is type of failure mechanism was not a problem at most T-wall fl oodwalls, which look like 

an inverted “T” and are constructed with concrete bases with more substantial, armored 

foundations.19 Th eir horizontal platforms provide more stability for the vertical wall and 

give the levee soil some protection from water pouring over the top of the wall.

Transition Points

Th e Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project (Lake Pontchartrain Project) was authorized in the Flood Control Act of 1965 to provide hurricane protection to areas 

around Lake Pontchartrain in Orleans, Jeff erson, St. Bernard, and St. Charles Parishes.20 Th e 

Ripped-out sheetpile with chunks of 

fl oodwall attached, New Orleans

Louisiana National Guard photo
Chapter 17

278

total project called for the design and construction of approximately 125 miles of levees and 

fl oodwalls.21 Parts of the system were built at diff erent times and involved the review and cooperation of diff erent local levee districts. Quite oft en, this resulted in non-uniform junctions. 

Scientists examining these “transition points” found inconsistencies in crest heights, types of 

protective structures, and materials used.22 In some places, fl oodwalls stood at a higher elevation than adjoining earthen levees, which concentrated the fl ow of water to the non-uniform 

intersection, “causing turbulence that resulted in erosion of the weaker levee soil.”23

One report noted that the key to the transition-points problem is that “infrastructure elements [were being] designed and maintained by multiple authorities.”24 Th e report said the 

result is that “the weakest (or lowest) segment or element controls the overall performance” 

of the hurricane protection system.25 One engineering recommendation was that crest 

heights – the highest elevations of the structure being used, regardless whether it is just a 

levee or a fl oodwall standing upon a levee – should be planned to guide overtopping waters 

“preferentially” toward locations that would minimize damage.26

Accessibility to Breach Sites

Scientists also found that the design of the levees and fl oodwalls along the major outfall 

canals (the 17th Street and London Avenue Canals) hampered emergency operations at the 

breach sites, despite a Corps of Engineers regulation27 about the importance of access roads 

to levees for inspection, maintenance, and fl ood-fi ghting. Th ese narrow access roads usually 

run along the crown of the earthen levee itself. However, the report noted that adding Iwalls to levees in highly built-up areas of New Orleans had sacrifi ced road access to the tops 

of the levees. Th ese decisions resulted in very signifi cant increases in time and cost when it 

became necessary to close breaches along these canals.28 Emergency roads needed to be constructed to get access to the breached areas so that construction equipment and fi ll materials 

could be brought in.

Enhanced Protection

Hurricane Katrina was a catastrophic storm that exceeded the design limits of parts of the 

levee system. Nevertheless, some portion of the fl ooding that occurred could have been lessened had the levees themselves not been eroded – and ultimately breached – by overtopping. 

Th e scientifi c community has determined that the hurricane protection system designed to 

protect the people living within the metropolitan New Orleans area could have (and should 

have) been constructed with enhanced protective features. As noted in one report:

A fundamental fl aw in the fl oodwalls and levees is that they include no means 

of accommodating overtopping that does not infl ict major damage or destruction. ... Most of the 350 miles of levees in New Orleans are unprotected from 

devastating damage and potentially total destruction if overtopped.

Th e question is not whether the levees will again be overtopped but when and 

by how much they will be overtopped.29

Another report found that the performance of many levees and fl oodwalls could have 

been greatly improved “and some of the failures likely prevented, with relatively inexpensive modifi cations” of the system, such as riprap (a loose assemblage of broken stones and 

concrete), concrete splash slabs, or pavement on the protected side of the levees to guard 

against anticipated overtopping.30

Th e failure of the system’s design to adequately address the impact of signifi cant overtopping likely resulted in a system more prone to failure in a major hurricane and should have 

raised greater concern about the eff ects of overtopping.
Why the New Orleans Levees Failed

279

Proper Hurricane Protection System Oversight

As alluded to in the “transition points” subsection above, scientists have noted that there are 

design/technical problems with the hurricane protection system that they attribute to numerous “infrastructure elements [being] designed and maintained by multiple authorities.”31

As Seed testifi ed before the Committee during a public hearing:

No one is in charge. You have got multiple agencies, multiple organizations, 

some of whom aren’t on speaking terms with each other, sharing responsibilities for public safety. Th e Corps of Engineers had asked to put fl ood gates into 

the three canals [structures that would, upon activation, block the waters of Lake 

Pontchartrain from entering the drainage canals], which nominally might have 

mitigated and prevented the three main breaches that did so much destruction 

downtown. But they weren’t able to do that because, unique to New Orleans, the 

Reclamation Districts who were responsible for maintaining the levees are separate from the Water and Sewage District, which does the pumping. Ordinarily, 

the Reclamation District does the dewatering pumping, which is separate from 

the water system. Th ese guys don’t get along. Th e Sewage District was so concerned they wouldn’t be able to pump through gates which had to be opened and 

closed that in the end, the Corps, against its desires, was forced instead to line the 

canals [with the fl oodwalls], which they did with some umbrage, and the locals 

bore a higher than typical fraction of the shared cost as a result of that ...

Levees in the New Orleans area are at diff erent heights. You can stand – we have 

a photograph in our report at one section where you can clearly see fi ve diff erent 

elevations, all within 100 yards of each other. If you have got fi ve diff erent elevations within 100 yards, the person who built the lowest section wins because they 

become the public hazard. Th ere is a need to coordinate these things.32

As a report by the ASCE’s External Review Panel (ERP) notes:

Th e ERP sees clearly that organizational complexities and the ways in which 

decisions are made are among the most important factors that infl uenced the 

performance of the hurricane protection system. Organizational eff ectiveness 

has been and will continue to be questioned, with justifi cation. It is impossible 

for the ERP to conceive a mechanism through which the levee system can be 

rebuilt and operated eff ectively and effi ciently with such organizational discontinuity and chaos.33

Subsidence in the Metropolitan New Orleans Area

In addition to design and construction issues, soil subsidence – “the lowering or sinking 

of [the] earth’s surface”34 – has impaired the protection off ered by the New Orleans levee 

system. In the New Orleans area, subsidence is caused primarily by the cumulative weight 

of millions of years of soil and silt deposits left by the Mississippi River as it enters the Gulf 

of Mexico. Th e sediment literally presses down on the earth’s crust, causing the land to 

sink. As a result, the water level rises, gradually increasing vulnerability to tides and storms. 

Th e levees themselves can also subside because of their own weight pressing down on the 

swampy soils upon which they are built.

As a result, it appears that the level of protection actually provided by the New Orleans 

region’s levee system at the time of Katrina was signifi cantly lower than intended:

Many sections of the levees and fl oodwalls were substantially below their 

original design elevations, an eff ective loss of protection. For example, the 
Chapter 17

280

structures associated with the Inner 

Harbor Navigation Canal were originally 

constructed to an elevation of 15 feet 

(relative to mean sea level) but are now 

just over 12 feet, a typical loss of approximately 2.7 feet in elevation over the 

lifetime of the project.35

Th e report noted that “subsidence is occurring 

at a rate of up to one inch every three years” in 

the New Orleans region.36

Subsidence routinely creates problems for 

those trying to construct levees and other 

structures at known heights above sea level. As 

stated in one IPET report, due to the complex 

and variable subsidence in southeast Louisiana, 

“establishing an accurate vertical reference 

for measurements has been a constant challenge.”37 Unfortunately, until the October 2005 

release by the U.S. Department of Commerce’s 

National Geodetic Survey of 85 benchmarks 

located in southern Louisiana, which showed 

heights (elevations) accurate to between 2 and 

5 centimeters (roughly 1 to 2 inches), surveyors, engineers, and the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers in New Orleans evaluated the levees 

and structures built and in use against vertical heights that had not been calibrated nor 

checked for several years.38

As a result, it appears that the levees were not 

built and maintained at the proper level above 

sea level. Since the level of protection that the 

levees provide is so closely related to their 

height above sea level, which aff ects their ability to block increased water levels driven by 

hurricanes, the failure to build and maintain the levees at the proper elevation diminished 

the level of protection they provided.

1 Testimony of Raymond Seed, Ph.D., National Science Foundation, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland 

Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Why Did the Levees Fail?, Nov. 2, 2005.

2 Th is section analyzes and summarizes the following scientifi c reports: Th e November 2, 2005, American Society of 

Civil Engineers (ASCE) and National Science Foundation (NSF) Preliminary Report on the Performance of the New 

Orleans Levee System in Hurricane Katrina on August 29, 2005, [hereinaft er, “ASCE/NSF Preliminary Report”]; Th e December 5, 2005, Summary of Field Observations Relevant to Flood Protection in New Orleans, LA: Interim Report to Task 

Force Guardian by the Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force [hereinaft er, “IPET Summary of Field Observations”]; Th e January 10, 2006, Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force Performance Evaluation Plan and Interim 

Status, Report 1 of a Series: Performance Evaluation of the New Orleans and Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Protection 

System [hereinaft er, “IPET Report 1 of a Series”]; Th e February 20, 2006, American Society of Civil Engineers External 

Review Panel Progress: Report Number 1 [hereinaft er, “ASCE ERP Progress Report Number 1”]; Th e March 10, 2006, 

Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force Performance Evaluation, Status and Interim Results, Report 2 of a Series: 

Performance Evaluation of the New Orleans and Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Protection System [hereinaft er, “IPET

Report 2 of a Series”]; and various other ASCE and NSF preliminary evaluations of the IPET Report 2 of a Series.

Plugging a breached fl oodwall, 

New Orleans 

Photo © 2005 The Times-Picayune Publishing 

Co., all rights reserved. Used with permission 

of the Times-Picayune
Why the New Orleans Levees Failed

281

For background, it should be understood that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) responded to Hurricane 

Katrina with, among other things, the activation of Task Force Guardian (TFG), with the crucial responsibility of repairing the damages to the hurricane protective system by the storm. Source: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Interagency 

Performance Evaluation Task Force, Summary of Field Observations Relevant to Flood Protection in New Orleans, LA,” 

Dec. 5, 2005, p. 2 [hereinaft er IPET, Summary of Field Operations]. In addition, the Interagency Performance Evaluation 

Task Force (IPET) was established on October 10, 2005, by the Chief of Engineers of the USACE, and sanctioned by the 

Secretary of Defense in a directive to the Secretary of the Army on October 19, 2005. Source: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force, Performance Evaluation Plan and Interim Status, Report 1 of a 

Series, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 3 [hereinaft er IPET, Report 1 of a Series]. Th e IPET, “comprised of leading experts in a comprehensive array of science and engineering disciplines [is] charged with studying the response of the hurricane protection 

system during Katrina for lessons learned.” Source: IPET, Summary of Field Observations, p. 2. Moreover, the IPET is 

to “provide credible and objective scientifi c and engineering answers to fundamental questions about the performance 

of the hurricane protection and fl ood damage reduction system in the New Orleans metropolitan area.” Source: IPET,

Report 1 of a Series, p. 3. Th e American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) External Review Panel (ERP) then “provide[s] 

for an external, expert, and constructive technical review of the activities and products of the [IPET].” Source: IPET, Report 1 of a Series, Appendix D, p. D–7. While this review is to be comprehensive, and done on a periodic basis, it is clear 

that the “ERP has no approval authority on the fi ndings of the [IPET], nor are the ERP’s recommendations to the [IPET] 

binding, but the [IPET] will give serious consideration to each.” Source: IPET, Report 1 of a Series, Appendix D, p. D–8.

On Nov. 2, 2005, the Committee held a public hearing entitled, “Hurricane Katrina: Why Did the Levees Fail?” [hereinaft er, “HSGAC Levee 1 Hearing”]. Th e witnesses for this hearing were representatives and/or heads of several diff erent 

forensic data gathering teams investigating why the levees in and around New Orleans failed. Testifying before the 

Committee were Raymond B. Seed, Ph.D., on behalf of the National Science Foundation (NSF), Peter Nicholson, 

Ph.D., P.E., on behalf of the ASCE, Ivor van Heerden, Ph.D., of the LSU Hurricane Center and on behalf of the State 

of Louisiana Forensic Data Gathering Team, and Paul F. Mlakar, Ph.D., P.E., on behalf of the USACE. Th e bulk of 

Seed and Nicholson’s formal written testimony provided for the HSGAC Levee 1 Hearing summarized the ASCE/NSF 

Preliminary Report.

During the HSGAC Levee 1 Hearing, Mlakar specifi cally noted the IPET objective: “Th e fi nal results will include conclusions as to the causes of the failures and recommendations for the future design and construction of such infrastructure 

nationwide. Th ese results will be independently reviewed by an external panel of the [ASCE]. At the request of the Secretary of Defense, the National Academies will also independently assess the results and report to the Assistant Secretary of 

the Army for Civil Works.” Source: Testimony of Paul Mlakar, Senior Research Scientist, Army Engineer Research and 

Development Center, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on 

Hurricane Katrina: Why did the Levees Fail?, Nov. 2, 2005.

On Nov. 2, 2005 – the day of the HSGAC Levee 1 Hearing – the ASCE and NSF teams jointly released the ASCE/NSF 

Preliminary Report. As noted in the report itself, the “ASCE/NSF Preliminary Report” present[ed] the results of fi eld 

investigations performed by collaborating teams of scientists and engineers in the wake of the passage of Hurricane Katrina, to study performance of the regional fl ood protection systems and the resulting fl ooding that occurred in the New 

Orleans area.” Source: American Society of Civil Engineers and National Science Foundation, Preliminary Report on the 

Performance of the New Orleans Levee System in Hurricane Katrina on Aug. 29, 2005, Nov. 2, 2005, p. 1–1 [hereinaft er, 

ASCE/NSF, Preliminary Report]. Th e initial fi eld investigations conducted in preparation for the report took place from 

Sept. 28, through Oct. 15, 2005. Source: ASCE/NSF, Preliminary Report, p. iv. Following the ASCE/NSF Preliminary 

Report, on Dec. 5, 2005, the IPET Summary of Field Observations was issued, which consisted of an “IPET review provided [to] Task Force Guardian with a simple statement of concurrence or nonoccurrence from the IPET fl oodwall and 

levee sub team and additional relevant discussion for each of the major fi ndings of the ASCE/NSF “Preliminary Report.” 

Source: IPET, Report 1 of a Series, Appendix F, p. F–2.

Consistent with IPET’s mission, it produced its fi rst evaluation of the metropolitan New Orleans area hurricane protection system on Jan. 10, 2006. Th e IPET Report 1 of a Series is a massive document. Moreover, as noted in its “Purpose” 

section, “IPET, Report 1 of a Series provides a strategic overview of the IPET, the fi nal IPET Scopes of Work on a taskby-task basis, including changes resulting from the review of the [ASCE ERP], and a status report on the work accomplished to date.” Source: IPET, Report 1 of a Series, p. 4. However, and as noted by the Feb. 20, 2006, ASCE ERP Progress 

Report Number 1, “the IPET [Report 1 of a Series] presented no specifi c fi ndings and conclusions, which is not surprising 

in view of the many questions that as yet are unanswered.” Source: American Society of Civil Engineers, letter to Lt. Gen. 

Carl Strock, “ERP Progress Report Number 1,” Feb. 20, 2006, p. 2. Provided to the Committee [hereinaft er ASCE, “ERP 

Progress Report Number 1”]. Th e IPET Final Report “will include the completed analyses for consequences and risk and 

reliability,” and is scheduled for release on June 1, 2006. Source: IPET, Report 1 of a Series, viii.

According to the IPET Report 1 of a Series, Objectives section, the IPET’s overall review is focused on answering the following critical questions:

a. Th e Flood Protection System: What were the design criteria for the pre-Katrina hurricane protection system, and did the design, as-built construction, and maintained condition meet these criteria? 

(1) What were the design assumptions and as-built characteristics of the primary components of the 

fl ood protection system? (2) What records of inspection and maintenance of original construction 

and post-Katrina repairs are available that documents their conditions? (3) What subsurface exploration and geotechnical laboratory testing information was available as the basis of design, and were 

these conditions verifi ed during construction? (4) Were the subsurface conditions at the locations of 

levee failures unique, or are these same conditions found elsewhere?
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b. Th e Storm: What were the storm surges and waves used as the basis of design, and how do these 

compare to the storm surges and waves generated by Hurricane Katrina? (1) What forces, as a function of location and time, were exerted against the hurricane protection system by Katrina?

c. Th e Performance: How did the fl oodwalls, levees, pumping stations, and drainage canals, individually and acting as an integrated system, perform in response to Hurricane Katrina, and why? (1) What 

were the primary failure mechanisms and factors leading to failure for those structures suff ering 

catastrophic failure during the storm? (2) What characteristics allowed components of the system to 

perform well under exceptional loads and forces? (3) What was the contribution of the pumping stations and drainage system in the unwatering of fl ooded areas? (4) What areas or components of the 

fl ood protection system have sustained damages that reduce their protection capacity and may need 

some reconstitution of capacity?

d. Th e Consequences: What have been the societal-related consequences of the Katrina-related damage? (1) How are local consequences related to the performance of individual components of the 

fl ood protection system? (2) What would the consequences have been if the system would not have 

suff ered catastrophic failure? (3) What are the consequences of Katrina that extend beyond New 

Orleans and vicinity?

e. Th e Risk: Following the immediate repairs, what will be the quantifi able risk to New Orleans and 

vicinity from future hurricanes and tropical storms? (1) What was the risk to New Orleans and vicinity from hurricanes prior to Katrina? (2) On June 1, 2006, what will be the condition and engineering 

integrity of the New Orleans hurricane protection system, including structural repairs? Source: IPET, 

Report 1 of a Series, p. 6–7.

While all of these questions are important ones – many of which are addressed throughout the balance of this Committee’s 

Report, the following have a direct bearing upon this section of the Committee’s Report: questions (a) and (a)(1)-(4); (b) 

and (b)(1); and (c) and (c)(1)-(2). In any event, given the state of the IPET’s review at the time of this Committee’s Report, 

the IPET Report 1 of a Series can best be used to demonstrate what the DOD sanctioned team of scientists is doing (or plans 

to do), while also taking note of what it is not doing (as referenced in the ASCE ERP Progress Report Number 1).

As noted above, the IPET Final Report is scheduled for release on June 1, 2006. Overall, and as largely recognized by the 

ASCE ERP, the IPET’s goal (and its approach to meeting this goal) is a critical and comprehensive one. Th e IPET Final 

Report has the makings to be – if conducted as planned, including the duo-layered review process – the defi nitive work 

on the lingering scientifi c/forensic questions related to Hurricane Katrina. However, and as referenced elsewhere in 

this Committee’s Report, the organizational problems referenced in the ASCE ERP Progress Report Number 1, and also 

by the scientists who testifi ed before the Committee at the HSGAC Levee 1 Hearing, are signifi cant issues that must be 

properly addressed before residents of the greater New Orleans area are to exude confi dence in the hurricane protection 

system charged with protecting their lives and livelihoods.

3 Ivor L. van Heerden, G. Paul Kemp, Wes Shrum, Ezra Boyd and Hassan Mashriqui, Louisiana State University, Center 

for the Study of Public Health Impacts of Hurricanes, Initial Assessment of the New Orleans’ Flooding Event during the 

Passage of Hurricane Katrina, pp. 7-10. [hereinaft er LSU, Initial Assessment of New Orleans Flooding]. Th e LSU professors also noted that, “[w]ater poured through the three deep breaches of the drainage canals into the New Orleans Metro 

bowl for more than 60 hours, until early Th ursday morning, when the level inside reached equilibrium with the water in 

the lake at about 3 feet above sea level, and with the ‘average’ home in the fl ooded neighborhoods standing in six to nine 

feet of water.” LSU, Initial Assessment of New Orleans Flooding, p. 10.

4 ASCE/NSF Preliminary Report, pp. iv-v, 2–3, 8–2; IPET, Summary of Field Observations, p. 8; and IPET, Report 1 of a 

Series, pp. 113-114; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force, Performance Evaluation Plan and Interim Status, Report 2 of a Series, Mar. 10, 2006, p. vi-3 [hereinaft er IPET, Report 2 of a Series].

5 IPET, Report 2 of a Series, p. I–4. See also: Raymond B. Seed and Robert G. Bea, National Science Foundation-Sponsored Independent Levee Inspection Team (ILIT), Univ. of Calif. at Berkeley, Initial Comments on Interim (70%) IPET 

Study Report, Mar. 12, 2006, p. 1 [hereinaft er, ILIT, Initial Comments on Interim (70%) IPET Study Report]. It should be 

noted that the ASCE ERP, noted above, seems to be satisfi ed with the IPET’s assessment: “In its initial review of the U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers’ [IPET] second report, Status and Interim Results, the [ASCE] External Review Panel (ERP) 

members are generally satisfi ed with the group’s analysis and progress. More specifi cally, we have been impressed with 

the IPET’s investigation of the 17th Street failure mechanism.” American Society of Civil Engineers, “Statement attributable to David Daniel, Ph.D., P.E., president of the University of Texas, Dallas, Chair, American Society of Civil Engineers 

(ASCE) External Review Panel (ERP),” news release, Mar. 10, 2006, p. 1.

6 IPET, Report 2 of a Series, p. I–4 (emphasis added).

7 American Society of Civil Engineers, letter to Lt. Gen. Carl Strock, Mar. 23, 2006, pp. 1-2. Provided to the Committee. Wherein the ASCE ERP also noted the Corps’ knowledge regarding soil/foundational issues in the area of the major 

outfall canals, and the fl oodwall fi eld test demonstrating similar failure mechanisms as that actually realized at the site of 

the 17th Street Canal and referenced in the IPET Report 2 of a Series.

8 ILIT, Initial Comments on Interim (70%) IPET Study Report, p. 1.

9 ILIT, Initial Comments on Interim (70%) IPET Study Report, p. 1.

10 ILIT, Initial Comments on Interim (70%) IPET Study Report, p. 3. See also: American Society of Civil Engineers, Letter to Lt. Gen. Carl Strock, Mar. 23, 2006.
Why the New Orleans Levees Failed

283

11 IPET, Report 1 of a Series, p. 106.

12 At this point, it should be noted that the IPET team undertook an analysis to determine the eff ects of the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MRGO) upon the storm surge generated by Hurricane Katrina. Th e note, which examined “the 

impact of the MRGO on large scale catastrophic storm surge development and propagation,” found as follows:

Th e MRGO is a dredged channel that extends southeast to northwest from the Gulf of Mexico to a point 

where it fi rst merges with the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway (GIWW), and then continues westward until 

it intersects the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal (IHNC). ... Th e fi rst 9 miles, the bar channel, are in the 

open Gulf. Th e next 23 miles of the channel lie in the shallow open waters of Breton Sound. From there, 

the inland cut extends 14 miles to the northwest with open marsh on the northeast and a 4,000-ft wide 

dredged material placement bank on the southwest side. At this point the channel cuts across the ridge of 

a relict distributary of the Mississippi River, Bayou La Loutre. For nearly the next 24 miles, there is a hurricane protection levee atop a dredged material placement bank on the southwest side of the channel and 

Lake Borgne and open marsh lie to the northeast. A portion of the levee protecting St. Bernard Parish/

Chalmette and the portion of the hurricane protection levee along the south side of Orleans East Parish, 

north of the GIWW, form the “funnel” that is oft en referenced. Th e point where the MRGO and GIWW 

channels merge is just to the east of the Paris Road Bridge. ... From this point, the merged GIWW/

MRGO channel continues west for about 6 miles to the point where it intersects the IHNC; this portion 

has hurricane protection levees on both banks. Th e IHNC extends from Lake Pontchartrain, to the north, 

to the Mississippi River to the south. Th e IHNC has levees or fl oodwalls along both banks. ... Th e MRGO 

bar channel authorized depth is 38 ft ; the authorized bottom width is 600 ft . Th e remainder of the channel 

has an authorized depth of 36 ft and an authorized bottom width of 400 or 450 ft , depending on location.

It is important to distinguish between two sections of the MRGO and the role each plays in tide and 

storm surge propagation. One is the east-west oriented section that runs between the IHNC and the 

confl uence of the GIWW/MRGO near the Paris Road Bridge ... and hereinaft er referred to as Reach 

1. Th e other is the much longer southeast-northwest section ... hereinaft er referred to as the Reach 2. 

IPET, Report 2 of a Series, Appendix E, p. E–2.

Citing past studies, and analyses of their own, the IPET report noted the following regarding MRGO/Reach 2:

Th e change in storm surge induced by MRGO/Reach 2 (computed as a percentage of the peak surge 

magnitude) is greatest when the amplitude of the storm surge is low, on the order of a few feet or less. 

In these situations, changes induced by the MRGO are rather small, 0.5 ft or less, but this amount is 

as much as 25% of the peak surge amplitude. When the long wave amplitude is very low, the surge is 

more limited to propagation via the channels. Once the surge amplitude increases to the point where 

the wetlands become inundated, this section of the MRGO plays a diminished role in infl uencing the 

amplitude of storm surge that reaches the vicinity of metropolitan New Orleans. For storm surges of 

the magnitude produced by Hurricane Betsy and Katrina, which overwhelmed the wetland system, the 

infl uence of MRGO/Reach 2 on storm surge propagation is rather small. When the expansive wetland 

is inundated, the storm surge propagates primarily through the water column over this much larger 

fl ooded area, and the channels become a much smaller contributor to water conveyance. Source: IPET, 

Report 2 of a Series, Appendix E, p. E–4. ... Th e reasons for the very limited infl uence of the MRGO/

Reach 2 in the vicinity of New Orleans for strong storm events are clear. First, the MRGO does not 

infl uence the important preliminary east-west movement of water that drives the signifi cant build up of 

surge in the early parts of the storm. Second, the northerly propagation of surge during the later stages 

of the storm are only minimally infl uenced by the MRGO because the increased hydraulic conveyance 

associated with the channel is very limited for large storms due to the large surge magnitude and especially due to the very large lateral extent of the high waters on the Mississippi-Alabama shelf that build 

up early on from the east. In addition, the propagation direction of this surge wave does not typically 

align with the MRGO and furthermore the southeasterly winds which align with the MRGO occur only 

very briefl y. Source: IPET, Report 2 of a Series, Appendix E, p. E–6.

Finally, the report said of MRGO/Reach 1:

While the simulations clearly show that Reach 2 of the MRGO does not signifi cantly infl uence the 

development of storm surge in the region for large storm events, Reach 1 (the combined GIWW/

MRGO section) and the IHNC, together, provide a hydraulic connection between Lake Borgne and 

Lake Pontchartrain. As a result of this connection, the storm surge experienced within the IHNC and 

Reach 1 (GIWW/MRGO) is a function of storm surge in both Lakes; a water level gradient is established within the IHNC and Reach 1 that is dictated by the surge levels in the two lakes. Th is is true for 

both low and high storm surge conditions. To prevent storm surge in Lake Borgne from reaching the 

IHNC or GIWW/MRGO sections of waterway, fl ow through the Reach 1 channel must be dramatically 

reduced or eliminated, either by a permanent closure or some type of structure that temporarily serves 

to eliminate this hydraulic connectivity. Th e presence of an open channel is the key factor.

Th e hurricane protection levees along the south side of Orleans Parish [Orleans East] and the eastern 

side of St. Bernard Parish along the MRGO, which together are referred to as a funnel, can locally 

collect and focus storm surge in this vicinity depending on wind speed and direction. Th is localized 

focusing eff ect can lead to a small local increase in surge amplitude. Strong winds from the east tend to 

maximize the local funneling eff ect. Source: IPET, Report 2 of a Series, Appendix E, p. E–7.
Chapter 17

284

A team of scientists from LSU, however, seem to take a diff erent position on the MRGO channel. In a report entitled, 

LSU, Initial Assessment of New Orleans Flooding, Ivor L. van Heerden, G. Paul Kemp, Wes Shrum, Ezra Boyd and Hassan Mashriqui state the following:

As the eye of the storm approached the latitude of New Orleans, a 14-17 foot surge was pushed into 

the western apex of a triangle known as the “Funnel”, so called because the hurricane protection levees 

that form the south bank of the MRGO and the north bank of the GIWW converge from being about 

10 miles apart to a few hundred yards at the banks of the GIWW where it separates the East Orleans 

and St. Bernard basins. Th e Funnel is a 6-mile long section of the GIWW where the cross-section was 

enlarged by a factor of three when the MRGO was built to expand it from a barge channel to accommodate ocean-going vessels. At the western end, the Funnel focused a jet into the IHNC. Th e US Army 

Corps of Engineers had inadvertently designed an excellent storm surge delivery system – nothing less 

– to bring this mass of water with simply tremendous “load” – potential energy – right into the middle 

of New Orleans. Source: LSU, Initial Assessment of New Orleans Flooding, p. 4.

13 ASCE/NSF, Preliminary Report, pp. iv-v.

14 ASCE/NSF, Preliminary Report, pp. iv-v.

15 ASCE, “ERP Progress Report Number 1,” p. 3.

16 ASCE, “ERP Progress Report Number 1,” p. 3.

17 ASCE/NSF, Preliminary Report, p. 8–1. See also: IPET, Summary of Field Observations, p. 6.

18 IPET, Summary of Field Observations, p. 6.

19 ASCE/NSF, Preliminary Report, p. 8–1. However, it should be noted that while the IPET report concurred with the 

ASCE/NSF Preliminary Report fi nding regarding the T-walls, noting that, “if overtopping of T-walls did occur, it did not 

lead to extensive scour and erosion,” the IPET team also stated that there were some T-wall structures “that had signifi -

cant scour, but none showed evidence of distress or movement” IPET, Summary of Field Observations, p. 6.

20 Written Statement of Anu Mittal, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, U.S. General Accountability Offi ce, 

for the U.S. Senate on Environment and Public Works, hearing on Comprehensive and Integrated Approach to Meet the 

Water Resources Needs in the Wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 2. 

21 Written Statement of Mittal, Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works hearing, Nov. 9, 2005, p. i.

22 ASCE/NSF, Preliminary Report, pp. 8–1 through 8–2; see also IPET, Summary of Field Observations, pp. 6-7; IPET, 

Report 1 of a Series, p. 114.

23 IPET, Summary of Field Observations, pp. 6-7.

24 ASCE/NSF, Preliminary Report, pp. 8–1 through 8–2.

25 ASCE/NSF Preliminary Report, pp. 8–1 through 8–2.

26 ASCE/NSF Preliminary Report, p. 8–3. It should be noted that the IPET team generally agreed with these ASCE/NSF 

comments, however, while the IPET recognized that planning for overtopping by adjusting crest heights “should be 

considered,” the team stated that there are a number of uncertainties regarding the location and size of these planned 

“spillways.” IPET, Summary of Field Observations, p. 11.

27 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Engineering and Design, Design and Construction of Levees, Apr. 30, 2000, Section 8–9.

28 ASCE/NSF, Preliminary Report, pp. 8–3 through 8–4. It should also be noted that the IPET team concurred, specifi -

cally noting that, “Given the logistical diffi culties in accessing and sealing the breaches to unwater fl ooded areas, [TFG] 

should carefully reconsider the guidance of EM 1110-2-1913, Section 8-9 [the Army Corps regulation on point].” IPET,

Summary of Field Observations, p. 11.

29 ASCE, “ERP Progress Report Number 1,” p. 3.

30 ASCE/NSF, Preliminary Report, p. 8–3. See also: IPET, Summary of Field Observations, p. 10.

31 ASCE/NSF, Preliminary Report, pp. 8–1 through 8–2. Th e IPET team, however, has left “the issues of organizational 

and jurisdictional complexities that can impact the eff ectiveness of the physical system” to be treated separately. IPET,

Report 2 of a Series, p. I–1.

32 Testimony of Raymond Seed, Ph.D., Team Leader, National Science Foundation, before the U.S. Senate, Committee 

on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Why Did the Levees Fail?, Nov. 2, 2005.

33 ASCE, “ERP Progress Report Number 1,” p. 2.

34 IPET, Report 2 of a Series, p. III–6.

35 IPET, Report 2 of a Series, p. I–2.

36 IPET, Report 2 of a Series, p. III–6.

37 IPET, Report 2 of a Series, p. I–2.

38 IPET, Report 2 of a Series, p. III-6. Signifi cantly, the report found that geodetic elevations are very time-dependant 

in the New Orleans area “and must be periodically adjusted to account for apparent sea level changes.” It also recommended annual reviews to measure subsidence. IPET, Report 2 of a Series, p. III–53.
584

287

Chapter 18

Communication Voids

The inability of government offi cials and fi rst responders to communicate during a 

response to an emergency – whether terrorist attacks, natural disasters, or everyday 

operations – results in the loss of lives. Problems with communications operability and interoperability constituted one of the main reasons for governments’ failures in 

response to Katrina. Operability refers to the basic functionality of any device (“Is it working?”). Interoperability refers to the device’s ability to connect with other devices and share 

voice or data communications (“Can the police talk to fi remen?” or “Can hospitals electronically share patient medical records with emergency health-care providers?”)

While there can be no interoperable communications where no communications exists at 

all – the situation confronting many fi rst responders in Louisiana and across the Gulf Coast 

immediately aft er Katrina – an interoperable communications system may be more resilient than “stove- piped” systems. For example, systems can be built with tower sites that 

have overlapping coverage so that if a single tower goes down, total coverage is not lost in a 

particular area.1

Katrina infl icted widespread destruction on communications and electrical infrastructure. 

With cellular towers down, land lines submerged, and no power, telephone and wireless 

communications were largely impossible in the areas most heavily aff ected by the hurricane. 

Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour summed up the lack of communications: “My head 

of the National Guard might as well have been a Civil War general for the fi rst two or three 

days because he could only fi nd out what is going on by sending somebody. He did have helicopters instead of horses, so it was a little faster, but the same sort of thing.”2

 Emergency 

personnel from across the Gulf Coast have described how the communications breakdown 

complicated the coordination of federal, state, and local response. For example: 

• In New Orleans, Mayor Nagin’s command center at the Hyatt Regency Hotel 

lost all communications.3

 Aft er landfall – though before fl ooding – Mayor Nagin had to walk across the street to City Hall in order to speak to city emergency 

managers.4

 One phone line in the Mayor’s room in the Hyatt would sometimes 

connect a call out, but could not receive incoming calls.5

 It was not until Th ursday, September 1, three days aft er landfall, that the Mayor’s command center 

began to receive e-mails. On Friday, September 2, the White House provided 

the Mayor with a mobile phone but he had to lean out of storm-damaged 

rooms at the hotel to get a signal.6

• Larry Ingargiola, Director of the Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness for St. 

Bernard Parish, Louisiana, lost phone and cellular communications on Monday aft ernoon following landfall. Later that night, the emergency radio system 

went down; he was left without any communications until August 31. Ingargiola, who went up to the roof of his building with his family when the water 

started to rise, received word of the levees’ breaching from Louisiana Wildlife 

and Fisheries (W&F) offi cials who rode by in boats.7

• Th e Louisiana offi cials in charge of evacuating the Tulane Medical Center received oral authorization from the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) 

to use buses in the possession of the National Guard to evacuate the patients. 

When the National Guard asked for proof of authorization, the head of the 

rescue team could not get through to the State EOC on his cell phone. Without 

(Left Page) 

Ruins in Gulfport, MS

(U.S. Coast Guard photo)
288

Chapter 18

the use of the buses, the rescue team resorted to evacuating the patients in the 

backs of pick-up trucks, with wheelchairs, stretchers, and other equipment 

loaded into boats pulled behind the trucks.8

• Phil Parr, who was part of the Federal Emergency Management Agency 

(FEMA) Advance Emergency Response Team at the Superdome, estimated 

that the lack of eff ective communications at the Superdome reduced FEMA’s 

eff ectiveness by 90 percent.9

• With the loss of phone and computer capabilities, the only way FEMA offi cials in Harrison County, Mississippi could track water, food, and other 

requested relief supplies was to send a police car to the distribution center at 

Stennis Space Center, located in Hancock County, near Louisiana, so that they 

could communicate using the police car’s radio.10

• Scott Wells, the Federal Coordinating Offi cer at the State EOC in Baton 

Rouge, said that communication with both New Orleans and the FEMA regional offi ce in Denton, Texas, aft er landfall was so poor that it was like being 

in a “black hole.”11

• Health-care providers’ inability to share data complicated the task of caring for 

thousands of patients and others injured during the storm. Injured citizens from 

the Gulf Coast were being treated at many diff erent locations, oft en far from 

their homes, sometimes in other states. Th e lack of an interoperable data system 

oft en prevented medical personnel from obtaining information about patients, 

even if their facility had suff ered no hurricane damage. To complicate matters 

further, no continuous records were kept to identify and track patients or the 

treatment they received. Oft en the identifi cation-and-tracking system consisted 

of paper stapled to victims’ bed sheets or taped to their bodies.12 One hospital offi cial found that the only reliable way to confi rm that planeloads of new evacuee 

patients were en route was to check with local air-traffi c controllers.13

Some private-sector entities, however, were much more successful in dealing with communications problems. Th e Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs Committee’s 

private-sector hearing featured testimony from companies about the communications 

challenges they faced, how they overcame them, and how any success they achieved aft er 

landfall depended on successful communications, including communications between the 

fi eld and the company’s headquarters, within headquarters, and with state and local emergency operations centers. 

In its testimony before the Committee, the Starwood hotel company discussed how it managed events on the ground in New Orleans, backed up by its corporate headquarters, which 

enabled the company to help approximately 2,100 guests, employees, and their families 

weather the storm in safety at two hotels.14 Th rough eff ective planning and pre-positioning of phones, Starwood never lost contact with areas outside the aff ected region. Satellite 

phones were deployed to the hotels, and Starwood maintained its Internet connection, 

which permitted employees and guests to communicate with the outside world.15 (One of its 

New Orleans hotels had two information-technology employees on-site and battery backups for their computer systems, which enabled the Internet connection.) Th rough media 

reports received via the Internet, managers on the ground knew what was going on around 

them when all other forms of communications had failed. Local responders and journalists 

sometimes relied on Starwood’s communications capabilities since the city’s communications system was largely lost.16
Communication Voids

289

Th e Wal-Mart retail-merchandise chain stressed the importance of “effi cient” communication, and described it as “absolutely the key to success at a higher level.”17 Wal-Mart 

developed situational awareness at the local level and passed it quickly to its emergency 

operations center, which compiled a big picture for the company. Th e business-unit representatives in the emergency operations center made decisions on tactics and strategies based 

upon the “big picture” information and then moved aggressively to disseminate objectives 

back to company response teams and fi eld teams for further dissemination.18 Wal-Mart determined that the “face-to-face communication at the Emergency Operations Center level, 

where the decision makers congregate, is the most effi cient method of communication.”19

Th e Mississippi Power public utility recognized the importance of communications to an 

eff ective response, particularly the ability to communicate with thousands of additional 

workers brought in from outside the region to help with restoration and repairs. Mississippi 

Power relied on its only viable form of communication – its internal system Southern Linc 

Wireless.20 Th is system was designed with considerable redundancy and proved reliable despite suff ering catastrophic damage. Within three days, the system was functioning at nearly 

100 percent. Mississippi Power told the Committee that it “also installed its own microwave 

capability to 12 remote staging areas in order to transmit material inventory data into our 

automated procurement process.”21 Th e company said, “When communication circuits 

of another company were down, our information technology group would fi nd a way to 

bypass those circuits and restore critical communications.”22

Th e storm and fl ooding severely damaged both the commercial and public safety communications infrastructure.23 Th is created chaos for every aspect of governments’ response 

– search and rescue, medical care, law enforcement, and provision of commodities. Th is 

section addresses each type of infrastructure and then considers the local, state, and federal 

governments’ eff orts to provide emergency and interoperable communications capabilities. 

Commercial Communications Infrastructure

BellSouth, the largest local phone company in the region, lost service at 33 of the central 

offi ces that route calls.24 Th is was the fi rst time that water damage had put switching centers 

out of service on their network.25 Almost 3 million customers were without phone service 

in the days aft er landfall and over 20 million calls attempted on Tuesday, August 30, the day 

aft er landfall, could not be completed.26 Of the 545 central offi ces that remained in service, 

over 180 had to run on generators due to the loss of commercial power.27

Commercial wireless communications also suff ered. Over 1,000 of some 7,000 cellular towers in the aff ected area were knocked out of service.28 Some of the switching centers that 

connected to cellular towers were fl ooded, while others were damaged by high winds.29 To 

restore cellular coverage, cellular providers brought in over 100 portable cellular towers, 

called cellular on wheels or cellular on light truck, to the Gulf Coast. Each portable tower 

provided cellular coverage over a limited area on a temporary basis.30

Th e generators supplying power to the central offi ces had limited fuel supply,31 and needed 

to be replenished about every three days. BellSouth obtained fuel trucks to top off its generators, proceeding into New Orleans with an armed convoy.32 Other companies had problems obtaining fuel for their generators. For example, Cox Louisiana Telecom LLC, which 

serves 85,000 customers, had fuel trucks that were destined for switch facilities intercepted 

by FEMA and turned away. FEMA also took fuel away from technicians with service trucks 

in the fi eld.33 In addition, FEMA commandeered a fuel tanker from BellSouth in order to 

refuel helicopters.34
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290

Th e commercial sector also had to negotiate security concerns. At BellSouth’s main central offi ce on Poydras Street in New Orleans, which serves as a regional hub for multiple 

telecommunications carriers, reports of violence and looting caused the New Orleans Police 

Department (NOPD) and Louisiana State Police (LSP) to advise employees to evacuate the 

building.35 Two days aft er the evacuation, the FBI and the U.S. Marshals Service provided 

security so that BellSouth workers could return to the Poydras Street building to fuel the 

generators, which were running low but never went out of service.36 In an eff ort to obtain security for all telecommunications providers, the National Communications System 

(NCS), the federal government’s lead agency for the response to communications problems, 

sought assistance from the Department of Defense (DOD), which forwarded the request to 

the Louisiana National Guard.37 In the end, however, security arrangements with the Louisiana National Guard fell through.38 Ultimately, telecommunications providers hired private 

security to protect their workers and supplies.39

Repair workers also had diffi culty gaining access to their equipment and facilities in the 

fi eld because police and National Guard in some cases refused to let them enter the disaster 

area. MCI sought a letter from Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco to access parts of New 

Orleans based on a requirement from the LSP, and Verizon Wireless wanted access and 

security for technicians restoring cellular service in New Orleans.40 Industry representatives 

said that their technicians would benefi t from having uniform credentialing that is recognized by the multiple law-enforcement agencies operating in a disaster area.41

Damage to First Responders’ Communications Infrastructure

Besides destroying commercial lines, Katrina decimated the towers and electronic equipment that support land mobile-radio systems, the primary means of communication for 

fi rst responders. Th is made it diffi cult for offi cials at all levels of government to communicate. Offi cials from NOPD, the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, and 

the Louisiana National Guard testifi ed that their law-enforcement and search-and-rescue 

eff orts were hindered by the lack of communications.42

Government offi cials at the Louisiana State EOC in Baton Rouge had trouble communicating with those in the disaster area.43 State and local emergency operations centers were 

left in a “communications void,” oft en unable to communicate with fi rst responders or to 

relay requests for assistance up the chain of command.44 Part of the problem was serious 

call congestion on surviving land lines.45 BellSouth said that it tried to reroute calls around 

damaged infrastructure, and the State EOC eventually had more lines installed to provide 

additional capacity. 

In New Orleans, only one tower that was at the airport remained operational: One tower 

was inundated by the storm surge, while two others had equipment damaged or lost power 

because of fl ood waters.46 Many police, fi re, EMS dispatch centers, and 911 centers were 

rendered unusable by fl ood waters.47 Th e ACU-1000 interoperability devices, which provided limited interoperability by patching together diff erent radio systems and were located 

within the Rosedale Fire Station, had to be abandoned because of fl ood waters.48 Katrina’s 

devastating impact on communications infrastructure around New Orleans forced fi rst responders to rely on fi ve or fewer mutual-aid channels – recognized by multiple agencies as 

channels to use when the coordinating electronics of the radio system fails – for voice-radio 

communications.49 But around 4,000 people were competing to use that constricted capacity.50 Th e heavy congestion resulted in delays before communications could be established.51

In St. Bernard Parish, extreme winds damaged communications towers and antennas, while 

fl ood waters inundated the 911 call center and forced the evacuation of buildings housing 
Communication Voids

291

communications for the Fire and Sheriff ’s Departments. All voice-radio communications 

were lost except for very limited radio-to-radio communications.52 Plaquemines Parish lost the parish government communications tower and communications center. Th e 

Plaquemines Sheriff lost the 911 communications and dispatch center, and all towers. It 

would be three weeks before Plaquemines Parish had any means of communications. Th e 

Jeff erson Parish Sheriff ’s Offi ce lost the main tower supporting its communications system. 

As a result of this destruction, antennas supporting its communications center were relocated to the boom of a 400-foot crane for months.53

Th e Louisiana State Police Department worked with FEMA to provide support to local 

departments whose communications capacity had been devastated by the storm. FEMA 

agreed to pay $15.9 million to Motorola to repair and augment the regional system and to 

purchase 600 portable radios. Th e contract for these repairs was signed approximately two 

weeks aft er landfall.54

911 Communications

Along with fi rst responder communications, Katrina wreaked havoc on the 911 systems on 

which the public relies to contact fi rst responders. During the Katrina crisis, 911 was unavailable for untold numbers of victims. At least 38 of the 911 centers in the region lost their 

ability to function during Katrina.55

When 911 systems go down, some call centers still re-route calls to other centers. However, 

telecommunicators on the receiving end did not have access to maps, data, and other information necessary to direct fi rst responders to callers in need of help.56 Also, only the voice 

is rerouted, while critical data (e.g., electronic information about a call’s point of origin) is 

not. However, in many cases, due to the widespread destruction in Louisiana, even voice 

signals could not be rerouted. As a result, when citizens dialed 911, they got a busy signal. 57

Broken utility poles, Mandeville, LA

Photo © 2005 The Times-Picayune Publishing Co., 

all rights reserved. Used with permission of the 

Times-Picayune
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Meanwhile, the infl ux of thousands of fi rst responders into the region greatly increased the 

workload for 911 call-center operators who were victims of the storm themselves. Some 

left when their families evacuated. Th ose remaining operated under tremendous stress.58 A 

North Carolina 911 offi cial helping the response eff ort in St. Tammany Parish, Louisiana, 

observed that no plan existed to bring additional, credentialed telecommunicators into the 

region, and that early Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) requests for 

inter-state assistance did not include 911 operators.59

Role of the National Communications System

Under the National Response Plan (NRP), Emergency Support Function-2 (ESF-2, Communications) ensures the provision of federal communications support to federal, state, 

local, tribal, and private-sector response eff orts during an Incident of National Signifi cance. 

Th e coordinator for ESF-2 activities is the National Communications System (NCS), an 

interagency consortium managed within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).60

Th e Deputy Manager and Director of NCS is Peter Fonash, Ph.D. 61

Before Hurricane Katrina, NCS never had to repair the land mobile radio (LMR) systems 

that are operated by local governments and used by fi rst responders.62 In fact, the organization did not have an operational plan to systematically assess an incident’s impact on the 

LMR systems and respond to local governments’ communications needs for operability, or 

interoperability, during emergencies.63 Fonash did not know what communications assets 

were available across the federal government, nor what communications assets DHS, DOD, 

or other agencies may have been deploying. “Even the federal agencies themselves, DOD, 

for example ... didn’t even have the control within DOD of all the assets being deployed by 

DOD because diff erent parts of DOD were deploying assets and there was no central control,” he said.64 Without knowledge of what communications assets federal agencies were 

bringing into the area, NCS could not eff ectively prioritize the use of those assets.65

Fonash acknowledged that NCS had inadequate information about the communication situation in the New Orleans area. According to NCS protocol, its headquarters receives such 

information only when its personnel on the ground have run into “problems [they] can’t 

fi x.”66 Th e magnitude of the damage in Louisiana proved this system inadequate. Fonash 

said that NCS staff was “so busy handling the crisis that they were probably not giving us 

the situational awareness that we should have been getting. . . . We just didn’t have enough 

people down there.”67 Eventually, Fonash sent additional staff to the region and placed a 

contact at the Louisiana state EOC.

Several communications assets were not deployed at all, or could have been deployed sooner:

• Th e U.S. Forest Service maintains over 5,000 radios, the largest civilian cache 

of radios in the United States, but many remained unused.68

• FEMA Mobile Emergency Response Support (MERS) units, which include 

trucks with satellite capabilities, were at Barksdale Air Force Base in Shreveport, LA, outside the disaster area, during landfall, and did not travel to the 

State EOC in Baton Rouge until the day aft er landfall.69

• DOD had communications assets, including radio systems, which could have 

been deployed sooner.70

• DHS’s Prepositioned Equipment Program (PEP) pods containing communications equipment did not start deploying until a week aft er landfall.71
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Th e NCS did identify and provide satellite communications vans to New Orleans City Hall, 

LSP in Baton Rouge, the Mobile Army Surgical Hospital at the New Orleans Airport, and 

to the National Guard in Jeff erson Parish.72 NCS also provided a cellular unit on a truck 

to the Louisiana State EOC.73 In addition, NCS identifi ed the need to provide a temporary 

LMR communications solution to the eight-parish area around New Orleans, working with 

FEMA to initiate the contract.74 But most of these NCS assets were not provided until days 

aft er the storm struck or were only provided to select locations. Indeed, satellite vans were 

not en route to the LSP in Baton Rouge until September 1, and high water kept one satellite 

van from reaching New Orleans City Hall until three days aft er landfall.75

It appears that some requests for the NCS to provide communications capabilities to local 

governments were not made until a few days aft er landfall. For example, Colonel Jeff Smith, 

Louisiana’s Acting Deputy Director for Emergency Preparedness, did not submit a form 

requesting “communications with the aff ected parish EOCs” until 5 p.m. on September 1 

– more than three days aft er landfall.76 Fonash said that he wasn’t aware that the state EOC 

had communications problems until the state made its request on September 1.77 An e-mail 

indicates that Governor Blanco did not ask for assistance with communications until the 

evening of August 31, two days aft er landfall; in that case, the federal ESF-2 representative 

in Baton Rouge met with a state offi cial the next day.78 Under the NRP, though, the NCS 

could have off ered assistance even before the state made an offi cial request for help. 

Mobile Emergency Response Systems

FEMA’s Mobile Emergency Response Support (MERS) division maintains roughly 300 mobile vehicles, most of which provide logistics support to FEMA. MERS units are dispersed 

throughout the country at fi ve MERS stations. Th e MERS vehicles range from small sportutility vehicles to large tractor trailers with expandable conference room space. Th e deployments are self-sustaining and include fuel, water, and power.79 

Th e primary responsibility of MERS is to provide communications capabilities to FEMA, 

including the Joint Field Offi ce (JFO), the Emergency Response Team A (ERTA), and the 

Rapid Needs Assessment Team. During a disaster, MERS units may provide some communications support to the state EOC, if requested by the state.80 However, MERS does not 

view this type of assistance to fi rst responders as part of its mission.81

Th e MERS Th omasville, GA, detachment (serving FEMA Region IV) and Denton, TX, 

detachment (serving FEMA Region VI) deployed the weekend before landfall.82 Recognizing the power of the storm, over the weekend MERS sent personnel, vehicles, and assets to 

the disaster area from its other detachments across the country as well as from the MERS 

National Capital Region team.83 Aft er landfall, MERS equipment also was used to support 

National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) and Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) eff orts 

and, approximately one week aft er landfall, helped to build the offi ce for Coast Guard Admiral Th ad Allen’s command center.84

Despite the level of MERS equipment deployed to the Gulf Coast, MERS was overwhelmed 

by the extent of communications needs, and experienced diffi culties in supporting FEMA 

personnel.

Th e MERS team assigned to the JFO in Baton Rouge on Saturday, August 27, was in place 

on Sunday, August 28, although not at the level needed to support the JFO, which eventually grew to more than 2,000 people. Aft er landfall, MERS had to provide additional communications support, including a high-capacity T-1 cable capable of providing hundreds 

of phone lines.85 FEMA employees experienced diffi culties calling out of the JFO because 
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MERS relies largely on local landlines and cellular systems that had failed or were heavily 

congested.86 One MERS technician estimated that eight of every 10 calls failed, noting that 

FEMA employees relying on landlines “have no higher priority than anybody else, [such 

as] the guy using the pay phone down at the corner of the street trying to make an outgoing 

call, and most of the facilities are dead or down or under water.”87 MERS therefore had to 

bring in satellite capabilities to provide a reliable means of getting calls in and out.88

Before landfall, FEMA Region IV requested that MERS deploy a detachment to the state 

EOC in Jackson, MS.89 In FEMA Region IV, the MERS unit from Denton, TX, sent support 

to Baton Rouge pre-landfall for FEMA’s Rapid Needs Assessment teams and the FEMA 

JFO, but otherwise staged its vehicles and equipment at Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana.90 Th ese vehicles included the so-called “Red October,” a large tractor-trailer vehicle.91

Post-landfall, the vehicles staged at Barksdale could not move until the high winds had 

subsided along the coast. On Tuesday, August 30, the day aft er landfall, the Barksdale 

equipment mobilized. A communications vehicle was sent to the Louisiana state EOC.92

Red October started out for New Orleans but had to be held in Lafayette, Louisiana on the 

night of August 30 due to diffi culties navigating around debris.93 In the end, Red October 

did not go to New Orleans because fl ood levels were too high for it to reach the Superdome.94 It eventually went to Baton Rouge, where it served as FEMA Director Michael 

Brown’s command center.95

No MERS vehicles ever reached the Superdome because of fl ooding, exacerbating problems 

there. Sandy Coachman, who was part of the FEMA team at the Superdome, said that at one 

point she could see a MERS vehicle on an overpass on I-10. She could see the driver, and 

they waved their phones in the air to signal each other, but that was the extent of their ability to communicate.96 Th e failure of a MERS communications vehicle to reach the Superdome cut off any meaningful communications with the EOC in Baton Rouge. Coachman said 

her satellite phone, cell phone, and Blackberry handheld wireless device all failed to work.97

Th e only way the FEMA team could communicate was by using National Guard phones, 

which oft en could not get through to the EOC because of congestion on the system.98 It is 

unclear why FEMA did not instruct MERS to deploy a smaller communications vehicle to 

the Superdome when the Red October experienced diffi culties moving there, or why FEMA 

did not attempt to airlift smaller MERS equipment (satellite phones in particular) into the 

Superdome once New Orleans fl ooded.

Th e response to Katrina stretched MERS’s resources and exposed the diffi culty that MERS 

would encounter in responding to simultaneous catastrophes in diff erent parts of the country. When Hurricane Rita hit, MERS Chief William Milani had to negotiate with the Federal 

Coordinating Offi cers directing the federal response in the Katrina region to get MERS 

assets released from areas devastated by Katrina, and also had to contract out for additional 

assets. Given that the response to Katrina essentially stripped bare all fi ve MERS detachments, Chief Milani was uncertain how MERS could have responded if another major disaster occurred during the response to Katrina.99

Satellite Communications

Satellite phones don’t rely on the ground-based infrastructure necessary for land mobile 

radio, land-line, and cellular communications. But there is anecdotal evidence that satellite 

communications experienced their own problems: New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin said that 

he had “a huge box of satellite phones that did not work.”100 In Mississippi, a FEMA employee, Mike Beeman, said that satellite phone connections were “sporadic.”101 And while 
Communication Voids

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wireless Blackberry devices worked, batteries were hard to recharge because of the lack of 

commercial electricity.102

Th e problems with satellite phones do not appear to have been caused by the phones themselves or the satellite networks; rather, a combination of user error and buildings or other 

objects obstructing satellite signals are the more likely culprits. In fact, NCS was not aware 

of any problems with the satellite phone networks.103 And Walt Gorman, a vice-president 

at Globalstar, which supplied many satellite phones to the federal government, Louisiana, 

and Mississippi, said that users with diffi culty operating satellite phones probably did not 

know how to use them properly because they had not received training. Th erefore, users 

may have had problems putting them in the correct mode, directing the antennae, or dialing the correct numbers.104

Louisiana supplied satellite phones to New Orleans parishes a few years ago, but aft er the 

state stopped paying for the satellite monthly service fee, all but three parishes discontinued 

the service and returned the phones to the state.105 Th ese satellite phones might have been 

useful if they had been available during Katrina. To fi ll the communications gap, Louisiana 

tried to bring in communications trailers with transmitters to restore cellular communications, but those eff orts were hampered by the fl ooding.106

In Mississippi, all Mississippi Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) personnel had 

mobile satellite radios for communications; satellite radios permanently mounted in the 

three coastal counties were available as well. Aft er Katrina struck, this was oft en the only 

functional form of communications in the state.107 Satellite worked so well that MEMA 

purchased additional portable satellite phones for state emergency response teams.108 Even 

though coastal county EOCs had satellite capability, the strong winds of Katrina shift ed 

their antennas, resulting in failed communications.109 In addition, MEMA deployed a mobile communications unit and Pearl River County had a mobile communications trailer that 

it purchased with DHS grants, which allowed it to communicate aft er Katrina.110

Pre-Landfall Attempts to Improve Louisiana’s Public-Safety 

Communications Infrastructure

Th e problem of interoperable communications was brought to the nation’s attention on 

September 11, 2001, when police and fi refi ghters at the World Trade Center had diffi culty 

communicating with each other. However, it is a long-standing problem. According to David Boyd, head of project SAFECOM, an “umbrella” DHS program designed to coordinate 

federal eff orts to promote interoperability, the inability to communicate eff ectively across 

jurisdictions and disciplines was a problem in the Air Florida crash in Washington, D.C., in 

1982; in New York City when the World Trade Center was fi rst attacked in 1993 and again 

on September 11, 2001; and when the Murrah Federal Building was destroyed in Okalahoma City in 1995. Sixty thousand individual local jurisdictions – including police, fi re, and 

emergency medical services – fi nance, own, operate, and maintain over 90 percent of the 

nation’s public safety wireless infrastructure.111

As in most states, parishes in the New Orleans area and state agencies maintain diff erent 

communication systems, which make it diffi cult for public safety agencies to communicate 

during everyday emergencies, let alone disasters on the scale of Katrina. 

Th e State of Louisiana operates on a statewide analog wireless system installed in 1996. It supports voice communication only. Th is system is presently used by approximately 70 agencies 

with 10,000 subscribers. Th is system consists of 46 tower sites and 28 dispatch consoles. Th e 

LSP operate an aging data network that cannot support additional users. Th e Louisiana Total-
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ly Interoperable Environmental (LATIE) Strategic Plan says that while “this system was quite 

sophisticated for its time, advances in technology have rendered it virtually obsolete.”112

Large parts of the communications systems in southeastern Louisiana are outdated and 

have been in various stages of disrepair for several years. In Orleans Parish the communications system is an 800 MHz system, which supports police, fi re, EMS and the Offi ce of 

Emergency Preparedness. (MHz (Megahertz) denotes the frequency on which the equipment operates and public safety radio equipment oft en can only operate on a specifi c frequency.) Th e age of the equipment created problems in getting technical support.113

In St. Bernard Parish, the 400 MHz communications system is so old that it must be maintained by purchasing repair parts through the eBay auction site on the Internet.114 Various 

volunteer fi re departments have other types of communications systems. Jeff erson Parish 

has an 800 MHz “Motorola Digital Smart Zone System” for the Sheriff ’s Offi ce, but the rest 

of the parish agencies use an analog system, which makes it nearly impossible to communicate with the Sheriff ’s Offi ce. In Plaquemines Parish, the Sheriff ’s Department uses an 800 

MHz analog system that cannot communicate with digital systems.115

According to FG Dowden, who works on interoperable communications and other issues 

for the New Orleans Offi ce of Homeland Security, the only interoperable system in use in 

southeastern Louisiana prior to the storm was between the NOPD and the Jeff erson Parish Sheriff ’s Offi ce; it used “console patches” to connect their 800 MHz controllers, which 

provided a degree of interoperability.116

ACU-1000 units also provided limited interoperability. Th e ACU-1000, which is manufactured by JPS Raytheon, acts as a converter between radios from each system. But it can 

support only a limited number of channels for communications, and it requires a person to 

manually confi gure the connections with the radios.117

Well before Katrina struck, Louisiana agencies encountered funding problems as they sought 

to enhance communications interoperability. In 2004 and again in January 2005, the Louisiana State Police attempted to secure $105 million to upgrade its communications infrastructure from an outdated, 800 MHz analog system which is no longer supported by the 

vendor to a modern 700 MHz digital interoperable network. Th at amount was considered an 

“inexpensive” way to connect existing operating systems in the state to a common, statewide 

network. Th e State Police sought funding from Congress, via earmark requests to Louisiana’s 

Congressional delegation, as well as through Louisiana’s state budget process and grant opportunities with DHS’ Offi ce of Domestic Preparedness, but was not successful.118

Th e greater New Orleans area also analyzed options for creating a region-wide, modern 800 

MHz system, well before Katrina struck. However, estimates ranged as high as $45 million, 

which local offi cials considered “cost prohibitive.”119 Just buying compatible radios for New 

Orleans Parish alone would cost almost $20 million.120 Th erefore, the region developed a 

plan for a region-wide system involving all four parishes in the region, which would be 

phased in over time.121

According to Dowden, New Orleans applied for and received a grant through the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) program at the Department of Justice (DOJ) that 

would have provided interoperability for the four-parish region by upgrading St. Bernard 

Parish and Plaquemines Parish to 800 MHz trunk radio systems and providing bridging 

technology between two or more of the 800 MHz systems (which Orleans and Jeff erson Parishes already had).122 Th is grant also would have allowed some of the systems to have P-25 

compliant technology (an interoperability standard designed by the government and private 

industry). However, the project was 18 months from completion when Katrina struck.123 If 
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the project had been completed by the initial time table, the loss of communication towers 

might not have been quite as signifi cant because there probably would have been at least 

two towers fully operational from the new system.124

New Orleans has a “tactical interoperability plan” developed pursuant to DHS grant guidance, but this plan was developed around an improvised-explosive-device scenario, not 

for an event of widespread destruction like that caused by a hurricane. According to Col. 

Dowden, a catastrophic hurricane plan “takes into account all of the assets within the region, and then pre-scripts what you would do in the event you lose specifi c towers or capabilities.”125 Even though the risk of major hurricanes striking New Orleans was well known, 

that kind of communications plan had never been developed.

In addition to funding, interoperability also always raises technical and policy issues. As 

Colonel Joseph Booth of the LSP put it, “there’s always issues about who’s going to control 

it, who’s making decisions, what technology to go with, what capabilities, what kind of local 

control there is.”126 

1 Committee staff interview of FG Dowden, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.), Regional Liaison, New Orleans Department of 

Homeland Security and Public Safety, LA, conducted on Nov. 11, 2005, transcript p. 50.

2 Testimony of Gov. Haley Barbour, Mississippi, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Th e Role of the Governors in Managing the Catastrophe, Feb. 2, 2006.

3 Committee staff interview of Sally Forman, Communications Director, City of New Orleans, LA, conducted on Jan. 10, 

2006, transcript pp.120-121.

4 Forman interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 68.

5 Forman interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 101.

6 Forman interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 121.

7 Committee staff interview of Larry Ingargiola, Director, Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, St. Bernard 

Parish, LA, Oct. 26, 2005, transcript pp. 91-93, 103-104.

8 Testimony of Lt. Col. Keith LaCaze, Assistant Administrator, Law Enforcement Division, Louisiana Department of 

Wildlife and Fisheries, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on 

Hurricane Katrina: Urban Search and Rescue in a Catastrophe, Jan. 30, 2006.

9 Committee staff interview of Phil Parr, Federal Coordinating Offi cer, Region I, Federal Emergency Management Association (FEMA), conducted on Nov. 15, 2005, transcript p. 28.

10 Committee staff interview of Michael Beeman, Director, Preparedness Division, Region II, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 

20, 2006, transcript p. 71.

11 Committee staff interview of Scott Wells, Deputy Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, 

FEMA, conducted on Nov. 14, 2005, transcript p. 116.

12 Committee staff interview of Knox Andress, RN, Christus Schumpert Health System, Shreveport, LA, conducted on, 

Mar. 10, 2006 (untranscribed).

13 Andress interview, Mar. 10, 2006.

14 Written Statement of Kevin T. Regan, Regional Vice President of Operations, Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, 

Inc., for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: 

What Can Government Learn From Private Sector’s Response?, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 5.

15 Written Statement of Regan, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 16, 2006, p. 6.

16 Committee staff interview of Kevin Regan, Regional Vice President of Operations, Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc., conducted on Nov. 3, 2006 (untranscribed).

17 Written Statement of Jason Jackson, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: What Can Government Learn From Private Sector’s Response?, 

Nov. 16, 2005.

18 Written Statement of Jackson, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 16, 2005.

19 Written Statement of David Ratcliff e, Southern Company, for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and 
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Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: What Can Government Learn From the Private Sector’s Response?, 

Nov. 16, 2005.

20 Written Statement of Radcliff e, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 16, 2005, pp. 4-5.

21 Written Statement of Radcliff e, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 5.

22 Written Statement of Radcliff e, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 5.

23 Th e White House report on Katrina aptly concluded, “Th e complete devastation of the communications infrastructure left emergency responders and citizens without a reliable network across which they could coordinate.” U.S. Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, Th e Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons 

Learned. Washington: Government Printing Offi ce, Feb. 2006, p. 55.

24 Written Statement of William Smith, Chief Technology Offi cer, BellSouth, for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Managing Law Enforcement and Communications in a Catastrophe, 

Feb. 6, 2006, p. 4. 

25 Written Statement of Peter M. Fonash, Ph.D., Deputy Manager, National Communications System, U.S. Department 

of Homeland Security, for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on 

Managing Law Enforcement and Communications in a Catastrophe, Feb. 6, 2006, p. 6.

26 Written Statement of Fonash, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 6, 2006, p. 1; Federal Communications Commission, 

Consumers Out of Service. Provided to Committee.

27 Written Statement of Fonash, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 6, 2006, p.1; Written statement of Smith, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 6, 2006, p. 4.

28 Committee staff interview of Christopher Guttman-McCabe, Vice President, Regulatory Aff airs, CTIA, conducted on 

Jan. 24, 2006, transcript p. 20.

29 Guttman-McCabe interview, Jan. 24, 2006, p. 21.

30 Guttman-McCabe interview, Jan. 24, 2006, pp. 11-12.

31 Committee staff interview of William Smith, Chief Technology Offi cer, BellSouth, Inc., conducted on Jan. 25, 2006 

(untranscribed).

32 Smith interview, Jan. 25, 2006. 

33 Kay Jackson, e-mail to La Public Service Commission, Sept. 20, 2005, 6:08 p.m. Provided to Committee. 

34 Smith interview, Jan. 25, 2006.

35 Written Statement of Smith, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 6, 2006, p. 8.

36 Written Statement of Smith, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 6, 2006, p. 8; Written statement of Fonash, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 6, 2006, p. 7.

37 Tom Wetherald, e-mail to Peter Fonash, Sept. 3, 2005, 9:37 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHSINFP-0002-0000737 through 0000738. See also: Committee staff interview of Jeff rey Glick, Chief of Critical Infrastructure Protection, National Communications System, conducted on Feb. 3, 2006, transcript p. 60 (explaining NCS’s eff orts 

to work through the NRCC and ESF-13 process as well as with the National Guard).

38 Glick interview, Feb. 3, 2006, p. 60

39 Guttman-McCabe interview, Jan. 24, 2006, p. 25.

40 Kim Hunter Reed, e-mail to Jeanne Wright and others, Aug. 30, 2005, 1:57 p.m. Provided to Committee; Brian Eddington, e-mail to LA Public Service Commission, Sept. 2, 2005, 7:20 p.m. Provided to Committee; Michael Vitenas, 

e-mail to LA Public Service Commission, Sept. 2, 2005, 5:10 p.m. Provided to Committee.

41 Guttman-McCabe interview, Jan 24, 2006, p. 28.

42 Testimony of Warren Riley, Superintendent, New Orleans Police Department, LA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Managing Law Enforcement and Communications in 

a Catastrophe, Feb. 6, 2006; Testimony of Capt. Timothy Bayard, Commander, Vice and Narcotics Squad, New Orleans 

Police Department, LA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Managing Law Enforcement and Communications in a Catastrophe, Feb. 6, 2006; Testimony of Lt. Col. Keith 

LaCaze, Assistant Administrator, Law Enforcement Division, Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, before 

the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs hearing on Managing Law Enforcement 

and Communications in a Catastrophe, Feb. 6, 2006; Testimony of Brig. Gen. Brod Veillon, Assistant Adjutant General, 

Louisiana National Guard, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing 

on Managing Law Enforcement and Communications in a Catastrophe, Feb. 6, 2006.

43 FEMA’s Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Louisiana, William Lokey, said there were problems making calls in and out 

of the State EOC. Committee staff interview of William Lokey, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in 

Louisiana, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 20, 2006, transcript p. 6.

44 Wells interview, Nov. 14, 2006, p. 116

45 Glick interview, Feb. 3, 2006, pp. 29-20.
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46 Testimony of FG Dowden, Regional Liason, New Orleans Department of Homeland Security, LA, before the U.S. 

Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Managing Law Enforcement and Communications in a Catastrophe, Feb. 6, 2006; Col. Dowden interview, Jan. 26, 2006.

47 Dowden, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 6, 2006.

48 Dowden, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 6, 2006; Dowden interview, Nov. 11, 2005, pp. 33-34.

49 Dowden, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 6, 2006.

50 Dowden interview, Jan. 26, 2006.

51 Dowden interview, Nov. 11, 2005, pp. 33-34.

52 Dowden, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 6, 2006.

53 Dowden, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 6, 2006.

54 Committee staff interview of Lt. Col. Mark Oxley, Chief of Staff , Louisiana State Police, and Lt. Col. Joseph Booth, 

Deputy Superintendent, Crisis Response and Special Operations, Louisiana State Police, conducted on Dec. 9, 2005, 

transcript pp. 78-79.

55 Written Statement of Kevin J. Martin, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, for the U.S. House, Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet, hearing on Public Safety 

Communications from 9/11 to Katrina: Critical Public Policy Lessons, Sept. 29, 2005, p. 2.

56 Committee staff interview of Craig Whittington, 911 Coordinator for Guilford Metro 911, Greensboro, NC, Mar. 13, 

2006 (untranscribed).

57 Whittington interview, Mar. 13, 2006.

58 Whittington interview, Mar. 13, 2006.

59 Whittington interview, Mar. 13, 2006.

60 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan. Washington: Government Printing Offi ce, Dec. 

2004, pp. ESF #2–1 through 2–3.

61 Fonash interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 4.

62 Fonash interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 37.

63 Fonash interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 50-51.

64 Fonash interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 60.

65 Fonash interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 62.

66 Fonash interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 116. 

67 Fonash interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 118-120. 

68 Written Statement of Mark Rey, Under Secretary, Natural Resources and Environment, U.S. Department of Agriculture, for the U.S. House, Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science, and 

Technology, hearing on Ensuring Operability During Catastrophic Events, Oct. 26, 2005, p. 3.

69 Committee staff interview of William Milani, Chief, Mobile Operations Section, Logistics Branch, FEMA, conducted 

on Jan. 12, 2006, transcript p. 59.

70 U.S. Department of Defense, “DOD Support to Hurricane Katrina,” Executive Summary. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates no. 00614 (“DOD provided 1500 mobile radios . . . ; radios arrived September 6 and given to the 82nd 

Airborne at the New Orleans Airport.”). When the DOD troops returned to their home stations, they provided 1500 of 

their radios to the National Guard troops. Committee staff interview of Col. James Kohlman, U.S. Army, U.S. Northern 

Command, U.S. Department of Defense, conducted on Dec. 6, 2005, transcript pp. 20, 39.

71 Marc Short, e-mail to Matt Mayer, Sept. 5, 2005, 10:51 a.m. Provided to Committee, fi led as Bates no. DHS-FRNT0010-0000386. 

72 Written Statement of Fonash, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 6, 2006, p. 6. 

73 Written Statement of Fonash, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 6, 2006, p. 6.

74 Written Statement of Fonash, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 6, 2006, p. 7.

75 National Communications System, “National Communications System Response to Hurricane Katrina.” Provided to 

Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-INFP-0001-0000672.

76 FEMA, Action Request Form, Sept. 1, 2005. Provided to Committee. 

77 Fonash interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 114.

78 Th omas Falvey, e-mail to Peter Fonash, Sept. 1, 2005, 2:25 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHSINFP-0002-0000026 through 0000027.

79 Milani interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 7-9, 23-25.

80 Milani interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 19-23.
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300

81 Milani interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 28, 129.

82 Milani interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 49.

83 Milani interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 24, 53-54.

84 Milani interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 96, 99, 103-04. 

85 Committee staff interview of James Attaway, Telecommunications Specialist, Mobile Emeregency Response System, 

Region VI, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 13, 2006, transcript p. 27; Milani interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 56-57. 

86 Attaway interview, Jan. 13, 2006, pp. 9, 12-13; Milani interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 60. 

87 Attaway interview, Jan. 13, 2006, p. 29. 

88 Attaway interview, Jan. 13, 2006, pp. 28-29.

89 Milani interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 52-53.

90 Attaway interview, Jan. 13, 2006, pp. 19, 79; Milani interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 53-54.

91 Milani interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 59.

92 Milani interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 59. 

93 Milani interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 59, 70. 

94 Milani interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 70.

95 Milani interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 95-96.

96 Committee staff interview of Sandy Coachman, Federal Coordinating Offi cer, Region VI, FEMA, conducted on Nov. 

16, 2005, transcript pp. 16-18.

97 Coachman interview, Nov. 16, 2005, pp. 16-18.

98 Coachman interview, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 18.

99 Milani interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 78-79.

100 Testimony of Mayor C. Ray Nagin, City of New Orleans, LA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Managing the Crisis and Evacuating New Orleans, Feb. 1, 2006.

101 Beeman interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 85.

102 Dowden interview, Nov. 11, 2005, p. 194.

103 Fonash interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 152.

104 Walt Gorman, Vice President, Globalstar, e-mail to Rob Strayer, Senate Committee staff member, Mar. 8, 2006, 

1:23 p.m.

105 U.S. House, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, A 

Failure of Initiative. Washington: Government Printing Offi ce, 2006, pp. 172-173 [hereinaft er U.S. House, A Failure of 

Initiative].

106 Col. Dowden Interview, Nov. 11, 2005, p. 195.

107 U.S. House, A Failure of Initiative, p. 172; Testimony of Robert R. Latham, Jr., Executive Director, Mississippi Emergency Management Agency (MEMA), before the U.S. House, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation 

for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Mississippi, Dec. 7, 2005. 

108 U.S. House, A Failure of Initiative, p. 173; Latham, House Select Committee hearing, Dec. 7, 2005; Committee staff 

interview of William Brown, Operations Chief, MEMA, conducted on Jan. 26, 2006.

109 Written Statement of Robert R. Latham Jr., Executive Director, MEMA, for the U.S. House, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Mississippi, Dec. 7, 2005, pp. 3-4.

110 U.S. House, A Failure of Initiative, p. 172; Committee staff interview of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, 

conducted on Jan. 26, 2006, pp. 16-17.

111 Testimony of David Boyd, Director, SAFECOM, Offi ce of Interoperability and Compatibility, U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security, before the U.S. House, Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science and Technology, hearing on Ensuring Operability During Catastrophic Events, Oct. 26, 2005.

112 Louisiana Totally Interoperable Environment Strategic Plan (LATIE), Executive Summary, p. 3. Provided to Committee.

113 Dowden interview, Nov. 11, 2005, pp. 11-12. 

114 Dowden interview, Nov. 11, 2005, p. 15.

115 Dowden interview, Nov. 11, 2005, pp. 12-13.

116 Dowden interview, Nov. 11, 2005, p. 13 
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301

117 Dowden interview, Nov. 11, 2005, pp. 32-34.

118 Lt. Col. Oxley and Lt. Col. Booth interview, Dec. 9, 2005, pp. 48, 51, 54.

119 Written Statement of Dowden, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 6, 2006, p. 3.

120 Dowden interview, Nov. 11, 2005, p. 41.

121 Written Statement of Dowden, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 6, 2006, p. 3.

122 Written Statement of Dowden, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 6, 2006, p. 2.

123 Dowden interview, Nov. 11, 2005, p. 211.

124 Dowden interview, Nov. 11, 2005, p. 49.

125 Dowden interview, Nov. 11, 2005, p. 201.

126 Booth interview, Dec. 9, 2005, p. 68.
Wrecked marina, 

Ocean Springs, MS

Sun Herald photo
303

Lack of Situational Awareness

Federal Situational Awareness

Having an ability to “connect the dots” was a main goal during the creation of the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Th e Homeland Security Operations 

Center (HSOC) is a key element, designed to be “the nation’s nerve center for 

information sharing and domestic incident management.”1

 Hurricane Katrina was the 

HSOC’s fi rst major, public test, and it failed. At the federal level, there was a startling lack of 

situational awareness as Katrina came ashore. On the day of landfall, DHS ignored, disregarded, or simply failed to obtain readily available reports that would have – and should 

have – led to an understanding of the increasingly dire situation in New Orleans and the 

remainder of the Gulf Coast. 

DHS witnesses have off ered essentially two explanations for the lack of situational awareness on Monday, August 29. First, they fault Federal Emergency Management Agency’s 

(FEMA) former Director Michael Brown and his agency for failing to provide the HSOC 

with crucial information. Second, they invoke the “fog of war” metaphor and assert that 

confl icting reports rendered the HSOC unable to develop any sense of the “ground truth.”

Th ese are at best only partial explanations for the HSOC’s failure to understand the scope 

of the unfolding disaster. Brown did fail to forward critical information in his possession, 

which is inexcusable. However, the HSOC’s failure to obtain reports of breaches and massive fl ooding issued by the National Weather Service (NWS), the Army Corps of Engineers, 

and the media, was unrelated to anything Brown or FEMA did or did not do. Indeed, 

throughout the day of landfall the HSOC received reports – including from two DHS 

Protective Security Advisors (PSAs)2

 stationed in the region – that uniformly refl ected a 

growing catastrophe. To the extent these reports “confl icted,” it was only about the scope of 

the catastrophe described, not the existence of the catastrophe itself.

Th e failure to “connect the dots” is best captured by the situation report (“sitrep”) issued by 

the HSOC at 5 p.m. Central Time (all subsequent times Central) on Monday, August 29. 

During hurricanes and other signifi cant incidents, the HSOC issues sitreps at 5 a.m. and 5 

p.m. to many customers, including DHS leadership and the White House.3

 In crucial areas 

this sitrep was both incorrect and incomplete. It was incorrect in stating that “preliminary 

reports indicate the levees in New Orleans have not been breached; however, an assessment 

is still pending.”4

 In fact, most preliminary reports stated just the opposite. It was incomplete 

in stating generically that “fl ooding is reported in New Orleans,”5

 but failing to provide any 

detail about the widely reported scope of the fl ooding or the devastating results – for example, that residents were seeking refuge from rising water in their attics and on rooft ops.

In a dynamic situation such as Katrina, time was of the essence, as people were in desperate 

circumstances. It may never be known for certain how the lack of awareness contributed to 

the overall failure of the federal government to respond adequately in a timely manner. It is 

known, however, that the 5 p.m. sitrep was the last report DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff 

received on the day of landfall,6

 and he went to bed Monday night with the incorrect belief 

that the levees had not been breached and that Katrina had not done the worst that had 

been predicted.7

 Th is incorrect sitrep was also forwarded to the White House. Several days 

later President Bush later remarked that “I myself, thought we had dodged a bullet.”8

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304

Analysis of the Failure

Th e HSOC’s failure to maintain situational awareness during Katrina grew out of a lack of 

planning and fl awed analysis. Th ough plans for obtaining situational awareness are developed for events like the Superbowl and national political conventions, HSOC Director 

Matthew Broderick acknowledged that “there was no plan developed” for maintaining situational awareness during Katrina.9

Th is lack of planning led to numerous failings. Neither HSOC Director Broderick nor 

HSOC Deputy Director Frank DiFalco knew that DHS had a representative in New Orleans 

and another in the Louisiana State Police Emergency Operations Center in Baton Rouge 

sending reports to the HSOC. Indeed, on the day of landfall, the HSOC failed to recognize, 

or disregarded as unconfi rmed, many of the reports that it did receive. Th e HSOC similarly 

failed to obtain reports and information that it should have obtained. As the week progressed, situational awareness improved little if at all, evidenced most pointedly by DHS’s 

belated awareness of the thousands of people gathering at the Convention Center.

Th ere were also structural fl aws in the way the HSOC obtained information from other federal agencies and other sources. Th e twice-a-day HSOC sitreps contained information that, 

in most cases, was at least three and, oft en, fi ve or more hours old. During Katrina, FEMA 

input to the HSOC sitrep was due three hours before a sitrep was issued.10 FEMA’s internal 

deadline for submissions to the HSOC was, in turn, two hours earlier.11 Th us, by design a 

5 p.m. sitrep refl ected information that was at least fi ve hours old. 

Between sitreps, HSOC issued “Spot Reports” on breaking news. Starting at approximately 

6:35 p.m., the HSOC generated numerous Spot Reports accurately detailing the devastation 

in New Orleans. However, many of those who were on the e-mail distribution list for these 

Spot Reports, issued late into the night on Monday, appear not to have read them when they 

were received. Witnesses also explained that, as a general matter, they viewed the sitreps as 

more authoritative than the Spot Reports. Th ey testifi ed almost universally that they were not 

aware of the inundation of New Orleans until aft er the 5 a.m. sitrep Tuesday morning – 12 

or more hours aft er the HSOC began issuing the grave Spot Reports detailed below.

During the Day of Landfall, a Litany of Reports Stated that Levees 

Had Failed, and Detailed the Increasingly Severe Flooding

Prior to issuing the fl awed 5 p.m. sitrep, the HSOC issued two Spot Reports during the 

morning of landfall. One, at 8:25 a.m., was based on a press conference by New Orleans 

Mayor Ray Nagin and stated in part that water was coming over the levees in the Ninth 

Ward. Almost two hours later, at 10:22 a.m., the HSOC issued another Spot Report, including reports that water was rising at the National Guard’s Jackson Barracks in the Ninth 

Ward, adding that it was unknown whether this was the result of breaching or overtopping. 

It also stated that the 911 call centers in St. Bernard and Orleans Parishes had been shut 

down and evacuated. Ten minutes later, the information in this second Spot Report was 

also distributed in an e-mail to, among others, DHS Chief of Staff John Wood and Deputy 

Secretary Michael Jackson.

Th e Committee has discovered no other communications out of the HSOC prior to the 

5 p.m. sitrep. Both before and aft er the two morning Spot Reports, however, the HSOC 

received reports of levee breaches, levee overtopping, fl ooding, and people trapped on roofs. 

Equally troubling are the reports the HSOC apparently never received. As discussed below, 

some of this information was received by FEMA, but not forwarded in a timely way to the 

HSOC. However, the majority of this information was available from other sources, includ-
Lack of Situational Awareness

305

ing government agencies that have desks within the HSOC, and major media outlets. Th ese 

reports are described below, with the ones that the HSOC received highlighted in bold:

12

• At 8:14 a.m., the New Orleans National Weather Service offi ce reported a 

levee breach along the Industrial Canal.13

• At 9 a.m. on the morning of landfall, the HSOC received an e-mail from 

Louis Dabdoub, the PSA on the ground in New Orleans. Dabdoub’s report 

stated in part: “It is getting bad. Major fl ooding in some parts of the city. 

People are calling in for rescue saying they are trapped in attics, etc. Th at 

means water is 10 feet high there already. Trees are blowing down. Flooding 

is worsening every minute. ... Th e bad part has not hit here yet.”14

• At 9 a.m., the New Orleans NWS offi ce reported overtopping in Orleans and 

St. Bernard Parishes and “Extensive and life threatening storm surge fl ooding 

occurring along the Louisiana and Mississippi coast.”15

• At 9:36 a.m., Dabdoub sent another e-mail to the HSOC, reporting that 

“Th e lower parishes of La [Louisiana], Plaq[uemines] and St Bernard parish’s 

[sic] are under water.”16

• At 10:13 a.m., the White House Homeland Security Council issued a spot 

report – which appears not to have been sent to the HSOC – reporting that 

“fl ooding is signifi cant throughout the region and a levee in New Orleans has 

reportedly been breached sending 6-8 feet of water throughout the 9th Ward 

area of the city. Per the Governor, water is rising at 1 foot per hour and the New 

Orleans Mayor reports problems with a pumping station, causing fl ooding.”17

• At 10:17 a.m., PSA David Hunter, who was in the Louisiana State Police 

Emergency Operations Center (EOC), reported “continued heavy fl ooding 

in area of New Orleans just east of the Industrial Canal (9th Ward). ... Calls 

coming into state EOC from citizens trapped in their houses, some in the attics or on the roof. State National Guard HQs at Jackson Barracks has 5 feet 

of water in some of its buildings.”18

• At 10:41 a.m., the HSOC received a copy of an 8 a.m. “Katrina Brief” created by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), which stated, in 

part, that “the National Weather Service has reported that a levee broke on 

the Industrial Canal near the St. Bernard-Orleans Parish line, and 3 to 8 feet 

of fl ooding was possible. ... In the uptown area of New Orleans on the south 

shore of Lake Pontchartrain, fl oodwaters by [sic] have already intruded on the 

fi rst stories of some houses and some roads are impassable. ... Th ere is heavy 

street fl ooding throughout Orleans, St. Bernard, and Jeff erson parishes.”19

• At 11 a.m., the Louisiana State Police Emergency Operations Center issued a 

situation report which reported a breach of the levee on 17th Street Canal.20

• At 11:40 a.m., the New Orleans NWS offi ce issued one of the most stark 

warnings of the day: “Widespread fl ooding will continue across the parishes 

along the south shore of Lake Pontchartrain in the greater New Orleans area. 

... Th is continues to be an extremely life threatening situation. ... Th ose seeking refuge in attics and roof-tops are strongly urged to take the necessary tools 

for survival. For example ... those going into attics should try to take an axe 

or hatchet with them so they can cut their way onto the roof to avoid drowning 

should rising fl ood waters continue to rise into the attic.” (emphasis added).21
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306

• At 12:51 p.m., the HSOC received a Coast Guard “Status Update” which reported a “levee in New Orleans has been breached sending 3 to 8 feet of water 

into the 9th Ward area of the city.”22

• At 1:14 p.m., a PSA reported a “levee breach on the 17th St. Canal (the 

border between Orleans and Jeff erson Parishes) reported by the New Orleans 

Fire Dept.”23

• At 3:05 p.m., and then again at 3:10, 4:20, and 8:13, the New Orleans NWS 

offi ce issued a report stating that “extensive and life threatening storm surge 

fl ooding remains in progress at this time ... especially in the New Orleans area. 

... Widespread fl ooding has occurred and storm water runoff will exacerbate 

the problem.”24

• A 4 p.m. Situation Report issued by the NWS Southern Region Headquarters 

stating that “Very widespread and signifi cant fl ooding has occurred throughout the city of New Orleans ... Industrial Canal at Tennessee Street: levee has 

been breached ... 17th Street at Canal Blvd: levee has been breached – breach 

extends several 100 meters in length[;] Much of downtown and east New Orleans is underwater; depth unknown at this time.”25

• At 4 p.m., LOHSEP issued a situation report detailing three levee breaches: 

“St. Bernard & 9th Ward Levee breach (reported by Sewage & Water Board). 

... Haynes Blvd Pump Station Levee Breach (reported by Jackson Barracks) ... 

17th Street Canal levee breach, fl ooding Lakeview area.”26

• During the 4 p.m. hour, Fox News interviewed Ivor van Heerden, Director, 

Louisiana State University’s Center For the Study of Public Health Impacts 

of Hurricanes, who said that “the National Weather Service [is] reporting 

that one of the levees was breached, and obviously, as the reporters have said, 

there’s very, very signifi cant areas of New Orleans that did fl ood from the levee 

overtopping. In some areas we have about 11 feet of standing water. People 

have been forced out onto the roofs of their homes.”27

In addition to these reports, at 11 a.m., Brown, FEMA’s Acting Deputy Director Patrick 

Rhode, Secretary Chertoff , Deputy Secretary Jackson, White House Deputy Chief of Staff 

Joe Hagin, representatives of the aff ected states, and individuals from numerous federal 

agencies attended the video teleconference (VTC) that FEMA hosted daily during Katrina. 

During this call, which was monitored by a Senior Watch Offi cer at the HSOC, a National 

Hurricane Center hydrologist said “We have signifi cant fl ooding occurring right now, 

beyond the storm surge fl ooding.”28 “We are truly experiencing some devastation here,” 

Colonel Jeff Smith, Acting Deputy Director of the Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security 

and Emergency Preparedness, said. William Lokey, FEMA’s Federal Coordinating Offi cer 

(FCO), then the lead federal offi cial in Louisiana, echoed this: 

To give you an idea of what’s going on down there, there is eight to ten feet of 

water in St. Bernard Parish. In New Orleans Parish, we have got water in the 

eastern part. And down in the Ninth Ward that borders St. Bernard Parish, 

we’re going to have serious search and rescue eff orts that are going to need to 

take place once we can get back in. ... We are pretty much inundated right now, 

and our next priorities are going to be search and rescue and saving lives.29

During the call, Hagin asked about the status of the levees. Louisiana Governor Kathleen 

Blanco responded:
Lack of Situational Awareness

307

We keep getting reports in some places that maybe water is coming over the 

levees. We heard a report unconfi rmed. I think we have not breached the levee. 

We have not breached the levee at this point in time. Th at could change, but in 

some places we have fl oodwaters coming in New Orleans East and the line St. 

Bernard parish where we have waters that are eight to ten feet deep, and we have 

people swimming in there, that’s got a considerable amount of water itself.30

Governor Blanco also reported “maybe as many as 30 or more calls from people who are 

trapped.”31 It appears that neither Mayor Nagin nor anyone else in New Orleans was on 

this call.

It is diffi cult to understand why the 5 p.m. sitrep refl ected few of the facts – and none of the 

urgency – conveyed by these reports. It is inexcusable that it included no mention of the reports of levee breaches that the HSOC received. On the contrary, the sitrep conveyed a false 

impression that there were multiple and uncontradicted reports that the levees had held. 

In fact, extensive investigation has uncovered nothing beyond Governor Blanco’s qualifi ed 

statement on the noon VTC stating that the levees had held. All other reports received by 

the HSOC pointed to the contrary. 

The HSOC Failed Either to Obtain or to Recognize Crucial Reports

Th e apparent failure to obtain the NWS reports issued by the local offi ces is a particularly 

troubling example of how the HSOC’s failure to plan for Katrina manifested itself. Th ese 

reports contained some of the earliest indications of levee breaches and catastrophic fl ooding 

and were readily available – NWS’s parent agency, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration (NOAA), maintains a desk in the HSOC.32 When asked about these reports, 

Broderick suggested that they may not have been obtained because they were issued by local 

Caught in rising waters, 

New Orleans

Photo © 2005 The Times-Picayune 

Publishing Co., all rights reserved. Used 

with permission of the Times-Picayune
Chapter 19

308

NWS stations. He did not know whether anyone at the HSOC was responsible for monitoring local weather stations during a major weather event. Common-sense steps such as 

identifying and monitoring local sources of information – particularly ones run by the federal government – would seem an obvious course of action for the HSOC in the days before 

landfall. And yet, no one within the HSOC appears to have given this any thought.

It is equally troubling that both Broderick and the HSOC Deputy Director DiFalco did not 

know of the reports of breaches and massive fl ooding that did come in during the day. Neither knew that two PSAs were on the ground submitting reports, nor were they aware of the 

Transportation Security Administration and the Coast Guard reports received. Th e 4 p.m. 

sitrep issued by the NWS Southern Region Headquarters, which included details of two major breaches, is similarly noteworthy. Th ough it was received in the HSOC – and forwarded 

from the Department of Defense desk in HSOC to senior Pentagon offi cials at 5:25 p.m. on 

the day of landfall33 – it apparently went unnoticed by HSOC leadership that night. Both 

the importance and the perceived reliability of this report are underscored by the fact that 

the HSOC’s Tuesday morning (5 a.m.) sitrep included verbatim reports of levee breaches 

and fl ooding from this then-13-hour-old 4 p.m. report. Th is NWS sitrep makes all the more 

inexplicable the HSOC’s inaccurate 5 p.m. sitrep.

Th e attitude of the HSOC and DHS leadership toward media reports was, at best, contradictory. On one hand, HSOC witnesses expressed an understandable reluctance to rely on 

media reports, which oft en carry outdated or preliminary information during an evolving 

event.34 On the other hand, Broderick relied on media reports in concluding that the situation in New Orleans was not catastrophic on Monday night: “Th e only one data point that 

I really had, personally, visually, was the celebration in the streets of New Orleans of people 

drinking beer and partying.”35 It is diffi cult to understand why DHS offi cials would fi nd the 

credibility of alarming news reports suspect, but have no such hesitation taking comfort in 

media stories that, superfi cially at least, suggested that the situation was stable. 

After the 5 p.m. Sitrep, the HSOC Issued Three Reports Refl ecting 

the Growing Catastrophe, But DHS Leadership Did Not Read or Did 

Not Understand Them

Aft er the 5 p.m. sitrep, reports of the increasingly dire situation in New Orleans continued. 

Many were received by the HSOC, and, indeed, the HSOC issued three Spot Reports that 

detailed levee breaches and extensive fl ooding. Th ese reports included:

• At 5:08 p.m., an American Red Cross Situation Report received by the HSOC 

stated in part, “Reports of fl ooding vary based on region with some levees in 

new Orleans reportedly breeched [sic]. Extensive fl ooding in the Lower 9th 

Board [sic] and St. Bernard Parish may be a result of water going over the tops 

of the levees.”36

• At 6 p.m., CNN’s Jeanne Meserve reported “a scene of utter devastation. In 

an entire neighborhood, water has come up to the eaves of the houses and [I] 

am told this is not the worst of it. Th at beyond this, part of the upper Ninth 

Ward, I'm told the main part of the ward further down is even worse. Th e water is over the houses. Th is is a life and death situation. I think by the end of the 

night we're going to fi nd a lot more death than we ever imagined.”37

• A 6:35 p.m. Spot Report issued by the HSOC was based on information 

received at some earlier time from the Corps of Engineers. It stated, in part, “A 

small breach reported at 17 Street Canal by local fi remen. ... Report that Dun-
Lack of Situational Awareness

309

can Pumping Station and Bonnebelle Pumping Station suff ered roof damage, 

inundation of pumps, and are not operating at this time. Reported overtoppings of levee near Arabi and Inner Harbor Navigation Canal. Some level of 

widespread fl ooding has occurred. Report there has been a breach of the levee 

in the east of Harvey Canal, west bank area.”38

• A Situation Report issued at 7:34 p.m. by the Corps of Engineers described 

major fl ooding in New Orleans and stated, “All Jeff erson and Orleans Parish 

Pumping Stations are inoperable as of 29 Aug.”39

• At 8 p.m. on CNN’s Larry King Live, Brown said, “Th is is a catastrophic disaster. I’ve just started getting reconnaissance reports from my folks in the fi eld 

and I’m anticipating now that I’m going to have to prepare for housing at least 

tens of thousands of victims that are going to be without homes for literally 

months on end. ... FEMA folks who have been with the agency for, you know, 

15 or 20 years, ... call in and talk about how this is the worst fl ooding they’ve 

ever seen in their entire lives and talking about just neighborhoods aft er neighborhoods gone.”40

• At 8:30 p.m., PSA Hunter reported “widespread fl ooding, and some suspected fatalities (bodies spotted fl oating in water) in an area of town near the Industrial Canal. Th e fl ooding cannot be alleviated due to the large water pumps 

which normally keep the city dry being out of service.”41

• A 9:30 p.m. Spot Report based on two overfl ights of New Orleans by Marty 

Bahamonde, the only FEMA offi cial in the city, said in part, “Th ere is a quarter-mile breech [sic] in the levee near the 17th Street Canal about 200 yards 

from Lake Pontchartrain allowing water to fl ow into the City. ... Only one of 

the main pumps is reported to still be working but cannot keep up with the 

demand and its longevity is doubtful ... an estimated 2/3 to 75% of the city is 

under water. ... Hundreds of people were observed on the balconies and roofs 

of a major apartment complex in the city. ... A few bodies were seen fl oating in 

the water and Coast Guard pilots also reported seeing bodies but there are no 

details on locations or numbers.”42

• At 10 p.m., MSNBC interviewed Lieutenant Kevin Cowan, Louisiana Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness, who said, “Th ere’s a lot of heavy rain. Th ere 

was some breaching of the levee system that pushed the water into St. Bernard 

Parish and into New Orleans proper itself, fl ooding neighborhoods. Streets 

are completely fl ooded. ... Th ere were some breaches where water was pushed 

over the top. I am sure there were areas that the levee did fail. We haven’t gotten complete reports.”43

• At 10:47 p.m., a Spot Report reporting that “According to Remote Sensing 

Imagery and available Census data, approximately 136,000 housing units in 

New Orleans have been impacted by fl ooding.”44

Th ough the three Spot Reports listed above were widely distributed by e-mail,45 few DHS 

witnesses recalled seeing them. Despite the fact that it was late at night and that Secretary 

Chertoff did not use e-mail, the HSOC made no eff ort to ensure that DHS leadership or 

the White House actually reviewed and understood the messages, or that they received this 

critical information in another form.46
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310

Nearly all DHS witnesses, including those who were on the distribution list for the Spot 

Reports, testifi ed that they did not know that the levees failed or that New Orleans was suffering catastrophic fl ooding until Tuesday morning. Many still did not know that the levees 

had breached and the city fl ooded on Monday as Katrina came ashore.47 When shown these 

three Spot Reports, DHS witnesses consistently attempted to minimize their import, claiming that they were unconfi rmed, confl icting, or unreliable.48

Th e attitude of DHS witnesses toward reports of fl ooding was also surprising. From the 

time Friday aft ernoon when forecasts put New Orleans in the bull’s-eye of the storm, every 

indication was that Katrina could cause horrifi c devastation.49 Yet time and again, DHS 

witnesses suggested that the reports of fl ooding received during the day were “typical,” 

“expected,” “standard,” and the “normal, typical hurricane background stuff .”50 While such 

a reaction might be understandable in a “typical” hurricane, in light of all that was known 

about Katrina’s power and the risks peculiar to New Orleans, these reports warranted a 

greater level of concern.

Moreover, in addition to these widely distributed reports, on Monday evening, FEMA Acting Deputy Director Patrick Rhode spoke with Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson to update 

The Superdome, cut off

AP/Wide World photo
Lack of Situational Awareness

311

him on the deteriorating situation.51 Later that night, both Wood and Jackson received emails about Bahamonde’s overfl ight of New Orleans. At 8:29 p.m., Wood received an e-mail 

from a DHS public-aff airs offi cial, which related that “the fi rst (unconfi rmed) reports they 

are getting from aerial surveys in New Orleans are far more serious than media reports are 

currently refl ecting. Finding extensive fl ooding and more stranded people than they had 

originally thought – also a number of fi res.”52

At 10:05 p.m., Jackson received an e-mail from Rhode summarizing many of the same 

observations from Bahamonde’s overfl ight that had already been reported to the HSOC, 

including that there was a 200-yard-long failure of one levee and that most of the city was 

fl ooded. Neither recalled seeing the e-mails that night. In sum, there is no evidence that 

overnight Monday into Tuesday any senior DHS offi cial saw the reports that would have 

informed them that Katrina was a catastrophe of unprecedented dimensions.

Continued Failure of Situational Awareness – 

the Convention Center

In many regards, DHS’s situational awareness did not improve as the week went on. Th e 

situation at the Convention Center in New Orleans provided the most striking illustration 

of this. Despite media reports on Wednesday night and video Th ursday morning of thousands of people at the Convention Center53 – and no later than shortly aft er noon, images of 

two dead bodies54 – HSOC reports do not even mention the situation until Friday morning. Secretary Chertoff himself learned about the Convention Center from an NPR reporter 

at 1 p.m. on Th ursday.55 During that interview, the Secretary initially tried to dismiss the 

reporter’s questions about the Convention Center as “a rumor or you get someone’s anecdotal version of something.”56

Witnesses have off ered no satisfactory explanation of how this breakdown occurred. 

Broderick testifi ed fi rst hearing reports of thousands at the Convention Center on Wednesday evening. However, “We actually and initially were confusing the Superdome with the 

Convention Center. We didn’t realize that it was a separate entity. Even on Th ursday, we 

were sorting it out.”57 On Th ursday, he dispatched Wendell Shingler, the Director of the 

Federal Protective Services (FPS), to investigate. Broderick testifi ed that Shingler arrived 

that evening and reported that there were approximately a thousand people gathered at the 

Convention Center, that food and water was available, and that New Orleans police were 

present. Broderick believes that Shingler failed to appreciate the true size of the Convention 

Center. Because media reports persisted, Broderick sent Shingler back Friday morning, at 

which point the accurate report of thousands stranded came back.58

Th e failure of DHS, and the HSOC in particular, to take note of ubiquitous media reports 

of the situation at the Convention Center is disturbing. Skepticism toward media reports in 

a crisis situation makes sense, but these were backed up by video, and media-based reports 

to DHS leadership and the White House could have included appropriate caveats. Instead, 

DHS and the HSOC did not forward media reports, which left the country’s leadership woefully uninformed.

FEMA Failed to Forward Information to the HSOC on a Timely Basis

DHS witnesses were uniform in their criticism of FEMA, and Brown in particular, for failing to provide crucial information to DHS and the HSOC on a timely basis. Th is criticism, 

while warranted, does not completely account for HSOC’s inadequate situational awareness. While Brown and FEMA should have kept the HSOC better informed of develop-
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ments on the ground, the HSOC never should have depended exclusively on FEMA for 

information. Moreover, as detailed above, it did not. Reports were actually arriving, and 

others were available, from plenty of other credible sources.

Nevertheless, the FEMA leadership appears to have failed to send critical information to 

DHS and the HSOC. Th ough Brown testifi ed that he provided reports to the White House 

at several points during the day of landfall, he did not call Secretary Chertoff because in 

his view, “It would have wasted my time.”59 He appears not to have communicated with 

the HSOC at all about conditions on the ground. It appears also that several signifi cant 

e-mails were not forwarded to the HSOC.60 Th ese included a series of e-mails between 8:36 

and 9:19 a.m. containing reports: from a member of FEMA’s liaison team at the National 

Hurricane Center, that the Industrial Canal levee had failed; a summary of a report from 

Marty Bahamonde, the FEMA offi cial, that detailed severe fl ooding, people trapped in attics, 

and failing pumps;61 and a 10:51 a.m. e-mail to FEMA’s Deputy Director of Response with 

Bahamonde’s news that the New Orleans Fire Department was reporting a 20-foot-wide 

breach in the 17th Street levee.62

Brown’s testimony made clear that he purposely refused to provide updates to the HSOC 

and to Secretary Chertoff . Th ough Broderick testifi ed that he believed that FEMA intentionally limited its reports,63 investigation found no independent evidence to support this, and 

it does not appear that Lokey, Rhode, or others in FEMA did so. To the contrary, Lokey 

testifi ed that “Michael Brown did not tell me to [in] any way, shape, or form stop any fl ow 

of information” and that he was not aware of any other limitation on the transmission of 

information to the HSOC.64 Rhode sent several e-mails to, and had at least one phone conversation with, Jackson on Monday. Finally, nine of the Spot Reports issued by the HSOC 

on Monday were ascribed to FEMA, a clear indication that there was a steady information 

fl ow from FEMA’s National Response Coordination Center into the HSOC.

Conclusion

Th e HSOC did not devise and implement a system to ensure access to all signifi cant, 

relevant information that became available as Katrina neared and then landed on the 

Gulf Coast. Compounding the problem, even though the HSOC had enough information 

by late Monday aft ernoon to conclude that the levees had failed, it issued a key situation 

report that refl ected and propagated incorrectly optimistic information about conditions 

in New Orleans. 

Situational Awareness of Louisiana State Offi cials

Louisiana should have had a much easier time maintaining situational awareness than the 

federal government. In contrast to DHS, which was operating out of Washington, D.C., 

Louisiana’s Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was in Baton Rouge, close to the primary 

hurricane impact area, and there were thousands of National Guard troops and other state 

and local offi cials on the ground in southeast Louisiana before, during, and aft er landfall to 

feed information. Nonetheless, while Louisiana avoided some of the obvious failures of the 

federal government, its record of maintaining situational awareness was mixed, at best.

Th e Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP) 

addressed situational awareness in its Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). Th e SOP 

identifi ed guiding principles for information handling, including, “Th e prompt capture, 

assessment and rapid dissemination of information within the EOC contributes markedly 

to quick response and eff ective decision making during an emergency.”65 It also required 
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313

“all personnel involved in the emergency” to “aggressively seek the status of these items as 

quickly as possible ... before, during and aft er an event” and to report it to the EOC.66

In fact, fi rst responders and others in the area aff ected by Katrina needed little encouragement to pass on information to the state EOC, since they relied heavily on the EOC to 

process their requests for assistance. But information came from numerous other sources as 

well, including National Guard on-the ground and fl y-over reports,67 Louisiana State Police 

reports,68 and media coverage.69 Some information even came from callers in other states. 

LOHSEP compiled the data fl ow into situation reports that were updated several times a 

day.70 Topics included weather, status and staffi ng of the emergency operations center, data 

on injuries and fatalities, shelter populations, status of nursing homes and hospitals, road 

closures, utility and communications outages, and status of response missions. Naturally, 

the length of these sitreps grew dramatically as the response progressed. For example, 

a LOHSEP sitrep at 10 a.m. on Sunday, the day before landfall, ran just nine pages; by 

Wednesday evening, the report was 75 pages.71 Senior offi cials at LOHSEP did not have to 

rely solely on sitreps, as they also received a steady stream of information from emergencymanagement offi cials on the ground.

72

LOHSEP was not alone in having an information-gathering strategy in the state. Th e Louisiana National Guard, which supplied information to LOHSEP, also had an information 

network to meet its own needs. Th e senior Guard offi cial in Louisiana, Major General Bennett Landreneau, was stationed with the Governor in the LOHSEP command room.73 As 

the hurricane approached, the command staff directed 10 air-squadron operations-support 

teams and troops on the ground to report to the Joint Operations Command at the Superdome every two hours.74 In addition, they stationed liaison offi cers with radio equipment 

at local parish offi ces, and held their own series of conference calls with parish emergencysupport offi cials throughout the night before landfall to monitor the hurricane’s eff ects.75

However, these elaborate information-gathering systems did not prevent serious breakdowns in the state’s situational awareness. One notable example was Governor Blanco 

herself, who evidently was unaware of earlier reports of levee breaches when she made her 

statement to state and federal offi cials in the noon video teleconference on the day before 

landfall that “We have not breached the levee at this point in time.”76 Th is was a particularly 

unfortunate misstatement, as it may have contributed to the federal government’s confusion 

about the status of the levees. Th e record does not indicate when she learned her statement 

was inaccurate, or whether she made any attempt to inform the state and federal offi cials on 

the video teleconference, including the White House deputy chief of staff , of her mistake. 

Th e state’s response was also hampered by a lack of information about the locations of 

people in distress. For example, the state was slow to learn about people brought by searchand-rescue teams to the major highway intersection in west New Orleans known as the 

Cloverleaf.77 Similarly, LOHSEP did not learn about people assembling at the Convention 

Center until well aft er crowds amassed there. Mayor Nagin bears some of the blame for the 

delay, as he apparently failed to inform other offi cials when he decided, on Tuesday, August 

30, to open the Convention Center as a shelter when the Superdome became overcrowded.78

Just the same, it was striking to hear the LOHSEP operations manager, Colonel William 

Doran, testify that his information on that situation was limited to what he saw on TV and 

occasional reports from security offi cers.79

Th e National Guard, which took charge of the Convention Center on Friday, September 2, 

learned about the situation there inadvertently. Brigadier General Gary Jones of Louisiana, 

Joint Force Commander of all National Guard troops involved in the Katrina operation, 

said, “We had no knowledge of [the people there] until we sent out reconnaissance patrols 
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[on August 31], and those reconnaissance patrols came back and said, ‘Oh, by the way, it 

looks like you’ve got another group of about 15,000 sitting over there.’”80

Lack of situational awareness contributed to problems in Louisiana in distributing food, 

water, and other commodities. In particular, logistics managers expressed frustration at not 

knowing when commodities were shipped or when they arrived.81 (See Chapter 23, Logistics.)

While lack of incoming information left LOHSEP unaware of important developments, in 

some cases the fault lay with LOHSEP’s inability to process the information it did receive. 

As Lt. Col. Doran testifi ed, LOHSEP was simply not equipped for the volume of information it needed to assess:

It may have been just for the fact that we were, again, rapidly overwhelmed to 

be able to target what information is good, what is not, the amount of information coming in. It’s just like in intelligence, you get an amount of information 

and then you have to sift through to fi nd out what’s good information, what’s 

bad, and what is factual, what’s not. Th en you have to prioritize.82

Th e state also lacked systems to organize incoming information in a manner that was useful for emergency response, making it necessary in some cases to improvise those systems 

on the fl y. A notable example was information about the location of the large numbers of 

people calling in on 911 lines. Assuming the many 911 calls it received were requests for 

rescue, LOHSEP, with no plans for managing the callers’ information, transferred them to 

the Louisiana Department of Wildlife & Fisheries (W&F) representative on staff . With help 

from the Louisiana Geological Survey, a research institution within Louisiana State University, a W&F representative named Robbie Duthu developed a system to plot incoming calls 

on a map that was forwarded to search-and-rescue personnel daily.83

1 On its Web site, DHS says the HSOC “serves as the nation’s nerve center for information sharing and domestic 

incident management. ... Th e HSOC is in constant communication with the White House, acting as the situational 

awareness conduit for the White House Situation Room by providing information needed to make decisions and 

defi ne courses of action.” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Fact Sheet: Homeland Security Operations Center 

(HSOC),” press release, July 8, 2004. http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/press_release/press_release_0456.xml. 

Accessed on Mar. 8, 2006.

2 PSAs are within the Infrastructure Protection Offi ce at DHS, and there are approximately 68 spread around the country. 

DHS’s Web site describes PSAs as “Homeland security experts identifi ed in major metropolitan communities across the 

country to serve as liaisons between the Department and other partners on issues of critical infrastructure protection.” U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security, “Fact Sheet: Key Priorities Update March 1, 2004 – March 1, 2005,” press release, Mar. 

2004. http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=43&content=4279&pring=true. Accessed on Apr. 12, 2006.

3 Th e morning sitreps are included in the DHS Secretary’s briefi ng book.

4 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), National Situation Report, Aug. 29, 2005, 6 p.m., p. 1. Provided to 

Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS 0001181.

5 FEMA, National Situation Report, Aug. 29, 2005, 6 p.m., p. 13. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS 

0001193.

6 In his answer to one of Senator Lieberman’s Questions for the Record submitted aft er Secretary Chertoff ’s appearance 

before the Committee on Feb. 15, 2006, the Secretary wrote, “Th e last report I received on Monday evening from the 

HSOC stated that preliminary reports had indicated the levees had not been breached, and that the situation was still being assessed.” Th is is almost a direct quote from the 6 p.m. sitrep. Questions for the Record of Sec. Michael Chertoff , U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security, for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, 

hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Homeland Security Department’s Preparation and Response, Feb. 15, 2006, p. 51.

7 Testimony of Sec. Michael Chertoff , U.S. Department of Homeland Security, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on 

Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Homeland Security Department’s 

Preparation and Response, Feb. 15, 2006.

8 President George W. Bush, “President, Lieutenant General Honoré Discuss Hurricane Relief in Louisiana,” press 
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315

release, Sept. 12, 2005. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/20050912.html. Accessed on Mar. 8, 2006.

9 Committee staff interview of Brig. Gen. Matthew Broderick, Director, Homeland Security Operations Center, U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security, conducted on Jan. 19, 2006, transcript pp. 81-82. 

10 Brig. Gen. Broderick interview, Jan. 19, 2006, p. 37.

11 Committee staff interview of Richard Gray, Team Leader, Information and Assessment Team and Team Leader, 

National Response Coordination Center, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 20, 2006, transcript p. 85.

12 DHS produced to the Committee documents from the Senior Watch Offi cer (SWO) at the HSOC on the day of 

landfall but did not produce documents from the individual desk offi cers at the HSOC. Because of this refusal – and 

because all but one of the bolded reports listed below was found somewhere other than in the SWO e-mails – the Committee does not, and cannot, represent that these bolded reports are the entirety of those received by the HSOC on the 

day of landfall. Th ere are numerous other reports that the Committee believes may have reached the HSOC, but absent 

complete production, there was no way to determine if in fact they were received.

13 National Weather Service, New Orleans-Baton Rouge, LA Offi ce, Flash Flood Warning, Aug. 29, 2005, 8:14 a.m. CT. 

Provided to Committee.

14 Louis Dabdoub, e-mail to Michael Waters and others, Aug. 29, 2005, 9 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 

DHS-INFP-0003-0001768.

15 National Weather Service, New Orleans-Baton Rouge, LA Offi ce, Hurricane Katrina Local Statement, Aug. 29, 2005, 9 

a.m. CT. Provided to Committee. 

16 Louis Dabdoub, e-mail to Michael Waters and others, Aug. 29, 2005, 9:36 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

no. DHS-INFP-0003-0001768.

17 Daniel Kaniewski, e-mail to Dan Bartlett and others, Aug. 29, 2005, 11:13 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

no. 004795. Elsewhere this document cites the HSOC as reporting that “due to the rising water in the 9th Ward, residents are in their attics and on their roofs.”

18 Francis Patno, e-mail to Ira Stern and others, Sept. 1, 2005, 9:54 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHSINFP-0003-0001497, 0001499.

19 Darryl Mahoney, e-mail to HSOC.HSIN and others, Aug. 29, 2005, 11:41 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

no. DHS-HSOC-0002-0000186.

20 Louisiana State Police, Emergency Operations Center, Hurricane Katrina Situation Report, Aug. 29, 2005, 11 a.m. 

Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. 000001 through 000004.

21 National Weather Service, New Orleans-Baton Rouge, LA Offi ce, issued by Mobile, AL Offi ce, Flash Flood Warning, 

Aug. 29, 2005, 11:40 a.m. CT. Provided to Committee. 

22 Lt. Robert Walls, e-mail to LANTHMHLS Watch and others, Aug. 29, 2005, 1:51 p.m. Provided to Committee.

23 Francis Patno, e-mail to Ira Stern and others, Sept. 1, 2005, 9:54 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHSINFP-0003-0001497, 0001500.

24 National Weather Service, New Orleans-Baton Rouge, LA Offi ce, Hurricane Katrina Local Statement, Aug. 29, 2005, 

3:05 p.m. CT. Provided to Committee; National Weather Service, New Orleans – Baton Rouge, LA Offi ce, Hurricane 

Katrina Local Statement, Aug. 29, 2005, 3:10 p.m. CT. Provided to Committee; National Weather Service, New Orleans 

– Baton Rouge, LA Offi ce, issued by Mobile, AL Offi ce, Hurricane Katrina Local Statement, Aug. 29, 2005, 4:20 p.m. CT. 

Provided to Committee; National Weather Service, New Orleans – Baton Rouge, LA Offi ce, issued by Mobile, AL Offi ce, 

Hurricane Katrina Local Statement, Aug. 29, 2005, 8:13 p.m. CT. Provided to Committee.

25 Anthony Capra, e-mail to DoD.DomesticIncidentManagement, Aug. 29, 2005, 5:25 p.m. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as MMTF 00418-05. Th e receiver of this e-mail was redacted. In an e-mail to investigators, Col. Dave Rhodes states 

that the prior e-mail was sent to the above e-mail distribution list. Col. Dave Rhodes, e-mail to Tom Eldridge, Dan 

Berkovitz, and Eric Andersen, Senate Committee staff members, Apr. 19, 2006, 10:36 a.m. 

26 Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP), Sitrep, Executive Summary, Hurricane Katrina, Aug. 29, 2005, 4 p.m. CT. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0028-0001109, 0001138

27 Ivor van Heerden, Live Event, Fox News Network, “Special Coverage: Hurricane Katrina Pounds New Orleans,” Aug. 

29, 2005, 5 p.m. ET. Transcript accessed on LexisNexis.

28 John Schmidt, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 29, 2005, transcript pp. 9-10. Provided to Committee.

29 William Lokey, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 29, 2005, transcript pp. 17-18. Provided to Committee. 

30 Gov. Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 29, 2006, transcript pp. 20-21. Provided to 

Committee. In his responses to the Committee’s Questions for the Record, Secretary Chertoff repeatedly references Governor Blanco’s statement regarding the levees. Questions for the Record of Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 

15, 2006, pp. 9, 15, 47, 48, 51, 81. As we now know, this statement was incorrect when it was made – reports coming into 

both the Louisiana State Emergency Operations Center and the HSOC detailed that the levees had breached. Moreover, 

this noon statement does not somehow contradict the many later reports of breaches that came in from varied sources.

31 Robert Latham, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 29, 2005, transcript. 22. Provided to Committee. Reports 

from Mississippi during the VTC were no less ominous. Max Mayfi eld accurately stated that the storm surge in the 
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Biloxi area would be “very, very devastating.” Source: Mayfi eld, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 29, 2005, 

transcript p. 5. Latham, Director of the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, stated “It certainly looks like it is a 

catastrophic event that we all expected” and reported that the Hancock County Emergency Operations Center collapsed 

while the Jackson County Emergency Operations Center was fl ooded. Source: Latham, VTC, Aug. 29, 2005, pp. 22-23. 

He also reported calls from “citizens who are trapped in the second fl oor of their homes, in the attics of their homes and 

roofs, and we cannot get to them.” Source: Latham, VTC, Aug. 29, 2005, pp. 22-23. Th e historic scope of the unfolding 

disaster was clear to him: “I suspect that the history books, that this event will replace Camille as far as Mississippi is 

concerned.” Source: Latham, VTC, Aug. 29, 2005, p. 24.

32 Brig. Gen. Broderick interview, Jan. 19, 2006, p. 84. Th ough this investigation uncovered no evidence of anyone at 

the HSOC or DHS being aware of these NWS reports, it is possible that these reports were received or reviewed by the 

NOAA desk at the HSOC. However, because DHS refused to produce e-mails from this desk we were unable to determine if in fact this happened. Th us, we consider these to be reports that HSOC failed to obtain. However, if in fact the 

HSOC did obtain these reports, they would simply be added to the long list of reports that the HSOC received but failed 

to understand or appreciate. 

33 Anthony Capra, e-mail to DoD.DomesticIncidentManagement distribution list, Aug. 29, 2005, 5:25 p.m. Provided to 

Committee; fi led as MMTF00418-05. Th e receiver of this e-mail was redacted. In an e-mail to investigators, Col. Dave 

Rhodes states that the prior e-mail was sent to the above e-mail distribution list. Source: Col. Dave Rhodes, e-mail to 

Tom Eldridge, Senate Committee staff member, and others, Apr. 19, 2006, 10:36 a.m.; Anthony Capra, e-mail to Paul 

McHale, Aug. 29, 2005, 5:25 p.m. ET. Provided to Committee.

34 While media reports are oft en not the most reliable, during interviews some witnesses went to illogical lengths in 

trying to explain why the media was not to be trusted. For instance, when shown the front page of the August 30, 2005, 

New Orleans Times-Picayune (posted online at 2:43 a.m. CT) – which showed an elderly man being rescued from his 

home in chest-deep water – Broderick said, “You know, this could be one house fl ooded, and the houses around it aren’t 

even touched.” Brig. Gen. Broderick interview, Jan. 19, 2006, pp. 166-167.

35 Brig. Gen. Broderick interview, Jan. 19, 2006, pp. 130-131.

36 Eric Jones, e-mail to Eric Jones and others, Aug. 29, 2005, 6:08 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. WHK06494 through 06499.

37 Jean Meserve, Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees, CNN, “Hurricane Katrina Slams Gulf Coast,” Aug. 29, 2005, 7 p.m. ET. 

Transcript accessed on LexisNexis.

38 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, HSOC Spot Report #7, Aug. 29, 2005, 7:35 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led 

as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0055-0007575. 

39 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Situation Report #3, Aug. 30, 2006, 0034 Z. Provided to Committee.

40 Michael Brown, Larry King Live, CNN, “Tracking Hurricane Katrina,” Aug. 29, 2005, 9 p.m. ET. Transcript accessed 

on LexisNexis.

41 Francis Patno, e-mail to Ira Stern and others, Sept. 1, 2005, 9:54 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHSINFP-0003-0001497, 0001502.

42 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, HSOC Spot Report #13, Aug. 29, 2005, 10:30 p.m. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates nos. DHS-HSOC-0004-0005521 through 0005522. 

43 Lt. Kevin Cowen, Th e Situation with Tucker Carlson, MSNBC, “Th e Situation for August 29, 2005,” Aug. 29, 2005, 11 

p.m. ET. Transcript accessed on LexisNexis.

44 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, HSOC Spot Report #12, Aug. 29, 2005, 11:47 p.m. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0055-0007581.

45 All reports appear to have gone to multiple desks in the HSOC as well as to Secretary Chertoff ’s briefi ng staff . Beyond 

this group, distribution lists for reports added diff erent offi cials. For example, the Spot Report detailing Marty Bahamonde’s overfl ight went to, among others, Deputy Secretary Jackson, Chief of Staff Wood, Secretary Chertoff ’s military 

aide, Broderick, Stephan, and the White House Situation Room and individuals within the White House Homeland 

Security Council.

46 In response to one of Senator Collins’ Questions for the Record submitted aft er Secretary Chertoff ’s appearance 

before the Committee on February 15, 2006, the Secretary was critical of just such a reliance on e-mails to communicate important information. Specifi cally, he criticized FEMA Acting Deputy Director Patrick Rhode for using e-mail to 

provide a report of the Bahamonde overfl ight to Deputy Secretary Jackson: “E-mails are not the most appropriate way of 

conveying urgent or important information, especially late at night. Instead, the right course would have been to notify 

the HSOC, which reaches both the Deputy Secretary and me by telephone at any time of day or night.” Source: Questions 

for the Record of Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 2006, p. 10; See also: Questions for the Record of Sec. 

Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 2006, p. 50 (“Th e best means of communicating important information 

with high-ranking offi cials was by telephone call to the HSOC, who could reach me any time of the day or night, not via 

e-mail.”). In fact, in the case of the Rhode e-mail, the HSOC had already been informed of the Bahamonde overfl ight, 

evidenced by the HSOC Spot Report detailing the report that is time-stamped 10:30 p.m., 35 minutes before the Rhode 

e-mail. Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, HSOC Spot Report #13, Aug. 29, 2005, 10:30 p.m. Provided to 

Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-HSOC-0004-0005521 through 0005522. However, the same is not true of the three 

Spot Reports (Spot Report numbers 7, 13, and 12 issued at 6:35, 9:30, and 10:47 CT respectively.) – no eff orts were made 

by HSOC offi cials to call or otherwise ensure that senior offi cials received these critical reports. Source: Brig. Gen. Brod-
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erick interview, Jan. 19, 2006, pp. 168-169. 

47 Committee staff interview of Robert Stephan, Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for Infrastructure Protection, 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, conducted on Jan. 13, 2006, transcript pp. 115-116 (“I still am not convinced 

that it was a known fact that there were widespread levee breaches or gaps or massive fl ooding happening some time 

on Monday.”); Brig. Gen. Broderick interview, Jan. 19, 2006, pp. 129-130 (“But the doomsday scenario of New Orleans, 

the levees breaking and tons of water going in and washing people away did not happen, and the people of New Orleans 

and the State and everyone else kind of breathed a sigh of relief. Th at later on, those failures started occurring at greater 

lengths on that levee system, and that’s when the preponderance of water, as I understand it, started coming in was 

in the middle of the night.”); Committee staff interview of Frank DiFalco, then-Deputy Director, Homeland Security 

Operations Center, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, conducted on Jan. 13, 2006, transcript p. 121 (“Q: Do you 

know now that the levees breached on Monday? A: I don’t know if they breached Monday.”).

48 Brig. Gen. Broderick interview, Jan. 19, 2006, p. 163 (Describing the spot report of the Bahamonde overfl ight as “not 

an excitable report to me. It’s of interest, and if I had received it, I’d go back and drill down and ask for some more 

clarity.”); Brig. Gen. Broderick interview, Jan. 19, 2006, pp. 159-160 (stating that because the 6 p.m. sitrep reported no 

breaches, the 7:35 p.m. Spot Report “wouldn’t have gotten me excited”); Brig. Gen. Broderick interview, Jan. 19, 2006, 

pp. 165-166 (questioning the 11:47 spot report which stated that 136,000 homes had been aff ected by fl ooding: “I mean, 

who says 136,000 houses. Did someone count all of them, or is that someone’s wild guess?”); Stephan interview, Jan. 13, 

2006, p. 35 (stating, aft er reviewing the spot report of the Bahamonde overfl ight, “[I did] not know what a breach on 

this particular section of New Orleans means to the overall, you know, picture”); Stephan interview, Jan. 13, 2006, p. 39 

(even aft er the spot report of the Bahamonde overfl ight was issued, there was still no “confi rmed information that we 

had massive breaching and fl ooding occurring”); DiFalco interview, Jan. 13, 2006, p. 107 (saying that the Bahamonde 

overfl ight did not merit a call to the Secretary or other senior staff to ensure that it was received, and stating “It says it’s 

from Public Aff airs. So, again, we’re back to the issue of, okay, that’s fi ne, Public Aff airs is saying this is what’s going on, 

what’s the engineers saying?”); Question for the Record of Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 2006, p. 

51 (the Secretary dismissed the 7:35 p.m. spot report as “uncontrovertibly tentative, and giv[ing] no indication that the 

‘small breach’ could not be repaired.”). It is diffi cult to understand how the report of a breach of the crucial levee on the 

17th Street Canal could be minimized because it did not state that the breach could not be repaired. Indeed, in the face of 

the dire predictions before landfall and the myriad reports of fl ooding aft er landfall, the presumption should have been 

to take the report any breach seriously absent some statement to contrary. Finally, this spot report, which refl ected an 

earlier Army Corps of Engineers report, also described a second levee breach, failing pumps, widespread fl ooding, and 

overtopping.

49 In response to one of Senator Collins’ Questions for the Record submitted aft er Secretary Chertoff ’s appearance before the Committee on February 15, 2006, the Secretary said, “We knew that this storm had the potential to wreak havoc 

on the Gulf Coast and could cause enormous damage to entire region.” Questions for the Record of Sec. Chertoff , Senate 

Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 2006, p. 6.

50 Stephan interview, Jan. 13, 2006, p. 59 (“typical” and “expected”); Committee staff interview of John Wood, Chief of 

Staff , U.S. Department of Homeland Security, conducted on Jan. 27, 2006, transcript p. 64 (“expected”); Brig. Gen. Broderick interview, Jan. 19, 2006, p. 164 (“standard”); Brig. Gen. Broderick interview, Jan. 19, 2006, p. 105 (“normal, typical 

hurricane background stuff ”); Brig. Gen. Broderick interview, Jan. 19, 2006, p. 131 (“Th ere’s always fl ooding aft er a 

hurricane”); Brig. Gen. Broderick interview, Jan. 19, 2006, p. 146 (“Every time there’s a hurricane, there’s a fl ood. So, you 

know, to say there is fl ooding in a particular part of town is a normal expectation of what’s happening in a hurricane.”). 

In addition, in response to one of Senator Akaka’s Questions for the Record submitted aft er Secretary Chertoff ’s appearance before the Committee on February 15, 2006, the Secretary said, “Flooding is an incident of almost all hurricanes.” 

Questions for the Record of Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 2006, p. 74.

51 Committee staff interview of Patrick Rhode, Acting Deputy Director, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 4, 2006, transcript p. 

50.

52 When shown this e-mail during a staff interview, Wood minimized its importance: “I do not equate extensive fl ooding necessarily with the type of fl ooding that we had due to the levee breach.” Source: Wood interview, Jan. 27, 2006, 

p. 74. In response to one of Senator Akaka’s Questions for the Record submitted aft er Secretary Chertoff ’s appearance 

before the Committee on February 15, 2006, the Secretary said “Th e e-mail to my chief of staff does not mention levee 

breaches. Th ere is a critical distinction between fl ooding and breach of a levee. Flooding is an incident of almost all hurricanes. Levee breach is extraordinary.” Source: Questions for the Record of Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, 

Feb. 15, 2006, p. 74.

53 During the 8 o’clock hour on Wednesday, August 31, reporter Chris Lawrence told Paula Zahn on CNN that “Th ere 

are literally thousands of people lined up at this convention center wandering aimlessly, I mean, mothers with their 

babies, little kids, walking through this putrid water. And there’s this dead body that is just sitting there. And I asked 

one of police offi cers and he said, we can’t – we can barely control the situation as it is. We can’t even worry about 

dead right now.” Source: Chris Lawrence, Paula Zahn Show, CNN, “President Bush Promises Massive Hurricane Relief 

Eff ort; Th ousands Feared Dead in New Orleans,” Aug. 31, 2005, 8 p.m. ET. Transcript accessed on LexisNexis. During 

the 10 p.m. broadcast of Scarborough Country on MSNBC, Michelle Hofl and reported that “We are hearing some really 

frightening stories tonight down at the convention center. ... Well, we are told that down there, at that convention 

center, it is absolute chaos. We haven’t been down there, Joe, because we are told that it’s just not a safe place to be. So, 

you have families with children and everything down at that convention center. Cars are being carjacked. And there’s 

no one there, we are told, to take care of the thousands of people who are there.” Source: Michelle Hofl and, Scarborough 

Country, MSNBC, “Scarborough Country For August 31, 2005,” Aug. 31, 2005, 10 p.m. ET. Transcript accessed on 
Chapter 19

318

LexisNexis. Th e next morning, in the 7 a.m. ET hour, Chris Lawrence reported “I mean right here at the convention 

center, which is just a couple of blocks away from us, as we were driving in, there were thousands, thousands of people 

just sleeping on the streets of New Orleans. I mean mothers with their children, entire families have nowhere to go. You 

walk by and people don’t have water. Th ey’re running out of food.” Source: Chris Lawrence, American Morning, CNN, 

“Massive Evacuation from New Orleans to Houston Coming to Sudden Halt; Looting and Lawlessness Continue to 

Escalate,” Sept. 1, 2005, 7 a.m. ET. Transcript accessed on LexisNexis. In the 10 a.m. hour, CNN Producer Jim Spellman 

reported that “Th e convention center was the secondary place where people were to go. Th e fi rst being the Superdome. 

And thousands of people are there. Th ey slept outside. Th e inside of the convention center is just crammed.” Source: Jim 

Spellman, CNN Live Today, CNN, “Chaos and Catastrophe in New Orleans; FEMA Briefi ng,” Sept. 1, 2005, 10 a.m. ET. 

Transcript accessed on LexisNexis.

54 Video shown on CNN’s 1 p.m. ET “Live From ... ” broadcast showed at least two bodies next to the convention 

center. Chris Lawrence, Live From ... , CNN, “Rescue Operations Suspended Due to Security Issues; Stranded Hurricane 

Victims Dying in New Orleans; Offi cials Face Chaos, Lack of Communication,” Sept. 1, 2005, 1 p.m. ET. Transcript accessed on LexisNexis. 

55 Evan Th omas, “Michael Chertoff : ‘What the Hell is Going on?’” Newsweek, Jan. 2, 2006. http://www.msnbc.msn.

com/id/10511927/site/newsweek/. Accessed on Mar. 10, 2006.

56 Sec. Michael Chertoff , All Th ings Considered, NPR, “Michael Chertoff discusses US aid eff ort being criticized in New 

Orleans,” Sept. 1, 2005, 8 a.m. ET. Transcript accessed on LexisNexis.

57 Brig. Gen. Broderick interview, Jan. 19, 2006, pp. 171-172.

58 Brig. Gen. Broderick interview, Jan. 19, 2006, pp. 173-174. Committee staff interviewed Federal Protective Service 

Director Shingler, but his recollection was inconsistent with that of other witnesses and with the documents obtained. 

Committee staff interview of Wendell Shingler, Director, Offi ce of Federal Protective Service, Border and Transportation 

Security, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, conducted on Feb. 14, 2006, transcript pp. 15-17. 

59 Testimony of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina, Th e Roles of DHS and FEMA Leadership, Feb. 10, 2006. Brown 

testifi ed that he believed that he could accomplish things more quickly by calling the White House directly.

60 Th e Committee cannot be certain that these e-mails were not sent to DHS, because DHS never produced e-mails from 

the FEMA desk in the HSOC that would have been the most likely recipient of these reports.

61 Patrick Rhode, e-mail to Michael Health, Aug. 29, 2005, 10:19 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS 

0005684 through 0005685.

62 Michael Heath, e-mail to Michael Lowder, Aug. 29, 2005, 11:51 a.m., pp. 1-2. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

nos. DHS-FEMA-0029-0002959 through 0002960.

63 Testimony of Brig. Gen. Matthew Broderick, former Director, Homeland Security Operations Center, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Roles of DHS and FEMA Leadership, Feb. 10, 2006.

64 Committee staff interview of William Lokey, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, 

FEMA, conducted on Jan. 20, 2006, transcript p. 175.

65 LOHSEP, Standard Operation Procedures, Section 5.a.(1). Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. 000008 through 

000009.

66 LOHSEP, SOP Level I Activation, Sec. KK. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 000055. 

67 Committee staff interview of Col. David Aycock, Operations Offi cer, Louisiana National Guard, conducted on Jan. 4, 

2006, transcript p. 212; Committee staff interview of Col. Jeff Smith, Jr., Louisiana National Guard (Ret.), Acting Deputy 

Director, Emergency Management, Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, conducted on 

Jan. 13, 2005, transcript p. 141; Committee staff interview of Brig. Gen. Gary Jones, Commander, Joint Force Pelican, 

Louisiana Army National Guard, conducted on Dec. 7, 2005, transcript p. 96.

68 Committee staff interview of Lt. Col. William Doran, Louisiana Air National Guard, Chief, Operations Division, 

Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, conducted on Dec. 2, 2005, transcript p. 73.

69 Lt. Col. Doran interview, Dec. 2, 2005, p. 115.

70 Col. Smith interview, Jan. 13, 2006, pp. 144-145. 

71 Compare LOHSEP, Sitrep, Aug. 28, 2005, 11 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. 000001 through 000009, 

with LOHSEP, Sitrep, Aug. 31, 2005, 10 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. 000001 through 0000075.

72 Col. Smith interview, Jan. 13, 2006, pp. 232-233.

73 Col. Aycock interview, Jan. 4, 2006, p. 212.

74 Committee staff interview of Lt. Col. Th ibodeaux, Joint Director of Military Support to Civilian Authorities, Louisiana National Guard, conducted on Dec. 6, 2005, transcript pp. 146-147.

75 Lt. Col. Th ibodeaux interview, Dec. 6, 2005, p. 149.

76 Gov. Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 29, 2005, transcript pp. 20-21. Provided to 

Committee.
Lack of Situational Awareness

319

77 Lt. Col. Doran interview, Dec. 2, 2005, p. 146; Committee staff interview of Brig. Gen. Brod Veillon, Assistant Adjutant General, Louisiana National Guard, conducted on Nov. 29, 2005, transcript p. 45.

78 See Chapter 23, p. 11. 

79 Lt. Col. Doran interview, Dec. 2, 2005, pp. 133-134.

80 Brig. Gen. Jones interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 96.

81 Committee staff interview of Col. Jadwin Mayeaux, Deputy Director, Homeland Security, Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, conducted on Nov. 29, 2005, transcript pp. 34-35.

82 Lt. Col. Doran interview, Dec. 2, 2005, p. 160.

83 Committee staff interview of Robert Duthu, Liaison to Louisiana State Emergency Operations Center, Louisiana 

Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, conducted on Dec. 8, 2005, transcript pp. 271-276.
Facing the media

U.S. Coast Guard photo
321

Protecting Infrastructure;

Public Communication; 

Role of the Media

Critical Infrastructure

Hurricane Katrina had a devastating impact on many types of critical infrastructure 

– “Systems and assets,” according to the National Response Plan, “whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such 

systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, 

national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.”1

Th e New Orleans levee system naturally received the most attention, but Katrina also placed 

the nation’s energy supply, chemical-production capacity, and fuel pipelines in serious jeopardy. Th e disaster highlighted the need for industry and government coordination to assess 

the implications of the damage to such infrastructure, to prioritize the restoration of specifi c 

infrastructure, and to have mechanisms in place to facilitate restoration. 

Because of the lack of coordinated restoration plans, signifi cant infrastructure problems 

were left to be addressed in ad-hoc manner:

• Immediately aft er landfall, the Colonial Pipeline, a 5,519-mile system that 

transports fuel from Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama to distribution 

points throughout 12 states and the District of Columbia, 2 reported that two 

major lines were shut down due to power outages. Th e company dispatched 

generation equipment, but FEMA regional representatives – understandably 

– diverted the generators to hospitals.3

 However, additional planning would 

have readied enough generators for both purposes. It was not until a full week 

aft er the storm that the Colonial Pipeline was restored to full capacity.4

 Th e 

Colonial pipeline is one of two key pipelines that carries up to 100 million gallons of gas, heating oil, and other petroleum products to the Southeast and the 

East Coast.5

 A sustained shut-down could have a serious impact on the nation’s 

energy supply.

• A fl ooded chemical plant that manufactured liquid hydrogen used by NASA 

and the Air Force and in the fi nishing process of some steel parts did not receive dewatering assistance from the Army Corps of Engineers until September 

5.6

 Th is plant alone was responsible for 31 percent of North America’s industrial-hydrogen production, and consequently NASA agreed to share its stored 

supply of hydrogen with the Department of Defense to compensate for this lost 

production.7

• Th e restoration and maintenance of critical telecommunications infrastructure was beset by a variety of security challenges, including the need to provide 

security for facilities and equipment, for repair crews, and for convoys bringing 

in fuel and other supplies.8

 BellSouth’s struggles provide one example of this, 

and the company’s security issues wound up being addressed through a patchwork of means. Th e Louisiana State Police escorted employees out of the buildChapter 20
Chapter 20

322

ing when BellSouth had to evacuate its New Orleans Main Central Offi ce on 

the aft ernoon of Tuesday, August 30 (the day aft er landfall) because of reports 

of violence.9

 Th e following day, BellSouth sought help from the U.S. Marshals 

Service to protect their facility.10 Th e Department of Justice, aft er coordinating 

through FEMA pursuant to Emergency Support Function-13 (ESF-13) of the 

National Response Plan (NRP),11 agreed to send in U.S. Marshals to secure the 

facility, and sent in FBI agents by helicopter until the marshals could arrive.12

In addition, state police provided security for convoys of fuel and water.13

BellSouth also needed assistance to provide security for their repair crews. Th e 

National Communications System (NCS),14 aft er going through the ordinary 

ESF process, and with the consent of FEMA, sought this further assistance 

from DOD, which forwarded the request to the Louisiana National Guard.15 In 

the end, however, security arrangements with the Louisiana National Guard 

fell through and BellSouth ended up arranging for private security protection 

for its workers.16 Pre-existing arrangements concerning security for such critical infrastructure could have eased these challenges and helped to facilitate the 

speedy restoration of the telecommunications infrastructure.

Th e federal, state, and local governments, and the private sector all are responsible for planning to protect and restore critical infrastructure. Within the federal government, Congress 

has assigned the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) a leadership role on critical 

infrastructure, including the task of developing a national plan for protecting it.17 Unfortunately, DHS has lagged in its responsibility to develop this plan and to create a meaningful 

inventory with prioritization for securing the nation’s key assets. Although DHS issued 

an interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) in February 2005 and a draft 

version of the fi nal plan in November 2005 that proposes to assess vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure and prioritize protective measures, it still has not implemented the fi nal 

plan.18 If the prioritization of vulnerable critical infrastructure had been completed prior to 

Katrina, it may have been helpful for coordinating restoration of that infrastructure. 

Currently, the NRP, the comprehensive federal framework for managing major domestic 

incidents, divides responsibility for restoring critical infrastructure among several Emergency Support Functions, each of which has diff erent lead agencies.19 No cross-cutting entity 

under the NRP takes a comprehensive approach to setting critical-infrastructure restoration 

priorities – or attempts to address the many infrastructure interdependencies that exist. Nor 

does the NRP address the way in which federal agencies should work with state and local 

governments to respond to emergencies that aff ect critical infrastructure in their jurisdictions. It is important that the NRP address the roles of federal, state, and local governments 

and the private sector in restoring critical infrastructure. To this end, the NRP should be 

amended to have an Emergency Support Function that is responsible for assessing the 

damage to critical infrastructure, taking measures to mitigate the impact on the economy 

and national security, and restoring critical infrastructure. Th e Department of Homeland 

Security should be responsible for leading this Emergency Support Function, but it should 

have the involvement of the private sector, other federal agencies, and state and local governments, as appropriate.

Because approximately 85 percent of critical infrastructure in the United States is privately 

owned and operated,20 and because private industry has vital information about its infrastructure, it is critical that industry actively work with the federal government in order to 

establish priorities for restoration. A model for private-sector involvement can be found in 

the DHS’s draft NIPP that will establish 17 sector-specifi c coordination groups and a crosssector council that can consider infrastructure interdependencies.21 According to DHS’s 

draft plan, these sector-specifi c groups will include industry representatives and represen-
Protecting Infrastructure; Public Communication; Role of the Media

323

tatives from all levels of government (federal, state, and local) when appropriate that will 

develop sector-specifi c plans for sharing information, assessing the vulnerability of critical 

infrastructure, and implementing protection measures. Th ese sector-specifi c groups would 

be a useful mechanism for acquiring the necessary stakeholder information to set priorities 

for the restoration of critical infrastructure and coordinating private sector and government 

eff orts to achieve prioritization goals.

Media and Public Affairs – ESF-15

Rumors proliferate in times of war, civil unrest, and natural disaster. If widespread and sensational, they can become disruptive – and become news events in themselves. Th e public 

suff ers when federal, state, and local governments tasked with disseminating public health, 

safety, and security information fail to do their jobs as envisioned by emergency-response 

planning. 

Media and Government’s Role

It is essential that the news media receive accurate disaster information to circulate to the 

public. News media can also help inform the public by reporting on rumors and soliciting 

evidence and comment on their plausibility, if any. Th ey may inadvertently do damage by 

reporting on rumors without seeking context or confi rmation, or by presenting them as 

established facts. Th e Evening Sun newspaper of New York City announced this news atop 

its front page on April 15, 1912:

ALL SAVED FROM TITANIC AFTER COLLISION

RESCUE BY CARPATHIA AND PARISIAN; LINER IS BEING

TOWED TO HALIFAX AFTER SMASHING INTO A ICEBERG.22

Th e factual defi ciencies of those headlines – based, if readers dove deeply enough into the 

article’s text, on a passing reference to an unquoted report by parents of a ship’s unnamed 

telegrapher – are now apparent, but they remind us that there is nothing new about the 

phenomenon of news media reporting rumor.

Nearly a century later, the proliferation of news outlets, the competition to be fi rst with a 

powerful story, the technologies that make broad reach and rapid reporting possible, and 

the 24-hour cycle of Web and broadcast news can increase the chance that rumors will 

creep unlabelled or unchallenged into news stories. And when public offi cials fail to provide 

timely, accurate, and credible public information – or stand before microphones and cameras to spread rumors themselves – rumor can become a serious threat to civil order and to 

relief eff orts.

For example, on August 29, the day of landfall, ABC’s “World News Tonight” reported: “In 

New Orleans, entire neighborhoods are underwater, but the levees held. Th e nightmare scenario of an entire city underwater did not happen.” Other broadcasters said: “New Orleans 

dodged the big bullet” (NBC’s “Today” show, August 29) and “Th ey dodged the bullet, but 

they still got a sound bruising” (National Public Radio’s “Talk of the Nation,” August 29).23

As the public learned later, on-the-scene reports by emergency offi cials, residents, and the 

press had already described fl ooding from levee breaches and overtopping several hours 

earlier. For example, Ivor van Heerden, the Director of Louisiana State University’s Center 

for the Study of Public Health Impacts of Hurricanes, relayed that “the National Weather 

Service [is] reporting that one of the levees was breached ... as the reporters have said, 

there’s very, very signifi cant areas of New Orleans that did fl ood from the levee overtopping. In some areas we have about 11 feet of standing water. People have been forced out 
Chapter 20

324

onto the roofs of their homes.”24 Yet as late as the next morning, August 30, there were still 

news items like this Washington Post report:

Some experts predicted the storm could become one of the worst catastrophes in 

U.S. history. But the city managed to avoid the worst of the worst. Th e Mississippi River did not breach New Orleans’s famed levees to any serious degree.25

Others issued confl icting reports, even within their own stories.26 Accurate reporting was at 

a premium, not only concerning the damage to the levees, but also with respect to security 

and law-enforcement issues, as discussed below.

Getting news from the fi eld, through the editing process, and to the public, all under time 

pressure, is a challenge. While modern technology makes correction of mistaken reports easier and faster than in the days of the Titanic, thanks to the same technology, news travels that 

much more quickly in the fi rst place, magnifying the potential damage of erroneous reports. 

Government’s Public-Affairs Responsibilities in the Event of a Disaster

Accurate information is never as critical as during an emergency. It’s also never more 

diffi cult to obtain. Emergency-response planning – in this case, the NRP and the State of 

Louisiana’s Emergency Operations Plan (LA EOP) – tasks federal and state agencies with 

delivering reliable information to the public and the media in the event of a disaster.27

During Hurricane Katrina, however, offi cials at all levels of government either failed to 

comprehend these roles or ignored these obligations, though there were times when offi cials 

understood and carried out their duties. 

Th e NRP’s Public Aff airs Support Annex directs DHS, in coordination with its component 

FEMA, to “mobilize” federal assets to deliver information to the public regarding emergencies as well as “use media monitoring ... and other techniques to identify rumors, misinformation, inaccurate reports ...” and rapidly correct them.28 Th e NRP also calls for establishing a federal Joint Information Center (JIC) to support the Joint Field Offi ce (JFO) with 

public-aff airs matters and information dissemination during an emergency, at the location 

of the disaster, depending on the incident’s requirements.29 However, the DHS reported that 

its federal JIC was not established until September 6 – over a week aft er Hurricane Katrina 

made landfall.30

State emergency agencies coordinate with the federal eff ort. Th e Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP) has primary responsibility for 

“initiating, organizing and coordinating all aspects of Emergency Public Information,”31 including the activation of a state Joint Information Center which would incorporate federal 

communications activity.32 Yet it is not clear whether during the response to Hurricane Katrina a state JIC was established, although state offi cials maintained an information center 

in a trailer behind the Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness in Baton Rouge, which provided 

briefi ngs from this location every four hours. 33

Both federal and state agencies have mutual obligations to formulate a coordinated message. 

Th e NRP envisions the JFO, or federal JIC, to work “in close coordination with other JICs to 

integrate into a Joint Information System (JIS) providing consistent, coordinated, and timely 

information during an incident,”34 and as stated above, the LA EOP envisions integrating 

federal communications activities into the state JIC. However, it appears this goal was not 

immediately carried out, or even understood, during the response to Hurricane Katrina.

A DHS/FEMA aft er-action report attributed some of the diffi culty and, ultimately, the 

failure of federal and state offi cials to ensure a fl ow of accurate, timely information to factors including the overwhelming damage to communication infrastructure, the early lack of 
Protecting Infrastructure; Public Communication; Role of the Media

325

co-location between federal (DHS/FEMA) and state public-information centers, reliance on 

fi eld staff to relay information on sporadically functional equipment, and the pressure on 

public-information staff to react to media queries as opposed to pushing out new information.35 Specifi cally, DHS Inspector General Richard Skinner testifi ed before the Committee 

that his department found there should have been more cooperation between federal and 

state public-aff airs offi cials.36

Media Performance During Katrina

As for the media, some of the rumor traffi c in Katrina derived from the reliance of reporters on dubious sources. A New Orleans Times-Picayune reporter later chastised himself for 

passing along unconfi rmed a National Guardsman’s comment that a freezer at the city’s 

Convention Center held “30 or 40” bodies, and another soldier’s comment that the dead included a “7-year-old with her throat cut.” As Brian Th evenot, the Times-Picayune reporter, 

went on to note, “Neither the mass of bodies nor the allegedly expired child would ever be 

found,” but the rumor was eventually traced to gossip in the food line at a nearby casino 

where military and police personnel were staging.37

Th e impact of rumors – sharks swimming in downtown New Orleans, dead babies in trash 

cans, and stacks of bodies at the Superdome and the Convention Center – was compounded 

by misinformation from offi cials. New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin told a nationwide TV audience about people “in that frickin’ Superdome for fi ve days watching dead bodies, watching hooligans killing people, raping people.”38 New Orleans Police Superintendent Eddie 

Compass reported that babies were being raped there.39 Both statements were unfounded. 

Inaccurate rumors reported without caveats, particularly with respect to law enforcement, 

included: “Violent gangs are roaming the streets at night, hidden by the cover of darkness” 

(Fox News), troops on rooft ops looking for snipers as “gunfi re crackled in the distance” 

(Los Angeles Times), “a young man run down and then shot by a New Orleans police offi -

cer” (Ottawa Sun), and “Girls and boys were raped in the dark and had their throats cut and 

bodies were stuff ed in the kitchens while looters and madmen exchanged fi re with weapons 

they had looted” (Financial Times of London).40

Th e frequency and apparent authority of rumor-based reporting during Hurricane Katrina 

added to public confusion about events along the Gulf Coast. As two Washington Post

investigators concluded:

Th e sensational accounts delayed rescue and evacuation eff orts already hampered by poor planning and a lack of coordination among local, state, and 

federal agencies. People rushing to the Gulf Coast to fl y rescue helicopters or to 

distribute food, water, and other aid steeled themselves for battle.41

Impact of Misinformation on Response Efforts

At 9:15 p.m. CT on Th ursday, September 1, DHS issued a report that FEMA’s search-andrescue forces “ceased operations until National Guard can assist TF’s [Urban Search and 

Rescue Task Forces] with security.”42 James Strickland, a member of FEMA’s Urban Search 

and Rescue team, explained that throughout the day there had been reports of shootings 

and rioting in the streets.43

And at that point, we said, okay, we’re not sending out any of our teams unless they have 

some type of force protection with them, which at the time was kind of scarce. ... So that 

day, by the time we got force protection kegged up with everybody, we had really lost most 

of the day, the daylight gone...If any went out, it was very limited as to what went out because we didn’t have a suffi cient protection plan.44
Chapter 20

326

Many private-sector telecommunications were delayed by similar anxieties. Jeff Glick, 

the Division Chief for Critical Infrastructure Protection at the National Communications 

System, said “[B]e they true or not, the perception that the [communications sector] crews 

felt that they weren’t safe, and the companies would not let them go into the area because of 

lack of being able to get enough security, slowed initial response and reconstitution of the 

communications net.”45 Christopher Guttman-McCabe, the Vice President for Regulatory 

Aff airs at Cellular Telecommunications and Internet Association, agreed: workers feared 

they would be “assaulted, stripped of whatever they had with them” when they entered the 

disaster area to conduct repairs.46 Ultimately some companies hired private security guards 

to protect their employees.47

Government’s Responsibilities to Disseminate Information About Public Health, 

Safety, and Security 

Federal, state, and local governments must also disseminate information critical to the 

health, safety, and security of the public, which includes evacuation or decontamination 

instructions and warnings.48 Th e NRP ascribes primary responsibility for this to state and 

local governments; when catastrophic events have overwhelmed state and local authorities, 

the federal government must step in.49 However, no level of government provided adequate 

safety information to the public during Hurricane Katrina.

For example, neither DHS, through its component FEMA, nor Louisiana, nor New Orleans 

issued warnings about levee breaches or rising fl ood waters, though DHS/FEMA issued 

several other warnings, including one cautioning evacuees not to return to disaster areas 

prematurely.50 Nicol Andrews, FEMA’s Deputy Strategic Director for Public Aff airs, testifi ed that she did not consider warning the public about the fl ooding nor even discuss it with 

colleagues, other than FEMA Director Michael Brown and one other FEMA offi cial:51

Th at is not an action that FEMA has traditionally taken in the past; nor would 

I ever assume that it would be appropriate in this case. ... Public safety is not 

in the National Response Plan. It is not a FEMA responsibility. ... I’m not sure 

what good it would do to notify the public that the levees had been breached, 

even if it were a FEMA responsibility – which it’s not.52

When Ms. Andrews, one of only fi ve individuals who accompanied Director Brown to 

Louisiana as staff support,53 was asked why she thought it would do no good to notify the 

public of the levee failures she said:

Where are they going to go? I mean, the city had been evacuated and the roads 

closed. ... And again, evacuation and sheltering – also not roles that FEMA can 

take care of. It would not have helped the situation at all. ... And it certainly, 

again, wouldn’t come from FEMA.54

Th ese comments are inconsistent with responsibilities assigned under the NRP. FEMA’s 

Deputy Director of Legislative Aff airs, Th omas Bossert, has acknowledged that communicating information to the public is “crucial.”55

Th e state also failed to eff ectively notify its citizens of levee failures. Louisiana never activated the Emergency Alert System that could have disseminated both audible and visual warnings to the public through radio and TV stations.56 Th e New Orleans Emergency Operation 

Plan’s Hurricane Annex indicates that the city intended to rely on the Emergency Alert 

System as “the primary means of advising the public of a localized emergency.”57

Th e failure of government offi cials on all levels contributed to rumor mongering and circulation of inaccurate and confusing information, signifi cantly impeding response eff orts. 
Protecting Infrastructure; Public Communication; Role of the Media

327

Th is was one of the greatest repercussions of the failure to grasp federal and state emergency-response planning. 

1 U.S Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan. Washington: Government Printing Offi ce, Dec. 2004, 

Appendix I, p. 64 [hereinaft er NRP]. Th e language mirrors the statutory defi nition at 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(e). 

2 Colonial Pipeline Company, “Company Profi le,” 2006. http://www.colpipe.com/ab_main.asp. Accessed on Mar. 16, 

2006; U.S. Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, Th e Federal Response to Hurricane 

Katrina: Lessons Learned. Washington: Government Printing Offi ce, Feb. 2006, p. 61 [hereinaft er Th e White House, 

Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned].

3 Th e White House, Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, p. 61; Colonial Pipeline Company, “Colonial Pipeline Plans to 

Restore Partial Service by this Weekend,” press release, Aug. 30, 2005. http://www.colpipe.com/press_release/pr_72.asp. 

Accessed on Mar. 16, 2006.

4 Offi ce of the Vice President, Domestic Policy, “Energy,” Draft , Sept. 6, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 

002746; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Spot Report #22, Sept. 6, 2005, 6 a.m., p. 5. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates no. DHS 0001465.

5 Colonial Pipeline Company, “Company Profi le,” 2006. http://www.colpipe.com/ab_main.asp. Accessed on Mar. 16, 

2006.

6 Paul Adams, “Hurricane washes over U.S. Economy; Katrina’s wake,” Baltimore Sun, Sept. 6, 2005; Sandra I. Erwin, 

“Commerce Dept. Seeks Data on Industries Aff ected by Katrina,” National Defense Magazine, Nov. 2005. ww.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2005/Nov/UF-Commerce.htm. Accessed on Feb. 26, 2006.

7 Sandra I. Erwin, “Commerce Dept. Seeks Data on Industries Aff ected by Katrina,” National Defense Magazine, Nov. 

2005. www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2005/Nov/UF-Commerce.htm. Accessed on Feb. 26, 2006.

8 Testimony of Peter Fonash, Ph.D., Deputy Manager and Director, National Communications System, U.S. Department 

of Homeland Security, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on 

Hurricane Katrina: Managing Law Enforcement and Communications in a Catastrophe, Feb. 6, 2006.

9 Written Statement of William L. Smith, Chief, Technology Offi ce, BellSouth Corp., for the U.S. Senate, Committee on 

Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Managing Law Enforcement and Communications in a Catastrophe, Feb. 6, 2006, p. 8.

10 James McAtamney, e-mail to Bill Mercer and others, Aug. 31, 2005, 4:07 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

nos. DAG 00000140 through 00000141.

11 NRP, p. ESF#13-1 (providing that DHS and DOJ are responsible for coordinating the federal government’s public 

safety and security support under the NRP). Peter Fonash testifi ed that NCS also played a role in coordinating assistance 

from the FBI and U.S. Marshal Service. Written Statement of Peter Fonash, Deputy Manager and Director, National 

Communications System, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Managing Law Enforcement and Communications in a 

Catastrophe, Feb. 6, 2006, p. 7.

12 Robert Trono, e-mail to James McAtamney and Bill Mercer, Aug. 31, 2005, 6:14 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. DAG 00000140.

13 Committee staff interview of Jeff rey Glick, Chief, Critical Infrastructure Protection Division, National Communications System, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, conducted on Feb. 3, 2006, transcript p. 59; Written Statement of 

Smith, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 6, 2006, p. 8.

14 Th e National Communications System is a component of the Department of Homeland Security which is designed to 

provide communications support during emergencies.

15 Tom Wetherald, e-mail to Peter Fonash and others, Sept. 3, 2005, 9:37 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

nos. DHS-INFP-0002-0000737 through 0000738. See also: Glick interview, Feb. 3, 2006, p. 60 (explaining NCS’s eff orts 

to work through the NRCC and ESF-13 process as well as with the National Guard).

16 Fonash, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 6, 2006.

17 “Homeland Security Act of 2002,” (P.L. 107-296), 6 U.S.C. § 201.

18 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Draft National Infrastructure Protection Plan version 1.0, Base Plan, Nov. 2, 

2005, pp. 50-51. Provided to Committee [hereinaft er Draft National Infrastructure Protection Plan, Nov. 2, 2005]. See 

also: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan, Feb. 2005. http://www.

newsecurityconcepts.com/DataFiles/interim-nipp.pdf. Accessed on Apr. 28, 2006 [hereinaft er Interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan, Feb. 2005].

19 Th e ESFs include: Transportation, Communications, Public Works and Engineering, Agriculture, and Energy.

20 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Protected Critical Infrastructure Information Program: Program Over-
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328

view.” http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial_0465.xml. Accessed on Apr. 30, 2006.

21 Draft National Infrastructure Protection Plan, Nov. 2, 2005, pp. 50-51.

22 Southampton, England City Council, “Titanic – A Southampton Story: What the Papers Said,” www.southampton.

gov.uk/leisure/local-history-and-heritage/historical-records/titanic/papers.asp. Accessed on Mar. 1, 2006. Th e Titanic 

sailed from Southampton, which was home for most of her crew. 

23 John Burnett, Talk of the Nation, NPR, “Hurricane Katrina Update,” Aug. 29, 2005, 2 p.m. ET. Transcript accessed on 

LexisNexis; Charles Gibson, World News Tonight, ABC, “World New Tonight Introduction,” Aug. 29, 2005, 6:30 p.m. 

ET. Transcript accessed on LexisNexis; Brian Williams, Today Show, NBC, “Superdome Structurally Sounds Despite 

Loosing Part of the Roof,” Aug. 29, 2005, 7 a.m. ET. Transcript accessed on LexisNexis.

24 Ivor van Heerden, Fox News, “Special Coverage: Hurricane Katrina Pounds New Orleans,” Aug. 29, 2005, 5 p.m. ET. 

Transcript accessed on LexisNexis. In addition, Jeanne Meserve, a CNN Correspondent, described the situation in New 

Orleans: “I am looking over a scene of utter devastation. In an entire neighborhood, water has come up to the eaves of 

the houses and am told this is not the worst of it. ... I’m told the main part of the ward further down is even worse. Th e 

water is over the houses.” Source: Jeanne Meserve, Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees, CNN, “Hurricane Katrina Slams Gulf 

Coast,” Aug. 29, 2005, 7 p.m. ET. Transcript accessed on LexisNexis. Also, the Times Picayune reported at 2 p.m. CT 

from the 9th Ward on the day of landfall: “Meanwhile, City Hall confi rmed a breach of the levee along the 17th Street 

Canal at Bellaire Drive, allowing water to spill into Lakeview.” Source: “Hurricane Katrina – Th e Storm Arrives,” New 

Orleans Times-Picayune, Aug. 29, 2005. Accessed on LexisNexis.

25 Peter Whoriskey and Guy Gugliotta, “Storm Th rashes Gulf Coast,” Th e Washington Post, Aug. 30, 2005, p. A01.

26 National Public Radio reported: “Th ey dodged the bullet, but they still got a sound bruising.” Th e reporter went on 

to say: “Th e levee, ... that surrounds the city of New Orleans has been breached in a couple of places by this storm.” 

John Burnet, Talk of the Nation, NPR, “Hurricane Katrina Update,” Aug. 29, 2005, 2 p.m. ET. Transcript accessed on 

LexisNexis.

27 NRP; Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP), Emergency Operations Plan, 

Apr. 2005, pp. ESF-15–1 through ESF-15–7 [hereinaft er Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan]. Th e discussion in this 

section focuses only on the State of Louisiana, although presumably Alabama and Mississippi confronted similar issues. 

Th e NRP “ensures that suffi cient Federal assets are deployed....to provide accurate, coordinated, and timely information 

to aff ected audiences, including governments, media, the private sector, and the local populace.” Source: NRP, p. ESF15–1. Th e Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan “provides information and external communications to inform people 

about the threat from natural...emergencies and disasters and the precautions and response measures that the State and 

local governments are taking to protect and preserve life and property.” Source: Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan, p. 

ESF-15–1.

28 NRP, pp. PUB–1, PUB–8. 

29 NRP, p. 36. 

30 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Situation Report #23, Sept. 6, 2005, 6 p.m., pp. 1, 21. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FRNT-0001-0001609, 0001629.

31 Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan, p. ESF-15–3.

32 Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan, pp. ESF-15–1, ESF-15–2.

33 Committee staff interview of Denise Bottcher, Press Secretary, Offi ce of the Governor, LA, conducted on Jan. 9, 2006, 

transcript. p. 22.

34 NRP, p. 36.

35 FEMA, DHS/FEMA Initial Response Hotwash: Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, New Orleans, Feb. 13, 2006, pp. 27-30.

36 Written Statement of Richard Skinner, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, for the U.S. 

Senate, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Recommendations for Reforms, Mar. 8, 2006, p. 17 (“Both federal and Louisiana 

offi cials felt they could have provided a more positive and unifi ed image to the press and the public had they combined 

their eff orts from the beginning.”).

37 Brian Th evenot, “Myth-Making in New Orleans,” American Journalism Review, Dec./Jan. 2006. www.ajr.org/Article.

asp?id=3998. Accessed on Feb. 8, 2006.

38 Susannah Rosenblatt and James Rainey, “Katrina Rumors,” Th e Los Angeles Times, Sept. 27, 2005. http://www.latimes.

com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-rumors27sep27,0,3794602.story?coll=la-home-headlines. Accessed on Mar.13, 

2006; Mayor C. Ray Nagin, Th e Oprah Winfrey Show, NBC, “Inside the Katrina Catastrophe,” Sept. 6, 2005, http://www.

oprah.com/tows/pastshows/200509/tows_past_20050906.jhtml. Accessed on Mar. 30, 2006.

39 Susannah Rosenblatt and James Rainey, “Katrina Rumors, Th e Los Angeles Times, Sept. 27, 2005”; Eddie Compass, Th e Oprah Winfrey Show, “Inside the Katrina Catastrophe,” Sept. 6, 2005. http://www.oprah.com/tows/

slide/200509/20050906/slide_20050906_102.jhtml. Accessed on Mar. 30, 2006.

40 Susannah Rosenblatt and James Rainey, “Katrina Rumors, Th e Los Angeles Times, Sept. 27, 2005”; Guy Dinmore, 

“City of Rape, Rumour and Recrimination: Inside New Orleans,” Financial Times, London Edition, Sept. 5, 2005, p. 7. 

Accessed on LexisNexis.

41 Robert E. Pierre and Ann Gerhart, “News of Pandemonium May Have Slowed Aid,” Th e Washington Post, Oct. 5, 
Protecting Infrastructure; Public Communication; Role of the Media

329

2005, p. A08.

42 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, HSOC Spot Report #53, Sept. 1, 2005, 10:15 p.m. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0055-0007629.

43 Committee staff interview of James Strickland, Team Member, Urban Search and Rescue, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 

25, 2006, transcript p. 91.

44 Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 91.

45 Glick interview, Feb. 3, 2006, p. 59.

46 Committee staff interview of Christopher Guttman-McCabe, Vice President, Regulatory Aff airs, Cellular Telecommunications and Internet Association, conducted on Jan. 24, 2006, transcript p. 25. 

47 Guttman-McCabe interview, Jan. 24, 2006 p. 25.

48 NRP, p. PUB–2, PUB–6.

49 NRP, p. ESF-15–1.

50 FEMA, “Evacuees Cautioned Not To Re-Enter Damage Areas Prematurely,” press release, Aug. 30, 2005. http://www.

fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=18488. Accessed on Mar. 9, 2006. Under the NRP and LA EOP, federal and state 

offi cials must adhere to responsibilities in emergency-response plans with respect to “immediate and continuing dissemination of health and safety instruction” and “to inform people about the threat from natural ... emergencies.” NRP, 

PUB–6; Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan, p. 15–1.

51 Committee staff interview of Nicol Andrews, Deputy Director, Public Aff airs, FEMA, conducted on Nov. 18, 2005, 

transcript pp. 13-14. 

52 Andrews interview, Nov. 18, 2005, pp. 13-17.

53 Andrews interview, Nov. 18, 2005, pp. 9, 24-25.

54 Andrews interview, Nov. 18, 2005, pp. 16-17.

55 Committee staff interview of Th omas Bossert, Deputy Director, Legislative Aff airs, FEMA, conducted on Dec. 20, 

2005, transcript p. 98. 

56 Ken Kerschbaumer, “Broadcasters Seek Better Emergency Alert System,” Broadcasting and Cable, Sept. 12, 2005. 

http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/CA6255755.html?display=Search+Results&text=kerschbaumer. Accessed on 

Apr. 17, 2006. It is all the more important that emergency responders have plans to activate the EAS and exercise those 

plans so that the EAS is actually used, because Congress made a signifi cant commitment to EAS when it authorized up 

to $156 million in funding “to implement a unifi ed national alert system capable of alerting the public, on a national, 

regional, or local basis to emergency situations by using a variety of communications technologies.” (P.L.109-171) 42 

U.S.C. § 3010.

57 New Orleans Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness, Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, May 2005.
Louisiana Wildlife & Fisheries 

team making a rescue 

FEMA photo
331

Search and Rescue

We would put two offi cers in a boat, one guy to operate the boat and another 

guy with a fl ashlight to give him direction. ... Most of our communication at 

this point is by voice. And they would go out and like I said, it wasn’t any problem to fi nd people, there were people everywhere, people were everywhere, 

every house, people on the porches, people on the roofs, people shouting from 

windows and you would just go to it and load up the people that you could 

take and tell them, We’ll be back for the rest of you. ...

We encountered every kind of medical condition that you can just about imagine, we had diabetics, we had bedridden patients, we had some security issues. 

... And it was constant, I mean it was limitless, you never got a break in the 

number of people you were bringing out.1

— Lt. Col. Keith LaCaze

Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries

Search and Rescue

On the day of Hurricane Katrina’s landfall, rescuers from Louisiana’s Department of 

Wildlife and Fisheries (W&F) didn’t need their standard grid system for searches. 

From every direction, thousands of people on rooft ops were calling for help in the 

dark – that evening, lights from the search-and-rescue boats and helicopters were the city’s 

only source of illumination.2

W&F would bring the rescuees back to one of three staging areas on highway overpasses. 

By 1 a.m. Tuesday, hundreds were massed at these locations, reaching capacity. By Tuesday 

aft ernoon, W&F alone had rescued 1,500 people.3

Federal, State, and Local Rescuers Saved Thousands of Lives

Federal, state, and local offi cials combined to rescue over 60,000 people aft er landfall.4

Federal

FEMA is the federal government’s lead agency for Emergency Support Function 9 (ESF-9, 

Search and Rescue) under the National Response Plan (NRP),5

 but during Katrina, some 

perceived the Coast Guard to have been the lead federal agency for search and rescue 

(SAR).6

 Th e Coast Guard rescued over 33,000 people.7 Th e U.S. Department of Defense 

(DOD), which deployed in support of the Coast Guard, rescued 2,911 people.8

 FEMA rescued over 6,000 people.9

FEMA’s Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) teams comprise state and local teams that 

FEMA contracted to assist the federal government during an emergency. In exchange for 

funding from FEMA for training and equipment, state and local search-and-rescue teams 

agree to be deployed by FEMA when needed. Th ere are 28 such teams around the country, 

many associated with local fi re departments. Th e men and women on these teams are themselves the fi rst responders for disasters in their own communities. When FEMA deploys 

them, they become federal assets and, therefore, no longer state or local fi rst responders.10

Chapter 21
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332

State

Th e Louisiana W&F is the state’s lead agency for ESF-9.11 W&F and out-of-state agencies 

rescued about 21,000 people trapped in the greater New Orleans area aft er landfall.12 Th e 

Louisiana National Guard, which supported W&F under ESF-9, rescued another 9,313 

people.13

Local

Th e New Orleans Fire Department (NOFD) and New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) 

offi cers – the exact number is unknown – worked with little rest in the fi rst week aft er landfall, even as their own families remained trapped or were evacuated.14 NOFD is the City of 

New Orleans’ lead agency for SAR; the NOPD supported NOFD.15

Hurricane Katrina Confi rmed What Hurricane Pam Had Predicted: 

Decimated Local Responders

Hurricane Katrina confi rmed what Hurricane Pam predicted: many local fi rst responders had been incapacitated and thrown into disarray by the severe hurricane. Th e section 

on SAR in the plan that grew out of Hurricane Pam stated: “Parish resources in the most 

severely impacted areas will not be available for several weeks or even months, as they were 

not removed from the area prior to the storm.”16 But even if Hurricane Pam predicted 

that Parish resources would not be available, William Lokey, FEMA’s Federal Coordinating Offi cer (FCO), the organization’s lead offi cer in Louisiana, who was stationed in Baton 

Rouge before landfall, pointed out that Hurricane Pam “did not envision the number of fi rst 

responders in New Orleans that would become disaster victims and would not be available 

to take part in that plan.”17

Pam’s conclusion that parish resources wouldn’t be available for weeks, if not months, may 

have derived from the city’s inadequate preparedness for search and rescue. For example, 

the NOFD owned no boats;18 the NOPD owned only fi ve.19 Although the NOFD was well 

trained in USAR and incident command, it had no training in water SAR.20 Th e NOFD had 

applied in 2005 to DHS for water USAR training, even lining up an instructor, but DHS 

denied its application.21 In the absence of boats and water SAR training, NOFD and NOPD 

offi cers had to commandeer and hot-wire boats to improvise rescue missions.22

Finally, the Hurricane Pam exercise predicted that a similar hurricane in real life would 

“result in fl ooding of many roads, limiting access into many areas until fl ood waters subside.”23 Such a warning required readiness for air and water rescue; specifi cally, Hurricane 

Pam called for 20,000 boat-based rescues and about 1,000 helicopter rescues.24 Emergency 

planners at all levels of government should have realized that large-scale search-and-rescue 

operations would be likely if a major hurricane struck New Orleans.25

Responders Prepare for the Storm

Although the search-and-rescue teams who deployed aft er landfall performed heroically, 

two agencies stand out, the U.S. Coast Guard and the Louisiana W&F.

U.S. Coast Guard

In general, the Coast Guard performed exemplary work in its search-and-rescue missions. 

Several factors may explain why: (1) pre-positioning of assets close enough to be useful 

on Monday, August 29, the day of landfall, but still out of harm’s way;26 (2) training and 

equipment for water missions; (3) an organizational culture that encourages personnel to 
Search and Rescue

333

respond proactively;27 (4) a familiarity with incident response generally and the Incident 

Command System specifi cally throughout the entire organization; 28 and (5) a long-term 

presence in the aff ected areas, promoting familiarity with the region and working relationships with state and local agencies.29

Th e Coast Guard’s Eighth District, which covers 26 states, is headquartered in New Orleans.30 Th e Coast Guard Air Station in New Orleans, like all the Coast Guard units along 

the Gulf Coast, exercises its hurricane plans several times each season.31 In New Orleans, 

the Coast Guard exercises regularly with other state and local agencies and in particular has 

worked closely with the boat forces of the Louisiana W&F.32 Pre-landfall, the Coast Guard 

placed liaisons at both the state Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Baton Rouge and 

at the New Orleans Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness.33

A key factor in the Coast Guard’s rapid reaction is that, unlike FEMA, the Coast Guard sees 

itself as a fi rst responder.34 Prior to landfall, based on the forecasted intensity of the storm, 

the Coast Guard decided to move its headquarters to its alternate site in St. Louis, Missouri,35 and to use its alternate incident-command post in Alexandria, Louisiana,36 approximately 200 miles away. Th e Coast Guard evacuated personnel and their family members37

from the direct path of the storm and pre-positioned personnel and assets north, east, and 

west of the predicted track, but close enough to maintain its ability to return them to the 

aff ected area.38

As a result, the Coast Guard was able to begin search-and-rescue missions by 2:50 p.m. on 

the day of landfall. Th e winds were still consistently 45-50 knots (about 52 to 58 m.p.h.) 

strong39 when a rescue swimmer named Laurence Nettles was lowered by helicopter and 

navigated his way through tree limbs to rescue a four-month-old infant, her mother and 

grandmother, and their pet dog in Plaquemines Parish.40 Of the more than 33,000 rescues the 

Coast Guard completed, 12,500 made use of helicopters.41 Th is was far more than the Hurricane Pam prediction of 21,000 total rescues, of which 1,000 would be helicopter rescues.42

Within the fi rst few days, about 40 percent of the Coast Guard’s national helicopter fl eet converged on the Gulf Coast to assist in search and rescue and air delivery of food and water.43

Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries

While the Coast Guard served as the primary source of air SAR, the Louisiana W&F was 

the primary source of water SAR, and performed equally admirably. Like the Coast Guard, 

W&F offi cers, trained for water-rescue missions, were adequately equipped, had pre-positioned search-and-rescue assets close enough to be useful on the day of landfall, and were 

composed of men and women familiar with the aff ected area and other federal, state, and 

local agencies involved. 

On Monday, W&F transported 60 boats to New Orleans from their pre-staged areas, and by 

4 p.m. that day launched the boats from one of three staging areas strategically located on 

high ground throughout the city.44 W&F also received assistance from the Louisiana National 

Guard, which had pre-deployed boats and helicopters in and outside of New Orleans.45

Shortcomings in the Preparation and Support for the SAR Missions

All levels of government could have provided far better support for these heroes and the 

people they rescued. Inadequate planning, preparation, and support compromised the SAR 

missions, and should be drastically improved for future catastrophes. 

Prior to Katrina, the NRP considered SAR to focus primarily, if not entirely, on SAR in collapsed structures.46 Th e NRP refl ects this belief by titling the mission as Urban Search and 

Rescue (USAR) and by requiring FEMA, rather than some other agency, to act as the lead 

agency for ESF-9. However, Katrina required search-and-rescue eff orts not only in urban 
Chapter 21

334

collapsed structures but also in a water environment. U.S. Coast Guard Vice Admiral Vivean Crea acknowledged that the federal response plan should be capable of covering more 

than one type of search and rescue.47

Pre-positioning of Search-and-Rescue Assets: Local and State 

Despite the success of the U.S. Coast Guard and the W&F in pre-positioning search-andrescue assets, similar eff orts by other agencies at the state and local levels failed in very 

basic ways. 

Because New Orleans lacked enough boats, complying with the NOFD Emergency Operations Plan required many NOFD offi cers to pre-position their personal boats.48

Although W&F pre-positioned search-and-rescue assets both within and on the outskirts 

of the aff ected areas, the Louisiana National Guard pre-positioned its boats and high water 

vehicles primarily at Jackson Barracks, which fl ooded when the Industrial Canal levee broke 

and fl ooded the Lower Ninth Ward. Th e fl oodwaters rendered many of the boats and high 

water vehicles unusable on the day of landfall.49 As many witnesses said, a hurricane’s precise landfall and impact are diffi cult to predict.50 Nonetheless, placing a key element of local 

fi rst response at Jackson Barracks, one of the lowest points in the city, was not an exercise in 

prudent planning.

Pre-positioning of Search-and-Rescue Assets: Federal

Although the Coast Guard successfully pre-staged search-and-rescue assets, FEMA did 

not.51 FEMA pre-staged only three search-and-rescue teams in Shreveport, LA, and only 

two in Meridian, MS.52

FEMA offi cials point out that FEMA is not a fi rst responder for disasters,53 but its modest 

pre-landfall deployment is still hard to understand, considering that the Pam exercise had 

revealed a critical need for immediate search-and-rescue capability. FEMA did activate 16 

additional search-and-rescue teams, but not until Tuesday, August 30, the day aft er landfall. 

(It activated 10 more the following day.)54 FEMA Federal Coordinating Offi cer (FCO) William Lokey told the Committee that FEMA did not pre-stage more search-and-rescue teams 

because the state did not request additional teams before landfall.55 But Lokey reasonably 

should have known, from FEMA’s participation in the Hurricane Pam exercise, that the 

state and locals’ search-and-rescue capabilities would need to be supplemented in the event 

of a catastrophic storm – which Lokey recognized Katrina to be.56 Th e state did not request 

additional search-and-rescue teams, and FEMA failed to off er them.

Th at FEMA pre-staged three teams in Shreveport, approximately 340 miles away from New 

Orleans, contributed to the delay.57 Th e teams left Shreveport for Baton Rouge on Monday, 

August 29, moving to the greater New Orleans area only late that night.58 As a result, they 

were not able to begin rescuing people until Tuesday morning,59 whereas the other federal, 

state, and local operations began search and rescue Monday aft ernoon, as soon as the storm 

died down.60

FEMA Lacked Water-Rescue Capabilities

“Water rescue is not part of the USAR mission,” Lokey testifi ed before the Committee.61

Indeed, when FEMA search-and-rescue teams arrived in New Orleans, they did not have 

boats.62 Instead, the FEMA teams joined boats operated by volunteers or other agencies.63

Although most of the 28 teams FEMA could tap for search and rescue lacked a water-rescue 

capability,64 FEMA was able to acquire eight teams in California that did possess that training.65 FEMA should have pre-staged teams trained in water rescue given that catastrophic 

post-storm fl ooding was anticipated. Some have argued that FEMA should have search-
Search and Rescue

335

and-rescue teams designed for a water environment, as drowning accounts for 90 percent 

of deaths in hurricanes.66 However, Lokey said that FEMA teams do not arrive on the scene 

quickly enough for it to make sense to equip and train them for those kinds of searches,67

even though long-term planning and training for water rescue would have obviated the 

need for on-the-scene equipping and training. Some have suggested that it might be worthwhile for FEMA teams to have some basic training and equipment for working in a fl ooded 

environment (e.g., life jackets), while more serious water rescue should be left to the states 

and the Coast Guard.68 Some have said FEMA cannot support water rescue under the current budget and would require additional funding.69 FEMA was ill-equipped to carry out its 

ESF-9 obligation in a setting that was anything but a surprise. 

Beyond an initial training course in 2000, FEMA’s Red, White, and Blue Incident Support 

Teams (ISTs), which coordinate and manage the search-and-rescue missions, received no 

training.70

Communications Failures 

Almost immediately aft er landfall, communications for the SAR personnel at all levels of 

government failed to one degree or another. Storm damage rendered many communications systems inoperable while heavy traffi c stalled others. Each agency had unique challenges, suff ering from communications that were neither operable nor interoperable. 

Indeed, these widespread communications failures contributed mightily to the failures of 

coordination among search-and-rescue agencies, which we address below.71

Communications Failures: Local

Th e fi re and police departments’ communications suff ered from both inoperability and lack 

of interoperability. 

Th e NOFD and NOPD were supposed to operate on an 800 megahertz system, but storm 

damage forced them to switch to their contingency plan: the mutual-aid channel, used by all 

fi rst responders in the area. Th e mutual-aid channel required each offi cer to wait his or her 

turn, sometimes for 20 minutes, before speaking. NOFD used the mutual-aid channel until 

Th ursday, September 1. NOPD used it until Saturday, September 3.72

Although the mutual-aid channel was operational, NOFD offi cers could not transmit to certain parts of the city because of its limited range. As a result, NOFD offi cers essentially had 

to play the children’s game “Operator”: An NOFD offi cer would hear offi cer A trying to talk 

to offi cer B, and would relay A’s message to B, if B was within the eavesdropper’s range.73

Communications Failures: State

Th e Department of Wildlife and Fisheries also suff ered from unique communications failures. W&F set up three operations centers strategically located around New Orleans. However, its offi cers could not communicate by radio with the boats carrying out SAR missions, 

requiring the operations centers to dispatch “runners” to deliver messages.74 (Th e boats, 

in turn, had trouble communicating with National Guard and Coast Guard helicopters.) 

Ultimately, the operations centers were able to make contact using walkie-talkies purchased 

from a local sporting-goods store.75

Aft er years of research, a Deputy Superintendent of Louisiana State Police in 2004, and 

again in January 2005, presented to the state and federal governments a detailed, $105 million proposal for interoperability infrastructure.76 According to W&F witnesses, the plan 

might well have avoided the communications failures between offi cials in Baton Rouge and 

New Orleans, as well as the communications among agencies, by bringing all state and local 

offi cials’ radio communications onto the same network.77
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336

Communications Failures: Federal

Communication capabilities for the Coast Guard varied, both by time and by unit. Although the UHF radio frequency used by Coast Guard helicopters to communicate at a 

local and unit level continued to work well aft er Katrina, VHF frequencies typically used 

to communicate with the Coast Guard and other emergency responders by outside entities 

(boaters, hospitals, etc.) were cluttered, and frequently overloaded.78

Coast Guard pilots also reported diffi culty communicating with their bases, including the 

Coast Guard Air Station in New Orleans, which returned to limited operational status on 

Monday aft ernoon, August 29. Th ey estimated that only 40 percent of their communication attempts with bases were successful.79 Th ey were attempting to reach the Coast Guard 

Air Station in New Orleans, Baton Rouge, and other bases by using other aircraft , including 

a Coast Guard C-130 surveying oil rigs in the Gulf of Mexico and a Customs and Border 

Protection P-3 AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System), as mobile communications-relay platforms. Th ese planes would patch calls through to Coast Guard bases, since 

most ground infrastructure was not operational. 

Some Coast Guard personnel were able to use personal cell phones to relay information to 

other Coast Guard offi ces, at least initially. But as the infrastructure for cell phone service 

began failing, this means of communication had to be abandoned.80

Th e Coast Guard should have been better prepared for an anticipated breakdown in communications infrastructure. While not initially deployed for that purpose, aircraft such 

as the C-130 and P-3 AWACS proved useful in relaying communications. More thought 

should be given to determining whether this or other temporary means of communication 

should be used in other large-scale incidents like Katrina. 

Unifi ed Command – Coordination of Search-and-Rescue Missions

While many individuals went to heroic lengths to rescue victims, their eff orts would have 

been far more eff ective if agency eff orts were better coordinated. Offi cials from nearly every 

search-and-rescue agency told Committee staff that they lacked basic maps of the area.81

At one point, state and local offi cials tore maps out of telephone books, so that out-of-state 

search-and-rescue teams could have some sense of where they were going.82 However, high 

fl oodwaters in New Orleans hid street signs from view,83 complicating their eff orts.

Eff orts by DOD and the National Guard to coordinate the airborne search-and-rescue mission by dividing up the city84 are discussed below.

Th e lack of coordination had several signifi cant consequences. Agencies searched areas 

without knowing whether those areas already had been searched by others.85 Th e agencies 

in boats were mostly unable to coordinate with the National Guard or the Coast Guard 

to request helicopters if victims needed to be airlift ed.86 Finally, the lack of coordination 

prevented food, water, and other critical needs from reaching the rescuees gathered at the 

search-and-rescue collection sites.87

According to Captain Tim Bayard, the lack of coordination at the local level, resulted 

from a lack of planning, direction, and leadership from the City of New Orleans’ Offi ce of 

Emergency Preparedness (OEP) and inoperable communications.88 For example, the NOPD 

decided the day before landfall to set up a command post from the trunk of a car and at picnic tables outside of Harrah’s Casino, but Captain Bayard did not know where the mobile 

command center for the city’s OEP was.89

Although W&F was the lead state agency for the search-and-rescue mission, it failed to 

establish itself as a leader for other state and local agencies involved in search and rescue.90
Search and Rescue

337

Th is is likely due in part to the lack of communications capability and how overwhelmed 

W&F offi cials were.

At the federal level, FEMA did not establish a local command site for search and rescue 

either before or on the day of landfall.91 On Monday, the FEMA teams had no plan for a 

base of operations in the greater New Orleans area. Th ey ultimately settled on the parking 

lot at a Sam’s Club in Jeff erson Parish.92 On Tuesday, FEMA moved its command to Zephyr 

Field, the New Orleans Saints’ practice fi eld in Jeff erson Parish,93 but by this time both W&F 

and the Louisiana National Guard had already established their own local command posts 

elsewhere.94 Under the NRP, federal and state governments were supposed to establish a 

unifi ed command for search and rescue,95 but both levels of government failed to achieve 

that objective.96 Poor communications capabilities aft er landfall exacerbated the challenge of 

coordination between state and federal agencies. W&F and FEMA did not establish a unifi ed 

command for search and rescue until Wednesday, two days aft er landfall, at Zephyr Field.97

Although there was no unifi ed command for search and rescue in New Orleans, there is 

some evidence of a stronger coordination eff ort made for federal, state, and local searchRescue boats, New Orleans 

U.S.Coast Guard photo
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and-rescue resources at the EOC in Baton Rouge, according to the U.S. Coast Guard Search 

and Rescue Controller Valerie Boyd assigned to Baton Rouge. She said that the Coast 

Guard, FEMA, W&F, the Louisiana National Guard and others formed a joint search-andrescue task force at the state EOC on Sunday, August 28.98 Th e task force met twice a day 

over the next two weeks, to try to coordinate the joint search-and-rescue response. Agencies 

there would update surface and aviation asset spreadsheets on a daily basis, and the Louisiana State Police would provide search-and-rescue case information coming into the EOC 

via the 911 system to the Coast Guard, who would triage cases to the extent practicable, and 

convert street addresses to latitude and longitude coordinates.99 Th e Coast Guard would 

then pass along the triaged cases and coordinate, but not direct, any other search-and-rescue assets.100

No Plan for Ground Transportation to Evacuate People from USAR Collection Points

As noted earlier, ground transportation arrived in the greater New Orleans area unnecessarily late. Th e absence of planning for ground transportation by the federal and state governments contributed to the appalling conditions at the Superdome, the Convention Center, 

the I-10 overpasses, and other search-and-rescue collection sites. 

Inadequate Resources

Louisiana National Guard Brigadier General Brod Veillon testifi ed: “We are a force of 

11,000 people, and so ... you can’t handle this size of a catastrophe. ... [Th e Emergency 

Mutual Assistance Compact (EMAC)] is designed to compensate for that,”101 and “parallel 

to [her use of EMAC] the Governor made the call to the President for DOD assets.”102

As described earlier, the NOFD and NOPD lacked critical watercraft . For nearly a decade, 

successive New Orleans mayors have imprudently denied NOFD funding requests for 

watercraft .103

Aft er landfall, bureaucracy continued to impede essential relief.104

W&F pre-staged the roughly 200 boats at its disposal and deployed them in staggered 

phases throughout the storm. But many of those boats were small; FEMA denied requests 

for larger rubber raft s105 because, according to FEMA’s lead offi cial in Louisiana, the rubber 

raft s would not have been strong enough to maneuver in water fi lled with debris.106 Lieutenant Colonel Keith LaCaze with W&F disagreed, claiming that the raft s would have been 

valuable – particularly in the early days – either for maneuvering in very shallow water near 

doors and windows or in saving additional trips to collection sites by collecting rescuees in 

rubber raft s that could be towed behind regular boats.107 At a minimum, FEMA’s denial of 

the request is an example of the organization’s failure to follow its own principle of letting 

those closest to the situation determine how best to meet needs. 

DHS was slow to deploy equipment pods that contained standardized equipment to sustain 

or replenish up to 150 fi rst responders. DHS pre-positions these pods at strategic locations 

nationwide in order that they can arrive at a disaster site within 4 to 12 hours.108 However, 

DHS waited until at least two days aft er landfall to advise either Mississippi or Louisiana 

of their availability.109 Th us, nearly a week aft er landfall, the equipment pods were still en 

route.110 DHS offi cial Matt Mayer, who was in charge of these pods,111 acknowledged that 

DHS “made a mistake” and should have deployed these pods earlier.112 Captain Fincher of 

the NOFD bemoaned the fact that he and other fi rst responders did not have these equipment pods earlier since they contained assets that would have been very useful to the NOFD 

offi cers: an 18-wheeler full of “turn-out clothes, breathing apparatus, search and rescue 

cameras, ... hazardous material equipment, ... communications system, [and] ... decontamination set-ups.”113
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339

On the day before landfall, the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) off ered two teams 

of law-enforcement offi cers to FEMA. Th ese offi cers would have proved highly valuable, 

when security concerns later in the week undermined FEMA’s search-and-rescue eff ort. But 

FEMA did not make use of those teams,114 and Lokey, FEMA’s FCO in Louisiana, testifi ed 

that he was unaware of the off er.115

In its response to the Committee’s interrogatories, DOI stated that “In the immediate aft ermath of the hurricane, DOI delivered to FEMA a comprehensive list of its deployable assets 

that were immediately available for humanitarian and emergency assistance,” including 300 

boats and 400 law-enforcement offi cers.116 However, DOI’s Emergency Coordinator, Laurence Broun, later told the Committee that DOI, in fact, did not send the list to FEMA and 

instead sent the list to the White House Homeland Security Council, not “in the immediate 

aft ermath of the hurricane,” but on Saturday, September 3, fi ve days aft er landfall. Broun 

does not know if the White House ever sent the list to FEMA,117 and Lokey was unaware of 

the off er.118

Emergency Mutual Assistance Compact 

In addition to designating the W&F as the lead state agency for search and rescue, the Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan specifi es that W&F is to seek assistance through EMAC, 

if W&F’s capabilities are overwhelmed.119 W&F witnesses testifi ed that the agency would 

have benefi ted from a request for additional SAR resources from other state governments 

through the EMAC process before, rather than aft er, landfall. Lokey specifi cally advised 

Colonel Jeff Smith, the Acting Deputy Director for Emergency Preparedness at LOHSEP, to 

use EMAC to get swift -water rescue teams from California because Lokey knew that California had robust water-rescue capabilities.120 Neither Lokey nor Col. Smith realized until 

Louisiana couple and dog rescued

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the day of landfall or just the day before that California was not a signatory to EMAC.121

Ultimately, FEMA and W&F operated outside the EMAC channels to request this assistance. FEMA was able to bring in eight California swift -water teams on August 30, because 

they happened to be embedded in an organization with which FEMA had contracts for its 

USAR program.122

In contrast to W&F, the Louisiana National Guard placed EMAC requests pre-landfall. Th e 

National Guard asked for helicopters from Arkansas, which approved the request before 

landfall.123 Moreover, Bennett Landreneau, the Adjutant General of Louisiana, testifi ed 

before the House Select Bipartisan Katrina Committee that the Louisiana National Guard 

knew “immediately” that its resources would be overwhelmed and consequently sought 

other assistance through EMAC.124 Forty-eight states and four territories provided requested assistance.

W&F also encountered bureaucratic diffi culties in making EMAC requests. Some states 

could not comply immediately because they were uncertain whether they had proper authorization.125 W&F Secretary Dwight Landreneau testifi ed that it would be helpful to have 

a list of all assets available from each state so that states in need could call on that help more 

effi ciently.126 Notably, it was by chance that Lokey was able to advise Louisiana about which 

states had water rescue teams that it could request through EMAC. Lokey, due to his prior 

experience with the National Urban Search and Rescue Program,127 advised Col. Smith to 

reach out to California and a few other states that he knew had water–rescue capabilities.128

No standardized list of such teams exists for state emergency managers.

Managing and Utilizing Volunteers 

Volunteers, who started to arrive as early as Monday evening, proved a great benefi t to the 

search-and-rescue mission in its fi rst days. Many provided boats to transport FEMA and 

other personnel to conduct search-and-rescue missions129 when only other agencies’ boats 

were available. 

At the same time, some volunteers were not well-prepared for water search and rescue. For 

instance, some of the boats were too big to navigate fl ooded streets in New Orleans. Moreover, the Louisiana W&F required volunteers to have food, water, fuel, and life jackets; many 

didn’t and were turned away.130 Several volunteers – as well as some out of state offi cers 

– were unfamiliar with the city.131 Finally, the Department could not handle the numbers of 

volunteers: one day as many as 200 volunteers showed up but could not be eff ectively used 

because “about half of them did not have the equipment that was necessary to help.”132

Security Risks

On Monday evening, aft er W&F offi cers reported sounds of gunfi re, one NOFD team 

aborted its SAR mission, though it eventually returned to its post.133 Tensions continued to 

run high in the area, but did not escalate until Th ursday, when media – at times incorrectly 

– reported widespread looting and violence.134

On Th ursday, FEMA ordered its search-and-rescue missions in New Orleans to stop for 

the entire day and pull back to Zephyr Field until more security arrived.135 Captain Patrick 

Lampard of the NOFD recalled that as these teams began to pull back, they recommended 

that the NOFD also withdraw due to the security concerns. Based on this recommendation, 

Capt. Lampard decided to pull back his NOFD teams that day as well,136 although some 

NOFD offi cers ignored the command.137

Although no other search-and-rescue witnesses have said that conditions on Th ursday were 

such that they would have stopped their mission,138 the need for security might very well 

have been legitimate,139 and the rapid deployment of additional law-enforcement offi cers 
Search and Rescue

341

would have been helpful, as shown in Chapter 25 on Public Safety and Security. Also, at 

least one FEMA search-and-rescue team member has recommended that FEMA searchand-rescue teams might have been able to continue their work if they deployed with force 

protection.140

Also, in some cases, search-and-rescue teams met resistance from residents who refused to 

leave their homes, despite the devastation.141 It was only on September 10 that the Department of Justice gave federal agents permission to use force to enter buildings to rescue 

remaining victims.142

Mississippi

Pre-Storm Planning

In Mississippi, the state emergency plan puts SAR operations in the hands of the Mississippi 

Emergency Management Agency (MEMA), with support from other state agencies.143 Hurricane Katrina SAR operations were conducted along the Mississippi Gulf Coast by local 

fi rst responders, state-sourced SAR personnel, the Coast Guard, rescue teams provided by 

FEMA, and teams from other states. Jim Brinson of the State Offi ce of Homeland Security 

directed SAR operations from the State Emergency Operations Center in Jackson and, later, 

from the Gulf Coast.144

Mississippi planning provides that local fi rst responders – especially fi re-department 

personnel and sheriff s (who are the presumptive incident commanders for their respective counties under the state plan) – have initial responsibility for SAR operations.145 For 

large-scale disasters requiring outside resources, the plan points to four sources: (1) Mississippi personnel and equipment secured by MEMA from other areas of the state; (2) federal 

assets sourced by FEMA; (3) resources from other states via the EMAC; and (4) Mississippi 

National Guard support.146 Brinson did not consult the state emergency plan to review these 

options, but the SAR response to Katrina involved signifi cant aid from each source, and appeared consistent with the plan. 

Th e identifi cation and staging of SAR assets began on August 27, before landfall. Within 

two days, MEMA had identifi ed 19 teams consisting of rescue personnel from throughout 

the state.147 In addition, FEMA pre-deployed USAR teams on August 27 to the Meridian 

Naval Air Station in east-central Mississippi, near the Alabama border, approximately 140 

miles from the Gulf Coast; fi rst to arrive were task forces from Ohio and Indiana, later 

augmented by teams from other states and additional FEMA USAR teams.148 Meanwhile, 

local fi rst responders had pre-positioned equipment like fi re trucks and rescue vehicles in 

anticipation of the storm.

On August 28 and 29, SAR teams and equipment continued to arrive. Th ese included 

FEMA teams, which were staged in Meridian, Mississippi, and in Florida before landfall.149

Fire fi ghters and fi rst responders from other Mississippi counties awaited the storm at the 

State Fire Academy in Pearl, near the state capital of Jackson.150 EMAC teams from Florida 

formed up and awaited direction from MEMA.151 In addition, Mississippi National Guard 

elements staged at Camp Shelby, near Hattiesburg, approximately 65 miles north of Gulfport and, to a lesser degree, along the three coastal counties. 

Search-and-Rescue Operations Post-Landfall 

Hurricane Katrina overwhelmed local SAR responders, who faced fl ooding, impassable 

debris fi elds, obliterated roads, and vast areas requiring searches.152 Personnel and equip-
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ment converged on the Gulf Coast late Monday, August 29, and early Tuesday. Coast Guard 

teams began air and water SAR missions on August 29. 

Th e level of devastation Katrina infl icted on the Gulf Coast posed a huge challenge for 

rescuers. Oft en, roads were impassable and had to be cleared before rescuers were able to 

start SAR operations. Rescuers sometimes could not wait for the roads to be cleared. For 

example, the White Cypress subdivision in northern Hancock County, the westernmost 

county on the Mississippi Gulf Coast, and its 200 residents were completely cut off by fallen 

trees. Rescuers had to be airlift ed into the area while forestry teams were still working to 

reopen roads.153

Rescuers faced debris piles that were oft en two to three stories high and as many as four 

blocks wide. Th e debris extended all along the Mississippi Gulf Coast and stretched inland 

several hundred yards in some places, to four miles in others. Th e debris fi eld itself was 

extraordinarily hazardous. It contained not only the remains of houses, buildings, and 

automobiles, but also hazards such as chemical spills and gas leaks. In Gulfport, the hurricane had destroyed a number of containers at the port holding chicken carcasses and pork 

bellies intended for export, and scattered the contents along the coast. Th is put thousands 

of decomposing chickens where SAR operations were later to take place. As Pat Sullivan, 

Gulfport’s Fire Chief, aptly summarized, it was “an impossible situation.”154

In part because communication was so diffi cult along the Gulf Coast, MEMA decided to 

headquarter state, federal, and EMAC search-and-rescue operations in Harrison County, 

the geographically central and most populous coastal county, while local responders 

remained deployed along the coast.155 For SAR purposes, the Mississippi Gulf Coast was 

divided into three areas: Jackson/George Counties, with Jackson County easternmost on the 

coast and George to its north; Harrison/Stone Counties, with Harrison central on the coast 

and Stone to its north; and Hancock/Pearl River Counties, with Hancock County westernmost on the coast and Pearl River to its north. Maps and grids helped ensure that areas were 

searched in a coordinated, methodical manner.156

Various offi cials in Mississippi reported good coordination among local, state, federal, and 

EMAC resources.157

Rescue teams combined Mississippi and out-of-state personnel to mix local knowledge with 

the specialized equipment and training available to federal and state teams, as Jim Brinson, 

the SAR coordinator, described: 

You know, somebody from New York isn’t real sure what water moccasins and 

alligators do in a severe storm. Th ey get very nasty. My [Mississippi] guys understand this, they live here, they hunt here. And on the fl ip side USAR teams 

are trained to do specifi c things and have specifi c equipment to do search and 

rescue in that type of urban environment that many guys don’t have: robots, 

acoustic mics, fi ber-optic cameras, things like that.158

Offi cials estimate that the teams assisting local fi rst responders consisted of approximately 

550 SAR personnel159 including Mississippi fi rst responders sent by MEMA, 17 FEMA 

rescue and incident-management teams,160 and rescuers from Florida and other states 

sent though the EMAC. Th ese fi gures do not include personnel from the Coast Guard and 

Mississippi National Guard, who fi gured importantly in search-and-rescue operations. For 

example, the Coast Guard rescued and airlift ed 1,700 stranded residents.161 Th e Mississippi 

National Guard provided manpower and engineering support along the Gulf Coast,162 and 

conducted SAR in devastated Hancock County on Mississippi’s western Gulf Coast.163
Search and Rescue

343

Search-and-rescue operations continued for about a week before moving into recovery 

phase.164 

Despite the many challenges SAR teams faced, Mississippi offi cials were generally pleased 

with search-and-rescue eff orts. Th ey praised the hard work and professionalism of the 

FEMA and EMAC teams, and of Mississippi fi rst responders.165

Gulfport Fire Chief Pat Sullivan was eff usive in his praise:

If everything went like the FEMA USAR teams, FEMA would get the academy 

award. ... [Th e] FEMA USAR [urban search and rescue] teams, you can’t say 

enough about what they did and how they did it and [the] equipment they 

brought in and the way that they were here to help you.166

Department of Defense and National Guard Air Search and Rescue

Accumulation of Aircraft

Despite the increased number of military helicopters in the Gulf Coast by the end of the fi rst 

week, the number of helicopters capable of performing search and rescue – the most critical 

of all missions – was still inadequate for the number of victims in need of rescue, leading to 

delays in saving lives and reducing suff ering. 

On Saturday, August 27, two days before Hurricane Katrina made landfall, the Louisiana 

National Guard began to supplement its state inventory of helicopters, requesting four 

CH-47 and two UH-60 helicopters from the National Guard Bureau. Th e helicopters were 

sent from neighboring states through the EMAC system, beginning with two UH-60s from 

Oklahoma, which arrived on Monday.167 By Monday, Army National Guard helicopters 

totaled 15 in Louisiana and 13 in Mississippi.168 As soon as gale-force winds subsided below 

fl ight-restriction levels, on Monday aft ernoon, the helicopters commenced SAR missions, 

continuing through the evening.169 Louisiana and Mississippi had 60 helicopters available 

for this initial response. Th e aircraft and crew fl ew around-the-clock due to the overwhelming number of emergency missions facing them. Additional National Guard aircraft did 

not begin to arrive in numbers until fi ve days aft er landfall.170 By September 8, however, 150 

Army National Guard aircraft were operating in the Joint Operating Area.171

Th e active-duty (Title 10) military involvement in Air SAR began Tuesday evening, with the 

arrival of the amphibious-warfare helicopter carrier USS Bataan (see Chapter 26, Military Operations) carrying three MH-60s and two MH-53s, and continuing with a steady 

buildup of assets through September 8, when the total number of active-duty helicopters 

peaked at 143.172 Th e Bataan had been positioned in the Gulf of Mexico at the conclusion 

of an exercise and, on the orders of the Second Fleet commander, had steamed northward 

toward New Orleans following the storm’s passage. Th e fi rst helicopters launched at 5 p.m. 

CT, once the Bataan was in range of the coast.173 Upon landing in New Orleans Tuesday 

evening, the pilots reported to the Coast Guard Air Station commander, who as the designated On-Scene Commander, coordinated all air assets then engaged in search-and-rescue 

missions.174

Aircraft began arriving in greater numbers on Wednesday, August 31, when six Army 

helicopters – three UH-60s and three CH-47s – reported to the Louisiana National Guard 

at the Superdome. Six additional Army helicopters arrived in Baton Rouge from Fort Benning, GA, on Th ursday, September 1, and performed medical evacuation missions in New 

Orleans.175 Five Air Force helicopters from Patrick and Moody Air Force Bases deployed on 

their own authority to Mississippi on Wednesday, performing SAR missions in Hawkins, 
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344

and Gulfport-Biloxi.176 By Friday, 21 Air Force HH-60 helicopters were operating from 

Jackson, MS.177

By the latter half of the week, helicopters from all services had joined the eff orts, including 

Marine utility and heavy lift aircraft from New River, NC; Air Force UH-60s from various 

locations; and Navy SH-60 helicopters from Jacksonville, FL. Many of the Jacksonvillebased aircraft were delayed for several days, however, as the Navy planned to transport 

them aboard ships which would pick them up in Florida on Friday and arrive in the region 

on Sunday. Friday, however, they were ordered to fl y over land to the region, and operate from one of the military bases ashore,178 and were joined by 13 additional Navy aircraft 

fl own in from Naval Air Station North Island in San Diego, CA.179

Th ough FEMA requested at least 45 helicopters from DOD between the day before landfall 

and the day aft er landfall180 – two on Sunday,181 fi ve just past midnight Monday,182 and 38 on 

Tuesday183 – DOD deployed far more, exceeding 45 by Wednesday. Still, according to Army 

personnel, there were no superfl uous aircraft in the fi eld.184 Vice Admiral Vivien Crea, 

Commander of the Coast Guard Atlantic Area, described her visit on “Saturday talking to 

the rescue swimmers, who were talking to me with tears in their eyes and the frustration 

and the fear that they weren’t going to get to everybody on time.” As late as Saturday, she 

said, there were “absolutely not enough assets.”185

And although the total number of military helicopters – active-duty and National Guard 

– reached 293 on September 8, the number does not accurately refl ect the number of assets 

devoted to SAR. Many of the helicopters in the region were not equipped with the hoist 

necessary for SAR, and many were light utility helicopters, without the necessary lift capacity. Others, such as the MH-53s from USS Bataan, are so large that the down-wash from 

their rotors would push a victim underwater, and thus cannot be used for SAR. While these 

aircraft served essential roles in medical evacuation, personnel transport, and logistical missions, hoist-equipped aircraft were a highly valuable asset, and far less numerous. Furthermore, the available SAR-capable aircraft were, at times, tasked with support missions more 

appropriate to the utility aircraft , detracting from the more urgent life-saving mission.186

Lack of Search-and-Rescue Coordination

Although the National Search and Rescue Plan (1999) covers conduct and interagency 

coordination in small-scale SAR operations, no plan exists for large-scale SAR operations 

during a declared disaster. 

Agencies and individuals performed heroically under exhausting, hazardous, and unprecedented circumstances. Yet the lack of an interagency plan to address search strategy, 

planning, and organization, communications, a centralized command structure, air-traffi c 

control, and reception of victims led to hazardous fl ight conditions, ineffi cient employment 

of resources, and protracted waits by victims in need of rescue.

Th e hundreds of aircraft that arrived on the Gulf Coast faced an overwhelming task. From 

throughout the miles upon miles of destruction, the number of distress calls mounted by 

the day, and as SAR crews would fl y to respond to calls, they would oft en pass over many 

more victims in need of rescue.187 Th e aircraft and crews fl ew long and diffi cult hours to the 

point of exhaustion, and at the same time, fl ew in extraordinarily dangerous and confusing 

conditions in congested skies, rescuing thousands of victims from rooft ops, attics, apartments, and overpasses. Th e participants included not just the DOD, National Guard, and 

Coast Guard, but numerous civilian elements such as the DOI, state and local law-enforcement agencies, and commercial entities. Yet in the chaos of Katrina’s aft ermath, no network 
Search and Rescue

345

of coordination linked these resources; even the DOD assets remained under separate and 

changing commands for many days. No common strategy to a thorough and expeditious 

search existed, and no unifi ed air-traffi c control system ensured safety of fl ight. At the root 

of these problems is the fact that the United States lacks an appropriate national plan for 

SAR in large-scale disasters.

Th e National Search and Rescue Plan is a multi-agency plan, agreed to by the DOD, DOI, 

and the Department of Transportation, among other federal agencies, providing guidance “for coordinating civil search-and-rescue (SAR) services to meet domestic needs and 

international commitments.”188 It outlines the roles and responsibilities of various agencies 

in establishing an integrated structure for SAR missions. Although the plan refl ects a consensus rather than doctrine, its intent is to achieve “the eff ective use of all available facilities 

in all types of SAR missions.”189 Perplexingly, however, it expressly does not apply during 

declared emergencies and disasters:

Civil SAR does not include operations such as ... overall response to natural or 

man-made disasters or terrorist incidents; and typical disaster response operations, such as: locating and rescuing victims trapped in collapsed structures or 

other assistance provided under the scope of the Federal Response Plan.190

In a catastrophic disaster, then, there is currently no mechanism for planning SAR operations over extensive areas in both maritime and overland environments, or establishing 

a suffi ciently broad command and control structure to encompass all agencies and assets 

involved. 

Although ESF-9 under the NRP covers USAR – “locating, extricating, and providing onsite 

medical treatment to victims trapped in collapsed structures”191 – it does not address such 

massive eff orts as Katrina, involving the combination of air, surface, and ground eff orts. According to Admiral Crea:

I was surprised by the nebulous nature of the National SAR Plan once I started 

looking at it from the post-Katrina perspective, because as a Coast Guard 

aviator and operator, I had always ... assumed that I could do any search and 

rescue, and certainly in the maritime environment, and I would do it in any 

inland environment if somebody asked me to do it. ... I was surprised when I 

read that it’s more of a not-to-interfere type of a basis. ... I think the maritime 

piece is pretty clear, but I think the inland piece needs a little more structure, 

perhaps.192

Th e lack of an adequate plan for large-scale SAR led to two major shortcomings in DOD’s 

air search-and-rescue missions: inadequate air-traffi c control and poor coordination of 

deployed aircraft .

Rear Admiral Joseph Kilkenny, who reported to Joint Task Force Katrina as the commander of maritime forces, agreed. Considering that an easily imaginable attack with a weapon of 

mass destruction would require a similarly complex SAR response, standardization of SAR 

procedures must become a priority, he said.193 As Second Fleet’s “Lessons Learned” Report 

observed, “An ad hoc grid reference system was established due to lack of awareness of the 

common grid reference system already designed by the U.S. National Search and Rescue 

Supplement.”194 Some regions were missed while others remained unsearched for long periods of time,195 and stranded citizens were still being rescued on September 8, 11 days aft er 

landfall.196
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Because the storm had incapacitated military and civilian air-traffi c control radar systems 

throughout the Gulf Coast, much of the airspace was uncontrolled,197 creating a hazardous 

and ineffi cient situation, with pilots relying simply on a “see-and-avoid” system, without 

the essential tracking or separation normally provided by an Air Traffi c Controller.198 “I am 

amazed at the volume of traffi c that was in that [Area of Responsibility] and there was not a 

mid-air collision,” Rear Admiral Dan Lloyd, a Coast Guard representative at U.S. Northern 

Command (NORTHCOM) said. 199

Coordination was poor because no overarching command existed to assign search sectors, 

communicate with all assets, or direct aircraft to respond to distress calls. Second Fleet 

recommended, “Centralized Command and Control, with subordinate sector command 

and control of air, land, and water-borne assets, in place as soon as possible, will maximize 

safety and capabilities.”200 Th e diff erent services each directed their own aircraft , with the 

structure changing continuously due to the rapid buildup of assets in the operating area 

throughout the fi rst week.

From Tuesday, August 30, to Wednesday, August 31, DOD air assets operated with Coast 

Guard aircraft under the coordination of Coast Guard District Eight.201 Beginning Wednesday, August 31, all DOD air assets were controlled by Admiral Kilkenny, based on USS 

Bataan.

202 Beginning Wednesday, August 31, Army SAR assets reported to the Louisiana 

National Guard, stationed at Eagle Base at the Superdome.203 Beginning late in the week, Air 

Force and other shore-based SAR assets reported to the Joint Force Air Component Commander, who arrived at Camp Shelby, Mississippi, on Th ursday, September 1.204 On SaturSafe on an Interstate island

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day, September 3, Air Force Brigadier General Harold Moulton arrived from NORTHCOM 

to consolidate command and control of all Title 10 SAR units from a mobile headquarters 

unit at Naval Air Station Joint Reserve Base in Belle Chasse.205 Meanwhile, the National 

Guard established their SAR coordination headquarters at Zephyr Field, the New Orleans 

Saints’ practice fi eld in Jeff erson Parish.206

According to the Lessons Learned Report from USS Bataan, the lack of a unifi ed communications system among these numerous authorities further complicated the SAR mission. 

While aircraft communicated with their respective commanders while on the ground, “once 

airborne ... aircraft from all services and the local authorities took tasking via radio calls 

from one another,” rather than from their operating bases.207 Th is ad-hoc tasking system led 

to a lack of an overall strategy, in which victims were oft en deposited at intermediary locations, requiring further transport. Admiral Crea elaborated:

We would take somebody for a Medevac to the airport where they were supposed to be triaged and further evacuated, and that place got saturated. So my 

helicopter would come in ... with a medical patient and be told to hold for a 

half-hour until they could fi t them in. Or in some cases, they were told to fl y to 

Baton Rouge, which is like a 2-hour fl ight. So there we were wasting one helicopter taking one patient all the way to Baton Rouge to drop them off before 

he’d get back. So I think, clearly, with better organization and planning, that 

things could have been divided up into missions and sectors and so forth. Th at 

was just understandably due to the terrible communications and the chaos and 

trying to fi gure out who’s in charge initially, and so forth.208

General Moulton, tasked with instituting a centralized SAR plan, described the “crisis 

mode” of operations he found upon his arrival: 

If you had a helicopter, you fl ew it in, you found somebody on the top of the 

roof, you grabbed them, and you took them to safety. And it appeared from 

our perspective that the procedures for doing that were not developed, were 

not organized. ... And I think sort of by – by routine they started ending up 

dropping people off at certain places.209

With his headquarters at NORTHCOM, and with leaders and representatives of the forces 

already engaged in SAR, he developed a plan to integrate the numerous agencies and their 

hundreds of assets, operating across the air, ground, littoral, and urban environments. Th e 

team assembled on September 5, and the overall intent was to achieve a thorough search of the 

disaster area with all agencies operating on a common strategy and using a common communications network. As described in Chapter 26, large numbers of active-duty military ground 

troops had then arrived, and together with the thousands of National Guard troops, were able 

to conduct the thorough door-to-door searches to ensure that all areas had been covered.

Katrina exposed a signifi cant gap in our nation’s plans for SAR in a catastrophe. Th ousands 

of lives were saved by the heroic eff orts of the pilots, aircrew, and swimmers, together with 

the thousands of personnel operating in boats and on land. From the moment Katrina 

cleared the Gulf Coast, SAR was the primary mission, as decreed by leaders of the response, 

and as refl ected by the actions of the Coast Guard and the National Guard as soon as the 

winds would permit safe fl ight. But it is necessary to harness these eff orts and this heroism 

in a single cohesive plan that would provide all agencies a centralized coordination structure, a unifi ed communications network, restorable air-traffi c control system, and a common search-and-evacuation strategy in order to ensure that in the next large disaster, which 

may occur in an entirely diff erent environment, this primary mission is a collaborative and 

effi cient success. 
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1 Committee staff interview of Lt. Col. Keith LaCaze, Assistant Administrator, Law Enforcement Division, Louisiana 

Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, conducted on Nov. 30, 2005, transcript pp. 51-53.

2 Committee staff interview of Sec. Dwight Landreneau, Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, conducted on 

Nov. 30, 2005, transcript pp. 44-45.

3 Testimony of Lt. Col. Keith LaCaze, Assistant Administrator, Law Enforcement Division, Louisiana Department of 

Wildlife and Fisheries, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on 

Hurricane Katrina: Urban Search and Rescue in a Catastrophe, Jan. 30, 2006 (“Th e number of people evacuated during 

that 36 hour period, in my estimate, would be approximately 1,500 people at the three sites we performed evacuations.”).

4 Testimony of Jeff Smith, Acting Deputy Director, Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP), before the U.S. House, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to 

Hurricane Katrina, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana, Dec. 14, 2005 

(estimating 60,000 people were rescued); Lt. Col. LaCaze, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 30, 2006 (estimating 60,000 

people were rescued); Testimony of Madhu Beriwal, President and Chief Executive Offi cer, IEM, Inc., before the U.S. 

Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Preparing for a Catastrophe: Th e Hurricane Pam Exercise, Jan. 24, 2006 (estimating between 60,000 and 100,000 people were rescued.).

5 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan. Washington: Government Printing Offi ce, Dec. 2004, 

Emergency Support Function Annex, p. ESF #9–1 [hereinaft er NRP].

6 See e.g.: Committee staff interview of James Strickland, Team Member, Urban Search and Rescue, Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA), conducted on Jan. 25, 2006, transcript p. 42 (stating that the Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Plan listed the U.S. Coast Guard as the lead federal agency for search and rescue and then relied on that information).

7 Written Statement of Madhu Beriwal, President and Chief Executive Offi cer, IEM, Inc., for the U.S. Senate, Committee 

on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Preparing for a Catastrophe: Th e Hurricane Pam Exercise, 

Jan. 24, 2006, p. 6. In all, the Coast Guard completed over 12,500 air rescues, 11,500 surface (boat) rescues and 9,400 

hospital evacuations during Katrina. While its air missions garnered much media coverage, it conducted almost half its 

rescues and evacuations by boats. U.S. Coast Guard, Factcard, “Coast Guard Response to Hurricane Katrina.” http://

www.uscg.mil/hq/g-cp/comrel/factfi le/index.htm. Accessed on Apr. 6, 2006.

8 Written Statement of Beriwal, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 24, 2006, p. 6. 

9 Testimony of William Lokey, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, FEMA, before the U.S. 

Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Urban Search and 

Rescue in a Catastrophe, Jan. 30, 2006 (stating that FEMA rescued 6,582 people); Strickland, interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 

86-87 (stating that FEMA rescued around 6,000 people). See also: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Emergencies 

& Disasters, “Hurricane Katrina: What Is Government Doing.” http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/Katrina.htm. 

Accessed on Apr. 11, 2006.

10 Written Statement of William Lokey, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, FEMA, for the 

U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Urban Search 

and Rescue in a Catastrophe, Jan. 30, 2006, pp. 2-3. 

11 LOHSEP, Emergency Operations Plan, Apr. 2005, p. ESF-9–2 [hereinaft er Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan, Apr. 

2005]; Committee staff interview of Maj. Jeff Mayne, Supervisor, Special Investigator Section, and Legislative Liaison, 

Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, conducted on Nov. 30, 2005, transcript p. 10.

12 Lt. Col. LaCaze interview, Nov. 30, 2005, pp. 134-136; Lt. Col. LaCaze, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 30, 2006.

13 Written Statement of Beriwal, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 24, 2006, p. 6 .

14 Committee staff interview of Capt. Paul Hellmers, Engine 18, Second Platoon, Fift h District, New Orleans Fire 

Department, LA, conducted on Nov. 7, 2005, transcript p. 137 (“from our perspective, we were going to stay there for 

weeks or as long as it took, you know? We had no intention of leaving until we were told it’s time to go.”); Capt. Hellmers interview, Nov. 7, 2005, p. 220 (“And by Saturday evening it was painfully clear that this was not going to be like one 

[these] small storms. So, me, I wasn’t the only one. Th ere were other people who were pretty much sure it was going to 

fl ood. I moved as much of my belongings to my second fl oor as I could, tried to save what I could before I went to work. 

Obviously, had I not gone to work, well, I could have saved a lot more of my belongings, but me and most other fi remen 

went to work.”); Testimony of Capt. Timothy Bayard, Commander, Vice Crimes and Narcotics Section, New Orleans 

Police Department, LA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on 

Hurricane Katrina: Urban Search and Rescue in a Catastrophe, Jan. 30, 2006. 

15 New Orleans Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness, Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, May 2005, Appendix 

– Emergency Support Functions, p. 7 (assigning the primary responsibility for Emergency Support Function 9 – search 

and rescue – to the New Orleans Fire Department, and assigning the New Orleans Police Department as a supporting 

agency for search and rescue).

16 Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, prepared by IEM, Inc. for LOHSEP and FEMA, Jan. 2005, p. 65 

[hereinaft er, Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, Jan. 2005].

17 Committee staff interview of William Lokey, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, 

FEMA, conducted on Nov. 4, 2005, transcript p. 113.
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349

18 Committee staff interview of Charles Parent, Superintendent, New Orleans Fire Department, LA, conducted on Nov. 

10, 2005, transcript pp. 9-10, 33-38; Capt. Hellmers interview, Nov. 7, 2005, p. 18-19 (stating that the NOFD “does not 

own any boats other than a ... deep-water boat”); Capt. Hellmers interview, Nov. 7, 2005, pp. 192-193 (preferring “one 

boat for every two rescuers”).

19 Capt. Bayard, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 30, 2006.

20 Parent interview, Nov. 10, 2005, pp. 39-40; Capt. Bayard, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 30, 2006 (stating that 

NOPD and NOFD are working on “cross-training police offi cers and fi remen in water and urban rescue procedures”).

21 Mike Joseph, the New Orleans Fire Department Liaison to the New Orleans Offi ce of Homeland Security and Public 

Safety who was responsible for that offi ce’s applications to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Offi ce for 

Domestic Preparedness (ODP) grants, said that ODP denied his request for water rescue training that would have been 

held just days before Katrina hit. Source: Committee staff interview of Michael Joseph, Liaison to New Orleans Offi ce of 

Homeland Security, New Orleans Fire Department, LA, conducted on Nov. 8, 2005, transcript pp. 18-20. 

I mean just Friday before the hurricane I was denied – I had written a proposal about two months before or a month and a half before. We wanted to have awareness and operational level training to water 

rescue. Th e Friday before the storm, request denied, does not meet the parameters of ODP. ... Just the 

irony is just unbelievable, because this training was scheduled for that Saturday and Sunday before 

landfall of Katrina. ... And that’s just total coincidence because we had been trying to get this water 

training for over a year as part of our new USAR Team, Urban Search and Rescue, which we formed 

over a year ago. Th e committee was formed probably in April or May of ’04, which I serve on that committee, and that’s always something that we wanted to have as part of our USAR was some type of water 

capability. And we probably found the appropriate and aff ordable instructor, and you know, as I said, I 

wrote a little proposal and sent it out through the process to ODP, and it was denied. 

Th e record does not indicate why DHS denied the application. 

22 Committee staff interview of Capt. Joseph Fincher, Engine 18, Th ird Platoon, Fift h District, New Orleans Fire Department, LA, conducted on Nov. 11, 2005, transcript p. 97. 

23 Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, Jan. 2005, p. 65.

24 Written Statement of Beriwal, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 24, 2006, p. 6. Additionally, the January 2005 plan that 

came out of the Hurricane Pam exercise predicted that hundreds of thousands would need to be evacuated aft er landfall 

of a catastrophic storm in New Orleans. Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, Jan. 2005, p. 30.

25 Two days before landfall, many FEMA offi cials, including the FCO, received via e-mail, the plan that came out of the 

Hurricane Pam exercise, including the section on search and rescue. Source: Sharon Blades, e-mail to Michel Pawlowski, 

Linda Hammett Morgan, Pete Jensen, Robert Jevec, Cassandra Ward, Debra Clark, William Lokey, Michael Lowder, 

Rick Tinker, Pleasant Mann, Richard Brown, Jr., Richard Gray, Vanessa Quinn, Ronald Goins, Bill Zellars, Ted Lift y, 

Shauna M. Blanchard-Mbangah, Gerilee Bennett, Pat Bowman, Tony Robinson, Gary Jones, Joe Bearden, Wayne 

Fairley, Chris Riley, and Kara Satra, “Sela Plan,” Aug. 27, 2005, 10:35 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 

DHS-FEMA-0028-0000455. However, FEMA search and rescue Incident Support Team member James Strickland said 

he did not receive the plan, and that it would have been very helpful to have been briefed on the Southeast Louisiana 

Catastrophic Hurricane Plan and the Hurricane Pam exercise before Katrina made landfall. Source: Strickland interview, 

Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 70-71.

26 Written Statement of Rear Adm. Robert F. Duncan, U.S. Coast Guard, Commander, Eighth Coast Guard District, 

for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Always Ready: Th e Coast 

Guard’s Response to Hurricane Katrina, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 1.

27 Testimony of Capt. Frank M. Paskewich, U.S. Coast Guard, Commander, U.S. Coast Guard Sector New Orleans, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Always Ready: Th e Coast 

Guard’s Response to Hurricane Katrina, Nov. 9, 2005 (“We simply would not dream of not responding. If there is a possibility to use a Coast Guard asset or Coast Guard people to help out when people need assistance, we are going to fi nd a 

way to do it. We are not going to wonder whether we have the authority to do it, we are just going to take action.”). 

28 Testimony of Rear Adm. Robert F. Duncan, U.S. Coast Guard, Commander, Eighth Coast Guard District, before the 

U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Always Ready: Th e Coast Guard’s 

Response to Hurricane Katrina, Nov. 9, 2005; Capt. Paskewich, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005 (“I am not sure 

I can recall in the last two years actually making it through a night without getting a phone call about responding to a 

particular incident. We are trained to do that, and I think that is our strength. We respond, and it is ingrained in our 

culture.”).

29 Written Statement of Rear Adm. Duncan, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 2.

30 Committee staff interview of Rear Adm. Robert F. Duncan, U.S. Coast Guard, Commander, Eighth Coast Guard 

District, conducted on Oct. 18, 2005, transcript pp. 7-8.

31 Testimony of Capt. Bruce C. Jones, U.S. Coast Guard, Commanding Offi cer, Air Station New Orleans, LA, before the 

U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Always Ready: Th e Coast Guard’s 

Response to Hurricane Katrina, Nov. 9, 2005. 

32 Rear Adm. Duncan, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005.

33 Capt. Paskewich, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005. 
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350

34 “Th e Coast Guard success in completing all of our assigned missions aft er one of the most devastating storms in the 

Nation’s history was a result of well-honed fi rst responder skills, our ability to pre-plan and our multi-mission nature.” 

Capt. Paskewich, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005. Th e Coast Guard also executed its other missions – containing or remediating hundreds of oil spills; clearing the waterways for navigation; delivering critical supplies by air – in 

addition to search and rescue in the aft ermath of Katrina. 

35 Rear Adm. Duncan interview, Oct. 18, 2005, pp. 9-10.

36 Capt. Paskewich, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005.

37 To minimize the direct impact on Coast Guard personnel, which would have adversely aff ected response eff orts, the 

Coast Guard evacuated (non-essential) personnel and their family members from the Gulf Coast region. “We exercise 

before every hurricane season. ... It is a good opportunity for us to bring people into the culture, to understand what the 

threats are in the Gulf Coast, how we would deal with that, make sure they have their own plans for their families, to talk 

about those things. ... We did that this time. We actually left the area.” Rear Adm. Duncan, Senate Committee hearing, 

Nov. 9, 2005.

38 Capt. Paskewich, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005.

39 Committee staff interview of Lt. Cmdr. Tom Cooper, U.S. Coast Guard, Helicopter Pilot and Engineering Offi cer, Air 

Station New Orleans, LA, conducted on Oct. 18, 2005, transcript pp. 11-12.

40 Capt. Jones, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005 (“Laurence Nettles was lowered from an H65 and threaded his 

way between tree limbs to reach a four-month old infant, her mother and grandmother stranded in deep fl ood waters in 

lower Plaquemines Parish at 2:50 that day.”).

41 U.S. Coast Guard, Factcard, “Coast Guard Response to Hurricane Katrina.” http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-cp/comrel/

factfi le/index.htm. Accessed on Apr. 11, 2006.

42 Written Statement of Beriwal, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 24, 2006, p. 6. However, a FEMA PowerPoint presentation dated Aug. 27, 2005, two days before Katrina made landfall in the Gulf, noted that there were likely to be “incredible 

search and rescue needs (60,000+).” FEMA, “Tropical Storm Katrina: 0900 August 27, 2005,” PowerPoint presentation. 

Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0055-0002142.

43 Rear Adm. Duncan, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005.

44 Lt. Col. LaCaze interview, Nov. 30, 2005, p. 46.

45 Testimony of Brig. Gen. Brod Veillon, Assistant Adjutant General, Louisiana Air National Guard, before the U.S. 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Urban Search and 

Rescue in a Catastrophe, Jan. 30, 2006; Committee staff interview of Col. Th omas Beron, Commander, 61st Troop Command, Louisiana Army National Guard, conducted on Dec. 9, 2005, transcript pp. 104-105; Committee staff interview 

of Lt. Col. Jacques Th ibodeaux, Joint Director of Military Support to Civilian Authorities, Louisiana National Guard, 

conducted on December 9, 2005, transcript pp. 151-153, 157-161. 

46 “See, Urban Search and Rescue Teams, this was the fi rst time they’d ever actively done water rescues. Th ey carry water equipment to work around in a water environment, but FEMA policy had been that we don’t do water rescue. We do 

structural collapse rescue assets. ... Well, in hindsight, what I would have done, since Urban Search and Rescue Teams 

aren’t water rescue teams, I would have worked more with the State through EMAC and whatnot.” Lokey interview, 

Nov. 4, 2005, pp. 66-67. 

47 Committee staff interview of Vice Adm. Vivean Crea, U.S. Coast Guard, Commander, Coast Guard Atlantic Area 

and Commander, Maritime Defense Zone Atlantic, conducted on Jan. 3, 2006, transcript p. 76 (“Q: Do you think that’s 

a change that needs to be made to the National SAR Plan, or does there need to be something in the National Response 

Plan which addresses – A: It would be nice to think that that was an all-hazards, all-encompassing plan, at least a reference to a relevant document that would go into more depth.”).

48 New Orleans Fire Department, 2005 Hurricane Guidelines, 2005, p. 2–4; Committee staff interview of Capt. Fincher, 

Engine 18, Th ird Platoon, Fift h District, New Orleans Fire Department, LA, and Capt. Hellmers, Engine 18, Second 

Platoon, Fift h District, New Orleans Fire Department, LA, interview, conducted on Nov. 7, 2005, transcript pp. 171-173.

49 Th e National Guard’s decision to keep its assets at Jackson Barracks is particularly puzzling given that it could have 

stationed at least some of the assets at New Orleans police stations throughout the city instead. According to New Orleans 

Police Department (NOPD) Superintendent Warren Riley (then Deputy Chief) the NOPD had asked the Louisiana National Guard to station some of its high-water vehicles (that can drive through fl ooded areas) and boats at eight police stations pre-landfall. However, the Guard told him that they would supply vehicles to only three or four NOPD stations, but 

would not be able to supply them with boats at that time. Source: Committee staff interview of Warren Riley, Superintendent of Police, New Orleans Police Department, LA, conducted on Jan. 12, 2006, transcript pp. 121-122. But LANG Brig. 

Gen. Veillon was not aware of the NOPD request. Source: Brig. Gen. Veillon, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 30, 2006.

50 Th e offi cer in command of the Louisiana National Guard forces in New Orleans before and aft er landfall, General Gary 

Jones said that deciding whether to pre-position equipment at Jackson Barracks in the future would be a “tough call.” 

Committee staff interview of Brig. Gen. Gary Jones, Assistant Joint Forces Commander, Louisiana Army National Guard, 

conducted on Dec. 7, 2005, transcript pp. 79-80 (“We pre-position as much of the stuff as we can. For example, the aviation support; we typically move out, get it right on the edge. Th e engineer teams, we do that, so forth. But if you’re going 

to be missioned at Jackson Barracks – which, obviously, that’s some of the most vulnerable part of the area – you have to 

take some risk. And, you know – I guess the question is, it kind of becomes a damned if you do, damned if you don’t. If 
Search and Rescue

351

we had not positioned some of the trucks and stuff there that ultimately got lost, and the water had not gotten up as high 

as it was, then we would have faced criticism for the slowness of response for doing that. Historically we’ve always prepositioned things there. Th is storm was of a magnitude that far surpassed anything that we previously had to deal with.”); 

Col. Beron interview, Dec. 1, 2005, pp. 29-30 (“[I]f the industrial canal had broken on the west side instead of the east side,

Jackson Barracks would have been high and dry and those vehicles would have been fi ne. As to places to move to higher 

ground, overpasses, bridges, they have inherent problems with vulnerability to wind and other things. So you maybe take 

them out of the water risk and put them in another risk. I’ll tell you that nowhere really comes to mind. You think of an 

elevated parking garage maybe would be good. You can’t exactly drive an 18-wheeler into something like that. I’ll tell you 

that I’ve thought and nothing comes immediately to mind that would lead me to believe that’s a better place because it 

off ers this. Everything that I’ve thought of so far has pros and cons, frankly.”); Committee staff interview of Col. Glenn 

Curtis, Chief of Staff , Louisiana Army National Guard and Col. Jacques Th ibodeaux, Joint Director of Military Support to 

Civilian Authorities, Louisiana National Guard, conducted on Dec. 6, 2005, transcript pp. 46-57.

51 Lokey, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 30, 2006 (stating that in retrospect, he would have activated more search and 

rescue teams before landfall). 

52 Lokey, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 30, 2006; Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 31-32.

53 Committee staff interview of William Lokey, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, 

FEMA, conducted on Jan. 20, 2006, transcript p. 184. Moreover, Lokey stated that he made a conscious decision to station the USAR teams in Shreveport rather than Baton Rouge. At the time, he explained, Baton Rouge was expected to be 

in the path of the storm and he wanted the USAR teams out of harm’s way. Source: Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 

88-90. According to Lokey, FEMA is now considering a fi ve-year plan that would revise its practices and budget to ensure that its search–and–rescue teams arrive within 12 hours aft er landfall. Source: Lokey interview, Nov. 4, 2005, p. 153.

54 Lokey, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 30, 2006.

55 Lokey interview, Nov. 4, 2005, pp. 81-82.

56 Lokey interview, Nov. 4, 2005, p. 82.

57 Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 33-34 (“I would have preferred being slightly closer.”).

58 Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 35-37, 42-48.

59 Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 82-83.

60 Although it is generally not advisable for even fi rst responders to begin search–and–rescue missions when the winds 

are above 40 mph, some of the NOFD offi cers literally threw caution to the wind. Fincher interview, Nov. 7, 2005, p. 93 

(“Personally, I guess I didn’t have good communications with me because I wasn’t aware and I really didn’t give a damn 

about what anybody else wanted. I knew there were people dying. I was pretty sure I could get out safely and get the boat 

back so we could get our rescue operations underway.”).

61 Lokey, Senate Committee hearing, Jan 30, 2006; Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 15 (“I don’t deem we were in 

the water rescue business.”).

62 Committee staff interview of Eric Tolbert, former Director, Response Division, FEMA, conducted on Dec. 1, 2005, 

transcript, p. 40 (stating that FEMA lacks any water rescue capability); Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 21 (“We 

don’t own boats.”).

63 Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 15, 83, 21-22 (stating that the FEMA search–and–rescue teams “were at the 

mercy of the people who showed up with the boats.”).

64 Th e teams are trained and equipped to rescue people from collapsed structures, as aft er an earthquake. Th e team 

members are not trained or equipped for a fl ooded environment. Lokey interview, Nov. 4, 2005, pp. 66, 70. 

65 Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 29-30; Lokey, Senate Committee hearing, Jan 30, 2006.

66 Beriwal, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 24, 2006 (“As you might know, nine of ten deaths that occur in a hurricane 

are due to storm surge and due to drowning from rain and storm surge. So we wanted to create ten to 20 feet of water in 

the City of New Orleans, which would constitute a catastrophic scenario for Southeast Louisiana.”).

67 Lokey interview, Nov. 4, 2005, p. 79.

68 Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 17 (“FEMA Urban Search and Rescue does not need to get into the water rescue 

business....But in any event, yeah, there is probably a little bit higher level of training that the USAR system needs to 

have in order to safely operate in a water environment.”); Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 18 (stating that the mission to do water rescue is that of the “Coast Guard and the federal, local and state.”); Lokey, Senate Committee hearing, 

Jan. 30, 2006. 

69 Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 19 (explaining that FEMA lacks boats and does not have the funding to support 

water rescue); Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 27 (“But that’s not to say that if they plan this out, and they fund it 

correctly, and they hit every step, and they connected all their dots, maybe we could get into the water rescue business.”); 

Lokey, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 30, 2006.

70 Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 12-13 (“It’s kind of irritating to me, but they don’t [provide additional training 

for IST teams]. Th ey haven’t in fi ve years.”); Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 14 (stating that with additional training, the IST teams “would have had a little bit smoother response ... when you only see people [when] ... we go out on a 

disaster ... it’s kind of hard; that’s not the optimum time to do training, when you’re up to your elbows in some kind of 
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352

an incident.”); Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 20 (explaining that “when you show up for something like Katrina 

... there’s no time to be trying to get our act together then.”); Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 22 (“When you’re in 

and around polluted, contaminated water like that, there’s a health and safety issue that we would have to prepare for. 

Th ere’s that higher level of training that they need to have.”).

71 Capt. Bayard, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 30, 2006; Lt. Col. LaCaze, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 30, 2006.

72 Capt. Fincher and Capt. Hellmers interview, Nov. 7, 2005, pp. 105-110, 113, 115-116 (stating that the “Fire Alarm,” 

the NOFD main communications center, fl ooded and went down around 6:20p or 7:20p on Monday, August 29, 2005, 

forcing prompting NOFD to follow its contingency plan and use the National Mutual Aid Channel); New Orleans Fire 

Department, 2005 Hurricane Guidelines, 2005, pp. 3–2 through 3–7. 

73 Capt. Hellmers interview, Nov. 7, 2005, pp. 111-112 (stating “that happened many times with not just me, but other 

people doing the same thing, relaying messages between people when it was clear they couldn’t hear each other.”).

74 Lt. Col. LaCaze interview, Nov. 30, 2005, pp. 62-63.

75 Sec. Landreneau interview, Nov. 30, 2005, p. 16.

76 Committee staff interview of Lt. Col. Joseph Booth, Deputy Superintendent, Crisis Response and Special Operations, 

Louisiana State Police, conducted on Dec. 9, 2005, transcript pp. 47-49. Th e record does not reveal why the proposal was 

not accepted. 

77 Sec. Landreneau, Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, explained that he would have diffi culty communicating from Baton Rouge at the state’s Emergency Operations Center to his offi cers operating in New Orleans, such 

as Lt. Col. Keith LaCaze. Sec. Landreneau interview, Nov. 30, 2005, p. 1. See also: Lt. Col. LaCaze interview, Nov. 30, 

2005, pp. 15-17 (“If we were in Baton Rouge and Keith was on Clearview Avenue in Metairie, [Department of Wildlife 

& Fisheries Major] Jeff [Mayne] would get a call and sometimes when we were lucky we could communicate from Baton 

Rouge to New Orleans, but then the next link is to be able to communicate from our operations center to the boats, that 

was virtually impossible and some of it because [we were] overwhelmed by traffi c, you’re in between big buildings. So we 

tried regular cell phones, we tried satellite phones, we ended up going to the local Academy Sports stores and we bought 

the little hand-held walkie-talkies. At least people in the boats could talk but it still didn’t assist us in getting communications from New Orleans to Baton Rouge and back. ... Is your communications with other agencies good or bad, and we 

would say we can’t communicate with them. Well, it wasn’t that we had a misunderstanding between the agencies, we 

just couldn’t talk to them.”); Brig. Gen. Veillon, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 30, 2006; Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 

2006, pp. 123-124.

78 Capt. Jones, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 9, 2005; Lt. Cmdr. Cooper interview, Oct. 18, 2005, pp. 19-20; Committee staff interview of Lt. Cmdr. Mark Vislay, U.S. Coast Guard, HH-60J Instructor Pilot, Training Division, Aviation 

Training Center Mobile, AL, conducted on Oct. 26, 2005, transcript pp. 18-19.

79 Lt. Cmdr. Vislay interview, Oct. 26, 2005, p. 17.

80 Lt. Cmdr. Cooper interview, Oct. 18, 2005, pp. 50-52.

81 Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 124; Lt. Col. LaCaze interview, Nov. 30, 2005, p. 189.

82 Sec. Landreneau interview, Nov. 30, 2005, pp. 189-190.

83 Lt. Col. LaCaze interview, Nov. 30, 2005, p. 49 (“As the water began to rise too it would have been extremely diffi cult 

for us to identify streets and addresses, so once the address on the side of the house or that little mark is under water, 

it’s kind of hard to go to a certain physical address. Th e same thing with street signs. Already some of the guys were not 

familiar with the city of New Orleans and then I guess even an added diffi culty with the street signs being covered by 

water, so it was diffi cult.”).

84 Committee staff interview of Brig. Gen. Brod Veillon, Assistant Adjutant General, Louisiana Air National Guard,

conducted on Nov. 29, 2005, transcript pp. 101-103.

85 Committee staff interview of Capt. Timothy Bayard, Commander, Vice Crimes and Narcotics Section, New Orleans 

Police Department, LA, conducted on Nov. 21, 2005, transcript p. 165.

86 Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 95 (“We couldn’t buy a ride on a DoD helicopter.”).

87 According to Sheriff Harris Lee for Jeff erson Parish, it is only by chance that he learned that thousands of people were 

sitting on I-10 in need of food and water. As a result, the people lacked food and water for as long as a full day. Committee staff interview of Harry Lee, Sheriff , Jeff erson Parish, LA, conducted on Jan. 9, 2006, transcript pp. 34-37. 

88 Capt. Bayard, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 30, 2006. See also: New Orleans Police Department, Initial (30-day) 

Aft er Action Report, Report of Captain Timothy Bayard, Oct. 16, 2005, p. 1. Provided to Committee (“Th e Offi ce of 

Emergency Preparedness needs to be revamped. If their role is to have us prepared to handle a disaster such as this they 

FAILED. [emphasis in original] Th ey lacked a plan, did not provide the necessary equipment, provided no direction or 

leadership, did not coordinate or attempt to have commanders of fi eld operations coordinate with any state, or federal 

agency etc.”).

89 Capt. Bayard interview, Nov. 21, 2005, p. 33; Capt. Bayard, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 30, 2006. 

90 Capt. Bayard interview, Nov. 21, 2005, pp. 83-84.

91 Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 56.
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353

92 Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 42-48. 

93 Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 60.

94 Maj. Sandy Dares, Enforcement Division, Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, Hurricane Katrina Activity 

Report (discussing Wildlife and Fisheries command post at Causeway and I-10 on Aug. 30, 2005); Brig. Gen. Veillon 

interview, Nov. 29, 2005, pp. 30-31.

95 Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 54-55; NRP, p. 39.

96 For example, one FEMA search and rescue team member testifi ed that W&F failed to keep a representative at Zephyr 

Field, where FEMA and the Coast Guard had set up “on the fl y” a local unifi ed command for search and rescue on 

Wednesday, August 31, 2005. Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 58; Capt. Fincher interview, Nov. 7, 2005, p. 226 

(“We kind of stumbled into FEMA. It wasn’t planned.”).

97 Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 56 (“the fi rst time we got all of the unifi ed commanders ... was 48 hours aft er 

the hurricane made landfall, and that’s not good.”).

98 Committee staff interview of Lt. Valerie Boyd, U.S. Coast Guard, Command Center Watch Offi cer, Eighth District 

Offi ce Headquarters, New Orleans, LA, conducted on Nov. 7, 2005, transcript p. 20.

99 Lt. Boyd interview, Nov. 7, 2005, pp. 15-16.

100 Lt. Boyd interview, Nov. 7, 2005, p. 23.

101 Brig. Gen. Veillon interview, Nov. 29, 2005, p. 188.

102 Brig. Gen. Veillon interview, Nov. 29, 2005, p. 153.

103 Parent interview, Nov. 10, 2005, p. 9. With such a signifi cant need for water search and rescue, it is inexcusable that 

no level of government provided New Orleans’ fi rst responders with more boats. Fincher interview, Nov. 7, 2005, pp. 

120-121 (requesting assistance for search and rescue at 3 p.m., on Monday, August 29, 2005); Capt. Hellmers interview, 

Nov. 7, 2005, p. 121 (“I assume when I tell people that the water is up to the roofs of houses that the people above me are 

going to do everything within their power to send help. I mean, it’s pretty clear there’s [sic] people drowning.”).

104 Capt. Hellmers interview, Nov. 7, 2005, pp. 205-207 (“If you call and say your house is on fi re, you don’t have to do 

any more. Th e fi re department is coming. You don’t have to sign a piece of paper to let them in you door, you know, 

they come.”). 

105 Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, E-Resource Request, Res-113736-911082805, Aug. 29, 2005, 11:39 

p.m. CT. Provided to Committee (including a handwritten remark above the request for rubber raft s that reads “Request 

Denied.”). 

106 Lokey, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 30, 2006.

107 Lt. Col. LaCaze, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 30, 2006. 

108 Jeff rey Hall, e-mail to Marc Short, Sept. 2, 2005, 10:04 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FRNT0010-0000294. See also: Committee staff interview of Matt Mayer, former Chief of Staff and Senior Policy Advisor, Offi ce of Domestic Preparedness Security, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, conducted on Jan. 26, 2006, transcript 

pp. 24-25. It appears that FEMA offi cials were unaware of, or forgot about, the pods that DHS held. Currently, DHS is 

reevaluating whether this program should come under FEMA control. Mayer interview, Jan. 26, 2006, pp. 26-27.

109 Mayer interview, Jan. 26, 2006, pp. 26-27; Jeff rey Hall, e-mail to Marc Short, Sept. 2, 2005, 10:04 p.m. Provided to 

Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FRNT-0010-0000294.

110 Capt. Fincher interview, Nov. 7, 2005, pp. 193-196.

111 Mayer interview, Jan. 26, 2006, p. 37.

112 Mayer interview, Jan. 26, 2006, pp. 37, 143 (“[B]ottom line is, hindsight, we would have deployed the PODS much 

sooner than when we did. We didn’t. We made a mistake.”). 

113 Fincher interview, Nov. 7, 2005, pp. 193-196. 

114 Committee staff interview of Laurence Broun, Emergency Coordinator, U.S. Department of the Interior, conducted 

on Mar. 21, 2006, transcript pp. 9-12. Broun stated that although a DOI representative had conversations with some 

FEMA personnel about the law enforcement personnel, but ultimately, FEMA did not follow through on the DOI off er. 

115 Lokey, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 30, 2006; Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 50-51.

116 U.S. Department of the Interior, Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary, Police, Management and Budget, Response to the 

U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, Document and Information Request Dated 

Oct. 7, 2005, Nov. 7, 2005, p. 20.

117 Broun interview, Mar. 21, 2006, pp. 15-19.

118 Lokey, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 30, 2006; Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 50-51.

119 Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan, Apr. l, 2005, pp. 14-15 (“Th e State of Louisiana is a signatory to the Emergency 

Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), as stated in the Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and 

Disaster Act of 1993 as amended. If an emergency becomes too widespread or serious for parish and state resources, the 

Director LOHSEP will process a request for assistance through EMAC.”).
Chapter 21

354

120 Lokey interview, Nov. 4, 2005, p. 73. See also: Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 152-153. 

121 Lokey interview, Nov. 4, 2005, p. 74.

122 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 152-153. On Saturday, Aug. 27, 2005, Gov. Blanco also facilitated the request by 

calling Gov. Schwarzenegger. California offi cially became a signatory to EMAC on September 13, 2005. California, Offi ce 

of the Governor, “Governor Schwarzenegger Signs Emergency Management Assistance Compact Legislation,” press 

release, Sept. 13, 2005. 

123 Brig. Gen. Veillon interview, Nov. 29, 2005, p. 152; Brig. Gen. Veillon, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 30, 2006.

124 Testimony of Maj. Gen. Bennett C. Landreneau, Adjutant General, Louisiana, before the U.S. House, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: 

Preparedness and Response by the Department of Defense, the Coast Guard, and the National Guard of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, Oct. 7, 2005.

125 Lt. Col. LaCaze, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 30, 2006 (“requests were bogged down in the process, in the pipe, so 

to speak”); Lokey, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 30, 2006 (recalling “delays of people not wanting to respon[d] because 

they didn’t have the right signature to assure they were covered under the EMAC compact”).

126 Sec. Landreneau interview, Nov. 30, 2005, pp. 116-117 (“South Carolina couldn’t leave the state until they could call 

a FEMA number. And we talked about this as a way to improve this, if FEMA or whoever is in charge of this would give 

us a list of approved department agencies. ... It would have been great because South Carolina took us basically a day 

from the time they got word that they ... were packed up and ready to come, they were stationed up in a convoy ready to 

go but they couldn’t move. And I don’t blame them, they couldn’t leave because the proper paperwork wasn’t done.”). 

127 Lokey interview, Nov. 4, 2005, p. 8.

128 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 152.

129 Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 117-118.

130 Sec. Landreneau interview, Nov. 30, 2005, pp. 169-174.

131 Capt. Fincher interview, Nov. 7, 2005, pp. 153-154; Sec. Landreneau interview, Nov. 30, 2005, pp. 189-190.

132 Sec. Landreneau interview, Nov. 30, 2005, p. 70; Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 169-170.

133 Lt. Col. LaCaze interview, Nov. 30, 2005, pp. 48-49, 66-69.

134 Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 66 (recalling that “Th ursday ... is when it seemed like the whole thing, New 

Orleans, was imploding”); Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 91-93 (stating that “on the 1st, ... there were all these 

reports ... that there was shooting, ... that they were rioting in the streets and all this.”).

135 FEMA-NRCC, e-mail to Clair Blong and others, “HSOC SPOT REP #53,” Sept. 1, 2005, 8:31 p.m. Provided to 

Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0051-0000193 (“Status of US&R Task Force in LA. ... All assets have ceased 

operations until National Guard can assist TF’s with security.”); Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2005, pp. 66, 91; Lokey 

interview, Jan. 20, 2005, pp. 148-149.

136 Committee staff interview of Capt. Patrick Lampard, Fift h District, New Orleans Fire Department, LA, conducted 

on Jan. 11, 2006, transcript pp. 76-78.

137 Capt. Hellmers interview, Nov. 7, 2005, p. 170 (stating that some NOFD offi cers “said no, we’re not stopping” and 

turned their radios off ).

138 Capt. Hellmers interview, Nov. 7, 2005, pp. 162-163 (“And our area wasn’t really that dangerous....for one thing, we 

were armed, but there was the potential of criminals getting into our area, but I didn’t see it as a big problem. We go into 

burning buildings for a living, and I’m not really that worried about running into a criminal. Not that I don’t value my 

own life, I do, ... I’m not particularly afraid of some possible danger.”).

139 Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 91-92.

140 Strickland interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 94-95.

141 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 209-211.

142 On September 10, 2005, the Department of Justice ruled: “Federal agents may pursue house-to-house forced entry 

rescue attempts where deemed appropriate.” Th e ruling was interpreted as allowing federal agents to force entry into a 

house to rescue someone trapped or injured in a building, but not to take part in a forced evacuation. Linda Bizzarro, 

e-mail to James A. McAtamney and others, “Legal Opinion on entry into homes,” Sept. 13, 2005, 3:26 p.m. Provided to 

Committee; fi led as Bates no. DAG 000000107.

143 Mississippi Emergency Management Agency (MEMA), Mississippi Emergency Operations Plan, Volume II: Mississippi Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP), May 14, 1999, section ESF-9, p. 9-1 [hereinaft er Mississippi 

CEMP, May 14, 1999].

144 Committee staff interview of Jim Brinson, Response Coordinator, Offi ce of Homeland Security, Mississippi Department of Public Safety, conducted on Dec. 14, 2005, transcript p. 12. 

145 Mississippi CEMP May, 14, 1999, section ESF-9, pp. 2-3.

146 Mississippi CEMP, May, 14, 1999, section ESF-9, pp. 9-5, 9-8 through 9-9. 
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355

147 MEMA, Hurricane Situation Report #11, Hurricane Katrina. Aug. 29, 2005, 9 a.m., p. 8. Provided to Committee; 

fi led at Bates no. MEMA-0010905.

148 FEMA, Urban Search and Rescue National Response System, Incident Support Team (White) Transition Team, 

Executive Summary, Sept. 11, 2005. Provided to Committee [hereinaft er USAR, Executive Summary].

149 Brinson interview, Dec. 14, 2005, p. 18. Aft er the storm, additional FEMA teams were staged in Texas and sent to 

Mississippi. USAR, Executive Summary. 

150 Brinson interview, Dec. 14, 2005, pp. 24-26.

151 Brinson interview, Dec. 14, 2005, pp. 23-24.

152 For example, Paul Bennett of the Gulfport Police Department recounted what search-and-rescue responders encountered in Harrison County immediately aft er the storm: 

And in some of the areas that we could not get to – and I very distinctly remember one of the fi rst units 

that had gone out, he had gotten as close as he could to a particular neighborhood and he couldn’t get 

in because you couldn’t fi nd the road. And residents were actually swimming out to the vehicle trying to 

get – because they saw the vehicle. Th ey saw the fl ashing blue lights. But they were swimming out to the 

vehicle trying to get to it. And that’s when it really started – we started getting our feedback from the 

fi eld, Hey, this is very, very bad.

Committee staff interview of Paul Bennett, Deputy Chief of Police, Gulfport Police Department, MS, conducted on Dec. 

7, 2005, pp. 33-34. 

153 Brinson interview, Dec. 14, 2005, pp. 63-64.

154 Committee staff interview of Pat Sullivan, Fire Chief, Gulfport Fire Department, MS, conducted on Dec. 7, 2005, pp. 

127-144.

155 Brinson interview, Dec. 14, 2005, pp. 16-17.

156 Brinson interview, Dec. 14, 2005, pp. 39-69.

157 See e.g., Committee staff interview of Michael Beeman, Director, National Preparedness Division, Region II, FEMA, 

conducted on Jan. 20, 2006, transcript p. 161-162. 

158 Brinson interview, Dec. 14, 2005, p. 40.

159 Brinson interview, Dec. 14, 2005, p. 50.

160 USAR, Executive Summary. Th e FEMA teams deployed were a mix of larger, approximately 80 person “Type I” 

teams and smaller “Type III” teams consisting of 20-30 people. 

161 Written statement of Gov. Haley Barbour, Mississippi, for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Role of Governors in Managing Catastrophe, Feb. 2, 2006, p. 3. 

162 Committee staff interview of Lt. Col. Lee Smithson, Director of Military Support, Mississippi Army National Guard, 

conducted on Jan. 25, 2006, transcript pp. 30-31.

163 Lt. Col. Smithson interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 28, 42. 

164 Brinson interview, Dec. 14, 2005, p. 36. A FEMA report on search and rescue in Mississippi indicates that fi eld 

operations for FEMA teams ended a couple of days later, on September 10, 2005. USAR, Executive Summary. 

165 Brinson interview, Dec. 14, 2005, p. 62. Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour, among others, has noted the eff orts of 

Coast Guard personnel in particular in conducting rescue eff orts. Written statement of Gov. Barbour, Senate Committee 

hearing, Feb. 2, 2006, p. 3. 

166 Sullivan interview, Dec. 7, 2005, pp. 104-105. 

167 National Guard Bureau, National Guard Aft er Action Review: Hurricane Response, “National Guard Timeline,” Dec. 

21, 2005, pp. 10-12. Provided to Committee.

168 National Guard Bureau, “Current Intelligence,” briefi ng slide, Aug. 29, 2005, 2 a.m. Provided to Committee.

169 Written Statement of Maj. Gen. Bennett C. Landreneau, Adjutant General, Louisiana, for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane: Katrina: Th e Defense Department’s Role in 

the Response, Feb. 9, 2006, p. 4.

170 National Guard Bureau, National Guard Aft er Action Review: Hurricane Response, “Army National Guard.” Dec. 21, 

2005, p. 72. 

171 Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, “Katrina Helicopter Flow into JOA.” Provided to 

Committee. 

172 Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, “Katrina Helicopter Flow into JOA.” Provided to 

Committee.

173 Committee staff interview of Capt. Rick Snyder, U.S. Navy, Executive Offi cer, USS Bataan, conducted on Nov. 14, 

2005 (untranscribed). Th e “Lessons Learned” inputs from USS Bataan state that although the three MH-60 aircraft were 

employed in SAR missions, the two heavy-lift MH-53 helicopters could not be used for Search and Rescue “due to their 

inability to provide direct support of hoisting survivors from rooft ops or out of the water.” USS Bataan, Combined 
Chapter 21

356

Bataan Lessons Learned Form, “Airborne Communications.” Provided to Committee.

174 Committee staff interview of Capt. Bruce Jones, U.S. Coast Guard, Commanding Offi cer, Air Station New Orleans, 

LA conducted on Nov. 9, 2005 (untranscribed). 

175 Committee staff interview of Col. Daniel Shanahan, U.S. Army, Commander, 1st Air Cavalry Brigade, 1st Cavalry 

Division, U.S. Department of Defense, conducted on Feb. 23, 2006 (untranscribed).

176 Insung Lee, e-mail to HSOC.SWO and others, “HSOC #4317-05 HC Katrina – DoD Update 311145 Aug 05m,” Aug. 

31, 2005, 11:50 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. WHK-12712.

177 JTF-Katrina, Commander’s Assessment, Sept. 2, 2005. Provided to Committee.

178 Committee staff interview of Cmdr. Th omas Quinn, U.S. Navy, Director of Operations, Commander Naval Air 

Forces, Atlantic, conducted Nov. 15, 2005 (untranscribed). 

179 U.S. Northern Command, “USNORTHCOM Hurricane Katrina Timeline,” draft , p. 16; JTF-Katrina, Commander’s 

Assessment, Sept. 3, 2005. Provided to Committee.

180 Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, “Hurricane Katrina Mission Assignments 

(MA’s) Recap,” Dec. 2, 2005. Provided to Committee.

181 FEMA, Mission Assignment, 3212EM-LA-DOD-01, Aug. 28, 2005. Provided to Committee.

182 FEMA, Mission Assignment, 1604DR-MS-DOD-01, Aug. 30, 2005, 12:16 a.m.; FEMA, Mission Assignment, 1604-

DR-MS-DOD-02, Aug. 30, 2005, 12:43 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS 0000803.

183 FEMA, Mission Assignment, 1604DR-MS-DOD-07, Aug. 30, 2005, 10:03 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

no. DHS 0000848.

184 Col. Shanahan interview, Feb. 3, 2006.

185 Vice Adm. Crea interview, Jan. 3, 2006, p. 52.

186 USS Bataan, Combined Bataan Lessons Learned Form, “Aircraft Support Eff ectiveness.” Provided to Committee 

(“BATAAN’s MH-60Ss were tasked with providing direct support for the transportation of Task Force Offi cials underutilizing the capability of a SAR capable aircraft complete with rescue swimmers. ... Th e New Orleans area contained 

many land based helicopter assets with no hoist capability that could have carried out this tasking thus freeing up 

BATAAN’s hoist capable H-60s to provide rescue assistance when the need was at its greatest.”). National Guard Bureau, 

National Guard Aft er Action Review: Hurricane Response, pp. 67-68 (elaborates on the importance of the availability and 

readiness of hoist-equipped aircraft .).

187 USS Bataan, Combined Bataan Lessons Learned Form, “Coordination of Rescue Aircraft .” Provided to Committee. 

188 National Search and Rescue Committee, United States National Search and Rescue Plan, 1999, Nov. 2, 2000. http://

www.uscg.mil/hq/g-o/g-opr/nsarc/nsp.htm. Accessed on Feb. 27, 2006 [hereinaft er United States National Search and 

Rescue Plan, 1999].

189 United States National Search and Rescue Plan, 1999.

190 United States National Search and Rescue Plan, 1999 (emphasis added).

191 NRP, Urban Search and Rescue Annex, p. ESF #9–1.

192 Vice Adm. Crea interview, Jan. 3, 2006, pp. 75-76. “Th eoretically, you’d want to have diff erent sectors or search areas, but the magnitude of the people popping up, my guys would say they would fl y in – they’d see one person on a roof, 

they’d fl y in to get them, and the noise of the helicopter, all of a sudden other people would start poking their heads out, 

you know? So instead of having one person, now they had 50 people, or they’d, you know, break a hole through the roof, 

get that one guy out, and he’d say, ‘I’ve got ten more people inside the house,’ which, you know, would clearly exceed the 

capability of that – you know, particularly if it was one of our smaller helicopters. So then you’d have to draw in more.” 

Vice Adm. Crea interview, Jan. 3, 2006, p. 57.

193 Committee staff interview of Rear Adm. Joseph Kilkenny, U.S. Navy, former Joint Force Maritime Component 

Commander, Joint Task Force Katrina, conducted on Nov. 30, 2005 (untranscribed). 

194 U.S. Second Fleet, Fleet-14, Katrina Lessons Learned, “JTF Katrina Search and Rescue,” p. 27. Provided to Committee.

195 U.S. Second Fleet, Fleet-05, Katrina Lessons Learned, “JTF Katrina Air Command and Control,” p. 13. Provided to 

Committee. (“Inadequate Command and control allowed some search areas to be missed while others were searched 

multiple times.”).

196 Col. Shanahan interview, Feb. 23, 2006.

197 National Guard Bureau, National Guard Aft er Action Review: Hurricane Response, “Army National Guard,” Dec. 21, 

2005, p. 90 (“All FAA and Military air traffi c control and air command and control systems were rendered inoperable as 

Katrina passed. ... Th ere was no known preplanning for the Command and Control of ... diversifi ed participants each 

having diff erent radios, frequencies and some with little or no ... rescue training.”). 

198 National Guard Bureau, National Guard Aft er Action Review: Hurricane Response, “Army National Guard,” Dec. 21, 

2005, p. 73 (“Th ere was no overall control, fl ight following, or separation of the many agency aircraft engaged around 

New Orleans, LA and Gulfport, MS creating potentially unsafe condition. A plan is required to facilitate the employment 

of military ATC assets in such cases.”).
Search and Rescue

357

199 Committee staff interview of Rear Adm. Dan Lloyd, U.S. Coast Guard, former Chief, Interagency Coordination 

Group, U.S. Northern Command, conducted on Dec. 8, 2005, transcript pp. 116-117.

200 U.S. Second Fleet, Fleet-05, Katrina Lessons Learned, “JTF Katrina Air Command and Control,” p. 13. Provided to 

Committee.

201 Vice Adm. Crea interview, Jan. 3, 2006, pp. 43-44.

202 Joint Task Force Katrina, Message to USS Bataan, “JTF Katrina FRAGO-2 to Hurricane Katrina EXORD,” Aug. 31, 

2005, 1634Z. Provided to Committee.

203 Col. Shanahan interview, Feb. 23, 2006.

204 Capt. Robert Reininger, e-mail to Maj. Gen. Richard Rowe, “Re: Bataan,” Sept. 1, 2005, 10:54 a.m. Provided to Committee.

205 Committee staff interview of Brig. Gen. Harold Moulton, Director, Standing Joint Headquarters-North, U.S. Northern Command, conducted on Dec. 5, 2005, transcript pp. 25-26, 55-56.

206 Brig. Gen. Moulton, Dec. 5, 2005, p. 58.

207 USS Bataan, Combined Bataan Lessons Learned Form, “Airborne Communications.” Provided to Committee. 

208 Vice Adm. Crea, Jan. 3, 2006, pp. 54-55.

209 Brig. Gen. Moulton, Dec. 5, 2005, p. 56.
High and dry in Houma, LA

National Guard photo
359

Chapter 22

Post-Landfall Evacuation

For several days aft er landfall, evacuation of New Orleans proceeded slowly, compounding the misery of residents stranded by the storm. Th e National Response Plan 

(NRP), the Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan, and the New Orleans Comprehensive Emergency Plan stipulate that, typically, emergency response is locally initiated 

and coordinated. 

Federal, state, and local authorities knew long before the storm that at least 100,000 residents 

of New Orleans would lack the means to evacuate.1

 Nonetheless, the city failed to pre-stage 

buses and drivers outside the fl ood zone. Meanwhile, the state’s lead agency for transportation during an evacuation ignored its responsibilities.

Th e plans mentioned above stipulate that local and state governments may call on federal 

support if their own resources become overwhelmed. For catastrophic events, the NRP, the 

federal government’s blueprint for its preparation and response to national emergencies,

adds that the federal government does not need to wait for requests from state or local government before off ering assistance. Although details of this policy were still under development when Hurricane Katrina – an undisputedly catastrophic storm – struck, this should 

not have prevented federal offi cials from preparing before landfall to assist with post-landfall evacuation. Unfortunately, federal offi cials, including those working out of Louisiana’s 

Emergency Operations Center in Baton Rouge, did little to prepare and were forced to 

scramble to provide assistance aft er Katrina struck. 

As the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA) stated in their own aft er-action report: “Hurricane Katrina has presented 

the need for a national focus on evacuation and sheltering.”2

An Incomplete Pre-Landfall Evacuation Likely Compounded the 

Post-Landfall Evacuation

Some 10,000 to 15,000 New Orleans residents took shelter at the Superdome, the “refuge of 

last resort” for those without the means to evacuate, 3 suggesting many may have preferred to 

leave the city altogether as part of a pre-landfall evacuation had they been off ered the means. 

Th eir staying behind placed their lives in jeopardy and increased the strain on responders.4

Before Landfall, the City Failed to Designate Buses and Drivers for a PostLandfall Evacuation

Before landfall, the city failed to designate buses or drivers for post-landfall evacuations. 

Although the Regional Transit Authority (RTA), the local municipal bus agency in New 

Orleans, did stage a fl eet of buses at the Poland Street Wharf,5

 a high-ground location inside 

the city that remained unfl ooded, no level of government attempted to move drivers to 

those buses until Th ursday, three days aft er landfall,6

 even though the route to the wharf 

remained open throughout the crisis.

Before Landfall, the Louisiana Secretary of Transportation and Development 

Ignored His Department’s Responsibility to Prepare for the Post-Landfall 

Evacuation
Chapter 22

360

Th e Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development (LA DOTD) failed in its 

duty, under the state’s emergency plan, to arrange transportation for post-landfall evacuation. As discussed in Chapter 16, in April 2005, the State of Louisiana transferred responsibility for transportation during an evacuation from the Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland 

Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP) to the LA DOTD. Despite signing the 

agreement, LA DOTD Secretary Johnny Bradberry believed his organization was not 

suited to the task because it did not have an in-house stable of transportation and drivers 

like the state Department of Tourism or the Louisiana National Guard.7

 Th e record shows 

no evidence that he raised these concerns outside his department between April 2005 and 

landfall.8 Before and aft er Katrina, Secretary Bradberry’s agency provided no transportation for evacuation, except for fi ve ferries to evacuate 6,000 people from St. Bernard and 

Plaquemines Parishes.9

Ultimately, thousands of buses were mobilized for evacuation through contracts with transportation providers, which LA DOTD – like any other state agency – could have arranged 

both before and aft er landfall. Secretary Bradberry conceded as much, admitting that his 

agency was best positioned in the state to contract with railroads and that it makes sense for 

the state’s lead agency for transportation to be responsible for negotiating agreements with 

other transportation providers.10 Th e Committee concludes that LA DOTD’s failure to carry 

out its duties under the state’s emergency plan delayed the eff orts to locate in-state buses.

LOHSEP, which was responsible under the state’s emergency plan for making sure Secretary 

Bradberry’s agency carried out its duties, did not urge him to take steps to prepare before the 

storm for post-landfall evacuation.11 But the Committee fi nds Secretary Bradberry primarily 

responsible for his department’s inertia aft er landfall to coordinate transportation resources. 

Inadequate Planning Hamstrung the Federal Government’s Assistance With 

the Post-Landfall Evacuation

As discussed elsewhere in this report, federal offi cials knew that (1) a catastrophic hurricane 

could leave hundreds of thousands of New Orleans residents stranded, as 2004’s Hurricane 

Pam catastrophic-storm exercise had predicted (see Chapter 8, Hurricane Pam), (2) that 

such a storm would incapacitate state and local resources, and (3) that the NRP authorized 

federal offi cials to off er help without requests from state and local governments (see Chapter 27, Failures in Implementation of the NRP). Th erefore, failures by the federal government to prepare before landfall for post-landfall evacuation were not failures of law, but, at 

least in part, of leadership.12 Federal offi cials at the highest levels failed to make full use of 

existing authority and resources that were available despite the incompleteness of planning 

for catastrophic storms. 

At a Hurricane Pam transportation workshop in late July 2005, federal, state, and local 

offi cials had discussed New Orleans’ need, before landfall, for at least 600 buses and 1,200 

drivers for post-landfall evacuation.13 A FEMA offi cial suggested that, in fact, 5,000 buses a 

day would be necessary.14 However, unifi ed federal, state, and local planning for evacuation 

aft er a catastrophic New Orleans storm was “less than 10 percent done” by the day before 

landfall and a written draft of the plan was not ready until September 9, 2005.15

One U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) offi cial testifi ed that “the people that were 

involved in that work group must have sensed the same thing that I did, that there was a 

large reliance [by state and local participants] on the federal team coming in and fi x[ing] 

everything.”16 Likewise, the head of Louisiana’s National Guard, who was briefed about the 

workshop, testifi ed that FEMA offi cials there agreed that they “would have the responsibility for the evacuation” of New Orleans.17 A FEMA offi cial testifi ed that, while at the work-
Post-Landfall Evacuation

361

shop, he said the federal government would provide buses, upon a request from the state or 

local government.18

Offi cials at every level of government knew that getting buses to New Orleans would take 

at least 72 hours because of the time it takes both to change the tires on city buses for long 

highway trips and to drive to New Orleans from various points around the country. Th is 

meant pre-storm preparations were required for the post-landfall evacuation.19 However, 

during the weekend before landfall, federal offi cials took barely any action to prepare for a 

post-storm evacuation.20

Sometime between early Friday night, August 26, and early Monday morning, August 29, 

Jules Hurst, a FEMA offi cial who participated in the July Pam workshop, gave DOT a “headsup” that it would need to check with its transportation contractor to locate between 1,000 

and 2,000 buses for evacuations.21 DOT, in turn, called Landstar, its transportation services 

contractor, to determine availability, but did not ask Landstar to send buses to the Gulf Coast 

because FEMA had not given DOT the authority to request it.22 However, neither Hurst nor 

any other FEMA offi cial tasked DOT with actually arranging for their delivery. 

On Sunday, August 28, the day before landfall, FEMA Acting Deputy Director Patrick 

Rhode sent an e-mail to other FEMA offi cials asking what FEMA had done to ensure that 

state and local authorities were doing everything in their power to make transportation 

available. He also asked whether state or local governments had requested evacuation assistance.23 Rhode recognized that FEMA would need 72 hours’ notice to help, time that was 

no longer available.24 Despite the limited time and the likely pressing need for evacuation 

assistance, he failed to act in the absence of a cry for help from state or locals governments. 

Rhode’s e-mail appears to have spurred no follow-up activity at FEMA. 

President Bush, Secretary Chertoff , and Governor Blanco Demonstrated 

a Failure of Engagement and Initiative at a Time When Th eir Leadership 

Was Critical

Before landfall, Governor Blanco failed to ask for evacuation resources from the federal 

government,25 while federal offi cials, including the President and Secretary Chertoff , failed 

to off er assistance. When Secretary Chertoff appeared before the Committee, he testifi ed 

that “the biggest failure was not getting the buses in,”26 adding that the federal government’s 

preparations during the weekend before landfall were inadequate, “particularly in the area 

of ... bus transportation.”27

President Bush and Secretary Chertoff had an opportunity to extend aid at a video-teleconference call among federal, state, and local offi cials at 11 a.m. CT on Sunday, when the 

President informed the participants that the federal government was doing all it could to 

prepare for and respond to the storm.28 Unfortunately, as Secretary Chertoff conceded 

before the Committee, that was not the case – particularly with respect to the evacuation 

of New Orleans.29 If, before or during this call, the President had directed his Cabinet to 

do everything in its power to help evacuate New Orleans, the post-landfall evacuation may 

have begun much sooner rather than three days aft er landfall. According to the Louisiana 

Adjutant General Bennett Landreneau, the head of the Louisiana National Guard, had 

buses arrived in New Orleans on Monday, Tuesday, or Wednesday, the Louisiana National 

Guard would have been able to get people from the Superdome to those buses.30 Th ere is no 

evidence that the President gave such orders. 

Additionally, as detailed in Chapter 12, Secretary Chertoff failed to activate the Catastrophic 

Incident Annex to the NRP, which would have sent an even clearer message to federal agencies that it was permissible for them to push transportation resources to New Orleans. 
Chapter 22

362

Just when the people of New Orleans required engagement, initiative, and leadership from 

their leaders, the President, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Governor exhibited a lack of all three. 

From Monday to Wednesday Night, No Government-Sponsored 

Buses Arrived in New Orleans

As the Hurricane Pam exercise predicted, many of the parish resources were unavailable after landfall, but the city had not planned to move many of its buses either outside the fl ood 

zone or to high ground within it.31

On the day of landfall, aft er learning that some of the city’s major levees had broken, New 

Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin directed his staff to compose a list of “critical needs” to present to 

Brown during a Tuesday morning meeting.32 Although the list included search and rescue 

assets, resources for the Superdome, law and order on the streets, and communications 

capabilities, it did not mention evacuation resources.33 Th e record does not indicate whether 

Mayor Nagin made an oral request during the meeting. 

However, on Tuesday, the Mayor did call Governor Blanco’s chief of staff and identifi ed buses as the “No. 1 priority” for help from the state.34 Also on Tuesday, the city tried to obtain 

Regional Transit Authority (RTA) buses, but they were believed to be fl ooded and unusable, 

as were school buses because they were pre-staged in the fl ood plain.35 In fact, as many as 200 

buses were pre-staged on high ground at the Poland Street Wharf, but that information was 

never passed from the RTA to city offi cials.36 On Wednesday, the Mayor spoke with President Bush and, according to the Mayor’s communications director, purposely limited the 

conversation to a discussion about the levee breaks, search and rescue needs, and buses.37

On the day of landfall, Governor Blanco had asked then-FEMA Director Brown for 500 

buses.38 Brown agreed, but no buses arrived Tuesday morning. Governor Blanco asked 

Brown again.39 Once again, Brown agreed, but no buses arrived in New Orleans Wednesday 

morning either.40 Th e Governor turned to the White House.41 When then- White House 

Chief of Staff Andrew Card called Governor Blanco later that morning, she requested his 

help in obtaining the promised 500 FEMA buses, adding that she might need as many as 

5,000.42 Th e Governor reiterated her frustration about FEMA’s failure to deliver buses in a 

phone call to the President later that aft ernoon.43

FEMA did not ask DOT to send buses to New Orleans until 1:45 a.m. on Wednesday, 

August 31, two days aft er landfall and 36 hours aft er Brown’s agreement to provide them.44

Brown could not explain why it took so long.45

Notably, when FEMA fi nally tasked DOT, FEMA requested 455 buses – not 500.46 According to LOHSEP Acting Deputy Director Colonel Jeff Smith, a FEMA offi cial at headquarters 

had overridden the state’s request because that individual had found the request excessive 

in view of the “number of people” thought to have been left in the city.47 Colonel Smith, a 

Certifi ed Public Accountant, cited this episode as an example of how FEMA’s bureaucracy 

failed the state: “I’ll talk despairingly against one of my previous occupations; some bean 

counter looked at it and fi gured that, you know, we didn’t need this. And I mean, the situations when you’re going and it literally, it’s life or death issues, it’s no time to be quibbling 

about, you know, what you have there.”48

Poor communications between FEMA offi cials at the Superdome and those at the state 

Emergency Operations Center in Baton Rouge may have undermined FEMA’s ability to obtain buses.49 On Tuesday FEMA offi cials at the Superdome informed General Gary Jones, the 
Post-Landfall Evacuation

363

Louisiana National Guard offi cial in charge, that 

they were trying to obtain buses.50 But they had 

trouble reaching their superiors in Baton Rouge,51

which may have slowed the procurement. As DHS 

and FEMA noted in their aft er-action report: 

“During Hurricane Katrina, catastrophic communications failures caused confusion during the 

post-landfall evacuation operation.”52

FEMA’s delays are regrettable, because buses arrived quickly aft er FEMA fi nally tasked the DOT 

with the mission. DOT offi cials immediately began 

contracting for buses,53 the fi rst of which arrived 

at a staging area at Mile Marker 209 (La Place, 

Louisiana) around 6:30 a.m. on Wednesday.54 By 

midnight Th ursday, less than 24 hours aft er DOT 

received the tasking order, approximately 200 

buses were participating in evacuations.55

Th e Governor also turned to state resources,56 asking Leonard Kleinpeter, a special assistant 

to the Governor and the head of the Offi ce of Community Programs, an agency with contacts in all the parishes, on Tuesday to locate buses,57 though without authority to commandeer those buses. Kleinpeter and his staff began to line up buses from local school districts 

and churches on Tuesday,58 and lined up school buses that LOHSEP commandeered on 

Th ursday, aft er the Governor issued an Executive Order on Wednesday.59 Th e Governor’s 

staff did not perceive a need for an Executive Order before Wednesday because the bus 

owners, including school superintendents, contacted by staff were highly cooperative to 

that point. On Wednesday, however, the need for an Executive Order emerged when some 

school systems began to oppose the state’s request for buses and media reports of lawlessness became pervasive.60

In all, the state and federal government obtained and sent 2,000 buses to New Orleans, 

which began heading there Wednesday, but did not arrive until Th ursday.61

Conditions in New Orleans Deteriorated Throughout the Week

Highway Overpasses 

During the Hurricane Pam working group, government offi cials planned to collect rescuees 

on highway overpasses, which they referred to as “lily pads.”62 Th e state’s Department of Wildlife and Fisheries staged at least three highway-overpass collection points: the Elysian Fields 

exit (near the city’s Ninth Ward), the St. Bernard exit (the next exit some 2,000 feet away), and 

the Interstate 10 – Interstate 610 split (near the border of Orleans and Jeff erson Parishes).63

Th e Louisiana National Guard and Coast Guard also collected rescuees from the Lower Ninth 

Ward and brought them to the third fl oor of Jackson Barracks and a highway overpass.64

Th e overpass at the I-10 Causeway intersection (less than a mile into Jeff erson Parish from 

the I-10 and I-610 split), which became known as the “Cloverleaf,” became one of the biggest collection points in New Orleans, as well as an ad-hoc triage point. Th e presence of 

medical assistance drew others, and soon the resources there (food, water, and medicine) 

were overwhelmed.65

Dr. Scott Delacroix, who was treating patients at the Cloverleaf, reported severe shortages of 

medical supplies and other necessities to Dr. Jimmy Guidry, the Secretary of the Louisiana 

Evacuee buses, Louisiana

Photo © 2005 The Times-Picayune Publishing Co., 

all rights reserved. Used with permission of the 

Times-Picayune.)
Chapter 22

364

Department of Health and Hospitals. At one point, Dr. Delacroix was forced to drive to 

Baton Rouge and raid the stockpiles of supplies languishing in the parking lot of the state 

emergency-operations center.66

When government-sponsored buses began trickling into New Orleans on Wednesday evening, they picked up rescuees on highway overpasses like the Cloverleaf (which was not cut 

off by fl ood waters) in addition to heading to the Superdome or the Convention Center.67

The Superdome

Th e Superdome lost electricity on Monday morning and plumbing on Tuesday, resulting 

in a sanitation crisis. Th e population doubled by Wednesday, as citizens who had stayed 

in their homes during the storm sought refuge. As a result, health offi cials were forced to 

move the special-needs population to the New Orleans Arena, across the walkway from the 

Superdome.68

Security opened the doors of the Superdome for the fi rst time late on Tuesday, so that people could see for themselves that the surrounding area was fl ooded and evacuation would 

be diffi cult. Even outside, the temperature and humidity were so brutal that the National 

Guard had helicopters hover over the concourse to function like massive fans.69

Some 20,000 to 30,000 people languished under these conditions until Th ursday at the earliest and as late as Saturday. 

The Convention Center

Although the city had not planned before landfall to open the Morial Convention Center 

to the public as a shelter or refuge, Mayor Nagin opened the facility on Tuesday, August 

30.70 No offi cials had planned for the food, water, medical support, and security needs of the 

people who took shelter there. 

Unlike the Superdome (rumors to the contrary notwithstanding), the Convention Center, where evacuees from the city’s hotels may have become attractive targets for theft ,71

experienced some crime, and the New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) became overwhelmed there.72

Although the record is inconclusive about when the federal government became aware that 

the city had opened the Convention Center to the public,73 the state learned about it on 

Wednesday.74 However, Adjutant General Landreneau instructed the Louisiana National 

Guard offi cers who were evacuating the Superdome to stick to their mission.75

Late on Th ursday night or early on Friday morning, however, the city’s Director of Homeland Security and Public Safety asked General Landreneau to take control of the Convention Center, provide relief, and evacuate the 19,000 people who had gathered there.76

The U.S. Army Located a Staging Area and Coordinated 

the Buses’ Trip to New Orleans

At 5 p.m. Wednesday evening, as buses fi nally began arriving in LaPlace, Louisiana, Governor Blanco asked Lieutenant General Russel L. Honoré, Commander, First Army, and 

Commander of Joint Task Force Katrina, to coordinate the evacuation of New Orleans.77

General Honoré delegated that responsibility to Brigadier General Mark Graham, who had 

arrived in Baton Rouge that day. General Graham established a staging area at Mile Marker 

209 near LaPlace, Louisiana (up to this point the buses were staging on I-10 a few miles away 

by default), and informed DOT, which was responsible for procuring the buses and drivers.78
Post-Landfall Evacuation

365

On Th ursday morning, General Graham learned that Governor Blanco wanted those buses 

heading to the Superdome to pick up 5,000 rescuees at the Cloverleaf fi rst.79 General Graham sent two liaison offi cers there, where they coordinated the convoys of buses arriving 

from Mile Marker 209.80 Th e two evacuation operations ran simultaneously. General Graham estimated that the Superdome evacuation was set back only an hour by this diversion.81

Th e Louisiana National Guard Planned and Executed the Movement of Buses 

from Off -Ramps to the Superdome and Convention Center

Th e Louisiana National Guard (LANG) at the 

Superdome routed buses from the O’Keefe Avenue off -ramp (a few blocks to the southwest of 

the Superdome) to the Superdome.82

First, National Guard offi cers designated a pickup spot for buses to meet Superdome evacuees, 

as the area immediately adjacent to the Superdome was fl ooded. Th e National Guard designated 

the Loyola Street entrance to the Hyatt Regency 

Hotel as the pick-up spot because the road only 

had a foot-and-a-half of water.83

Second, National Guard offi cers identifi ed a 

path to the Hyatt Regency Hotel pick-up point 

for evacuees, from the outdoor concourse surrounding the Superdome to the adjacent mall, 

which connected indoors to the Hyatt. Guardsmen and NOPD offi cers lined the path, ensuring 

that only Superdome evacuees would be entering buses, and that they would not be harassed 

by other people who had not sought refuge at 

the Superdome, but who wanted to sneak onto 

buses designated for the Superdome evacuees.84

Th ird, National Guard offi cers identifi ed and secured a route for buses from the I-10 off -ramp 

to the Loyola Street entrance of the Hyatt, locating checkpoints strategically along the way.85

Evacuation of the Superdome Swung into Full Gear on Thursday

Buses fi nally arrived in large numbers in front of the Hyatt on Th ursday morning, September 1. Th e DOT also expended considerable energy trying to arrange for rail cars, but 

without much luck.86 In the end, just 97 people were evacuated, in a single trip, by rail.87

The Evacuation of the Convention Center Began and Ended on Saturday

On Friday morning, at 8 a.m., the National Guard’s General Jones ordered Colonel Jacques 

Th ibodeaux to plan and execute a “rescue mission,” in coordination with the NOPD, at 

the Convention Center by noon that day.88 Colonel Th ibodeaux designed a plan to bring 

law and order to the Convention Center within the fi rst 30 minutes, provide food, water, 

and medicine within fi ve hours, and evacuate the premises within 48 hours.89 Supported 

by National Guard units from fi ve other states, Colonel Th ibodeaux carried out the plan at 

noon, and National Guard troops secured the entire complex in under 15 minutes without 

incident. Th e 19,000 people taking refuge were evacuated the next day within eight hours, in 

buses sent by General Graham, helicopters, and the Canal Street Ferry.90

Helping hands, Louisiana

U.S. Coast Guard photo
Chapter 22

366

Every Level of Government Failed to Identify an Adequate Number 

of Shelters Before Landfall

Before landfall, neither the city, state, nor federal government identifi ed adequate sheltering 

space outside the area that would become the fl ood zone. Adequate sheltering space was not 

identifi ed until Wednesday, August 31, two days aft er landfall. 

Sheltering options within the State of Louisiana are limited in part because the American Red Cross, the entity 

primarily responsible for sheltering under the NRP, 

will not certify any shelters below the I-10 and I-12 split 

outside of Baton Rouge because the risk of fl ooding is 

too great.91

A FEMA situation report published at 10 p.m. on Tuesday, August 30 stated: “Th e State requested assistance 

in relocating all remaining victims of Hurricane Katrina 

out of the Superdome shelter. Limiting factors include 

identifying where they are to be relocated to and identifying the transportation required.”92 A Department of 

Homeland Security document published a few hours 

later noted, under the heading “Decisions needed,” that 

the state was “expected to identify location[s] of alternate shelter locations this morning.”93

On Tuesday night, Governor Blanco had instructed 

Ann Williamson, the state’s Secretary of Social Services, 

to fi nd a shelter for 25,000 people by 6 a.m. on Wednesday.94 At 1:30 a.m. on Wednesday, Secretary Williamson 

called Texas to request the use of the Astrodome.95 Secretary Williamson explained that she had to ask for the 

Astrodome because demand for shelter space exceeded 

what was available in Louisiana.96 Between 8:30 and 9:30 

a.m. on Wednesday morning, Governor Blanco called 

Governor Perry of Texas, who agreed to open the Astrodome to receive Katrina evacuees.97 According to General Honoré, “the destination was Houston ... because 

Baton Rouge is full. Shreveport is full. Jackson, Mississippi is full. Th ere’s no more capacity in the state.”98

Family Reunifi cation and Prevention of Missing Children 

and Adult Scenarios 

A total of 13,502 adults were reported to the National Center for Missing Adults (NCMA) 

as a result of Katrina,99 and a total of 5,088 children were reported to the National Center 

for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC).100 Many shelters did not have intake forms 

or release forms to track individuals, or they did not use these forms. Additionally, FEMA 

did not fully cooperate with NCMA or NCMEC to help reunite families, citing privacy concerns (which could have been addressed). Finally, due to the lack of coordinated reporting 

or tracking of missing persons, family members oft en had to repeatedly call several organizations to seek help with fi nding family members. 

Small evacuee secured, 

New Orleans

U.S. Coast Guard photo
Post-Landfall Evacuation

367

1 Committee staff interview of Terry Tullier, Director, New Orleans Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness, LA, conducted 

on Nov. 22, 2005, transcript p. 18. FEMA sent the Committee a 2003 document from the state that recognized that 

“250,000 to 350,000 people [would] remain in stranded conditions with limited self rescue capability” aft er landfall of a 

major hurricane in the greater New Orleans area. Source: Sean Fontenot, memorandum to FEMA, Aug. 22, 2003, p. 2. 

Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0079-0000004 through 0000005 (indicating the document was 

also sent on Aug. 25, 2004 to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.); Ron Castleman, memorandum to 

Lacy Suiter, “Catastrophic Planning for New Orleans,” Aug. 8, 2001. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHSFEMA-074-0000027 (stating a need to evacuate 300,000 to 350,000 aft er landfall of a catastrophic hurricane in New 

Orleans.). According to a 2006 Emergency Response/Shelter Plan appropriations request document for which Col. Terry 

Ebbert is the point of contact, “Th e city of New Orleans faces the reality that it is impossible to conduct a mandatory 

evacuation in advance of a Category 3, 4, or 5 hurricane, as well as respond to other...disasters including terrorism. Even 

under the best conditions that currently exist in terms of emergency response in the New Orleans region, evacuation 

would leave 150,000 people in harm’s way.” Source: City of New Orleans, FY2006 Funding Request to Congress, Emergency Response Shelter/Plan Homeland Security Appropriations. Provided to Committee.

2 FEMA, DHS/FEMA Initial Response Hotwash: Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, Feb. 13, 2006, p. 45 [hereinaft er DHS/

FEMA Initial Response Hotwash, Feb. 13, 2006].

3 City offi cials interviewed did not know exactly how many people the RTA buses brought to the Superdome on Sunday, 

but the City’s Director of Homeland Security and Public Safety said that the majority of the total population at the 

Superdome before landfall arrived there by bus. Source: Committee staff interview of Col. Terry Ebbert, U.S. Marine 

Corps, (Ret.), Director, New Orleans Offi ce of Homeland Security, LA, conducted on Jan. 10, 2006, transcript pp. 81-82. 

Th e total population of the Superdome before landfall is not known with certainty, but evidence in the record indicates 

that a range of 10,000 to 15,000 people were there before landfall. Source: Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and 

Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP), Situation Report, Executive Summary, Hurricane Katrina, Aug. 29, 2005, 10 a.m. 

CT. Provided to Committee (stating that 10,342 were in the Superdome); Sally Forman, Communications Director, 

New Orleans Offi ce of the Mayor, Timeline and Notes, Aug. 28, 2005. Provided to Committee (“Dome opens as shelter 

of last resort – 10,000 gather”); Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 52, 112 (estimating 12,000 to 15,000 were in the 

Superdome before landfall).

4 DHS/FEMA Initial Response Hotwash, Feb. 13, 2006, p. iii (stating that with Katrina’s “mass evacuation to locations 

throughout the country and other spillover eff ects nationwide, human resources were stretched particularly thin.”).

5 U.S. Department of Transportation, Hurricane Katrina-Situation Report, Aug. 28, 2005, 3 p.m., p. 3 (“All buses and 

large support vehicles not in use are being moved to the Poland St. Wharves, the highest place in New Orleans.”); Committee staff interview of Dwight Brashear, Chief Executive Offi cer and General Manager, Capital Area Transit System, 

Baton Rouge, LA, conducted on Jan. 5, 2006, transcript pp. 56-57 (recalling conversation RTA Director William DeVille 

telling Mr. Brashear that the RTA “parked 180 buses up there”). U.S. Department of Transportation offi cial circulated an 

e-mail, reporting that buses would be moved to “docks” before the storm hit, to a number of federal offi cials, including 

the Administrator for the Federal Transit Administration, Robert Jamison and the Homeland Security Operations Center. Source: Robert Patrick, e-mail to Anthony Tisdale, Aug. 28, 2005, 11:52 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

no. DHS-HSOC-0002-0000055 (“Buses not being used are being moved to docks. Oddly enough the high ground in new 

Orleans [sic]. Houma does not have high ground but are securing facilities. ... Please forward to all interestd [sic] paries 

[sic]. Ps. I’ve spoken with bill deville. Rta gm and he will keep us updated.”). Tisdale forwarded this e-mail ten minutes 

later to a number of U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT) offi cials, including Robert Jamison, the Administrator 

of the Federal Transit Authority, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) offi cials, including one at DHS headquarters 

and one at the Homeland Security Operations Center. Source: Anthony Tisdale, e-mail to Roger Bohnert and others, 

Aug. 28, 2005, 12:02 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-HSOC-0002-0000055.

6 On Th ursday, a Capital Area Transit Systems offi cial, Dwight Brashear, learned of these buses from RTA Director William DeVille and immediately took steps to move drivers to those buses, so that they could participate in the evacuation 

of New Orleans. Brashear interview, Jan. 5, 2006, pp. 56-59.

7 Committee staff interview of Sec. Johnny Bradberry, Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development, 

conducted on Dec. 21, 2005, transcript p. 80 (“So it makes sense to me what would be an agency that would be more 

closely tied to a function that could provide both, drivers and buses and we needed to iron that out. Could it be – could it 

be tourism. Th ey know, they have all the buses, companies in the State, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. So I had a real issue 

with resources as it relates to this. Not only in terms of drivers and buses, but in terms of in my opinion not having the 

resources that National Guard had. Th ey obviously have access to a lot more people, resources than DOTD people do.”). 

Although he signed the state’s April 2005 Emergency Operations Plan along with the Governor and every other state 

offi cial, Sec. Bradberry testifi ed that he “had serious issues” with LA DOTD’s responsibility under that plan because “we 

didn’t feel like we were the best quote agency or group to coordinate that.” Source: Sec. Bradberry interview, Dec. 21, 

2005, pp. 78-79. Sec. Bradberry testifi ed that he disagreed with the assignment of his department to lead the state’s ESF-1 

eff ort because “My main issue is that it’s a resource issue. We don’t feel like, fi rst of all, we’re not in the transit business, 

we have the title of Department of Transportation but we’re not in the transit business. We have no buses, we have no 

drivers.” Source: Sec. Bradberry interview, Dec. 21, 2005, p. 80.

8 Secretary Bradberry said that between April 2005 and landfall, he was not personally involved in any conversations 

with any Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness offi cials about his department’s new 

transportation responsibilities under the April 2005 plan. Source: Sec. Bradberry interview, Dec. 21, 2005, pp. 84-85. 

Sec. Bradberry’s chief subordinates, LA DOTD Assistant Secretary of Operations Gordon Nelson and LA DOTD Chief 
Chapter 22

368

of Emergency Services Joe Modicut learned about the assignment of this responsibility to LA DOTD in July 2005, aft er 

which Asst. Sec. Nelson tried to schedule a meeting with LOHSEP Acting Deputy Director Col. Jeff Smith, but the 

meeting did not take place before Katrina made landfall, even though Modicut does not recall becoming aware of the 

department’s responsibility until the weekend before landfall. Source: Committee staff interview of Gordon Nelson, Assistant Secretary of Operations, Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development, conducted on Jan. 6, 2006, 

transcript pp. 52-59; IEM, Inc., notes from Unifi ed Command Final Briefi ng, July 29, 2005, p. 3. Provided to Committee 

(placing Joe Modicut at the July 2005 transportation working group meeting); Committee staff interview of Joe Modicut, 

Emergency Services Coordinator, Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development, conducted on Jan. 5, 

2006, transcript p. 38 (stating he did not know LA DOTD was responsible for transportation under the state plan until 

the weekend before landfall).

9 On Tuesday and Wednesday, the state’s Department of Transportation and Development used fi ve ferries to evacuate 

6,000 people from those parishes. Sec. Bradberry interview, Dec. 21, 2005, pp. 108, 113-114; Nelson interview, Jan. 6, 

2006, pp. 79-83.

10 Sec. Bradberry interview, Dec. 21, 2005, pp. 172-183, 192-193.

11 Sec. Bradberry interview, Dec. 21, 2005, p. 86; Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, 

Emergency Operations Plan, Apr. 2005, p. BASIC-4–A–1 [hereinaft er Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan, Apr. 2005] 

(stating that the Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness would be the lead agency for 

Emergency Support Function 5 – Emergency Management – which required LOHSEP to “[p]repare detailed implementing procedures for all primary functions, to include the procedures by which the offi ce will be alerted and activated for 

24-hour operations when needed.”).

12 DHS/FEMA Initial Response Hotwash, Feb. 13, 2006, p. 45 (“Th e Federal government has neither generic nor specifi c 

evacuation plans.”). Th e Department of Homeland Security and FEMA recognized their failure to train personnel for an 

evacuation, before Katrina approached the Gulf Coast. DHS/FEMA Initial Response Hotwash, Feb. 13, 2006, p. v (“Hurricane Katrina highlighted the need to train operations personnel for evacuation.”).

13 Don Day, Region VI Regional Emergency Transportation Representative, Offi ce of Intelligence, Security and 

Emergency Response, U.S. Department of Transportation, cited in notes from Unifi ed Command Final Briefi ng, July 

29, 2005, p. 4. Provided to Committee (reporting to other federal, state, and local offi cials: “600 buses needed just to 

move people from collection points. ... We need to pre-identify the sources for these buses and have them lined up and 

ready. Th ere are plans to evacuate buses and operators out before the storm. Requires forethought, prior action. We have 

never looked into what it takes to make a bus staging/dispatch area.”); Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, 

prepared by IEM, Inc. for LOHSEP and FEMA, Sept. 2005, Appendix 1, p. 1 [hereinaft er Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, Sept. 2005] (Noting that “local/state/federal” offi cials “pre-landfall” should “identify/validate ... 

600 buses [and] 1,200 drivers”); Committee staff interview of Don Day, Region VI Regional Emergency Transportation 

Representative, Offi ce of Intelligence, Security and Emergency Response, U.S. Department of Transportation, conducted 

on Jan. 17, 2006, transcript p. 57 (stating that the need for 1,000 buses “came out of the forethought, a little bit of the 

thought process of Pam.”). 

Day briefed another DOT offi cial on what Day learned at Pam: “Don Day was the U.S. DOT rep in that [Pam] work 

group and I was mainly talking to him. I remember being debriefed as needing hundreds of buses, hundreds of buses to 

augment the hundreds of buses they already had there in New Orleans. ... ” Source: Committee staff interview of Dolph 

Diemont, Region X Regional Emergency Transportation Representative, Offi ce of Intelligence, Security and Emergency 

Response, U.S. Department of Transportation, conducted on Jan. 6, 2006, transcript p. 26 (“I remember Don Day agonizing over that. We were working long hours in there, trying to come up with a plan, a way, some way to move all those 

people. And we said oh, this is so huge, we’re going to need so many buses, we’re going to need all of this planning and 

communications and cooperation, coordination, all of this to come together. It’s really a massive eff ort.”). DOT offi cial, 

Dan Prevo, who participated in that working group, recalled the needed number of buses discussed without prompting. 

Source: Committee staff interview of Dan Prevo, Region VI Regional Emergency Transportation Representative, Offi ce 

of Intelligence, Security and Emergency Response, U.S. Department of Transportation, conducted on Jan. 17, 2006, transcript p. 14 (“Th ey talked in terms of 600 buses. And the reason I remember that is that once we got into Katrina where 

we didn’t have the number of evacuees or number of injured that were estimated in this Pam exercise. But we ended up 

calling up about 1,100 buses. So even that, that 600 estimate had we gotten the number of evacuees and casualties that 

were estimated during Pam, we would have needed considerably more than the 600 than fi rst estimated.”).

14 A FEMA offi cial at the workshop suggested to the other participants that 5,000 buses per day would be needed. Committee staff interview of Jules Hurst, Transportation Supervisor, Logistics Branch, FEMA, conducted on Dec. 27, 2005, 

transcript p. 34 (“At fi rst we were told that – I said you got to give me a number to work with here, and when they said 

how many buses do we need, they said, okay, 75,000 refugees a day – refugees? Evacuees a day for 10 days. And they said, 

What do you need? And I said 5,000 buses a day.”).

15 Don Day, Region VI Regional Emergency Transportation Representative, Offi ce of Intelligence, Security and Emergency Response, U.S. Department of Transportation, cited in notes from Unifi ed Command Final Briefi ng, July 29, 2005, 

p. 4. Provided to Committee (“We’re at less than 10% done with this trans planning when you consider the buses and the 

people.”). Th e inadequacy of local resources to evacuate New Orleans had been a longstanding concern. Source: Brian 

Wolshon, Elba Urbina, and Marc Levitan, Louisiana State University Hurricane Center, National Review of Hurricane 

Evacuation Plans and Policies, 2001, p. 18 (“Th e total number of busses in all of New Orleans would provide only a 

fraction of the capacity needed to transport all of these people.”). It also became known to DOT offi cials that city lacked 

drivers for the buses. Source: Prevo interview, Jan. 17, 2006, pp. 12-14 (stating that based on the Pam discussions, there 

was “no certainty that the drivers – if the buses would be made available, that the drivers would be available ... a whole 
Post-Landfall Evacuation

369

lot of research had to be done with regard to how many drivers would be available, or the liability issues that might be 

faced for the buses and for the drivers”); Hurst interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 37 (recalling that local offi cials in the Pam follow-up workshops reported “they didn’t know if they could get the drivers to report.”).

16 Diemont interview, Jan. 6, 2006, pp. 30-31; Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, Sept. 2005, Appendix 1, 

p. 1 (noting that “local/state/federal” offi cials “pre-landfall” should “identify/validate ... 600 buses [and] 1,200 drivers”) 

(emphasis added).

17 Testimony of Maj. Gen. Bennett Landreneau, Adjutant General, Louisiana, before the U.S. Senate Committee on 

Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Defense Department’s Role in the 

Response, Feb. 9, 2006; Committee staff interview of Maj. Gen. Bennett Landreneau, Adjutant General, Louisiana, conducted on Jan. 11, 2006, transcript pp. 68, 133. 

Th e Secretary of Transportation and Development of the State of Louisiana also expected federal involvement in the 

pre-storm preparation for the post-landfall evacuation. Sec. Bradberry interview, Dec. 21, 2005, p. 87 (“My assumption 

was that once the Federal Government was informed that a disaster or a potential disaster was to strike that appropriate 

assets would be deployed accordingly, that included buses, that included National Guard from other areas, that included 

FEMA and their other assets besides buses, it included the whole gamut.”).

18 Hurst interview, Dec. 27, 2005, p. 36. However Scott Wells, the Federal Coordinating Offi cer during Katrina and a 

Hurricane Pam participant testifi ed the state offi cials at Pam told him not to worry about evacuation because the state 

did not need help with that aspect. Committee staff interview of Scott Wells, Deputy Federal Coordinating Offi cer for 

Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, FEMA, conducted on Nov. 14, 2005, transcript pp. 86-87.

19 Patrick Rhode, e-mail to Edward Buikema, Michael Lowder and Ken Burris, Aug. 28, 2005 10:16 a.m. Provided to 

Committee; fi led as Bates no. HS-FEMA-0091-0000320 (“I know we need 72 hours to do this – we don’t have it.”); 

Committee staff interview of Vincent Pearce, Manager, National Response Program, Offi ce of Intelligence, Security, 

and Emergency Response, U.S. Department of Transportation, Jan. 6, 2006, p. 72 (stating that DOT worked with the 

Metropolitan Transit Authority for the City of New York to get buses to New Orleans aft er landfall, but that “it wasn’t 

an instantaneous thing” in part because “you have to put diff erent tires and wheels on inner-city buses to move them 

interstate,” and then “once they were ready to move, it was going to take ... about 24 hours just to get the buses ready to 

move downrange.”). 

20 By contrast, in the run up to Hurricane Rita, FEMA deployed over 300 people to prepare for the evacuation. DHS/

FEMA Initial Response Hotwash, Feb. 13, 2006, p. 5 (“When it came time to prepare for evacuation when Hurricane Rita 

threatened, over 300 people were reporting to the various teams.”).

21 Compare Hurst interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 8, 44 (stating the heads-up would have occurred “about 48 to 72 hours 

prior” to the time when the task order was ultimately placed on Wednesday, at 1:45 a.m.) with Committee staff interview 

of Reggie Jones, ESF-1 Program Manager, Offi ce of Intelligence, Security and Emergency Response, U.S. Department 

of Transportation, conducted on Jan. 17, 2006, pp. 23, 31 (stating that the heads up was made as early as “Friday night 

... or Saturday morning”); See also: Committee staff interview of Mike Foran, Region IV Regional Emergency Transportation Representative, Offi ce of Intelligence, Security and Emergency Response, U.S. Department of Transportation, 

conducted on Jan. 17, 2006, transcript p. 38 (recalling that he proposed 500 buses, and Hurst said, “you might have to 

double it”). Although Hurst recalled giving a handwritten note with this request to Reggie Jones, a DOT representative 

staffi ng the ESF-1 desk at the NRCC during Katrina, the DOT has not produced the note in response to the Committee’s 

document requests. Hurst’s request made its way into a DOT document published at 3p.m. on Sunday, Aug. 28, 2005, 

which reported that “coordination is underway... with the DOT national transportation contractor for possible provision of buses.” U.S. Department of Transportation, Hurricane Katrina – Situation Report #4, Aug. 27, 2005, 3 p.m., p. 4. 

Provided to Committee.

22 Landstar Express America Inc., Hurricane Katrina Response Research, Aug. 28, 2005. Provided to Committee; Foran 

interview, Jan. 17, 2006, p. 38.

23 Patrick Rhode, e-mail Edward Buikema, Michael Lowder and Ken Burris, Aug. 28, 2005, 10:16 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0091-0000320 (“Have we asked all eoc’s via emac or esf (transportation) to make 

transportation assets available to assist New Orleans today with evacuations? I know we need 72 hours to do this – we 

don’t have it – not sure what state is applying if someone can get some granularity on this issue.”).

24 Patrick Rhode, e-mail to Edward Buikema, Michael Lowder and Ken Burris, Aug. 28, 2005, 10:16 a.m. Provided to 

Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0091-0000320. 

25 It should be noted, however, that on Saturday, Aug. 27, 2005, the Governor did ask the President for funds to assist 

with the state’s coordination of the evacuation. Gov. Kathleen Blanco, letter to President George Bush, Aug. 27, 2005, pp. 

2 and Enclosure A. Provided to Committee (requesting $2.5 million for evacuation-related funds for the Louisiana State 

Police, Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, and the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development, but no request for transportation.). 

26 Testimony of Sec. Michael Chertoff , U.S. Department of Homeland Security, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on 

Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Homeland Security Department’s 

Preparation and Response, Feb. 15, 2006.

27 Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 2006.

28 President George Bush, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 28, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. 

DHS-FEMA-0105-0000079 through 0000080, 0000103 through 0000104; 
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29 Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 2006 (stating that aft er the video teleconference call of Sunday, 

Aug. 28, 2005, he “did not call the Department of Transportation and say, I want to see the plan.”).

30 Maj. Gen. Landreneau, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 9, 2006 (“We had procedures in place. We had contingencies 

to be able to get the personnel to the buses because the water was rising. In every case, from Monday through Th ursday, 

there were – we had plans in place and we had contingencies to be able to get all of the personnel onto the buses.”); Col. 

Ebbert interview, Oct. 13, 2005, p. 121 (stating that “there was no reason not to move people ... out of the Superdome”).

31 Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, Sept. 2005 (“Parish resources in the most severely impacted areas 

will not be available for several weeks or even months, as they were not removed from the area prior to the storm.”)

32 Testimony of Mayor C. Ray Nagin, City of New Orleans, LA, before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Managing the Crisis and Evacuating New Orleans, Feb. 1, 

2006; Col. Ebbert interview, Oct. 13, 2005, p. 121; Committee staff interview of Sally Forman, Communications Director, 

Offi ce of the Mayor, City of New Orleans, LA, conducted on Jan. 10, 2006, transcript pp. 70-76; Mayor C. Ray Nagin, 

City of New Orleans, “Post-Hurricane Katrina Critical Needs Assessment,” Aug. 29, 2005, p. 1. Provided to Committee 

[hereinaft er Mayor Nagin, “Post-Hurricane Katrina Critical Needs Assessment”]

33 Th e list did not list evacuation as a critical need, but it did state that “vehicles and drivers to coordinate the transport 

from the Dome to the Convention Center would also be required,” if and when the city were to open the Convention 

Center as a refuge of last resort “in lieu of the Superdome.” Mayor Nagin, “Post-Hurricane Katrina Critical Needs Assessment,” p. 1; Forman interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 75-76 (noting that transportation needs were not listed).

34 Th e mayor’s communications director provided the Committee with transcribed notes for each day’s activities immediately preceding and following landfall. For Tuesday, Aug. 30, 2005, her notes stated: “Call to [Chief of Staff to the 

Governor] Andy Kopplin for No. 1 priority from state for buses.” Sally Forman, Communications Director, New Orleans Offi ce of the Mayor, Timeline and Notes, Aug. 30, 2005. Provided to Committee; Forman interview, Jan. 10, 2006, 

pp. 99-100 (noting that the city may have also made earlier requests for buses).

35 Forman interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 100-104.

36 Brashear interview, Jan. 5, 2006, p. 57; Committee staff interview of James Tillie, Safety Director, Regional Transit 

Authority, New Orleans, LA, conducted on Dec. 19, 2005, transcript p. 46.

37 Forman interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 92-93, 99.

38 Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Response to the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 

Aff airs, Document and Information Request Dated Oct. 7, 2005 and to the U.S. House of Representatives Select Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, Overview of Governor Kathleen Babineaux 

Blanco’s Actions in Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, Dec. 2, 2005, p. 7 [hereinaft er Louisiana Offi ce 

of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline] (Governor Blanco told the President on Monday, “We need your help. We need 

everything you’ve got.” Brown told Governor Blanco that FEMA had “500 buses on standby, ready to be deployed,” and 

that Governor Blanco recommended to him that FEMA put two drivers in each bus, so they can alternate shift s and rest 

without losing time.); Maj. Gen. Landreneau, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 9, 2006. 

39 Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 9 (stating that Governor Blanco asked Maj. Gen. Landreneau on Tuesday to check on the status of the FEMA buses); Maj. Gen. Landreneau, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 

9, 2006; Louisiana Offi ce of Emergency Planning, Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development, and 

Louisiana State Police, “OEP, DOTD, LSP Timeline,” p. 18. Provided to Committee (“OEP, 8/31/05, 1:30:00, Verbal 

request to FEMA ESF-1 for 455 buses.”); Testimony of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, before the U.S. Senate, 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Role of U.S. Department of Homeland Security and FEMA Leadership, Feb. 10, 2006 (stating that Brown requested 500 buses from other 

FEMA offi cials, but that FEMA did not task the U.S. Department of Transportation for buses until Wednesday, August 

31, 2005, two days aft er landfall).

40 Brown, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 10, 2006; Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 9 (“the 

expected and promised federal resources still have not arrived on Wednesday.”).

41 Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 9.

42 Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, pp. 9-10.

43 Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 10.

44 FEMA, Tasking Request and Assignment Form, Aug. 31, 2005, 1:45 a.m. Provided to Committee (tasking “Transportation” to send 455 buses to New Orleans). 

45 Brown, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 10, 2006 (unable to explain why the buses did not arrive when expected, and 

why FEMA did not task the U.S. Department of Transportation for buses until Wednesday, Aug. 31, 2005); Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 2006 (incorrectly understood that 450 FEMA buses were on their way to New 

Orleans on Tuesday night, before any FEMA tasking order went out to DOT.); Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, 

Feb. 15, 2006 (stating that “the biggest failure was not getting buses in.”). 

46 FEMA, Tasking Request and Assignment Form, Aug. 31, 2005, 1:45 a.m. Provided to Committee (tasking “Transportation” to send 455 buses to New Orleans). 

47 Committee staff interview of Col. Jeff Smith, Louisiana National Guard (Ret.), Acting Deputy Director, Emergency 

Management, LOHSEP, conducted on Jan. 13, 2006, pp. 113-114 (stating that a FEMA offi cial “at the headquarters 
Post-Landfall Evacuation

371

decided based on the number of people and everything that 455 would be enough.”).

48 Col. Smith interview, Jan. 13, 2006, p. 116.

49 Th e Governor’s eff orts were also set back by a miscommunication from FEMA. Phil Parr, a FEMA offi cial on the 

ground at the Superdome, developed a plan (which ultimately proved impracticable) to use Chinook helicopters to 

evacuate the Superdome. Testimony of Phil Parr, Federal Coordinating Offi cer, Region I, FEMA, before the U.S. Senate, 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Perspectives of FEMA’s 

Operations Professionals, Dec. 8, 2005. At one point on Wednesday, that plan was communicated by FEMA to Ty 

Bromell of the state’s Offi ce of Rural Development. Source: Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 

11; Committee staff interview of Ty Brommel, Executive Director, Louisiana Governor’s Offi ce of Rural Development, 

conducted on Jan. 10, 2006, transcript p. 19. Reacting to that information, Bromell then sent out a statewide e-mail at 

10:30 a.m., which read, in part, “NO MORE CALLS FOR BUSES!” Source: Ty Bromell, e-mail to Rochelle Michaud 

Dugas and others, Aug. 31, 2005, 10:30 a.m. Provided to committe. Brommel interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 19. It is unclear 

from the record whether FEMA told Brommel to stop the buses, or whether he ordered the staff to stop getting buses on 

his own, communications between FEMA. Later in the day, the same staff er learned that the eff ort to obtain buses should 

continue and sent out an e-mail to that eff ect. Source: Brommel interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 28-29.

50 Committee staff interview of Brig. Gen. Gary Jones, Assistant Joint Forces Commander, Louisiana Army National 

Guard, conducted Dec. 7, 2005, transcript pp. 89, 90-91.

51 Parr, Senate Committee hearing, Dec. 18, 2005; DHS/FEMA Initial Response Hotwash, Feb. 13, 2006, p. 46 (“An 

example of a problem associated with the lack of communications was during the Superdome evacuation coordination. 

Th e liaison team at the Superdome attempted to coordinate with the Federal and State elements at the State Emergency 

Operations Center (EOC) in Baton Rouge. Communications to Baton Rouge failed, so the liaisons coordinated with the 

[FEMA Region VI Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) in Denton, TX] and [the National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) in Washington, D.C.]. Consequently, the EOC in Baton Rouge had no visibility on this operation.”). Although this communications failure limited FEMA offi cials’ visibility on the evacuation of the Superdome, it 

should not have eliminated their visibility, assuming they could share information with state offi cials at Baton Rouge. 

52 DHS/FEMA Initial Response Hotwash, Feb. 13, 2006, p. 46.

53 At 3:47 a.m., DOT dispatched the fi rst 50 buses with 200-250 more buses anticipated in the next 12-18 hours. U.S. 

Department of Transportation, Actions for Hurricane Katrina, Annotated Chronology of Signifi cant Events, Oct. 6, 

2005, p. 4. [hereinaft er DOT, Timeline, Oct. 6, 2005].

54 DOT, Timeline, Oct. 6, 2005, p. 4. 

55 DOT, Timeline, Oct. 6, 2005, p. 4. 

56 It is not clear whether the Governor delegated the post-storm evacuation responsibilities outside of LA DOTD 

because she knew LA DOTD was supposed to be responsible for the post-storm evacuation. Committee staff interview of 

James Ballow, Senior Operating Offi cer, LOHSEP, conducted on Jan. 4, 2006, pp. 81-84 (stating that the likely conclusion from the Governor’s assignment of the post-storm evacuation to Leonard Kleinpeter was that she determined the 

LA DOTD was not able to fulfi ll its post-storm evacuation functions under the plan, but “maybe there is a possibility 

that maybe she wasn’t familiar with the plan itself enough to know who to call either. I am not sure. I really can’t say 

how she arrived at that decision.”).

57 Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 8; Committee staff interview of Leonard Kleinpeter, Special 

Assistant to the Governor and Director, Louisiana Offi ce of Community Programs, conducted on Jan. 10, 2006, transcript pp. 6-9, 18 (“And I called my – remember the part about being director of [the Offi ce of Community Programs] 

and rural areas and in charge of all of that. And my folks knew those people on a fi rst named basis. I knew some as well. 

And I picked the phone up and said, “We need the school buses.” And we started calling for school buses. And we called 

for school buses and we put some in motion as fast as we could.”).

58 Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 8; Kleinpeter interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 18.

59 Executive Order No. KBB 2005-31, “Emergency Evacuation by Buses,” Aug. 31, 2005; Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 11. 

60 Kleinpeter interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 28-30, 98-101; Brommel interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 43-47.

61 Th e evacuation was also assisted by Dwight Brashear with the Capital Area Transit System (CATS), whom the 

state enlisted on Wednesday night to follow up on the Governor’s Executive Order and procure school buses. Source: 

Brashear interview, Jan. 5, 2006, pp. 5-6. To that point, the state had been operating without a professional transportation logistics expert, and when Mr. Brashear arrived at the state’s EOC, he found not only a lack of planning for the use 

of buses in evacuation, but also little useful information to assist him in his task: “Th is was major ... but it was almost 

like they weren’t – like they were being hit with a hurricane for the fi rst time. Maybe nobody thought it would ever happen, I guess.” Source: Brashear interview, Jan. 5, 2006, p. 85. 

62 Committee staff interview of Maj. Jeff Mayne, Supervisor, Special Investigator Section, Louisiana Department of 

Wildlife and Fisheries, conducted on Nov. 30, 2005, transcript pp. 72-73, 156; Sec. Landreneau interview, Nov. 30, 2005, 

pp. 191-192; Committee staff interview of Avis Gray, Regional Administrator, Region I, Offi ce of Public Health, Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, conducted on Dec. 8, 2005, transcript pp. 157-161.

63 Committee staff interview of Lt. Col. Keith LaCaze, Assistant Administrator, Law Enforcement Division, Louisiana 

Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, conducted on Nov. 30, 2005, transcript pp. 70-71.
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64 Committee staff interview of Brig. Gen. Brod Veillon, Assistant Adjutant General, Louisiana National Guard, conducted on Nov. 29, 2005, transcript pp. 31, 41-42. 

65 According to Sheriff Harris Lee of Jeff erson Parish, it is only by chance that he learned that thousands of people were 

sitting on I-10 in need of food and water. As a result, the people lacked food and water for as long as a full day. Committee staff interview of Harry Lee, Sheriff , Jeff erson Parish, Louisiana, conducted on Jan. 9, 2006, transcript pp. 34-37. 

66 Committee staff interview of Scott Delacroix, M.D., resident, LSU, conducted on Feb. 20, 2006 (untranscribed).

67 Lt. Col. LaCaze interview, Nov. 30, 2005, pp. 143-144; Committee staff interview of Col. Glenn Curtis, Chief of Staff , 

Louisiana National Guard, conducted on Dec. 6, 2005, transcript pp. 264-265; Committee staff interview of Lonnie 

Swain, Assistant Superintendent, New Orleans Police Department, LA, conducted on Nov. 9, 2005, transcript pp. 101-

102.

68 Louisiana National Guard (LANG) offi cials on the ground at the Superdome began talking about evacuation planning 

to some extent on Monday night, but those conversations intensifi ed on Tuesday, when the area around the Superdome 

fl ooded. On Tuesday, Maj. Gen. Landreneau ordered Gen. Gary Jones, who was in command of the LANG offi cers on 

the ground in New Orleans during Katrina, to take control of the evacuation, even though LANG usually served in a 

supporting role. Gen. Jones assumed his job would be to provide security for the people at the Superdome and get people 

to the buses, when they arrived. Source: Brig. Gen. Jones interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 93 (“FEMA was saying we’ll get you 

the buses, and I was responsible for the security of the people until the buses came.”). Nevertheless, Gen. Jones had his 

soldiers experiment with high water vehicles to see if they could be used to evacuate people, but the vehicles had limited 

capacity, and there were concerns about whether they could handle the volume of passengers give the depth of water on 

the ground. Source: Brig. Gen. Jones interview, Dec. 7, 2005, pp. 106-107.

69 Swain interview, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 102.

70 Mayor Nagin, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 1, 2006.

71 Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 115-116, 137-138; Mayor Nagin, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 1, 2006 

(stating that people from the hotels evacuated to the Convention Center).

72 Maj. Gen. Landreneau interview, Jan. 11, 2006, p. 265 (“New Orleans Police Department was becoming overwhelmed 

at the Convention Center.”).

73 Mayor Nagin, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 1, 2006 (“With all due respect to Secretary Chertoff and Mr. Brown, I 

don’t understand how anyone in authority, with this type of crisis, can say that they were not aware that we had a crisis 

in New Orleans, and we had people that were stranded on roofs, on highways, and at the Convention Center, and they 

didn’t know about it. Th at is just next to impossible. Th e entire Nation was enthralled on this disaster, so I categorically 

reject their claims.”). Key DOD offi cials did not learn of the need until Th ursday, Sept 1. Committee staff interview 

of Brig. Gen. Mark Graham, U.S. Army, Deputy Commanding General, Fift h U.S. Army, conducted on Jan. 12, 2006, 

transcript p. 105.

74 Brig. Gen. Jones interview, Dec. 7, 2005, pp. 96, 190-191.

75 Brig. Gen. Jones interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 196.

76 Maj. Gen. Landreneau interview, Jan. 11, 2006, pp. 265-266 (stating that Col. Ebbert called him late on Th ursday 

night); Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 151-155 (stating that he called Maj. Gen. Landreneau late on Th ursday 

night); Lt. Col. Jacques Th ibodeaux, memorandum on the events surrounding the Louisiana National Guard rescue 

mission of the Morial Convention Center, Dec. 2, 2005, p. 1 [hereinaft er Lt. Col. Th ibodeaux, memorandum on the 

Convention Center, Dec. 2, 2005] (“Early Morning Hours (Approximate 0200), 2 Sep 05–MG Landreneau receives a verbal request from NO Emergency Operations Manager, COL(R) Terry Ebbert to conduct a rescue mission at the MCC. 

COL(R) Ebbert requests the mission be conducted in coordination with the New Orleans Police Department and that it 

commence the same day.”).

77 Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 10; Brig. Gen. Graham interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 26-28.

78 Brig. Gen. Graham interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 54-55. By Wednesday evening, a suffi cient numbers of buses had 

amassed at Mile Marker 209. Source: Brig. Gen. Graham interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 81. He developed a plan: 10 buses at 

a time would leave mile marker 209, escorted by two State Troopers; they would travel to the Hyatt Regency (adjacent 

to the Superdome complex) where evacuees would board. Source: Brig. Gen. Graham interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 78-79. 

Th e convoys (or “serials”) would be appropriately spaced – when buses arrived at the Hyatt, the liaison offi cers on site 

would call back to Mile Marker 209, at which point another serial would leave. By the time the fi rst serial was loaded, the 

next serial had already arrived. Source: Brig. Gen. Graham interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 55.

79 Brig. Gen. Graham interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 95-96.

80 Brig. Gen. Graham interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 57.

81 Brig. Gen. Graham interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 96.

82 Committee staff interview of Lt. Col. Jacques Th ibodeaux, Joint Director of Military Support to Civilian Authorities, 

Louisiana National Guard, conducted on Jan. 12, 2006, transcript pp. 44-49.

83 Committee staff interview of Lt. Col. Jacques Th ibodeaux, Joint Director of Military Support to Civilian Authorities, 

Louisiana National Guard, conducted on Dec. 16, 2005, transcript p. 261; Lt. Col. Th ibodeaux interview, Jan. 12, 2006, 

pp. 44-49, 64; Brig. Gen. Graham interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 53, 64, 69.
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373

84 Lt. Col. Th ibodeaux interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 64; Brig. Gen. Graham interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 83.

85 Lt. Col. Th ibodeaux interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 39-65 (discussing story of LANG offi cials catching U.S. Navy offi cers 

in the act of posing as hotel contractors and stealing buses headed to the Superdome, so that the offi cers could use them 

to evacuate the stranded families of Naval offi cers in New Orleans); Lt. Col. Th ibodeaux, memorandum on the Convention Center, Dec. 2, 2005, p. 3.

86 Diemont interview, Jan. 6, 2006, pp. 99-100.

87 U.S. DOT, Timeline, Oct. 6, 2005, p. 6.

88 Lt. Col. Th ibodeaux, memorandum on the Convention Center, Dec. 2, 2005, p. 1 (“BG Jones further advises LTC 

Th ibodeaux that ... the mission must start not later than 1200 hours.”).

89 Lt. Col. Th ibodeaux, memorandum on the Convention Center, Dec. 2, 2005, pp. 1, 3 (“LTC Th ibodeaux establishes 

goals for each phase: Law & Order: 30 Minutes, Relief: 5 Hours and Evacuation: 48 Hours.”); Lt. Col. Th ibodeaux interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 31-32, 132-133.

90 Lt. Col. Th ibodeaux interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 35. DOD assets on the ground at the Convention Center created some 

confusion for the LANG offi cers at times. For example, LANG Lt. Col. Th ibodeaux, in charge of the Convention Center 

missions for the Guard, discussed the unannounced landing of a limited number of DOD helicopters on Friday, which if 

used at that time to evacuate people, would have forced the Guard and DOD to decide who would get on the helicopters, 

thereby potentially enraging the rest of the crowd. Source: Lt. Col. Th ibodeaux interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 147-149. Lt. 

Col. Th ibodeaux explained that he made arrangements with the DOD helicopter pilots to have the helicopters return to 

the Convention Center on Saturday to participate in the coordinated evacuation at that time. Source: Lt. Col. Th ibodeaux 

interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 147-149. Although Lt. Col. Th ibodeaux initially thought 20,000 to 22,000 people were at the 

Convention Center, he later determined that 19,000 people were there, and they were evacuated by Saturday, September 

3, 2005, at 6:30 p.m. CT. Source: Lt. Col. Th ibodeaux, memorandum on the Convention Center, Dec. 2, 2005, p. 9 (“1830 

hours, 3 Sep 05-LTC Th ibodeaux reports evacuation complete to JOC. LTC Th ibodeaux estimates the total numbers 

evacuated: 2000 via the Canal Street Ferry, 14000 via 269 buses and 3000 (mostly elderly and medical) via helicopters.”).

91 Committee staff interview of Kay Wilkins, Chief Executive Offi cer, Southeast Louisiana Chapter, American Red 

Cross, conducted on Dec. 20, 2005, transcript pp. 14-18. See also: Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 34-35 (characterizing the Red Cross’s ban on sheltering South of I-10 as “arbitrary”).

92 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Region VI RRCC Spot Report #26, Aug. 20, 2005, 10 p.m. CT. Provided to 

Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-HSPC-0003-0001157.

93 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, HSOC Spot Report #30, Aug. 31, 2005, 2 a.m. ET, p. 2. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0061-0000575 through 0000576 (“New, alternate shelter locations have not been 

determined but sites have been considered and the State is making a decision early today.”).

94 Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 9; Committee staff interview of Sec. Ann Williamson, 

Louisiana Department of Social Services, conducted on Dec. 7, 2005, transcript pp. 98-99. Sec. Williamson and her 

team analyzed the shelter capacity in Louisiana and determined that the demand outstripped the supply. At around 10 

or 10:30 that evening, they arrived at the fi nal plan – use the Astrodome in Houston, TX. Sec. Williamson immediately 

conveyed this plan to the TAG and the Governor’s executive staff . Sec. Williamson and her team reached out to offi cials 

in Texas that night. Sec. Williamson interview, Dec. 7, 2005, pp. 98-99, 102-106.

95 Sec. Williamson interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 105.

96 Sec. Williamson interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 102.

97 Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 10; Sec. Williamson interview, Dec. 7, 2005, pp. 105-106. 

According to Gen. Russell Honoré, “ ... the destination was Houston ... because Baton Rouge is full. Shreveport is full. 

Jackson, Mississippi is full. Th ere’s no more capacity in the state.” Committee staff interview of Lt. Gen. Russell Honoré, 

U.S. Army, Commanding General, First U.S. Army, conducted on Jan. 9, 2006, transcript p. 93.

98 Th e Committee’s investigation has revealed that the insuffi ciency of in-state sheltering options was also an obstacle to 

pre-landfall evacuation, and even to pre-storm planning in the months leading up to Katrina. When RTA representative 

James Tillie called Chief Matthews over the weekend to off er their services, he was told that city planners had not yet 

identifi ed destinations for potential evacuees. Source: James Tillie, e-mail to William Deville, “RTA Actives for Hurricane Katrina,” Oct. 23, 2005, 11:29 a.m., p. 1. Provided to Committee. Similarly, the lack of available in-state sheltering 

options was an obstacle to eff orts to conduct advance planning for evacuation; for example, one of the obstacles to the 

fi nalization of draft MOUs between the City and Amtrak to procure emergency means of evacuation was that the city 

planners could not provide destinations for the evacuees. Source: Committee staff interview of William Crosbie, Senior 

Vice-President of Operations, Th e National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak), conducted on Feb. 17, 2006, 

transcript p. 77.

99 Kym I. Pasqualini, National Center for Missing Adults, e-mail to Patricia Rojas, Senate Committee staff member, 

Mar. 29, 2006, 10:53 p.m. See also: National Center for Missing Adults. http://www.missingadults.org.

100 National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, “National Center for Missing and Exploited Children Reunites 

Last Missing Child Separated by Hurricane Katrina and Rita,” press release, Mar. 17, 2006. http://www.missingkids.

com/missingkids/servlet/NewsEventServlet?LanguageCountry=en_US&PageId=2317. Accessed on Mar. 30, 2006.
374

Offloading drinking water

Army National Guard photo
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Logistics

Although some FEMA witnesses testifi ed that FEMA had pre-positioned more commodities before Hurricane Katrina made landfall than before any other previous 

storm, it was not enough to sustain the tens of thousands of people left stranded by 

the hurricane. FEMA’s logistics system became critical to providing additional food, water, 

ice, portable toilets, fuel, generators, and other necessary supplies to the impacted areas. 

However, as Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff testifi ed: “FEMA’s logistics 

systems simply were not up to the task.”1

 Former FEMA Director Michael Brown agreed: 

“FEMA has a logistics problem.”2

In some cases, state and local offi cials faced such overwhelming circumstances that they 

could not assess or communicate their needs accurately to FEMA. At other times, the 

system itself revealed fl aws, as red tape prevented the prompt and complete acquisition and 

distribution of assets. To some degree, each level of government shares some of the responsibility for the failure of the FEMA commodities system aft er landfall.

Ordinary people forced to endure inhuman circumstances were the victims of these failures. 

Without generators, plumbing, or portable toilets, the Superdome became a stadium of 

human waste rotting in extreme heat. In Mississippi, victims who took refuge in public shelters found shortages of food and water, sanitation problems, and lack of electricity. 

FEMA

Th e failed response to fulfi ll basic critical needs following Hurricane Katrina highlighted 

long-standing problems with FEMA logistics. With state and local authorities overwhelmed, 

the unprecedented demand for commodities fell – as the Hurricane Pam exercise predicted 

– on the federal government.

FEMA’s logistics failure during the Katrina crisis was no surprise. FEMA already knew it 

lacked staff and systems needed to respond to a large disaster.3

 William Lokey, Federal Coordinating Offi cer (FCO) in Louisiana, told Committee investigators that FEMA regularly 

fails to track supplies: “It has been a problem at every disaster I’m aware of.”4

In 2004, Ken Burris, the FEMA Acting Director of Operations, initially requested $60 million for modifi ed logistical requirements that included logistical tracking systems.5

 In January 2005, FEMA submitted an initiative to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

to improve its logistics system.6

 Documentation for the request reveals the burdens on 

FEMA’s antiquated logistics systems. For example, warehouse-space requirements in some 

areas have grown as much as 10 times and the transportation mission had grown over 300 

percent in three years, while staff support for these functions had been unchanged for seven 

years.7

 Th e request concluded the logistics system was not functional, resulting in the “total 

inability to accomplish the FEMA mission in accordance with the performance goals.”8

 Th e 

status quo would also “negatively impact the ability to rapidly respond to both no-notice 

incidents and notice disasters and incidents.”9

FEMA’s poor planning for transportation was a key factor in the problems with commodities. Gary Moore, FEMA Director of Logistics, said FEMA had diffi culty moving commodities during Katrina.10 For instance, on Saturday aft ernoon, FEMA realized it did not have 

enough truck drivers to deliver commodities and equipment and started reviewing résumés 

to hire additional drivers.11 By Sunday aft ernoon, August 28, records show that FEMA was 

Chapter 23
376

Chapter 23

short 68 of the 94 drivers who would be needed to move commodities for a short response 

eff ort and 162 drivers for a longer response.12 To make matters worse, FEMA’s transportation contractor, Landstar, does not own any vehicles. Instead, it locates independent drivers 

only aft er FEMA asks it to move commodities, which can also lead to delays.13 FEMA then 

had to compete against Landstar for drivers to hire.14 Drivers were also hard to come by 

because the commodities needed to be moved over a weekend.15

Staffi ng shortages hindered FEMA’s logistics response to Katrina. In addition to the shortage of drivers, FEMA did not have enough people in Louisiana to staff a 24-hour operations center aft er the storm hit, which required many people to work more than 50 hours 

straight.16 FEMA’s own evaluation of its response in Louisiana admitted that, “Lack of suffi cient trained logistics staff signifi cantly detracted from our response to Hurricane Katrina 

in Louisiana and jeopardized the overall logistics mission.”17

Unlike many large private shippers, FEMA could not track assets en route to destinations. 

As Moore explained: “I can tell you today when they leave someplace and I can tell you 

when they arrive someplace because they’re manually counted when they got through the 

gate. In the middle of that, I don’t know where they are.”18

FEMA’s decision to wait to determine whether pre-positioned assets were suffi cient – instead of maintaining a constant stream of supplies – compounded the problem, as admitted 

by FEMA Director Brown: “We pre-positioned and then tried to see what was going to happen and then started it back up again. We should have just kept pushing.”19

Th e logistics plan used in Katrina grew out of the Hurricane Pam catastrophic-storm 

exercise begun in 2004, and was still in development when Katrina struck. It envisioned 

a sequence of commodity deliveries from Federal Operational Staging Areas (FOSAs) to 

regional staging areas (RSAs), and then to local points of delivery (PODs). Th e plan assumed that as many as 160,000 people would require supplies.20 Local offi cials viewed the 

commodities distribution plan as one of the most valuable products of the Hurricane Pam 

exercise, 21 and FEMA offi cials scrambled to fi nd, read, and use the Pam documents in the 

days before Katrina’s landfall.22

Th e Hurricane Pam plan guidelines for commodity distribution are internally inconsistent.23 Th e power, water, and ice distribution section states that FEMA will direct the 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to have “approximately one-day’s supply of water and ice 

– 1,530,000 gallons of water [322 truckloads] and 5.5 million pounds of ice [137.5 truckloads] – at Camp Beauregard, a federal staging area, in Pineville, LA, before the hurricane 

makes landfall.”24 Camp Beauregard was chosen because it was far enough inland to be 

safe from hurricanes, yet close enough to quickly deliver supplies.25 Later in the document, 

pre-landfall planning charts specify that one day’s supply of ice and water would be 32 to 40 

truckloads each. Th e same sections identify one day’s supply of Meals Ready to Eat (MREs) 

and tarps to be 15 to 20 truckloads and 36 to 34 truckloads respectively.26

FEMA had 30 truckloads of water, 17 truckloads of ice, 15 trailer loads of MREs, and 6 

trailer loads of tarps at Camp Beauregard before the storm.27 Th ese commodities had been 

positioned at the beginning of the 2005 hurricane season as part of a new way to speed up 

the response to hurricanes, but FEMA did not get any additional commodities to Beauregard as Katrina moved through the Gulf of Mexico.28 

Despite some eff orts to move some commodities into Mississippi, there were major defi ciencies in commodities prestaging there. FEMA’s FCO for Mississippi, William Carwile, wrote 

several e-mails throughout Sunday to his superiors in which he expressed concern with commodities issues. Despite the fact that FEMA had ordered 400 trucks of ice, 400 trucks of water, 
377

Logistics

and 250 trucks of MREs for the Meridian Naval Air Station in Mississippi, by the evening of 

August 29 only 30 trucks of water, 15 of MREs, two of tarps, and 30 of ice were at the base.29 

FEMA’s action of staging supplies early in the season throughout the Gulf Coast no doubt 

helped the response to Katrina.30 But these supplies were not enough for a storm as strong 

as Katrina. Th e preparations for the hurricane should not have ended with the initial prepositioning of supplies. Burris confi rmed that the initial pre-positioning was only a start, 

and the specifi cs of a storm would dictate whether FEMA should move more supplies to the 

area.31 While some supplies already staged in the Gulf region were moved to Mississippi or 

Alabama, records indicate that relatively few additional truckloads arrived in the primary 

FEMA staging areas in the days before landfall.32 Th e record is not clear whether additional 

supplies were moved into the region, bypassing the primary FEMA staging areas. In any 

event, the Committee believes that with Katrina bearing down on the Gulf Coast as a catastrophic storm, FEMA should have moved additional supplies to its primary staging areas 

in Mississippi and Louisiana.

Commodities such as water, ice, food, tarps, and generators were delivered ineffi ciently 

and ineff ectively to Mississippi and Louisiana both before and aft er landfall. In Mississippi, 

Carwile expressed concerns in a September 1 e-mail to some senior FEMA offi cials, including Director Brown, that the “System appears broken. ... Will now attempt to get product 

in alternate ways.”33

A week aft er landfall, Carwile wrote that the food deliveries were “totally unacceptable.”34 

Robert Latham, Director of Mississippi’s Emergency Management Agency, testifi ed that he 

received only 10 to 20 percent of the food and water he requested during the days he described 

as critical, and did not receive adequate supplies until September 9, 12 days aft er landfall.35

FEMA’s logistics also failed to meet demands in Louisiana. Colonel Terry Ebbert, Director 

of Homeland Security for the City of New Orleans, told the Committee that he had 

diffi culty getting food and water the week aft er the storm;36 Lokey confi rmed that requests 

were not being met.37 In particular, FEMA was unable to fi ll the number of requests for 

MREs.38 However, as noted by Colonel Al Jones, the Department of Defense (DOD) liaison 

offi cer who started working on logistics issues with Director Brown on September 2, local 

emergency managers had diffi culty articulating an accurate level of demand for commodities given the catastrophic conditions and lack of communications.39

FEMA recognized that it had failed.40 Perceiving an overwhelmed logistics system, FEMA 

Director Brown “reached back to headquarters and had discussions about [how he] wanted 

all logistics turned over to DOD.”41 On September 1, FEMA headquarters contacted the 

Department of Defense, requesting that DOD take over full logistics operations in Louisiana and Mississippi,42 thus proposing the transfer of one of its most important functions to 

another entity. (See Chapter 26 for additional information on this mission assignment and 

DOD’s resulting actions).

Considerable attention has been paid to this attempt to turn over FEMA’s troubled 

logistical eff orts to the Department of Defense. Aft er discussions among FEMA and DOD 

offi cials, on September 2 FEMA issued a $1 billion mission assignment to DOD to plan and 

execute the procurement, transportation, and distribution of commodities in Louisiana and 

Mississippi. FEMA offi cials authorized spending up to $1 billion on this mission, an estimate, as one FEMA offi cial said, that was large enough to give DOD the authority to “cover 

the eventualities” that might arise in accomplishing this mission.43 

Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul McHale testifi ed of this mission that DOD “got the largest request for assistance in the history of the United States. And it wasn’t anything other 
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than ... ‘full logistics support throughout the entire area of responsibility.’” McHale continued that he felt that this was a “very broad, fairly loosely defi ned mission requirement” but 

since it was a “crisis circumstance, we felt that we should take that on, and we did.”44

DOD’s performance under this mission assignment was ultimately considerably less than 

full logistical support. DOD appears to have identifi ed certain areas of FEMA’s logistics 

system that required immediate attention – namely sourcing, tracking, and transportation 

– and restored the fl ow and distribution of commodities to both Louisiana and Mississippi. 

Hence, FEMA retained control over many of its traditional tasks.45

Of the billion dollars authorized, DOD has sought reimbursement from FEMA for approximately $100 million of work.46 Billing records compiled by FEMA indicate DOD has sought 

reimbursement from FEMA partly for substantial costs for ship leases, fuel, airlift support, 

personnel travel, and some food.47

Th e day before the mission assignment to DOD, despite FEMA leaders’ acknowledgement 

of the logistics problems, DHS Secretary Chertoff was publicly claiming otherwise:

Th e limiting factor here has not been that we don’t have enough supplies. ... 

We not only had a hurricane; we had a second catastrophe, which was a fl ood. 

Th at fl ood made parts of the city very diffi cult to get through. If you can’t get 

through the city you can’t deliver supplies. ... I’m telling you that we are getting food and water to areas where people are staging. ... Th e limitation here 

on getting food and water to people is the condition on the ground.48

Other factors contributed to the logistics struggle. For example, communications between 

offi cials within Louisiana and with FEMA headquarters were almost nonexistent. As Scott 

Wells, the Deputy FCO in Louisiana said, “Th ere was just a big communications void” in 

Baton Rouge.49 FEMA had done little before landfall to ensure communications capabilities aft er landfall. (See Chapter 18, Communication Voids) Th e FEMA team leader at the 

Superdome had very limited communication capabilities with superiors in Baton Rouge and 

elsewhere, and estimated that this lowered his operational eff ectiveness by 90 percent.50

Additionally, as discussed in Chapter 25, both FEMA and state offi cials cited security issues 

as a principal reason for delayed delivery of commodities.51

Problems with Request for Assistance Systems

Louisiana’s Staff and E-Team Server Were Overwhelmed 

Th e Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP), the 

agency in charge of the Louisiana Emergency Operations Center (EOC) under the Louisiana Emergency Plan, uses a computerized request system called E-Team to log requests 

from state or local emergency offi cials. Louisiana offi cials said that the number of incoming 

requests overwhelmed their E-Team server.52 LOHSEP ordered a replacement server for 

overnight delivery, but it was not installed until August 31.53

Parishes that lacked Internet access transmitted their requests to LOHSEP by telephone, 

fax, and ham radio,54 though the loss of key communications infrastructure between New 

Orleans and Baton Rouge undermined these eff orts.55 Although the E-Team system was at 

times interminably slow, it never completely stopped working.56

When the state receives requests for assistance, the state is supposed to validate the requests 

before passing them to FEMA. A validation process eliminates frivolous or low-priority 
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Logistics

requests or those requests best handled by other states through the EMAC system. In Louisiana, offi cials lacked understanding of what assistance FEMA could appropriately provide. 

Th at lack of understanding led to submission of requests that wasted FEMA’s time and 

resources. As Wells put it: 

When the state gets all these requests, they’re supposed to consolidate them 

and see if they can meet those [requests] and they pass them to us. Th at mechanism of the state consolidating and screening requests was nonexistent [in 

Louisiana]. Everything was passed to us.

People wanting pens, paper – and this was back in October – an air-conditioner, a bus for the Mayor to go to Atlanta; all that stuff comes straight to us, ... 

there’s no validation at the state level. We were just – we were getting actually 

thousands of requests.57

At the Committee’s December 8 hearing, Wells further elaborated that requests for ammunition, golf carts, bus rides for Mayor Nagin and his staff , and portable air conditioners were intermingled with legitimate, high-priority requests.58 Wells told the Committee 

that the “hundreds and hundreds” of invalid requests “clogg[ed] down the system for the 

legitimate requests.”59 Wells’ testimony is uncontroverted. Louisiana’s failure to adequately 

prioritize its requests to FEMA wasted FEMA’s time and limited resources.. 

The Systems That FEMA and the States Used to Process Requests for Aid 

Were Incompatible, Delaying Fulfi llment

Requests to FEMA, on the other hand, must be submitted on an Action Request Form 

(ARF). Th e ARFs and the state’s E-Team system are not compatible, so state offi cials had to 

fi ll out both E-Team requests and FEMA ARFs. While Lokey did not think the incompatibility slowed the response to requests, it certainly complicated the tracking of requests, as 

will be discussed below.60

Aft er a standard hurricane, FEMA has 72 hours to establish a Joint Field Offi ce (JFO), which 

uses Mission Assignments – broad orders based on the ARFs – to task various government 

agencies to provide needed assets. Aft er Katrina, however, the JFO in Louisiana did not become fully operational for 12 days aft er landfall, forcing state and FEMA offi cials to send important functions over to the FEMA Regional Operations Center in Denton, Texas.61 Instead 

of coordinating with an on-site JFO, state and FEMA offi cials had to spend time reaching 

regional offi cials62 who were oft en unacquainted with the situation in Louisiana.63

FEMA also didn’t have enough staff .64 Th e FEMA team in Louisiana had a single individual 

who worked 18 to 20-hour shift s to fi ll out and submit ARFs. Despite repeated requests for 

additional staff , Wells was still trying to get more staff as late as September 9. Wells called 

the shortage of people to process assistance requests “our biggest problem.”65

FEMA Could Not Track Requests

Once FEMA submitted requests for assistance to the agencies expected to complete them, 

it had no effi cient way to track progress by those agencies. FEMA’s review of the Katrina 

response in Louisiana found that tracking diffi culties led to duplication of requests, orders, 

and eff orts.66 Th e inability to track left some orders “unfi lled, unchecked, or misdirected.”67

Sometimes, state offi cials had a hard time following up on state E-Team requests they 

had transferred to FEMA’s ARFs, as FEMA oft en failed to record on the ARFs their 

corresponding E-Team request. LOHSEP designated staff ers to manually match up E-Team 

requests with ARFs, but that cumbersome process proved inadequate for the magnitude of 
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Chapter 23

the task.68 Eventually FEMA started logging the state numbers, which made tracking request 

easier, though the system was still far from perfect.69

Judgment Errors Within the System Also Hampered the Response

Th e Louisiana Nursing Home Association (LNHA), which represents 80 percent of the 

nursing homes in the State of Louisiana, had a desk at the state EOC in Baton Rouge70

because it had primary responsibility for helping nursing homes coordinate evacuations. 

LNHA submitted E-Team requests during the fi rst days of the crisis, but then LOHSEP 

revoked its privilege71 because LNHA was not a government agency.72 Meanwhile, hundreds 

of nursing-home patients were stranded by rising water. LNHA was forced to set up and 

privately coordinate nursing-home rescue eff orts.73 As a result, rescues were delayed.

FEMA personnel admitted that there was a chance that an approved request would be 

denied at FEMA’s Regional or National Headquarters. For example, FEMA denied a state 

request for 1,000 small rubber raft s because the boats would not be useful for rescues in debris-fi lled water. A state offi cial disagreed and testifi ed that the boats would have been valuable for towing behind motorboats and picking up victims in shallow water.74 LOHSEP’s 

Colonel Jeff Smith felt that reasonable requests were being “fi ltered,” probably because not 

all levels of authority recognized the severity of the situation.75

Emergency Management Assistance Compacts

As noted elsewhere, the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) is an interstate agreement76 to provide mutual aid when disaster strikes.77 Forty-nine states, along with 

the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands have all enacted legislation to 

become part of the Compact,78 and Congress has given its consent.79 Upon declaration of 

an emergency, states can pre-position assets and wait for a request for assistance from the 

aff ected state.80

Both Louisiana and Mississippi asked for assistance through the EMAC system during the 

Hurricane Katrina disaster. Every member state as well as the District of Columbia and 

Puerto Rico responded, providing a wide range of equipment, medical aid and supplies.81

Hurricane Katrina resulted in the largest EMAC response in U.S. history.82

Th e EMAC system demonstrated both its value and limitations during Katrina. Carwile testifi ed that the resources made available through EMAC – almost 25,000 personnel who performed close to 900 missions, were crucial.83 Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour agreed, 

singling out Florida’s search-and-rescue teams and law-enforcement offi cials.84 Th e Louisiana National Guard described EMAC as “the most successful feature of our response.”85

Louisiana Commodities

Th e Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan designates LOHSEP as the lead state agency for 

coordinating the distribution of commodities. In Katrina’s aft ermath, emergency managers in Louisiana faced two distinct logistical challenges aft er landfall: (1) providing massive quantities of commodities to the enormous numbers of victims in the Superdome 

and Convention Center, and (2) disbursing relatively smaller amounts to the thousands of 

victims scattered across southeast Louisiana and the greater New Orleans metropolitan area 

– chiefl y, the collection sites for rescuees along highway overpasses. Not surprisingly, they 

performed best in delivering to locations where the need was rapidly identifi ed and supply 

lines could be established. But LOHSEP failed to coordinate and establish supply lines to the 

ad-hoc, unplanned distribution points. 
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Logistics

Katrina revealed what the Hurricane Pam exercise and resulting plans assumed: the catastrophic storm would severely limit the capabilities of local authorities,86 thereby requiring FEMA and the state to lead the distribution of commodities to the aff ected areas aft er 

landfall. Wells said that FEMA’s responsibility was to get commodities to the federal staging 

areas, and then, according to the planning done during the Hurricane Pam exercise, the 

state and FEMA would decide how they would deliver the commodities the “last mile” to 

the public distribution points.87

Before landfall, FEMA and the state pre-positioned more commodities at FEMA’s Operations 

Staging Area at Camp Beauregard (in Pineville, Louisiana – 220 miles from New Orleans)

than any previous storm (although less than the amount discussed at Hurricane Pam).88

Consistent with the assumptions in the Hurricane Pam exercise, the fl ooding that resulted 

from Katrina left some parish governments’ resources incapacitated,89 making it necessary 

for FEMA and LOHSEP to push commodities to them without waiting for requests.90 Before 

and aft er landfall, LOHSEP’s operating principle for moving commodities was “if you can’t 

get it yourself, then you turn to FEMA.”91

Some parishes, however, asked for more commodities than the state or FEMA could provide.92 LOHSEP and the National Guard also experienced diffi culties in coordinating the 

delivery of commodities and the equipment needed by parishes.93 In some cases a commodity delivery would be made by the National Guard to a parish distribution point, but the 

parish did not have access to a forklift , thus making unloading the delivery unnecessarily 

problematic.94 Although the magnitude of the operation overwhelmed the manpower and 

equipment of Louisiana National Guard, making it necessary to rely on support from other 

states,95 those needs should have been anticipated and planned for accordingly. 

Some of the parishes’ needs could have been met through better long-term planning and 

preparation. First, had FEMA and the state had executed more contracts with vendors 

before the storm for critical supplies, that would have saved time during the post-storm 

crisis.96 Second, key commodities were not sent until two days aft er landfall from Zephyr 

Field, FEMA’s post-landfall operational staging area in Jeff erson Parish, to the Superdome.97

Th ird, high-water vehicles were needed to deliver commodities to fl ooded areas like the 

Superdome. Th e Louisiana National Guard failed to anticipate needing to use its high-water 

vehicles to distribute commodities and failed to anticipate the manpower and equipment 

needs of a large-scale commodities distribution.98 Fourth, planners failed to ensure that all 

supply PODs in aff ected areas would be set up on high ground. Many parish-designated 

PODs were fl ooded.99 LOHSEP and the parishes had to establish alternative drop points.100

Fift h, although Hurricane Pam working groups had discussed establishing Search and 

Rescue Bases of Operations (SARBOOs), temporary collection sites for rescuees on highway 

overpasses, neither FEMA nor the state had planned or prepared for a coordinated system 

of commodities distribution to the SARBOOs, where the situation became critical as transportation to evacuate the rescuees was delayed.101

Sanitation

Masses of people gathered at the Superdome, Convention Center, and various search-andrescue drop points around town without basic sanitation. Superdome plumbing ceased 

to operate shortly aft er a levee breached and the pumps that maintained water pressure 

failed.102 FEMA public-aff airs offi cial Marty Bahamonde characterized the Superdome as 

a shelter of last resort that cascaded into a cesspool of human waste and fi lth. 

Imagine no toilet facilities for 25,000 people for fi ve days. Women and children were forced to live outside in 95-degree heat because of the horrid smell 

and conditions inside. Hallways and corridors were used as toilets, trash was 
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everywhere, and amongst it all children – thousands of them. It was sad, it was 

inhumane, it was heart-breaking, and it was so wrong.103

Sanitary conditions at the Convention Center were little better, although the relatively 

smaller crowd did have more open area available.104

On Tuesday, the New Orleans Police Department and the Louisiana National Guard 

requested portable toilets for the Superdome.105 A FEMA representative at the Superdome 

promised to have toilets delivered the next day, Wednesday.106 But law-enforcement agencies had checkpoints set up on major highways and prevented individuals without credentials from getting past some checkpoints. According to one portable-toilets vendor, he was 

turned away twice at security checkpoints in Plaquemines Parish (where his supply yard 

was located) when he tried to fulfi ll the order. Eventually, the National Guard provided an 

armed escort that enabled him to make the delivery on Saturday. By that time, the Superdome evacuation was nearly complete.107

Superdome 

As the storm approached, city, state, and federal offi cials raced on the day before landfall 

to stock the Superdome with the additional food and water that would be needed for the 

refuge of last resort’s massive incoming population.108

While FEMA and the National Guard were able to provide additional MREs and water before landfall,109 offi cials were able to locate enough food for Sunday and Monday only. Despite some “touch and go” moments as deliveries lagged behind the arrival of more people 

seeking shelter,110 offi cials were able to feed the Superdome population twice a day. 

On Monday and Tuesday, however, federal and state offi cials described the situation at 

the Superdome as “desperate”111 and “beyond critical,”112 as an estimated 25,000 to 30,000 

people gathered there.113

While Superdome residents never experienced an outright food and water shortage (as Bahamonde predicted to Brown), 114 other essential commodities – portable generators, lights, 

and batteries – did not arrive before the evacuation.115 Better long-term planning would 

have avoided these pitfalls. 

On Tuesday, Mayor Nagin asked Brown for many of these commodities, which FEMA 

offi cials knew were staged at Zephyr fi eld, 10 miles west of the Superdome.116 Lack of 

security and usable roadways did not interfere with the delivery of those commodities to 

the Superdome. At any time aft er the storm abated on Monday, offi cials at the Superdome 

could receive commodities at nearby highway overpasses, where they would be loaded onto 

high-water vehicles for delivery to the Superdome.117 It remains unclear which entity bears 

responsibility for the failure to deliver commodities to the Superdome.

Convention Center

Unlike the Superdome, which emergency planners at all levels of government expected to 

become a refuge of last resort, Mayor Nagin’s opening of the Convention Center as a refuge 

two days aft er landfall was largely unplanned. As a result, over the weekend, no food or 

water was pre-positioned there, and no commodities arrived there until Friday, September 

2. Lokey said, “Th e state and the locals did not preplan or preposition anything, and so there 

was obviously a problem there.”118

Although the City made no pre-landfall preparations to use the Convention Center as a 

refuge, Mayor Nagin included the possibility of using the Convention Center in lieu of the 

Superdome on a list he presented to FEMA Director Brown on Tuesday, the same day on 
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Logistics

which Mayor Nagin opened the Convention Center. 

Th e document stated, under the heading “Refuge of 

Last Resort–Superdome”:

(Alternative Need) Access to the Convention 

Center to use it as the refuge of last resort in 

lieu of the Superdome; if this option is exercised, each of the above-listed needs [generators, lights, video equipment, security and 

food and water] would be required for the 

Convention Center and, additionally, vehicles 

and drivers to coordinate the transport from 

the Superdome to the Convention Center 

would be required.119 [Emphasis added.]

Unfortunately, when Mayor Nagin opened the Convention Center as a refuge, the city did not provide 

food and water to those it would house, and did not 

tell federal offi cials that the Convention Center had 

been opened.120

When questioned about opening the Convention 

Center, Mayor Nagin testifi ed that he asked FEMA 

two or three times a day to deliver supplies there.121

But when pressed to provide specifi c examples of 

requests, Mayor Nagin suggested that the Committee speak to Colonel Terry Ebbert, Director of 

the New Orleans Offi ce of Homeland Security and 

Public Safety, as the person who would have told 

FEMA about the city’s opening of the Convention 

Center as a shelter.122 When the Committee asked 

Colonel Ebbert whether he told FEMA of the city’s 

decision to open the Convention Center, he stated 

that the city never made an offi cial decision to open 

the Convention Center.123 When pressed further on 

whether he made a request for food and water to be 

delivered to the Convention Center, Colonel Ebbert 

said, “I did not make that request.”124 Th e fi rst written request for food and water at the Convention 

Center came on Friday.125

Nevertheless, Lokey said that Colonel Jeff Smith, the 

Acting Deputy Director for the Louisiana Offi ce of 

Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, 

made him aware on Tuesday or Wednesday that 

thousands of people were beginning to congregate at 

the Convention Center.126 Th e state asked FEMA to 

send food and water to the Convention Center, but security concerns delayed their delivery 

until Th ursday, according to Lokey.127 Lokey also said that he was depending on requests 

from the state before sending any other commodities to the Convention Center.128

Further complicating the response to the developing situation at the Convention Center 

was confusion among Department of Homeland Security HSOC offi cials, who were tasked 

Sorting through donations 

U.S.Coast Guard photo
384

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with gathering and disseminating critical information, and who erroneously believed the 

Convention Center and the Superdome were the same location.129 

Th e result of Mayor Nagin and Colonel Ebbert’s lack of planning, preparation, action, and 

coordination, combined with security concerns and DHS’s lack of situational awareness, 

was that food and water for the 19,000 people at the Convention Center began to arrive 

on Th ursday, but did not arrive in meaningful quantities until Friday, when the National 

Guard arrived with food and water provided by FEMA.130

Mississippi Commodities

The Federal Logistics System Failed to Provide an Adequate Supply of Commodities in 

the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in Mississippi

Hurricane Katrina disrupted the state’s economic and physical infrastructure, complicating the ability of authorities and citizens to acquire commodities such as food, water, ice, 

and fuel.131

Th e federal logistics system could not adequately respond. FEMA’s Federal Coordinating 

Offi cer in Mississippi, William Carwile, said that only about 25 percent of requested water 

and ice, and a short supply of MREs arrived in Mississippi in the fi rst week and a half aft er 

landfall.132 Robert Latham, Executive Director of the Mississippi Emergency Management 

Agency (MEMA), estimated that Mississippi had to make do with even less – 10 percent to 

20 percent of requests during the critical days aft er landfall.133

Positioning Supplies Prior to Landfall

Prior to landfall, state authorities realized that the massiveness of the storm required prelandfall preparations. Tom McAllister, MEMA’s Response and Recovery Director, said 

that MEMA requested that FEMA pre-position supplies at Meridian Naval Air Station in 

east-central Mississippi near the Alabama border.134 Bob Fenton, a FEMA Region IX (covering the western United States) offi cial, who served as Director of Operations for Mississippi during Katrina, upped the request.135 Unfortunately, FEMA was unable to provide the 

requested supplies. In fact, McAllister, and apparently Fenton, were never able to discover 

how much had been pre-staged.136 McAllister said the initial failure to pre-position adequate 

supplies left Mississippi “critically shorthanded.”137

Post-landfall State and Federal Supply “Pipelines”

Both the federal and state governments supplied commodities. Because the FEMA logistical system fell short, the State of Florida and the National Guard maintained the “pipeline” 

until FEMA recovered.138 Valuable help also came from Voluntary Organizations Active in 

Disaster (VOADs), such as the Red Cross and the Salvation Army.

Supplies from FEMA 

Local authorities transferred requests they couldn’t fulfi ll to MEMA, 139 which conveyed 

them to FEMA in cases when it couldn’t help. MEMA and FEMA offi cials in Mississippi 

alike complained that requests disappeared as if into a “black hole.” 140 As Carwile said, 

“During Hurricane Katrina we seldom had visibility of critical resources, i.e., body bags, 

refrigerated trucks for temporary morgues, etc., because FEMA does not have a reliable 

system for tracking commodities, equipment, and personnel.”141As a result, local and state 

authorities were oft en “totally in the dark,” causing friction.142 Th e ice, food, and water 

that were delivered went to “staging areas” serving regions within the state,143 and then to 

smaller Points of Distribution (PODs)144 operated by the Mississippi National Guard.
385

Logistics

The Florida “Pipeline”

Before entering the Gulf of Mexico, Hurricane Katrina had passed over south Florida, 

appearing to pose a risk to the Florida Panhandle, as Hurricane Ivan had done in 2004. 

Florida readied emergency-management assets, which were thus readily available when the 

storm fi nally struck further west.145 Using the Stennis Space Center, located near the Gulf 

Coast and close to the Louisiana border, as a staging area, “Task Force Florida” brought 

food, water, and ice, as well as law-enforcement personnel, search-and-rescue assets, and 

other assistance.146 Th e Florida teams “basically circumvented” FEMA’s logistical system, as 

MEMA’s McAllister said.147

Florida’s contributions raised Mississippi to 40 to 50 percent of requested amounts, which 

proved crucial to the distribution of commodities.148 “Robert [Latham] and I continue to rely 

on you all (FL),”149 Carwile wrote in a September 3 e-mail to Craig Fugate, the Director of 

Florida’s emergency-management agency. Florida’s operation in Mississippi lasted for approximately six weeks, with most personnel and assets returned to Florida by October 1.150

The National Guard “Pipeline”

On Wednesday, August 31, the National Guard realized that not only were an insuffi cient 

number of MREs being delivered to south Mississippi, but massive debris fi elds were preventing individuals in need from reaching distribution points.151 In response, Major General 

Harold Cross, the head of Mississippi’s National Guard, requested that Northern Command 

(NORTHCOM), the federal military command responsible for North America, send MREs 

from military stocks.

Within seven or eight hours, aircraft were arriving at the Gulfport Combined Regional 

Training Center (CRTC), the National Guard airbase near the Gulfport airport, with MREs 

and water.152 All vehicles leaving the CRTC were required to take along at least 10 cases of 

water and 10 cases of MREs, to be handed out whenever National Guardsmen encountered 

survivors.153

Starting August 30, the National Guard also delivered commodities by air aft er advance 

helicopters scouted for support needs, oft en by landing and talking with survivors.154 Commissioner of Public Safety George Phillips, whose agency also had helicopters assessing the 

situation, recalled the desperation: “It was horrible ... the minute people heard helicopters, 

... they came, people came running out, holding up signs SOS and need help and food and 

water.”155 If supply helicopters couldn’t touch down, they would drop the supplies.156 Approximately 1.2 million MREs and over 1 million gallons of water were distributed in this 

way, mostly in the September 1 through September 9 period.157

Diffi culties Arise in the Distribution System

While all three of the supply “pipelines” were operational soon aft er landfall, the distribution system did not work smoothly. Michael Beeman, FEMA Division Director for Harrison County, the central county on Mississippi’s Gulf Coast, noted that the fi rst trucks with 

water and ice arrived without notice on August 30.158 Oft en supplies would be discovered 

only when an offi cial happened to spot a truck and approached the driver.159 In an e-mail 

sent on September 4, a FEMA offi cial in Mississippi informed Carwile and Fenton that a 

priority commodity shipment to Pearl River County, a county on the Louisiana border approximately 20 miles north of the coast, was a “no show,” leaving lines of people waiting in 

vain for food and water.160

Many trucks arrived at the Meridian staging area mislabeled. Others bypassed staging areas 

and traveled directly to the coast, with no specifi c destination.161 Stennis Space Center, in essence, became a large terminal where supply trucks were loaded and unloaded, but without 
386

Chapter 23

expert truck management. Th is problem was also refl ected in numerous reports of trucks 

standing idle at Stennis. As one offi cial said, Stennis did not have “real terminal operations 

going on out there.”162

An apparent shortage of trucks aggravated the problem.163 Many truck drivers refused to 

leave staging areas without armed escorts.164 Others, as McAllister explained, did not grasp 

the urgency of their tasks.165 

McAllister estimated that much of the reported confusion at Stennis began ten days aft er 

landfall. He attributed this confusion to diffi culties in determining the rate at which the PODs 

were distributing supplies. Immediately following landfall, the tremendous need for supplies 

ensured that the supplies were sent out of Stennis to the PODs right aft er they arrived. Beginning around day ten, more supplies were fl owing into Stennis than were being distributed to 

the PODs; this resulted in a backlog of trucks. It took four to fi ve days for offi cials at Stennis to 

balance the supply of commodities being delivered to Stennis with the demand for commodities at the PODs Stennis supported. By this point, the PODs were also becoming increasingly 

useful because road-clearing work was enabling more people to get to them.166

Diffi culties with Fuel

Fuel shortages created another problem.167 Th e fuel shortage had a number of causes, 

including damage to Mississippi’s refi ning capacity; fuel suppliers no longer keeping a large 

quantity of fuel in stock due to price fl uctuations; the loss of electricity crippling service 

stations’ ability to pump fuel; and incompatibility between many tankers and vehicles 

requiring fuel.168

Th e emergency manager for Jones County, located approximately 70 miles north of the 

coast, noted that following Hurricane Katrina, “Fuel turned out to be as important as 

food, water, and ice.”169 Th e loss of electricity in Mississippi forced parts of the state’s 

infrastructure to rely on fuel for power. Because of this, the fuel shortage had the potential 

to cause signifi cant problems.170 When the City of Gulfport, located on the central part of 

C-130 transport unloading

U.S. Air Force photo
387

Logistics

the coast, loses electricity, as it did following Katrina, its water wells rely on a back-up fuel 

supply. Th e generators contain enough diesel fuel to operate independent of the electric grid 

for 24 hours. If this back-up fuel runs out, Gulfport loses its water supply and depends on 

bottled water. Following Katrina, Gulfport came perilously close to running out of fuel.171

Fuel shortages were also a problem for hospitals, many of which had no more than a threeday supply.172

While state and local offi cials were able to make do with what fuel they had and with what 

was brought into the state through FEMA, the shortage came perilously close to causing 

a crisis. Given the importance of fuel to fi rst responders and private citizens, as well as its 

importance to infrastructure, emergency managers must place a higher priority on ensuring 

an adequate supply in the aft ermath of a disaster.

Private-Sector Logistics

Th e companies that testifi ed at the Committee’s private-sector hearing all had in place 

deliberate plans for deploying and tracking material and personnel. From batteries, fuel, 

and generators to food and water, Wal-Mart, Starwood, IBM, and Mississippi Power knew 

what they would need, had those commodities either in place or at staging areas outside 

the storm’s path, and had a plan for moving them in immediately aft er the storm.173 Th ese 

companies also had employees from unaff ected regions at the ready, to assist in the region 

once the storm passed, and they responded proactively.174

Within seven days of Katrina’s making landfall, Mississippi Power had 11,000 workers on 

the ground from 23 states and Canada.175 Th ey utilized mutual-assistance agreements, in 

place prior to the storm, to “borrow” employees from other utility companies.176 IBM knew 

their services would be needed aft er the storm and deployed a Crisis Response Team to Baton Rouge to immediately begin working with government and non-governmental organizations to address critical needs.177 Starwood also had a corporate-response team staged at a 

safe distance, but ready to move in once the storm had passed.178

Wal-Mart managed logistics eff ectively and delivered commodities quickly when responding to Katrina.179 Wal-Mart has its own fl eet of trucks, 100 distribution centers, and stores 

located all over the country.180 Of the 100 distribution centers, eight have reserved “disaster 

merchandise” square footage, with approximately $4.7 million in “disaster merchandise” 

stockpiled for emergencies, including more than 250,000 gallons of drinking water.181

Wal-Mart also has relationships with vendors that help with surge requests during times of 

emergency.182 Th e company has a specifi c protocol for responding to disasters, and operates 

an emergency operations center year-round to coordinate crises around the country.183

With Hurricane Katrina, Wal-Mart used its expertise to move in supplies and operate eff ectively.184 In the fi rst three weeks aft er landfall, the company “delivered approximately 2,500 

trailers of emergency supplies ... including trucks of water and supplies that fl owed into the 

New Orleans metropolitan area beginning on Saturday, September 3, for emergency service 

workers, shelters, and hospitals. A total of three temporary mobile pharmacies [were] provided to support communities, and a 16,000-square foot ‘tent store’ was erected to serve a community where the store had been all but demolished.”185 Based on past experience with major 

storms and hurricanes, Wal-Mart knew what supplies would be sought prior to the hurricane 

making landfall and what would be needed for the recovery phase aft er the storm.186
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1 Written statement of Sec. Michael Chertoff , U.S. Department of Homeland Security, for the U.S. Senate, Committee 

on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Homeland Security Department’s 

Preparation and Response, Feb. 15, 2006, p. 5.

2 Testimony of Michael Brown, former Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), before the U.S. 

House, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing on 

Hurricane Katrina: Th e Role of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Sept. 27, 2005. 

3 In January 2005, FEMA leaders acknowledged in the internal review called the “MITRE Report” the weakness of 

FEMA logistics with comments such as “We are not good at tracking assets,” “If the White House asks, ‘Where are the 

water trucks?’ I can’t tell them” and “We’ve had 3 or 4 people ordering water for the same people.” Th e MITRE Report 

was a report commissioned by FEMA Director Brown to review FEMA’s “policies, plans, organization and systems 

to increase consistency, eff ectiveness, timeliness, and eff ectiveness in carrying out its core mission.” Participants were 

members of FEMA’s senior leadership. MITRE Corp., Draft Statement of Work, Planning Support for Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Jan. 2005. Provided to Committee.

4 Committee staff interview of William Lokey, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, FEMA, 

conducted on Nov. 4, 2005, transcript p. 151.

5 Ken Burris, e-mail to Matt Jadacki, Sept. 18, 2004, 11:52 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA0079-0000120 through 0000121 (“I have broken the request from response and recovery into the following strategic 

areas and the following amounts. Let me know what you think and I will have it put in a formalized document.”).

6 Michael Brown, memorandum to various FEMA offi cials, “Disaster Support Initiatives,” Jan. 3, 2005. Provided to 

Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0079-0000093 through 0000095.

7 Ken Burris, e-mail to Matt Jadacki, Sept. 18, 2004, 11:52 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA0079-0000120 through 0000121. See also: FEMA, Under Sec. Disaster Support Initiatives #1, Reinvent Logistics Business 

Case (First DRAFT), Jan. 31, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0079-0000130 (“Th e staffi ng 

level of the DSIC, Logistics Centers and transportation support staff has remained at the same level as commissioned 

over seven years ago.”). 

8 FEMA, Under Sec. Disaster Support Initiatives #1, Reinvent Logistics Business Case (First DRAFT), Jan. 31, 2005. 

Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0079-0000133.

9 FEMA, Under Sec. Disaster Support Initiatives #1, Reinvent Logistics Business Case (First DRAFT), Jan. 31, 2005. 

Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0079-0000130.

10 Committee staff interview of Gary Moore, Director, Logistics Branch, FEMA, conducted on Dec. 9, 2005, transcript 

p. 37. 

11 Th eresa Gauger, e-mail to Lisa Williams, Aug. 27, 2005, 11:33 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHSFEMA-0069-0000772. See also: Committee staff interview of Marie Sloan, Chief, Disaster Workforce Section, Response 

Division, FEMA, conducted on Mar. 1, 2006, transcript p. 31.

12 Kerry Young, e-mail to Jules Hurst, II, Aug. 28, 2005, 3:08 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHSFEMA-0127-0011518. 

13 Moore interview, Dec. 9, 2005, p. 35.

14 Moore interview, Dec. 9, 2005, pp. 35-37. 

15 Moore interview, Dec. 9, 2005, p. 56. 

16 Committee staff interview of Scott Wells, Deputy Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, 

FEMA, conducted on Nov. 15, 2005, transcript p. 68.

17 FEMA, DHS/FEMA Initial Response Hotwash: Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, Feb. 13, 2006, p. 10 [hereinaft er DHS/

FEMA Initial Response Hotwash, Feb. 13, 2006]. 

18 Moore interview, Dec. 9, 2005, pp. 59-61 (“I have no idea. I have no way to contact them. ... Th e problem with the 

system is it’s a bit like ... the bombing of Pearl Harbor. ...We don’t know. We mark these things in when it goes through 

the gate. Th ey pass it to another individual, who passes it to another individual, and they get distorted numbers by the 

time it get back to us. It is a nightmare trying to get the right information. ... Not only is it with my shop, it’s also then 

on the other side with the FCO’s log people when they’re trying to get accurate numbers on what they have, and they 

call, they pick the phone up and they got one person and they are also busy and they say, well, you’ve got ten, and they 

fi nd out they’ve got 20, or it’s even more ridiculous. Someone might tell them you’ve got 100 out there and you’ve got 

500 out there.”).

19 Committee staff interview of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, conducted on Feb. 23, 2006, transcript p. 167.

20 Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, prepared by IEM, Inc. for Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security 

(LOHSEP) and FEMA, Sept. 2005, Appendix 6 [hereinaft er Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, Sept. 

2005]. 

21 Committee staff interview of Col. Jadwin Mayeaux, Louisiana Army National Guard (Ret.), Deputy Director, Homeland Security, LOHSEP, conducted on Nov. 29, 2005, transcript pp. 16-17; Committee staff interview of Lt. Col. William 

Doran, Louisiana Air National Guard, Chief, Operations Division, LOHSEP, Dec. 8, 2005, transcript pp. 163-164; Com-
389

Logistics

mittee staff interview of Lt. Col. Jacques Th ibodeaux, Joint Director, Military Support to Civilian Authorities, Louisiana 

National Guard, conducted on Dec. 6, 2005, transcript p. 1.

22 At 8:19 a.m. on Aug. 27, 2005 FEMA’s Acting Deputy Director Patrick Rhode e-mailed the Acting Director of Response a request for a copy of the New Orleans Catastrophic Plan. Source: Patrick Rhode, e-mail to David Garratt, Aug. 

27, 2005, 8:19 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0085-0003866. At 9:07 a.m. Lokey replied to 

Rhode, Brown, and others that “Copies are being made as we speak.” Source: William Lokey, e-mail to Patrick Rhode 

and David Garratt, Aug. 27, 2005, 9:07 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0085-0003860. At 

10:35 a.m. Sharon Blades e-mailed 25 FEMA personnel including William Lokey, Tony Robinson, Gary Jones, and 

Wayne Fairley an electronic version of the plan, and told them that copies were being printed. Source: Sharon Blades, 

e-mail to Michel Pawlowski, Aug. 27, 2005, 10:35 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0085-

0003570. Later that aft ernoon Deputy Chief of Staff Brooks Altshuler e-mailed twice asking for additional copies for the 

front offi ce. Source: Brooks Altshuler, e-mail to Sharon Blades, Aug. 27, 2005, 3:36 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0085-0003325. A few minutes later he received a reply that 50 copies were being printed. Source: 

Michel Powlowski, e-mail to Brooks Altshuler, Aug. 27, 2005, 3:42 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHSFEMA-0085-0003570. At 8:37 p.m. that night Blades again e-mails Altshuler: “We have printed up more plans and they 

are on the mezz in Area A. We are also printing copies of the latest draft s and a preface explaining the planning process 

and the various documents because they all have not been fi nalized and assembled into one document. Th is will, we 

hope, avoid confusion.” Source: Sharon Blades, e-mail to Brooks Altshuler, Aug. 27, 2005, 8:37 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0085-0003325.

23 Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, Sept. 2005, Appendix 5, p. 10.

24 Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, Sept. 2005, p. 24. Th e Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane 

Plan (Hurricane Pam) includes charts to convert individual servings of commodities into truckloads. Example: one 

truckload of water = 4,750 gallons. Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, Sept. 2005, Appendix 4, p. 8. 

25 Committee staff interview of Wayne Fairley, Response Operations Branch Chief, Region VI, FEMA, conducted on 

Jan. 18, 2005, transcript pp. 18-19.

26 Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, Sept. 2005, Appendix 4, Appendix 5, p. 10. 

27 FEMA Video Teleconference, Aug. 27, 2005, pp. 16-17; FEMA, Commodities Status as of Aug. 29, 2005. Provided to 

Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0127-0010528.

28 Committee staff interview of Ken Burris, former Acting Director of Operations, FEMA, conducted on Dec. 29, 2005, 

transcript p. 14; FEMA, Federal Operational Staging Area, Situation Report, Aug. 28, 2005, 7 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0080-0000005 through 0000006; FEMA, FEMA LC’s, PPS, TSS & Ice Storage, Commodity Status as of Aug. 26, 2005, 9:30 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0127-0014017.

29 FEMA, Commodities Status as of Aug. 29, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0127-

0010528. 

30 Fairley interview, Jan. 18, 2006, pp. 18-19.

31 Burris interview, Dec. 29, 2005, p. 14.

32 FEMA, FEMA LC’s, PPS, TSS & Ice Storage, Commodity Status as of Aug. 26, 2005, 9:30 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0127-0014017; FEMA, Commodities Status as of Aug. 29, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0127-0010528.

33 Michael Brown, e-mail to William Carwile, Michael Lowder, Edward Buikema, and Gary Moore, Sept. 2, 2005, 8:35 

a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0083-0000329. 

34 William Carwile, e-mail to Mary Lynne Miller, Michael Lowder, and Edward Buikema, Sept. 6, 2005, 4:47 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0028-0000742.

35 Written Statement of Robert Latham, Executive Director, Mississippi Emergency Management Agency (MEMA), for 

the U.S. House, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Mississippi, Dec. 7, 2005.

36 Committee staff interview of Col. Terry Ebbert, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.), Director, New Orleans Offi ce of Homeland 

Security, City of New Orleans, Louisiana, conducted on Jan. 10, 2006, transcript p. 140.

37 Lokey interview, Nov. 4, 2005, p. 150.

38 DHS/FEMA Initial Response Hotwash, Feb. 13, 2006, p. 16.

39 Committee staff interview of Col. Al Jones, U.S. Army, Senior Army Advisor, Georgia Army National Guard, conducted on Mar. 2, 2006, transcript p. 31.

40 Committee staff interview of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 23, 2006, transcript p. 158 

(“Our logistics just sucked. It was awful.”); Committee staff interview of William Lokey, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for 

Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 20, 2005, transcript p. 71.

41 Brown interview, Jan. 23, 2006, p. 185.

42 Patrick Rhode, e-mail to Michael Lowder, Sept. 1, 2005, 8:33 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS 

0000927. Th e mission assignment was later cut to 500 million on Sept. 7. 
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Chapter 23

43 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 134. See also: Committee staff interview of Col. Roberta Woods, U.S. Army, Chief of 

Plans and Operations Division, Logistics Directorate, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Department of Defense, conducted 

on Dec. 7, 2005, transcript pp. 82-83 (the $1 billion was an estimate).

44 Testimony of Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, 

before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e 

Defense Department’s Role in the Response, Feb. 9, 2006. 

45 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2005, p. 137 (“I’m not sure they ever took over that. . . . Th is, to me, was a broad, encompassing statement to cover any eventuality, and the military may have assisted in moving ice and water, but I’m not aware of 

that. As far as I’m concerned, all the requests came through my logistics train to our people supporting this out of Camp 

Beauregard.”). Committee staff interview of Brig. Gen. Matthew Broderick, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.), former Director, 

Homeland Security Operations Center, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, conducted on Jan. 19, 2006, transcript 

p. 64 (“Q: Do you know whether DOD actually did end up taking over the procurement, transportation, and distribution 

of ice, water, food, fuel, and medical supplies? A: Th ey did not. Th ey augmented and supplemented ... no, not the full 

logistical.”).

46 FEMA, Hurricane Katrina billing spreadsheet. Provided to Committee.

47 Department of the Army, “1604DR-MS-DOD-19 – Uses of Funds.” Provided to Committee (indicating 

$51,122,526.05 designated for “Lunch meals w/ drinks; meals tailored operational; commercial meals; meals individual; 

DLA MRSs; freight charges”); FEMA, Hurricane Katrina billing spreadsheet. Provided to Committee (indicating 

$2,981,123.90 expended for “ship lease, port /canal charges, & prop fuel for Algol, Altair, Bellatrix, Pollux, Pillilaau”; 

$1,084,587.24 for Diesel fuel; $39.56 for “unleaded gasoline”).

48 Sec. Michael Chertoff , All Th ings Considered, NPR, “Michael Chertoff discussed US aid eff ort being criticized in New 

Orleans,” Sept. 1, 2005, 8 a.m.

49 Wells interview, Nov. 15, 2005, p. 116.

50 Committee staff interview of Phil Parr, Federal Coordinating Offi cer, Region I, FEMA, conducted on Nov. 16, 2005, 

transcript p. 28.

51 Committee staff interview of Brig. Gen. Brod Veillon, Assistant Adjutant General – Air, Louisiana National Guard, 

conducted on Nov. 29, 2005, transcript pp. 65-66; Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 116-117.

52 Committee staff interview of Terry Vallarautto, Interoperability Coordinator, LOHSEP, conducted on Dec. 1, 2006, 

transcript pp. 39-40; Committee staff interview of Matt Farlow, Information Technology Division Chief, LOHSEP, 

conducted on Dec. 1, 2005, transcript p. 53; 

53 Vallarautto interview, Dec. 1, 2005, pp. 39-40; Farlow interview, Dec. 1, 2005, p. 53.

54 Vallarautto interview, Dec. 1, 2005, p. 42.

55 Committee staff interview of William Smith, Chief Technology Offi cer, BellSouth Corp., conducted on Jan. 25, 2006 

(untranscribed).

56 Farlow interview, Dec. 1, 2005, p. 56.

57 Wells interview, Nov. 11, 2004, pp. 205-206.

58 Testimony of Scott Wells, Deputy Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, FEMA, before the 

U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Perspectives of 

FEMA’s Operations Professionals, Dec. 8, 2005.

59 Wells, Senate Committee hearing, Dec. 8, 2005. 

60 Lokey interview, Nov. 4, 2005, p. 128.

61 Committee staff interview of Lucy Brooke, Emergency Management Program Specialist, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 

24, 2006, transcript p. 16.

62 Brooke interview, Jan. 24, 2005, p. 53.

63 Committee staff interview of Col. Jeff Smith, Louisiana National Guard (Ret.), Acting Deputy Director, Emergency 

Management, LOHSEP, conducted on Jan. 13, 2006, transcript pp. 108-113.

64 Brooke interview, Jan. 24, 2005, p. 51; DHS/FEMA Initial Response Hotwash, Feb. 13, 2006, p. 32 (“It is estimated that 

the ERT had 25% of the staff that were needed.” “DHS/FEMA needs to have 24/7 staffi ng capability for each section. Th e 

agency needs to be willing and able to provide heavy staffi ng at the start of a disaster, and establish minimum staffi ng 

requirements based on responsibilities of the sections. Failure to do so causes fatigue, mistakes and errors in judgments 

in the units.”).

65 Scott Wells, e-mail to Michael Hall, Sept. 9, 2005, 5:42 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA0040-0003030.

66 DHS/FEMA Initial Response Hotwash, Feb. 13, 2006, p. 38

67 DHS/FEMA Initial Response Hotwash, Feb. 13, 2006, p. 38

68 Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, Emergency Operations Plan, Apr. 2005, p. 10 

[hereinaft er Louisiana Emergency Operations Plan]; Col. Smith interview, Jan. 13, 2006, p. 32.
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Logistics

69 Brooke interview, Jan. 24, 2005, p. 35. 

70 Committee staff interview of Joseph Donchess, Executive Director, Louisiana Nursing Home Service Corporation, 

conducted on Jan. 9, 2006, transcript pp. 6, 12-13.

71 Donchess interview, Jan. 9, 2006, pp. 35-38.

72 Donchess interview, Jan. 9, 2006, p. 36.

73 Donchess interview, Jan. 9, 2006, p. 38.

74 Testimony of Lt. Col. Keith LaCaze, Assistant Administrator, Law Enforcement Division, Louisiana Department of 

Wildlife and Fisheries, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on 

Hurricane Katrina: Urban Search and Rescue in a Catastrophe, Jan. 30, 2006.

75 Col. Smith interview, Jan. 13, 2006, pp. 108-113.

76 EMAC was established by Congress through Joint Resolution in 1996 (P.L 104-321), 110 Stat. § 3877.

77 For information on EMAC, see http://www.emacweb.org.

78 California joined on Sept. 21, 2005, aft er Hurricane Katrina made landfall. California, Offi ce of the Governor, “Governor Schwarzenegger Signs Emergency Management Compact Legislation,” press release, Sept. 13, 2005. Provided to 

Committee.

79 P.L. 104-321 (Oct. 19, 1996).

80 Once a state requests EMAC support, a team is deployed to the disaster area and works with the state to determine 

requirements and match those needs to available resources. Source: National Emergency Management Association 

(NEMA), “How does EMAC work?” http://www.emacweb.org. Accessed on Apr. 15, 2006. EMAC representatives are located within the NRCC as well, to help facilitate requests and ensure there is no duplication of eff ort at the federal level. 

Source: Committee staff interview of Richard Gray, Team Leader, Information and Assessment Team and Team Leader, 

National Response Coordination Center, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 20, 2006, transcript pp. 31-33.

81 Louisiana National Guard, Task Force Pelican, “Hurricane Katrina: Overview of Signifi cant Events,” Nov. 28, 2005, 

pp. 5-6. Provided to Committee. 

82 Committee staff interview of Maj. Gen. Bennett Landreneau, Adjutant General, Louisiana, conducted on Jan. 11, 

2006. transcript pp. 63-64.

83 Written Statement of William Carwile, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Mississippi, for the 

U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Perspectives of 

FEMA’s Operations Professionals, Dec. 8, 2005, p. 5.

84 Testimony of Gov. Haley Barbour, Mississippi, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Role of the Governors in Managing the Catastrophe, Feb. 2, 2006.

85 Louisiana National Guard, Task Force Pelican, “Hurricane Katrina: Overview of Signifi cant Events,” Nov. 28, 2005, 

pp. 5-6. Provided to Committee.

86 Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, prepared by IEM, Inc. for the LOHSEP and FEMA, Sept. 2005, 

Transportation, Staging and Distribution of Critical Resources: Draft Functional Plan, p. 1.

87 Wells interview, Nov. 15, 2005, pp. 88-89; Fairley interview, Jan. 18, 2006, pp. 19-20.

88 To help push these commodities closer to the disaster area, FEMA and the Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security 

and Emergency Preparedness worked together at the Emergency Operations Center in Baton Rouge before landfall to 

bring more commodities to the staging area and, therefore, into the “pipeline.” Source: Col. Mayeaux interview, Nov. 29, 

2005, pp. 20-21, 64-65 (acknowledging that Pineville was FEMA’s main operational staging area for commodities). Both 

before and aft er landfall, FEMA sent commodities from Pineville to Regional Staging Areas in Hammond (a city 60 miles 

northwest of New Orleans) and Harrahan (a suburb just to the west of New Orleans). Source: Col. Mayeaux interview, 

Nov. 29, 2005, pp. 64-65. FEMA also drew on supplies stockpiled at Barksdale Air Force Base in northwest Louisiana and 

elsewhere in the country. Source: Col. Mayeaux interview, Nov. 29, 2005, pp. 21, 64-65, 98.

89 Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, prepared by IEM, Inc. for LOHSEP and FEMA, Sept. 2005, Transportation, Staging and Distribution of Critical Resources: Draft Functional Plan, p. 1.

90 Col. Mayeaux interview, Nov. 29, 2005, pp. 25-26; Lt. Col. Doran interview, Dec. 8, 2005, p. 157 (“We thought about 

... we’ve got to push commodities down regardless, because we know people are going to need food and water. And we 

weren’t – you know, we didn’t wait for a request for that. We said, we know we’re going to need to move food and water 

down to the area.”).

91 Col. Mayeaux interview, Nov. 29, 2005, pp. 20-21.

92 Col. Mayeaux interview, Nov. 29, 2005, pp. 56-57. See also: Col. Mayeaux interview, Nov. 29, 2005, pp. 68-69 (“MR. 

ADELBERG: It was areas that you weren’t staffi ng. It was just places where people were asking for commodities to be 

supplied? COL MAYEAUX: Yes, sir. MR. ADELBERG: And for one reason or another, the word wasn’t getting to you 

that they needed more than you were able to provide? COL MAYEAUX: Th at is correct, more than I could provide. I 

didn’t know there were people there.”).

93 Col. Mayeaux interview, Nov. 29, 2005, pp. 34-35.
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Chapter 23

94 Col. Mayeaux interview, Nov. 29, 2005, pp. 34-35.

95 Committee staff interview Col. Steven Dabadie, former Chief of Staff , Louisiana National Guard, conducted on Jan. 

12, 2006, transcript pp. 138-39 (“We were simply out of capabilities and resources because we got overwhelmed with 

the fl ood, and we needed to get those EMAC forces in. For example, you know, commodity distribution almost took an 

entire brigade. Th ey struck a brigade out of – Pennsylvania National Guard, they were the ones doing the commodity 

distribution when they came in.”).

96 Th e Department of Homeland Security recommended this year that FEMA “establish contracts for priority resources 

prior to the onset of disasters.” Source: DHS/FEMA Initial Response Hotwash, Feb. 13, 2006, pp. 10-11 (stating that the 

“lack of pre-negotiated contracts for large recurring services impacted the overall response”). Th e National Guard acknowledged in its Aft er Action Report that “last minute scrambling to locate & contract required equipment and services 

to support commodity distribution (e.g., forklift s, Port-a-Lets, tents, meal contractors, etc.) created delays in supporting 

Parish requests.” Source: Louisiana National Guard, Aft er Action Report, Task Force Griffi n, Commodities Distribution, 

Jan. 4, 2006 (recommending that LOHSEP, FEMA, and local authorities execute such contracts in advance of future 

storms). Nevertheless, LOHSEP’s Col. Mayeaux claimed that the state did not run out of bulk commodities. Source: Col. 

Mayeaux interview, Nov. 29, 2005, p. 64.

97 Testimony of Mayor C. Ray Nagin, City of New Orleans, LA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Managing the Crisis and Evacuating New Orleans, Feb. 1, 

2006.

98 Louisiana National Guard, Aft er Action Report, Task Force Griffi n, Commodities Distribution, Jan. 4, 2006; Col. 

Mayeaux interview, Nov. 29, 2005, pp. 34-35.

99 Lt. Col. Doran interview, Dec. 8, 2005, pp. 158-59.

100 Col. Mayeaux interview, Nov. 29, 2005, pp. 33-34.

101 While it is diffi cult to quantify the problem, there is anecdotal evidence of people clamoring for food and water 

wherever they could fi nd authorities who might be able to help. For example, Louisiana Department of Wildlife & Fisheries Lt. Col. Keith LaCaze had diffi culty establishing a medical evacuation point on Wednesday morning because “we 

had a lot of evacuees who were assembling there and asking for water and food, which was interfering with the medical 

staff who were trying to attend to the patients on the ground.” Lt. Col. Keith LaCaze, Activity Report on Hurricane 

Katrina, pp. 3-4.

102 Committee staff interview of Brig. Gen. Gary Jones, Assistant Joint Forces Commander, Louisiana Army National 

Guard, conducted on Dec. 7, 2005, transcript p. 90. 

103 Testimony of Marty J. Bahamonde, Director, External Aff airs, Region I, FEMA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans: A Flooded City, A 

Chaotic Response, Oct. 20, 2005. 

104 Committee staff interview of Lt. Col. Jacques Th ibodeaux, Joint Director of Military Support to Civilian Authorities 

and Branch Chief, Louisiana National Guard, conducted on Jan. 12, 2006, transcript p. 131.

105 Brig. Brig. Gen. Jones interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 91; Committee staff interview of Lonnie Swain, Assistant Superintendent, New Orleans Police Department, LA, conducted on Nov. 9, 2005, transcript p. 63. 

106 Brig. Gen. Jones interview, Dec. 7, 2005, pp. 89-91, 162-163.

107 Committee staff interview of Chris Villar, Owner, Go-Cans, LLC, conducted on Jan. 26, 2006 (untranscribed).

108 Swain interview, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 66. When NOPD Deputy Chief Lonnie Swain arrived at the Superdome on Sunday, 

he immediately called the city’s Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness and requested food and water, which Deputy Chief 

Swain said the Louisiana National Guard ultimately delivered before landfall. Source: Swain interview, Nov. 9, 2005, pp. 

44-47. Th e National Guard had pre-positioned stock to be able to provide “some limited support to some special needs 

people. But the bulk of what [the National Guard] had there was for our troops. Source: Brig. Gen. Jones interview, Dec. 

7, 2005, pp. 86-87. Gen. Jones quickly put out a call for MREs and found enough from nearby National Guard contingency stocks to supply people with two servings a day until Tuesday aft ernoon. Source: Swain interview, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 

66. LANG Col. Glenn Curtis also ordered trucks to move food and water from Camp Beauregard to the Superdome on 

Sunday, Aug. 28, 2005. Source: Committee staff interview of Col. Glenn Curtis, Chief of Staff , Louisiana National Guard, 

conducted on Dec. 6, 2005, transcript pp. 129-130. As the Louisiana National Guard’s Deputy Commander for Katrina, 

Col. Glenn Curtis, said: “Once it became a shelter of last resort we just knew we would need food and water there.” 

Source: Col. Curtis interview, Dec. 6, 2005, p. 134.

109 Louisiana National Guard offi cials stated that their requests for additional food and water before landfall were 

met. Committee staff interview of Lt. Col. Douglas Mouton, Commander, 225th Engineering Group, Louisiana Army 

National Guard, conducted on Dec. 1, 2005, transcript pp. 69-74.

110 NOPD Deputy Chief Lonnie Swain testifi ed that offi cials were able to feed the population at the Superdome twice 

a day, but that the fl ow of food and water was at times “touch and go” and resulted in periodic frustration. Swain interview, Nov. 9, 2005, pp. 65-68.

111 Brig. Gen. Jones interview, Dec. 7, 2005, pp. 86-87 (Th e National Guard had pre-positioned stock to be able to 

provide “some limited support to some special needs people. But the bulk of what [the National Guard] had there was 

for our troops.”).
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Logistics

112 Committee staff interview of Marty Bahamonde, Director, External Aff airs, Region I, FEMA, conducted on Oct. 7, 

2005, transcript p. 191 (“Th ere was not enough food in the Superdome, there was not enough water in the Superdome 

to properly provide meals and water for the continued growing number of people that were constantly coming to the 

Superdome. It never really stopped. Th ey kept coming. Estimates now were up to 25,000, 30,000 people at the Superdome.”).

113 Bahamonde interview, Oct. 7, 2005, p. 191.

114 Although Bahamonde recalled being “once again consumed with fi nding food” on Wednesday, it does not appear 

that food or water ever ran out at the Superdome. Source: Bahamonde interview, Oct. 7, 2005, p. 195; Brig. Gen. Jones 

interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 88. Th e fact that an MRE is designed to feed a person for up to two days helped: “You can 

actually survive for two days on one MRE. So had it gotten really desperate, we would have come up with a plan to bust 

them open and split them up.” Source: Brig. Gen. Jones interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 87. See also: Col. Curtis interview, 

Dec. 6, 2005, pp. 127-28; Committee staff interview of Lt. Col. William Doran, Chief, Operations Division, LOHSEP, 

conducted on Dec. 2, 2005, transcript p. 132. 

115 Swain interview, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 65 (“We never received fl ashlights or batteries. We never received generators. 

Period.”).

116 Mayor C. Ray Nagin, City of New Orleans, LA, “Post-Hurricane Katrina Critical Needs Assessment,” Aug. 29, 2005; 

Mayor Nagin, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 1, 2006. 

117 Swain interview, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 93 (“I don’t think they were able to come in – well, on Monday, they would have 

been able to; yes. Tuesday morning is when the water came in. Aft er that, supply trucks were not able to drive into the 

Dome. Th ey were driven up on to the up ramp or down ramp of the interstate, the I-10, and from there I think they were 

unloaded or whatever on to, I guess, the high-water vehicles, and supplies were brought in.”).

118 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 116.

119 Mayor C. Ray Nagin, City of New Orleans, LA, “Post-Hurricane Katrina Critical Needs Assessment,” Aug. 29, 2005, 

p. 1.

120 Penya Moses-Fields, letter to Th e Honorable Susan M. Collins and Th e Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman, Jan. 30, 

2006, “Attachment A: Timeline of Mayor Nagin’s Activities, Aug. 26, 2005 – Sept. 6, 2005.” Timeline entries include: 

Wed., Aug. 31 – “Convention Center – numbers growing, no food or water Still no food and water”; Th urs., Sept. 1 

– “Center – numbers growing, no food or water.”

121 Mayor Nagin, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 1, 2006.

122 Mayor Nagin, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 1, 2006.

123 Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 131.

124 Col. Ebbert interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 139.

125 FEMA, Action Request Form, Sept. 2, 2005. Provided to Committee.

126 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 116 (“Q: When did you become aware of any problems or issues at the convention 

center? A: Sometime Tuesday or Wednesday, when we got word from Jeff Smith that people were showing up at the convention center. Th e fi rst thing we heard, there were 5,000 people there. Th en we heard there were 25,000 people there. ... 

But early in the game, we heard that people were congregating there, too, mainly probably late Tuesday, because Tuesday was when the fl ooding really--when people started leaving their homes and wading and swimming and everything 

toward the Dome and the convention center.”).

127 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 116-117:

Mainly what I did was respond to the State’s request to get food and water to them, because again, the States and the locals did not preplan or preposition anything, and so there was obviously a problem there. And I remember sending, and 

again, I don’t know how many, but trucks of food and water. And aft er they were dispatched from Camp Beauregard, 

I remember hearing all the things about loss of control and law and order and things like that and I got worried about 

my truck drivers driving into a situation like that and getting mobbed. Th en I heard that the local offi cials, whoever that 

is, the National Guard was holding the trucks and were going to go in the next morning, whatever morning that was, 

probably Wednesday or Th ursday morning, when they went in with security to establish order. And they would have to 

speak to that, exactly what they did, but again, we got a lot of the rumors about the law and order breakdown and what 

not. But I do remember that my trucks didn’t go down there without appropriate protection when they went in on the 

morning, so I’m guessing that might have been Th ursday morning with just all the things that were going on, but I do 

not know for sure.

Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 116-117.

128 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 117-118 (“Well, again, some of our medical assets may have been sent [to the 

Convention Center], but again, we respond to requests from the State as a result of requests from the local governments, 

and other than getting the people out of there and getting food into them, I don’t have a recollection of another specifi c 

request from Jeff Smith at the time relative specifi c to the [Convention Center], other than the evacuation and the lifesustaining food and water.”).

129 Brig. Gen. Broderick interview, Jan. 19, 2006, pp. 171-172.

130 Louisiana National Guard, Timeline of Signifi cant Events for Hurricane Katrina, Dec. 7, 2005. Provided to Com-
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Chapter 23

mittee. Th e National Guard did not move to the Convention Center until noon on Friday. When the Guard did arrive 

at the Convention Center on Friday, they saw people barbecuing food outside the Convention Center. Source: Lt. 

Col. Th ibodeaux interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 122-123, 126-127. It is not clear from the record where the people at the 

Convention Center obtained the means to grill food outside, but the Guard who approached the Convention Center 

for the fi rst time on Friday correctly saw the outdoor cooking as a sign that their missions to establish law and order 

and to provide relief there would be executed without incident. Source: Lt. Col. Th ibodeaux interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 

126-127 (“It was an extremely heart moving thing to see these people that needed help come to you and say ‘thanks, I 

appreciate you guys are here.’”); Brig. Gen. Jones interview, Dec. 7, 2005, pp. 194-195 (“In fact, quite the contrary to 

what we thought, or what our intelligence had told us the situation was, and what the Mayor and some of the other folks 

told us, the people actually cheered us, you know, as we came in. And we had absolutely no problem getting control of 

the Convention Center, setting up the food distribution point. Th ey were very orderly.”). In contrast to the optimism 

engendered from seeing a working barbecue outside the Convention Center, LANG offi cials became pessimistic when 

they fi rst entered the structure because they saw what seemed to be about 100 people lying dead all over the fl oor of the 

building. But when those offi cials returned to the inside of the structure, hours aft er they had provided food, water, and 

medical relief to the crowd, not one of the people they had presumed to be dead were there: they were never dead; they 

were asleep, passed out from exhaustion, dehydration and malnourishment. Th is turn of events came as a great relief to 

the LANG offi cials at the Convention Center. Source: Lt. Col. Th ibodeaux interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 159-60. Within 

fi ve hours of their noon arrival, the Guard had brought in food and drink for the people there. Source: Brig. Gen. Veillon 

interview, Nov. 9, 2005, pp. 66-67 (“Th e crowd did that in a very orderly manner. We had no problems. We fed them. 

We gave them all they wanted and told them that we would be shortly evacuating them.”); Lt. Col. Th ibodeaux interview, 

Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 127, 141-142 (“We drove down in there and immediately began to interact with the crowd. Th e questions that – the comments they made to us is ‘we need help.’ ‘We need food, water. How are we going to get out of here. 

Please just help us. What is going on. Th ank you. Th ank you so much for coming here.’”). Troops patrolled throughout 

the night, encouraging people to eat as much as they wanted and informing them of the following day’s evacuation. 

Source: Lt. Col. Th ibodeaux interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 157.

131 While there is a consensus that food and water are vital, lifesaving commodities, some dispute exists as to whether 

ice belongs in that same category.

132 Written Statement of Carwile, Senate Committee hearing, Dec. 8, 2005, p. 6.

133 Written Statement of Latham, House Select Committee hearing, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 3.

134 Committee staff interview of Tom McAllister, Director of Response and Recovery, MEMA, conducted on Jan. 25, 

2006, transcript pp. 5-7.

135 McAllister interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 5-7.

136 In an interview with Committee staff , McAllister explained: “I never saw them. And the problem we had on my 

side as far as stateside, I never had visibility of those. I never knew how many we actually had. And I kept trying to fi nd 

out, you know, how many do we have staged? How much is there? ... I never got an answer of any kind. ... It was in 

the pipeline, it’s en route or it’s – you know, it was those type of answers we were getting out of Nashville in logistics. I 

mean, Bob [Fenton] was even frustrated ... because he couldn’t get any visibility on them either. You know, he couldn’t 

– he wanted to be able to tell me I’ve got 250 ice sitting in Meridian. Well, we never did know that. We never knew what 

was actually there at Meridian, or I didn’t.” McAllister interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 7-8. 

137 McAllister interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 8-9.

138 Committee staff interview of Mike Beeman, Director, National Preparedness Division, Region II, FEMA, conducted 

on Jan. 20, 2006, transcript p. 168.

139 McAllister interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 32-34.

140 McAllister interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 27-30.

141 William L. Carwile III, White Paper, “Th e Response and Initial Recovery to Hurricane Katrina in Mississippi: A 

Field Perspective,” Feb. 22, 2006, p. 25. Provided to Committee.

142 McAllister interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 27-30.

143 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Incident Management System, Mar. 1, 2004, p. 136.

144 In Harrison County, the county operated an LSA within the county that would receive supplies from Stennis and 

then distribute them to the PODs. Beeman interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 74-76.

145 Florida had prepositioned supplies off of I-10 near Jacksonville, Florida and was prepared to move into Mississippi 

to respond to the storm’s impact. Committee staff interview of Mike DeLorenzo, Bureau Chief, Bureau of Preparedness 

and Response, Florida Division of Emergency Management, conducted on Feb. 9, 2006 (untranscribed).

146 DeLorenzo interview, Feb. 9, 2006.

147 McAllister interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 8-9.

148 McAllister interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 32-34.

149 William Carwile, e-mail to Craig Fugate and others, Sept. 3, 2005, 3:21 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

no. DHS 0003582.

150 DeLorenzo interview, Feb. 9, 2006.
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Logistics

151 In an interview with Committee staff , Lieutenant Colonel Lee Smithson, Director of Military Support for the Mississippi Army National Guard, stated that: “Getting on into the 31st of Aug., 1st of Sept. we were getting some commodities 

in and we realized really on the 31st of Aug. that there was no way given what we thought the number of people who did 

not evacuate was, which my rough estimates was about 100,000 people along. . . the six coastal counties. . . . we knew that 

there was no way that with central distribution points, with the debris fi elds that were out there, that people could come 

in and get water, ice and MREs.” Committee staff interview of Lt. Col. Lee Smithson, Director of Military Support, Mississippi Army National Guard, conducted on Jan. 25, 2006, transcript pp. 43-45.

152 Committee staff interview of Maj. Gen. Harold A. Cross, Adjutant General, Mississippi Military Department, conducted on Jan. 26, 2006, transcript pp. 21-22, 28.

153 Mississippi National Guard, Joint Force Headquarters, Adjutant General’s Offi ce, “Hurricane Katrina Narrative,” 

Oct. 20, 2005, p. 2.

154 Mississippi National Guard, Joint Force Headquarters, Adjutant General’s Offi ce, “Hurricane Katrina Narrative,” 

Oct. 20, 2005, p. 3.

155 Committee staff interview of George Phillips, Commissioner, Mississippi Department of Public Safety, conducted on 

Jan. 26, 2006, transcript p. 41.

156 Lt. Col. Smithson explained this process during an interview with Committee staff : “[W]e would send our small helicopters out and they would fi nd pockets of displaced Americans or whatever you want to call them, and it was really easy 

to fi nd them because they’d hear the helicopters coming and they’d make signs and hold them up. So they would radio 

back and that’s where we would go in and drop things.” Lt. Col. Smithson interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 44.

157 Mississippi National Guard, Joint Force Headquarters, Adjutant General’s Offi ce, “Hurricane Katrina Narrative,” 

Oct. 20, 2005, p. 3.

158 Beeman interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 61.

159 Mike Beeman related the following anecdote in an interview with Committee staff :

Th ere were times when the trucks would just pull off the highway. We’d fi nd them parked along [U.S.] 

49. ...One of the requirements for the sheriff ’s department and the local police departments was whenever they saw a diesel truck sitting somewhere that might be idling the engine and all that, the truck 

driver was asleep, go over and fi nd out who he was, what he had in the back end, because we many 

times [we] knew items were sent to us, but we didn’t know where they were because the system, once 

[Stennis] sent it out, we had no idea what was sent. ... We knew that we were expecting ice, water, and 

food, but if something else were sent, we wouldn’t know it, because again, we had no notifi cation process and information process that it was coming to us. ... We’d fi nally fi nd maybe fi ve or six truckloads 

of water or ice that were sitting off the roadway in some apron at a supermarket or whatever and we’d 

just send them on down to this site, get them back on track. Some of them sat sometimes two or three 

days. I found 25 trucks one day, all with blue tarps on them, that were sitting down at the Wal-Mart [on 

U.S. 49]. ... But they were sitting there. Somebody told me all these trucks were down there, so I drove 

down there and started knocking on the truckers’ doors and I said, ‘What do you have in the back end?’ 

And they said, ‘Tarps.’ And I said, ‘Tarps?’ Well, ultimately it turned out to be blue roof, the stretch 

material, but they were just sitting, and sitting there for three or four days. Th ey were just sitting there, 

waiting for somebody to tell them where to go with the loads of blue tarp, blue stretch material. ... I 

have no idea where they came from. ... Th ey just appeared.

Beeman interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 80-82.

160 James Russo, e-mail to William Carwile and Robert Fenton, Sept. 4, 2005, 10:01 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0094-0002227.

161 Lt. Col. Smithson interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 55-57.

162 He described management of the trucks as amounting to: “Guys in golf carts going up and waking up a truck driver 

saying, what have you got in the truck, that kind of thing. And then, okay, take this truck and go over two roads because 

there’s just – I mean, there were literally – the road network out at the ammunition plant looks like this calendar, you 

know, you’ve got a lot of east-west, north-south roads that just go nowhere, they’re just a road with trees on either side 

of them. So there were at times hundreds of trucks just parked out there. And, you know, that took them a while to get it 

under control.” Lt. Col. Smithson interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 103-104.

163 McAllister interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 34.

164 Lt. Col. Smithson interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 105-106. Th is was confi rmed in an interview with offi cers of the 

Gulfport Police Department. Committee staff interview of Cmdr. Alan Weatherford, Gulfport Police Department, MS, 

conducted on Dec. 8, 2005, transcript p. 90.

165 As he explained during an interview with Committee staff : “Truck drivers are not emergency [personnel]. Th ey may 

load up and go to the house for two days. Th ey may park it. Th ey’re going to take their days off . And that load that you 

loaded out on Friday, you may not see it until Tuesday. And that caused us frustrations, you know. Some days we had 

big loads – you know, you can always count on Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday you had a bunch of trucks because 

everybody that loaded out at the end of the week can take a couple days off . Now, Monday, they’re ready to roll.” McAllister interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 34-35.

166 McAllister interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 40-45.
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Chapter 23

167 Latham testifi ed before the House that, “Th e fuel issue was something that, to be honest with you, just caught us out 

of left fi eld.” Testimony of Robert Latham, Executive Director, MEMA, before the U.S. House, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Mississippi, Dec. 7, 2005.

168 McAllister interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 75-77.

169 Don McKinnon, e-mail to James McKay, Senate Committee staff member, Feb. 16, 2006, 5:53 p.m.

170 Th ese problems were oft en made worse because of the apparent diffi culties with FEMA even acquiring generators. In 

a questionnaire submitted for an aft er action report, Gulfport Public Works Director Kris Riemann wrote that: “FEMA 

support for items such as generators oft en took 2-4 days to get. In many cases we already had a generator from another 

source by the time FEMA went through their long process. I would think there would be a faster way to get generators in 

place especially for the water and sewer system when every day counts so much to our residents.” Kris Riemann, Director of Public Works, City of Gulfport, MS, “Hurricane Katrina Post-Incident Survey,” sent to Crystal Johnson, Nov. 3, 

2005.

171 Committee staff interview of Kris Riemann, Director of Public Works, City of Gulfport, MS, conducted on Dec. 7, 

2005, transcript pp. 60-62.

172 Committee staff interview of Jim Craig, Director of Health Protection, Mississippi Department of Health, conducted 

on Jan. 25, 2006, transcript p. 44.

173 Written Statement of Jason Jackson, Director of Business Continuity, Global Security Division, Wal-Mart Stores, 

Inc. for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: 

What Can Government Learn from the Private Sector’s Response?, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 6; Written Statement of David M. 

Ratcliff e, President and CEO, Southern Company, for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: What Can Government Learn from the Private Sector’s Response?, Nov. 

16, 2005, p. 2; Written Statement of Kevin T. Regan, Regional Vice President, Hotel Operations, Starwood Hotels and 

Resorts Worldwide, Inc., for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on 

Hurricane Katrina: What Can Government Learn from the Private Sector’s Response?, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 4.

174 Written Statement of Jackson, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 7; Written Statement of Ratcliff e, Senate 

Committee hearing, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 2; Written Statement of Regan, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 4.

175 Written Statement of Ratcliff e, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 2.

176 Written Statement of Ratcliff e, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 2

177 Written Statement of Stanley S. Litow, Vice President, Corporate Community Relations, IBM Corporation, for the 

U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: What Can 

Government Learn from the Private Sector’s Response?, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 2.

178 Written Statement of Regan, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 4.

179 Written Statement of Jackson, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 6.

180 Testimony of Jason Jackson, Director of Business Continuity, Global Security Division, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. for 

the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: What Can 

Government Learn from the Private Sector’s Response?, Nov. 16, 2005.

181 Written Statement of Jackson, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 6.

182 Written Statement of Jackson, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 6.

183 Jackson, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 16, 2005.

184 Jackson, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 16, 2005.

185 Written Statement of Jackson, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 9.

186 Jackson, Senate Committee hearing, Nov. 16, 2005.
584
Storm victims waiting at the airfi eld

Photo © 2005 The Times-Picayune Publishing Co., all rights 

reserved. Used with permission of the Times-Picayune
399

Chapter 24

Medical Assistance

Introduction to the Health Impacts of Hurricane Katrina

I

n both Mississippi and Louisiana, the onset of Hurricane Katrina found signifi cant 

populations of acutely ill patients in hospitals and patients in nursing homes who were 

not evacuated.1

 In the case of acutely ill hospital patients, most hospitals decided that 

the medical risk of moving these patients outweighed the benefi t, and chose to shelter-inplace. Unfortunately, the majority of the hospitals were not adequately equipped to carry 

out this function in the face of a storm the magnitude of Katrina.2

 Some nursing homes 

made similar decisions based on diffi culties they encountered in previous evacuations or for 

other reasons. All told, some 235 deaths occurred in 28 of Louisiana’s hospitals and nursing 

homes.3

 Special-needs patients transported themselves or were evacuated to the Superdome 

and to other shelters.4

 Although an estimated 450 special-needs patients were evacuated 

from the Superdome prior to landfall and transferred to a state-supported shelter in Baton 

Rouge, many more remained in the city.5

So on the eve of Katrina’s landfall, federal, state, and local medical emergency managers 

found themselves confronted with the need to evacuate and care for thousands of medically compromised individuals – a circumstance forewarned in the Hurricane Pam exercise 

a year before Katrina.6

 Even more telling is the fact that these offi cials were apparently well 

aware of the situation that they would face. For example, a U.S. Department of Health and 

Human Services (HHS) e-mail describes information communicated on a FEMA-arranged 

conference call on Sunday night, August 28, just hours before landfall. Th e e-mail stated 

that 40 to 50 patients at the Superdome special-needs shelter were critical-care medical 

patients and that there were approximately 2,500 hospital patients still in New Orleans. Th e 

e-mail goes on to say, “Advanced planning was never completed on how the patients left in 

the hospitals will be evacuated aft er the event,” and later noted, “it is assumed that many of 

the hospital generators will lose power given the expected height of the water.”7

Similar circumstances were reported in Mississippi. A report from HHS Region IV emergency representatives in Atlanta, also on Sunday evening, reported that in Mississippi there 

were “no hospital evacuations other than 8 critical patients from VA [Veterans Aff airs]” 

and “out of 29 Skilled Nursing Facilities only 2 reported evacuations.”8

Aft er the storm, federal, state, and local offi cials, and health-care workers in Mississippi and 

Louisiana faced extraordinary demands for health services, including evacuation of thousands of hospital and nursing-home patients. In addition, the health-care response system 

was taxed to its limits dealing with care of survivors and tens of thousands of people who 

had fl ed from the coastal regions and required medical care for pre-existing illnesses and 

chronic diseases, as well as preventing the spread of disease among these evacuees, many of 

whom were now living in crowded shelters.9

All of this had to be done in areas where major portions of the health-care system had been 

damaged or destroyed. All but three hospitals in the New Orleans area were incapacitated10

and essentially all hospitals in the Mississippi Gulf Coast area sustained some level of physical damage and operational disruption (from loss of power, evacuation of staff , disruption 

of their supply systems, etc.). Charity Hospital in New Orleans, rendered inoperable by 

fl ood water, was one of only two major trauma centers in the entire state.11
Chapter 24

400

Medical Assistance: Louisiana

As Hurricane Katrina approached Louisiana, hospitals and nursing homes had to decide 

which of their thousands of patients and residents could be safely evacuated, and to where. 

Once Katrina struck, hospitals and nursing homes had to care for those left behind, as well 

as new arrivals – all while dealing with fl ooding, power outages, supply shortages, security 

problems, and other issues.

Medical Evacuations

Temporary triage and medical-care facilities, developed as part of the Hurricane Pam exercise, provided triage for tens of thousands of evacuees and victims. Th e plan called for searchand-rescue teams to drop people at Search-and-Rescue Bases of Operations (SARBOOs) near 

the fl ooded areas, where paramedics would perform initial triage. Rescuees would then be 

transported to Temporary Medical-and-Operations Staging Areas (TMOSAs), larger areas 

with temporary medical facilities, for care and triage. Using this system, the state successfully 

triaged approximately 60,000 people.12 With a capacity of 800 beds to provide medical care, 

the TMOSA at the Pete Maravich Center on the Louisiana State University (LSU) campus in 

Baton Rouge was the largest temporary emergency facility ever built, according to Dr. Jimmy 

Guidry, the Medical Director for the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH).13

However, while the SARBOO/TMOSA structure was critical to handling the large volume of 

people needing attention, the plan did not work exactly as intended. For example, the New 

Orleans airport became a major triage center, especially for critically ill patients evacuated 

from hospitals, even though it was not part of the state plan. And as stated by Dr. Guidry, the 

state also lacked adequate transportation resources to evacuate all of the victims:

Most of the hospitals did not have helipads, so they either had to go to the 

Superdome helipad or to another hospital’s helipad. Th e helicopters that we 

did have were not willing to make a fl ight beyond picking them up there and 

bringing them to the airport, because they had to go back and pick up some 

more folks. So they weren’t going to take them to anywhere [else] in the state 

by helicopter if they could avoid it because that would be loss of time. So most 

of the helicopter pick ups were from a helipad next to a hospital, to the airport 

or to the Causeway, depending on the critical [condition] of the patient. From 

the airport and from the Causeway, then it was buses or planes. 14

Many victims did eventually arrive at the TMOSAs, although this created a signifi cant 

transportation problem because of the large number of evacuees in New Orleans. Eventually buses were organized to carry out this function, as further described by Dr. Guidry, the 

buses were used

when we started evacuating the large numbers at Causeway and the large 

numbers at the Superdome. Th ose buses would then bring the patients by the 

TMOSA and at the TMOSA, then we would triage them to see whether they 

could continue on the trip that the buses was taking them to, either a general 

shelter in Louisiana or a general shelter outside of Louisiana.15

Some of the diffi culties experienced in moving victims into the state’s medical-triage system 

were compounded by the fact that the evacuation of hospitals was simply not addressed in 

Hurricane Pam, despite the presumption that New Orleans would fl ood and that the hospitals would become inoperable. In fact, the Hurricane Pam exercise assumed that some 2,000 

patients would be sheltered in place in area hospitals that would cease to operate as functional medical facilities due to fl ooding – a prediction that came strikingly close to reality 

during Katrina.16 Little action was taken to address this daunting scenario prior to Katrina. 
Medical Assistance

401

As explained by Dr. James Aiken, Medical Director for Emergency Preparedness for the 

Medical Center of Louisiana in New Orleans (a.k.a. Charity and University Hospitals):

Well, to start with my own hospital, it [Pam] did not change our planning at 

all. I don’t think it changed anyone else’s planning that I am aware of ... Th e 

focus of the health care planning that I participated in [during the exercise]

had to do with not what happens within what we call the aff ected areas [that] 

have fl ooding but what happened on dry land. And most of the activities that 

happened in the health care breakout sessions had to do with standing up the 

temporary medical support sites.

[M]any of my colleagues registered our concerns that we were literally writing 

off any serious planning above and beyond what we had then, which was to tell 

the hospitals they were going to have to be self-suffi cient for three to fi ve and 

now seven days. ... 

So the Hurricane Pam, again, exercises and planning eff orts, as far as I know, 

never addressed the issue of pre-threat evacuation or actually serious detailed 

planning for the aff ected area. 17

Notwithstanding the failure of emergency planners during the Hurricane Pam exercise to 

address the need to evacuate hospitals, the hospitals were required to have emergency and 

evacuation plans. For example, DHH regulations required hospitals to have such plans, and 

for those plans to be made available to regional emergency offi cials upon request.18 Nonetheless, these requirements proved woefully inadequate. As Dr. Guidry explained:

It is not a requirement for licensure [for hospitals] to have generators at a 

certain level, at a certain place. It is not a requirement for licensure that [the 

hospital] show proof that your plan is operational. 

It was not a requirement prior to this event [Hurricane Katrina] that they 

would turn in plans defi ning what their evacuations plans [are].

When I had discussions with a number of these hospitals in this area over the 

years, the questions was, “How are you going to evacuate?” And their response 

was always, “We do not plan to evacuate. Our evacuation plan will be to get 

those people out that can travel, elective surgeries. But we will remain here 

with the people that are not able to get out and the people that are going to 

need our care so that we can be here aft er the event.”

I can tell you that next hurricane season, there are going to be a lot more people 

leaving and the plan is going to change drastically. Th ose that do stay will be the 

hospitals that have the capability of hardening their structures and putting their 

generators higher because it does not make sense to stay in a bowl, if you will.19

In the end, hospitals in southeastern Louisiana were simply reluctant to follow their plans 

and evacuate the critically ill because of the danger, expense, and uncertainty of the hurricane path itself. As LSU’s Dr. Aiken put it:

Hurricanes have a remarkable capability of changing directions quickly. And so 

when you say, “In the line of the path of a storm,” you know, for us, that path 

actually gets realized aft er the fact. So when you talk about evacuating patients 

from the number of hospitals that now exist, and we have to expand this conversation beyond New Orleans, because, quite frankly, a lot of the destination 
Chapter 24

402

hospitals that some of the areas use would be the same ones that we [LSU] would 

want to use. ...

How do you decide which hospitals should evacuate and where should they 

go? I mean, do we evacuate the entire coastline? ...

And again, remember 24 hours [prior to landfall of the hurricane], we do not 

want anybody on the road. So the risk benefi t [issue arises], and also remember every single patient who is critically ill requires almost their own means of 

transportation, whether it’s an ambulance or helicopter. We certainly could 

put a couple in. But for our critical care patients, school buses [are] not usually 

the answer.20

In addition, evacuation would have required New Orleans area hospitals to confront the 

diffi cult problem of fi nding other hospitals that could take their patients. As Dr. Guidry 

explained, in Louisiana under normal situations, sick or emergency patients with pressing 

needs are sent to the New Orleans region, which hosts a large number of medical facilities, 

the state’s “medical Mecca.” However, Katrina reversed that burden, causing 25 hospitals in 

the area to try to fi nd places for their patients outside of New Orleans, and “the rest of the 

state can’t absorb it.”21

However successful it had been in prior hurricanes, the strategy of hospitals to stay open for 

critically ill patients and storm victims proved untenable in Katrina. Aft er a few days, most 

hospitals that had stayed open were running out of fuel for their backup generators, making 

it impossible to operate eff ectively or, in some cases, at all, due to fl ooding. In desperation, 

they appealed to DHH to help them evacuate. Dr. Guidry found that helicopters and other 

transportation assets were tied up in search-and-rescue eff orts:

And so their plan was stock up, be prepared to stay in place a few days. Most 

hurricanes, three days, fi ve days out, you’re done with it and be ready to take 

care of people aft er. Th e calls started coming in saying we’re about to lose 

power, we’re going to have to bag [manually ventilate] patients. We got to 

get them out of here. We got to get them out of here. We got to get them out 

of here. And I was asking for the resources to move them. Search and rescue 

is going to have to move them. I got to have the helicopters, I got to have the 

planes to move them out. ... So it then becomes where do I send them, how do 

I get them there, how do I get them out of there. So the Hospital Association 

is coming to me in tears, the folks there are in tears trying to help their folks 

and I’m beating my head to try to get the help. And you’ve got the search and 

rescue that’s trying to get people out of water and rooft ops and out of hospitals. 

And that’s all the competing needs for the limited assets.22

First responders attempting to answer hospital-evacuation calls faced chaotic conditions, 

particularly in the early days aft er landfall. Security concerns, including rumors of snipers, 

thwarted rescue eff orts.23 Communications were poor, making it diffi cult to coordinate with 

ambulances and helicopters. Flooded streets thwarted attempts to drive through New Orleans. Dr. Fred Cerise, Secretary of DHH, who participated in evacuation missions in New 

Orleans, described the challenge of attempting to take seven patients by truck from Charity 

Hospital to the Superdome special-needs shelter:

And we picked up seven people, some that needed dialysis, to take back to the 

Superdome. By this time it was dark; it was late, probably midnight. And there 

were people ... outside of the Superdome that were sleeping all around the outer 

concourse. And so the truck had to – made its way up the external ramp to get 
Medical Assistance

403

to the helipad. And the guard was trying to clear the path, and by this time it’s 

... late, late Wednesday night. ... It’s very tense in the Superdome by this point. 

People are belligerent, not wanting to get – they’re getting woken up to move. ...

I’m in the back of the truck and I hear this loud, “Move it, move, move, move.” 

And I look back and there’s like 30 Guardsmen running at the crowd with 

their rifl es drawn. I – my initial thought was they were just trying to scatter 

the crowd, which they did. But then they turned into the Superdome and I saw 

a medic team come running against traffi c at me, and this is when they had a 

Guardsman that was shot in the Superdome. Th ese guys were going in to get 

their guy out that had gotten shot.24

Evacuating special-needs patients from the Superdome presented its own set of challenges, 

partly because they were next to the general-population shelter. As noted elsewhere, evacuation of the general public didn’t get under way until late Wednesday, due to the delayed 

arrival of buses. Meanwhile, state offi cials had begun evacuating special-needs patients 

from the site by helicopter and boat. Seeing the special-needs evacuation proceeding, some 

members of the general public “fi gured out that if they were sick they might get out earlier. 

And so they started having chest pains and they started getting sick so they could get out 

earlier.”25 Offi cials were also concerned that the general population, angry at having to stay 

behind, would become violent. 26

Flooding around the Superdome also interfered with medical evacuations. Offi cials had 

staged ambulances before landfall on the upper and outer concourses, expecting to use 

them for evacuation once the storm passed. Unfortunately, rising water on Monday evening 

prevented their use.27 Th ereaft er, patients who could tolerate the ride were transported in 

high-water trucks to ambulances at other locations; others had to wait for helicopters.28 Patients were loaded in ambulances, boats, high-water vehicles, aircraft , and even 18-wheeler 

trucks.29 Many patients required continuous, individual medical care while in transit.30 Th e 

logistics were nearly overwhelming, as described by Dr. Cerise:

It’s not a simple ordeal. Put them on manual bagging for people off the ventilator; put them on a spine board. Th e interior of the hospital was dark, and so they 

would carry them down 12 fl ights of stairs on the external stairwell over their 

heads on a spine board making tight turns to get these people down onto the boat.

Got them to boat and we took them over to the hospital. I can tell you we had 

a policeman on the boat, because I remember the people throwing stuff at us 

from the Interstate, Claiborne overpass. And there was a shouting match that 

went on with the police and the guys that were throwing boxes and stuff down 

at the boats.31

Overall, Aiken described the process of evacuating patients as “one of the issues that I feel 

less than satisfi ed, most unsatisfi ed about. I think it sort of overwhelmed us, and I think we 

had a fi ngers-crossed attitude.”32

Aiken also felt that the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) did not always appreciate the urgency of his requests for assistance. While acknowledging that his demands were 

competing with those of other responders, he believed he would have fared better if EOC 

offi cials involved in handling requests had been at the scene of the crisis:

I don’t know if it was because the right decision maker wasn’t at the desk at the 

time, like with ESF-8 or whatever. But there was always this, “I will see what I 
Chapter 24

404

can do.” And then they would come back and say, “I think we need – we got 

the information, but I got a feeling we better start looking at other options.”

If we could just work out a system. Either bring in distant EOC personnel down 

to the scene, whether it’s FEMA or whoever else the lead agents are, and work 

side by side. Conditions are horrible, but they are not impossible. Th at to me 

could be the optimal eyes and ears. But if you don’t have that, I felt like I was negotiating a lot. And I know I had competing of interest, and I understood that.33

Nursing Home Evacuations

Nursing homes in the metropolitan New Orleans area had their own Emergency Operations Plans (EOPs) that incorporated evacuations. In addition, Louisiana law required 

nursing homes to maintain EOPs and provide them to their parish emergency managers 

to “review and approve” the plans. 34 In reality, the Committee staff found that few parishes 

followed through on this guidance. One parish emergency manager from the metropolitan 

area thought he only had to review the plan.35 Th e emergency manager for the City of New 

Orleans felt that the law did not provide parish emergency managers with the means to 

enforce the regulations.36

Th e Committee also found that there was no process to vet the plans for consistency and 

practicability. For example, many nursing homes rely on ambulance services to evacuate 

their populations. During a crisis, however, ambulance services may be in use by other 

nursing homes or hospitals. Furthermore, nursing homes and hospitals are not required 

to evacuate.37 Th e facility’s plan could simply be to weather the storm – even if the nursing home is in a fl ood-prone area. In short, nursing homes are only required to have their 

emergency plans on the books, which is a far cry from ensuring that they will actually work 

during a time of crisis.

Th e results were predictable. As Katrina approached, nursing homes found themselves without 

evacuation resources. In some cases, they turned to hospitals to take their patients, even though 

hospitals couldn’t guarantee patient safety. Aiken described the situation aft er nursing-home 

offi cials discovered that their memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with government agencies 

or other entities for transportation or other resources had been overtaken by events:

We get a panic call 24 to 36 hours out. Th ey have exhausted their MOUs. Th ey 

have been told “No” on their level, we don’t have what we said we would have 

for you in terms of buses or ambulances or even helicopters. And they call us ...

We are not saying no. We are saying, “We may go under water. Our patients 

may die. You putting them with us [has] not increased their likeliness or likelihood to survive necessarily.”

We do everything we can to assist them in getting out. If somebody does show 

up, we take them in, which is what we do. Again, it’s a very awkward. It’s very 

frustrating and, quite frankly, very scary, and I will even say a deadly situation.38

Medical Supply and Preparations

Medical institutions also struggled in obtaining adequate supplies, such as fuel. Dr. Aiken 

described Charity Hospital generators as “running on fumes for the fi rst day or two.”39 For 

many hospitals, lack of fuel became the decisive factor, forcing them to shut down and 

evacuate. As there was no statutory or regulatory requirement that generators be located 

above levels exposed to fl ooding, 40 many generators fl ooded. Hospitals lost power abruptly, 

making rapid evacuation essential. Th e LSU computer system was also heavily damaged, 

seriously impairing access to patient records.41
Medical Assistance

405

On the other hand, pre-stocked food and medical supplies at Charity Hospital were adequate to carry the facility through until the National Guard could re-supply.42 Dr. Kevin Stephens, Director of the New Orleans Department of Health, who oversaw medical care for 

special-needs patients at the Superdome, also said that he had “no problems with supplies,” 

although medical oxygen ran low at one point.43

DHH managed to keep supplies fl owing, but only through extraordinary measures. On 

Sunday, August 28, DHH put the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) on notice that it 

might need supplies from the Strategic National Stockpile, which CDC would deliver within 

12 hours of the request. However, when DHH did make the request shortly aft er Katrina 

passed, CDC did not come through promptly, and Guidry was forced to obtain needed supplies elsewhere: “I personally signed for an order of fi ve million dollars’ worth of medical 

equipment from a private vendor because I didn’t know where else to go, who was ready to 

deliver to me when I needed it. And so I did not have the funding for that, but I signed for it 

and got the Governor’s backing to make that happen.”44

Support from Federal Medical Teams

Apart from supplies, the state depended heavily on a steady fl ow of outside medical personnel, including Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Disaster Medical 

Assistance Teams (DMATs), which are nominally 35-member self-contained emergency 

medical teams, to stay on top of health-care needs.45 DHH opened seven special-needs 

shelters around the state46, and every one of them wanted to have a DMAT with its medical 

personnel and supplies to assist them.47 According to Dr. Guidry, “we couldn’t get enough 

teams here quick enough to meet those demands, so we went for quite some time before we 

got enough teams to meet the demand.”48 A team of U.S. Public Health Service (USPHS) 

offi cers also arrived in Louisiana on Tuesday night, August 30, and USPHS helped staff the 

state’s triage facility at LSU for the duration of the event.49

State and local health offi cials described two occasions when DMATs redeployed from the 

special-needs facility at the Superdome, leaving an increased burden for medical professionals still on site. According to these offi cials, the fi rst instance occurred either late on 

Monday or Tuesday, shortly aft er the special-needs operations were relocated from the 

inner concourse of the Superdome to the neighboring basketball arena. At that point, state 

and local health offi cials stated that two DMAT teams assigned to the facility left , apparently 

concerned about their equipment getting wet.50 It should be noted, however, that according 

to the National Disaster Medical Systems (NDMS) Management Support Team Commander on site, Ronald Martin, the teams did leave the arena fl oor, but that he redeployed the 

DMAT teams to avoid the rising water. He stated that he moved one team to the mezzanine 

area and one team out of the Superdome to the adjacent elevated highway. Martin explained 

that he was concerned about keeping all of his assets within the Superdome if further fl ooding were to occur51. At least one local offi cial was concerned about this change, and it did 

have the practical eff ect of reducing available resources inside the Superdome. According to 

Dr. Stephens, those teams were needed to help relieve his medical staff in their third straight 

day of caring for special needs patients and facing burnout.52

Th e second occasion occurred on Th ursday when all of the DMAT teams at the Superdome 

(as well as city health department and Emergency Medical Services (EMS) personnel) pulled 

out due to security concerns.53 General Gary Jones of the Louisiana National Guard, and 

Incident Commander at the Superdome, claimed that he was surprised by their abrupt departure, leaving behind at least 500 critical-care patients with no provisions for the transition:

Dr. Lupin came up to me and he said, “Sir” – and he was pretty irate – he said, 

“You know, how do you expect me to deal with all of these critical care patients 

here?” And I said, “What are you talking about?” ... And he said, “All the pa-
Chapter 24

406

tients over there on that ramp.” And I said, “Why are you dealing with them?” 

... He said, “FEMA left .” He said, “Th ey left ”; and he said, “Th ey didn’t leave 

any supplies, I don’t have charts, I don’t know what’s wrong with these people, 

I don’t know – they got IVs in their arms, I don’t even know really what’s supposed to happen, what the plan is or anything else.”54

General Jones said he made no secret of his displeasure to FEMA offi cials:

[Th e FEMA team leader] came back and she said we’re back, and this is soand-so, and he’s going to be the lead guy. And I said, “Are you going to stay 

this time?” And they said, “Oh, yeah, we’re going to stay.” And I said, “Well, 

good, because I would hate to have to shoot somebody.” And they laughed and 

they said, “You’re joking.” And I said, “Th ink so?” You know, and I – and I 

was joking. Obviously, I mean, I wasn’t going to shoot anybody. But I kind of 

voiced my displeasure with the fact that they had left me unsupported.55

Hundreds of special-needs patients were cared for at the Superdome and eventually evacuated. In the end, 19 nursing homes evacuated pre-landfall, and leaving 34 to do so aft er the 

hurricane.56 Moreover, a total of 12,000 patients and caregivers were evacuated from hospitals before and aft er Katrina with 25 hospitals evacuating in the fi rst fi ve days post-landfall.57

Many of these patients endured terrible suff ering. Of the 400 patients at Charity Hospital, 

nine died, including some directly as a result of the prolonged evacuation process.58 Dr. 

Stephens described rushing special-needs cases out of the Superdome before they started “to 

decompensate” [lose their vital functions]. He said, “I knew that I had to get people from 

the Dome to somewhere else ... another day or two, [and] these fragile elderly people were 

going to start dropping out on me [dying].”59 Similarly, Dr. Cerise, Secretary of DHH, said 

that many special-needs patients in the Superdome were elderly people who couldn’t take 

care of themselves, and that it was clear some had not received necessary attention when 

they were moved from the Superdome to the neighboring arena.60

Th e severity of these patients’ problems was made even more clear as this investigation developed more information on pre-storm planning and emergency coordination during the 

response. Some of the more troubling information came from the Executive Director of the 

Louisiana Nursing Home Association (LNHA), Joseph Donchess, who has been with the 

LNHA for nearly 20 years. Although the LNHA had an established seat at the state EOC, 

and was initially allowed access to E-Team, the state’s electronic emergency request tracking 

system, these practices were interrupted during the response to Katrina. Donchess said:

It’s my personal opinion that nursing homes and hospitals are just too low of 

a priority and I’m very disappointed in that because here you’re talking about 

the most frail population there is and they’re relying on two non-profi t associations to pretty much get this work done and it was never intended for us to be 

that kind of life saver organizations. ... And that’s what we had to act as during 

this last storm.61

For the fi rst two days, LNHA was on its own to improvise and fi nd ways to 

rescue the elderly in nursing homes. We helped members and nonmembers 

alike. At fi rst, LNHA could submit E-Team missions, but by the fourth day our 

E-Team missions were denied because we were not a governmental agency.62

Once the LNHA was denied access to the E-Team system, Donchess and other LNHA 

personnel sought Dr. Guidry and DHH’s authorization for LNHA’s needs. However, this 

practice also proved ineff ective, as Dr. Guidry “had 100 diff erent things” he had to do him-
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self, so it was still very diffi cult for the LNHA to get its requests approved for the benefi t of 

the many nursing home residents counting on assistance. 63

Another troubling aspect of the state’s emergency-preparedness structure was a gaping hole 

in the state’s planning and coordination as it related to hospitals and nursing homes under 

the State’s Emergency Operations Plan (EOP). Under the State’s EOP, Emergency Support Function 8 (ESF-8, Public Health and Medical Services), responsibilities were divided 

between two state agencies. DHH was responsible for public health, sanitation, medical, 

and health assistance to special-needs shelter operations, mental health, and crisis counseling. Th e LSU Health Sciences Center, which runs the state’s public hospital system, was 

responsible for providing and coordinating hospital care and shelter for nursing-home and 

home-health patients with acute care requirements, as well as casualties of emergencies and 

disasters. LSU also had the lead role in coordinating hospital planning and actions with 

private hospitals and other facilities.64

Unfortunately, the emergency-preparedness and response system laid out in the Louisiana 

EOP did not refl ect reality for nursing homes and hospitals in Louisiana. LSU did not, and 

was not equipped to provide and coordinate hospital care and shelter for nursing-home, 

special-needs, or home-health patients as called for in the plan. Nor did LSU coordinate the 

overall planning and actions of private hospitals during emergencies as it was required to 

do.65 To the extent any agency met these responsibilities, it was DHH, which did so through 

a program to prepare hospitals to respond to bioterrorist attacks. Th is program was funded 

through the U.S. Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), an agency of the 

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), and was not intended to deal with 

issues such as hurricane preparations.66

However, some aspects of the HRSA program did come into play. For example, under the 

HRSA program, DHH had previously worked with hospitals to establish a hospital emergency 

network to track available hospital beds and communicate information among hospitals 

which was used during Katrina.67 However, while the HRSA program did provide some level 

of preparedness among the hospital community, this safety net for the charges and responsibilities that were supposed to have been shouldered by LSU under the state plan did not fully 

replace the work that LSU was supposed to do either before or during the response to Katrina.

Th e investigation sought to determine why this aspect of the state emergency plan was not followed. For one, LSU simply did not accept its responsibilities under the State’s EOP, though it 

appears to have been understood that these responsibilities existed. As explained by Aiken: 

Oh, I understand the confusion because we are not doing it the way – exactly 

the way – the Emergency Operations Plan. ... Th e way it realistically and the 

way it has operated, not only during Hurricane Katrina but for some of the 

other instances where hurricanes have come very close to us over the last 

couple of years, that LSU actually does not coordinate the overall hospital 

response. Th ey tend to focus – and, obviously, since I don’t sit there, I can’t say 

exactly what they do minute to minute. ... But I have a feeling that people ... 

who sat in that chair [at the state EOC and have] been assigned that responsibility, they tend to focus on LSU hospitals and the HRSA, the people who have 

been employed through the HRSA grant and have traditionally been present 

to help coordinate the overall network, which certainly includes us, but also 

includes all the private hospitals. What you see in the plan is not what actually 

happens. It’s certainly a job deserving of many more people than the plan calls 

for. And, again, these are all comments that I made public during the revision 
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408

process earlier this year. In my opinion, the plan is not realistic. It should be 

more refl ective of how we really do it, and I certainly hope that changes.68

LSU’s responsibilities under the State’s 2005 EOP were not new. Prior iterations, specifi cally 

the 2001 plan, made LSU’s responsibilities for planning and coordinating hospital care and 

shelter for nursing-home and home-health patients even more explicit.69

As a result of LSU’s failure, there was inadequate attention to emergency planning for 

important components of the health-care system in Louisiana. Dr. Aiken said he was not 

aware of any planning by LSU or other involved agencies at the state level for nursing-home 

and home-health patients under the State’s EOP:

I don’t know of any substantial act of involvement that LSU has on nursinghome and home-health patients, truly across the board on an emergency basis, 

planning, preparation, or the actual response itself. Nursing homes in this state 

have always been a huge concern for us. ... We over the years through the local 

emergency-preparedness committees, through every level of emergency planning that I have been involved with, we have always been concerned over their 

involvement, what they do during storms, that kind of thing. And I am not 

aware of any instance where LSU has had a – again, on Baton Rouge, on a State 

Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness or Emergency Operation Center level – has 

had any real impact or infl uence on [them].70

Dr. Aiken also noted that he was “99 percent sure” that his boss, Don Smithburg, Chief Executive Offi cer of LSU Health Care Services Division (HCSD) and Executive Vice President 

for the LSU system, “didn’t spend much time in providing or coordinating care for nursing home or home health placement, except for those patients that may have arrived at our 

hospital, which they did, the night before at Charity.”71 Smithburg admitted to LSU’s shortcomings, stating that the individual charged with the overall planning and coordination for 

emergency preparedness and management for the Charity and University Hospitals, the 

Chief Operating Offi cer “was weak and not engaged and not communicative with the rest of 

our staff in that responsibility.”72 (Smithburg terminated this employee in February 2005.)73

Furthermore, when asked by Committee staff if LSU had the resources or manpower to 

meet its charges under the State’s EOP, regardless of whether the Chief Operating Offi cer 

for the system was competent in his/her position or not, Smithburg said, “Th ere’s no way.”74

Dr. Aiken spoke of his concerns about the fl aws in the state EOP to superiors in the LSU 

HCSD, to Colonel Jadwin W. “Jay” Mayeaux, Louisiana’s Deputy Director of Homeland Security, and to the State Medical Offi cer, Dr. Guidry.75 But the responsibilities stayed with LSU.76

Despite this notable vacuum in the State’s EOP, Dr. Aiken was reasonably certain that the 

HRSA network acted as a surrogate for LSU in meeting the hospital-related responsibilities 

under ESF-8.77 However, the Committee’s investigation revealed that this safety net did not 

work as well as some would have hoped. Erin Downey, the HRSA Program’s Director of 

Emergency Preparedness at the time, on contract with the DHH, was at the State EOC in 

Baton Rouge for the Katrina response, and had a diff erent view:

So you had emergency preparedness people calling and asking for resources, 

expressing their concerns, calling the command center or ... they would call 

their coordinator, and then their coordinator would call ... When requests 

were coming in to us, ... our marching orders were to put everything in ETeam, okay, because what that was, was a way of facilitating that or standardizing all of the requests, funneling them through one main decision point, and 
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409

that was the total breakdown. Now, I would love to say something diff erent 

about that, but that was a total breakdown.78

Medical Assistance: Mississippi

Hurricane Katrina devastated the medical infrastructure of south Mississippi, destroying or 

severely damaging 14 of the 16 hospitals in the region’s six counties.79 Th ree hospitals were 

damaged so severely that they were forced to close, including the only acute-care hospital 

in Hancock County.80 One hospital, Select Specialty Hospital in Gulfport, was destroyed in 

the storm.81

Th e storm also damaged or destroyed other medical facilities in the southernmost six counties. More than a third of primary-care clinics were closed or destroyed.82 In addition, the 

damage done to the local physical infrastructure has resulted in longer response time for 

ambulances and a greater reliance on airlift ing patients for care.83 Seventy-three nursing 

homes were aff ected, including 16 in the southernmost six counties; two were destroyed.84

As the lead state agency under the Mississippi Comprehensive Emergency Management 

Plan’s ESF-8 for health and medical services, the Mississippi Department of Health (MDH) 

played the lead state role in response to this catastrophe. Under that plan, MDH is charged 

with providing state assistance to local governments in response to public-health and medical-care needs following a disaster.85 While the MDH does not provide primary care, once 

the Governor declares an emergency, all health and medical considerations fall within the 

purview of MDH.86

Dr. Brian Amy, Mississippi’s State Health Offi cer and the top health offi cial in the state,

explained that although MDH was prepared and had recently increased its capacity to 

respond, it did not have the capacity to deal with disasters of Katrina’s magnitude.87 MDH 

activated its EOC at the MDH central offi ce in Jackson on August 27, two days before 

landfall. Th e department pre-positioned response personnel, such as public-health nurses in 

special-needs shelters throughout South Mississippi and emergency-response coordinators 

in coastal county EOCs. It also worked with representatives from FEMA’s National Disaster 

Medical System and HHS that arrived before landfall to request that additional federal help 

be readied, including DMATs, medical personnel capable of providing medical care following disaster.88 Th ese teams were eventually positioned at every aff ected hospital, treating 

15,500 patients (out of 17,649 reported injuries), in the fi rst days aft er landfall.89

MDH also supports pre-landfall evacuation. In these eff orts, MDH assists in evacuating 

nursing-home, special-needs, and sometimes hospital patients.90 Th ese facilities are generally evacuated well prior to the general evacuation so that ambulances do not have to fi ght 

traffi c congestion.91 MDH also has a “decompression plan,” to assist in discharging patients 

who can safely leave the hospital early.92

MDH regulates nursing homes in Mississippi. Jim Craig, MDH’s incident commander during Katrina, reported that nursing homes asked to evacuate prior to Katrina did so.93

Th is hasn’t always been the case. According to Governor Haley Barbour, one nursing home 

resisted evacuation prior to Hurricane Ivan. In response, Governor Barbour had the director of the state-run, low-income Medicaid program call them:

We had to make one of the nursing homes evacuate, and that’s where Medicaid 

comes in because that is who pays them. And if they get sort of uncertain of 
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410

whether they need to evacuate, I get 

the Director of Medicaid to call them, 

and they get a better attitude.94

Ultimately, MDH responded to Katrina with 

over 1,400 personnel.95 Immediately following landfall, MDH began to assess and 

support local medical facilities. In addition, 

MDH’s state epidemiologist led a team to 

the coast to assess damage to hospitals. Th e 

largest immediate problem was a severe fuel 

shortage. With power out in the area, many 

health-care facilities were forced to rely on 

generators. As a result, MDH offi cials began 

procuring and delivering fuel. Th e other 

major post-landfall challenge was maintaining security at health-care facilities, as they 

generally had power, drawing local residents 

displaced by the storm.96

In addition to federal help, Mississippi 

received considerable help from other states 

under the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). Dr. Amy has stated 

that Mississippi “owe[s] a special debt of gratitude to our friends from other state public 

health agencies, particularly Florida, Kentucky, Indiana, Illinois, and North Carolina.” He 

singled out for special praise the Florida Department of Health, which dispatched more 

than 300 personnel to Mississippi, and Kentucky, which sent more than 100 personnel.97

One of the most signifi cant resources deployed to Mississippi under EMAC was Carolina-1. 98 Carolina-1 is a portable hospital unit that includes a surgical suite, x-rays, a laboratory, a 

pharmacy, and 100 beds. 99 According to Craig, when Mississippi fi rst contacted Carolina1, it was bound for Louisiana. Due to legal-liability issues it re-deployed to Mississippi. 100

Ultimately, Carolina-1 deployed to the Bay St. Louis area in Hancock County, where it became the central health-care provider in the county, replacing the Hancock County Medical 

Center devastated by Katrina.101

Mississippi also became the fi rst state to receive, stage, store, and distribute the Strategic 

National Stockpile (SNS) Push Pack. Within 12 hours of Dr. Amy’s offi cial request, the 

CDC delivered eight truckloads of SNS medical supplies for Mississippi medical facilities. 

Supplies continued to fl ow into Mississippi for two weeks until Mississippi’s facilities were 

able to reestablish their regular supply channels.102

Federal Health Response 

Use of the National Disaster Medical System

Th e National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) is the nation’s primary federal response 

capability to meet medical needs in times of disaster when state and local systems are overwhelmed. Part of FEMA’s Response Division, the NDMS has two basic components.103 Th e 

fi rst is a collection of special medical and response teams that are on call to provide medical 

care during national emergencies.104 Th e second component is a partnership of FEMA, the 

Veterans Aff airs (VA), the Defense Department (DOD) and HHS that maintains a network 

Flooded reception area, Hancock 

Medical Center, Mississippi

Provided to Committee
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411

of hospitals and coordination centers throughout the United States to transport and care 

for large numbers of patients in an emergency.105 Th is network was originally established 

to provide medical care within the United States for military casualties, but was used essentially for the fi rst time on a large scale during Katrina to evacuate medical patients from 

New Orleans.106

NDMS teams comprise some 9,000 volunteers.107 Th ese volunteers organize, train, and 

deploy as part of geographically dispersed teams supported by local sponsors. When they 

deploy, the team members become temporary federal employees, which provides them a 

salary, reimbursement for expenses, and liability coverage.108 Th e basic unit of the NDMS is 

the DMAT. NDMS also contains specialty teams which can deliver logistical support, mortuary, veterinary, burn- and crush-injury care, and other services. Ideally, a DMAT consists of 35 health professionals who are deployable within six hours with a well maintained 

supply and equipment cache, and have the capability to treat 250 casualties and sustain 

themselves over a 72-hour period.109 A full DMAT typically has three to four physicians and 

a mix of nurses, pharmacists, paramedics, and physician assistants. Hurricane Katrina led to 

activation of 98 percent of the NDMS teams.110

Notwithstanding this extensive deployment, the NDMS teams were hampered by numerous 

problems. Beall described DMAT medical supply cache shortfalls as a common condition

At last year’s conference in Orlando, I asked every team there, if you have your 

complete federal cache, raise your hand. Not one team raised their hand because we’ve never been able to fi nish out buying the cache. ... We had ordered 

all the stuff to fi nish these teams 100 percent, and as I had been advised, the 

million dollars had been pulled back for some reason. Some people talk about 

[a “tax”] or whatever DHS may have applied [to FEMA’s budget]. I cannot 

testify that was the reason, but know that that order was cut by $1 million, and 

that these teams did not have 100 percent cache when we deployed them for 

Katrina, so we went into a response with a shortfall.111

FEMA was also limited in its ability to make all of the teams fully operational and to expand 

the number of NDMS teams due to lack of resources.112 Of the 52 DMATs, only 25 are considered fully operational.113

NDMS also lacked suffi cient administrative resources to sustain NDMS operations, let alone 

improve them. NDMS was transferred from HHS in 2003 pursuant to the Homeland Security 

Act,114 but some administrative-support positions did not transfer from HHS. Other support 

positions were moved out of NDMS to FEMA’s own logistics section.115 To compound the 

situation, when activated, NDMS routinely sends its administrators to be part of fi eld operations. Beall said, “At the initial launch of Katrina, I was really the only operations person in 

NDMS left in the section, and the other people that were there were operational specialists, 

which I had to send to the fi eld ... I never went home. I slept on the fl oor in my offi ce.”116

NDMS Team Deployment Problems

As described more fully in Chapter 12, on Th ursday, August 25, four days prior to Katrina’s 

landfall, FEMA Response Division Chief Ed Buikema activated the NDMS system and 

began to mobilize and pre-position its medical and mortuary teams. Although FEMA 

understood that states were relying on these resources to help them cope with the expected 

aft ermath of the storm, FEMA had delays in mobilizing, deploying and staging its teams. 

For example, although the NDMS regional representative for Louisiana told NDMS leadership on Saturday, August 27, that Louisiana would need nine DMATs to staff its medical 

triage centers, these teams were not available before landfall.117 FEMA also selected team 

staging areas that were hundreds of miles away from the coastal areas where they ultimately 
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412

expected to be deployed and eff orts by Louisiana to get FEMA to bring them closer were 

apparently unsuccessful.118

Some delays in deployment were the result of the logistics and travel system that FEMA 

uses for NDMS. For example, a DMAT from San Diego was mobilized on Sunday, August 

28, the day before landfall. (Th e team would ultimately be deployed to the New Orleans Airport to assist in the medical evacuation there.) By the time NDMS headquarters approved 

the team roster late on Sunday night, there were no fl ights remaining to transport the team. 

Th e team’s aft er-action report said, “We could have been to Houston [one of the NDMS 

staging areas] half a day earlier, and to Baton Rouge a day earlier” if there had been a more 

effi cient travel-approval process.119 NDMS also relies on team supply trucks to transport 

medical supplies. In this case, the San Diego team’s medical-supply trucks were to drive all 

the way from San Diego to Louisiana.120 Finally, because team drivers are also “essential key 

team members,” the San Diego team found itself short “six more team members, when we 

became engaged at the airport.”121

Inadequate DMAT Team Support

By all accounts, NDMS teams delivered excellent care given the constraints of the environment in which they were working and living.122 NDMS team members worked tirelessly 

and heroically in diffi cult and sometimes desperate conditions. Th ree NDMS DMATs were 

also deployed on August 30 to the New Orleans airport to support the medical evacuation 

eff ort being established there.123 Th e DMATs provided care to more than 4,000 patients in 

what would become one of the largest contemporary mass-casualty triage and evacuations 

in the United States.124 For the fi rst two-and-a-half days, the three DMATs provided care to 

patients without relief in what one NDMS doctor called the “hospital from Hell.”125

Th e NDMS teams could not operate without rest. It is unclear why more medical teams 

did not arrive at the airport until Friday, September 2, when the NDMS log indicates the 

presence of two additional DMATs, MA-2 and FL-3.126 Th eir help was still desperately 

needed, but additional medical support should have deployed sooner. As described by the 

commander of a logistical support team sponsored by the U.S. Forest Service – an Incident Management Team (IMT) – that arrived at the airport on September 1, the situation 

demanded more medical and support assets, and sooner:

Upon arrival at the Louis Armstrong New Orleans International Airport on 

September 1, the scene the IMT encountered could best be described as surreal. DMAT’s had hundreds of patients scattered about the main terminal and 

ticketing area. Over 300 of these were confi ned to stretchers. Most were elderly 

and infi rmed, but many had encountered injuries due to the accidents related 

to the hurricane. Medical personnel were stretched to the breaking point.127

Th e shortage of personnel also meant it was more diffi cult to provide adequate triage. Th e 

NDMS teams operated from the perspective that the best care was simply to put patients 

on planes and get them out of the facility. DOD and private-sector planes were used to 

transport patients to hospitals wherever possible.128 When asked how patients were tracked, 

Captain Art French, one of the NDMS doctors who tried to manage the DMATs at the 

airport, replied, “We wrote down their names, where they were going, and with whom on a 

piece of paper. Th ose pieces of paper I hope are still there.”129 In between was an “expectant 

area” where failing patients were provided comfort care. In the end, 26 patients died at the 

airport, mostly in this area. Capt. French said that despite conditions at the airport the care 

of these patients was fully adequate and that these patients would have probably died in any 

medical setting.130
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413

Although DMATs are supposed to deploy 

with management support from Management 

Support Teams (MSTs), no organized MST 

deployed to the airport.131 Instead, an ad-hoc 

MST was created from NDMS personnel 

on-site. In fact, neither of the two men who 

would eventually co-direct the NDMS medical operations of the New Orleans Airport 

was formally assigned that duty.132 Th ey had 

traveled on their own to the airport to help 

out when their other assignments were canceled. When they arrived Wednesday, they 

were confronted with three medical teams, 

CA-4, TX-4, and WA-1, without any management support, facing growing numbers 

of patients, and increasingly diffi cult conditions, so they assumed leadership roles.133

Th is ad-hoc management team did its best to 

manage the situation, but had no ability to 

communicate even with NDMS leadership in 

Baton Rouge.134 When asked why he thought 

an MST was not deployed to the airport given 

the diffi culty and complexity of the mission, 

Capt. French observed that there were no 

MST staff left to send.135

Th e lack of experienced MST members led to 

other problems. At one point, Beall e-mailed 

that his fi eld operators were not supporting 

the DMATs suffi ciently: “I need a plan put 

together on how the teams will be supported. 

Many of the leaders in the fi eld are not well 

versed on NDMS fi eld ops.”136 Th e response: 

“Th en they shouldn’t be leaders, nor should 

they be in the fi eld without supervision.”137

One team complained, “We all know what 

disasters are, we would not be here if we did 

not want to help. But when the situation is 

compounded by mismanagement it makes our jobs much more diffi cult to do. We have 

asked for items and heard nothing as to the status of the request.”138

Many teams had diffi culty communicating. Th e DMATs at the Superdome had satellite phones, but had diffi culty utilizing them because they were initially not programmed 

properly and the truck-mounted units would not work inside the building.139 Th e NDMS 

MST commander on-scene deployed with only his personal cell phone.140 Management was 

aware of the problem, but seemed unable to resolve it. On September 1, Beall complained, 

“Communication has been the worst I have seen.”141 Eight days aft er Katrina’s landfall, he 

was still desperately trying to obtain communications capability. He e-mailed, “Where are 

the sat[ellite] phones for the NDMS teams? Teams do not have communications.”142

Beall attributes some of these problems to the way in which DHS absorbed NDMS from 

HHS. Th e NDMS logistics personnel were transferred to the FEMA logistics branch rather 

than remaining with their agency. Beall remarked, “So all the logistic shortfalls and all the 

Medical evacuation

U.S. Air Force photo
Chapter 24

414

things that we’re starting to see in the aft er action, it’s because the person working the logistics side of the house did not have any background in NDMS. ... we need a lot of supplies, 

and what I don’t need is somebody to tell me, `Why do you need this, why are you asking 

for that?’ I don’t need someone to slow up that request, and that’s what you’ll see”14

NDMS Patient Movement

On the night of Tuesday, August 30, federal emergency managers authorized the medical evacuation of hospital and other acute-care patients from New Orleans.144 Th is was the 

fi rst time a full-scale operation using the NDMS patient-movement capability had ever 

been initiated. 145 Th e plan called for DMATs to establish a triage center at the New Orleans 

airport and to utilize assigned Air Force aircraft to move the patients to hospitals around 

the country.146 As described above and in the aft er-action reports of the agencies that participated, more than 4,000 patients were evacuated through the airport although less than 

half (approximately 1,800) were actually placed on Air Force aircraft .147 Th e remainder were 

placed on National Guard and private aircraft . Th e distinction is important because only 

those patients who were placed on the Air Force aircraft were logged into the NDMS patient 

movement-tracking system. Th e tracking system was not accessible for all patients and as a 

result, there was no systematic way of knowing what had become of everyone.148

As noted above, medical teams on site were overwhelmed by the volume of patients. Th ere 

was essentially no overall command structure governing the medical evacuation, especially 

during the fi rst three or four critical days.149 Operations at the airport were also plagued by a 

lack of eff ective management of the airport complex and the simultaneous civilian evacuation, a shortage of security, and a lack of logistical support. Although a U.S. Forest Servicesponsored Incident Management Team arrived at the airport on Th ursday, September 1, 

and began to provide badly needed logistical support to the NDMS teams and other federal 

personnel, their deployment to the airport was essentially accidental.150 While the evacuation was a success in that it succeeded in moving thousands of patients, and the NDMS 

network operated largely as intended, it clearly did not work as well as it should have. 

Medical Surge

HHS is the coordinating federal agency for federal public-health and medical-assistance 

activities under the National Response Plan (NRP) (ESF-8, Public Health and Medical Services).151 Within HHS, the Offi ce of Public Health and Emergency Preparedness (OPHEP) 

leads the Department’s preparedness and response activities and is tasked with coordinating activities within HHS and with other federal agencies. During Hurricane Katrina, one 

of OPHEP’s primary responsibilities was to meet medical-surge needs, which involved 

increasing capacity to provide medical care by providing more healthcare personnel, more 

health-care facilities, and more health-care supplies across the aff ected region.

Personnel

HHS drew from four primary sources to meet emergency health-personnel needs. First, 

the U.S. Public Health Service (USPHS) is the principal personnel surge resource for HHS. 

Th ere were approximately 6,000 offi cers in the USPHS under the command of the U.S. 

Surgeon General in 800 locations around the country at the time of Hurricane Katrina.152

In the immediate aft ermath of Katrina, from August 30–September 16, HHS deployed 

2,132 USPHS offi cers. Second, the Medical Reserve Corps (MRC), comprising 62,000 local 

volunteer healthcare workers in state-sponsored teams across the country, deployed approximately 6,900 volunteers during Katrina.153 Th e third source of federal health personnel 

was a federal volunteer database created in the immediate aft ermath of Katrina that had 

approximately 34,000 volunteers. Of this total, only 1,400 eventually deployed. 154 Th e fourth 

source was turning to other federal agencies such as the Department of Defense (DOD) or 

Veterans Aff airs for assistance.
415

U.S. Public Health Service

Under the Public Health Service Act, the Secretary of HHS has broad authority to mobilize 

and direct the USPHS in times of a public health emergency. USPHS offi cers work in many 

parts of the federal government around the country.155 Th ey include physicians, nurses, 

pharmacists, engineers, environmental health offi cers, dentists, mental-health providers, 

scientists, therapists, epidemiologists, and other public-health professionals.156 Th ey are a 

uniformed service, and can be directed to leave their normal jobs to deploy under the direction of the Secretary of HHS in an emergency.

As described more fully in Chapter 12, the HHS Offi ce of Force Readiness and Deployment 

(OFRD), which is responsible for overseeing USPHS offi cers deployed in an emergency, 

began identifying personnel for deployment (known as “rostering”) well before landfall, 

starting August 25. HHS’s original goal was to create a 100-person team to deploy to the 

area prior to landfall.157 However, only 37 offi cers arrived – in Jackson, Mississippi, mere 

hours before landfall, late Sunday night. Th ey were far from their original destination of the 

Superdome in New Orleans. 

Once in Jackson, the team had limited capability. USPHS offi cers are not issued medical 

equipment or supplies nor are there pre-arranged teams or equipment caches.158 Th ese offi cers did not have any capacity to provide care by themselves without additional logistical 

support, especially to support special-needs patients such as individuals with heart conditions, diabetes, or oxygen requirements. Th e team remained in Jackson, Mississippi, until 

Tuesday due to high winds, lack of electricity, and lack of communications.159 When they 

were fi nally able to leave, they traveled to Baton Rouge to staff the state-run medical triage 

center at the athletic center of LSU.160

Th ere are several reasons why HHS, with 6,000 USPHS offi cers theoretically available, could 

not send a complete team to the aff ected parts prior to landfall. Each time a USPHS team is 

needed, it is formed ad-hoc: offi cers are not assigned to pre-existing teams, so teams must 

be assembled from lists of available offi cers matching both needed skills and the numbers of 

offi cers. Th ey must then fl y in from multiple locations using commercial transport. Because 

the 100 team members originally identifi ed to deploy were spread across the country, there 

was no practical way to move them into New Orleans at the last moment.161

In addition to these early eff orts, on Monday, August 29, rostering continued in an eff ort 

to identify USPHS offi cers to deploy to the New Orleans area.162 According to Rear Admiral John Babb, the USPHS offi cer who heads OFRD, teams were identifi ed for deployment 

by Tuesday, August 30, but mission assignments were not made.163 For instance, many of 

the offi cers were slated to staff mobile fi eld hospitals, known as Federal Medical Shelters or 

FMSs. During the course of that week, Admiral Babb fulfi lled staffi ng requests for ten 250-

bed FMS units,164 but the units were not ready. Consequently, there was initially no place 

to send the teams.165 Furthermore, once placed on a team roster, USPHS offi cers were then 

sent to a travel contractor to arrange commercial travel.166 However, the travel contractors 

did not deploy the teams as OFRD had them structured due to commercial fl ight limitations 

and disruptions.167 Admiral Babb said deployment of the USPHS teams “would have been 

much more successful had we had geographically connected teams so that we could have 

deployed people from a given location instead of from all over the place.”168 Th e reliance on 

an outside travel contractor without the capacity to deploy and rotate approximately 3,000 

personnel from around the country did not result in a uniform and predictable deployment 

process and adversely impacted HHS’s response.

As a result of these factors, and despite its eff orts to begin to roster personnel before landfall, no signifi cant USPHS deployments, other than the initial team of 37, occurred until the 

end of the fi rst week following Katrina.169

Medical Assistance
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416

USPHS deployment diffi culties also relate to a number of organizational factors. USPHS 

teams do not have their own medical and support supplies, pharmaceuticals, food, housing, and other logistical capabilities that allow them to be self-sustaining.170 Admiral Babb 

specifi cally cited a lack of medical and supply resources as contributing to deployment 

delays.171 USPHS also relies upon commercial travel services. Robert Lavender, Deputy 

Director of Information Technology and Communications within OPHEP, cited problems 

with closed airports, ground-transportation problems, and lack of hotels and other housing options as impeding deployment.172 In essence, HHS personnel depend on the local 

economy, infrastructure, and commercial transportation for deployment and ongoing support – a requirement that could not be easily met in the wake of a catastrophic hurricane or 

likely in other emergency situations. Deployment logistics were further strained by the fact 

that USPHS offi cers were rotated out of the fi eld every two weeks, signifi cantly adding to the 

logistical workload.173

USPHS deployments were also compromised by the daily professional commitments of 

USPHS offi cers.174 Many USPHS offi cers were also federal employees playing essential roles 

in their agencies, such as the Indian Health Service and the Bureau of Prisons, making them 

unavailable for deployment. USPHS offi cers were also supposed to notify the Medical Affairs Branch in the USPHS about any changes in their deployment availability.175 However, 

status updates did not systematically occur. 176 Numerous e-mails were sent to OFRD from 

USPHS offi cers stating that they could not leave their agencies because of employment obligations or other reasons such as illnesses or pregnancies.177 In other cases, USPHS personnel 

were members of other emergency teams, such as the NDMS teams managed by FEMA. If 

they had already deployed as part of those teams, they were no longer available to deploy as 

part of USPHS.178

Hurricane Katrina was not the fi rst time these problems with USPHS deployment have been 

identifi ed. An aft er-action report published by the CNA Corporation, a non-profi t research 

fi rm, following Hurricanes Frances and Ivan, documented many of the same issues.179 A key 

criticism in the CNA report was that USPHS rotational rosters were not “ready-go” personnel 

assets, which means they did not have supplies and equipment to provide clinical services.180

Again, this continued to be a problem for deployments pre-landfall and aft erwards for Hurricane Katrina. CNA also cited limited travel and logistics support for offi cers as problematic.181 Travel-logistics problems continued into Hurricane Katrina, as OPHEP relied again on 

an outside contractor with insuffi cient capacity to eff ectively deploy a signifi cant number of 

people. OFRD also had no mechanism in place for tracking the movement and placement of 

USPHS personnel in the fi eld at the time of Hurricanes Frances and Ivan,182 and again did not 

have the capacity to do so during Katrina. As a result, Admiral Babb stated that OFRD “didn’t 

have visibility necessarily about where people were. Were they still at home? Were they in 

fl ight status? Were they there and gainfully employed?”183 Problems with the USPHS team 

identifi cation and notifi cation process were not resolved for the 2005 hurricane season despite 

the diffi culties during the Frances and Ivan deployments. Th e prior year’s diffi culties were 

compounded, because Katrina required signifi cantly more personnel than Frances and Ivan.184

It is clear that the USPHS, in its current form, cannot respond to public-health and medical 

emergencies quickly. When the local economy, and physical and health infrastructure are 

compromised, the USPHS deployment process is crippled because they require supplies, facilities, and transportation to be individually arranged for each USPHS offi cer and/or team. 

All of these issues raise questions as to what the USPHS’s emergency-deployment capabilities truly are, what should be expected of it, and what its future role should be.

If USPHS is truly going to be a fi rst responder for medical emergencies, signifi cant changes 

must be made. As Assistant Secretary Stewart Simonson said, “I think it’s clear that one of 
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the things we need is a quick-response force within the Public Health Service and the ability 

to move people pre-identifi ed into emergencies in a much faster way than we can now.”185

Credentialing and the Medical Volunteers

Any signifi cant medical or public health response will require that health-care personnel 

move across localities and states to assist in meeting personnel surge needs, as illustrated by 

Hurricane Katrina. Th e Public Health Service and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response 

Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-188) mandated a national credentialing system for all health professionals to ensure that health-personnel surge needs are quickly and effi ciently met.186 In 

response, HRSA187 created the Emergency System for Advance Registration of Volunteer 

Health Professionals (ESAR-VHP) to provide a credentialing system to move health professionals within and across states in the event of an emergency. Each state individually joins 

the ESAR-VHP system in order to provide advance registration of their volunteer health 

professionals. At the time of Hurricane Katrina, only 12 states were part of the credentialing 

system. 188 Credentialing criteria for health-care workers were not standardized across states. 189 And even for those 12 states, HHS had no oversight of the states’ credentialing systems in 

order to determine which volunteers might be available or whether volunteers were registered in multiple systems.190

In the immediate aft ermath of Katrina, HHS began receiving numerous calls from health 

professionals wanting to volunteer their time and services to the aff ected region. In response, 

HHS created an entirely new federal volunteer-signup website.191 For lack of a national 

credentialing system, HHS decided to rely on a private contractor to individually verify the 

credentials of the 34,000 individuals who volunteered in the weeks aft er Katrina.192

Th e volunteering and deploying process was time- and resource-consuming at best. Aft er 

registering on the website, volunteers were contacted by the private contractor to verify 

their credentials. Volunteers were sent to the HHS Human Resources Offi ce to be hired as 

temporary employees, then to OPHEP for deployment. Credentialing became a signifi cant 

bottleneck in the process, and there seemed to be no consistent plan as the weeks went on.193

Numerous documents indicate credentialing delays by the private contractor, who was hired 

and started work only aft er landfall.194 Because diff erent organizations were handling credentialing, hiring, and deployment, HHS had limited information on volunteers in the system 

and where they were being deployed.195 Th e volunteers also posed a host of diffi culties for 

the HHS logistics department because volunteers were not familiar with travel regulations, 

procedures, and reimbursement protocols, among other issues.196 Creating this massive 

federal volunteer eff ort during the crisis took a signifi cant amount of eff ort and resources at 

the federal and the local level and impaired HHS’s ability to function as effi ciently as possible. 

Once created, the new volunteer system experienced many problems. Numerous documents 

indicate constant additions and changes to the website,197 underscoring the unplanned nature 

of this project in the midst of a signifi cant national catastrophe. Th is was also singularly a 

federal eff ort. Staff to the Secretary of HHS made clear in an e-mail to those administering the 

database that there was a lack of coordination with states around volunteer recruitment.198

States felt that the HHS volunteer-recruitment eff ort confl icted with their own eff orts to recruit and organize volunteers, who they would dispatch themselves, and the HRSA-sponsored 

credentialing programs they had been encouraged to establish.199 It also failed to directly 

include state emergency-management agencies which were trying to fi ll requests for medical 

assistance from the Gulf Coast to ensure the eff orts were coordinated and not duplicative.200

Eventually, approximately 1,400 out of 34,000 volunteers in HHS’s volunteer system actually deployed, or only 3.5 percent of those that signed up on the volunteer website. Th e costs 

of HHS’s constructing and maintaining this database, and of contracting with a private credentialing entity, are not known. In the end, it was unable to effi ciently process volunteers. 
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Th e federal volunteer-deployment eff ort was a haphazard attempt to respond to undoubtedly well-intentioned people off ering help in the immediate aft ermath of Katrina. While it is 

human nature to want to volunteer and assist in the face of a major disaster, the signifi cant 

eff ort made to attempt to accommodate individual volunteers may not have been the best 

use of resources.201

To date, HHS has failed to meet its statutory mandate to create a national credentialing 

system to allow health professionals to work across localities and states to meet healthcare personnel surge needs. Had a national credentialing system been in place for Katrina, 

volunteer health professionals would likely have been utilized more quickly and eff ectively, 

obviating the need to create an entirely new federal volunteer database and deployment effort in the midst of a national crisis.

Facilities 

Katrina devastated much of the medical infrastructure in Louisiana and Mississippi, leaving some 2,500 hospital patients in New Orleans alone in need of relocation. Th ousands of 

elderly nursing-home and assisted-living patients, and others with chronic medical conditions, such as heart disease, diabetes, and mental illness, required medical care. However, 

surviving local capacity to meet their needs was limited. Anticipating these medical needs, 

HHS launched a major eff ort to deploy mobile hospitals units even though the concept was 

still in development and HHS’s capability was very limited.

Federal Medical Shelters (FMS)

OPHEP’s Offi ce of Mass Casualty Planning had started to develop a Federal Medical Shelter 

(FMS) capability to establish fi eld hospitals for a mass-casualty event. HHS hoped to expand 

its response capability and avoid relying on DOD medical units, which historically can take 

some time to deploy.202 Th e FMSs would act as all-hazards medical facilities with the capacity to treat patients with basic medical needs. An FMS unit would include hospital cots and 

medical supplies. Healthcare personnel would also be needed to staff the unit. However, 

at the time of Hurricane Katrina, the FMSs were still under development and not ready 

for fi eld units to be established.203 Assistant Secretary Simonson said, “Th ey were not an 

operational asset, really. Th ey were still at a concept asset.”204 Assistant Secretary Simonson 

nonetheless ordered HHS to supply and staff mobile units.205

Supply Procurement for FMS 

Th e Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 

played a key role in acquiring supplies to staff the mobile FMS units. Assistant Secretary 

Simonson tasked the stockpile program with procuring a total of 10,000 hospital beds’ worth 

of equipment and supplies for the FMSs and asked HHS staff “to lean forward and be very 

aggressive” in making the acquisitions.206 He sent an e-mail on Wednesday, August 31, to his 

staff and to the CDC Director that HHS needed “to get the fi rst 2,500 beds for the Federal 

medical shelters staged by midnight on Friday. ... I must tell you there is no margin for error. 

I implore you – please go all out on this.”207 Th e entire FMS program was only at the conceptual stage: HHS had two of their own FMS units they were developing with a capacity of approximately 500 beds, with a “fairly modest pharmaceutical cache,” and with approximately 

three days’ worth of material support for non-acute patients for their mobile units.208

Procuring the FMS units was the “fi rst foray into a broader all-hazards support function”209

for the stockpile program and it placed an enormous burden on it. So signifi cant was the 

impact, that on Saturday, September 3, less than a week into the event, Assistant Secretary 

Simonson himself e-mailed the director of the offi ce overseeing the SNS and the Acting Director of the SNS, and asked them to place less eff ort on FMS acquisition and refocus their 

eff orts on medical resupply for Mississippi.210 At the time, Mississippi was experiencing 
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great diffi culty in getting needed medical supplies, and as explained below, required HHS 

to ship them a 50-ton emergency Push Pack to tide the state over until other supplies could 

reach them.

FMS Location

Deployment of the FMS units was further hampered by a lack of coordination with states 

on where or how the mobile units should be placed to maximize their utility; negotiations 

initially only occurred with DOD in advance of any state requests for the facilities.211 An email stated, “HHS is completing the delivery of the 1st Wave – 2,500 beds etc. Now working 

the 2nd Wave of 2,500 and early working of the 3rd Wave of 5,000 (total 10K beds). However, this has – for the most part – [been] accomplished without feedback from the States.”212

To its credit, OPHEP attempted to anticipate health needs and worked with HHS partners 

to develop estimates of personnel required to operate FMSs, but they did not have adequate 

intelligence from states, FEMA, or their own personnel to generate concrete estimates of the 

need for the 10,000 beds or the locations at which to deploy them. As late as September 2, 

days aft er procurement for additional beds had been aggressively undertaken by the SNS,213

OPHEP was still trying to develop relationships with the DOD medical facilities at which 

they hoped to place the units214 and some locations proved impractical. At Eglin Air Force 

Base in Florida and Ft. Polk, Louisiana, FMSs were deployed but never used, requiring these 

units to be redeployed. In short, initial placement decisions were not made in consultation 

with state emergency managers or with adequate situational awareness of medical needs, so 

resources had to be redirected and reprioritized.215

Blu-Med and USNS Comfort

HHS spent a considerable eff ort acquiring the use of two Blu-Med hospital surge units 

– mobile medical facilities – one from Nevada and one from North Carolina. Th ese are 

commercially available medical units manufactured by Blu-Med Response Systems in Kirkland, Washington. Like the FMS units, they were a means to increase medical-facility surge 

capacity. Deployment of these units became the subject of protracted negotiations among 

sponsors, host states, and emergency managers.

In the end, the Nevada unit was the subject of confl ict about need between NDMS and 

HHS. NDMS argued it was not needed, while HHS wanted it deployed. By the time the 

Nevada unit was to fi nally arrive at the New Orleans airport, NDMS concluded that there 

was no need for it, saying, that “Stu Simonson did not want to turn off Blu-Med, saying that 

PHS staff would staff it if needed.”216 Confi rming NDMS’s assessment, the Blu-Med hospital 

unit shipped from Nevada to the New Orleans airport was never used there. It was shipped 

several days later to Gulfport, Mississippi217, but took an extended period of time to set 

up.218 Th e Carolina unit was shipped directly to Mississippi, where it was used extensively,219

suggesting that the deployment of the units was a mixed success.

Th e hospital ship USNS Comfort was another asset made available to meet medical surge 

needs aft er Katrina. It is a DOD asset with a signifi cant hospital-bed capacity and its own 

personnel and supplies. However, it is not quickly deployable. On September 2, Assistant 

Secretary Simonson sent a letter to Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security 

Paul McHale requesting that the Comfort be deployed with personnel and supplies to treat 

1,000 patients;220 however, it did not arrive at its location in Pascagoula, MS, until Friday, 

September 9. By that time, an e-mail within the Secretary’s offi ce reported, “Nobody could 

think of a mission for [the Comfort]. State Health Department was clear that they had nothing at this time.”221 Th e Comfort was eventually redeployed to Louisiana. Th e FMS and BluMed units and the Comfort took a signifi cant amount of time to deploy and, in some cases, 

became available only aft er the greatest need for medical care had passed. 
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Medical Supply Capacity

One of the major challenges in preparing for and responding to medical emergencies is 

acquiring and delivering medical supplies, including pharmaceuticals, to address a broad 

range of health conditions and threats. During Katrina, medical supplies were needed for 

a range of situations: (1) hospitals and other health care facilities cut off from their normal sources of supply by the storm, (2) large evacuee populations, (3) medical responders, 

including medical teams from HHS and other agencies, and (4) unique medical problems 

caused by the storm, such as the need for tetanus vaccines. Despite its role as the coordinator of ESF-8, HHS has limited medical assets.222 During the event, HHS relied primarily 

on the CDC, as an HHS operating division, to provide medical supplies, equipment, and 

pharmaceuticals through their SNS division.

Supplying HHS Personnel and HHS Assets

USPHS offi cers are not normally issued basic supplies or equipment. Consequently, during 

Katrina HHS had to procure supplies to equip its personnel. For instance, the OPHEP logistics offi cial reported purchasing 1,200 “primary medical bags.”223 Budgetary considerations 

were the primary reasons why purchases such as these were not made previously, though 

concerns about shelf life of products and logistics considerations were also factors.224

Strategic National Stockpile 

HHS maintains a stockpile of medicine and medical supplies for use in public health emergencies through its SNS program. Th ese materials are supplied from both regional government warehouses and from vendor-managed inventories (VMI), which are private medical-supply companies that fi ll orders as needed during emergencies. However, the primary 

assets in the SNS are “Push Packs.” Th ese pre-packaged units contain about 50 tons of pharmaceutical and medical supplies, and are intended to arrive anywhere in the United States 

within 12 hours of a deployment decision. States are expected to formally request supplies 

from the SNS and are periodically evaluated by CDC on their ability to accept and distribute 

supplies from the stockpile. Once a state’s request is approved by HHS, SNS dispatches the 

Push Pack with a security escort and a special assistance team to help state and local health 

agencies receive and distribute the supplies. If an emergency requires additional or diff erent 

medical supplies, the SNS turns to their private vendors, who are expected to ship supplies 

to arrive within 24 to 36 hours of a request.225

Supply Requests

Normal procedures for deploying SNS supplies were overtaken by events from the outset. 

On Sunday, August 28, the day before landfall, Assistant Secretary Simonson directed SNS 

to dispatch a select set of medical supplies to the Superdome.226 Although these supplies were 

shipped on Sunday, they did not reach Louisiana until Monday, when they were turned over 

to the state.227 While the vast majority of medical supplies provided by HHS came from vendors, the State of Mississippi formally requested deployment of a Push Pack because no other 

supply requests were being fi lled quickly.228 Although a Push Pack can be delivered quickly, it 

is not the fi rst choice when general medical supplies and pharmaceuticals to treat chronic conditions are requested, because its contents are tailored to terrorist attacks and other medical 

countermeasures. When Mississippi’s Push Pack arrived, HHS had to separate general medical supplies and pharmaceuticals out of the 50-ton shipment.229 A Push Pack request from 

Louisiana was apparently discussed, but there was no formal request for deployment.230

Mississippi’s letter requesting a Push Pack was sent to HHS on Th ursday, September 1.231

However, there was uncertainty and tension between HHS headquarters and CDC as to 

who was responsible for authorizing its release.232 OPHEP noted that it had no direct control over assets provided by the SNS.233 An SNS offi cial stated, “I think, probably this is one 

of the areas where we’ve not really practiced around the optimal way to go through com-
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mand and control around a protracted natural disaster. ... I think that there could be value 

in formalizing some of the processes around release of the stockpile.”234 Th e movement of 

requests and approvals through multiple channels created confusion at senior OPHEP and 

CDC levels, though there is no evidence that this confusion delayed deployment. 

Medical Supply Problems

Th e SNS was never designed to serve as sustained operation delivering medical supplies 

directly to health-care providers. Informal reports from USPHS offi cers deployed to the LSU 

triage center stated that the medical-supply packages sent by SNS did not arrive labeled and 

lacked basic items, such as bandages and alcohol.235 Generally, SNS supplies were tailored for 

use by an acute-care facility for people with life-threatening injuries or illnesses. However, 

many of the patients passing through the triage center suff ered from long-term, chronic 

diseases such as diabetes. As a result, the triage center ran out of key pharmaceuticals needed 

for chronic care within one day of initiating operations.236 Th ere was no organized method for 

resupply and USPHS offi cers reported calling multiple sources – the HHS Secretary’s Operations Center (SOC), the SNS, and private vendors – to try to meet resupply needs.237

Th e USPHS offi cers reported that most of the medical problems encountered were acute 

exacerbation of chronic diseases, such as hypertension, diabetes, congestive heart failure, and 

psychiatric conditions,238 which usually require daily medications. Th ey also reported numerous patients in need of kidney dialysis and of oxygen, both of which were in short supply.239

However, the SNS has historically focused on bioterrorist attacks and not routine health 

problems, even in large evacuations such as that which occurred in Katrina.240 Th us, they did 

not anticipate and were not prepared to meet the medical needs of a general population that 

had been displaced by a disaster, despite the key preparedness role HHS plays under the NRP. 

As one HHS headquarters offi cial stated, “I don’t believe the Stockpile is as comprehensive 

as everyone believes it is.”241 Katrina highlighted the need for broader medical preparation 

and planning that includes chronic-disease groups,244 as states and localities turned to the 

federal government to fi ll gaps in its medical-supply chains. Th e SNS was also not designed 

to be an on-going medical supply operation. 242 However, the CDC acknowledges that there 

must be a national capacity to tailor medical-supply delivery for diff erent types of disasters 

when normal chains of delivery are disrupted.243 Katrina has highlighted the need to ensure 

a national capacity to move supplies and pharmaceuticals to areas in need when local health 

infrastructure is compromised. 

Conclusions

According to HHS, between August 30 and September 16, the SNS acquired or distributed 

some $38 million worth of medical supplies, including 14 FMS units accounting for some 

3,500 patient beds, 440,000 doses of various vaccines valued at $9 million, and hundreds of 

thousands of doses of antibiotics and maintenance medications for chronic diseases such as 

diabetes, heart disease, high blood pressure, and other conditions.245 HHS adapted the SNS 

system, which was not designed or prepared to provide basic medical supplies and pharmaceuticals, to become a de facto medical-supply chain for a devastated region. However, 

the ad-hoc system created in the wake of Katrina is not geared to handle a broad range of 

emergency health needs, especially ones related to the day-to-day health problems of the 

U.S. population. One HHS offi cial summarized it best when he stated, “From a medical supply standpoint, we were ill prepared. We didn’t have and we don’t have today, the assets, the 

medical assets, to support this kind of an incident.”246

Emergency Support Function 8: Coordination Issues

Th e NRP designates the HHS as the coordinator and primary response agency for ESF-8, Public Health and Medical Services. ESF-8 provides both public-health and medical-care support 
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ranging from deployment of medical-care personnel, to the provision of medical equipment 

and supplies, to patient evacuation.247 In this role, HHS theoretically becomes the lead agency 

for federal medical response in a federally declared emergency, working with and coordinating the deployment of assets from other federal agencies.248 Within HHS, this function is carried out primarily by the Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency Preparedness.249

Confl icts with FEMA and NDMS

During Katrina, HHS had mixed success in carrying out its role as the lead agency for ESF8. Some agencies, notably DOD, appear to have accepted HHS as the ESF-8 lead. Others, 

notably FEMA, did not. Although an eff ort was made to establish a unifi ed incident command for ESF-8 at the agency-headquarters level to resolve confl icts and improve coordination, this did not occur until September 5, a week aft er landfall.250 It is unclear whether 

establishing such a structure would have substantially aided the initial response eff orts or 

fully resolved ESF-8 coordination issues, but it is clear that there were interagency-coordination problems during the event. Th ese occurred principally between HHS and FEMA, 

and ranged from a failure to share basic operational information, to more complex tasks 

such as making asset-deployment decisions.

NDMS teams were staged and deployed with minimal, if any, coordination with HHS. 

When asked about coordination between FEMA and HHS in the deployment and prestaging of NDMS teams and his eff orts to get a DMAT to the Superdome before landfall, 

Assistant Secretary Simonson explained that even though he was able to convince the acting 

head of FEMA’s Response Division, Ed Buikema, to send a DMAT to the Superdome, this 

was the exception, not the rule:

Now I should say, contrary to what has been reported in other places, the 

NDMS was not overly concerned with our views on where particular assets should go. And so it’s not clear to me that we have – we had then much 

say in where they would go. I think the Superdome situation revealed to Ed 

[Buikema] how weak the pre-deployment was and I think it was very diffi cult 

for them to resist that it was a logical deployment at that point. But that was 

between me and Ed. Th at wasn’t part of a structure.251

Another example of this deployment issue is documented in an e-mail exchange between 

Simonson and Beall, the NDMS chief, on Saturday, September 3. At the time, eff orts were 

still under way to evacuate the Superdome and the Convention Center. Th e medical teams 

handling the medical evacuation at the airport were being overwhelmed. Beall and Simonson exchanged a series of e-mails about replacing DMATs providing medical care at 

evacuation centers in Texas. 252 Beall later reported that there were fi ve NDMS teams in 

Texas.253 Th is exchange raises questions such as why these capable NDMS teams were staff -

ing evacuee centers when there was a critical need for them in New Orleans, and how these 

deployment decisions were made.

 ESF-8 also included oversight of mortuary aff airs and deployment of the NDMS Disaster 

Mortuary Operational Response Teams (DMORT).254 Operational insight by ESF-8 was no 

better in deployment of these teams. When asked about HHS’s participation in a plan for 

addressing the large number of expected fatalities in the Gulf, the Deputy Assistant Secretary at HHS charged with this responsibility said:

It didn’t come for approval. FEMA runs its own operations so they didn’t ask 

if we approve or not. But, as I said, we had a liaison. We had a DMORT person 

working upstairs. So he, he writes this up and shares it with us and it served 

as an, it served as an important thing for us to work with. Th is is, this was not 

developed with our input.255
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Th ese examples raise basic questions not only about whether the right medical assets were 

being deployed to the right locations during the response, but also, more fundamentally, 

about who was in charge of those decisions. It clearly was not HHS, the lead for ESF-8 in 

the NRP. HHS/NDMS coordination problems are unfortunately not a new issue and were 

identifi ed as a problem in responding to the 2004 hurricanes.256 Th e causes were not addressed then and obviously remain.

HHS Coordination Resources

Th e reasons for these ESF-8 coordination problems are perhaps best articulated by an analysis 

prepared by one HHS OPHEP staff member at the height of the crisis on September 3. Th is 

analysis locates the problem in a lack of situational awareness by HHS and a lack of direct 

cooperation from NDMS: “Given NDMS’s: superior situational awareness; no mandate to 

share their Intel [intelligence]; and clear and forceful decision to NOT allow us to be a part of 

their operational planning, OPHEP lacks the ability to properly lead ESF#8.”257 Implicit in the 

analysis is that HHS lacks suffi cient emergency-response and coordination assets in the fi eld. 

Whether the ESF-8 command-and-control problems can be attributed solely to the factors 

identifi ed in the HHS analysis, there does appear to be an inadequate level of HHS emergency planning and coordination capability both in the fi eld and headquarters. As the staff 

analysis points out, HHS has only recently established 10 regional emergency coordinators – one for each federal region.258 Th e Region VI coordinator who was responsible for 

covering Louisiana did not assume that position until April 2005, and so was not familiar 

with the situation in Louisiana.259 In addition, she was responsible for a large, fi ve-state area 

covering Arkansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas, as well as Louisiana.260 At the time 

Katrina made landfall, the Region VI coordinator had not yet visited Louisiana, nor had she 

met or communicated with Louisiana’s ESF-8 offi cials.261

Th is lack of awareness of Louisiana’s hurricane or health preparations was further exacerbated 

by the fact that no one from OPHEP participated in the Hurricane Pam exercise – which 

shaped much of the state’s medical-response plan used for Katrina – or follow-up medical 

workshops, including one held the week before Katrina. As a result, the Region VI coordinator had to oft en depend on the NDMS regional staff for information and insight into the crisis 

in Louisiana as it unfolded.262 In addition, virtually all of the HHS regional emergency coordinators were deployed to Mississippi and Louisiana response operations. 263 Th is left a gap in 

their own regions in the event of another crisis, or even, in this event, when Katrina evacuees 

began to fl ow to other regions and required health and medical coordination services. 

Lack of Emergency Preparedness Program and Response Integration

Although HHS has several medical-emergency preparedness programs to help state and local public-health offi cials and health-care facilities prepare for emergencies, these programs 

are not carried out by OPHEP. HRSA264 carries out a bioterrorism hospital-preparedness 

program and a medical-volunteer credentialing program. CDC carries out a public-health 

bioterrorism cooperative-grant program and a program to deliver emergency medical 

supplies from the SNS. Although OPHEP has general oversight of these programs within 

HHS,265 as do the emergency coordinators at the regional level, they do not administer these 

programs. HRSA and CDC personnel administer the programs and have the primary interactions with state and local health offi cials.266

Although these HHS preparedness programs are primarily focused on the threat of bioterrorism, several of them did provide demonstrable “all-hazards” benefi ts which were utilized during Katrina (Th e exception is the HRSA credentialing program). For example, the 

HRSA hospital-preparedness program was used to procure satellite phones for hospitals in 

Mississippi, which allowed the state to establish and maintain communications throughout 
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424

the hospital system during Katrina despite the loss of most other communications alternatives.267 In Louisiana, the HRSA hospital program was used to establish a statewide hospital 

network before Katrina that was used to track available hospital beds during the event and 

provide information about the status and emergency needs of the hospital system.268 Th e 

CDC stockpile program was used extensively both to provide medical supplies through 

vendor managed inventories and through the deployment of a Push Pack in Mississippi. 

Th ese programs and the relationships that are established between HHS and state and local 

personnel are not integrated into OPHEP emergency-preparedness and response eff orts. 

A similar situation occurred between health-care delivery facilities – both hospitals and 

community clinics – and the HHS operating divisions that provide reimbursement and 

fi nancial support to those facilities and maintain close day-to-day relationships. During 

Katrina, HRSA became a conduit for status reports and requests for emergency assistance 

from community-health clinics to HHS emergency-operations center, and the administrator of HRSA provided facility-specifi c needs from HRSA funded programs, primarily health 

centers and rural hospitals.269 Th e Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services played a 

similar role for hospitals.270

It is clear that HHS and its operating divisions provided signifi cant medical-preparedness 

capabilities before the event and response capabilities during it. However, as witnesses and 

interview subjects repeatedly said during this investigation, joint planning, exercises, and 

relationships among emergency responders are essential to eff ective, coordinated operations in a crisis. OPHEP, as the lead HHS organization for emergency preparedness and 

response, had very limited interaction with state and local offi cials. It also had limited ability 

to ensure that the Department’s own agencies were truly providing eff ective preparedness 

programs and emergency-response capability.

SERT Deployment

Although HHS deployed emergency response coordinators to staff the Louisiana and Mississippi EOCs prior to landfall, HHS did not send the Secretary’s Emergency Response Team 

(SERT) to those states until several days into the event.271 Th ese teams are supposed to be the 

Secretary’s direct, on-scene representative and the local command-and-control organization 

for health resources. Th e Louisiana SERT team leader, Admiral Craig Vanderwagen, USPHS, 

did not arrive in Baton Rouge until Friday aft ernoon, September 2. Th e Mississippi SERT 

team leader, Admiral Brenda Holman, USPHS, did not arrive in Jackson until Sunday aft ernoon, September 4. It then took additional time for them to fully constitute their SERT teams. 

As explained in an e-mail from the deputy commander for the Mississippi SERT, on Monday, 

September 5, a week aft er landfall, “We are a little behind with this response. ... Members of 

the MST [management support team] and added SERT members are arriving slowly.”272

Th e impact on response eff ectiveness of HHS’s not having additional “boots on the ground” 

more quickly is hard to evaluate. However, there is evidence that a greater HHS presence 

was needed earlier. For example, HHS began to acquire and deploy mobile fi eld-hospitaltype facilities to the region early in the event. HHS identifi ed several military bases to host 

these facilities, including Eglin Air Force Base in Florida and Fort Polk in Louisiana. Although this deployment plan allowed HHS to begin bringing signifi cant amounts of medical 

supplies into the region, the Louisiana SERT team quickly recommended abandoning the 

Fort Polk operation and redistributing its supplies to other locations in Louisiana.273 Similar 

adjustments had to be made in Florida, where they were never used, and Mississippi, inviting the question whether quicker, better deployment decisions could have been made with 

the benefi t of a greater SERT presence earlier in the event.

Another example where greater SERT presence appears to have been needed was in the 

diffi cult, chaotic, fi rst-of-a-kind evacuation of patients from the New Orleans airport, where 
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there was little command and control, and insuffi cient medical personnel, supplies, communications, and security.274 Despite the importance of this mission and the extraordinarily 

diffi cult circumstances, it appears there was little if any HHS presence. As reported by a 

NDMS representative at the airport to the NDMS Director, Beall, as operations were winding down on Sunday, September 4: “Just a heads-up. Th ere has not been any HHS/ESF-8 

representation at the airport operation site during any portion of this evolution.”275

Advance Deployment and Procurement

Early in the event, HHS enlisted DOD’s help to deploy resources in advance of state assistance requests. HHS began to request DOD assistance in staffi ng mobile medical facilities 

shortly aft er landfall on Monday, August 29.276 Although no formal state request had been 

made for these resources, HHS took the initiative to acquire and deploy some 2,250 beds 

initially, in anticipation of large numbers of patients. In the absence of an actual mission assignment, HHS formalized the request in a letter from Assistant Secretary Simonson to Paul 

McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security, on August 31.277 Th e letter 

justifi ed the request as follows: “In light of the grave situation in the southern coastal regions, 

and consistent with the National Response Plan’s Catastrophic Incident Annex, Secretary 

Leavitt has directed the deployment of multiple Federal Medical Shelters. I am therefore 

writing to request assistance from the Department of Defense (DOD), as outlined below in 

completing this deployment in a timely fashion.”278 DOD accepted the request even though 

the Catastrophic Incident Annex had not yet been formally invoked, and promptly tasked 

its fi eld elements to respond that day.279 Later the same week, Simonson made an additional 

written request to McHale, again invoking the Catastrophic Incident Annex, for deployment 

of the hospital ship USNS Comfort and outlining expected future requests.280 Again, DOD 

accepted the request and the Comfort embarked from Baltimore the same day.281

While not unique to ESF-8, the procedure for deploying and requesting federal assets in 

advance of state requests is unclear. Although the Catastrophic Incident Annex was invoked 

here to enable the federal government to “lean forward” and to begin to deploy signifi -

cant medical assets in anticipation of Mississippi’s and Louisiana’s needs, this Annex was 

not formally in eff ect at the time, nor is it clear how such decisions should be made in the 

future. In the cases cited here, circumstances required these decisions to be made at a senior 

political level in the absence of a formal process, as Assistant Secretary Simonson explained:

What I should have written was in the spirit of the Catastrophic Incident [Annex]. ... But there was substantive agreement on these procedural legalistic 

issues that we were trying to work with. What I was trying to do was to get out 

on the ice so that if we were needed I wouldn’t have to start from a standing 

stop. I wanted to be there. I wanted to be out there so that we could advance 

in two places where we were needed with as little lead time as possible. And so 

no, there were no ARFs or MAs or anything else issued. Th is was coming right 

from us. And thank God much of this wasn’t needed, as it turned out. But in 

the end I think it was the right thing to do. What authority? Th e authority is a 

general one. We have fairly general authority under the Public Service Health 

Act to assist the states.282

HHS also relied upon its own limited funds to begin advance procurements of FMS units 

and take other actions in advance of formal mission assignments. For example, it used some 

$5 million in surplus funds available in its Public Health and Social Service Emergency 

Fund appropriation to begin these purchases. As Assistant Secretary Simonson explained, 

“Th ere’s no money in the Public Health Service’s emergency fund, other than the monies 

that are being channeled through the CDC and to HRSA for their grant programs. It’s not 

like there’s a big contingency fund there.”283 He also explained that although Section 319 of 
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the Public Health Service Act provides for the creation of a special emergency fund, “Th ere’s 

just nothing in the fund and I don’t think there ever has been.”284 HHS also deferred other 

purchases for the SNS, such as a planned purchase of antibiotics, to free additional funds to 

buy medical supplies for Katrina.285 It is not clear that this approach to incurring costs in the 

absence of a formal Staff ord Act request from a state provides HHS with suffi cient capability 

to “lean forward” in catastrophic public health emergency.

Mortuary Responsibilities

Although it is clear that ESF-8 is responsible for victim identifi cation and mortuary functions, 

a serious problem developed during Katrina in collecting and transporting deceased victims. 

Th e usual capabilities of local coroners and fi rst responders were limited or nonexistent in 

aff ected parts of Louisiana. Although FEMA initially accepted responsibility for collecting 

bodies of victims and tried to hire a contractor to recover bodies, FEMA was unsuccessful 

in negotiating a contract. NDMS DMORT teams were pressed into service to perform this 

function286 and federal-level resolution of the problem became the responsibility of ESF-8, 

although this responsibility had not previously been assigned to ESF-8, or any other ESF. 

Th is made an already diffi cult task more so. As the Deputy Assistant Secretary with responsibility for this function at OPHEP explained,

[Given] the number of bodies and the complexity that came with the hurricane, there wasn’t any coordinated way to go ahead and fi gure how we’re going 

to do the recovery. And ... that’s not an ESF 8 function, that is recovering bodies is not a health and medical thing. Processing them in terms of identifying 

them through the pathologic and mortuary aff airs part, that is in ESF-8. So one 

of the gaps that existed is . . . what kind of national coordination policy do we 

have for recovery of remains?287

1 Th e remaining patient population in southeast Louisiana was estimated at between 2,000 and 2,500 at the time of 

landfall, and more than 625 in Mississippi. New Orleans planned to shelter some 400 special- needs patients at the Superdome, but there has been no precise number established for the special-needs population in New Orleans expected or 

treated. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Secretary’s Operations Center, Flash Report #4 – Hurricane Katrina, Aug. 29, 2005, 8:30 a.m. ET. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. OPHEP 28247; HHS, Secretary’s 

Operations Center, Flash Report #5 – Hurricane Katrina, Aug. 29, 2005, 3 p.m. ET. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. OPHEP 28249; Mississippi Emergency Management Agency (MEMA), Hurricane Katrina Situation Report 

#19, Aug. 30, 2005, 6:30 p.m. ET, p. 8. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. MEMA-0010984.

2 Hospitals in the New Orleans area, for example, had not relocated their emergency generators and electric switch gear 

above fl ood level. In the case of the LSU hospitals in New Orleans, Charity and University, the hospital system had been 

unable to obtain funding from the legislature to accomplish this goal. Committee staff interview of James Aiken, M.D., 

Medical Director, Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness, Medical Center of Louisiana in New Orleans, conducted on Jan. 

11, 2006, transcript pp. 73-75; Committee staff interview of Don Smithburg, Executive Vice President and Chief Executive Offi cer, Health Care Services Division, Louisiana State University, conducted on Feb. 7, 2006, transcript pp. 15-17.

3 Th e Attorney General of Louisiana, Charles Foti, is investigating these deaths. Criminal charges have already been 

brought in the case of one nursing home and eight cases, involving fi ve nursing homes and three hospitals are active and 

open at this time. Kris Wartelle, e-mail to David Berick, Senate Committee staff member, Mar. 21, 2006, 3:02 p.m.

4 Committee staff interview of Avis Gray, Regional Administrator, Region I, Offi ce of Public Health, Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, conducted on Dec. 8, 2005, transcript pp. 99-100, 108-109.

5 Gray interview, Dec. 8, 2005, pp. 179-180. See also: HHS, Secretary’s Operations Center, Flash Report #6 – Hurricane 

Katrina, Aug. 30, 2005, 3 a.m. ET. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. OPHEP 28252.

6 Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, prepared by IEM, Inc. for LOHSEP and FEMA, Sept. 2005, pp. 99-

111 [hereinaft er Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, Sept. 2005]. Section 14.0 “Temporary Medical Care,” 

includes the following planning assumption “All 40 medical treatment facilities in the impacted area are aff ected by the 

high-water levels, loss of electricity, loss of communications, and storm-force winds, rendering them isolated and useless. 

At best, they will shelter-in-place whatever patients they were not able to discharge prior to landfall. In addition, refugees 

(non-injured or ill individuals) will come to those treatment facilities for sheltering. All patients, staff , family members, and 
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427

refugees will require evacuation from nonfunctional facilities. Th ese treatment facilities may require restoration of power, 

as well as medical, water, and food re-supply, until evacuation is complete.” Th e planners also estimated that there would 

be more than 2,000 hospital and a minimum of 900 special needs patients needing evacuation aft er landfall along with 

hospital and nursing home staff . See also: Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, Sept. 2005, Appendix A.

7 Philip Navin, e-mail to EOC Report, Aug. 29, 2005, 6:58 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. CDC 747 

through 749.

8 EOC Report, e-mail to Donald Benken and others, Aug. 28, 2005, 1 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. 

CDC 725 through 726.

9 Th e low incidence of infectious-disease outbreaks among survivor and evacuee populations appears to be the result of 

successful public health surveillance of shelters and public-health intervention. During August 29-October 30, 2005 a 

total of 81 reports were investigated by Louisiana infectious-disease epidemiologists. MMWR Morbidity and Mortality 

Weekly Report, Surveillance in Hurricane Evacuation Centers – Louisiana, September – October 2005, Jan. 20, 2006, Vol. 

55, No. 2, pp. 31-35.

10 Suzan Dunaway, e-mail to Monica Giovachino, Sept. 3, 2005, 12:45 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 

OPHEP 932.

11 Committee staff interview of Erin Downey, Louisiana Hospital Association, Director of Emergency Preparedness 

(Liaison to Health and Resources and Services Administration), conducted on Jan. 20, 2006, transcript pp. 43-44.

12 Committee staff interview of Jimmy Guidry, M.D., Medical Director and State Health Offi cer, Louisiana Department 

of Health and Hospitals, conducted on Dec. 20, 2005, transcript p. 116.

13 Testimony of Jimmy Guidry, M.D., Medical Director and State Health Offi cer, Louisiana Department of Health and 

Hospitals, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Challenges in 

a Catastrophe: Evacuating New Orleans in Advance of Hurricane Katrina, Jan. 31, 2006.

14 Dr. Guidry interview, Dec. 20, 2005, pp. 42-45.

15 Dr. Guidry interview, Dec. 20, 2005, pp. 44-45.

16 Southeast Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane Plan, Sept. 2005, pp. 99-111. 

17 Dr. Aiken interview, Jan. 11, 2006, pp. 66-68. See also: Keith Holtermann, e-mail to Robert Blitzer and others, Aug. 

29, 2005, 1:38 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. CDC 747 through 749 (“Advanced planning was never 

completed on how the patients left in the hospitals will be evacuated aft er the event. Th e use of boats to support the other 

ESFs has been fairly comprehensive, and ESF #8 has yet to be completed.”).

18 La. Admin. Code 48:1, Chapter 93, § 9335 (Nov. 2003). Moreover, the regulations state that “as a minimum,” the plan 

shall include the following: Emergency procedures for evacuation of the hospital; Comprehensive measures for receiving 

and managing care for a large infl ux of emergency patients; Comprehensive plans for receiving patients who are being 

relocated from another facility due to a disaster; and the system or procedure to ensure that medical charts accompany 

patients in the event of a patient evacuation and that supplies, equipment, records and medications would be transported 

as part of an evacuation. Furthermore, and as noted by the Feb. 16, 2006, U.S. Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, Chairman’s Report on Elder Evacuations During the 2005 Gulf Coast Hurricane Disasters, 

issued by Senator Michael B. Enzi, p. 2, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services mandate that nursing homes 

and hospitals maintain EOPs as a prerequisite to receiving Medicare and Medicaid payments. Th e Joint Commission 

on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations has a similar requirement as a prerequisite to accreditation. U.S. Senate, 

Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, Chairman’s Report on Elder Evacuations During the 2005 Gulf 

Coast Hurricane Disasters, Feb. 16, 2006.

19 Dr. Guidry, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 31, 2006.

20 Dr. Aiken interview, Jan. 11, 2006, pp. 62-63.

21 Dr. Guidry interview, Dec. 20, 2005, p. 87.

22 Dr. Guidry interview, Dec. 20, 2005, pp. 86-87.

23 Dr. Aiken interview, Jan. 11, 2006, pp. 91-92; Dr. Guidry interview, Dec. 20, 2005, p. 71.

24 Committee staff interview of Sec. Fred Cerise, M.D., Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, conducted on 

Dec. 2, 2005, transcript pp. 164-166. Ironically, on Sunday evening, before it was known that the hospitals would fl ood, 

some special-needs patients who were too ill to be treated at the Superdome had been moved to one of the hospitals. See 

also: Committee staff interview of Col. Pat Prechter, State Chief Nurse, Louisiana Army National Guard and Deputy 

Commander, Louisiana Medical Command, conducted on Jan. 6, 2006, transcript pp. 41-42.

25 Dr. Guidry interview, Dec. 20, 2005, p. 68.

26 Dr. Guidry interview, Dec. 20, 2005, pp. 70-71 (“And so you had those large numbers of people in the Dome without 

power, without sewerage, waiting for buses, waiting for transportation. And you had the special-needs patients getting 

fl own out by helicopter or taken out by boat. And our intent was to get the sick out fi rst. And that’s real diffi cult to do 

when there’s 20,000 people right next door. And there was a lot of discussion and I hear this from my boss as well who 

was there, that they were afraid that the people were going to get violent. Th at time was taking too long, that they were all 

in each others’ faces and they were afraid that violence was going to break out and everybody was afraid for their life.”).

27 Dr. Cerise interview, Dec. 2, 2005, pp. 229-230.
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428

28 Dr. Cerise interview, Dec. 2, 2005, pp. 212, 230-231.

29 Dr. Aiken interview, Jan. 11, 2006, pp. 100-101.

30 Dr. Aiken interview, Jan. 11, 2006, pp. 90-91, 94.

31 Dr. Cerise interview, Dec. 2, 2005, pp. 156-157.

32 Dr. Aiken interview, Jan. 11, 2006, pp. 134.

33 Dr. Aiken interview, Jan. 11, 2006, pp 143.

34 La. Admin. Code 48:1, Chapter 97, § 9729 (January 1998). Th e law also states that each plan “shall be activated at least 

annually, either in response to an emergency or in a planned drill,” and that “the nursing home’s performance during 

the activation of the plan shall be evaluated and documented.” Moreover, “[a]s a minimum,” the written plans must 

describe: the evacuation of residents to a safe place, either within the nursing home or to another location; the delivery of 

essential care and services to nursing home residents; the provisions for the management of staff , including distribution 

and assignment of responsibilities and functions; a plan for coordinating transportation services required for evacuating 

residents to another location; and assurance that the resident’s family or sponsor is notifi ed if the resident is evacuated to 

another location.

35 Walter Maestri, emergency manager for Jeff erson Parish, said “Nursing homes are required by state law and by licensing statutes to have in place an emergency operations plan. ... Th e enforcement is in the hands of the State of Louisiana 

and the parishes through the emergency management offi ce. Each nursing home that functions in Jeff erson Parish is 

mandated by State law to send to me once a year a copy of their emergency plan. We peruse that plan, we have no requirement, the State does not require us to approve or disapprove the plan. But we must peruse it and affi rm to the State 

that there is a plan.” Committee staff interview of Walter Maestri, Ph.D., Director, Jeff erson Parish Offi ce of Emergency 

Management, conducted on Oct. 27, 2005, transcript p. 218.

36 Joseph Mathews, emergency manager for Orleans Parish said, “Hospitals, nursing homes, special care – yeah, they 

should have an adequate plan. It’s required by the State that they have an adequate plan. [I review e]ach one of them 

individually, page by page – I look at it and basically [inaudible]. Th ey are supposed to submit a plan to my offi ce, yes. 

... An adequate plan includes a plan of evacuating and moving those persons. ... Basically they’re governed by the State, 

and all I can do at my offi ce is ask that they comply. As far as any punitive measures or anything like that, I don’t have 

the authority to do anything. I can – the best I can do is report it to the State, send them correspondence [inaudible] it’s 

basically up to the State.” Committee staff interview of Joseph Matthews, Director, New Orleans Offi ce of Emergency 

Preparedness, LA, conducted on Nov. 23, 2005, transcript pp. 130-131, 133.

37 Dr. Guidry interview, Dec. 20, 2005, pp. 107-108; Dr. Aiken interview, Jan. 11, 2006, pp. 49-51.

38 Dr. Aiken interview, Jan. 11, 2006, pp. 49-52.

39 Dr. Aiken interview, Jan. 11, 2006, pp. 85, 118. It should be noted, however, that while Dr. Aiken did say that Charity Hospital generators were “running on fumes for the fi rst day or so,” he also noted that “[a]nd then I think maybe 

Wednesday or Th ursday, we had more [generator fuel] than we needed.” 

40 Dr. Guidry, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 31, 2005. In a special session aft er Katrina, the Louisiana legislature enacted 

legislation calling for a re-examination of hospital building codes. Source: 2005 La. Acts 41 (1st Extraordinary Session).

41 Dr. Aiken interview, Jan. 11, 2006, pp. 127-128.

42 Dr. Aiken interview, Jan. 11, 2006, p. 118.

43 Committee staff interview of Kevin Stephens, M.D., Director, New Orleans Health Department, LA, conducted on 

Nov. 19, 2005, transcript pp. 65-66.

44 Dr. Guidry interview, Dec. 20, 2005, pp. 32-33, 105.

45 Committee staff interview of Roseanne Pratts, Director, Emergency Preparedness, Louisiana Department of Health 

and Hospitals, conducted on Jan. 31, 2006, transcript p. 18.

46 Dr. Guidry, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 31, 2006.

47 Dr. Guidry interview, Dec. 20, 2005, p.65.

48 Dr. Guidry interview, Dec. 20, 2005, p. 65.

49 U.S. Public Health Service, PHS Katrina Response: Baton Rouge Deployment Alpha Team, briefi ng slides, Oct. 16, 

2005. Provided to Committee.

50 Dr. Stephens interview, Nov. 10, 2005, pp. 25-26; Dr. Guidry interview, Dec. 20, 2005, pp. 58-59, 61-63; Pratts interview, Jan. 31, 2006, pp. 18-19; Col. Prechter interview, Jan. 6, 2006, p. 55.

51 Committee staff interview of Ronald Martin, Deputy Commander, Management Support Team, National Disaster 

Medical System, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 13, 2006, transcript pp. 53, 63-68.

52 Dr. Stephens interview, Nov. 10, 2005, pp. 25-26.

53 Col. Prechter interview, Jan. 6, 2006, pp. 100, 102, 109, 115.

54 Committee staff interview of Brig. Gen. Gary Jones, Louisiana National Guard, conducted on Dec. 7, 2005, transcript 

p. 180; Col. Prechter interview, Jan. 6, 2006, p. 115.
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55 Jones interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 189.

56 Dr. Guidry interview, Dec. 20, 2005, p. 75. However, it should be noted that Joseph Donchess, Executive Director of 

the Louisiana Nursing Home Association, stated that 21 nursing homes were evacuated pre-storm and 36 were evacuated post-storm, amounting to a total of about 5,500 to 6,000 nursing home residents evacuated pre- and post-storm. 

Testimony of Joseph Donchess, Executive Director, Louisiana Nursing Home Service Corporation, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Challenges in a Catastrophe: Evacuating 

New Orleans in Advance of Hurricane Katrina, Jan. 31, 2006.

57 Dr. Guidry, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 31, 2006.

58 Dr. Aiken interview, Jan. 11, 2006, pp. 106-107.

59 Dr. Stephens interview, Nov. 10, 2005, pp. 26-27.

60 Dr. Cerise interview, Dec. 2, 2005, p. 177.

61 Committee staff interview of Joseph Donchess, Executive Director, Louisiana Nursing Home Service Corporation, 

conducted on Jan. 9, 2006, transcript p. 128.

62 Donchess, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 31, 2006.

63 Donchess, Senate Committee hearing, Jan. 31, 2006.

64 Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP), Emergency Operations Plan, Apr. 

2005, p. ESF–8–1 (emphasis added). Provided to Committee. 

65 Dr. Aiken interview, Jan. 11, 2006, pp. 20-21, 32-33, 34; Smithburg interview, Feb. 7, 2006, pp. 55, 60-61.

66 Downey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 17-21.

67 Downey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 50-54. 

68 Dr. Aiken interview, Jan. 11, 2007, pp. 20-21 (emphasis added).

69 Under the 2001 EOP, LSU was responsible for the following: “Th e [CEO] of the [LSU] Health Sciences Center (HSC) 

Health Care Services Division (HCSD) shall be primarily responsible for participating in state, regional and parish 

planning to coordinate the provision of hospital care and shelter for nursing home and home health care patients with 

acute care requirements, and casualties of emergencies and disasters. Th e LSU-HSC-HCSD will have the lead role among 

state agencies in such planning.” Source: LOHSEP, Emergency Operations Plan, March 2001, pp. M–1 through M–2. 

Furthermore, as explained by James Aiken, M.D., Medical Director for Emergency Preparedness for the Medical Center 

of Louisiana in New Orleans (a.k.a. Charity and University Hospitals), these sorts of responsibilities were held by LSU 

dating back to 1992. Source: Dr. Aiken interview, Jan. 11, 2006, pp. 18-21.

70 Dr. Aiken interview, Jan. 11, 2006, pp. 32-33 (emphasis added).

71 Dr. Aiken interview, Jan. 11, 2006, p. 34.

72 Smithberg interview, Feb. 7, 2006, p. 55.

73 Smithberg interview, Feb. 7, 2006, p. 55.

74 Smithberg interview, Feb. 7, 2006, pp. 60-61.

75 Dr. Aiken interview, Jan. 11, 2006, pp. 24-25.

76 Dr. Aiken interview, Jan. 11, 2006, p. 28.

77 Dr. Aiken interview, Jan. 11, 2006 pp. 21-22.

78 Downey Interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 67-68, 69.

79 Th e six counties are Hancock, Harrison, Jackson, Pearl River, Stone, and George. Committee staff interview of Jim Craig, 

Director, Offi ce of Health Protection, Mississippi Department of Health, conducted on Jan. 25, 2006, transcript p. 28.

80 Th e three hospitals were Hancock Medical Center in Bay St. Louis, Gulf Coast Medical Center in Gulfport, and L.O. 

Crosby in Picayune. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and the Mississippi Department of Health, Hurricane Katrina: Medical Support/Demobilization/Transition Plan for the State of Mississippi, Jan. 2006, p. 3 [hereinaft er 

Mississippi Medical Support/Demobilization/Transition Plan].

81 Mississippi Medical Support/Demobilization/Transition Plan, p. 3.

82 Mississippi Medical Support/Demobilization/Transition Plan, p. 3.

83 Mississippi Medical Support/Demobilization/Transition Plan, p. 7.

84 Mississippi Medical Support/Demobilization/Transition Plan, p. 3.

85 Th e plan provides that MDH is responsible for “the overall public health response, the triage, treatment and transportation of victims of a disaster, immediate support to hospitals and nursing homes, the provision of emergency mental 

health crisis counseling for individuals and the community, and the re-establishment of all health, medical and social 

service systems.” MEMA, Mississippi Emergency Operations Plan, Volume II: Mississippi Comprehensive Emergency 

Management Plan (CEMP), May 14, 1999, pp. ESF 8–1 through ESF 8–16. Provided to Committee.

86 Craig interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 11-12.
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430

87 Written Statement of Brian Amy, M.D., State Health Offi ce, Mississippi Department of Health, for the U.S. House, 

Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Mississippi, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 3.

88 Written Statement of Dr. Amy, House Select Committee hearing, Dec. 7, 2005, pp. 9-10.

89 Written Statement of Dr. Amy, House Select Committee hearing, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 6.

90 Craig interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 12-13.

91 Craig interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 36.

92 Craig interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 12-13.

93 Th ere is a potentially contrary report from HHS Region IV on the evening of August 28, 2005 stating that not all, in 

fact only two of 29 skilled-nursing facilities reported evacuations. EOC Report, e-mail to Donald Benken and others, 

Aug. 28, 2005, 10:04 p.m. Provided to Committee, fi led as Bates no. CDC 725; Craig interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 37-38.

94 Testimony of Gov. Haley Barbour, Mississippi, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Role of the Governors in Managing the Catastrophe, Feb. 2, 2006.

95 Craig interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 8.

96 Written Statement of Dr. Amy, House Select Committee hearing, Dec. 7, 2005, pp. 10-11.

97 Written Statement of Dr. Amy, House Select Committee hearing, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 15.

98 Craig interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 28-29. In his testimony before the House Committee investigating Katrina, Dr. 

Amy recalled Carolina-1 being deployed by HHS. Written Statement of Dr. Amy, House Select Committee hearing, Dec. 

7, 2005, p. 6.

99 Craig interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 24.

100 Craig interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 30-31.

101 Craig interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 28-29.

102 Written Statement of Dr. Amy, House Select Committee hearing, Dec. 7, 2005, pp. 16-17.

103 Th e National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) was formerly within the Department of Health and Human Services 

(HHS), Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness (OEP). Th e Homeland Security Act transferred NDMS to DHS in 2003. 

“Homeland Security Act of 2002.” (P.L. 107-296), 6 U.S.C. § 201.

104 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Disaster Medical System. http://www.oep-ndms.dhhs.gov/index.

html. Accessed on Mar. 6, 2006.

105 U.S. Department of Veterans Aff airs, National Disaster Medical System. http://www1.va.gov/EMSHG/page.

cfm?pg=45. Accessed on Apr. 21, 2006. 

106 U.S. Department of Veterans Aff airs, “National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), Patient Movement Aft er Action 

Review Meeting, December 12-13, 2005.” http://www1.va.gov/emshg/page.cfm?pg=111. Accessed on Apr.21, 2006 [hereinaft er NDMS Patient Movement AAR, Dec. 2005].

107 FEMA, Current NDMS Overview, Jan. 6, 2006. Provided to Committee.

108 FEMA, Current NDMS Overview, Jan. 6, 2006. Provided to Committee.

109 FEMA, Current NDMS Overview, Jan. 6, 2006. Provided to Committee.

110 Deployments included 40 DMAT’s, 16 strike teams, 8 DMORTs, 4 VMATs and 3 MSTs. In the Louisiana and Mississippi this meant 1,265 and 667 personnel, respectively, for a total of 1,932 NDMS team members. FEMA, Hurricane 

Katrina NDMS Resource Status Report, Sept. 5, 2005, 11 p.m. Provided to Committee.

111 Committee staff interview of Jack Beall, Chief, National Disaster Medical System, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 10, 

2006, transcript p. 11.

112 Committee staff interview of Capt. Art French, M.D., U.S. Public Health Service, Deputy Chief Medical Offi cer, Disaster Medical Assistance Team PHS-1, National Disaster Medical System, FEMA, conducted on Mar. 2, 2006, transcript p. 98.

113 National Disaster Medical System, Team Ratings 12-20-05.xls, Jan. 6, 2006. Provided to Committee.

114 “Homeland Security Act of 2002,” (P.L. 107-296), 6 U.S.C. §§ 313, 503.

115 “I know there were 144 positions that were in OEP. I’ve been given that number, and I was led to believe, when were 

transferred to FEMA, that HHS kept 40 of these positions – I think that’s a number – and then the rest, I think it was 17 

moved into logistics. Th ose personnel would have come out of that operations division.” Beall interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 16. 

116 Beall interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 7. 

117 Mick Cote, e-mail to Jack Beall, Aug. 27, 2005, 3:24 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA0098-0004489.

118 William Lokey, e-mail to Jack Beall, Aug. 28, 2005, 1:13 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA0098-0003831.

119 FEMA, NDMS Aft er-Action Report, Disaster Medical Assistance Team San Diego CA-4, Mission: Hurricane Ka-
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431

trina, Dec. 29, 2005. Provided to Committee.

120 Additional delays resulted when one truck had a mechanical problem an hour outside of San Diego resulting in 

an additional seven to eight hour delay. Th e cause of the mechanical failure was a part that had been the subject of a 

manufacturer’s recall, but had not yet been repaired because of instructions from FEMA to delay the repair. FEMA, 

NDMS Aft er-Action Report, Disaster Medical Assistance Team San Diego CA-4, Mission: Hurricane Katrina, Dec. 29, 

2005. Provided to Committee. 

121 FEMA, NDMS Aft er-Action Report, Disaster Medical Assistance Team San Diego CA-4, Mission: Hurricane Katrina, Dec. 29, 2005. Provided to Committee.

122 Craig Interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 24-26.

123 FEMA, Hurricane Katrina NDMS Resource Status Report, Aug. 30, 2005, 10 p.m. Provided to Committee. 

124 Capt. Art French, M.D., Aft er-Action Presentation, “New Orleans Airport Evacuation: Th e MST Perspective on the 

Hospital from Hell,” briefi ng slides, Feb. 2006.

125 Capt. Art French, M.D., Aft er-Action Presentation, “New Orleans Airport Evacuation: Th e MST Perspective on the 

Hospital from Hell,” briefi ng slides, Feb. 2006.

126 FEMA, Hurricane Katrina NDMS Resource Status Report, Sept. 2, 2005. Provided to Committee.

127 George Custer, Aft er Action Report – FEMA Hurricane Katrina, Southern Area Incident Management Team, p. 1. 

Provided to Committee.

128 Capt. French interview, Mar. 2, 2006, pp. 14, 17-18, 25-26, 36.

129 Capt. French interview, Mar. 2, 2006, p. 55.

130 Capt. French interview, Mar. 2, 2006, pp. 22-26.

131 Capt. Art French, M.D., Aft er-Action Presentation, “New Orleans Airport Evacuation: Th e MST Perspective on the 

Hospital from Hell,” briefi ng slides, Feb. 2006; Capt. French interview, Mar. 2, 2006, pp. 10, 15

132 Capt. French interview, Mar. 2, 2006, pp. 6-11.

133 Capt. French interview, Mar. 2, 2006, pp. 10, 16.

134 Capt. French interview, Mar. 2, 2006, p. 16.

135 Capt. French interview, Mar. 2, 2006, p. 15.

136 Jack Beall, e-mail to EC William Piggot, Sept. 1, 2005, 4:11 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHSFEMA-0098-0002099.

137 William Piggot, e-mail to Jack Beall, Sept. 1, 2005, 4:51 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA0098-0002099.

138 Chris Turner, e-mail to Jack Beall, Sept. 2, 2005, 8:48 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA0098-0001737.

139 Martin interview, Jan. 13, 2006, pp. 54-58, 146-148.

140 Martin interview, Jan. 13, 2006, p. 32.

141 Jack Beall, e-mail to Th omas Bowman, Sept. 1, 2005, 7:27 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHSFEMA-0098-0002216.

142 Jack Beall, e-mail to Chris Turner, Sept. 6, 2005, 10:21 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA0098-004204.

143 Beall interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 48.

144 FEMA, Mission Assignment, 1603DR-LA-HHS-02, Aug. 31, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 

OPHEP-28877; FEMA, Mission Assignment, 1603DR-LA-HHS-02, Aug. 31, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

nos. OPHEP 28878 through 28879.

145 Beall interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 43-44; Capt. Art French, M.D., Aft er-Action Presentation, “New Orleans Airport 

Evacuation: Th e MST Perspective on the Hospital from Hell,” briefi ng slides, Feb. 2006.

146 Robert Jevec, e-mail to Gary Kleinman and others, Aug. 31, 2005, 10:41 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

nos. DHS-FEMA-0098-0004357 through 0004358.

147 NDMS Patient Movement AAR, Dec. 2005.

148 Capt. French interview, Mar. 2, 2006, pp. 13-14, 54-56.

149 Capt. French interview, Mar. 2, 2006, pp. 64-65; See also: FEMA, NDMS Aft er-Action Report, Disaster Medical 

Assistance Team San Diego CA-4, Mission: Hurricane Katrina, Dec. 29, 2005. Provided to Committee; See also: OR-2 

DMAT, Hurricane Katrina – Aft er Action Report, Sept. 25, 2005. Provided to Committee. 

150 Th e Incident Management Team was designed to provide food, showers, and other logistical support for emergency 

teams working in the fi eld. Upon arriving in Louisiana, the Team literally sent out “scouting parties” to determine where 

their logistical support could be used aft er they determined that their original mission assignment to establish a base camp 
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in Port Allen, Louisiana was already being met by another agency. One of the scout teams identifi ed the airport as a critical need and the team got permission from its regional coordinator to relocate there. George Custer, Aft er Action Report 

– FEMA Hurricane Katrina, Southern Area Incident Management Team, TX=FEM-05004, Provided to Committee.

151 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan. Washington: Government Printing Offi ce, Dec. 

2004, p. 12.

152 Committee staff interview of Rear Adm. John Babb, Director, Offi ce of Force Readiness and Deployment, U.S. Public Health Service, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, conducted on Feb. 8, 2006, transcript, pp. 5, 24.

153 Rear Adm. Babb interview, Feb. 8, 2006, pp. 5.

154 Rear Adm. Babb interview, Feb. 8, 2006, pp. 41-45.

155 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Concept of Operations Plan (CONOPS) for Public Health and 

Medical Emergencies, Jan. 2005, p. 4, Appendix A.

156 U.S. Public Health Service, “History of the Commissioned Corps.” http://www.usphs.gov/html/history.html. Accessed on Apr. 21, 2006.

157 Rear Adm. Babb interview, Feb. 8, 2006, p. 22; Committee staff interview of U.S. Public Health Service, Alpha Team 

members, Jan. 12, 2006 (untranscribed). 

158 Rear Adm. Babb interview, Feb. 8, 2006, pp. 14-15.

159 Rear Adm. Babb interview, Feb. 8, 2006, p. 33; U.S. Public Health Service, Alpha Team members interview, Jan. 12, 

2006; U.S. Public Health Service, briefi ng on Hurricane Katrina: PHS Response, Team Alpha, given to Senate Committee 

staff , Jan. 12, 2006.

160 U.S. Public Health Service, briefi ng on Hurricane Katrina: PHS Response, Team Alpha, given to Senate Committee staff , Jan. 12, 2006; U.S. Public Health Service, briefi ng on PHS Katrina Response: Baton Rouge Deployment Alpha 

Team, Oct. 16, 2005. Provided to Committee. Th e USPHS team at the PMAC worked with a team of volunteers from 

Illinois obtained through an EMAC agreement and a DMAT team that was stationed there for approximately one week.

161 Rear Adm. Babb interview, Feb. 8, 2006, pp. 22-24.

162 Offi cers were identifi ed to support NDMS and the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS), a LA hospital, and to staff the 

FMSs which were part of OPHEP’s strategy to increase facility surge capacity. See also: John T. Babb, e-mail to William 

C. Vanderwagen and others, Aug. 29, 2005, 2:12 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. OSG170.

163 Rear Adm. Babb interview, Feb. 8, 2006, p. 62.

164 Rear Adm. Babb interview, Feb. 8, 2006, pp. 69-70.

165 It was explained that since USPHS personnel do not have pharmaceuticals, medical supplies and equipment, and 

other supports, it would be best to couple their deployments to the FMS shelters. Rear Adm. Babb interview, Feb. 8, 

2006, pp. 61-63, 66-67.

166 Rear Adm. Babb interview, Feb. 8, 2006, p. 72.

167 Rear Adm. Babb interview, Feb. 8, 2006, pp. 69-71 (“Basically, we had been told to put together people that would 

staff ten 250-bed federal medical shelters, which we did. But when they began to deploy them, they didn’t necessarily 

deploy the teams the way we had them structured. ... When the travel contractor deployed people, well, parts of teams 

arrived in diff erent places. ... New Orleans airport was almost non-functional. It was accepting very few fl ights. Baton 

Rouge had – every seat was full. Every time we turned around, we were trying to get fl ights in there and couldn’t get 

people there.”). 

168 Rear Adm. Babb interview, Feb. 8, 2006, pp. 71-72.

169 Rear Adm. Babb interview, Feb. 8, 2006, p. 62.

170 Rear Adm. Babb interview, Feb. 8, 2006, pp. 14-15, 35-37.

171 Rear Adm. Babb interview, Feb. 8, 2006, p. 67: “So to look at the delay in the deployment as thought it was because 

offi cers didn’t get down fi eld is assuming that the resource was there and waiting on them or that they were taking it with 

them, and that was not the case. Th ey had to wait until the resource got there.”

172 Committee staff interview of Robert E. Lavender, Jr., Deputy Director of Information Technology Communications, 

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, conducted on Feb. 3, 2006, transcript p. 10 (“In this year’s hurricane 

season, you couldn’t get into airports, so we had to fi nd the closest airport and fi nd a way to transport our people from 

that remote airport into the area in which we were asking them to provide services. So it was – this year was diff erent 

from anything I’ve ever experienced in that it required a lot of creativity. Th ere were no hotels, so one of the things that 

I did was – we call them rock star buses. We had sleeper buses sent in that slept 12 people. And so we did the best we 

could to provide as reasonable an accommodation as we could for the people that we were deploying.”).

173 Lavender interview, Feb. 3, 2006, pp. 74-75. Two week deployments have traditionally been used because of the dual 

federal role of many USPHS offi cers and the nature of the typical disaster deployment. 

174 Rear Adm. Babb interview, Feb. 8, 2006, p. 16. Despite Secretary of HHS Michael Leavitt activating the USPHS on 

Sunday, August 28, which made all USPHS deployments mandatory, many USPHS offi cers were still unable to deploy 

due to professional commitments at their daily positions. Committee staff interview of Rear Adm. Craig Vanderwagen, 

Acting Chief Medical Offi cer, Indian Health Service, and Offi cer, U.S. Public Health Service, U.S. Department of Health 
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433

and Human Service, conducted on Feb. 7, 2006, transcript pp. 2, 62-64; Lavender interview, Feb. 3, 2006, pp. 74-75.

175 Rear Adm. Babb interview, Feb. 8, 2006, pp. 79-80. USPHS offi cers are required to update their status and obtain 

medical waivers when necessary as they come on-call and they receive e-mail reminders each time they are on-call to 

update their availability status. However, there are no sanctions for not reporting changes in deployment status or for 

not deploying.

176 Rear Adm. Babb interview, Feb. 8, 2006, pp. 79-80.

177 Noreen Hynes, e-mail to John Babb, Aug. 30, 2005, 3:55 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. OSG162.

178 Capt. French interview, Mar. 2, 2006, p. 67.

179 Monica Giovachino, et al., Hurricanes Frances and Ivan: Improving the Delivery of HHS and ESF#8 Support, Th e 

CNA Corporation, IPR 11208, Feb. 2005, pp. 42-43 [hereinaft er, Hurricanes Frances and Ivan: Improving the Delivery 

of HHS and ESF#8 Support]. Th e report focused on improving the HHS ESF-8 response and focused a section on the 

USPHS. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, Hurricanes Frances and Ivan involved the largest deployment of personnel from 

HHS and its ESF-8 partners. Th e report stated that offi cers were deployed from each region of the country and each 

USPHS rotational roster was “tapped for personnel.” Th e CNA report concluded, “Th is examination reveals a fractured 

system that does not have the manpower or administrative infrastructure necessary to support a major deployment.” Th e 

report concluded that OFRD does not have the capacity to coordinate major personnel deployments, as evidenced by the 

fact that senior level staff spent the weekend to identify and contact offi cers individually by phone for deployment.

180 Hurricanes Frances and Ivan: Improving the Delivery of HHS and ESF#8 Support, p. 45 (“Each roster is not set up to 

be a ‘ready-go’ asset for OASPHEP. Instead it is a pool of personnel that may be available in a time of need.”).

181 Hurricanes Frances and Ivan: Improving the Delivery of HHS and ESF#8 Support, p. 46.

182 Hurricanes Frances and Ivan: Improving the Delivery of HHS and ESF#8 Support, p. 43.

183 Rear Adm. Babb interview, Feb. 8, 2006, p. 78.

184 PHS deployed 138 offi cers for Frances and 263 for Ivan. Source: Hurricanes Frances and Ivan: Improving the Delivery 

of HHS and ESF#8 Support, pp. 39-40. A total of 1,885 were deployed to aff ected areas and 247 to other locations for 

Katrina. Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Response to the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland 

Security and Governmental Aff airs, Feb. 28, 2006, p. 42. 

185 Committee staff interview of Stewart Simonson, Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency Preparedness, U.S. 

Department of Health and Human Services, conducted on Feb. 16, 2006, transcript p. 107.

186 “Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002.” (P.L. 107-188), 42 U.S.C. § 201 

(“Th e Secretary shall, directly or though an award of a grant, contract, or cooperative agreement, establish and maintain 

a system for the advance registration of health professionals for the purpose of verifying the credentials, licenses, accreditations, and hospital privileges of such professionals when, during public health emergencies, the professionals volunteer 

to provide public health services. ... In carrying out the preceding sentence, the Secretary shall provide for an electronic 

database for the verifi cation system.”).

187 HRSA’s mission is to provide national leadership, program resources and services needed to improve access to 

culturally competent, quality health care. Th ey support healthcare systems that are culturally competent, comprehensive, 

and provide quality care for the goal of optimal health for all.

188 Simonson interview, Feb. 16, 2006, p. 112.

189 Rear Adm. Babb interview, Feb. 8, 2006, p. 39.

190 Rear Adm. Babb interview, Feb. 8, 2006, pp. 54, 39; Simonson interview, Feb. 16, 2006, p. 112. In FY2005, HHS 

asked for funding for a portal that would have pooled the data across all states to create a national credentialing mechanism; however, the request was not funded. 

191 Norman Coleman, e-mail to Norman Coleman and others, Sept. 2, 2005, 12:06 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. OPHEP 9408. On Saturday September 3, the Web site was opened to the public.

192 Rear Adm. Babb interview, pp. 19, 44.

193 Clara Witt, e-mail to Th omas Christl and others, September 7, 2005, 1:20 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

no. OPHEP 9779. Even aft er the private contractor was hired and work was under way, there were talks within HHS to 

use states to assist in credentialing in the process aft er the federal contractor had already initiated the process

194 Clara Witt, e-mail to Ann Knebel, Sept. 7, 2005, 8:31 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. OPHEP 9990.

195 John Babb, e-mail to Ann Knebel, Sept. 5, 2005, 9:02 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. OPHEP 9660. 

Rear Admiral Babb stated, the volunteers, “are going straight to OPHEP and we don’t have any visibility. At this point, 

that’s fi ne. But I would like to know what kinds of personnel are being deployed.”

196 Lavender interview, Feb. 3, 2006, pp. 66-67.

197 For instance, numerous changes were made to the website to include specialties of healthcare workers left off the original list. Lynn May, e-mail to Norman Coleman, Sept. 3, 2005, 5:37 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. OPHEP 

8636; Mary Couig, e-mail to Ann Knebel, Sept. 4, 2005, 8:42 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. OPHEP 8635.

198 Teresa Brown-Jesus, e-mail to Ann Knebel, Sept. 6, 2005, 5:26 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 

OPHEP 9805 (“States ... have continued to express their concerns about the way that federal volunteer recruitment ef-
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forts have been implemented.”).

199 Th e Federal volunteer database also created confl ict with the purpose and mission of the Medical Reserve Corps 

(MRC). Th e MRC is comprised of health professionals who voluntarily join locally-sponsored medical units that can be 

called upon to provide additional medical personnel in an emergency. Th e Director of the MRC expressed concerns almost 

one week aft er the hurricane about the confusion surrounding the deployment process and how the MRC units would be 

integrated into the federal volunteer database that HHS had established. Because there was no clear connection between the 

MRC and the Federal volunteer database eff orts, HHS created confl icting and overlapping volunteer systems. Ann Knebel, 

e-mail to Norman Coleman and others, Sept. 7, 2005, 5:55 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. OPHEP 9755; 

Robert Tosatto, e-mail to Ann Norwood, Sept. 7, 2005, 3:39 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. OPHEP 9670.

200 Ann Knebel, e-mail to Norman Coleman and others, Sept. 7, 2005, 5:55 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

no. OPHEP 9755; Robert Tosatto, e-mail to Ann Norwood, Sept. 7, 2005, 3:39 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. OPHEP 9670.

201 Dr. Guidry interview, Dec. 20, 2005, pp. 53, 56 (“To try to match up the resources with where they were needed became a full-time job...(t)he teams that worked the best, were like Illinois had a medical team. Th ey came and you could 

hand them off a shift and they could pretty much handle it because they came trained and working together. Th ey were 

organized. Other professionals who showed up as volunteers really have not trained in such events and really makes it 

diffi cult to perform when it’s not well organized.”). 

202 Simonson interview, Feb. 16, 2006, p. 31. Th e FMS capacity for OPHEP has not been funded to date, but all development occurred using year-end money. 

203 Lavender interview, Feb. 3, 2006, p. 57.

204 Simonson interview, Feb. 16, 2006, p. 66.

205 Th e Logistics section of OPHEP bore much of the burden for acquiring and coordinating movement of the FMSs, 

such as personnel and supplies. Given the growing list of demands for the mobile medical units, personnel, and supplies, 

OPHEP logistics had to exponentially increase their staff of four full-time employees; thus, many new staff did not have 

experience with procedures of the Logistics offi ce. Th e lack of experience in the Logistics offi ce, with the added burden of 

coordinating the establishment of unproven and never utilized FMS units prototype, compounded the logistical diffi culties 

in Washington and on the ground. Lavender interview, Feb. 3, 2006, pp. 6-9, 31-32, 89-90. See also: Stewart Simonson, letter to Paul McHale, Aug. 31, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. OPHEP 27874. OPHEP requested assistance 

to support the following FMS unit deployments: 500 beds at Eglin Air Force Base in Pensacola, FL; 750 beds at Fort Polk, 

LA; 500 beds at Naval Air Station in Meridian, MS; and 500 beds at Mississippi Air National Guard Base in Jackson, MS.

206 Committee staff interview of Robert E. Blitzer, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Operations Security Program, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, conducted on Feb. 2, 2006, transcript p. 96.

207 Stewart Simonson, e-mail to William Gimson and others, Aug. 31, 2005, 6:33 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. OPHEP 27771.

208 Committee staff interview of Richard Besser, Director of Coordinating Offi ce for Terrorism Preparedness and 

Emergency Response, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and Steve Adams, Acting Director of the Strategic 

National Stockpile, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, conducted on Feb. 14, 2006, transcript p. 14.

209 Besser and Adams interview, Feb. 14, 2006, p. 12.

210 Stewart Simonson, e-mail to William Gimson and others, Sept. 3, 2005, 7:22 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. OPHEP 27077 (“We are struggling right now with a Miss hospital resupply mission. Th e Push Pack may tide 

them over for a little while, but I need to pick-up the pace on this order. Please tell me if we cannot do both (FMS and 

Miss Hosp) resupply at once – if this is the case, we may have to back-off for a bit on the FMS ordering. I cannot have 

Miss run out of provisions.” To which, SNS staff eventually replied “...we are doing this right now, SNS is focusing in 

the MS re-supply right now and will see if they can move back to the FMCS ordering this aft ernoon.”). See also: Galen P. 

Carver, e-mail to Stewart Simonson, Sept. 3, 2005, 9:13 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. OPHEP 27076.

211 Simonson interview, Feb. 16, 2006, pp. 71-72.

212 Tom Sizemore, e-mail to Michael L. Vineyard, Sept. 3, 2005, 8:45 a.m. Provided to Committee, fi led as Bates no. 

OPHEP 24464.

213 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Division of the Strategic National Stockpile, “Hurricane Katrina Update,” Aug. 31, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. OPHEP 27774.

214 Robert Claypool, e-mail to William “Contact” Vanderwagen, Sept. 2, 2005, 7:49 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. OPHEP 24227.

215 Stewart Simonson, e-mail to Richard Chavez, Sept. 2, 2005, 5:29 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 

OPHEP 27839 (“We have been turned away from the gate at the Mississippi Air National Guard Base in Jackson. We are 

diverting the beds scheduled for that facility to Meridian. Can you confi rm with the base commander there that they will 

accept them. Th is is urgent.”). For instance, MS could not transport their residents to Eglin Air Force Base in Pensacola, 

FL; therefore, two FMS units were moved to MS. Source: Sandy Bogucki, e-mail to Stewart Simonson, Sept. 4, 2005, 3:24 

p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. OPHEP 27584. In Louisiana, Mike Milner was assisting Adm. Vanderwagen in redeploying the FMSs that OPHEP had mapped out. He stated that at Ft. Polk there had been no patients and that 

the mission was redefi ned to support special needs shelters based on the state requests; this was only one of several FMS 

staffi ng and placement decisions that had to be interrupted by the SERT in Louisiana alone. Source: Mike Milner, e-mail 
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435

to William C. Vanderwagen, Sept. 5, 2005, 11:35 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. OPHEP 8198.

216 Stewart Simonson, letter to Paul McHale, Sept. 2, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. OPHEP 27877.

217 Shayne Brannman, e-mail to Gregory Davis, Sept. 8, 2005, 11:05 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no: 

OPHEP 8745.

218 Craig interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 72, 75.

219 Craig interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 24-25; 28-29.

220 Paul McHale, letter to Stewart Simonson, Sept. 2. 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. OPHEP 27880.

221 Gregory Banner, e-mail to KC Decker, Sept. 9, 2005, 10:39 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. OPHEP 

8196. 

222 Lavender interview, Feb. 3, 2006, pp. 35-49.

223 Lavender interview, Feb. 3, 2006, p. 35. Lavender acquired “primary medical bags ... so that ... when our people 

arrived on the ground, they could provide primary treatment, whether it be bandaging or removing a splinter, whatever 

it happened to be. But I procured those early in the event because we didn’t have them,” unfortunately, USPHS teams 

were not equipped with these materials and supplies prior to the event or as a matter of procedure because it was not 

“perceived to be a requirement.”

224 Lavender interview, Feb. 3, 2006, pp. 45-46.

225 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Strategic National Stockpile (SNS),” Apr. 14, 2005. http://www.bt.cdc.

gov/stockpile/. Accessed on Apr. 21, 2006.

226 Th ese supplies were dispatched by truck from Atlanta and Tennessee on the aft ernoon of September 28 and arrived 

at Camp Beauregard, LA aft er landfall.

227 HHS, Secretary’s Operation Center Flash Report #6 – Hurricane Katrina, Aug. 30, 2005, 3 p.m., p. 2. Provided to 

Committee; fi led as Bates no. OPHEP 28253. 

228 Gregory Banner, e-mail to Keith Holtermann, Sept. 2, 2005, 2:39 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. 

OPHEP 27869 through 27870 “My understanding of the situation is that hospitals and medical facilities along the coast 

are in desperate need of resupply for a variety of expendables. Supply requests have been submitted but the planned 

delivery times are still more than 24 hours away. Th e SNS push packages contain a number of needed items and so in the 

interest of speeding up the delivery of supplies to the hospitals, a push package was requested. Th is appeared to be the 

quickest way to obtain at least part of the needed supplies.”).

229 Sandy Bogucki, e-mail to SNS OPS Center Lead, Sept. 2, 2005, 8:27 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 

OPHEP 27642.

230 Besser interview, Feb. 14, 2006, pp. 53-55 (“I don’t think that there was a complete understanding of what it meant 

to request a push pack and what that provided ... we were trying to make sure the people on the ground specifi ed 

clearly what it was that they wanted. And in Louisiana, a lot of what ... people wanted was a restoration of their supply 

chains and their facilities, and a lot of chronic medications that weren’t in push packs ... sending out a push pack is an 

extremely expensive endeavor which is justifi able when the parties receiving it need what’s in it. But it’s, in my mind 

not justifi able for expense, plus a waste of people’s time if they’re getting, you know, 50 tons of material that isn’t what 

they’re looking for.”).

231 Brian W. Amy, letter to Phil Naven, Sept. 1, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. OPHEP 27639 (“Mississippi’s hospitals are in dire need of supplies from the Strategic National Stockpile’s Push Packages ... Sixteen hospitals 

located south of Interstate 20 are totally out of basic supplies, such as IV solutions and oral doses of broad spectrum antibiotics ... as well as saline solutions, sterile water ... syringes, etc. and all other related supplies. Th us far, supply requests 

have not been fulfi lled for a variety of reasons. ... Please note that the longer we are delayed in distributing supplies to 

hospitals, the more likely it will be that emerging infections will compound our all-ready overwhelming situation.”).

232 Evidenced by an internal OPHEP e-mail “FYI, just got pinged by the DEOC [CDC’s emergency operations center]. 

Gerberding [the Director of CDC] wanting to know who gave the permission to move SNS assets.” Keith Holterman, 

e-mail to Stewart Simonson, Sept. 2, 2005, 6:33 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. OPHEP 28195.

233 Lavender interview, Feb. 3, 2006, p. 43.

234 Besser and Adams interview, Feb. 14, 2006, pp. 46-47.

235 U.S. Public Health Service, briefi ng on Hurricane Katrina: PHS Response, Team Alpha, given to Senate Committee 

staff , Jan. 12, 2006. Th ese materials arrived on Tuesday, August 30 and the PHS team reported that the packages were not 

very manageable and were not well-suited to meet the needs of a 200-bed special needs shelter. 

236 U.S. Public Health Service, briefi ng on Hurricane Katrina: PHS Response, Team Alpha, given to Senate Committee 

staff , Jan. 12, 2006.

237 U.S. Public Health Service, briefi ng on Hurricane Katrina: PHS Response, Team Alpha, given to Senate Committee 

staff , Jan. 12, 2006. Th ey reported that there was no organized method for obtaining supplies – they oft en went to the 

SNS who reported that it would take 1-2 days aft er ordering for delivery, they would then speak with the SOC to push 

the SNS orders, and would also speak with private vendors and pharmacies.

238 U.S. Public Health Service, briefi ng on Hurricane Katrina: PHS Response, Team Alpha, given to Senate Committee 
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staff , Jan. 12, 2006.

239 U.S. Public Health Service, briefi ng on Hurricane Katrina: PHS Response, Team Alpha, given to Senate Committee 

staff , Jan. 12, 2006.

240 Besser interview, Feb. 14, 2006, pp. 9-10, 60-61 (“it’s [the SNS] an asset that was developed around the bioterrorism, 

and has morphed to pandemics, but [it’s] not been constructed in the same all-hazards approach as CDC as an agency 

is for public health events. For what it’s worth, with all the hurricanes that have occurred since the program’s inception 

in 1999, to my recollection, we’ve never deployed anything to a hurricane before, so it doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t 

have been thinking more broadly or – but in a environment of fi xed resources, you know, we focus on missions that are 

clearly defi ned.”).

241 Lavender interview, Feb. 3, 2006, p. 41.

242 Besser interview, Feb. 14, 2006, p. 10 (“I think, one of the things we saw with Katrina, here we had an organization 

that was designed for moving material, moving material very effi ciently and eff ectively. It very quickly adapted to a situation where it was moving products that it hadn’t been designed for. ... What we saw in Louisiana was a complete loss of 

the supply chain for quite a large are in terms of medical supplies, and the stockpile was able to step up and become that 

chain – that delivery chain.”). See also: Besser and Adams interview, Feb. 14, 2006, pp. 24-32.

243 Besser interview, Feb. 14, 2006, pp. 10-11 (“As we look at the [mission] for the stockpile ... what we are looking at is, 

should the mission be broader, and if so ... means developing logistical plans that are very diff erent from a model where 

you are taking a large push pack delivering it and turning it over to the States ... it’s developing a logistical chain so that 

you’re dealing with a wider array of products; you’re dealing with ongoing consumption of products and replacement; 

you’re putting in place systems for being able to look at what kind of patients are being seen so you can tailor your supplies in a very unique way. And I think, what Katrina demonstrates for us is a capacity that as country we need to have.”).

244 Besser interview, Feb. 14, 2006, p. 76 (“I think that, I mean, Hurricane Katrina clearly identifi ed chronic disease as 

an area that has to be addressed as part of response to major natural disasters. And if the SNS is the body that’s going to 

do that, we need to put the systems in place to make that work.”).

245 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Response to the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Aff airs information request, Feb. 28, 2006, p. 41. 

246 Lavender interview, Feb. 3, 2006, p. 50.

247 “As the primary agency for ESF #8, HHS coordinates the provision of Federal health and medical assistance to fulfi ll 

the requirements identifi ed by the aff ected State, local and tribal authorities. ESF #8 uses resources primarily available 

from: HHS, including the Operating Divisions and Regional Offi ce; the Department off Homeland Security (DHS); and 

other ESF #8 support agencies and organizations.” NRP, p. ESF #8–4.

248 HHS possesses additional statutorily assigned health responsibilities under the Public Health Service Act, the 

Social Security Act, and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. In fact, the Secretary of HHS declared public health 

emergencies for Louisiana, Mississippi and surrounding states pursuant to this independent authority beginning on 

Wednesday, August 31, 2005. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Concept of Operations Plan (CONOPS) 

for Public Health and Medical Emergencies, Jan. 2005, pp. 4-5, Appendix A. 

249 NRP, p. 5

250 An initial planning meeting to establish “an interagency incident management system to address the ESF 8 public 

health and medical response” to Katrina was formally established held on Monday, September 5, 2005. A Unifi ed Incident Management Team was established at the HHS headquarters in the Humphrey Building on that day. Secretary’s 

Operations Center, e-mail to Allen Dobbs and others, Sept. 5, 2005, 2:44 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. 

DHS-FEMA-0098-0000635 through 0000640.

251 Simonson interview, Feb. 16, 2006, pp. 64-65.

252 Jack Beall, e-mail to Stewart Simonson, Sept. 3, 2005, 10:56 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. OPHEP 

27922.

253 Stewart Simonson, e-mail to Gerald Parker, Sept. 3, 2005, 2:55 p.m. Provided to Committee, fi led as Bates nos. 

OPHEP 27922 through 27924.

254 NRP, pp. ESF 8–6, ESF 8–10.

255 Committee staff interview of Robert Claypool, M.D., former Deputy Assistant Secretary, Director of Mass Casualty 

Planning, Offi ce of Public Health Emergency Preparedness, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, conducted 

on Feb. 14, 2006, transcript p. 67.

256 Th e aft er-action report for HHS concerning the response to Hurricane Frances and Ivan recommended that the 

HHS Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency Preparedness work with the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) “... to (i)mprove coordination between HHS and NDMS during response operations (the separation 

of NDMS from HHS has fractured ESF #8).” Hurricanes Frances and Ivan: Improving the Delivery of HHS and ESF #8 

Support, p. 2.

257 Keith Holtermann, e-mail to Robert Love, Sept. 3, 2005, 1:27 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. 

OPHEP 19978 through 19979.

258 NDMS and the Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness at HHS were transferred to the Department of Homeland Security 
Medical Assistance

437

when the Homeland Security Act was enacted in November, 2002, eff ective March, 2003 (P.L. 107-296 §503). Although 

the existing Offi ce of Public Health Emergency Preparedness (OPHEP) was created by statute on June 12, 2002, and predates the transfer, the resulting changes created a vacuum in HHS’ emergency response capability which it is still trying 

to fi ll. See also P.L. 107-488 § 102.

259 Committee staff interview of Jean Bennett, Regional Emergency Coordinator, Region VI, Offi ce of Public Health and 

Emergency Preparedness, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, conducted on Mar. 1, 2006, transcript p. 5.

260 Bennett interview, Mar. 1, 2006, p. 5.

261 Bennett interview, Mar. 1, 2006, pp. 15-17.

262 HHS/OPHEP provided three reasons why it did not participate in any of the 2004 or 2005 Hurricane Pam medical 

discussions – (1) the exercise was sponsored by FEMA and they were not specifi cally invited, (2) a Region VI REC was 

not yet in place when the bulk of the exercise took place in 2004, and (3) the Region VI REC was unable to take part in the 

fi nal ESF-8 Hurricane Pam follow-up workshop (which occurred just days before Katrina hit) due to a scheduling confl ict. 

263 Robert Blitzer, e-mail to Robert Claypool, Sept. 5, 2005, 11:37 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. OPHEP 

28178.

264 HRSA is the agency within HHS that provides funding and training programs to health care providers, such as 

health clinics, to provide care to the uninsured, people with HIV/AIDS, and pregnant women, mothers, and children.

265 Dr. Claypool interview, Feb. 14, 2006, p. 38.

266 Bennett interview, Mar. 1, 2006, p. 20.

267 Craig interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 25.

268 Downey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 46-48; Dr. Guidry interview, Dec. 20, 2006, pp. 78-79.

269 Betty Duke, e-mail to Richard Carmona, Sept. 7, 2005, 6:02 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. OPHEP 

27217 through 27220.

270 Dianne Whittington, e-mail to Brian Kamoie, Sept. 4, 2005, 2:30 pm. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. 

OPHEP 22014 through 022017; Committee staff interview of Gerald Parker, M.D., D.V.M., Ph.D., Principal Deputy 

Assistant Secretary, Offi ce of Public Health Emergency Preparedness, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 

conducted on Feb. 10, 2006, pp. 52-54.

271 Vanderwagen interview, Feb. 7, 2006, pp. 46-47; Brian Kamoie, e-mail to Stewart Simonson, Sept. 3, 2005, 2:33 p.m. 

Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. OPHEP 27072.

272 Clara Cobb, e-mail to Robert Love, Sept. 5, 2005, 11:19 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. OPHEP 8344.

273 Mike Milner, e-mail to William C. Vanderwagen, Sept. 5, 2005, 11:35 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

nos. OPHEP 8198 through 8199. 

274 Capt. Art French, M.D., USPHS, Aft er-Action Presentation, “New Orleans Airport Evacuation: Th e MST Perspective on the Hospital from Hell,” briefi ng slides, Feb. 2006.; Capt. French interview, Mar. 2, 2006.

275 George Havens, e-mail to Jack Beall, Sept. 4, 2005, 10:47 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA0098-0001413.

276 Mark Roupas, e-mail to Paul McHale, Aug. 29, 2005, 5:54 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as MMTF 00418-05.

277 Stewart Simonson, letter to Paul McHale, Aug. 31, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. OPHEP 27874 

through 27875.

278 Stewart Simonson, letter to Paul McHale, Aug. 31, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. OPHEP 27874 

through 27875.

279 Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense), Hurricane Katrina/Rita/Ophelia Interim Timeline, Nov. 2, 2005, p. 7. Provided to Committee (“Oral approval of SecDef and Draft MOD$ to SecDef EXORD tasks 

SECARMY to provide Ft. Polk deployment site, SECNAV to provide Naval Air Station Meridian site, SECAF to provide 

Eglin AFB site, and CNGB to coordinate use of MS Army National Guard Base.”). 

280 Stewart Simonson, letter to Paul McHale, Sept. 2, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. OPHEP 27884 

through 27885.

281 U.S. Joint Forces Command, Hurricane Katrina Comprehensive Timeline, Nov. 15, 2005, p. 8. Provided to Committee, fi led as Bates no. MMTF 00500-05.

282 Simonson interview, Feb. 16, 2006, pp. 97-98.

283 Simonson interview, Feb. 16, 2006, p. 74

284 Simonson interview, Feb. 16, 2006, p. 75

285 Simonson interview, Feb. 16, 2006, p. 76

286 Stewart Simonson, e-mail to Jack Beall, Sept. 2, 2005, 9:18, p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. OPHEP 

27927.

287 Dr. Claypool interview, Feb. 15, 2006, pp. 63-64.
438

Louisiana State Police in New Orleans

Photo © 2005 The Times-Picayune Publishing Co., 

all rights reserved. Used with permission of the 

Times-Picayune
439

Chapter 25

Public Safety and Security

Among the many enduring images Katrina bequeathed to us was this: rampaging 

crowds wading through fl ooded streets and climbing through broken store windows, gleefully carrying off impossible loads of electronics and other goods they 

could not possibly use in the storm-ravaged city, all while New Orleans police were said to 

be standing by or even in some cases participating.1

 Footage of these events was played over 

and over again on network and cable news outlets during the initial days aft er the storm. 

Stories suggesting a near-total breakdown of law and order in key parts of the city of New 

Orleans soon saturated the media. But as the world watched aghast, many of the stories 

reported and repeated – including some by city leaders – were wrong. 

Th e world saw the full range of events which can occur when law and order break down. 

A September 1, 2005, press report observed, for example, that “At fl ood-swamped Charity Hospital, looters with handguns forced doctors to give up stores of narcotics. Wal-Mart 

gun racks and ammunition supplies were stripped. ... Th ieves commandeered a forklift to 

smash the security glass window of one pharmacy, fl eeing with so much ice, water, and food 

that they left a trail behind them. Brazen gangs chased down a state police truck fi lled with 

food, and even city offi cials were accused of commandeering equipment from a looted Offi ce Depot.2

 New Orleans Police were said to be abandoning their posts in droves. On September 3, the Los Angeles Times reported seeing “dozens of Chinook helicopters dart[ing] 

overhead, transporting desperately ill patients from hospitals that were being evacuated by 

doctors and nurses under sporadic gunfi re.”3

 Charity Hospital reportedly had to suspend 

airlift ing patients to a fi eld hospital set up by the National Guard at Louis Armstrong New 

Orleans International Airport due to sniper fi re.4

 A September 4, 2005, article in the New 

York Times reported that, “at least 200 police offi cers have walked away from their jobs 

and two have committed suicide.”5

 And as late as September 6, then-Police Superintendent 

Eddie Compass expressed frustration about the police’s inability to do anything about the 

“little babies getting raped” in the Superdome.6

 Some of these stories were true; some were 

false; some, partially true; others, infl ated.

While the city was far from peaceful, its occupants were safer and more disciplined than 

it fi rst appeared; some 90 percent of the New Orleans police force stayed on duty;7

 and 

there was only one confi rmed incident of an attempted violent crime at the Superdome.8

Nevertheless, both the perception of extreme threats of violence and the reality of a lesser, 

but still serious, level of disorder had a signifi cant detrimental impact on Katrina’s victims 

and on those who were trying to help them. During the fi rst days aft er the storm, safety 

fears prompted FEMA’s emergency-response team and a medical team to pull out of the 

Superdome, some search-and-rescue crews to suspend their eff orts, and utility workers to 

forestall starting the critical task of repairing downed communications.9

While the magnitude of the storm’s immediate impact on New Orleans, its infrastructure 

and its police force made some disruption of public order inevitable – and while individual 

local, state, and federal public-safety offi cers performed heroically throughout the disaster 

– the Committee’s investigation has found several preventable causes that contributed to 

the real and perceived breakdown in public order. For example, Hurricane Pam, the principal planning exercise for a catastrophic hurricane event in New Orleans, did not include 

any public-safety or law-enforcement components, other than security at shelters.10

At the local level, New Orleans and its police department worked under the most challenging of circumstances. Given Katrina’s impact on the city and its force, given the incredible 

need for assistance that inevitably resulted, and given the tens of thousands of public-safety 
440

offi cers and troops that ultimately were required to assist the city’s eff orts at maintaining 

order, it is apparent that the New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) would have been 

overwhelmed under these circumstances. 

Unfortunately, its diffi culties were exacerbated by several factors that better planning could 

have avoided. Th e city and the NOPD had only vaguely worded emergency plans and those 

plans didn’t, for example, direct offi cers to refuges of last resort or provide for specifi c 

high-ground locations to shelter the emergency vehicles police would need to do their job 

aft er the storm passed. Both failures led to signifi cant losses of resources that impeded the 

ability of individual offi cers to do their jobs. Except for ad hoc arrangements with neighboring Jeff erson Parish to detain violent criminals in their jail, the city also lacked a backup site 

to detain those it arrested once the city jail fl ooded; as a result, the police department was 

compelled to release anyone arrested for a non-violent crime. Also importantly, city offi cials 

oft en compounded the public’s fears – and thereby deterred professional and volunteer 

responders from doing their jobs – by repeating sensational rumors as fact.11 On September 

2, for example, Mayor Nagin opined, “What you are seeing is drug-starving, crazy addicts, 

drug addicts, that are wreaking havoc.”12 City offi cials failed to follow their own plans for 

responding to the news media’s rumor reporting and for making sure that no city spokesman repeated a rumor before confi rming it.

So, the NOPD, suff ering from the destruction of its equipment and uniforms, the failure of a 

tenth of its forces to report for duty, the indecisiveness and unpreparedness of its leadership, 

blinded by lack of situational awareness and deafened by the lack of communications, was 

truly overwhelmed by the catastrophe besetting the city it was supposed to protect and serve.

At the state level, the record was mixed. Th e Louisiana State Police (LSP) poured its personnel and equipment into the New Orleans area to reinforce and re-equip the beleaguered 

NOPD. However, at the administrative level, the state struggled with the massive deputization burdens caused by the huge number of offi cers and agents responding to the area. It 

also did not have eff ective control over the Emergency Management Assistance Compact 

(EMAC) process for more than fi ve days aft er landfall, and only then with the organizational aid of federal agencies. Governor Blanco and her senior staff may also have contributed 

to the delays in receiving outside assistance by the manner of their initial requests to the 

federal government and the timing of their requests to other states. However, as discussed 

later in this section, the Committee would fi nd it very troubling if in fact the federal government failed to respond to a request from a state, even though the wrong offi cers signed the 

request, in a triumph of form over intent and urgent need.

At the federal level, the government’s initial response fell far short of what the Gulf Coast’s 

citizens could reasonably have expected. Th e National Response Plan’s (NRP) Emergency 

Support Function-13 (ESF-13) gives the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Department 

of Homeland Security (DHS) joint responsibility for, among other things, leading and coordinating federal eff orts “in situations requiring extensive assistance to provide public safety 

and security and where State and local government resources are overwhelmed or are inadequate.”13 New Orleans’ desperate need for extensive assistance in ensuring public safety 

was apparent – and requested by Colonel Henry Whitehorn of the State Police – within a 

day of landfall. Yet the federal response to requests for assistance there and elsewhere in the 

region was too slow to ramp up under the circumstances, having been severely hampered 

even before Katrina’s landfall by a seemingly complete absence of planning – indeed a lack 

of a basic understanding of the Departments’ roles and obligations – on the part of DOJ and 

DHS. In fact, DOJ did not assign anyone to coordinate the DOJ function until September 2. 

When federal assistance did begin to arrive in force, on Saturday, September 3, and Sunday, 

September 4, it acquitted itself well and provided immeasurable help to the response eff orts. 

Chapter 25
441

But the failure to anticipate, plan for, and then provide adequate assistance in Katrina’s 

initial days had a lasting impact on the response eff orts.

I. The Local Response

A. Hurricane Katrina Delivered a Powerful Blow Against the Poorly Prepared New 

Orleans Police Department

As anywhere in the United States, the job of ensuring public safety and order in New Orleans 

falls in the fi rst instance to the local police department. At the time Hurricane Katrina made 

landfall, the NOPD had a force of 1,668 sworn offi cers.14 By the time the storm had passed, at 

least 147 failed to report for duty,15 while 90 percent of the force remained on duty. But their 

ability to carry out their life-saving and law-enforcement missions was gravely compromised 

by material losses and communications blackouts they suff ered in the storm.

Th e lack of uniforms, cars, weapons, and ammunition impacted the offi cers’ ability to perform law-enforcement activities.16 Th e lack of watercraft and training in water search and 

rescue limited their ability to rescue and move people from the aff ected area.17 Th e loss of 

communications resulted in signifi cantly diminished overall command and control and an 

inability to coordinate law-enforcement activities around the city among NOPD offi cers.18

Th e lack of interoperable communications resulted in an inability to coordinate searchand-rescue operations and diffi culty in coordinating law-enforcement operations with the 

military and with other law-enforcement agencies.19

As one offi cer noted, “Communications failed at the most critical time. Backup systems 

did not work at all. Th e radio system crashed and was not operational. Th is was critical to 

the operations and seriously hampered rescue operations. Lack of communication placed 

offi cers in extreme danger without an avenue for assistance. ... ‘Mutual aid’ channels were 

hardly usable.”20

FBI Special Agent in Charge Kenneth Kaiser graphically described the status of the NOPD 

force:

Th ey were running out of ammunition. Th ey were running out of food and 

water. We were bringing them food and water. And we brought in our medical personnel ... to look at the people. Some of these people had been on duty 

since the hurricane, hadn’t heard from their wife and kids, hadn’t left their 

post. Some of them were very ill. Th ey had fevers. ... A lot of them were wearing the same clothes they’d worn for seven, eight days.21

Even when offi cers were deployed, the fact that many had lost their uniforms decreased 

their eff ectiveness. As then-Chief of Operations Warren Riley noted in discussing NOPD 

presence at the Convention Center: 

So we had some offi cers that still had uniforms, but a lot of them were wearing 

blue jeans and t-shirts and khaki pants and Wal-Mart things that were given to 

us. ... So a lot of people may have said, “Th e police, they aren’t there,” but we 

just weren’t in uniform.22

Th ese losses were the result not only of the storm, but also of the failure of planning and preparedness. Good planning should anticipate the full range of likely problems and breakdowns. 

It should reasonably have been anticipated that communications would have been lost in a 

major hurricane, while the eff ects could have been mitigated had a good plan been in place.

Public Safety and Security
Chapter 25

442

Unlike the New Orleans Fire Department’s (NOFD) Hurricane Guidelines, the NOPD’s 

plan does not include provision for last areas of refuge for hurricanes.23 Th ese refuges are 

multi-level facilities, with a center core stairwell, in strategic locations around the city. Each 

facility’s availability to house personnel and/or equipment is reconfi rmed during preseason 

preparations.24 In addition to providing refuge for fi re personnel, some of the locations in 

the NOFD’s plan are also high-ground staging areas for equipment.25 Th e NOPD’s plan calls 

for all vehicles not being utilized to be relocated to safe locations but does not specify where, 

resulting in responsibility for unit assets being left up to individual commanders.26 Unfortunately, many vehicles were parked in low-lying areas to avoid exposure to high-velocity 

winds and ended up submerged.27

Th e NOPD was unprepared to protect its assets or to provide for acquiring replacement 

equipment, precautions which would seem reasonable in a city built mostly below sea level.

Two issues identifi ed by NOPD Command Staff in the Aft er Action Reports (AAR) concern 

this lack of adequate resources to conduct law-enforcement and search-and-rescue operations 

under emergency conditions. Th e fi rst, “Vehicles appropriate to operate in high water conditions,” included a notation that, “Although some units had Expeditions [Ford SUVs], pick-up 

trucks, or other SUV-type vehicles, the majority of the department did not have access to a 

high profi le vehicle which would allow for movement on streets fi lled with some water.”28 Th e 

second, “Watercraft to conduct rescue operations,” noted, “Once the storm had passed, and 

the levees breached, many offi cers made use of commandeered modes of transportation. Boats 

of all types were put into use as methods of transportation for both offi cers and rescuees.”29

Riley was Chief of Operations during preparations before Hurricane Ivan and Hurricane 

Katrina. Prior to Hurricane Ivan, Riley requested and received from the Louisiana National 

Guard (LANG) high-water vehicles which were staged at each of the police districts prior to 

the storm.30 Before Hurricane Katrina, Riley said he asked for fi ve high-water vehicles and fi ve 

boats to be pre-staged at each of the Department’s eight stations. Some vehicles were provided 

to three or four districts, but no boats were provided.31 Major General Landreneau, head of 

the Louisiana National Guard, disputed the assertion regarding high-water vehicles, but documents he provided the Committee do not show that any boats were sent to district stations.32

Th e NOPD’s own AARs provide evidence of the pervasive lack of preparedness. Th e AARs 

noted that the NOPD did not adequately supply its offi cers with basic provisions, nor did 

it have logistics in place to handle supplies. While some bottled water was distributed to 

offi cers, “Th ere did not appear to be any pre-planning for food, water, weapons, and medical care.”33 As one offi cer noted, “Th e lack of provisions and a quartermaster system forced 

Offi cers to procure needed items from abandoned business locations.”34

Despite challenges facing NOPD offi cers, maintaining and restoring public safety was of 

pre-eminent importance, for without it, those trying to help Katrina’s victims could not 

do their jobs. While media reports may have exaggerated the extent of lawlessness, the fact 

remains that looting and other criminal acts were occurring around the city. Th ere are no 

reliable statistics available due to the fl ooding of NOPD headquarters and the jail, but there 

is signifi cant anecdotal evidence regarding such activity.

Captain Timothy Bayard described an example of looting observed when SAR teams were 

taking people to the Convention Center:

We pulled four or fi ve guys out of an apartment two blocks from the Convention Center. But at the time we didn’t have any jails, didn’t have anyplace to 

bring them, you know? So we pulled them out of burglarizing a guy’s apartment above the store. Th ey had already broken into the store.35
Public Safety and Security

443

Riley described “three hours of mayhem” on Canal Street to which 60 offi cers responded:

Well, there were some points where, for instance, Brooks Brothers was being 

looted. Our offi cers had some confrontations there. Saks Fift h Avenue was being looted. Some other stores along the block, I believe for the most part, like 

places that had athletic wear and tennis shoes, things like that.36

At the Superdome, despite media reports, including comments made by the NOPD’s 

Compass, the number of violent acts appeared limited. Th ere was an attempted assault on 

a young woman in one of the rest rooms.37 Another incident involved the shooting of a 

National Guardsman which appeared to be an accidental shooting by a fellow Guardsman.38

Th ere was one suicide, but no homicides.39

Despite the absence of signifi cant violent crime, there were nonetheless problems at the 

Superdome. FEMA Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs) and Emergency Response 

Teams (ERTs) and New Orleans Health Department (NOHD) personnel, decided to withdraw from the Superdome complex because they perceived the situation there as unsettled 

or unsafe.40 Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) personnel curtailed operations until security 

was provided.41 Th e NOPD feared carjackings by those seeking to fl ee New Orleans.42 And 

the delivery of utility repair services apparently suff ered delay until proper security for the 

workers and sites themselves existed.43 Only when a secure environment was restored could 

basic needs truly be addressed.

Lack of readiness and loss of personnel and equipment were major contributing causes to 

the inability of the NOPD to maintain law and order in the devastated city. But they were 

not the only ones.

B. The Effectiveness of the NOPD Was Further Diminished by Command Confusion 

and Lack of Familiarity with Emergency-Operation Plans

Although the NOPD had an emergency-operations manual that included hurricane procedures, the Committee’s investigation has not revealed any systematic training administered on a department-wide basis on its own plan, let alone the city’s plan or the NRP. 

Riley surmised, based on the comments in some of the aft er-action reports done within the 

department, that some of the commanders had not read their operations manuals.44 When 

asked what actions he took during his tenure as chief to ensure that offi cers were familiar 

with their responsibilities under the disaster-operations manual, Compass responded only 

that he “encouraged [his] commanders to make sure that people were very familiar with the 

hurricane plan.”45 Riley said that every commander (but not every offi cer) receives a version 

of the plan and that the plan is “probably reviewed as we have a hurricane approaching.”46

Not all information about procedures to be used during a storm is included within the text 

of the manuals. Alternative reporting locations, for instance, are not included other than a 

general instruction to “report to the nearest District Station or police facility.”47 Instead, the 

Department appears to rely on oral communication among and by commanders immediately before an event to inform the rank and fi le about rally locations.48

Compass recalled that members of specialized units underwent emergency-preparedness 

training conducted by Terry Ebbert, but that not every offi cer did.49 For instance, many 

offi cers did not know what the OEP was.50 Th e lack of familiarity by the department’s rank 

and fi le with the OEP and other hurricane emergency procedures must be attributed in 

part to the department’s leadership, including Compass and then-Chief Danny Lawless, 

the Department’s designee at the EOC and Chief of Policy, Planning and Training. Aft er 

the hurricane, Compass resigned51 and Lawless was demoted because of his performance.52

Riley explained that Lawless did not make an adequate eff ort to communicate information 

and that his successor would be someone trained in the Incident Command System (ICS). 53
Chapter 25

444

Defi ciencies in the NOPD’s manual, lack of training on this manual, lack of familiarity with 

it, or a combination of the three resulted in inadequate protection of department resources. 

One offi cer noted that he had not received training on the hurricane procedures in the 

NOPD’s manual: “In 2004, the police department produced an elaborate hurricane plan and 

issued it to all its commanders. But it stayed on their bookshelves. Th e department didn’t 

run exercises to familiarize offi cers with the plan.”54

Th e Aft er Action Report addressed another area critical to a department’s command and 

control structure – leadership. Th is was the apparent lack of a clearly identifi ed, unifi ed 

command structure, an issue raised by members of the Command Staff :

Unifi ed Command: Although the police department normally has the entire 

command structure in place for normal, everyday operations, the scale of this 

event required the implementation of an ICS, where a unifi ed command for all 

departments was a necessity. Who was the Incident Commander and how did 

we receive instructions from him or her? Where was the Unifi ed Command 

position?55

One captain noted that, “Unifi ed command was never established. Th is, in my mind, was 

the major problem with the response during Katrina” and the “Training in Incident/Unifi ed Command for the department is critical.”56 Another noted that, “Th ere did not appear 

to be an established incident Command, EOC, TOC [Tactical Operations Center] aft er the 

impact of the storm.”57

A related critique was made by eight of the responding Command Staff offi cers of the City’s 

Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness (OEP), who noted:

Total failure of OEP: Although identifi ed as the point of command for the 

emergency, the OEP was out of communication with a large percentage of the 

department several times during the storm.58

C. The Loss of Detention Facilities to Hold Looters and Lawbreakers Contributed 

to the Public Safety Problem

Shortly aft er Katrina made landfall, fl ooding rendered the Orleans Parish Jail, the detention 

facility used by the city, uninhabitable, and the Criminal Sheriff was forced to evacuate it.59

As a result, there was nowhere to detain most of those caught in criminal acts in Katrina’s 

aft ermath, so police had to release all but those caught committing violent acts.60

Th e breakdown of the detention system, while unavoidable given the extent of fl ooding, 

could have been anticipated. With proper contingency plans, existing prisoners could have 

been evacuated earlier and more easily to detention facilities identifi ed before the storm, 

and new arrests could have proceeded with fewer processing and housing concerns.

Th e task of planning for managing prisoners in New Orleans is complicated by an unusual government structure. Th e jail is operated as a separate entity from the NOPD and 

the city. It is part of Orleans Parish operations, under the direction of an elected sheriff . 

Primary responsibility for planning and coordination of the jail’s evacuation rests with the 

Criminal Sheriff .61 Riley had a general understanding of the jail evacuation planning:

Over the past many years, the prison has always been self-suffi cient as it relates 

to [evacuation of the prison population]. Th ey normally prepared to do two 

types of evacuations. One is to take their most violent off enders and have them 

relocated to another state facility, evacuating them before the storm. Th e other 

was a vertical evacuation ... [for] less violent off enders.62
Public Safety and Security

445

Th ere was no pre-landfall coordination between the NOPD and the Orleans Parish. Yet, on 

the day following landfall, the prison – like much of the rest of the city – was surrounded by 

water estimated at fi ve to six feet deep. At this time, the sheriff sought manpower assistance 

from the NOPD but was told that none could be spared.63 On possibly Tuesday or Wednesday, the NOPD did agree to lend a few boats to allow the sheriff to move his prisoners to a 

nearby Interstate overpass that was above the water line.64 In pictures seen around the country and the world, prisoners sat on the overpass under the watchful eye of deputy sheriff s 

supported by National Guard troops until arrangements could be made to move them to 

detention facilities outside the city.

With the parish jail closed, the NOPD found itself without the use of the jail’s booking and 

intake-processing center.65 During the fi rst week aft er landfall, the City of New Orleans was 

not able to detain most of those caught in criminal acts in Katrina’s aft ermath. Police could 

only catch and release persons arrested for anything other than violent acts.66 Th e NOPD’s 

disaster-planning document does not address the possibility of the detention facility’s being 

unavailable. Th e NOPD’s Aft er Action Report highlights the impact on law enforcement of 

the loss of the jail and the lack of a backup facility: “Th e repeated announcements from the 

city relative to its intention to, ‘vigorously go aft er looters and prosecute them to the fullest 

extent of the law’ appeared overly ambitious and unenforceable due to the evacuation of the 

jail. Once the facility to intake arrested subjects was made unavailable, arresting subjects 

was not an option,”67 except to the limited extent an ad hoc arrangement with neighboring 

Jeff erson Parish for detaining violent felons was made.68

Th e lack of a detention center and its impact on law enforcement were not lost on the state 

Attorney General and the United States Attorney for Eastern Louisiana.69 By the fi rst weekend aft er landfall, eff orts were underway to identify an alternative location within the city.70

Flooding of the jail and its impact on both the prisoners held there and the detention of new 

arrestees clearly should have been anticipated. Given the NOPD’s dependence on the Criminal Sheriff ’s offi ce to provide critical support, the NOPD leadership should have taken steps 

as it developed its disaster plan to ensure that the plans of other relevant agencies addressed 

the NOPD’s needs. It is not suffi cient for agencies who are interdependent to develop their 

own plans; they must ensure that other agencies’ plans synchronize with their own to meet 

mutual needs. Th e NOPD’s and Orleans Parish’s planning did not appropriately account for 

foreseeable contingencies.

D. Unsubstantiated Rumors of Lawlessness by City Offi cials and the Failure to Have a 

Plan for Verifying and Controlling Such Rumors Contributed to the Perceived Lack of 

Safety in New Orleans

Th e city apparently did not eff ectively plan or manage rumors of unrest, and some of its 

leaders unfortunately repeated them as fact while they were still rumor. Th is had the result 

of fueling unsubstantiated media reports that the city was out of control. NOPD Superintendent Compass, for example, made this comment about the Superdome as late as September 6: “We had little babies in there, little babies getting raped. You know how frustrating 

it is to be Chief of Police knowing inside these things are being done and you don’t have 

enough manpower to go in there?”71 On the same day, Mayor Nagin said: “Th ey have people 

standing out there, have been in that frickin’ Superdome for fi ve days watching hooligans 

killing people, raping people.”72 Fortunately, neither statement turned out to be true; there 

were no confi rmed rapes or murders at the Superdome.73 But these statements, coming as 

they did from those the public would have reason to believe knew what they were talking 

about, created a sense of societal breakdown, and likely added to the sense of danger that 

deterred some fi rst responders from quickly and eff ectively doing their jobs.
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Among the responsibilities assigned to the NOPD’s Public Information Offi cer (PIO) in 

the Emergency Operations Manual are: (1) release information authorized by the Incident 

Commander, (2) disseminate media-alert announcements as instructed by the Incident 

Commander, (3) be responsible for establishing rumor control, (4) schedule media briefi ngs 

as necessary, and (5) be responsible for establishing a system to monitor incident rumor 

control.74 Superintendent Riley noted that the standard policy in the department is to refer 

media inquiries to the PIO.75

While that was the policy, the practice was far diff erent. Despite the department’s standard 

policy of referring media inquiries to the PIO and concern expressed by offi cials about the 

impact of unsubstantiated rumors being reported by the media that the city was out of control, Compass fueled such reporting by speaking directly to the media, making sensationalized statements, such as the one noted above, about conditions in the Superdome.76

II. The State Response

A. The Louisiana State Police Substantially Supported NOPD with Personnel and Assets

Despite having a force of only 1,050 troopers,77 the LSP carried out a variety of emergencysupport functions during Katrina, not only by orchestrating the state’s contrafl ow plan,78

but by providing law-enforcement support to the embattled NOPD. As Brigadier General 

Mark Graham testifi ed, LSP played an important role escorting buses during the evacuations of the Superdome and Convention Center.79 LSP troopers conducted 1,300 escort missions within the fi rst few days of Katrina.80 In addition to security escorts for buses, troopers 

were dispatched to provide perimeter security, including a mission to secure the perimeter 

around City Hall, where the EOC was located.81 Th ey helped to secure the Superdome. As 

the population in Baton Rouge grew with the exodus from New Orleans, LSP troopers deployed to provide security at fi eld hospitals and evacuee shelters.82

Among the LSP deployments were Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Teams. Th e LSP’s 

initial SWAT presence was in New Orleans prior to the storm.83 Additional LSP SWAT 

teams arrived on Tuesday, August 30, with the remainder scheduled to arrive Wednesday, 

August 31.84 While the LSP sent signifi cant numbers of offi cers, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph 

Booth noted that there were some early problems getting offi cers into the city because of 

high water. “I’ve requested watercraft off and on for some eight to 10 years,” Colonel Booth 

said, but those requests had been “Unsuccessful, unsuccessful.”85

Eight hundred troopers were sent to New Orleans during the fi rst few days aft er Katrina.86 Th e 

small LSP force, like their NOPD counterparts, quickly became overwhelmed by the scope of 

the catastrophe and the many services expected of them. Meanwhile, their reassignment to 

New Orleans left a law-enforcement void in other parts of the state.87 Still, more offi cers were 

needed, and on August 30, Colonel Whitehorn wrote to FBI Director Robert Mueller for help:

As you are aware, the city of New Orleans, Louisiana has suff ered massive 

damage caused by Hurricane Katrina. We are currently utilizing all State assets 

to stabilize the situation; however, looting continues to be a signifi cant problem. As the head of Louisiana State Police, I am requesting any assistance you 

can provide to this agency to assist with the issue to include deployment of 

available tactical teams.88

Th e letter was faxed from the FBI on August 31 to Principal Associate Deputy Attorney 

General William Mercer.89
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447

Another contribution of the LSP, which had published an 800 number before the storm, 

was fi elding 911 calls from New Orleans residents trapped in their homes, as the 911 system 

in New Orleans failed in the fi rst few days post-landfall. Th e LSP emergency operations center received 22,000 emergency calls over a period of approximately one month post-landfall.90 EOC staff e-mailed and hand delivered the messages to search-and-rescue agencies.91

Th e LSP, from their own supplies, helped to re-equip the NOPD by substantial resources 

including 137 vehicles which the LSP marked with the NOPD insignia, uniforms, ammunition, 300 pairs of boots, and other provisions as basic as socks and underwear, toothbrushes, 

and deodorant.92

B. The State of Louisiana Did Not Ask for Federal Law-Enforcement Assistance as 

Quickly as It Should Have

Consistent with emergency-management and constitutional principles generally, Louisiana 

state government also had a vital role to play in securing law-enforcement help from outside 

the state. As with local and federal governments, Hurricane Katrina exposed distinct shortcomings and signifi cant oversights in the state’s planning and execution of its response.

As with other kinds of assistance, Louisiana’s recourse when its own resources are overwhelmed with respect to law enforcement is through the Emergency Management Assistance 

Compact (EMAC). Th e state is a signatory to EMAC, as provided in the Louisiana Homeland 

Security and Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act of 1993, 93 as amended. According to 

the Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP) Emergency Operations Plan, if an emergency becomes too widespread or serious for parish or state 

resources, the Director of LOHSEP is supposed to request assistance through EMAC.94

EMAC establishes a process by which states receive mutual aid. Impacted states can request 

assistance over a wide range of services from those other signatory states without having to 

negotiate many of the legalities, which have been worked out through the compact. EMAC 

provided a valuable tool that supported many phases of disaster response, including law 

enforcement. 

Such capabilities involved lending states’ police forces, and, through Memoranda of Understanding arranged by the National Guard Bureau, National Guard forces including military 

police.95 According to Colonel Steven Dabadie, Chief of Staff of the Louisiana National 

Guard, “a large amount of those National Guardsmen that we had in New Orleans were 

performing security missions,”96 including at shelters and commodities-distribution sites.97

During the fi rst week aft er landfall, outside law-enforcement agencies were “showing up”98

in New Orleans, without prior coordination. “It was pitch black in New Orleans,” which 

resulted in “a couple situations” where one law enforcement agency ran into members of 

another when neither agency knew the other was in the area. 99 Th is could be attributed to 

the fi rst responder self-deployment phenomenon identifi ed aft er the September 11, 2001, 

terrorist attacks, and could be a recurring problem in future disasters.100 It could also be 

the result of an EMAC process where both the local sheriff s association and LSP separately 

made EMAC requests. Colonel Whitehorn thought that “one EMAC request rather than the 

sheriff s doing EMAC and then State Police do[ing] another EMAC” made more sense.101

It was not until “around day fi ve [that New Orleans] began to coordinate better.”102 Substantial numbers of military personnel were on the ground, tens of thousands of people 

had been evacuated from the city, and, most importantly, the immediate search-and-rescue 

crisis was winding down. Additionally, substantial numbers of federal law-enforcement 

personnel were fl owing into the state. Organization, largely absent in the fi rst week, was 

established through a single check-in at the State Police facility in Baton Rouge operated 
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448

in conjunction with a federal Law Enforcement Coordination Center (LECC) set up on 

September 5. Under the auspices of the lead federal law-enforcement offi cials, the LECC 

brought together representatives from LSP and local law enforcement, among others. 

Th ereaft er, many out-of-state responders came with their own command structures in 

place, including clear lines of authority. Th is made the integration process work even more 

smoothly and allowed out-of-state responders to meet local needs even in areas where they 

were not familiar with the surroundings.103

Th e LSP ultimately oversaw the deputization of more than 400 law-enforcement offi cers 

from other states and more than 3,000 from the federal government.104

At the same time, the State of Louisiana did not request assistance in a form that the Department of Justice found acceptable until days aft er the storm. Governor Blanco sent a specifi c 

request on September 4, stating in part that “the request is made under the Justice Assistance 

Act of 1984 (‘the Act’), 42 U.S.C. §§ 10501-10503, which authorizes the U.S. Department 

of Justice to provide law enforcement assistance to a State.”105 Th e State Attorney General’s 

offi ce has not provided the Committee with any information which has shed light on the 

timing and preparation of this letter, or Colonel Whitehorn’s earlier request for assistance.

Moreover, it is not clear that Louisiana requested law-enforcement assistance from FEMA, 

which, in the fi rst week, assigned hundreds of law-enforcement offi cials to New Orleans.106

Th us, the State waited several days aft er landfall before getting a request for law-enforcement assistance to the other states through EMAC, in a formal request, to the federal government for help in a form DOJ found acceptable. 

III. The Federal Response

A. Neither DHS Nor DOJ Took Any Signifi cant Steps Prior to Landfall to Understand, 

Plan For or Coordinate Their Joint ESF-13 Responsibilities Relating to a Natural Disaster

Th e National Response Plan’s ESF-13 assigns the DHS and DOJ jointly to lead the federal 

government’s public-safety and security eff orts.107 Th is is the only ESF for which two agencies are designated as both Coordinators and Primary Agencies, and the results of that joint 

assignment in Katrina show the wisdom of the unitary assignments for the other ESFs. By 

assigning this responsibility to more than one entity, the NRP eff ectively ensured that no 

one took charge. Because the NRP is silent on resolving leadership issues, DHS and DOJ 

neither coordinated with each other prior to Katrina, nor independently planned for carrying out their ESF-13 functions. As a result, the days immediately prior to and aft er landfall 

were spent fi guring out precisely how to implement the ESF-13 responsibilities, rather than 

actually implementing them in full.

Even the simplest of questions were unresolved prior to Katrina. In the days aft er landfall, 

for example, offi cials at both DOJ and DHS expressed confusion over how the two agencies 

were supposed to coordinate and which of the two was supposed to take the lead. A September 1 memo among several senior DOJ offi cials suggested that “DHS is in the lead,”108

and showing the extent of the confusion, the version of the September 1 DOJ memo 

produced to the Committee had a handwritten note from the Principal Associate Deputy 

Attorney General next to the caption “Responsibilities, ESF Coordinators/Primary Agencies” asking “How are these designated? By Whom?”109 Meanwhile, a September 4 DHS 

e-mail expressed concern that “DOJ is looking to run this whole eff ort.”110 On the same day, 

another DHS e-mail noted that “We have several hundred DHS LEOs [Law Enforcement 
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449

Offi cials] already there and can mobilize several thousand more if our department can make 

a decision to seriously commit to this eff ort.”111

Matthew Broderick, Director of the DHS’s Homeland Security Operations Center, off ered this 

candid testimony on the extent to which the ESF-13 responsibilities in a Katrina-like situation 

were neither contemplated nor understood: “In most cases in the NRP, the FBI has got the 

lead because it’s a terrorist-related action, and they have to do the criminal investigation. No 

one had thought about a natural disaster.”112 Broderick described the confusion about who 

would be the lead as part of the “growing pains of working through the NRP,”113 saying:

In a natural disaster, there really is no reason for the FBI, there was no investigative part of it to be involved, particularly when the preponderance of the law 

enforcement – Federal law enforcement was all [Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection] owned by us anyway. So, 

if we had – if FEMA was overseeing it as a component, why not let our law 

enforcement component take the lead in doing that? ... I think it was just a 

matter of no one thinking it through. ... I don’t think anybody had thought 

about the natural disaster scenario.114

In addition, neither DHS nor DOJ seems to have resolved which component within each 

agency was responsible for the Departments’ ESF-13 responsibilities.115 To this day, no 

witness interviewed by or document provided to the Committee has defi nitively identifi ed 

the agency or component in charge of ESF-13 at DHS, or who made the decision to activate 

the support function. Senior Department offi cials couldn’t tell the Committee who within 

the Department was in charge.116 DHS Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson, for example, had 

no idea even when the Committee interviewed him which component of his agency was in 

charge of ESF-13, and he was unable to off er any insight into what DHS did as co-lead.117

Instead, he repeatedly suggested pursuing this issue with FEMA, notwithstanding the fact 

that DHS, not FEMA, includes law-enforcement components.118 His answer did not change 

aft er he was informed during this interview that the NRP assigns responsibility for ESF-13 

to DHS as a whole, not to FEMA.119

Th e DHS offi cial who ultimately served as the Department’s lead law-enforcement person in 

Louisiana spoke candidly about his lack of familiarity with the NRP, and the lack of clarity 

in the guidance given him concerning the roles of DHS, ICE, or himself at the time of his 

deployment. Assistant Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE’s) Offi ce 

of Investigations Michael Vanacore told the Committee that, with respect to the NRP, “I 

... had a fl eeting familiarity with it. To be honest, it wasn’t something that was high on my 

radar screen with my particular responsibilities.”120 When he was fi rst put on “standby” on 

September 2, he was told “that I would probably be going down in some capacity for ICE, 

but nobody was sure what that capacity would be.”121 Prior to his arrival on September 4, 

he said there was “nobody who’s stepping up to say ‘I’m in charge,’ and I don’t think any of 

us had the authority to step up and say, ‘I’m in charge.’ Hence, . . . the need for some sort 

of designation.”122 Upon his arrival, he recalled that processes were not in place for coordinating the chains of command among state, local, federal, regular military, and National 

Guard personnel.123 Even as of September 6, two days aft er his arrival, he still did not know 

whether he was there “to coordinate ICE . . . or to coordinate all of DHS.”124

Vanacore admitted that the role ICE played during the Katrina response had not been 

envisioned previously. “While the National Response Plan may call on DHS, it didn’t call 

on ICE. And I think ICE stepped up and took on a role that nobody defi ned for us up until 

that point. Nobody told ICE, ‘Th is is your role.’”125 Vanacore questioned the wisdom of 

ICE’s role as the ESF-13 lead for DHS: “I think we’re primarily a law enforcement investigative agency, and that’s where our focus is. We do investigations. We really did not, up until 
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450

that point, have, I think, a focused role 

in a natural disaster response.”126 He also 

opined that uniformed offi cers within 

DHS might be better suited to respond 

than ICE investigators.127

In the days aft er Katrina, DOJ leadership 

seemed as confused as the leadership at 

DHS about how ESF-13 was supposed 

to work. Th e previously referenced 

memorandum among top DOJ offi cials 

includes a marginal notation on the 

third page that asks “who activates” 

ESF-13,128 and a September 1 e-mail 

from Senior Counsel James McAtamney 

notes that requests from state and local 

offi cials should be directed to the Joint 

Field Offi ce (JFO),129 even though the 

JFO didn’t exist until well into the next 

week. It also reports that a representative 

from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) had deployed to DHS’s Homeland Security Operations Center,130 even though the NRP calls for such designees to report 

to an entirely diff erent entity, the National Response Coordination Center.131

B. The Departments’ Failure to Understand, Plan for and Implement Their ESF-13 

Responsibilities in Natural Disasters Prior to Katrina Led to Delays in Providing 

Law-Enforcement Assistance

Th e confusion over the meaning of and responsibility for implementing ESF-13 had realworld consequences, because it prevented the federal government from hitting the ground 

running when the magnitude of Katrina’s likely catastrophic consequences became apparent. 

If ever there were a case for the activation of ESF-13, Katrina was it. All indicators prior to 

landfall – from the President’s call to Governor Blanco urging a mandatory evacuation, to 

FEMA Director Brown’s comments on the Sunday, August 28, video teleconference in which 

DHS offi cials participated, that Katrina could be “a catastrophe within a catastrophe” 132– left 

little doubt that Katrina would create, in the words of the ESF, “a situation requiring extensive assistance to provide public safety and security and where State and local government 

resources are overwhelmed or are inadequate.”133 Events immediately aft er landfall –most 

importantly the devastation of NOPD’s capabilities – confi rmed the need for a federal law 

enforcement cadre prepared, trained and ready to deploy to assist.

Yet the lack of advanced planning meant that it took several days aft er landfall – days in 

which the city and those helping it suff ered from a lack of order and protection – for DOJ 

to move into the New Orleans area in force. On September 1 – three days aft er landfall 

– only 45 agents from 4 DOJ components were reportedly in the city, while as many as 215 

were on hand in Baton Rouge.134 Notably, 188 of the 214 FBI personnel assigned to the New 

Orleans offi ce were on administrative leave as late as September 8,135 presumably not participating in the response eff ort.136 Nonetheless, starting on September 2, signifi cant federal 

law-enforcement contingents began arriving in Louisiana. On September 6, there were reportedly 2,326 federal law-enforcement offi cers in the disaster relief area137 – including 694 

from DOJ. Th e combined federal law enforcement deployment was nearly equal to the total 

of LSP and NOPD offi cers in the State of Louisiana before landfall.138

Patrolling a fl ooded city

Army National Guard photo
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451

In the midst of this time-sensitive need, federal law-enforcement agencies found themselves 

grappling with issues they had not resolved previously, including how their newly assigned 

public-safety and security functions would mesh with military assistance provided for civil 

disturbances.139 DOJ, at least, envisioned its law-enforcement role in Katrina’s aft ermath as 

secondary to that of military troops sent to the aff ected states for these purposes.140 In fact, 

Louisiana offi cials had requested such troops and thousands of military police and Guardsmen available and intended to reinforce the NOPD deployed to the city from August 31 

through September 3.141 Th e deployment of active-duty troops for such purposes, pursuant 

to an invocation of the Insurrection Act, also remained a real possibility.142 Th e extent to 

which DOJ and DHS coordinated the deployment of their personnel and assets with any 

DOD entity remains unclear.

Similarly, it does not appear that DHS law-enforcement personnel, with the exception of the 

Federal Protective Service143 and Customs and Border Patrol,144 were preparing to assist with 

their ESF-13 response with much urgency. Senior Immigration, Customs and Enforcement 

(ICE) leadership, were at an ICE conference in Baltimore from August 29-31 at which Katrina 

merited only “some mention,” and that was regarding plans for recovery of ICE assets, not a 

larger emergency response.145 Among those attending was Mike Holt, the ICE Special Agent 

in charge in New Orleans, who was unable to get back to the city until the following Friday.146

Th ere’s another twist to the timing of the deployment of DOJ resources: although ESF-13 

contemplates a broad role for federal law enforcement,147 DOJ appears to take the position 

that it could only deploy resources to provide law-enforcement assistance to a state pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 10501.148 Th is statute provides a process for federal law-enforcement 

assistance to be provided to a state in the event of a “law enforcement emergency.”149 Th e 

process requires a written application150 from a governor before DOJ can push its personnel 

into a state to provide “law enforcement assistance.”151 Although DOJ appears never to have 

responded to Col. Whitehorn’s letter, it follows from the position it took in its responses 

to HSGAC’s questions in its November 23, 2005, response concerning the applicability of 

42 U.S.C. § 10501 that it found his August 30 request insuffi cient to allow for the dispatch 

of DOJ assistance to Louisiana, because it came from the superintendent of the State Police 

rather than the Governor herself.152 As noted earlier, Colonel Whitehorn wrote asking for 

any assistance the FBI could provide, including deployment of available tactical teams.153

Although Colonel Whitehorn’s letter does not comply with the terms of 42 U.S.C. § 10501, 

the lack of a compliant letter need not have prevented DOJ from deploying law-enforcement offi cers and resources to Louisiana. In the fi rst place, the NRP, to which DOJ is a 

signatory, contemplates the deployment of federal law enforcement personnel and does 

not reference 42 U.S.C. § 10501.154 In the second place, DOJ ended up deploying personnel 

to Louisiana before receiving a compliant request under the statute. Indeed, the bulk155 of 

DOJ’s responding personnel were in the state before Governor Blanco personally requested 

assistance on September 4.156

Another example of DOJ reliance on the absence of a formal 42 U.S.C. § 10501 request from 

the Governor is an exchange of e-mails between DOJ’s Principal Associate Deputy Attorney 

General William Mercer, Senior Counsel McAtamney and Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Steve Bradbury, concerning a State request for ATF help with crowd control.157

Bradbury wrote on September 1, “Th ere is not currently a written request from the Governor 

to the AG to provide DOJ assistance to State and local law enforcement. We would not approve this State law enforcement activity until there is such a request and the AG has issued 

an order approving the request. ATF could move forward with preparations and pre-positioning but should not actually begin state law enforcement without such an order.”158
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Again, there is no record DOJ ever advised the Governor of its view of the prerequisite conditions for providing law-enforcement assistance.

On September 1, the Attorney General’s deputy chief of staff , Kyle Sampson, sent an e-mail 

to the directors of the FBI, ATF, U.S. Marshals Service, and others, noting that “Th e AG intends to issue a directive to each of you later today to move additional resources into [Louisiana] in response to Hurricane Katrina and its aft ermath.”159 Sampson also wrote that “the 

President has said publicly that looting and violence and lawlessness will not be tolerated 

and that he has spoken to his AG about it, so we want to ensure that we are bringing all of 

our [law enforcement] assets to bear on this.” Each of the subordinate agencies was directed 

to “provide ... in the next several hours, a rack-up of additional personnel, assets, and other 

resources ... available to be applied directly to this problem.”160 Th e Attorney General issued 

a directive on Friday, September 2, designating DOJ assets to deploy to the aff ected region.161

Despite repeated requests, DOJ has not provided the Committee with suffi cient information 

to determine the cause of the delay between receipt of Colonel Whitehorn’s August 30 letter 

and issuance of the September 2 order directing the deployment of federal law-enforcement 

personnel to Louisiana. However, the Committee would fi nd it unacceptable if the delay 

was caused by the fact that the request from Colonel Whitehorn did not technically meet 

the formula set forth 42 U.S.C. § 10501. Th is is particularly so given that DOJ has provided 

the Committee with no documentation or testimony indicating that it told Louisiana offi -

cials that Colonel Whitehorn’s letter was insuffi cient. At a minimum, the letter should have 

been treated by DOJ with a greater sense of urgency than was disclosed to the Committee 

given the crisis that was still unfolding in Louisiana. It would be equally unacceptable if the 

reason was simply failure to plan for or anticipate the need for federal law-enforcement assistance under ESF-13.

It is also clear that other legal issues that should have been resolved long prior to landfall 

caused confusion and limited what DOJ would allow its personnel to do in the fi rst week 

following Katrina. In the days before landfall, the ATF took the initiative to contact the 

Deputy Attorney General’s offi ce to seek “any guidance that would come from the Attorney 

General to all the Justice components about what authorities we’d be acting under and what 

our response would be.”162

As the law-enforcement situation in New Orleans worsened with the storm’s passing, DOJ 

law-enforcement agencies continued their quest for guidance as to the Department’s plans 

to coordinate and implement a departmental response.163 On the evening of August 31, DOJ 

advised its component agencies that it was still in the process of developing such guidance.164 DOJ lawyers were still reviewing “a number of very sensitive legal/perhaps constitutional issues” with providing assistance on non-federal law-enforcement matters to state 

and local offi cials.165

On September 4, following receipt of Governor Blanco’s offi cial, written request for lawenforcement assistance, U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales issued an order to DOJ 

law-enforcement offi cers authorizing them to assist law-enforcement offi cials in the State of 

Louisiana to enforce the laws of that state.166 Even aft er the order was issued, the deputization 

process which was a state responsibility, proved to be “diffi cult.” 167 ICE Assistant Director 

Vanacore described helping coordinate a deputization process for all federal agents with the 

Louisiana Attorney General’s Offi ce in which agents had to take an oath in the personal presence of a state assistant attorney general.168 Th e numerous, rapid deployments of agents each 

day, combined with the limited number of assistant attorney generals available to conduct live 

deputization ceremonies, made it hard to get people together at the same time and place. Accordingly, they were forced to dispatch non-deputized agents with deputized agents, NOPD 

offi cers, or LSP troopers.169 Th is increased the complexity of taking coordinated action.170
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453

Similar issues arose regarding agents’ powers to rescue residents trapped in their homes, 

or to conduct street patrols. For example, according to e-mails submitted by DOJ, a message – including an opinion from the offi ce of the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of 

Louisiana – addressing FBI agents’ authority regarding forced entries, forced evacuations, 

and rescues appeared on a password-protected website no earlier than September 10. On 

September 13, DOJ offi cials sought broader distribution of this message. As FBI Agent Kenneth Kaiser said, these kinds of issues “frustrated a lot of the agents,”171 and he felt like he 

“was holding back the reins on a horse.”172

Even today, it is unclear what sort of law-enforcement role DOJ envisions for federal lawenforcement offi cers in a natural-disaster scenario. In answers to the Committee’s questions, the DOJ stated that ESF-13 “does not extend to providing federal law enforcement 

personnel to ... enforce federal, state or local laws.”173 DOJ off ers as an example to illustrate 

the type of support it could provide under ESF-13 that if a state or local law-enforcement 

agency had suff ered the loss of communications equipment, it could submit a request for 

federal law-enforcement assets to the ESF-13 staff , who would evaluate it and then pass it 

on to the senior federal offi cial. In contrast, Michael Bouchard, ATF’s Assistant Director 

in Charge of Operations, believed that the requests would be passed from the NRCC to the 

IIMG.174 Special Agent in Charge of the Boston Field Offi ce Kenneth Kaiser, who has had 

substantial training on the NRP, including appointment as a PFO, expressed another view 

of the type of assistance contemplated by ESF-13, stating, “Th ere’s nothing in the ESF-13 

that says that the FBI or any DOJ or any law enforcement agency is responsible for supplying food and clothing for these people. ... ESF-13 does not address that at all. ESF-13 is 

a law-enforcement function and that’s what we did. Th e other functions, resupplying and 

stuff like that, that is not a law enforcement function.”175

According to DOJ, conferring the authority to enforce state and local laws on federal lawenforcement offi cers requires two steps. First, there must be a 42 U.S.C. § 10501 request for 

such assistance from a governor, and second, they must be deputized in accordance with the 

laws of the requesting state. Of course, federal law-enforcement offi cers could be deployed 

to a state without a gubernatorial request,176 in any event, and could undertake federal missions and provide support to local law enforcement, while their mere presence would go a 

long way towards preserving order and security in a panic-stricken city. In addition, they 

could have performed search and rescue, thus permitting the NOPD and the LSP to focus 

more on traditional law-enforcement tasks such as crowd control. Between September 1 

and September 3, DOJ law-enforcement components were in fact engaged in law-enforcement and search-and-rescue operations, including saving lives.177

 Th e DHS and DOJ’s confusion about their roles and authorities prevented the Departments 

from bringing the full weight of their resources to bear until roughly a week aft er landfall. 

It was not until the beginning of the second week that the federal agencies took action to 

establish a law-enforcement coordination center to track and coordinate arriving offi cers; 

designate offi cials to be in charge of that process; and arrange for deputization of federal 

offi cers by the states.

C. The Departments’ Failure to Designate Senior Federal Law-Enforcement Coordinators 

Until Nearly a Week After Landfall, If They Ever Did, Further Hindered Response Efforts

Further adding to the confusion created by the NRP’s joint delegation to DHS and DOJ of 

its ESF-13 responsibilities is another part of the NRP, which creates the position of Senior 

Federal Law Enforcement Offi cial (SFLEO). According to the NRP, the SFLEO “is the 

senior law enforcement offi cial from the agency with primary jurisdictional responsibility 

as directed by statute, Presidential directive, existing Federal policies, and/or the Attorney 

General.”178 Th e SFLEO directs intelligence/investigative law-enforcement operations in a 
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national incident, such as terrorism, a national-security special event, or disaster. Th e NRP 

states that “In the event of a terrorist incident, this offi cial will normally be the FBI SAC,”179

but it doesn’t specify who takes the post aft er a natural disaster. Th e jockeying for a law-enforcement position refl ects the failure to engage in pre-incident planning for a federal lawenforcement role, at least in response to a national disaster, and played a role in this delay.

Th e NRP off ers no insight into how the SFLEO is supposed to interact or coordinate with 

the ESF-13 agencies, or why two agencies are charged with primary and coordinating 

responsibility under ESF-13.180 Th ese ambiguities, as well as delay by both DHS and DOJ 

in designating a SFLEO, further contributed to the untimeliness of the federal public safety 

response and impeded the strategic coordination of incoming federal law-enforcement 

resources.181 It further refl ects the failure to engage in adequate, if any, pre-event planning 

for a federal law-enforcement role in response to a natural disaster.

Although FEMA and DHS appear to have considered the ESF-13 function activated two 

days prior to landfall, the eventual putative co-SFLEOs –Vanacore and FBI Special Agent 

Michael Wolf – were not identifi ed until September 5, almost a week aft er landfall. While 

the reasons for this delay remain unclear, the shared responsibility for ESF-13 between DOJ 

and DHS, and in-fi ghting within DHS,182 initially played a role.

Th e process by which DHS selected its prospective co-SFLEO is instructive as to the lack of 

defi nition. On September 2, ICE leadership told Vanacore that he would deploy to Louisiana 

to serve in a liaison capacity, though his exact duties remained unclear.183 In this capacity, any 

information he provided was sent to ICE, not to senior DHS leadership.184 He arrived in Baton Rouge late in the aft ernoon on September 4.185 Aft er he arrived in Baton Rouge he learned 

that he was made co-SFLEO, although without written designation.186 Th ough an experienced 

leader, he had no specifi c training on the NRP and no natural-disaster response experience.187

Vanacore determined that he could best contribute by assuming a coordination role.188

DOJ has been unclear in its statements to the Committee on the subject of SFLEO designation. According to Wolf, he assumed co-SFLEO responsibilities on September 4, but 

never received a formal designation; instead, he received his orders by telephone from the 

Bureau’s Executive Assistant Director for Criminal Investigations.189 Yet, William Mercer, 

DOJ’s Principal Associate Deputy Attorney General, stated in his Committee interview that 

the SFLEOs were self-selected.190 During a follow-up interview, he amplifi ed on his earlier 

statements, stating that SFLEOs were not designated during the response, and that the U.S. 

Attorney for the Eastern District of Louisiana retained coordinating control over law-enforcement assets and personnel in New Orleans pursuant to a memorandum signed by the 

Attorney General dated September 4.191

With the arrival of the co-SFLEOs, the law-enforcement management situation in Louisiana, especially New Orleans, improved signifi cantly, and local authorities were ultimately 

pleased with federal help, once it arrived.192

Vanacore and Wolf fulfi lled their duties ably, in part because they could establish a productive working relationship,193 but both noted that a single chain of command would have 

been more eff ective. Vanacore concluded, “You need one general in command. ... We managed this because everybody agreed to be managed. But that’s not the way to do things. ... 

You don’t run a war with co-generals.”194

D. Conclusion

While federal law-enforcement offi cers eventually provided enormous assistance to state 

and local governments in the Gulf Coast region, more forethought and planning would 
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have allowed them to provide greater and critically needed help when it was most needed 

– during the storm’s immediate aft ermath.

Perhaps testimony from Kenneth Kaiser, a former FBI Special Agent in Charge of the New 

Orleans Field Offi ce who volunteered to deploy to New Orleans on August 31, and who 

assumed responsibilities as the Bureau’s on-scene tactical commander, best summed up 

the lack of forethought by federal law enforcement planners. Kaiser had received Principal 

Federal Offi cer training under the NRP, and described himself as having received “as much 

training and crisis management exercis[ing] that probably anybody in the Bureau has ever 

[received].”195 According to this experienced offi cial, “I would have told you that prior to 

Katrina that there would be no way that the FBI would be as heavily involved in a natural 

disaster as we were down there. ... Post-Katrina, I would say there defi nitely is a law enforcement aspect to these natural disasters, in the worst-case scenario.”196

Th e Committee expects that this experience will prompt DOJ and DHS to engage in far better 

planning and coordination in anticipation of the next disaster.

1 Allen G. Breed, “Opportunists Help Th emselves, Sometimes in Front of Police,” BC Cycle, Aug. 30, 2005; “New 

Orleans probes police role in looting,” Th e Associated Press, Sept. 29, 2005, 8:43 p.m. ET. http:// www.msnbc.msn.

com/id/9535751/. Accessed on May 9, 2006. 

2 Scott Gold, Lianne Hart, and Stephen Braun, “Katrina’s Rising Toll,” Los Angeles Times, Sept. 1, 2005, Part A, p. 1.

3 Scott Gold, Alan Zarembo, and Stephen Braun, “Katrina’s Aft ermath; Guardsmen Arrive in New Orleans; Pace of 

Evacuations Is Stepped Up,” Los Angeles Times, Sept. 3, 2005, part A, p. 1.

4 Gold, Zarembo, and Braun, “Katrina’s Aft ermath,” part A, p. 1.

5 Joseph B. Treaster, “Police Quitting, Overwhelmed by Chaos,” Th e New York Times, Sept. 4, 2005, Section 1, p. 1.

6 Eddie Compass, Th e Oprah Winfrey Show, “Inside the Katrina Catastrophe,” Sept. 6, 2005. http://www.oprah.com/

tows/pastshows/200509/tows_past_20050906.jhtml. Accessed on Mar. 30, 2006.

7 Written Statement of Warren Riley, Superintendent, New Orleans Police Department, LA, for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Managing Law Enforcement and 

Communications in a Catastrophe, Feb. 6, 2006, p. 8. 

8 Committee staff interview of Lonnie Swain, Assistant Superintendent, New Orleans Police Department, LA, conducted 

on Nov. 9, 2005, transcript pp. 75-76; Committee staff interview of Warren Riley, Superintendent, New Orleans Police 

Department, LA, conducted on Jan. 12, 2006, transcript p. 34.

9 Committee staff interview of Jeff Glick, Chief, Critical Infrastructure Protection Division, National Communications 

System, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, conducted on Feb. 3, 2006, transcript p. 59. See also: Committee staff 

interview of Christopher Guttman-McCabe, Vice President for Regulatory Aff airs, Cellular Telecommunications and 

Internet Association, conducted on Jan. 24, 2006, transcript p. 25.

10 See: Chapter 8: Hurricane Pam: Warning Flag for Katrina.

11 Th e Oprah Winfrey Show, “Inside the Katrina Catastrophe,” Sept. 6, 2005. http://www.oprah.com/tows/pastshows/200509/tows_past_20050906.jhtml. Accessed on Mar. 30, 2006.

12 Mayor C. Ray Nagin, “Transcript of WWL-AM Radio with New Orleans’ Nagin,” Sept. 2, 2005. http://www.cnn.

com/2005/US/09/02/nagin.transcript/. Accessed on Mar. 20, 2006.

13 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan. Washington: Government Printing Offi ce, Dec. 

2004, p. ESF #13–1 [hereinaft er NRP].

14 Written Statement of Riley, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 6, 2006, p. 2.

15 Written Statement of Riley, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 6, 2006, p. 8. According to NOPD offi cials, approximately 65 have been terminated, 60 have resigned, 12 have been suspended, and 37 others were still subject to disciplinary 

proceedings at the time of interview. Swain interview, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 122; Riley interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 148.

16 FBI Special Agent in Charge Kenneth Kaiser provided a vivid picture of the status of the NOPD force:

Th ey were running out of ammunition. Th ey were running out of food and water. We were bringing 

them food and water. And we brought in our medical personnel to look at the people. Some of these 

people had been on duty since the hurricane, hadn’t heard from their wife and kids, hadn’t left their 
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post. Some of them were very ill. Th ey had fevers. ... A lot of them were wearing the same clothes they’d 

worn for seven, eight days. 

Committee staff interview of Kenneth Kaiser, Special Agent in Charge, Boston Field Offi ce, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), conducted on Jan. 25, 2006, transcript p. 29. See also: Riley interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 75; Committee staff 

interview of Col. Mark Oxley, Chief of Staff , Louisiana State Police, conducted on Dec. 9, 2005, transcript p. 253.

17 New Orleans Police Department, Initial (30-day) Aft er Action Report-Summary, p. 6. Provided to Committee [hereinaft er NOPD, Initial Aft er Action Report-Summary].

18 New Orleans Police Department Initial (30-day) Aft er Action Report, Report of Capt. Jeff rey J. Winn, Oct. 10, 2005, 

p. 2; Written Statement of Capt. Timothy Bayard, Commander, Vice Crimes and Narcotics Section, New Orleans Police 

Department, LA, for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Urban Search and Rescue in a Catastrophe, Jan. 30, 2006, p. 2. Captain Bayard described the problem in 

his aft er action report: “our biggest fl aw is the fact that we failed to communicate. ... Th e instructions and plans that are 

formed at the top are not clearly communicated to the rank and fi le. ... Th is causes confusion and misdirection. In the 

time of crisis our leaders need to be SEEN and HEARD.” New Orleans Police Department, Initial (30-day) Aft er Action 

Report, Report of Capt. Timothy Bayard, Oct. 16, 2005, p. 4. Provided to Committee [hereinaft er Capt. Bayard, Initial 

Aft er Action Report, Oct. 16, 2005].

19 New Orleans Police Department, Initial (30-day) Aft er Action Report, Report of Capt. Jeff rey J. Winn, Oct. 10, 2005, 

p. 2. Provided to Committee [hereinaft er Capt. Winn, Initial Aft er Action Report, Oct. 10, 2005]; NOPD, Initial Aft er 

Action Report-Summary, pp. 4, 6.

20 Capt. Winn, Initial Aft er Action Report, Oct. 10, 2005, p. 2.

21 Kaiser interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 29.

22 Riley interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 75.

23 New Orleans Police Department, Emergency Operations Manual, 2005, p. 13–3. Provided to Committee [hereinaft er 

NOPD, Emergency Operations Manual, 2005].

24 Committee staff interview of Capt. Paul Hellmers, Captain, Engine 18, Second Platoon, Fift h District, New Orleans 

Fire Department, LA and Capt. Joe Fincher, Engine 18, Th ird Platoon, Fift h District, New Orleans Fire Department, LA, 

conducted on Nov. 7, 2005, transcript pp. 12-13, 16; New Orleans Fire Department, 2005 Hurricane Guidelines, p. 2–1. 

Provided to Committee [hereinaft er NOFD, 2005 Hurricane Guidelines]. 

25 NOFD, 2005 Hurricane Guidelines, pp. A2–1 through A5–2, A7–1. 

26 NOPD, Emergency Operations Manual, 2005, p. 13–3.

27 Committee staff interview of Lt. Col. Mark Oxley, Chief of Staff , Louisiana State Police, and Lt. Col. Joseph Booth, 

Deputy Superintendent, Crisis Response and Special Operations, Louisiana State Police, conducted on Dec. 9, 2005, 

transcript pp. 251-253.

28 NOPD, Initial Aft er Action Report-Summary, p. 6 (Th is was noted by 12 offi cers, or 46.1% of respondents.). 

29 NOPD, Initial Aft er Action Report-Summary, p. 6 (Th is was noted by 10 offi cers, or 38.4% of respondents.).

30 Committee staff interview of Warren Riley, Superintendent, New Orleans Police Department, LA, conducted on Dec. 

20, 2005, transcript p. 49.

31 Testimony of Warren Riley, Superintendent, New Orleans Police Department, LA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee 

on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Managing Law Enforcement and Communications in a Catastrophe, Feb. 6, 2006; Riley interview, Dec. 20, 2006, pp. 45-51.

32 Maj. Damian K. Waddell, memorandum for Joint Force Headquarters Louisiana, Feb. 7, 2006. Provided to Committee. See also: Chad Michael Lynch, Louisiana Army National Guard, sworn statement, Feb. 8, 2006. Provided to Committee; Robert John Th reeton, Louisiana Army National Guard, sworn statement, Feb. 8, 2006. Provided to Committee; 

David S. Silva, Louisiana Army National Guard, sworn statement, Feb. 8, 2006. Provided to Committee; Edward M. 

Knight, Louisiana Army National Guard, sworn statement, Feb. 9, 2006; Louisiana Army National Guard, high water 

vehicle list with assigned drivers. Provided to Committee; Col. Jonathan T. Ball, memorandum for the record, “Request 

for ‘High Water’ Trucks,” Feb. 8, 2006. Provided to Committee.

33 Capt. Winn, Initial Aft er Action Report, Oct. 10, 2005, p. 2; Riley interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 119 (“As it relates to 

food, food has never, ever been an issue. Most offi cers pack their own lunch, bring their own food, and prepare for the 

storm. ... If you talk about a fl ood of this proportion for 14 days, then absolutely food and water was a defi nite issue.”); 

Capt. Bayard, Initial Aft er Action Report, Oct. 16, 2005, p. 2.

34 New Orleans Police Department, Initial (30-day) Aft er Action Report, Report of Capt. Juan Quinton, p. 3. Provided 

to Committee. 

35 Committee staff interview of Capt. Timothy Bayard, Commander, Vice Crimes and Narcotics Section, New Orleans 

Police Department, LA, conducted on Nov. 21, 2005, transcript pp. 93-94.

36 Riley interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 25.

37 Riley interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 34.
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457

38 Swain interview, Nov. 9, 2005, pp. 77-78 (Mr. Swain related the incident in detail during his committee interview: 

Th ere was a man in one of the locker rooms who was apparently looking for a place to use the rest room. “I think he may 

have had a stick or something in his hand, or whatever. I think the Guardsman went to approach him to determine what 

[he was] doing. ... Th e fl oors were extremely slippery from the water and the much and everything else. ... Apparently 

when the Guardsman approached, there was two Guardsmen, the one in the front, as they approached the guy, I don’t 

know if this guy stood up from a squatting position or whatever. But the Guardsman in the front stepped back. When he 

stepped back , the Guardsman behind him apparently attempted to step back and slipped. As he was slipping, he had his 

gun apparently, his fi nger on the trigger, and his weapon discharged, hitting him in the leg.”). 

39 Riley interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 35. 

40 Committee staff interview of Ronald L. Martin, Deputy Commander, Management Support Team, National Disaster 

Medical System, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), conducted on Jan. 13, 2006, transcript pp. 92-97; 

Committee staff interview of Marty Bahamonde, Regional Director, External Aff airs, Region I, FEMA, conducted on 

Oct. 7, 2005, transcript pp. 200-201; Committee staff interview of Kevin Stephens, MD., Director, New Orleans Health 

Department, LA, conducted on Nov. 10, 2005, transcript pp. 50-63. 

41 Committee staff interview of David Webb, Program Specialist, Program Offi ce, National Search and Rescue, Urban 

Search and Rescue Response System, FEMA, conducted on Feb. 7, 2006, transcript pp. 58-61; Committee staff interview 

of James Strickland, Team Member, Urban Search and Rescue, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 25, 2006, transcript p. 91.

42 Douglas Crow, e-mail to Matthew Friedrich, Sept. 1, 2005, 6:58 p.m. Provided to Committee (discussing in part alleged carjackings on the road from New Orleans to Baton Rouge. FBI Special Agent in Charge Kenneth Kaiser also spoke 

of such fears in the context of power company trucks sustaining gunfi re; the police also chased one truck involved in a 

highjacking.).

43 Kaiser interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 59; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Hurricane Katrina DHS SitRep #23, Sept. 

6, 2005, 6 p.m., pp. 9, 12, 14, 20. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS 0001487, 0001490, 0001492, 0001498.

44 Riley interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 125.

45 Committee staff interview of Eddie Compass, then-Superintendent, New Orleans Police Department, LA, conducted 

on Jan. 12, 2006, transcript p. 31.

46 Riley interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 31.

47 NOPD, Emergency Operations Manual, 2005, pp. 2-3, 13-12.

48 Riley interview, Dec. 20, 2005, p. 33.

49 Compass interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 9-12.

50 Riley interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 127-128.

51 Compass interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 128. Compass offi cially resigned from the NOPD on Oct. 31, 2005.

52 Riley interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 127.

53 Riley interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 127-129. 

54 Dan Baum, “Deluged,” Th e New Yorker, Jan. 9, 2006, p. 54; Bayard interview, Nov. 21, 2005, pp. 46, 50. 

55 NOPD, Initial Aft er Action Report-Summary, p. 14. 

56 New Orleans Police Department, Initial (30-day) Aft er Action Report, Report of Capt. Robert Norton, Oct. 10, 2005, 

pp. 2-3.

57 Capt. Winn, Initial Aft er Action Report, Oct. 10, 2005.

58 Capt. Winn, Initial Aft er Action Report, Oct. 10, 2005.

59 Capt. Winn, Initial Aft er Action Report, Oct. 10, 2005.

60 Capt. Winn, Initial Aft er Action Report, Oct. 10, 2005.

61 Riley interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 39-40.

62 Riley interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 39-40.

63 Riley interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 40.

64 Compass interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 126.

65 Riley interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 44.

66 Riley interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 38.

67 NOPD, Initial Aft er Action Report-Summary, p. 11.

68 Riley interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 38.

69 Committee staff interview of James Bernazzani, Special Agent in Charge, New Orleans Division, FBI, conducted on 

Jan. 25, 2006, transcript p. 88.

70 FBI, New Orleans Command Post, Baton Rouge, LA., Daily SitRep, Sept. 4, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates nos. FBI 000000127 through 000000130.
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71 Eddie Compass, Th e Oprah Winfrey Show, “Inside the Katrina Catastrophe,” Sept. 6, 2005. http://www.oprah.com/

tows/pastshows/200509/tows_past_20050906.jhtml. Accessed on Mar. 30, 2006.

72 Mayor C. Ray Nagin, Th e Oprah Winfrey Show, “Inside the Katrina Catastrophe,” Sept. 6, 2005. http://www.oprah.

com/tows/pastshows/200509/tows_past_20050906.jhtml. Accessed on Mar. 30, 2006.

73 Th ere was one attempted rape. Source: Riley interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 34-35. Th ere were 11 deaths at the Superdome, one was determined to have been a suicide. None were determined to be homicides. Th ere was one gunshot injury 

involving a National Guardsman inside the Superdome which was determined to have been an accidental shooting. 

Source: Swain interview, Nov. 9, 2005, pp. 77-78.

74 NOPD, Emergency Operations Manual, 2005, p. 1–6.

75 Riley interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 133.

76 Th e NOPD’s plan regarding press conferences and the release of information to the public required two levels of approval. While the PIO, as noted above, is tasked with responsibilities including release of information on authority of the 

Incident Commander and scheduling of media briefi ngs as necessary, the plan also states that, “A media press room ... 

shall issue statements only with the permission from the Mayor’s Public Information Offi ce. Statements and decisions relating to the emergency shall emanate only from the Mayor and may be released only through the Public Information Offi cer.” 

NOPD, Emergency Operations Manual, 2005, p. 15–1 (emphasis in original).

77 Lt. Col. Oxley and Lt. Col. Booth interview, Dec. 9, 2005, p. 7.

78 Lt. Col. Oxley and Lt. Col. Booth interview, Dec. 9, 2005, pp. 14-24; Th e LSP is also the primary agency responsible 

under the State’s plan for hazardous materials, and took steps before landfall to coordinate the removal or protection of 

dangerous materials. Troopers supported search-and-rescue missions, including rescuing 500 victims on their own. Lt. 

Col. Oxley interview, Dec. 9, 2005, p. 233.

79 Written Statement of Brig. Gen. Mark Graham, U.S. Army, Deputy Commanding General, Fift h U.S. Army, for the 

U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Managing the 

Crisis and Evacuating New Orleans, Feb. 1, 2006, pp. 2-4.

80 Committee staff interview of Col. Henry Whitehorn, Superintendent, Louisiana State Police and Deputy Secretary, 

Public Safety Services and Corrections, LA, conducted on Nov. 29, 2005, transcript p. 106. 

81 Lt. Col. Oxley and Lt. Col. Booth interview, Dec. 9, 2005, p. 240.

82 Lt. Col. Oxley and Lt. Col. Booth interview, Dec. 9, 2005, pp. 287-288.

83 Lt. Col. Oxley and Lt. Col. Booth interview, Dec. 9, 2005, pp. 201-202.

84 Lt. Col. Oxley and Lt. Col. Booth interview, Dec. 9, 2005, p. 243; Louisiana State Police, LSP Hurricane Katrina Timeline of Events. Provided to Committee.

85 Lt. Col. Booth interview, Dec. 9, 2005, pp. 245-246.

86 Lt. Col. Oxley and Lt. Col. Booth interview, Dec. 9, 2005, pp. 250, 287.

87 Lt. Col. Oxley and Lt. Col. Booth interview, Dec. 9, 2005, pp. 287-98.

88 Col. Henry Whitehorn, letter to Robert Mueller, Aug. 30, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DAG 

000000001 through 000000002. 

89 Th e Whitehorn letter was faxed to Bill Mercer by Jon Solomon, FBI, on Aug. 31, 2005, at 7:12 p.m. Jon Solomon, 

facsimile to Bill Mercer, Aug. 21, 2005, 7:21 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DAG 000000001 through 

000000002. See also: James McAtamney, e-mail to Bill Mercer and others, Aug. 31, 2005, 8:18 a.m. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates nos. 000000019 through 0000000020 (enclosing an attached fi le describing the impact on Hurricane Katrina 

on DOJ component agencies. Th e FBI section reports that the “Louisiana State Police (LSP) has indicated a formal request 

for FBI assistance is forthcoming. LSP is assisting the New Orleans PD, which has been signifi cantly impacted. Looting is 

the major problem. Reporting indicates that the National Guard is predominately engaged in search and rescue. We will 

coordinate our response with the Department.”). In an e-mail to McAtamney on Aug. 31, 2005, in which at 8:32 a.m., Edgar 

Domenech, ATF wrote: “I assume the department will be looking to implement a departmental response, let me know what 

you need.” Source: Edgar Domenech, e-mail to James A. McAtamney, Aug. 31, 2005, 8:32 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led 

as Bates. no. DAG 000000014. McAtamney then wrote to Mercer and others, “Deputy Director Domenech from ATF raises 

a good point. Is a plan in place to coordinate the departmental eff ort in support of these offi ces? I think it would be helpful 

to add any information on our plans going forward to the update paper for the AG.” Source: James A. McAtamney, e-mail 

to Paul Corts and others, Aug. 31, 2005, 8:44 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DAG 000000014.

90 Lt. Col. Oxley and Lt. Col. Booth interview, Dec. 9, 2005, pp. 237-38.

91 Lt. Col. Booth interview, Dec. 9, 2005, p. 239.

92 Lt. Col. Oxley and Lt. Col. Booth interview, Dec. 9, 2005, pp. 253, 257, 291.

93 “Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act,” LA R.S. 29:733. 

94 Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP), Emergency Operations Plan, Apr. 

2005, pp. 14-15.

95 Gov. Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, letter to Gov. Jeb Bush, Sept. 1, 2005, attachment “Memorandum of Understanding 

Between Th e State of Louisiana and Th e State of Florida.” As discussed in Chapter 26: Military Operations, other states 
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began sending Military Police on Wednesday, Aug. 31, 2005, at Maj. Gen. Landreneau’s request to the National Guard 

Bureau.

96 Committee staff interview of Col. Steven Dabadie, Chief of Staff , Louisiana National Guard, conducted on Jan. 12, 

2006, transcript p. 146. 

97 Committee staff interview of Col. Earl Santos, Joint Director of Military Support, Louisiana National Guard, conducted on Dec. 21, 2005, transcript pp. 34, 54, 93.

98 Riley interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 90.

99 Kaiser interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 66.

100 As the 9/11 Commission Report noted:

Yet the Pentagon response encountered diffi culties that echo those experienced in New York. As the 

“Arlington County: Aft er Action Report” notes, there were signifi cant problems with both self-dispatching and communications: “Organizations, response units, and individuals proceeding on their 

own initiative directly to an incident site, without the knowledge and permission of the host jurisdiction 

and the Incident Commander, complicate the exercise of command, increase the risk faced by bonafi de 

responders, and exacerbate the challenge of accountability. ... 

It is a fair inference, given the diff ering situations in New York City and Northern Virginia, that the 

problems in command, control and communications that occurred at both sites will likely recur in 

any emergency of similar scale. Th e task looking forward is to enable fi rst responders to respond in a 

coordinated manner with the greatest possible awareness of the situation.

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Th e 9/11 Commission Report. Washington: Government Printing Offi ce, 2004, p. 315. 

101 Col. Whitehorn interview, Nov. 29, 2005, pp. 111-112.

102 Riley interview, Jan. 12, 2006, p. 90.

103 Riley interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 91-92 (“Everyone who came and worked under the command of NOPD, ranking 

offi cers, all SR team members worked under Captain Wynn, Captain Norton. We basically divided everyone up. ... But 

the State Police, New York State Police, everyone who came in – for instance, some of the offi cers when they came in 

from around the state, they were assigned to districts. And they worked under our district commanders. And their commanders fully understood that if there was ever an issue, then, obviously, their commander would deal with ours. But 

everyone worked at the direction of NOPD commanders, even the National Guard.”).

104 Col. Whitehorn interview, Nov. 29, 2005, p. 96. Lt. Col. Booth noted that in the State Police EOC, “We had other 

jurisdictions at our request. ... California had, I would say, 24-hour presence ... with us. New Orleans Police Department or the City of New Orleans requested assistance from various other agencies, I think through the EMAC process. 

We had the port authority from New York/New Jersey.” Lt. Col. Booth interview, Dec. 9, 2005, p. 100.

105 Although Governor’s Blanco’s request letter is dated Sept. 3, it was not faxed to DOJ until Sept. 4. Gov. Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, letter to Alberto R. Gonzales, Sept. 3, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DAG 

000000081 through 000000082. 

106 See e.g.: FEMA, Mission Assignment, 1603DR-LA-FPS-05, Sept. 2, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 

DHS-FEMA-0035-0000147; FEMA, Mission Assignment, 1603DR-LA-FPS-05, Aug. 31, 2005. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0035-0000148; FEMA, Mission Assignment, 1603DR-LA-CBP-01, Sept. 2, 2005. Provided 

to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0000551.

107 NRP, p. ESF#13–1. 

108 McAtamney’s memorandum said, “there have been no additional requests for federal law enforcement assistance 

from state or local offi cials, to my knowledge.” Source: James A. McAtamney, memorandum to Ted Ullyot and Bill 

Mercer, Sept. 1, 2005, routing and transmittal slip. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DAG 0000000101. At the 

time he wrote this, DOJ had already received the LSP Superintendent’s letter to FBI Director Robert Mueller. Th at letter 

reported “massive damage” caused by the Hurricane, that “all state assets” were being used, but that “looting continue[d] 

to be a signifi cant problem,” and it requested “any assistance you can provide.” Source: Col. Henry Whitehorn, letter to 

Robert Mueller, Aug. 30, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DAG 000000001 through 000000002. It is also 

unclear what position DOJ took regarding this request in light of 42 U.S.C. § 10501, which requires that an application 

for law enforcement assistance in an emergency “shall be submitted in writing by the chief executive offi ce of a state to 

the Attorney General.” Source: 43 U.S.C. § 10501(b). Governor Blanco sent such a letter to the Attorney General (dated 

September 3, 2005), via facsimile on September 4, 2005, but the Superintendent’s letter clearly made a similar request 

four days earlier. Source: Gov. Kathleen Blanco, letter to Alberto R. Gonzales, Sept. 3, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led 

as Bates nos. DAG 000000081 through 000000083. 

109 James A. McAtamney, memorandum to Ted Ullyot and Bill Mercer, Sept. 1, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led 

as Bates nos. DAG 000000101 through 000000106. Mercer included a question in the margin of the attached excerpt. 

McAtamney sent a memorandum in response to the question on September 12. James A. MacAtamney, memorandum 

to Bill Mercer, Sept. 12, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DAG 000000100. Th us, Mercer fi rst made note 

of these questions about ESF-13 at some time between September 1 and September 12.

110 Michael Vanacore, e-mail to John Clark and others, Sept. 4, 2005, 7:38 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 
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DHS-ICE1-0001-0000026. See also: John Clark, e-mail to Matthew Broderick, Sept. 4, 2005, 10:34 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-HSOC-0004-0003339 (“Having failed in many aspects on preparation, emergency assistance 

and recovery, if we now turn our homeland security responsibility over to the FBI/DOJ, we might as well all await 3SR.”). 

“3SR” is an apparent sarcastic reference to the “Second Stage Review (2SR),” through which Secretary Chertoff made substantial changes to DHS’s structure and staffi ng. 

111 John Clark, e-mail to Matthew Broderick, Sept. 4, 2005, 10:34 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHSHSOC-0004-0003339.

112 Committee staff interview of Matthew Broderick, Director, Homeland Security Operations Center, U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security, conducted on Jan. 19, 2006, transcript pp. 208-209.

113 Broderick interview, Jan. 19, 2006, p. 208.

114 Broderick interview, Jan. 19, 2006, pp. 209.

115 Th e White House report recommends that the NRP be revised to designate DOJ as the sole primary agency responsible 

for ESF-13. U.S. Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, Th e Federal Response to Hurricane 

Katrina: Lessons Learned. Washington: Government Printing Offi ce, Feb. 2006, p. 102.

116 Secretary Chertoff ’s Chief of Staff , John Wood, did not recall any discussions by or with the Secretary on pre-landfall 

ESF-13 action by DHS and did not know who within DHS was tasked with this responsibility. He only recalled that, at 

some point, apparently post-landfall, there were discussions about how best to utilize DHS law-enforcement assets. Source: 

Committee staff interview of John Wood, Chief of Staff , U.S. Department of Homeland Security, conducted on Jan. 27, 

2006, transcript pp. 56-57. A DHS twice daily Sit Rep from the morning of August 30 contains a “Law Enforcement Issues” 

section broken into local, regional, and federal boxes. All list “Nothing to report” Source: U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security, Hurricane Katrina DHS SitRep #8, Aug. 30, 2005, 6 a.m., p. 7. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS 

00001209. Th e section entitled ESF-13 merely noted the availability of fi ve FEMA “safety offi cers” and the draft ing of a 

document regarding “Dangerous Critters & Plants in the Gulf Coast.” Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 

Hurricane Katrina DHS SitRep #8, Aug. 30, 2005, 6 a.m., p. 21. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS 0001222 

(Th is same Situation Report includes extensive details of activities undertaken pursuant to other ESFs.). When asked about 

this document, Wood said that he “strongly” suspected that more was being done than was listed, but could not identify 

anything. Source: Wood interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 101-102. 

117 Committee staff interview of Michael Jackson, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, conducted on 

Jan. 27, 2006, transcript pp. 69-71.

118 Jackson interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 69-71.

119 Jackson interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 69-70.

120 Committee staff interview of Michael Vanacore, Director, Offi ce of International Aff airs, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, conducted on Jan. 27, 2006, transcript p. 8. During his fi rst three days in Baton Rouge, “a lot of it seemed to 

be in a foreign language there because that whole National Response Plan had a language all its own, which I had never 

heard up until that point.” Vanacore interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 35.

121 Vanacore interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 13-14.

122 Vanacore interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 34.

123 Vanacore interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 50.

124 Vanacore interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 89.

125 Vanacore interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 108.

126 Vanacore interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 8.

127 Vanacore interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 108.

128 James A. McAtamney, memorandum to Ted Ullyot and Bill Mercer, Sept. 1, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. DAG 000000103.

129 James McAtamney, e-mail to Bill Mercer, Sept. 1, 2005, 2:06 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DAG 

00000065.

130 James McAtamney, e-mail to Bill Mercer, Sept. 1, 2005, 2:06 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DAG 

00000065. DOJ previously designated ATF to serve as the Department’s ESF-13 coordinator in the event of a natural disaster. Source: Committee staff interview of Michael R. Bouchard, Assistant Director for Field Operations, Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, conducted on Jan. 24, 2006, transcript pp. 8-9. While the FBI took the lead in the fi eld, 

this is not necessarily an internal inconsistency, but rather may be an administrative decision about how best to allocate the 

available leadership.

131 NRP, p. ESF #13–3; Committee staff interview of Lt. Cmdr. Brian Penoyer, U.S. Coast Guard, Operations Integration 

Staff , U.S. Department of Homeland Security, conducted on Mar. 2, 2006, transcript p. 68.

132 Michael Brown, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 28, 2005, transcript p. 36. Provided to Committee.

133 NRP, p. ESF #13–1.

134 Kyle Sampson, e-mail to Kimberly Smith, Brian Roehrkasse, William Mercer and Ted Ullyot, Sept. 1, 2005, 6:24 p.m. 

Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DAG 000000185 (noted eleven FBI agents, zero DEA agents, twenty-fi ve ATF 
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agents, and nine USMS personnel available.). While there were federal law enforcement personnel in Baton Rouge, within 

an hour’s drive or otherwise en route to the area, their readiness and availability for operational missions was severely compromised by the same kind of limitations faced by others in the city. See, e.g.: Bernazzani interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 25-28, 

34. Consistent with an evacuation plan, Agent Bernazzani evacuated all of his agents except for himself and three volunteers 

to protect the fi eld offi ce’s classifi ed information, communications systems, weapons and ammunition. Source: Bernazzani 

interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 19-21. However, as of September 1, fi ft y-one employees of the New Orleans-based Field Offi ce 

could not be located. Source: Bernazzani interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 25-28. Reconstitution eff orts were further hampered 

by local evacuation and continuity of operations plans that relied upon cell phone coordination amongst agents and the 

Field Offi ce’s own telecommunications hub, which was decimated. Source: Bernazzani interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 25.

135 Offi ce of the Attorney General, OAG Request Hurricane Katrina FBI personnel, Nov. 16, 2005. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates no. SEPS 0000000045.

136 While it was prudent for the agents working in the fi eld offi ce to evacuate in the teeth of the storm in accordance with 

their pre-arranged plan, discussions within the agency that reviewed the FBI’s response aft er the fact focused at least in part 

on the inadequacy of the FBI’s ability to locate its forces in the aft ermath of a catastrophe in the absence of local telephone 

communications. Source: Kaiser interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 90-91, 97-98. Agents Kaiser and Bernazzani both participated 

in discussions with the Crisis Incident Response Group (CIRG) that evaluated the agency’s response. Source: Kaiser interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 97; Bernazzani interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 67 (discussing “two or three meetings down at CIRG.”). 

However, the DOJ never provided any aft er action report or similar document to the Committee.

137 Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, Situation Report for ESF-13, Sept. 6, 2005, 10:08 a.m. Provided 

to Committee; fi led as Bates no. ATF000000002.

138 Th e NOPD had a strength of approximately 1,600 police offi cers. Source: Written Statement of Riley, Senate Committee 

hearing, Feb. 6, 2006, p. 2. Th e LSP has approximately 1,050 troopers. Source: Lt. Col. Oxley interview, Dec. 9, 2005, p. 7.

139 See: Chapter 26: Military Operations and Chapter 27: Failures in the National Response Plan.

140 For example, when ATF sought guidance on September 1 regarding requests from local offi cials for assistance with 

crowd control and other missions, a senior DOJ leader cautioned the ATF not to act without PFO coordination specifi cally 

because of reported deployment by the National Guard of 4,200 military police for civil duty. James McAtamney, e-mail to 

William Mercer, Th eodore Ullyot, and Jeff rey Taylor, “Requests for Federal Law Enforcement Support,” Sept. 1, 2005, 11:39 

a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DAG000000290.

141 Committee staff interview of Lt. Gen. Steven Blum, U.S. Army, Chief, National Guard Bureau, U.S. Department of 

Defense, conducted on Jan. 19, 2006, transcript pp. 52-53. According to Lt. Gen. Blum, these deployments restored a signifi -

cant degree of order by September 1, and that things were basically under control by September 2. Lt. Gen. Blum interview, 

Jan. 19, 2006, p. 81.

142 See: Chapter 26: Military Operations; Maj. Gen. Richard Rowe, e-mail to Maj. Gen. Th omas Miller and others, Aug. 31, 

2005, 7:46 a.m. Provided to Committee, fi led as Bates no. MMTF 00088-06 (recommending that Department look at “‘what 

if’ MAC DIS [Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances] required.”). For more discussion of MACDIS and the Insurrection 

Act, see Chapter 26: Military Operations. ESF#13, in fact, includes a provision for “the event that State and local police forces 

(including the National Guard operating under State control) are unable to adequately respond to a civil disturbance or 

other serious law enforcement emergency,” the state may request assistance under the Insurrection Act. NRP, p. ESF #13–2.

143 As of landfall, the Federal Protective Service (FPS), a small force within DHS had deployed 40 offi cers into New 

Orleans to protect federal buildings. FPS’s mission to secure federal buildings and infrastructure and to provide security to 

FEMA during disasters may have prompted the Service to move directly into the city more rapidly than any other federal 

law-enforcement entity. Committee staff interview of Wendell Shingler, Director, Offi ce of Federal Protective Service, U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security, conducted on Jan. 31, 2006, transcript pp. 17-19, 29.

144 As early as Sunday, August 28, 2005, the Customs and Border Patrol placed a contingent of 100 agents, drawn from its 

Border Patrol Search, Trauma, and Rescue (BORSTAR) teams and other specialized units, on standby. Source: Customs and 

Border Protection, Commissioner’s Situation Room Report, Aug. 29, 2005, 2:30 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

nos. DHS-CBP1-0001-0000002 through 00000003. BORSTAR teams are “highly specialized units capable of responding 

to emergency search and rescue situations. ... Th ese teams ... undergo a highly specialized regimen consisting of training 

in physical fi tness and training in various other disciplines, including medial skills, technical rescue, navigation, communications, swift water rescue and air operations.” Source: U.S. Customs and Border Protection, “BORSTAR,” June 9, 2003. 

http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/border_patrol/borstar/borstar.xml. Accessed on May 5, 2006.

145 Vanacore interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 9-12.

146 Marcy Forman, e-mail to John P. Clark, Aug. 28, 2005, 12:50 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 

DHS-ICE1-0002-0000650 (advising him that she has heard from New Orleans SAC Mike Holt and he is “on his way to 

Baltimore.”). See also: George Forman, e-mail to John P. Clark and others, Sept. 1, 2005, 3:45 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-ICE1-0002-0000551 (discussing SAC Holt’s travel plans to return to the New Orleans region 

on Friday, September 2, 2005.); John P. Clark, e-mail to Gary Lang, Matthew Broderick, Bob Stephan and others, Sept. 

3, 2005, 4:38 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-HSOC-0004-0003933 through 0003934 (“SAC Mike 

Holt had been out of the area but got back into New Orleans on Friday [September 2, 2005] and has been designated by 

DHS as the DHS law enforcement coordinator, assigned to specifi cally work with the New Orleans Mayor and Police 

Chief to assist with establishing law and order in the city area.”).

147 NRP, p. ESF #13–1 (ESF-13 “integrates Federal public safety and security capabilities and resources to support the 
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full range of incident management activities associated with potential or actual Incidents of National Signifi cance.” It 

“provides a mechanism for coordinating Federal-to-Federal or Federal support to State and local authorities to include 

non-investigative/non-criminal law enforcement, public safety, and security capabilities during potential or actual 

Incidents of National Signifi cance.” It “generally is activated in situations requiring extensive assistance to provide public 

safety and security and where State and local government resources are overwhelmed or inadequate, or in pre-incident 

or post-incident situations that require . . . capabilities unique to the Federal Government.”). 

148 42 U.S.C. § 10501 provides that a state “may submit an application under this section for Federal law enforcement 

assistance,” and that “an application for assistance under this section shall be submitted in writing by the chief executive 

offi cer of a State to the Attorney General, in a form prescribed by rules issued by the Attorney General.” “Th e Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.” (P.L. 98-473), 42 U.S.C. § 10501. Th e Attorney General may consult as necessary 

with Department offi cials and has 10 days to respond. Despite DOJ’s belief that this statute governed its response to 

Hurricane Katrina, the legislative history suggests that this section is an alternative to the Staff ord Act, to be used in situations that do not satisfy the criteria of a “major disaster” under the Staff ord Act:

For decades, the Federal government has provided emergency assistance in response to natural disasters 

to units of State and local government. Communities devastated by hurricanes, tornadoes, fl oods and 

other similar calamities have benefi ted from coordinated federal response to these emergencies. 42 

U.S.C. § 5152 et. seq. [Staff ord Act]. Th ere is, however, no coordinated Federal response to the existence 

of a man-made disaster. Similarly, Federal law enforcement offi cers are authorized to intervene in riots, 

but there is not [sic] organized mechanism for responding in a less blunt way.

Rep. William J. Hughes, U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary, Report on the “Justice Assistance Act of 1983,” Report 

No. 98-68, 98th Cong. 1st Sess., p. 8.

149 42 U.S.C. § 10501. Th e term “law enforcement emergency” is defi ned as “an uncommon situation which requires law 

enforcement, which is or threatens to become of serious or epidemic proportions, and with respect to which State and local 

resources are inadequate to protect the lives and property of citizens or to enforce the criminal law.” 42 U.S.C. § 10502(3).

150 Th e fi rst indication in DOJ documents that a governor’s letter was required occurred on Th ursday, September 1, 

2005. Shortly before noon, James McAtamney sent an e-mail to Bill Mercer and others to advise them that the ATF was 

“getting requests for agents for crowd control, etc.” Mercer, in turn, forwarded this e-mail to Steve Bradbury, commenting that he was “not sure how Steve [Bradbury] will view our legal authority to accommodate this request. From an 

operations standpoint, I’d rather have ATF redeploy to other areas to enforce the fi rearms laws.” Source: James A. McAtamney, e-mail to Bill Mercer, Th eodore Ullyot, and Jeff rey Taylor, Sept. 1, 2005, 12:39 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led 

as Bates no. DAG000000290. Bradbury replied:

Th ere is not currently a written request from the governor to the AG to provide DOJ assistance to state 

and local law enforcement. We would not approve this state law enforcement activity until there is such 

a request and the AG has issued an order approving the request. ATF could move forward with preparations and pre-positioning but should not actually begin state law enforcement without such an order. 

Steve Bradbury, e-mail to Bill Mercer, Th eodore Ullyot, Jeff rey Taylor, Sept. 1, 2005, 12:03 p.m. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates no. DAG 000000290.

151 42 U.S.C. § 10501. See also: Committee staff interview of William Mercer, Principal Associate Deputy Attorney 

General, Offi ce of the Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, conducted on Jan. 26, 2006, transcript pp. 29-30 

(“But I guess if the question is how did the requests come in, let me turn to those. Because that’s a very signifi cant part 

of the Federal statute here. In Title 42 – and I think the provision is 42 USC 10501 – a governor, not a state attorney 

general, not a mayor – a governor can ask the Attorney General of the United States to deploy Federal law enforcement 

resources if the governor makes a proff er saying, ‘We can’t meet the responsibilities that we need to carry out for public 

safety, and I request that you deploy Federal resources to assist.’ And we got a letter from Governor Barbour on Saturday 

the 3rd. And we responded that same day. It was faxed in on the 3rd, we met with the Attorney General on Saturday. He 

issued the order on Saturday. ... And Governor Blanco faxed us a letter the next day.”).

152 Col. Henry Whitehorn, letter to Robert Mueller, Aug. 30, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DAG 

000000001 through 000000002.

153 Col. Henry Whitehorn, letter to Robert Mueller, Aug. 30, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DAG 

000000001 through 000000002.

154 See: NRP, p. ESF #13–1.

155 Internal documents show on the morning of September 6, two days aft er DOJ received, and the Attorney General 

approved, Governor Blanco’s letter requesting law enforcement assistance, a total of 694 DOJ personnel were in the “disaster area.” Source: Situation Report for ESF-13, Sept. 6, 2005, 10:08 a.m., produced by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 

Firearms and Explosives. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. ATF000000002. Based on other documents produced 

by DOJ, the committee identifi ed approximately 520 DOJ law enforcement personnel who were deployed to Louisiana as 

of September 3, 2005, the day before DOJ received Governor Blanco’s letter. Th e number of DOJ personnel deployed on 

September 3 represents 75% of the number available on September 6. Source: William E. Moschella, letter to the Honorable Susan M. Collins and the Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman, Response to Request for Information Dated Oct. 7, 2005, 

Dec. 21, 2005; Edgar Domenech, e-mail to Bill Mercer, Sept. 2, 2005, 4:51 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

nos. DAG 000000322 through 000000323; FBI, New Orleans Command Post, Baton Rouge, LA., Daily SitRep, Sept. 3, 

2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. FBI 000000133, 
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156 Even without 42 U.S.C. § 10501 request letter from a governor, the Attorney General has the authority to re-deploy 

federal agents through the states to execute federal missions. In addition, the Staff ord Act authorizes federal agencies, upon 

direction of the President following a major disaster declaration, to “provide assistance,” including “any work or services essential to saving lives and protecting or preserving property and public health and safety,” without a request from a governor 

(Sec. 7170(c)). Source: “Robert T. Staff ord Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.” (P.L. 93-288), 42 U.S.C. § 5170(b). 

Th e DOJ acknowledged in its interrogatory responses that it had authority to provide public safety support under this 

provision. Source: William E. Moschella, letter to the Honorable Susan M. Collins and the Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman, 

Response to Request for Information Dated Oct. 7, 2005, Nov. 23, 2005, p. 3. However, it is unclear whether the President 

contemplated or directed the Attorney General pursuant to this provision to deploy federal law enforcement to the region.

157 James A. McAtamney, e-mail to Bill Mercer, Th eodore Ullyot, and Jeff rey Taylor, Sept. 1, 2005, 11:39 a.m. Provided 

to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DAG 000000290.

158 Steve Bradbury, e-mail to Bill Mercer, Th eodore Ullyot, Jeff rey Taylor, Sept. 1, 2005, 12:03 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DAG 000000290.

159 Kyle Sampson, e-mail to Robert Mueller and others, Sept. 1, 2005, 11:56 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

no. DAG00000165.

160 Kyle Sampson, e-mail to Robert Mueller and others, Sept. 1, 2005, 11:56 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

no. DAG00000165.

161 Alberto Gonzales, memorandum for the heads of federal law-enforcement agencies, “Law Enforcement Response to 

Hurricane Katrina,” Sept. 2, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DAG 000000001.

162 Bouchard interview, Jan. 24, 2006, pp. 61-63 (“Th e discussions before the hurricane hit was myself and Mr. Dhillon, ... 

who works in the DAG’s offi ce. He’s our contact person for ATF. And he was communicating with Mr. McAtamney, who 

also works in that offi ce, about what the overall Justice coordinated eff ort would be. What, any guidance that would come 

from the attorney general to all the Justice components about what authorities we’d be acting under and what our response 

would be. Would there be one Justice agency in charge so that we could all say, almost like your mini ESF 13, let’s all decide 

– and these are things that we talked about – we know this big thing is coming. We’ve been through it on smaller scales. 

Let’s pre-identify all the assets that I’ve got all these emergency vehicles from every agency. Let’s get them all located in one 

place so that we know, so when time comes and we ask for them, we know who the point of contact is. We’re not scrambling 

to fi nd out what do you have, who can do it, and how soon can you get there? ... I believe my fi rst conversation with Mr. 

Dhillon on that – I have it in the log here. It was two or three days before it hit. Beginning August 28th.”). See also: Bureau of 

Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, ATF Summary of Signifi cant Activity, Aug. 28-30, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. ATF 000000008 (documenting “contact with DAG offi ce on preparing DOJ response to hurricane.”).

163 Edgar Domenech, e-mail to James A. McAtamney, Aug. 31, 2005, 8:32 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

no. DAG 000000003 (“I assume the department will be looking to implement a departmental response [to Hurricane 

Katrina], let me know what you need.”).

164 On August 31, 2005, at 4:07 p.m., Mercer and others at DOJ received an e-mail which said that Bell South’s New 

Orleans’ “offi ce is critical communications infrastructure node that, if damaged by looters or others, would result in loss 

of comms in the area. Th ey’ve asked for USMS assistance in protecting the facility, as the state/local police are overwhelmed. Advised USMS to notify FEMA of the request: DHS has the lead for protection of critical infrastructure. More 

important, DHS/FEMA is responsible for coordinating requests for support and directing capable [federal government] 

assets within the overall context of the NRP and Staff ord Act.” Source: James A. McAtamney, e-mail to Bill Mercer and 

others, Aug. 31, 2005, 4:07 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DAG 000000035 through 000000038. Th e 

internal DOJ approval process would last over four hours. Once the mission was approved, Arthur Roderick, Assistant 

Director, USMS, Operations Support Division, wrote an e-mail to DOJ saying, “I know all component [law enforcement 

agencies] are looking for this authority.” Source: Art Roderick Jr., e-mail to James McAtamney and others, Aug. 31, 2005, 

8:28 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DAG 000000060 through 000000061 

165 Paul R. Corts, e-mail to Bill Mercer and others, including representatives of DOJ’s law enforcement agencies, Aug. 

31, 2005, 6:42 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as DAG 000000042 (“Th anks for your attendance at the meeting today 

at noon. I appreciate the good response, especially given the very short notice. Th anks for the info sharing and thanks 

too for the good spirit that prevailed as we dealt with this horrifi c situation... Here is a quick bit of info following up 

on some of the points discussed today ... Requests from State and Locals to our Law Enforcement (LE) components 

for assistance with non-federal LE matters – OLC is reviewing this. Th ere are a number of very sensitive legal/perhaps 

constitutional issues with this. We are trying to get guidance as quickly as possible. More tomorrow.”). 

166 Offi ce of the Attorney General, Order No. 2779-2005, Sept. 4, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DAG 

000000091 (“Department of Justice law enforcement personnel who are engaged in this mission shall have the authority 

to enforce the laws of the United States and to assist law enforcement offi cials in the State of Louisiana to enforce the 

laws of that State. All such offi cers engaged in this mission shall coordinate with their state and local counterparts to 

make appropriate arrangements as necessary to ensure the most eff ective law enforcement assistance eff orts in the State 

of Louisiana. In addition, all such offi cers shall be subject to the supervision of the United States Attorney for the Eastern 

District of Louisiana, who may delegate operational authority to appropriate Department of Justice offi cials.”).

167 Vanacore interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 77-78 (“Well, it was diffi cult. Louisiana was trying their best. Th e Attorney 

General’s Offi ce was doing a great job. But the problem was our people that needed to be deputized were moving targets. So 

we would send – they would send an Assistant Attorney General down to do a swearing-in. We’d fl y her in, get a helicopter, 

and get her down to New Orleans. And by the time she got there, maybe the SRT team she was going to swear in had been 
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deployed. So we were having a little diffi culty getting everybody in one place at one time. So effi cient – I mean, they tried. 

It’s a good process. But I don’t think personal swearing-ins are the process in an event like that.”).

168 Vanacore interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 77-78.

169 Vanacore interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 79-80.

170 Deputization took even longer in Mississippi, despite a simpler procedure, where the appropriate documents were not 

issued until September 9.

171 Kaiser interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 84.

172 Kaiser interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 84.

173 William E. Moschella, letter to the Honorable Susan M. Collins and the Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman, Response 

to Request for Information Dated Oct. 7, 2005, Nov. 23, 2005, p. 2 (“In other words, the support provided via the ESF-13 

process does not extend to providing federal law enforcement personnel to engage in actual operational investigative activities to enforce federal, state or local laws. Instead, law enforcement support is provided within the overall umbrella of the 

Department of Homeland Security’s coordination function under the authority of the Staff ord Act or pursuant to inherent 

authority of the individual law enforcement agencies.”). 

174 Bouchard interview, Jan. 24, 2006, pp. 23-24 (“Any assets that would be needed on the ground in the aff ected areas 

would be calling up to Washington, asking for them. Th ey would funnel them through the IIMG and to the ESF 13. At the 

same, people who say I may have these assets that are available in case they’re needed are coming in from the other side 

through the ESF 13 to the IIMG, with the IIMG being the focal point that decides here is what the needs are, here’s what the 

off er is, here’s how we marry those up.”).

175 Kaiser interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 53 (“Th e other functions, resupplying and stuff like that, that is not a law enforcement 

function. We did do it because they needed it and we were trying to help out, but that’s not a DOJ function whatsoever. 

We don’t do that. We are not a consequence management. We are law enforcement, okay, and consequence management, 

which is what you’re talking about, is strictly by FEMA and those other groups, and they did do it eventually, but in the 

meantime, we did that because, you know, what are we going to do, let them stay in the precincts without ammunition?”).

176 Committee staff interview of William Mercer, Principal Associate Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Department of 

Justice, conducted on Feb. 23, 2006, transcript p. 44 (“And so I know that there were a whole lot of conversations that were 

going on...the ground. And what we had independent authority to do was to add a bunch of Federal resources to the affected area, which is what we did. We had independent authority to do that, and we did that.”); Mercer interview, Feb. 23, 

2006, p. 46 (“[C]ertainly it is very clear from the record that by the time [Governor Blanco’s September 4, 2005] letter was 

submitted, we already had put a substantial number of Federal agents there.”).

177 Th e DEA’s “Hurricane Katrina Events Log” documents federal agents involved in a broad range of traditional and 

non-traditional law enforcement activities throughout the metropolitan New Orleans area. DEA reported that as of 

September 1, “DEA [New Orleans Field Division] agents departed with NOPD offi cers to assist them in their enforcement mission.” Th at same day, “DEA agents provided security to Lt. Col. Leblanc, [LSP] Troop B, in his inspection of the 

New Orleans Superdome,” and other sites within the city. On Sept. 3, Special Agents teamed with NOPD and Rapides 

Parish Sheriff ’s Offi ce SWAT to clear buildings of snipers, conducted proactive patrols and provided security to fi refi ghters putting out fi res. Others built a boat launch in Plaquemines Parish for use in rescue operations; coordinated relief 

mission planning in St. Bernard Parish, and provided law enforcement and relief supplies in Gonzales. Th at same day, 

ASAC Kevin Harrison, New Orleans Field Division, and a team of 9 Special Agents rescued and evacuated over 70 senior 

citizens who were abandoned at a retirement home in New Orleans near the St. Bernard Parish line. Many residents of 

the home had already died as a result of dehydration and a lack of medical care. Water and food was provided to sustain 

them. Th ey were transported to a shelter outside of the City of New Orleans on the West Bank of the Mississippi River to 

safety. Drug Enforcement Administration, New Orleans Field Division, Hurricane Katrina Events Log, Aug. 31- Sept. 7, 

2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. 000000141 through 000000142.

178 NRP, p. 35.

179 NRP, p. 35.

180 When ESF-13 is activated, the primary agencies assume responsibility for a series of actions and activities. Signifi cant 

actions at the headquarters, regional and fi eld levels include staffi ng the National and Regional Response Coordination 

Centers, Joint Field Offi ce, and possibly the Emergency Response Team- Advance Element; coordinating with analogous 

regional and fi eld ESF elements; and coordinating all federal activities with the local FBI fi eld offi ce, Joint Terrorism Task 

Force and other DOJ-led law enforcement and investigations and intelligence assessments. Incident management coordination may include: (1) supporting operational and tactical planning activities to prevent or mitigate potential incidents or 

threats to public safety, (2) the deployment of federal resources in response to such incidents or threats, (3) providing technical assistance in planning and assessment eff orts, (4) establishing badging and credentialing processes, (5) helping control 

access to the incident site or critical facilities, (6) conducting traffi c and crowd control, (7) protecting emergency responders 

and other relief workers, (8) protecting the people, facilities and supplies during distribution eff orts; 9) providing surveillance support; and 10) supplying specialized equipment, clothing, and gear as needed. NRP, pp. ESF #13–3 through 13–4.

181 For these purposes, strategic coordination entails the macro-level planning and direction of operational missions 

or resources to achieve broad objectives while aiming to minimize redundancy and overlap and maximize effi ciency, 

eff ectiveness and safety. By comparison, tactical coordination suggests lower level commanders of on-scene, operational 

units eff orts to achieve micro-level ends via communication and cooperation with other, similarly situated commanders 

on the ground.
Public Safety and Security

465

182 Michael Vanacore, e-mail John Clark and others, Sept. 4, 2005, 7:38 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 

DHS-ICE1-0001-0000026 (“DOJ is looking to run this whole eff ort.”); Marc Raimondi, e-mail to William Knocke, Sept. 

4, 2005, 10:33 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-HSOC-0004-0003339 (e-mail entitled “FBI to take 

over?” reports “Th ey [FBI] showed up here last night with a command center on wheels, a bunch of black Suburbans, 

and held a press conference.”); Samuel Neglia, e-mail to Matthew Broderick, Sept. 4, 2005, 8:30 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-HSOC-0004-0003258 (“Need HEAVY Secretary Offi ce Level push quickly w/ FBI to 

ensure the co-lead is DHS per NRP ESF-13.”); Sigal Mandelker, e-mail to Matt Mayer, Sept. 2, 2005, 1:18 a.m. Provided 

to Committee, fi led as Bates no. DHS-FRNT-0010-0000161 (“We’re constantly trying to take the lead with State and 

locals on the Homeland Security mission and now we’re giving DOJ the lead.”). David M. Wulf, e-mail to James A. 

McAtamney and Carson W. Carroll, Sept. 4, 2005, 6:13 p.m. Provided to Committee (“We understand the FBI SAC 

Kiser [sic] will soon assume command of Federal law-enforcement activity at the Joint Field Offi ce that will be set up in 

Louisiana. We feel it would make sense to install an ATF SAC as Deputy law-enforcement commander at the JFO (I suppose, in NRP parlance, he would serve as Deputy Senior Federal Law Enforcement Offi cial). Th is would provide seamless 

coordination on ESF-13 related matters with our folks who are staffi ng the NRCC and IIMG 24/7. Also might make 

sense in view of the large number ATF agents (100+, I believe) on hand to be deployed for Katrina-related missions.”) 

At approximately the same time, Wulf forwarded the e-mail to Samuel Neglia, Robert Shea and others at DHS, asking 

“Is this something you guys could push from DHS side?” David Wulf, e-mail to Samuel Neglia and others, Sept. 4, 2005, 

6:15 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-ICE1-0001-000000026 through 000000027.

183 Vanacore interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 13-14.

184 Vanacore interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 91-95.

185 Vanacore interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 14, 17-18, 24.

186 Vanacore said in his interview that Brian Pennoyer, of PFO Brown’s support staff , called him around midnight 

between September 4-5. Vanacore interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 32-33.

187 Vanacore interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 6, 8, 35.

188 Vanacore interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 37-39.

189 FBI briefi ng to Committee, conducted by Michael J. Wolf, Critical Incident Response Special Agent in Charge, FBI, 

Dec. 20, 2005.

190 Mercer interview, Jan. 26, 2006, pp. 52-53 (“I think the people on the ground determine[d] that it would be useful to 

have an SFLEO and sort of a centralized process, and then that was created.”). 

191 Offi ce of the Attorney General, Order No. 2779-2005, Sept. 4, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DAG 

000000091 (Authorizing the Deputy Attorney General to Take Certain Actions Related To Hurricane Katrina); Mercer 

interview, Feb. 23, 2006, pp. 63-67. Vanacore said that initially the U.S. Attorney had been designated the law enforcement lead, but that this changed when DOJ recognized that as a prosecutor, rather than a law-enforcement agent, he 

should deal “with the legal issues ... and the little higher level things,” because he was not going to “tell the cops what to 

do.” Vanacore interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 55.

192 Th e then-Deputy Superintendent of the New Orleans Police Department off ered this praise:

Th e [Immigrations and Customs Enforcement] agents ... stayed far longer than anyone else, working as 

a patrolman, riding around answering calls for service from our people. Th ey were absolutely outstanding. ... Th e FBI [Special Response] team was great. Th e [Drug Enforcement Agency] SR team was great. 

Th e [Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms] SR team was great. 

Source: Riley interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 88-89. NOPD Captain Bayard also praised counterparts at DEA, ATF, the United 

States Marshal’s Service, and the FBI, especially FBI Agent Todd Cox, who helped address a continuing lack of coordination 

weeks later by further establishing a Command Center at the Royal Sonesta Hotel. Source: Capt. Bayard interview, Nov. 21, 

2005, pp. 81-82, 119-120. Th e LSP’s Col. Whitehorn cited the United States Secret Service for establishing a key credentialing 

process, while Jeff erson Parish’s Sheriff Harry Lee generally thought he received good support from federal agencies. Source: 

Col. Whitehorn interview, Nov. 29, 2005, pp. 116-117; Committee staff interview of Harry Lee, Sheriff , Jeff erson Parish, LA, 

conducted on Jan. 9, 2006, transcript p. 108. New Orleans Director of Homeland Security Col. Ebbert had this to say:

I want to go on record as thanking the federal agencies. By later in the week we had tremendous 

response with hundreds of federal agents from all the federal agencies. ... Th e federal agents from all 

those agencies, both Justice and Homeland Security, worked together to help manage those resources 

throughout the city. 

Source: Committee staff interview of Col. Terry Ebbert, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.), Director, New Orleans Department of 

Homeland Security, conducted on Jan. 10, 2006, transcript p. 167. 

193 Vanacore interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 126-127; FBI briefi ng given to Committee, conducted by Michael J. Wolf, 

Critical Incident Response Special Agent in Charge, FBI, Dec. 20, 2005.

194 Vanacore interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 128-129; FBI briefi ng given to Committee, conducted by Michael J. Wolf, 

Critical Incident Response Special Agent in Charge, FBI, Dec. 20, 2005.

195 Kaiser interview, Jan. 25, 2006, p. 54.

196 Kaiser interview, Jan. 25, 2006, pp. 94-95.
466

Guardsmen on the Gulf Coast

Clarence Williams/Iris Photocollective photo
467

Chapter 26

Military Operations

Background: Military Support to Civil Authorities

The National Guard generally constitutes the fi rst military support provided to civil 

authorities for domestic disaster relief. If civilian fi rst responders and the National 

Guard cannot adequately respond, the Department of Defense (DOD) may be asked 

to deploy active-duty forces.

The Statutes and Role of the National Guard in Emergency Response 

National Guard units conduct operations in one of three modes: (1) under control of 

their governor as commander-in-chief, on state active-duty status, with the state paying 

salaries and expenses; (2) under gubernatorial control, but operating under Title 32 of the 

U.S. Code, with the federal government paying mission costs;1

 or (3) under control of the 

President, having been federalized under provisions of Title 10 of the U.S. Code.2

 While 

governor-controlled, National Guard units may perform law-enforcement missions.3

 When 

federalized under Title 10, however, National Guard units, like regular federal forces, are 

generally prohibited from enforcing laws.4

National Guard missions performed in state active-duty status include assisting in response 

to natural disasters such as hurricanes and other storms, and fi res and fl oods which have 

not been declared federal disasters. Governors routinely use their states’ National Guards 

for disaster-relief missions when local fi rst responders are overwhelmed.5

Th e DOD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, dated June 2005, says local 

National Guard units are particularly well-suited for civil-support missions: Th ey (1) are 

“forward deployed” in about 3,200 communities across the United States, (2) are readily 

available for use in either state active-duty status or Title 32 status, (3) routinely exercise 

with state and local fi rst responders, and (4) have experience mobilizing for local disasterrelief missions.6

Th e National Response Plan (NRP) guides federal-agency emergency response and recognizes the role of governors in a federal system for the public safety and welfare of their 

states’ people by coordinating state resources to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and 

recover from a variety of man-made or natural disasters. Moreover, the Plan recognizes the 

governor’s constitutional role as the commander-in-chief of the state’s military forces – the 

National Guard – when in state active-duty or Title 32 status.7

Emergency Management Assistance Compact Provides a Framework for 

Interstate Mutual Aid

Th e Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) is an interstate agreement that 

provides a framework for interstate mutual aid using the National Guard. Th e National 

Emergency Management Association, an association of state emergency managers, administers EMAC8

 and has developed a nine-step process for mutual aid.9 In addition to the 

EMAC process, some state-to-state mutual-aid agreements also exist for providing lawenforcement and other assistance in a crisis.10 States that receive assistance requests under 

EMAC are not obligated to send their National Guard units to aff ected states. In addition to 

the emergency managers’ and state-to-state processes, the National Guard Bureau developed a 20-step process to deploy National Guard units in response to Hurricane Katrina 

under EMAC.11
Chapter 26

468

DOD Has a Supporting Role Under a Key Presidential Directive and the 

National Response Plan

DOD has a key supporting role under Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD5) dated February 28, 2003,12 and the NRP.13 Th e Presidential Directive specifi es that DOD 

will provide military assistance to civil authorities for domestic incidents as directed by 

the President or when consistent with military readiness and appropriate under the circumstances and the law. Th e Directive also clearly states that the Secretary of Defense shall 

retain command of military forces when such forces are providing civil support. Finally, the 

Directive also requires DOD and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to establish 

“appropriate” relationships and mechanisms for cooperation and coordination between the 

two Departments.14

DOD responds to a domestic disaster within the National Incident Management System 

(NIMS), which provides a framework to integrate disaster response at all levels of government and the private sector. To coordinate its participation in the system, DOD has 

provided certain specialized training to military offi cers, known as Emergency Preparedness Liaison Offi cers, usually at the rank equivalent of Army colonel or Navy captain.15 Th e 

Emergency Preparedness Liaison Offi cers deploy to national or regional incident-command 

centers such as the Homeland Security Operations Center to coordinate the DOD response 

to the event. To manage DOD’s assistance as directed by HSPD-5, DOD has also provided 

specialized training to another cadre of colonels known as Defense Coordinating Offi cers 

(DCO).16 Th ese offi cers generally deploy to the Joint Field Offi ce (JFO) or other incidentcommand centers to process urgent requests for DOD assistance needed to assist civil 

authorities in responding to the immediate needs of the situation.17 DOD also provides a 

deployable support staff to the DCO, known as the Defense Coordinating Element, consisting of three to 30 service members or DOD civilians, depending on the nature and scope of 

the incident.18 DOD may also provide military offi cers to augment the staff of the Principal 

Federal Offi cer (PFO), the designee of the Secretary of Homeland Security in executing the 

federal disaster response.19 Finally, DOD has permitted FEMA, the Coast Guard, and other 

agencies to maintain a permanent presence at U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), 

the DOD Combatant Command for the North American area of operations.20 DOD may 

also provide augmentation to the FEMA offi ce at NORTHCOM in a large-scale disaster.21

Th e NRP establishes a key support role for DOD in assisting the federal agency that leads 

the federal disaster response. Th e NRP points out that the Secretary of Defense authorizes 

defense support to civil authorities for domestic incidents as directed by the President, or 

when consistent with military readiness and appropriate under the circumstances and the 

law – virtually the same language as that used in HSPD-5. Similarly, as with the Directive, 

the NRP specifi es that the Secretary of Defense retains control over military forces at all 

times during its assistance to civil authorities, as specifi ed in Title 10 of the U.S. Code.22

In addition to assigning DOD a general role to support civil authorities, the NRP identifi es 

DOD as a supporting agency to the lead agency in all 15 of the NRP’s Emergency Support 

Functions (ESF), refl ecting the fact that DOD has unique resources and capabilities to provide humanitarian relief in a catastrophe. It also identifi es DOD’s Army Corps of Engineers 

as a co-primary agency for ESF-3, Public Works and Engineering.23 Th e table below provides additional information on DOD’s assigned roles under the ESFs.
Military Operations

469

Emergency 

Support Function DOD’s Specifi c Role

1. Transportation Provides military liaison to ESF-1 desk and military transportation to move resources, 

and assists in contracting for civilian aircraft.24

2. Communications Uses own resources to provide own communications and coordinates numerous other 

communication issues with the Federal Emergency Communications Coordinator.25

3. Public Works and 

Engineering

Army Corps of Engineers provides technical assistance, engineering, and construction 

management.26

4. Firefi ghting Conducts fi refi ghting on DOD installations and assists other lead agencies for fi refi ghting on non-DOD land.27

5. Emergency 

Management Annex No specifi c role identifi ed.28

6. Mass Care, Housing, 

and Human Services

Army Corps of Engineers provides ice and water; inspects shelter sites for suitability; 

and assists in construction of temporary shelters and temporary housing repair.29

7. Resource Support No specifi c role identifi ed.30

8. Public Health and 

Medical Services

Transports patients to medical care facilities; assists with mortuary services; procures 

and transports medical supplies; and provides DOD medical supplies, blood products, 

medical personnel, laboratory services, and logistics support.31

9. Urban Search 

and Rescue

When requested, serves as a primary source for rotary and fi xed-wing aircraft to support urban search-and-rescue operations; and Army Corps of Engineers provides (1) 

certain training and structural integrity analysis, (2) assessments of whether buildings 

are safe to enter, (3) building stability monitoring, and (4) other services.32

10. Oil and Hazardous 

Materials Response

Provides the federal on-scene coordinator and directs response actions for releases 

of hazardous materials from its vessels, facilities, vehicles, munitions, and weapons; 

and Army Corps of Engineers provides response and recovery assistance involving 

radiological dispersion devices and improvised nuclear devices.33

11. Agriculture and 

Natural Resources

Assesses (1) the availability of DOD food supplies and storage facilities, (2) transportation equipment at posts near the affected area, and (3) laboratory, diagnostic, and 

technical assistance; and assists in animal emergency response; develops appropriate 

plans; and the Army Corps of Engineers provides expertise and resources to assist in 

removal and disposal of debris and animal carcasses.34

12. Energy Coordinates emergency power team missions with power restoration activities and 

provides appropriate support.35

13. Public Safety and 

Security

If directed by the President, quells insurrection and provides physical and electronic 

security-systems assistance and expertise.36

14. Long Term 

Community Recovery 

and Mitigation

Provides technical assistance in community planning, civil engineering, and natural 

hazard risk assessment and supports national strategy development for housing, 

debris removal, and restoration of public facilities and infrastructure.37

15. External Affairs No specifi c role identifi ed other than to provide support as required.38

Applicable Statutes Provide DOD the Authorities to Deploy Forces

Various statutes govern DOD participation in emergency management. Th ese statutes 

establish pre-disaster and disaster-response reimbursement procedures, authorize the use 
Chapter 26

470

of military forces to put down insurrection, and generally prohibit the use of military forces 

for law-enforcement purposes except to put down insurrection and in certain other limited 

circumstances. 

Economy Act

Th e Economy Act permits federal agencies to provide goods or services to another federal 

agency when such support is requested. Such assistance will not necessarily be related to 

disaster response.39

Stafford Act

Th e Staff ord Act is the primary statute governing DOD and other federal agency disaster 

assistance under the NRP. Staff ord Act reimbursements are authorized once a governor has 

asserted that state capabilities are overwhelmed and federal assistance is needed, and the 

President has declared an emergency.40

Insurrection Act

Th e Insurrection Act authorizes the President to use military force to suppress an insurrection or end other domestic violence. Specifi cally, the President may employ military forces 

to restore order, prevent looting, and engage in other law-enforcement activities.41

Posse Comitatus Act

Th e federal Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 prohibits the use of the Army and the Air Force 

(originally part of the Army) to execute the laws of the United States except where authorized 

by the Constitution or Acts of Congress. Congress enacted the law to restrict the use of federal troops in the conduct of law enforcement in the South during Reconstruction.42 Federal 

courts have interpreted the Act to prohibit the use of troops in an active role of direct civilian 

law enforcement including search, seizure, and arrest. DOD has issued policy guidance extending the Posse Comitatus Act’s restrictions to the Navy and Marine Corps. Th e Act does 

not apply to the National Guard when under the direct command of a state’s governor.43

Congress has created a number of specifi c exceptions to the general restrictions in the 

Posse Comitatus Act to authorize DOD to use its personnel and equipment in a number of 

circumstances to 

• assist with drug interdiction and other law-enforcement functions, 

• protect civil rights or property, or suppress insurrection,

• assist the U.S. Secret Service,

• protect nuclear materials and assist in solving crimes involving nuclear material, 

• assist with some terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction, and 

• assist with the execution of quarantine and certain health laws.44

Title 10

Title 10 of the U.S. Code establishes the armed services; defi nes their organization, missions, 

and general military powers; specifi es personnel limits; defi nes training and education requirements and organizations; and specifi es service, supply, and procurement roles. Generally, under Title 10, the military departments defi ne training requirements, and design and 

implement the training.45 Certain military commanders have interpreted this to mean that 

such training can include the deployment of forces from their home installation to another 

installation, which, coincidentally, also may position them for use in an upcoming mission 

in the same area.46 In eff ect, this positions these commanders and forces closer to a disaster 

area before receiving a request for assistance, thus making them more immediately available 

to address immediate disaster relief needs.
Military Operations

471

Other Authorities

Under DOD doctrine, local commanders have the authority to unilaterally act to prevent 

immediate threats to life and property if it is not feasible to obtain prior approval from higher 

military authorities. At the same time, DOD directives require an oral civilian request before 

exercising this authority, except during a civil disturbance. DOD would be unlikely to obtain 

reimbursements for assistance rendered under the immediate-response authority.47

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense) Prepares for and Guides 

DOD’s Domestic Missions

Th e Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense) is principally responsible for the 

overall supervision of Homeland Defense activities in DOD. Th e Assistant Secretary is to 

develop policies, conduct analyses, provide advice, make recommendations on homeland 

defense, and provide support to civil authorities, emergency preparedness, and domestic 

crisis management in DOD. Th e Assistant Secretary is also to assist the Secretary of Defense 

in providing policy direction to NORTHCOM, and other combatant commands, when 

appropriate, to guide development and execution of these commands’ plans and activities. 

Lastly, the Assistant Secretary is also the DOD domestic crisis manager and represents the 

Department on Homeland Defense and support to civil authorities matters with the lead 

federal agency,48oft en DHS.49

DOD’s Guidance and Key Strategy Documents Lay Out the Department’s 

Views of Its Mission

DOD’s guidance and Quadrennial Defense Review make clear that domestic natural-disaster response is not within the Department’s primary mission set and will only be undertaken when forces are available, or if directed by the President or Secretary of Defense. Moreover, under the NRP, and consistent with departmental guidance, DOD provides support 

to the lead federal agency in responding to domestic natural disasters, but is not considered, 

and does not consider itself, to be a lead responder.50

DOD Directives Guide the Department’s Domestic Disaster Response

DOD has issued a set of directives and related documents that together establish DOD policy for military assistance to civilian authorities. Th e fi rst is DOD Directive 3025.1, Military 

Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA), which requires DOD components to provide support 

requested by civil authorities once properly approved by the designated DOD approval authorities. Th e Directive is premised on the notion that DOD support is only to be provided 

if civil response capabilities are overwhelmed, as determined by FEMA. It also states that 

DOD’s military operations other than military assistance to civil authorities have priority unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense. Th e Directive states that DOD 

components may not procure or maintain any supplies, material, or equipment exclusively 

for civil emergencies unless directed by the Secretary of Defense. Lastly, it also states that 

military forces will remain under the control of DOD at all times.51

Ordinarily, FEMA tasks DOD to perform a mission by sending DOD a “mission assignment.” However, DOD takes the view that among federal agencies, it is unique in that under 

the Constitution and under the Goldwater-Nichols Act, there is a military chain of command from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the Combatant Commander. Th e 

NRP specifi es that the Secretary of Defense retains control over military forces at all times 

during its assistance to civil authorities, as specifi ed by Title 10 of the U.S. Code.52 Under 

“existing authorities and as a matter of policy,” DOD takes the position that “placing a 

FEMA offi cial or a DHS offi cial in command outside the Department of Defense within the 

military chain of command violates Goldwater-Nichols and is a bad idea.”53 DOD therefore 

interprets a “mission assignment” as a “request for assistance.”
Chapter 26

472

DOD Directive 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities, was issued on February 

18, 1997, and specifi es the mechanisms that DOD’s designated approval authorities will use 

to evaluate whether or not support should be provided to civil authorities. Th e Directive 

establishes the following six criteria against which requests are to be evaluated, usually by 

DOD’s Offi ce of the Joint Director of Military Support (JDOMS), which also determines 

what capability DOD has available to meet the request:54

• legality (compliance with laws),

• lethality (potential use of lethal force by or against DOD forces),

• risk (safety of DOD forces),

• cost (who pays, impact on the DOD budget),

• appropriateness (if it is in DOD’s interest to conduct the requested mission), and 

• readiness (DOD’s ability to perform its mission).55

Th e JDOMS makes a recommendation to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff whether 

to approve the request.56 Th e Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense) reviews the request for consistency with policy.57

DOD Directive 3025.12, Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS), governs 

DOD’s response to requests from federal, state, or local governments’ law enforcement 

agencies to assist with civil disturbances. Th e Directive requires a specifi c Presidential order 

before the military can deploy on such a mission, except that DOD commanders may act 

unilaterally in the case of unexpected disasters including an earthquake, fi re, or fl ood; if life 

is endangered; or if local authorities are unable to control the situation and circumstances 

preclude obtaining prior authorization by the President.58

All three Directives are actually out of date, as the mentioned DOD components no longer 

have the responsibilities identifi ed in the Directives or no longer even exist. For example, 

they specify that the Department of the Army is the DOD’s executive agent for military 

support to civil authorities.59 In fact, the JDOMS performed that function at the time of the 

Committee’s investigation.60 Directive 3025.1 designates the Commander-in-Chief of U.S. 

Atlantic Command as the planning agent for military support missions,61 although that 

command was re-designated in October 1999.62 Conversely, the Directives make no mention of U.S. Northern Command, even though that command began operations on October 

1, 2002, to carry out the types of domestic missions contemplated in the Directives.63

DOD Differs Critically From Other Agencies

DOD’s mission is to deter foreign aggression against the United States and to fi ght and win 

the nation’s wars if deterrence fails. Th e Quadrennial Defense Review released in February 

2006 addressed the use of military forces in domestic disaster-relief eff orts. It pointed out 

that the ability of military forces to mitigate the eff ects of an attack on the homeland may 

also be useful for disaster-relief operations.64

While DOD’s mission is clearly focused on overseas operations as documented in the 

defense strategy, the June 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review identifi es fi ve key strategic 

objectives to support civil authorities:

• achieve maximum awareness of potential threats,

• deter, intercept, and defeat threats at a safe distance,

• achieve mission assurance to ensure that DOD can continue to operate aft er 

an attack,
Military Operations

473

• support civil authorities in minimizing the damage and recovering from 

domestic chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive 

mass-casualty attacks, and

• improve national and international capabilities for homeland defense and 

homeland security.65

While some active-duty and National Guard units are designed and structured to deploy 

rapidly as part of their military missions, the Department of Defense is not organized, 

funded or structured to act as a fi rst responder for all domestic catastrophic disasters.66

The Military Departments Prepare the Forces but the Joint Community Generally 

Employs Them 

In accordance with Title 10 of the U.S. Code, the Departments of the Army, Air Force, and 

Navy organize, train, and equip the force, among other things.67 To organize the force, the 

military Departments establish such organizational structures as brigades, divisions, air 

wings, battle groups, air/ground task forces, and other confi gurations needed to facilitate 

accomplishment of the mission. In addition, the Departments identify, develop, and deliver 

training deemed appropriate to prepare the forces for their mission. Lastly, the Departments develop and acquire the weapons systems, equipment, and supplies needed by the 

forces to successfully carry out their missions.68

While the military departments organize, train, and equip the force, the combatant commands generally execute the missions.69 DOD’s unifi ed-command plan establishes fi ve 

geographically based combatant commands that are responsible for conducting operations in 

their individual areas of operations.70 NORTHCOM is based in Colorado Springs, Colorado, 

and is responsible for conducting military operations in the United States, Canada, Mexico, 

Cuba, certain Caribbean islands, and in the sea and air approaches to the United States.71

NORTHCOM’s specifi c mission is to conduct operations to deter, prevent, and defeat 

threats and aggression aimed at the United States within assigned areas of operations and, 

when directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, to provide defense support for civil 

authorities.72 NORTHCOM’s mission statement clearly indicates that the command only 

provides support to civil authorities if directed to do so, or the proposed mission is consistent with DOD’s directives and other documents that specify the circumstances under 

which DOD conducts civil support.73

NORTHCOM consists of the command headquarters, certain small deployable headquarters units, and certain non-deployable headquarters organizations that would coordinate 

operations within defi ned geographic locations, such as the National Capital Region and 

Alaska.74 NORTHCOM generally executes its assigned missions through Joint Task Forces 

which are established to carry out specifi c missions. NORTHCOM has a small number of 

forces assigned to its headquarters and subsidiary units.75

Status of Plans for Support to Civil Authorities

Th e Committee not know how eff ectively NORTHCOM planned for its role in Defense Support to Civil Authorities in a disaster response, nor is it clear if that planning is fi nished. At 

the Committee’s hearing on February 9, 2006, the Commander of NORTHCOM, Admiral 

Timothy Keating, testifi ed that Concept Plan 2501 (CONPLAN 2501) was “a comprehensive 

approach to providing Defense Support to Civil Authorities” and was “ready to be approved 

by the Secretary and it is on our shelf.”76 DOD defi nes a CONPLAN as “An operation plan 

in an abbreviated format that would require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into an [operation plan] or [operation order]. A CONPLAN contains the combatant 

commander’s strategic concept and those annexes and appendixes deemed necessary by the 
Chapter 26

474

combatant commander to complete planning. Generally, detailed support requirements are 

not calculated.”77 Although DOD states, “Th e fact that CONPLAN 2501 was still in draft 

had no impact on the speed and effi ciency of NORTHCOM’s response,” the Committee 

has been unable to evaluate this assertion because, despite repeated requests, DOD has not 

provided the CONPLAN to the Committee. DOD has stated, “We cannot release the Draft 

USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 2501. It is still deliberative and pre-decisional.78

DOD Issues Execute Orders to Direct Missions and Augments Northern Command 

With Additional Forces When Needed

DOD directs that assigned commands undertake missions when ordered to do so via 

certain mission orders including “Execute Orders.” Th e Execute Order will be sent to 

commands assigned to missions and may include a variety of relevant information, including the provision of (1) intelligence or situational reports, (2) concepts of operations to be 

implemented, (3) procedures to be followed if assisting another lead federal agency, such as 

FEMA, (4) instructions in reporting on mission progress, and (5) mission-reimbursement 

information if appropriate.79

When given a mission via such an order, NORTHCOM submits a “request for forces” to 

the Secretary of Defense who, in turn, will assign appropriate forces for the duration of the 

mission. Forces temporarily assigned to Northern Command can be pulled from anywhere 

in the force structure, but generally consist of forces based in the United States which are 

not already deployed on another mission. DOD’s Joint Forces Command issues an order 

transferring operational control of those forces from their current command to NORTHCOM for the duration of the mission.80

Defense Coordinating Offi cers and Elements Are Often DOD’s First Deployers 

for Civil Support

Once DOD approves a request to provide defense support to civil authorities, it usually 

deploys the Defense Coordinating Offi ce (DCO) and Defense Coordinating Element to the 

Joint Field Offi ce (JFO) used to manage the federal response. Th e DCO serves as the single 

point of contact for requests to DOD originating at the JFO. (Other requests for DOD assistance may originate at such national response locations as the Homeland Security Operations Center.) Th e NRP identifi es the DCO’s position and describes its responsibilities.81

Th e offi cer may also assign liaison offi cers to the JFO-based ESFs and refer contentious issues to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense) for resolution.82

U.S. Department of Defense Response

Introduction

[Th e] movement of 72,000 men and women in military uniform within the 

United States is the largest deployment of military capability within our country since the Civil War. Th e scope and speed of ... our DOD Katrina response, 

was the largest, fastest civil support mission in our nation’s history.83

– Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense 

When we got off the airplane, General [Russel] Honoré [Commander, Joint 

Task Force Katrina] picked me up about 30 minutes later. He fl ew in by his 

helicopter, grabbed me and said, okay, I’m going to go orient you to your mission ... your job is to fi x the airport and fi x New Orleans.84

– Major General William Caldwell, U.S. Army, Commander, 82nd Airborne Division
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475

In general, DOD’s response to Hurricane Katrina can be divided into three phases. In the 

fi rst two phases – before landfall and immediately aft er landfall – DOD responded in accordance within its traditional posture under the NRP to provide assistance to civil authorities only aft er requested. However, as the DOD leadership recognized the potentially 

catastrophic nature of the disaster on Tuesday morning, August 30, 2005, DOD’s approach 

shift ed from this reactive approach to a forward-looking posture, including the mobilization 

of signifi cant assets that DOD commanders anticipated might be needed for the response. 

Th is third phase represented a departure from DOD’s traditional practice and enabled DOD 

to respond to requests for assistance in a timely manner. 

During the fi rst phase of DOD’s response, in the week prior to landfall, DOD began to plan 

and prepare for the deployment of forces to provide support that might be requested by 

FEMA. DOD identifi ed commodities that could be provided to FEMA, and led and participated in interagency teleconferences.85 In addition, DOD deployed DCOs to Louisiana 

and Mississippi and identifi ed military installations that would be available for FEMA use 

as staging bases. Although individual commanders exercised their own initiative to prepare, identify, and alert troops as a result of the forecasted magnitude of Katrina, and had 

expedited certain procedures, these actions were not coordinated by senior leaders of the 

Department. For the most part, DOD’s actions were consistent with the type of pre-hurricane activities it had undertaken in the past. One of the lessons from Katrina is that these 

procedures are inadequate for a catastrophic incident. 

Th e second phase occurred during and immediately aft er landfall. In this phase, DOD lacked 

any signifi cant information regarding the extent of the storm’s devastation. DOD offi cials 

relied primarily on media reports for their information. Many senior DOD offi cials did not 

learn that the levees had breached until Tuesday; some did not learn until Wednesday. As 

DOD waited for DHS to provide information about the scope of the damage, it also waited 

for the lead federal agency, FEMA, to identify the support needed from DOD. Although 

DOD continued to identify and prepare assets for potential deployments, for the most part 

DOD’s actions during this phase were again consistent with its traditional posture under the 

NRP to be prepared to respond to requests, rather than actually begin responding on its own 

initiative. DOD’s approach during this phase continued to be deliberative. Th e lack of situational awareness during this phase appears to have been a major reason for DOD’s belated 

adoption of the forward-looking posture necessary in a catastrophic incident.

By Tuesday morning, however, DOD leadership began to recognize that the scope of the 

disaster may have been catastrophic, and that an expedited DOD response likely would be 

necessary. In addition, there was a growing frustration within DOD over the lack of requests for assistance from FEMA. On Tuesday morning the Deputy Secretary of Defense 

informed the commander of NORTHCOM that he had a “blank check” for any DOD 

resources that he believed were reasonably necessary for the Katrina response. Th e Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the chiefs of the various services to begin deploying 

forces they believed might be needed for the response. Th is third phase of the response represented the type of approach that may be necessary in a catastrophic incident: anticipating 

requests and deploying assets in advance of requests. 

DOD’s shift in approach during this third phase enabled DOD to quickly respond to FEMA’s 

mission requests; in a number of instances DOD “response” began before FEMA submitted 

the request. FEMA offi cials stated that although in the past they had found DOD’s process 

cumbersome, during Katrina they felt DOD responded quickly and eff ectively to FEMA’s 

requests. In a number of critical instances, DOD off ered its assets and support to FEMA and 

DHS; in these instances, too, DOD support was deemed eff ective. 
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Th e third phase, however, revealed a critical need for improvement in military planning and 

preparation for catastrophic incidents, as well as the need to better integrate the military response into the overall response. In addition to DOD’s being tasked by FEMA to provide support, the State of Louisiana asked both the National Guard and DOD to provide large numbers 

of ground troops. Th e resulting movement of 50,000 National Guard and 22,000 active-duty 

troops in response to Katrina was the largest deployment of military capability within the United States since the Civil War. Th e National Guard and active-duty military response provided 

critical humanitarian relief that saved lives and eased the suff ering of thousands. 

Many of the state and federal requests for military support, however, lacked adequate specifi city. Th e responses to the requests for military support oft en were poorly coordinated with 

each other, if at all. Th e deployments of the National Guard troops were not well coordinated 

with the active-duty forces. One result was that local, state, and federal offi cials had diff ering 

perceptions of the numbers of federal troops that would be arriving, the missions they would 

be performing, who was in command of the military forces, and who should be in command. 

Discussion

Severe Weather Execute Order

On August 19, one week prior to Hurricane Katrina’s initial landfall on the Atlantic coast of 

Florida, the Secretary of Defense delegated to NORTHCOM the authority to deploy certain 

DOD assets as necessary to prepare for a hurricane. NORTHCOM holds responsibility for 

command and control over military operations conducted in defense of the continental 

United States, and in support of civil authorities, responding directly to the Secretary of Defense. Previously, all authority to deploy any such DOD assets had rested exclusively with the 

Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff , who serve as the uniformed advisors to 

the Secretary. However, recognizing that 2005 was forecast to be “a well above-average hurricane season” with “an above-average probability of a major hurricane landfall in the United 

States,” the Secretary and the Joint Staff wanted to provide additional fl exibility in advance of 

the hurricane season, and on Friday, August 19, issued the “Severe Weather Execute Order.”86

Th e order authorized the commander of NORTHCOM to “provide support to FEMA for 

planning and conducting disaster response operations in aff ected areas” for the duration of 

the 2005 hurricane season. Th is order granted approval for NORTHCOM to take two actions prior to a hurricane’s landfall:

1. NORTHCOM was able to deploy DCOs and their staff s. Under the NRP, 

DCOs serve as DOD representatives to the JFO – the locally established operations center where federal, state, and local offi cials coordinate response activities. Th e DCO processes requests for military assistance, and ordinarily serves 

as the local commander of supporting military forces.87

2. NORTHCOM was able to designate military installations for other uses, 

such as operational staging areas where FEMA could store commodities in 

preparation for distribution, or for ports.

Colonel Darryl Roberson, the Assistant Deputy Director of the Joint Staff for Antiterrorism 

and Homeland Defense, told the Committee: “It was unprecedented to allow NORTHCOM 

commander to move those kinds of assets in the [continental United States] without the 

[Secretary of Defense] being specifi cally notifi ed on each occasion. So it was a big deal, and 

it proved to be very helpful, and allowed us to respond in a much quicker fashion than 

would normally have been the case last year.”88
Military Operations

477

Colonel Don Harrington, the permanent National Guard/DOD Liaison to FEMA, who helped 

develop the order aft er serving in that capacity through the hurricane season of 2004, reported 

that it resulted in a much earlier deployment of DCOs. “It takes a while ... to track down the 

SecDef [Secretary of Defense], get him to sign off on it, whether he’s in China or wherever.”89

NORTHCOM ordered DCOs to deploy to Mississippi and Louisiana on Sunday, August 

28, one day prior to Katrina’s second landfall.90 However, in anticipation of formal orders,

both offi cers deployed on Saturday and began to coordinate with FEMA personnel.91 Additionally, NORTHCOM designated Naval Air Station Meridian, Mississippi (85 miles east 

of Jackson, Mississippi), and Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana (200 miles northwest of 

Baton Rouge, Louisiana), as staging areas in response to FEMA requests.92

The Pentagon: Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff

In the civilian leadership at the Pentagon, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland 

Defense, Paul McHale, has responsibility for domestic operations and disaster assistance.93

Colonel Richard Chavez was his Senior Military Advisor for Civil Support. On August 23, 

Colonel Chavez learned of what would become Hurricane Katrina when the National Hurricane Center began tracking Tropical Depression 12. In consultation with Assistant Secretary McHale, he began standard hurricane preparations by assessing the availability of three 

key assets: Meals Ready to Eat (MREs), emergency medical capabilities, and FEMA staging 

bases.94 Colonel Chavez presented his fi ndings to the Secretary of Defense on August 28, the 

day before landfall. Although Tropical Depression 12 had become Hurricane Katrina, and 

had swelled from Category 1 to Category 5 status by that time, DOD did not alter the scope 

of the inventory.95

Th e Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary has not developed or implemented formal policies 

and procedures regarding that offi ce’s role in preparing the Department for a civil-support 

mission, let alone one of catastrophic magnitude. For example, Colonel Chavez conducted 

these preparations on his own initiative, having derived these criteria from experience rather than from codifi ed DOD guidance. Indeed, he said his offi ce had intended to formalize 

these anticipatory actions into a pre-storm checklist, and now plans, as a result of Katrina, 

to expand the scope of the inventory to include other foreseeable needs such as shallowdraft boats.96 As Katrina demonstrated, DOD needs to have procedures and plans to more 

fully prepare for catastrophic events. 

Within the Joint Staff , the offi ce dedicated to supporting civil authorities is the Offi ce 

of the Joint Director of Military Support (JDOMS), then led by Brigadier General Terry 

Scherling.97 Th e JDOMS began “24-7” monitoring of the situation in the Gulf of Mexico on 

Sunday, August 28, also activating a Crisis Action Team to process requests from FEMA.98

Because DOD reports solely to the President, DOD treats FEMA mission assignments as 

Requests for Assistance, then considers whether the request may be supported, examining 

such issues as legality, possible harm to civilians, and the eff ect on readiness for overseas 

missions. JDOMS received relatively few requests prior to landfall. FEMA requested two 

staging bases, and that DCOs and their staff s be deployed to Louisiana and Mississippi. 

Th ese requests were granted by NORTHCOM on the authority delegated by the Severe 

Weather Execute Order. 99 FEMA’s single request requiring JDOMS approval was received 

by DOD on Sunday at 5 p.m., requesting air and ground transportation “to support life 

saving and life sustaining missions.”100 As will be discussed below, JDOMS processed the 

request the following day, 12 hours aft er landfall.

U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM)

Having begun tracking Katrina as Tropical Depression 12 on August 23,101 NORTHCOM 

issued a Warning Order on August 25, directing the Army, Navy, and Air Force to prepare 
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478

to “provide the necessary resources to conduct disaster relief operations consistent with 

defense priorities.”102

Th e NORTHCOM Operations Directorate began conducting teleconferences – which 

included FEMA, First and Fift h Armies, and supporting commands of the Navy, Marine 

Corps, and Air Force103 – on August 24 in preparation for the initial landfall in Florida, 

continuing the teleconferences daily as the storm progressed into the Gulf. Before landfall, 

the conversations focused on evacuation plans for military bases, protection of military 

infrastructure, and the initial requests received from FEMA for staging bases and Defense 

Coordinating Offi cers and Elements.104

Prior to landfall, logistics experts at NORTHCOM were aware of FEMA’s activities in 

positioning commodities. As in previous hurricanes, the planners listened in on daily videoteleconferences during which FEMA described its preparations in pre-positioning food, water, and ice.105 Th ey anticipated that they might be called upon to provide strategic airlift .106

In addition, NORTHCOM planners had participated in the Hurricane Pam exercise in July 

2004, and so were aware of the possible need for a “large-scale evacuation of personnel out 

of the city.”107 But because DOD had not been asked by FEMA to take on any responsibilities in the preparations, the Army planners, under the NRP, had no “direct relationship” 

with FEMA.108 Th ey were in “listen only mode.”109

Army Commanders: First Army

Lieutenant General Russel L. Honoré, Commanding General of First U.S. Army, was 

responsible for Army forces east of the Mississippi River. He had served in that position 

through the destructive hurricane season of 2004, and was aware of the likely requests for 

DOD assistance post-landfall. According to General Honoré, First Army had begun tracking the tropical wave that would become Katrina on August 8,110 well before it appeared as 

a tropical depression on the Pentagon’s screen. On August 24, as Tropical Depression 12 

became Tropical Storm Katrina, First Army issued a Warning Order, followed on August 

25 by a Planning Order, deploying the DCO and his staff to Florida and ordering equivalent 

elements to prepare to deploy to Alabama, Georgia, and Mississippi.111

General Honoré recognized early response as essential to saving lives, and from experience 

knew that equipment such as helicopters, boats, and communications equipment would 

be required. He wanted the necessary equipment and personnel identifi ed and alerted in 

advance so as to expedite their eventual deployment. Th e process would involve multiple 

entities: NORTHCOM as the commander of military operations, Joint Forces Command as 

the provider of resources to NORTHCOM, and the Joint Staff in the Pentagon to ultimately 

authorize the deployment. 

To initiate this process, General Honoré sent a message to NORTHCOM at about 1 p.m. on 

Sunday, August 28, requesting by 7 p.m. an assessment of the resources it considered necessary.112 His immediate superior, Army Forces Command, sent an identical request to Joint 

Forces Command requesting a response by 2 a.m. Monday.113 Aft er receiving General Honoré’s request, NORTHCOM forwarded an identical message to the Joint Staff at the Pentagon. 

In addition to forwarding the formal message, Major General Richard Rowe, Operations 

Director at NORTHCOM, recognized the urgency of the request and informally directed 

his staff to anticipate the need for military support: “[First Army] has forwarded request for 

capabilities. ...We need to get [the Joint Staff and Joint Forces Command] thinking about 

types of support that may be needed – joint solutions.”114 General Scherling, the Director 

of Military Support on the Joint Staff , responded to his e-mail. “Good plan, Sir,” she wrote. 

“Th is sounds VERY catastrophic.”115
Military Operations

479

Nonetheless, according to General Rowe, “Joint Forces Command and the Joint Staff did 

not do anything.” Th e Joint Staff did not even want to receive this message prior to landfall, 

he said, because a specifi c requirement had not yet been identifi ed, and under DOD’s role 

in the NRP, DOD was not to respond until a request had been processed through FEMA: 

“Th ey believe perhaps the likelihood of having to provide this kind of ... joint capabilities is 

not likely.”116 He reported to General Honoré that he was unable to provide the requested 

information, even 12 hours aft er Katrina’s landfall in Louisiana: “Somewhat hamstrung by 

JDOMS desire to wait” for requests for assistance, he wrote.117

Army Commanders: Fifth Army

Fift h Army held responsibility over Army forces west of the Mississippi River, which included Louisiana. Colonel Tony Daskevich deployed from Fift h Army as DCO to Louisiana, 

departing at noon on Saturday prior to the offi cial NORTHCOM orders. Th e order, however, instructed him to deploy without the full complement of staff , or Defense Coordinating 

Element, that would normally have accompanied him, and instead to deploy two planners. 

He explained that the decision to deploy only two planners was based on uncertainty as to 

Katrina’s path and limited lodging space in Baton Rouge.118 To give his staff the fl exibility to 

join him once the storm had passed and he had established his role in Baton Rouge, he sent 

the Element staff to Houston.119 Although he was concerned that they would not be available to assist him in the immediate aft ermath, his Mississippi counterpart, Colonel Damon 

Penn, reassured him that “it takes a full 48 hours of assessment before they even start discussing DOD participation. I think you’re in good shape.”120

Upon arriving in Baton Rouge Saturday night, August 27, Colonel Daskevich met with the 

senior FEMA offi cials in Louisiana, William Lokey and Scott Wells. Th ey discussed the 

weather predictions and the potential severity of Katrina’s impact. Th ere was no discussion 

of specifi c mission assignments to DOD, although there was a general discussion of what 

assets DOD might be able to provide.121 At the time of his arrival, Colonel Daskevich, who 

had recently taken part in training on the NRP, understood that DOD planned to operate 

on a “pull” system, following its established role wherein DOD is to respond to requests 

rather than to provide assets prior to identifi cation of a specifi c need.122 Sunday morning, 

Colonel Daskevich met with Major General Bennett Landreneau, the head of Louisiana’s 

National Guard, and again, received no specifi c requests for DOD assistance.123

Navy Commanders 

As Katrina approached the Gulf Coast on Sunday, August 28, the helicopter landing ship

USS Bataan lay in port in Ingleside, Texas, following an exercise in the Caribbean Sea. Th e 

Bataan off ers a large fl at deck, refueling capacity, vast hanger space for cargo transport, and 

substantial medical facilities. Vice Admiral Mark Fitzgerald, Commander of the Second 

Fleet, based in Norfolk, Virginia, placed the Bataan on alert, and off ered it as an asset to 

NORTHCOM.124 USS Bataan left port by midday, and, aft er re-embarking the helicopters 

– two medium-lift utility MH-60s and three heavy-lift MH-53s – moved to position herself 

behind Katrina as it came ashore. 

Additionally, the Navy followed standard pre-landfall procedure by moving ships in the 

storm’s path out to sea. Five supply and logistics vessels left New Orleans for the Gulf of 

Mexico, remaining close enough to provide assistance as soon as Katrina passed. Aircraft 

departed from the Gulf Coast for protection, but Construction Battalion engineers (“Seabees”) in Gulfport, Mississippi, equipped with heavy-lift ing vehicles and trained to build or 

rebuild structures quickly, sheltered from the storm locally in order to respond quickly if 

required.125 In Baltimore, Maryland, the hospital ship USNS Comfort began preparations for 

deployment on Sunday.126
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480

Marine Corps Commanders

New Orleans is home to the headquarters of the Marine Corps Reserve Forces and its warfi ghting component, the Fourth Marine Division, commanded by Major General Douglas 

O’Dell. General O’Dell evacuated his headquarters on Friday, August 26, to avoid the 

approaching storm.127 Beginning Saturday, August 27, he began examining what Marine 

forces might be required for the response.

Realizing that transportation assets were the most diffi cult to move quickly and would be the 

linchpin if a fast response were required, he conducted assessments of the most important 

of these “enablers”: amphibious vehicles; motor transport in the event that infantry were 

deployed or a large evacuation were required; and a command-and-control element to receive 

and direct forces. Th e assessment was complete by mid-day Monday, shortly aft er landfall.128

Realizing that his logistics and engineering equipment might also be required, Lieutenant 

General James Amos, Commander of the II Marine Expeditionary Force – a total of almost 

50,000 troops – directed an assessment of resources such as bulldozers, trucks, road graders, mobile hospitals, and associated personnel.129 “Th is is 35 years of being a Marine and 

it’s what we call anticipating a mission,”130 he stated, explaining his recognition that Katrina 

would be of devastating severity and that 

the Marines’ assistance would assuredly 

be required.

U.S. Transportation Command

U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) holds responsibility for ground, 

air, and sea logistical and transportation 

support to military operations, and is assigned a supporting role to U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 

(HHS) in patient evacuation operations. 

As is standard practice in advance of a 

hurricane, TRANSCOM alerted numerous heavy-transport aircraft at bases 

throughout the country in the event that 

mass transportation of supplies, personnel, or evacuees would be required. Th e 

aircraft were alerted on Sunday, August 

28, and included C-5s and C-17s at 

Dover, Travis, Charleston, and McCord 

Air Force Bases.131 Additionally, TRANSCOM alerted two Contingency Response Wings,132

whose mission is to deploy to a damaged airfi eld, and rapidly repair the runway, lighting, 

navigation, and communications systems to restore aircraft operations. 

Immediate Response After Landfall

Situational Awareness

Like the rest of the federal government, for at least 24 hours aft er landfall, DOD had poor 

awareness of the extent of devastation in Louisiana and Mississippi. Th roughout Monday, 

the day of landfall, DOD personnel remained in “wait-and-see mode.” In Katrina, this 

period of damage assessment took much longer than usual. Many of the fi rst responders 

were immobilized by damage or fl ooding, and communications systems were incapacitated. 

As a result, DOD personnel relied on media reports; nearly all interviewed by the ComGeneral Honoré arriving on 

USS Bataan

U.S. Navy photo
Military Operations

481

mittee said that by Monday evening they had concluded from various media reports that 

New Orleans had “dodged a bullet.”133 Th ey were not aware either of the levee breaches and 

overtopping, or the extensive fl ooding that followed.

 Th e challenge of obtaining rapid and reliable information about hurricane damage is not 

new. According to what was then known as the General Accounting Offi ce (GAO), “In the 

case of [1992’s] Hurricane Andrew, it was several days before the local authorities realized 

how bad the situation was and how much assistance was needed.” Th e GAO recommended 

“supporting state and federal agencies should not waste time waiting for accurate assessments but use their experience to push obviously needed assistance toward devastated communities before citizens begin to die for lack of it.”134

Initial Request for Assistance: Two Helicopters

At 7 p.m. Monday, the Joint Directorate of Military Support (JDOMS) issued the fi rst offi cial order for military support to the response, directing the deployment of two helicopters 

to meet FEMA’s request for two helicopters to support initial surveys of the storm damage 

and the most urgent requirements by Rapid Needs Assessment teams. Th e order also provided general guidance to the armed services: “Be prepared to provide additional personnel, units, equipment, airlift , and/or other support as requested by FEMA and approved by 

SecDef.”135 Colonel Roberta Woods, Deputy Director of Logistics at NORTHCOM, interpreted this order on Monday evening to mean that beyond the two helicopters, NORTHCOM and the services were to think ahead as to what they might provide: “At that time, 

again, we still had...no specifi c requirements to meet, no mission assignments, or word of 

mission assignments at that time.”136

Th e First Air Cavalry Brigade in Fort Hood, TX, received orders to provide the two helicopters early Tuesday morning, and the aircraft were in Baton Rouge by 1 p.m.137 Th ey had 

launched within hours of receiving orders, but the JDOMS sent its orders 12 hours aft er 

landfall, and 24 hours aft er having received the request.138 However, FEMA had requested 

that these two helicopters begin operations “8/30/2005 Tuesday,” so they arrived on the 

day FEMA requested.139 Th e lack of situational awareness early in the response may have 

contributed to a delay; other witnesses have attributed the time of response to Department 

bureaucracy and a “cultural reluctance” to commit Department assets to civil support missions unless absolutely necessary. 

DOD Culture and Bureaucracy May Have Impeded the Process Initially

Assistant Secretary McHale disputed that idea, saying that although, prior to the 21st 

century, DOD’s traditional role placed a primary focus on overseas missions, “September 

11 made it very clear that homeland defense and civil support missions were ... equal to or 

of even greater importance than other more traditional missions.” He maintained that “if 

[resistance within the Department] ever had existed, [it] had ceased to exist in terms of the 

recognition of the importance of homeland defense and civil support missions.”140

Some DHS offi cials have asserted that they were frustrated by how long it took DOD to 

approve requests for assistance,141 and have suggested that a delay in processing the large requests for assistance from DOD – the logistics request approved September 2, and a second 

set of requests approved September 5 – slowed the response eff ort. Some FEMA witnesses 

also said that they would have liked “things to happen faster” in terms of DOD’s bringing in 

assets for the response.142

In its own analysis, the White House asserted that DOD’s “21-step” approval process 

– which included converting a mission assignment into a Request for Assistance and 

reviewing the request for legality and appropriateness, among other things – was “overly 

bureaucratic” and “resulted in critical needs not being met.”143 FEMA Deputy Federal Coor-
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482

dinating Offi cer (FCO) in Louisiana Scott Wells and other witnesses144 described the process 

of gaining assistance from DOD as a “negotiation” in which DOD, along with the other 

government entities, collaborates in dividing up what needs to be done and by whom.145

Colonel Chavez testifi ed that FEMA offi cials did not always have a good understanding of 

what assets and resources DOD could provide to best accomplish a mission and of DOD’s 

processes for responding to FEMA’s requests for assistance.146

Top DOD offi cials vigorously disputed the assertion that their approval process slowed 

the arrival of DOD assets. General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

during the Katrina response, said, “I don’t know if we have a 21-step process or not. If we 

do, it’s one that takes 21 seconds to complete.”147 General Myers said DOD would “never” 

wait to start planning to execute a mission until formal orders were signed, saying such an 

approach would be “incongruous” with DOD culture.148 Assistant Secretary McHale concurred, saying, “I can tell you, in a crisis, there are no 21 steps for approval.”149

But some military offi cers reported encountering diffi culties in responding to FEMA’s early 

requests. Captain Michael McDaniel, the lead Navy liaison to FEMA, described his experience in processing the helicopter request: “JDOMS is notorious or has been notorious, 

‘Well, you can’t ask for it that way. You need to do it like this.’ Well, tell me how I need to 

ask for it, you know? I just need some helicopter support down there.”150 Colonel Harrington, the lead DOD and National Guard Liaison to FEMA, agreed that “Yes, there were 

some delays over there for diff erent reasons, and that created some angst,” 151 adding:

I think it’s just a cultural thing, all the way up. From last year, it was both 

JDOMS, [Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense], 

and the SecDef. It was the entire – and even Northern Command to a degree, 

even though Northern Command was a little more proactive. Just a cultural 

reluctance that they want to make sure that mission analysis is done and all the 

options are explored before you come to DOD.152

Prior to landfall, General Honoré had asked General Rowe, NORTHCOM Director of 

Operations, to identify certain assets for the response, including helicopters, boats, and 

communications equipment, but 12 hours aft er landfall General Rowe replied that he was 

“somewhat hamstrung by JDOMS desire to wait for [Requests for Assistance]”153 and could 

not provide these critical assets to General Honoré. To the Committee, General Rowe 

explained: “I think the primary resistance is the organizational resistance and absence of a 

detailed, approved plan.”154

“It’s hard to get them to do anything where there is a chance of failure,” Wells said, adding 

that DOD wants “to know 80 to 90 percent of the information before they will commit an 

asset to work with you.”155 Wells asserted that DOD “could have played a bigger role. Th ey 

could have played a faster and a bigger role.”156

While FEMA and DHS offi cials have complained that DOD did not do enough, and was 

slow to process requests, this investigation has found that, in fact, FEMA originated very few 

requests in this early period. In one instance, DOD received complaints from DHS about 

actions it did take. As discussed above, the Navy had ordered the helicopter carrier USS

Bataan to sail towards New Orleans behind the storm, and to prepare to provide assistance. 

However, on Monday aft ernoon, a senior DOD representative to DHS reported to Assistant 

Secretary McHale’s staff that “folks over here [are] hopping mad about the news of the Navy 

ship that announced their deployment without evident legal authority.”157 Th e USS Bataan, 

the military’s most signifi cant pre-landfall deployment, with helicopters prepared to assist 

with search and rescue, was challenged by DHS. Th e Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary of De-
Military Operations

483

fense for Homeland Defense had to reassure DHS that USS Bataan was simply pre-positioning, and in fact would not engage in the response without the proper request and authorization.158 Bataan’s helicopters launched on Tuesday, becoming the fi rst active-duty aircraft to 

assist with search and rescue.

Th e Committee has found that the JDOMS was slow in approving the initial request for helicopter support in Louisiana. Th e record shows that the time required to process this initial 

request was not consistent with the scale of the disaster. Th is timeline and the testimony of 

witnesses both within and outside of DOD indicates that, while the extent of the damage may 

not have been known, both a traditional treatment of civil support as a secondary mission 

and a bureaucratic process slowed the response within the Department. Th e expeditious 

response by the helicopters themselves demonstrates that the Army was ready to mobilize, 

but that in this case, orders slowed the response. As will be seen, however, any reluctance and 

bureaucracy gave way beginning Tuesday, as top DOD offi cials took steps to expedite the 

responsiveness and bypass the ordinary approval process in moving assets forward.

The Pentagon: Offi ce of the Secretary of Defense and 

the Joint Staff

During the fi rst two days aft er landfall, then-Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon 

England exercised primary authority over the Department’s response because the Secretary 

was traveling with the President.159 Deputy Secretary England described the level of accurate information in the Pentagon for the fi rst 24 hours as “no input except what was on 

the news;”160 his primary source of information was the television. He said he attempted to 

contact FEMA Director Michael Brown and other DHS offi cials early Monday morning, but 

was unsuccessful.161

Assistant Secretary McHale’s offi ce received a situation report at 5 p.m. Monday which included information indicating that the Industrial Canal and the 17th Street Canal levees had 

breached and that “much of downtown and east New Orleans is underwater.”162 Assistant 

Secretary McHale’s offi ce attempted to contact the Army Corps of Engineers that evening and in the early hours of the next morning regarding these and other reports of levee 

breaches, but even into Tuesday morning, the Corps was unable to confi rm whether the 

levees had been breached or overtopped, and whether any such damage could be repaired.163

At 1:47 p.m. on Tuesday aft ernoon, DHS transmitted to DOD a report that the Army Corps 

had confi rmed the breach at the 17th Street levee164 and at 3:15 p.m., Assistant Secretary 

McHale’s offi ce received an e-mail detailing the Army Corps’s intentions for repairing the 

breach.165

Assistant Secretary McHale acknowledged that damage assessment was one area of the military response that should be improved, particularly aft er reviewing the lessons of Hurricane 

Andrew: “One of the fundamental lessons learned ... from Katrina is the need to have available immediate wide-area surveillance capabilities in order to more accurately and rapidly 

determine how much damage has been experienced.”166

On Tuesday morning, Assistant Secretary McHale instructed his Principal Deputy, Peter 

Verga, to encourage DHS to appoint a Principal Federal Offi cial (PFO). Th e NRP dictates 

that in catastrophic incidents, the Secretary of Homeland Security is to designate a PFO to 

coordinate the overall federal response,167 and given the now-apparent scale of the disaster, 

a PFO would be critical to managing the necessary response eff orts. Assistant Secretary 

McHale said:
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It was becoming increasingly clear that the damage was so severe that we would 

likely have a declaration of a major disaster and that a principal federal offi cial ... 

was going to be a central element of leadership in terms of the federal response. 

... I, therefore, thought that having a named PFO would be an important initial 

step in triggering the capabilities available under the National Response Plan. 

So I directed Peter Verga to call DHS and ... serve as a catalyst for the consideration to urge the appointment of a principal federal offi cial ... because the PFO, 

once appointed, would become a critical enabler of follow-on DOD capabilities. 

By the end of that day, Mike Brown was appointed the PFO.168

Furthermore, General Honoré had deployed to the Gulf Coast from Georgia, and NORTHCOM was preparing to designate him as the commander of active-duty military forces committed to the response. Another motivation underlying DOD’s suggestion to DHS that it 

name a PFO appears to be concern within the Pentagon over the potential interpretation of 

the presence of a three-star general that the military was assuming control over the disaster 

response. An internal DOD e-mail indicates concern over a uniformed offi cer “being senior 

person on the ground.” Th e message also indicates a preference that General Honoré report 

to a civilian offi cial, and DOD maintain the appropriate posture of the military playing a 

supporting role.169

It is not clear what role Verga’s phone call played in Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff ’s decision to appoint a PFO; Assistant Secretary McHale stated in testimony, 

“All I know for sure is we did make that recommendation and that, by the end of the day, a 

PFO ... had been appointed.”170

U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM)

As discussed in Chapter 12 (Federal Preparations), NORTHCOM Operations Directorate had been conducting daily interagency teleconferences since August 24 to coordinate 

the military response.171 By 1:30 p.m. Mountain Time Monday, damage assessments were 

beginning, but were not conclusive.172 NORTHCOM’s Deputy Director of Intelligence, 

Captain Brett Markham, told the Committee that “we relied heavily, on the 29th, on 

our National Technical Means”173 (sensory equipment managed by national intelligence 

agencies to collect information for the benefi t of the entire federal government). He said 

that some information – including a graphic representation of fl ooding received from the 

National Geospatial Agency174 – was collected on August 29,175 but that it didn’t present a 

suffi ciently clear picture.176 Colonel Wesley McClellan, a senior member of NORTHCOM’s 

Interagency Coordination Group, which comprises numerous interagency representatives, said that it also lacked damage assessment information, and was unable to specify 

the types of support needed from DOD.177 Like his counterparts at the Pentagon, Admiral 

Keating, the NORTHCOM Commander, also woke up on Tuesday believing that “New 

Orleans dodged a bullet.”178 However, as the extent of the damage became clear on Tuesday, 

NORTHCOM staff clearly saw the need for military assistance, but was frustrated by the 

paucity of requests for assistance. Brigadier General Harold Moulton, who later in the week 

deployed from NORTHCOM to establish a command-and-control headquarters in New 

Orleans, described the growing frustration that developed as the damage became apparent: 

Th e National Response Plan process establishes a sequence which goes from 

local asking for help from the state, state asking for help from the federal 

government, the federal looking around and choosing which appropriate spot 

through the mission assignment process to eventually get into. ... Th at whole 

concept seemed to be, for lack of a better term, frustrating for this staff and for 
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Admiral Keating as they were trying to fi gure out how to respond to this compelling human tragedy that they could see unfolding on TV.179

Colonel Daskevich, who had deployed from Oklahoma on Saturday to serve as the DCO 

– NORTHCOM’s direct representative – in Baton Rouge, reported to the State Emergency 

Operations Center at 4:30 a.m. Monday.180 He also spent most of Monday struggling to gain 

an accurate picture of the situation, and acknowledged that from Baton Rouge, he in fact 

had very little awareness of the developments in New Orleans. Colonel Daskevich appears 

to have received a report of levee failure on Monday.181 However, because he was unfamiliar with the signifi cance of the levees, he did not recognize the potential implications 

of this limited information.182 “Th e hunt for information in the fi rst 24, 48 hours aft er the 

storm was a challenge,” he said.183 Having deployed with only one additional staff member, 

as ordered by NORTHCOM, Colonel Daskevich acknowledged that a lack of manpower, 

communications equipment, and operating space within the State Emergency Operations 

Center rendered it “extraordinarily demanding to try to keep up with all of the information 

fl ow and, or course, to actually do business” during the fi rst several days.184

The “Blank Check”

Whatever you can think of and get it moving yesterday, carriers, helos, trucks, 

amphibs, LCACs [Landing Craft Air Cushion], C-17s, C-130s, hospital ships, 

medical teams – whatever. Overkill is better than undershoot. POTUS [President of the Untied States] is coming back to D.C. tonight just for this.185

–Admiral Ed Giambastiani, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , to Admiral Keating, 

Commander of U.S. Northern Command, August 30, 2005.

Th ough offi cials had begun to learn more about the extent of the damage, through Tuesday 

morning the Department remained in a posture as dictated by the NRP, to allow FEMA to 

coordinate the response.186 At the same time, senior offi cials within the Department responsible for homeland defense were becoming concerned that they were not receiving requests 

from FEMA, and that awaiting such requests could further delay the movement of military 

assets. Assistant Secretary McHale, who that morning met with Deputy Secretary England, 

and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Myers to discuss the hurricane and the Department’s response during the daily morning briefi ng, said that notwithstanding media reports 

“that were less sobering than the scope of the actual damage,” the leadership recognized that 

the Department needed to mobilize its assets for the support requests they anticipated:

We were much more focused and concerned than the published reports of the 

damage might have justifi ed. In part that was because certain key individuals 

expressed a deep concern that the damage was more severe than was being 

reported and so there was a collective sense that Hurricane Katrina was likely 

to be equal to or greater in damage than that of Hurricane Andrew in 1992.187

Yet offi cials within the Pentagon were surprised at the silence from FEMA. First thing in 

the morning, General Myers inquired from his Operations Directorate how many requests 

the Joint Staff had received, “and the answer was, We hadn’t got any.” A resulting discussion with the Deputy Secretary, then, led to the conclusion that “We need to start leaning 

forward – they’re going to need some Department of Defense assets.” 188

During a meeting at 7:30 a.m. Central Time, Deputy Secretary England informed senior 

Pentagon offi cials, including representatives of the military services and the Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , of the Department’s commitment to quickly provide to the 
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486

NORTHCOM Commander whatever assets were needed to support the overall hurricane 

response, and urged all commanders to “lean forward” to be able to quickly meet requests 

for assistance.189 In a subsequent call that morning to Admiral Keating, Deputy Secretary 

England made clear that NORTHCOM would be provided any asset Admiral Keating 

deemed necessary.

Deputy Secretary England reported to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld: 

We are leaning forward on all fronts. I have authorized all local commanders 

to provide their assistance and have authorized NORTHCOM and the Chairman to take all appropriate measures to push forward available DOD assets 

that could be useful to FEMA.190

In a meeting at 3:40 p.m.,191 General Myers then instructed his service chiefs to work together with NORTHCOM in determining necessary assets, telling them to pre-position resources in anticipation of a request for assistance from FEMA, if they thought it prudent.192

To expedite the deployment process, he instructed the services to proceed on the authority 

of this vocal command – Secretary England’s direct instruction to Admiral Keating, and his 

own guidance to the service chiefs – and that the necessary paperwork would follow later.193

“Th ink large,” he told them.194

A vocal command of this magnitude is extremely rare in DOD. For the purpose of ensuring 

legality, availability of resources, and documentation of the chain of command, all deployments are normally processed rigorously through specifi c written orders and electronic 

tracking systems. Deputy Secretary England’s command represented an extraordinary 

delegation of military judgment, on the assurance that Admiral Keating would keep the 

Department informed. It was a “blank check,”195 Deputy Secretary England said. Assistant 

Secretary McHale elaborated: “What was communicated ... was what we in the military call 

‘commander’s intent.’ Th e message from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, consistent with 

the counsel provided by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, was to act with a sense of urgency 

and to minimize paperwork and bureaucracy to the greatest extent possible.”196 As Admiral 

Keating understood the direction, “We’re moving anything we think FEMA will need. No 

obstacles from DOD or Joint Staff .”197 While DOD’s inherent authorities to respond had not 

changed, and it was understood that all the necessary paperwork would follow, the decision refl ected an extraordinary delegation to the military commanders. Assistant Secretary 

McHale said, “Th e climate in the decision-making process in this department could not 

have been more proactive than it was.” 198

Although individual commanders had already begun moving assets and conducting predeployment preparations, many witnesses have credited these actions with fundamentally 

shift ing the overall response of DOD, particularly at the departmental level, into a proactive 

mode. Captain McDaniel, who represented the Navy to FEMA, said:

Th e pendulum swung from one extreme to the other through this. I mean, it 

went from having to pry Secretary Rumsfeld’s fi ngers off of a helicopter package ... and this 100-pound [sic] gorilla just goes, “Okay, we’ve got it.” Boom, 

and then the fl oodgates open.199

Colonel Harrington agreed that the “cultural reluctance” had now been overcome, and that 

attitudes within the Department “dramatically shift ed” as “things got a little crazy.”200

On Wednesday morning, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs issued guidance to Joint Forces 

Command (which maintains control of most military assets within the United States until 

they are assigned to Combatant Commanders such as NORTHCOM), consistent with his 
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487

guidance to the service chiefs on Tuesday: “(1) Continue to lean forward; (2) Remind services to work through Joint Task Force components; and (3) Be aggressive but don’t get in 

FEMA’s way.”201 Forces had begun to deploy in large numbers to the region, some requested 

by NORTHCOM, and many others volunteering on their own initiative. Th e initial result 

was a “wide open barn door,” according to General Rowe, with NORTHCOM having diffi culty tracking self-deployed assets.202

“Our primary concern for Wednesday will be search and rescue” Admiral Keating informed 

his staff . “Temperature index likely to exceed 100F in New Orleans. Folks that survived 

certain to need water, then food, then shelter.”203 However, offi cials at the Pentagon were 

surprised to have so few requests from DHS in the fi rst few days aft er landfall.204 (See Chapter 23 for information on the assistance-request system.) 

Colonel Darryl Roberson, Assistant Deputy Director for Antiterrorism and Homeland Defense in the Joint Staff , described his frustration at not being asked to do more sooner:

I will tell you that I personally felt very frustrated that we had not been called 

in earlier. We had assets available. We were all leaning forward. We knew we 

were going to receive them. We responded, in my opinion, in an unprecedented manner to everything that we got. I am absolutely convinced in my heart 

that it is a good-news story that DOD came to the rescue. Th at may sound 

strong. Obviously I’m biased. But in my mind, DOD saved the day to a large 

extent, and it was because of what we did. My frustration comes from the fact 

that I think we could have done it earlier if we had been asked.205

Assistant Secretary McHale expressed a similar frustration, stating that throughout the fi rst 

week, he believed that FEMA’s requests for assistance were still not commensurate with the 

scale of the catastrophe and the types of eff orts that would be required of DOD, and that 

even “by Saturday it was clear that the [requests] we had received, reviewed, and approved 

were pretty narrow in scope.”206 Yet on the message conveyed by Deputy Secretary England, 

military forces converged upon the Gulf Coast.

Mobilization of Military Forces

Despite an overall lack of awareness within the Department about conditions in Louisiana 

and Mississippi, a number of military commanders within the services took action, pursuant to their own command authority, to prepare assets for potential requests for assistance. 

In general, it is possible to characterize commanders’ actions throughout the fi rst week as 

one of three types: (1) preparation and mobilization into the Joint Operating Area in 

coordination with NORTHCOM; (2) mobilization into the Joint Operating Area, but without full coordination with NORTHCOM; and (3) individual preparations conducted within 

the services, without specifi c orders to do so. To characterize the response most broadly, 

commanders took action consistent with the guidance of Deputy Secretary England and 

General Myers, making all reasonable eff orts to pre-position assets or prepare for their 

deployment. And indeed, the overwhelming majority of deployments occurred prior to a 

request by DHS or FEMA. As will be discussed below, the lack of expected requests in fact 

led the Department to draft requests for FEMA, in recognition that such military assistance 

was required, but that FEMA had either failed to ascertain the requirements, or had inadequately expressed the requirements to DOD. 

However, the original intent of the Secretary’s vocal order was that despite the lack of 

paperwork, all deployments and preparations were to be undertaken in coordination with 

NORTHCOM to ensure that Admiral Keating had knowledge of all forces operating in the 
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488

region, and to maximize the effi ciency and eff ectiveness of the military response. Th e Committee has found that preparations in the early stages led to a faster response when the requests and orders fi nally came, and the pre-positioning of assets was essential to responding 

to immediate needs. Yet not all deployments were coordinated with NORTHCOM, possibly 

detracting from the unifi ed eff ort as intended by offi cials, and ultimately causing NORTHCOM to deploy a headquarters “to get our arms around this Title 10 force structure that’s 

now just basically all merging on the same local area,”207 as described by the headquarters 

commander, General Moulton.

A NORTHCOM execute order at 10 p.m. Central Time expanded the geographic reach of 

commanders’ ability to provide assistance under the Immediate Response Authority. Whereas this authority was previously limited to a commander’s immediate vicinity, it now granted 

commanders located anywhere within the Joint Operating Area authority to provide assistance anywhere in the region, provided they coordinated with NORTHCOM through Joint 

Task Force Katrina.208 Th e combination of this order with the vocal direction from Deputy 

Secretary England and General Myers broadened the authority of military commanders to 

operate domestically, and was an extraordinary departure from the Department’s ordinary 

procedures. Because the Deputy Secretary and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs had encouraged commanders to use their inherent authority to pre-position assets into the disaster area 

(while coordinating with NORTHCOM), this order now permitted any pre-positioned unit 

to provide assistance using the expanded immediate response authority. 

Navy 

Th e Committee found that, overall, the Navy showed a strong willingness to push assets 

into response eff orts, ultimately sending more than 20 ships and 100 aircraft into the Gulf 

of Mexico, oft en in advance of a request or an order. Th e Navy provided a wide variety of 

mobile platforms for landing and servicing aircraft , treating patients, transporting enormous quantities of cargo and commodities, in addition to land-based assets which included 

engineering battalions of Seabees and logistics support.209 But more than other services’ assets, which may oft en arrive by air in a matter of hours, the mobility of the Navy’s primary 

assets is limited by the “time-distance” problem: An immutable factor in a ship’s ability to 

arrive on scene is the distance it must travel and its maximum steaming speed. In this case, 

the presence of the helicopter carrier USS Bataan in the Gulf of Mexico prior to Katrina 

proved extremely fortunate, for many of the ships had to steam from Norfolk, Virginia, and 

with the combined preparation and steaming time, did not arrive in the Gulf until Saturday 

and Sunday.210 But preparations for the ships’ deployment began shortly aft er landfall, even 

as the initial lack of damage assessments created an information vacuum. 

In accordance with standard practice for hurricanes, Second Fleet Commander Vice Admiral 

Mark Fitzgerald placed a group of three amphibious-warfare ships in port in Norfolk, VA, on 

24-hour alert for possible deployment.211 Th ese three ships – the USS Iwo Jima, USS Shreveport, and USS Tortuga – had been previously designated as the Expeditionary Strike Group 

(ESG) to respond to contingencies on the East Coast or in the Atlantic Ocean.212 Th e ESG 

has large-deck vessels for landing helicopters, “well-decks” for retrieving amphibious landing 

craft , signifi cant hangar and deck space for supplies, refueling capacity for helicopters, and facilities to provide showers, food, and water for both victims and response personnel. Admiral 

Fitzgerald also contacted Coast Guard Vice Admiral Vivien Crea, on Tuesday morning, and 

“off ered help” from the Navy. He credits this channel of coordination as essential to the events 

of the fi rst week; he had diffi culty communicating with General Honoré and with NORTHCOM because of the initial focus on National Guard and Army land-based missions.213 Ad-
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489

miral Crea confi rmed that, “Th e Navy was very proactive in sending things down. We didn’t 

have to ask them. ... Th ey started diverting ships and aircraft that direction.”214

Meanwhile, having been stationed in the Gulf of Mexico at the conclusion of a previously 

scheduled exercise held prior to Katrina, the USS Bataan followed Katrina, and by Tuesday 

morning was within 150 to 200 miles of New Orleans.215 Watching the news, the vessel’s 

commanders began identifying ways to help. At 3 p.m. CT, the Bataan received orders from 

Second Fleet to send helicopters into New Orleans to conduct search and rescue missions 

in coordination with Coast Guard District Eight.216 Th e Navy and Marine Corps helicopters were in the air by 5 p.m., and reported to the Coast Guard Air Station commander,217

that, as the designated On-Scene Commander, held responsibility for coordinating all air 

search-and-rescue assets. Th ey were joined by two Navy SH-3 helicopters from Pensacola 

that arrived unannounced at the Coast Guard station, off ering their services.218 In all, USS

Bataan’s aircraft rescued, evacuated, or transported over 2,000 persons.219

Fleet Forces Command and Second Fleet identifi ed Rear Admiral Joseph Kilkenny, Commander of the USS Harry S. Truman Carrier Strike Group, to represent the Navy on the 

proposed Joint Task Force Katrina under General Honoré.220 Th e Task Force was formally 

established late Tuesday night; Admiral Kilkenny fl ew to Naval Air Station Pensacola 

Wednesday morning,221 where he began coordinating the deployment of Navy helicopters to the region.222 Admiral Kilkenny echoed Admiral Fitzgerald’s statement that General Honoré was diffi cult to reach during the fi rst few days, but that he was able to report 

back on his actions through Second Fleet;223 Admiral Kilkenny said that he knew General 

Honoré’s general intentions to focus on the immediate saving of lives through search and 

rescue, and could proceed by simply coordinating with Second Fleet.224

At 3 p.m. CT Tuesday, Fleet Forces Command had directed Second Fleet to launch the ESG. 

USS Iwo Jima, USS Shreveport, and USS Tortuga left Norfolk, Virginia, on Wednesday, 

scheduled to arrive off the Louisiana coast on Sunday aft ernoon.225 Th ey carried a standard 

load of equipment called the Disaster Relief Kit. Th e kit included supplies such as bulldozers, medical supplies, water purifi cation, and other equipment.226 Fleet Forces Command 

then deployed the aircraft carrier Truman (without orders from NORTHCOM) in order 

to provide fuel and deck space for the rapidly increasing fl eet of helicopters. Th e aircraft 

carrier departed Norfolk on Th ursday. On Friday NORTHCOM submitted a Request For 

Forces to the Joint Staff asking that Truman be committed to the response.227 Th e Truman 

was tasked with supporting the Joint Task Force upon its arrival off the coast of Biloxi, MS, 

on Sunday, September 4.228

On Th ursday, Admiral Crea requested that Second Fleet assist with clearing channels in 

order to reopen shipping lanes into New Orleans and the Mississippi River, one of the 

nation’s most critical commercial routes, as quickly as possible.229 USS Grapple deployed the 

same day, assisting with salvage operations in Pascagoula, MS, on September 6. Th e minecountermeasures ship USNS Altair deployed from Ingleside, TX, on Friday, September 2, 

and commenced port clearance operations on Saturday, September 3, arriving alongside 

the pier in New Orleans the same day.230 With the channel clear, the Tortuga was able to 

proceed up the river on Sunday, followed by the Iwo Jima on Monday, September 5. 

In addition to serving as General Honoré’s headquarters for the Joint Task Force in New 

Orleans, USS Iwo Jima provided showers, food, and rest for the fi rst responders who had 

operated in the devastated city for a week. As the ship’s captain described in an e-mail on 

September 6: 

We are one [of] the few full service airports in the area and have been operating aircraft ... for almost 15 hours each day. We are also one of the only air 
Chapter 26

490

conditioned facilities within a 10 mile radius and ... we are also the only hot 

shower within miles. All day long we have been accommodating local policemen, fi remen, state troopers, National Guard, 82nd Airborne division personnel with hot showers and hot food.231

Numerous other ships and forces deployed, including the High Speed Vessel USS Swift, to 

replenish USS Bataan with disaster relief supplies, three Logistics Support vessels, and four 

amphibious hover-landing craft to transport supplies into New Orleans.232 Th e hospital ship 

USNS Comfort had begun its preparations on Sunday before landfall; because its specialized 

personnel and equipment required additional preparation time, it deployed from Baltimore, 

MD, on Friday, September 2, arriving in Pascagoula, MS, on September 9.233

Th e Navy also deployed medium-lift and heavy-lift helicopters from 15 squadrons throughout the country. In addition to those already operating from the USS Bataan, a total of 50 

rotary- wing aircraft deployed from Jacksonville, Norfolk, Corpus Christi, and San Diego,234

to assist with search and rescue, evacuation, and logistical operations. (See Chapter 21, 

Search and Rescue) Th e heavy-lift H-53 aircraft assisted the levee-repair operations, dropping sandbags into the breaches.235

Army

General Honoré, based at Fort Gillem, GA, as Commanding General of First Army, planned 

to deploy to the Gulf Coast as soon as the storm had cleared. Although he had not been 

ordered to do so, he wanted to establish himself in the area to be positioned advantageously 

as the response progressed: “My thought was ‘get there,’ because the fi rst rule of war is 

you’ve got to get there,” he said.236 His authority as an Army commander permitted him 

to move from one military installation to another provided that such a movement could 

be considered training. Th us, he created an “Exercise Katrina,” and in coordination with 

NORTHCOM and his superior offi cer at Army Forces Command, planned his move to 

Camp Shelby, an Army facility in southern Mississippi. 

General Honoré explained that it was not in his nature to wait for a Request for Assistance 

or deployment orders prior to moving: “Th at is a response, sometimes, by folks to say, ‘Let’s 

wait until they ask for something.’ But in this case, we’ve got a case where we need to save 

life and limb. We can’t wait for a [Request for Assistance] or shouldn’t be waiting for one. If 

there’s capability, we need to start moving.”237

General Honoré informed NORTHCOM and Admiral Keating of his plan to deploy to 

Camp Shelby on Monday aft ernoon,238 but because Katrina continued to track northward 

from the Gulf Coast, he could not move until Tuesday morning.239 He arrived at 11 a.m. 

CT240 and surveyed the base and the surrounding region of Gulfport and Biloxi, which 

looked to him like they “had been hit by a nuclear weapon.”241 General Honoré had previously received NORTHCOM’s warning order to “be prepared to establish [Joint Task Force] 

Katrina covering the states of LA, MS, AL, FL, KY, TN, and GA for command and control of 

consequence management operations resulting from the severe weather caused by Hurricane 

Katrina.”242 (A Warning Order instructs a commander to take all necessary preparations so as 

to be able to react immediately to a likely forthcoming Deployment Order or Execute Order). 

A NORTHCOM Execute Order, sent at 4 p.m. CT, alerted him to establish the Joint Task 

Force “on order.”243 At 10 p.m. CT, he received that order, offi cially converting his training 

mission into an operational mission.244 General Honoré assumed control over all active-duty 

forces then and subsequently involved in the response within the above states, now designated as the Joint Operating Area; he would report to NORTHCOM. 
Military Operations

491

With General Honoré now in command of an area which bridged the areas of responsibility of First Army and Fift h Army, Fift h Army wanted to provide assistance to him. Colonel Daskevich, the DCO for Louisiana, lacked the necessary personnel and equipment to 

eff ectively cope with the constant fl ow of information and demands for his assistance from 

numerous levels and organizations. Fift h Army Deputy Commander Brigadier General 

Mark Graham deployed from Fort Hood on Wednesday to provide more senior DOD 

representation in Baton Rouge, and to handle the requests from higher levels. Bringing a 

small headquarters planning staff , he arrived at the Louisiana Emergency Operations Center 

at 5 p.m. CT and in a meeting with Governor Blanco, Louisiana Adjutant General Bennett 

Landreneau, and General Honoré was soon assigned the task of planning and coordinating 

the evacuation of New Orleans. 245

Preparing for Deployment of Federal Troops

Of the vast quantity and range of military forces which deployed to the Katrina response, from 

ships and aircraft to medical teams and amphibious-assault craft , one deployment is distinguished from all others – one for which no FEMA mission assignment was issued, and which 

did not originate from a decision within DOD. On Saturday, September 3, the President 

ordered 7,200 troops from the high-alert units of the Army and the Marine Corps to deploy 

to Louisiana and Mississippi for the general purpose of humanitarian assistance. Although the 

Committee has not been provided access to documents and individuals explaining the reason 

for this deployment, the next section in this chapter will further discuss the events leading up 

to the deployment, beginning with Governor Blanco’s plea to President Bush on the night of 

August 29 for “everything you have got” and continuing through further requests and discussions between Louisiana, NORTHCOM, and Washington, D.C. Th e following will present 

the preparations conducted by the Army and the Marine Corps, which began, as might be 

expected of prudent commanders, with planning for assistance that might be required, despite 

lack of specifi c guidance. Although the preparations within the Army and the Marine Corps 

proceeded on very similar timetables, the Committee has been unable to establish whether 

these preparations were conducted in coordination with or based on guidance from NORTHCOM, the Joint Staff , or the Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, or whether the 

services were preparing individually to react to the growing crisis in New Orleans. 

82nd Airborne Division

Th e 82nd Airborne Division, commanded by Major General William Caldwell and based at 

Fort Bragg, NC, includes a combat unit known as the Division Ready Brigade, which consists of about 3,700 soldiers, is maintained on a high state of readiness, and has an advance 

element prepared to deploy anywhere in the world within 18 hours of receiving orders.246

Beginning Tuesday, the Division’s planning cell identifi ed the assets that might be required 

to assist in the hurricane response, reviewed standing procedures for hurricane preparation, and consulted with an experienced DCO on the NRP and the standard procedures for 

providing assistance to civil authorities. Wednesday evening, Forces Command ordered 

that the Army “be prepared to provide a brigade-size force to operate distribution centers, 

and/or if appropriate authorization were received, conduct crowd control and security in 

the vicinity of New Orleans.”247

General Caldwell considered this guidance to be vague, and merely a codifi cation of the general guidance provided by Forces Command in preparation for hurricane season, but issued 

an internal warning order to the Division Ready Brigade, increasing the state of readiness. 

Although the Division usually keeps an advance team of only 120 soldiers on two-hour recall, 

General Caldwell ordered all 5,000 soldiers to stand by in two-hour response mode.248
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492

Aft er receiving a call Friday morning from the Commander of Forces Command, which to 

him signaled a high likelihood of involvement, General Caldwell directed his staff to commence an exercise simulating a rapid deployment, combining all elements of the brigade 

– aviation, infantry, logistics, communications, and certain types of support. He also coordinated with Lieutenant General Robert Dale of U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), based at Scott Air Force Base in St. Louis, MO, to pre-position four C-17 transport 

aircraft at Pope Air Force Base in North Carolina, in preparation for the deployment. 249

Friday evening, Forces Command issued warning orders 

indicating that a deployment was likely, the fi rst specifi c 

indication to General Caldwell that the Division Ready 

Brigade would, on short notice, be required to assist with 

the distribution of commodities, crowd control, and 

security in New Orleans.250

On Saturday morning the President announced the 

deployment in an address to the nation: 

Today I ordered the Department of Defense to 

deploy additional active-duty forces to the region. 

Over the next 24 to 72 hours, more than 7,000 

additional troops from the 82nd Airborne, from 

the 1st Cavalry, the 1st Marine Expeditionary 

Force, and the 2nd Marine Expeditionary Force 

will arrive in the aff ected areas. Th ese forces will 

be on the ground and operating under the direct 

command of General Russ Honoré.251

Th is public announcement was the fi rst word that General Caldwell received that his brigade would deploy, 

although offi cial orders from Forces Command arrived 

early in the aft ernoon.252 General Caldwell contacted 

General Honoré, who told him: “[G]et here as fast as you 

can.” General Honoré also asked General Caldwell to 

bring a substantial command-and-control capability, by 

which he meant the appropriate personnel, equipment, 

and communications assets to plan, direct, and coordinate the numerous missions required of them. General 

Caldwell adjusted his deployment package correspondingly, adding several headquarters elements to enable the 

coordination and integration of ground forces, aviation 

units, and support personnel.253

Th e deployment began within hours; General Caldwell arrived in New Orleans seven hours 

aft er the President’s announcement. “Fix the airport, and fi x New Orleans” was General 

Honoré’s guidance. Over the next two days, the 82nd Airborne presence swelled to more 

than 3,000 soldiers, many of whom arrived in a convoy of nearly 1,400 vehicles from Fort 

Bragg, North Carolina.254

General Caldwell then learned further from General Honoré that his mission was, fi rst, to 

conduct search and rescue, then to provide humanitarian assistance, and third to provide 

presence. In its initial days, the 82nd Airborne assisted in restoring order at New Orleans 

International Airport and at the Convention Center, which continued to be a focal point for 

evacuees throughout the city, simply through their presence, and established connections 

Soldiers heading for the 

Gulf Coast

Army National Guard photo
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with the New Orleans Police Department. “I think the biggest, I’ll be honest, [thing] we 

probably did was to give them a sense of assurance that everybody is there to help you,” As 

General Caldwell said.255 Beginning Sunday, the 82nd Airborne worked with the National 

Guard in dividing the city into search sectors, and on Monday amplifi ed FEMA’s search efforts by providing helicopters, boats, trucks, and additional troops to the Urban Search and 

Rescue (USAR) teams.256

First Cavalry Division

Th e First Air Cavalry Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division in Fort Hood, TX, which consists of 

an aviation unit of UH-60 utility helicopters and CH-47 heavy-lift helicopters and a battalion 

of 1,500 troops, had begun “prudent planning” prior to landfall. Th e fi rst order for two UH60s arrived on Tuesday morning as a result of FEMA’s request to support the Rapid Needs 

Assessment teams in Louisiana. Later that day, the brigade received orders for six additional 

aircraft , which departed for New Orleans on Wednesday and joined the Louisiana National 

Guard search-and-rescue eff orts based at the Superdome.257 (See Chapter 21.)

On Wednesday, the brigade received a warning order to prepare a command-and-control 

headquarters element for Title 10 (federalized National Guard) forces,258 a conduit for communications and planning consisting of 50 soldiers. Accordingly, the brigade commander, 

Colonel Dan Shanahan, departed to Naval Air Station Belle Chasse in New Orleans on 

Th ursday evening, reporting to Joint Task Force Katrina as an aviation task force in command 

of Army aviation units, and coordinating with the Coast Guard.259 A medical evacuation unit 

of nine helicopters arrived from Fort Benning, GA, joining search-and-rescue eff orts, evacuation, and distribution of food and water.By September 11, 50 aircraft were operating in 

Colonel Shanahan’s task force, although there was “always a need for more aircraft .”260

Th e Second Brigade Combat Team of the 1st Cavalry Division also received warning orders 

from Forces Command.261 Like General Caldwell, Brigade Commander Colonel Bryan 

Roberts described the message’s guidance as very general, but he ordered his staff to begin 

preparing approximately 300 light and heavy vehicles for deployment. Th eir vehicles were 

undergoing maintenance following their recent return from Iraq, and so needed a 72-hour 

period to ready for deployment. Colonel Roberts understood that the mission would likely 

involve search and rescue, evacuation, debris removal, traffi c control, and distribution of 

commodities. Colonel Roberts believed the soldiers were well-versed in these tasks because 

they had performed similar missions in their overseas commitments.262

Colonel Roberts fl ew to New Orleans International Airport on Friday in order to survey the 

area where he expected the team to stage.263 He returned to Fort Hood Saturday morning; 

by the time he arrived, the President had announced that the 1st Cavalry Division would 

deploy that day along with the 82nd Airborne.264 He arrived with his advance element on 

Sunday and reported to General Caldwell. Colonel Roberts’s unit began to arrive on Monday, with 1,638 troops on-site by Tuesday.

Th e 1st Cavalry operated primarily in Algiers Parish, on the south bank of the Mississippi 

River, conducting door-to-door search-and-rescue operations. Evacuation was to be voluntary only. Soldiers received guidance to knock on doors, and off er food, water, and assistance, and were all briefed on the Rules on the Use of Force,265 which explained the implications of the Posse Comitatus Act, which prohibits federal military forces from engaging in 

law-enforcement duties. Th e rules stated, “Force will be used only as last resort. If you must 

use force to fulfi ll your duties, use the minimum force required.”266 Th e 133rd Field Artillery Regiment of the Texas National Guard was embedded within the brigade in order to 

provide law-enforcement capability to the brigade as it patrolled the parish.267
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Marine Corps

II Marine Expeditionary Force and 4th Marine Division 

Much like the Army commands described above, commands within the Marine Corps 

planned, beginning mid-week, for the deployment of troops that were the most prepared and 

set at the highest level of alert posture. Unlike the Army, however, the Marines took additional preparatory actions for a major troop deployment, including positioning a headquarters command element in New Orleans, and sending engineering equipment via Navy ships. 

Indeed, evidence before the Committee suggests that the Marines may have ordered a signifi -

cant portion of their troops and assets to deploy prior to the President’s order on Saturday.

Lieutenant General James Amos, Commander of the II Marine Expeditionary Force based 

at Camp Lejeune, NC, called together his Planning Team immediately aft er landfall on 

Monday. Having begun to identify engineering equipment and aircraft in the preceding 

days, he now instructed his staff to plan for a major deployment of air and ground forces.268

As with the Norfolk-based naval units, there were initially no orders from NORTHCOM or 

the Joint Staff directing these Marine units to deploy. But mid-day Tuesday, aft er the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs had urged the services to be proactive in moving forces forward, 

General Amos received a Warning Order from his superior offi cer, the Commander of 

Marine Forces Atlantic, directing him to prepare to deploy the helicopters his staff had 

already identifi ed.269

On Th ursday, General Amos deployed helicopters and transport aircraft to Naval Air Station Pensacola in preparation for a variety of support missions.270 Expecting that tasking 

would soon be forthcoming for “lots of Marines,” he loaded his engineering equipment 

onto the USS Iwo Jima Strike Group on Th ursday271 and sent an advance party to establish a 

command-and-control headquarters at Naval Air Station Belle Chasse.272 In anticipation of 

a deployment order he “put them [the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (24 MEU), an infantry battalion of 1,200 Marines] on their packs” in preparation to deploy as early as Friday.273

At the time, the 24 MEU was the Marine equivalent of the Army’s Division Ready Brigade, 

postured at the highest state of readiness and prepared to deploy anywhere in the world. 

Evidence and testimony received by the Committee suggest that the Marine deployments 

were not fully coordinated within DOD, and that NORTHCOM was not fully aware of 

Marine Corps eff orts in the Gulf. General Amos e-mailed General Honoré on Th ursday 

morning, writing that he was sending helicopters and engineering equipment. “What can I 

do for you?” he asked.274 General Honoré responded, “HELLO BROTHER GET HERE AS 

FAST AS YOU CAN.”275 Friday morning, when General Amos told General Honoré of his 

intentions to send a command-and-control suite to New Orleans, General Honoré replied: 

“[It’s] hitting fan get here fast as you can.”276 Th at day General Amos fl ew fi ve aircraft to 

Belle Chasse carrying 150 Marines – the majority of the battalion’s command element – 

along with a mobile communications suite, capable of establishing a command-and-control 

headquarters anywhere in the world.277 An e-mail to General Rowe of NORTHCOM from 

one of his planners shows that the Marines’ preparatory movements were not coordinated 

with NORTHCOM: “Th ey do not have orders to move out yet but they are inside our [Joint 

Operating Area] w/out [Joint Task Force Katrina] or [NORTHCOM visibility].”278

General O’Dell stated that a plan was already in place for the full deployment of Marines: “I 

knew it was General Amos’s intention to deploy 24 MEU.”279 As General Amos confi rmed, 

“I anticipated them leaving on Friday. I fi gured the [deployment] order was going to be 

signed on Friday.”280 Th e Committee received evidence that at least a preliminary or partial 

deployment order was signed on Friday.281 On that date, Marine Forces Atlantic directed that 

a Marine task force, to consist of a broad range of air and ground amphibious assault assets 

from the 24 MEU and the Marine Reserve Forces, begin deploying on Friday, September 2, 
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495

and fully deploy no later than Saturday, September 3.282 Th e troops were to deploy to Naval 

Air Station Belle Chasse, using their authority to reposition from one military base to another (as General Honoré had done in his initial movement to Camp Shelby) and to prepare 

to support General Honoré. Once established at Belle Chasse, they would be able to provide 

support on the expanded Immediate Response Authority granted by NORTHCOM. 

Under these authorities, the deployment order appears to have been given in the spirit of 

General Myers’s guidance encouraging the services to pre-position assets to enable their 

rapid employment when requested by FEMA. However, the deployment does not appear 

to have been fully coordinated within DOD. In particular, unlike all other troop deployments into the area under NORTHCOM’s command, there had been no corresponding 

request for forces from NORTHCOM. General Rowe stated that although he knew General 

Amos and General Honoré were communicating, he was unaware of the specifi c exchanges 

leading up to the order: “Th at’s one part of the help that I will have to give you that we did 

not ask for. However, I am aware that General Amos and General Honoré corresponded. 

General Honoré shared that with me, that General Honoré at that point said the help would 

be appreciated.”283

Furthermore, this urgent need for the deployment of Marine troops does not appear to have 

been fully communicated to other DOD offi cials considering whether there was a need to 

deploy active-duty troops. 

Th e next day, Saturday, September 3, the President issued a broad order for the deployment of active-duty ground troops. Because General Amos had anticipated the deployment 

for several days, with his Marines “sitting on their packs,” they were “ready to go. ... I was 

determined that when we got the Execute Order, we were going to darken the skies with 

C-130s and get them down there as quickly as we can.”284 Over the next 28 hours, aircraft 

ferried 1,250 troops, now reporting to General O’Dell,285 who had been appointed as Marine 

Component Commander for the Joint Task Force, reporting directly to General Honoré. 

General O’Dell confi rmed that the Friday order from Marine Forces Atlantic was subsumed 

into the President’s order on Saturday: “Prior to the President’s order, for planning, I knew that 

we would have elements of my division as I’ve described and 24 MEU from Camp Lejeune ... 

available.” Most signifi cantly, he added that the only thing that the President’s order changed 

about the Marines’ plans was that an element from the West Coast joined the 24 MEU.286

Th e forces initially operated in southwestern Mississippi, and then moved to St. Bernard 

Parish and the Lower Ninth Ward in New Orleans to perform door-to-door search and 

rescue missions. Th e West Coast-based Marines of the 11 MEU, however, were an unexpected capability. General O’Dell explained that he had not incorporated them into his 

plans, and that it was a challenge for him to provide them appropriate tasking and operating space: “We had to fi nd work for them. We really had to look to fi nd work for them.”287

Ultimately, he said, the 11 MEU was tasked with debris removal in Slidell, Louisiana, where 

their eff orts were initially welcomed, “but toward the end of the ten-day period, they were 

picking up sticks in granny’s yard.”288

U.S. Air Force and U.S. Transportation Command

Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) holds responsibility for ground, air, and sea 

logistical and transportation support to military operations, and is assigned a supporting 

role to the Department of Health and Human Services in patient evacuation operations. 

Th e command had alerted C-17 and C-5 transport aircraft on August 28; the crews were in 

three-hour standby status. According to Brigadier General Paul Selva, Director of Opera-
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496

tions, TRANSCOM again followed its standard practice 12 hours aft er landfall, alerting 

eight additional aircraft .289

Th e fi rst mission received was to transport eight Swift Water rescue teams from Travis and 

March Air Force Bases in California to Louisiana for surface search and rescue.290 Although 

Deputy Secretary England approved the request by 11 a.m. on Tuesday, TRANSCOM still 

had to locate a suitable airfi eld to receive these heavy-lift aircraft . Colonel Glen Joerger was 

assigned on Monday as the TRANSCOM liaison to FEMA in Washington, D.C., and arranged 

for Contingency Response Groups – on alert since Sunday – to deploy to re-open the New 

Orleans and Gulfport airports; both had been fl ooded, and their lighting and communications 

systems had suff ered damage.291 As a result, it was determined that the aircraft would land at 

Lafayette Regional Airport while the larger fi elds were reopened. Th e Response Groups evaluated the condition, restoring lighting, communications, and navigation systems, and performing maintenance on departing planes. By Tuesday evening, the airports were reopened, and 

the TRANSCOM aircraft were able to land with the Swift Water teams.292

Some witnesses attributed the timeline of this mission to a delay within DOD in approving 

the mission assignment for the aircraft . And although the request was initiated during the 

period in which DOD’s culture of reluctance is said to have slowed the approval process, the 

record shows that DOD personnel began work on this assignment on Monday, August 29, 

and that any delay was introduced by the diffi culty in fi nding a suitable landing fi eld rather 

than by the approval process itself.

On Th ursday evening, September 1, DOD received a mission assignment to airlift evacuees 

from New Orleans to Houston.293 Th e Joint Staff processed the request on Friday, but the fi rst 

evacuation airlift from the New Orleans International Airport had already occurred by 8 a.m. 

Th ursday morning.294 Th e TRANSCOM operations at the airport actually involved three separate missions, according to Colonel Joerger: patient evacuation, citizen evacuation, and cargo 

delivery.295 TRANSCOM provided 15 transport aircraft – fi ve C-17s, C-5s, and C-130s each 

– for the evacuation of patients as part of the National Disaster Medical System296 (National 

Disaster Medical System is an interagency system to evacuate patients and individuals with 

critical needs from hospitals in the event of an emergency). (See Chapter 22.) TRANSCOM 

evacuated 21,000 people from New Orleans by air between Th ursday and Saturday.297

TRANSCOM also played a major role in the deployment of the 82nd Airborne Division. Once 

the deployment appeared likely to the division commander, TRANSCOM pre-positioned four 

C-17s at Pope Air Force Base in North Carolina on Friday aft ernoon.298 When the President 

ordered the troops to deploy on Saturday morning, TRANSCOM diverted additional aircraft 

to Pope, enabling the movement of personnel, vehicles, helicopters, and supplies, to New 

Orleans International Airport within hours of the President’s order.299

Standing Joint Force Headquarters-North

Th ough General Honoré initially deployed as commander of the First Army, with only a 

small staff , his command eventually grew to more than 22,000 personnel from all branches 

of the armed services.300 Th e Joint Task Force Katrina command structure grew more complex by the day, incorporating additional command elements as additional assets from the 

diff erent services were absorbed into the Task Force. Admiral Kilkenny arrived on Wednesday as the Commander of the Navy component and General O’Dell took command of the 

Marine component on Saturday; additionally Major General M. Scott Mayes, Commander 

of the First Air Force, based at Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida, arrived late in the week 

to take command of the Air Force assets and to coordinate control of the airspace with the 

Federal Aviation Association.301
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497

It became apparent to NORTHCOM that additional measures were necessary to maintain 

command and control over the many active-duty assets and to coordinate with the evergrowing number of National Guard forces. Admiral Keating, for instance, reported that 

he had little sense of National Guard capabilities beyond simply the numbers of troops 

being deployed.302 As for active-duty troops, he reported that aft er the President ordered 

7,200 troops to mobilize, 8,800 actually deployed,303 many of whom were included based on 

personal requests from General Honoré to his fellow generals. As a result, NORTHCOM 

had diffi culty maintaining an operational picture of the total military involvement. General 

Rowe complained in an e-mail to General Honoré, that he was “getting killed by the ‘good 

ideas fl owing.’ ... Right now I have an unexplained 13th Corps support command fl owing 

– about a thousand more 82nd Abn division than we asked for, odd Navy comms pieces. 

Unexplained marines. Services are killing me off of buddy deals.”304

Once NORTHCOM had assumed control of the active-duty military response on Tuesday, 

headquarters deployed planning and coordination elements. But on Friday, NORTHCOM 

decided to deploy Standing Joint Force Headquarters-North, a NORTHCOM entity designed to rapidly deploy a command and control element, led by General Moulton. 305

General Moulton arrived with a staff of 38 in New Orleans Saturday morning, just prior 

to the deployment of the 7,200 active-duty troops. He established his headquarters at the 

Naval Air Station. His fi rst task was to integrate National Guard forces with active-duty 

ground troops to take advantage of the National Guard’s law enforcement capabilities because the Posse Comitatus Act prohibits active-duty troops from engaging in law enforcement.306 Th ey also had to coordinate the numerous assets devoted to the search-and-rescue 

mission, which was currently operating under diff erent commands and following diff erent 

procedures. Th e Standing Joint Force Headquarters established a common search-and-rescue grid and assigned responsibilities to the various entities involved. 

Finally, General Moulton transitioned from search-and-rescue coordination to broader 

planning of the federal response for Coast Guard Vice Admiral Th ad Allen, the Deputy 

Principal Federal Offi cial, who later replaced Michael Brown as Principal Federal Offi cial 

(PFO). General Honoré assigned General Moulton, together with General Graham from 

Fift h Army, to provide the PFO with operational planning assistance in incorporating DOD 

resources into the overall eff ort.307

Logistics 

In disaster response, commodities fl ow into an area called the Federal Operational Staging 

Area. Oft en, this is a DOD facility.308 Under the NRP, the Army Corps of Engineers is responsible for procuring water and ice. Th e Army Corps contracts with vendors to purchase these 

goods, directing these vendors to deliver the commodities to the Operational Staging Area.

As for food, the other major commodity, FEMA typically requests military Meals Ready to 

Eat (MREs), which are ultimately supplied by the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). FEMA 

assigns the General Services Administration (GSA) to arrange to have the MREs delivered 

to the Operational Staging Areas.309

A FEMA representative, usually from the aff ected FEMA region, manages these Operational 

Staging Areas. Based on priorities established by the state, the FEMA representative directs 

the movement of commodities from the staging area to locations in the state called Points of 

Distribution (PODs).310 State and local personnel, oft en supervised by the National Guard, 

distribute goods at the PODs to the people who need them. 

NORTHCOM had begun planning for large-scale logistics missions prior to Katrina’s landfall. Aft er landfall, NORTHCOM’s logisticians were involved in the evacuation of patients, 
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498

and were “heavily involved” in the evacuation of people from the Superdome.311 However, 

prior to Friday, September 2, NORTHCOM was aware of, but not heavily involved with, 

FEMA’s actions in moving commodities into the Gulf Coast. 

Although DOD had been called upon to assist in the movement of commodities in past 

hurricanes, including Hurricane Ivan along the Gulf Coast in 2004, NORTHCOM’s planners did not know before Friday that there was a need for them to become more involved 

in that issue in the Katrina response.312 Nor did the planners, a subset of the NORTHCOM 

organization, believe they could become more actively involved without a request to do so 

from FEMA.313 Said a senior NORTHCOM planner, “We didn’t have details at that point in 

time, or real authority to gather those details.”314

On Th ursday, September 1, FEMA began asking DOD to take on responsibilities beyond those 

it had been called upon to fulfi ll in past disasters. For example, FEMA requested that DOD 

“provide airlift capability to transport” people being evacuated from New Orleans to Houston, 

Texas, with a cost estimate of $20 million.315 On that same day, FEMA also asked DOD to assist 

in the logistics of moving food and water to New Orleans and elsewhere on the Gulf Coast.316

As the magnitude of the disaster was becoming clearer, there was growing concern among 

FEMA offi cials that Gulf Coast residents’ basic needs for food and water were not being 

met, and that FEMA’s logistics operation was becoming overwhelmed and would be unable 

to meet them. 

Late Tuesday night or early Wednesday morning,317 FEMA Director Michael Brown discussed with FEMA’s Federal Coordinating Offi cer (FCO) in Louisiana, William Lokey, the 

need to expand DOD’s role in the response, including logistics.318 Brown said he raised this 

issue with personnel in the White House and urged them to declare an insurrection and 

federalize the entire response eff ort.319 However, the Committee found no evidence that 

Brown’s desire to have DOD play a larger role in logistics was communicated by FEMA offi cials to DOD offi cials until Th ursday, September 1.320

On Th ursday, Ed Buikema, the Acting Director of the Response Division at FEMA, approached Ken Burris, the Acting Director of Operations, and said that FEMA needed DOD’s 

help with commodities, supplies, and logistics321 because the high water made it ”very 

diffi cult delivering supplies and commodities,”322 because of DOD’s human and material 

resources,323 and because of the reports of civil disturbance “playing out on television.”324

Buikema’s view was that “DOD is very well equipped to not only deliver things in diffi cult 

situations, but also to provide the security that is commensurate to delivering that kind of 

service.”325 Burris agreed.326 Although FEMA moved more truckloads of commodities in the 

days following landfall than they did for all four major hurricanes that hit Florida in 2004,327

Burris thought that it still wasn’t enough to “keep up with the consumption rate.”328

Lokey thought the request was necessary, less as a response to a specifi c set of challenging 

circumstances, than as a catch-all to cover all aspects of a rapidly changing and generally 

overwhelming situation.329 According to him, this request was to “cover the eventualities 

... because ... what we were faced with was well beyond anything I felt our system could 

handle.”330 Although Lokey’s view was that DOD did not need to take over all logistics,331

then-FEMA Director Brown says that was exactly what he wanted DOD to do.332

Aft er speaking with Buikema on Th ursday morning,333 Burris called Colonel Chavez in the 

Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.334 Burris told Colonel 

Chavez that “Th e FEMA logistics capability has been overwhelmed,” and that he “wants 

DOD to take over logistics operations in Louisiana and Mississippi.”335 Colonel Chavez 

viewed this request as extraordinary because it appeared FEMA was asking DOD to take 
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499

over its job.336 Colonel Chavez says he asked Burris, “is this really what you want us to do, 

take over the function? He indicated that that is indeed what they wanted to do.”337 Colonel 

Chavez told Burris that the request “would require a Secretary DHS to Secretary DOD call 

to initiate and signifi cant General Counsel input.”338

Th e NRP stipulates that DOD is a supporting agency to all 15 ESFs. Th us, they are 

on notice that they may be called upon to assist civilian authorities in a variety of ways. However, in this instance, the civilian agency – FEMA – was asking DOD to take over a role it had 

not traditionally played in disaster response, and which is not listed as one of DOD’s support 

functions in any of the listed ESFs.339 Th us, Colonel Chavez’s surprise is understandable. 

Aft er conferring with Colonel Chavez, Burris modifi ed his request to state that FEMA 

wanted DOD to “provide the support and planning and execution of the full logistical 

support to the Katrina disaster in all declared states in coordination with FEMA.”340 Burris 

also conveyed the information to DHS Secretary Chertoff so he could make the request to 

Secretary Rumsfeld.341

Meanwhile, DOD sought clarifi cation from offi cials at FEMA and from the Homeland Security Operations Center at DHS about the meaning of “full logistics support.”342 As details 

of the potential mission were being collected, Secretary Rumsfeld and Assistant Secretary 

McHale conferred with General Duncan McNabb, the Logistics Director for the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff .343 In the Secretary’s offi ce, Assistant Secretary McHale asked General McNabb 

whether DOD could perform this mission. “We can,” General McNabb told him. 344

On Friday, September 2, FEMA sent the mission assignment to DOD. It stated:

Assistance Requested: FEMA request[s] that DOD provide planning and execution for the procurement, transportation and distribution of ice, water, food, 

fuel and medical supplies in support of the Katrina [disaster] in Louisiana and 

Mississippi.345

When DOD performs work pursuant to an approved FEMA mission assignment, DOD 

is reimbursed for the amount it costs DOD to perform that work up to the total amount 

“obligated” or authorized by FEMA. FEMA authorized spending $1 billion for this assignment.346 Both FEMA and DOD viewed the billion-dollar total as an estimate, but one large 

enough to give DOD authority “to do what needed to be done” to get commodities moving 

into the Gulf Coast. 347

In the words of Assistant Secretary McHale, it “may well have been the single most complex 

civil support mission in the history of the U.S. military.”348 Ultimately, for reasons discussed below, DOD did not take over all logistics operations from FEMA, although they did 

provide signifi cant assistance. DOD plans to or has sought reimbursement from FEMA for 

only $118 million of the $1 billion dollars obligated under this mission assignment.349

Th e Secretary of Defense approved the request orally on Friday, September 2,350 and Assistant Secretary McHale notifi ed DHS Deputy Secretary Jackson of the approval on Friday in 

an e-mail.351

On Saturday, September 3, the paperwork was approved, and DOD issued its order directing 

the commander of NORTHCOM, Admiral Keating, to “plan and develop a concept of operations to execute logistical support operations in aff ected states of Louisiana and Mississippi.”352

On Friday, September 2, before the mission assignment was offi cially approved,353 NORTHCOM’s planning staff began gathering information in “excruciating detail” about what 

orders FEMA had already placed with the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), “how many 
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500

trucks are lined up, how many trucks have left , how many trucks have been loaded.”354 Th ey 

started calling the operational staging areas and collecting detailed information from the 

FEMA representatives on the ground there.355

Th ey learned that, unlike DOD, FEMA did not have “detailed supply accountability and 

the in-transit visibility of assets.”356 Th ere was no tracking methodology, and no one within 

FEMA “owned” the complete commodities-movement process.357 Th ey also learned that 

the DLA was sourcing the MREs from only two facilities,358 where loading was additionally 

constrained by space limitations and material-handling equipment.359

Commodities Crisis in Mississippi

NORTHCOM planners had little time to study FEMA’s logistics system in Louisiana 

because of a developing crisis in Mississippi. “We have got to get food and water [there],” 

Colonel Damon Penn, the DCO in Mississippi told Colonel Roberta Woods, Chief of Plans 

and Operations in NORTHCOM’s Logistics Division on Friday, September 2.360

Although the logistics mission assignment was broad, DOD’s logisticians knew from experience that they had to prioritize, and quickly.361 Colonel Woods described how she and 

her staff , using their knowledge of the DLA distribution system, worked to speed food to 

Mississippi:

I know the food’s been ordered [from DLA]. I know precisely how many 

thousands of cases have been ordered ... and I know how many have left the 

warehouse.

We discover that trucks that were inbound to Mississippi have not arrived in 

Mississippi but have been diverted to Louisiana. So ... using that [billion dollar] mission assignment... [we] make the call ... to use airlift to get some of 

those MREs into Mississippi. ... We coordinate airlift of about 50,000 cases of 

MREs into Mississippi. 

We put in the requirement to TRANSCOM to airlift . We put in the requirement to DLA to prepare the stocks for airlift . And on Saturday aft ernoon, 

evening, the 3rd, I think about 10,000 cases are fl own into Gulfport, and on 

Sunday, the 4th, 40,000 cases are fl own in.

Simultaneously now DLA is gathering more trucks to pick up MREs and have 

trucks begin delivering and – and that’s the shot in the arm. Th at surge of 

assets got Mississippi out of crisis mode and got routine fl ow into both Mississippi and Louisiana.362

NORTHCOM planners also retooled the way FEMA procured and transported commodities. 

Previously, the DLA, which supplied MREs, loaded them onto trucks that had to be arranged 

by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT).363 Th e new structure gave DLA authority 

to contract for those trucks on its own, improving the fl ow of commodities to Mississippi.364

Distribution of Commodities in Louisiana and Mississippi

As they gathered data on how FEMA’s logistics system worked, the DOD planners were still 

unsure how much of the system DOD was being asked to assume and whether FEMA was 

going to back out of logistics completely.365 Although DOD planners believed the last stage 

of commodities distribution would remain in the hands of the National Guard, they were 

not sure whether FEMA would remain in control of the operating staging areas366 – Camp 

Beauregard, Louisiana, and the three Mississippi locations – all of which stand between the 

warehouse and the state-controlled points of distribution in the supply chain. By Saturday, 
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501

September 3, DOD developed a plan for how DOD would run operations at those staging 

areas traditionally run by FEMA.367

As part of developing the plan, a DOD offi cial was tasked to “map” the commodities distribution system in Louisiana and Mississippi. Th is is how he described the process in Louisiana as of Tuesday, September 6:

In LA, trucks arriving at the FOSA are redirected to one of 20 State Receiving 

Points and from there, redirected to local Distribution Sites where the MREs, water, and ice are provided to the people of Louisiana. Th e Beauregard FOSA keeps 

records of how many trucks are directed to each State Receiving point. ... FEMA 

management at the FOSA provides C2 [command and control, in this case over 

the movement of commodities into and out of the site] of the supplies and equitably distributes based on the requirements at each State Receiving Point.368

Th e DOD offi cial explained why he saw no need for federal active-duty troops to take over 

handing out commodities at the end of the distribution chain: “Unloading capabilities vary 

signifi cantly at fi nal distribution sites but at that point in the supply chain it doesn’t make 

much diff erence. MREs could be issued from the back of the trailer if required.”369

DOD never had to take over for FEMA at the Operational Staging areas. Th e commodities 

situation was stabilized in Mississippi by the large movement of food by air, and commodities distribution never turned into a crisis in Louisiana.370 NORTHCOM’s Colonel Woods 

described DOD’s role as “very much a cooperative eff ort. FEMA stayed in – in the chain 

and in the processes, and we – we put shots in the arm, is what we did.”371

Th us, although DOD provided an important contribution to improving FEMA’s logistics 

operations, they did not – as was originally requested – “take over” those operations from 

FEMA. DOD’s contribution was to quickly bring to bear its expertise in planning and executing commodities movements. It was not to deploy large numbers of active duty troops 

to run the supply chain. In fact, large numbers of National Guard troops already deployed 

performed the bulk of the distribution work. 

Katrina demonstrated that DOD has well-developed expertise in logistics management, but 

there is no reason that FEMA could not develop a similar level of profi ciency. 

The Second Large Group of Requests For Assistance

An extraordinary number of military assets were deployed by DOD, including assets 

deployed by Presidential order and by the individual services, with the expectation their 

capabilities would be required. When Assistant Secretary McHale notifi ed DHS Deputy Secretary Jackson that the Secretary of Defense had approved the logistics mission assignment, 

he added that DOD possibly would be able to do even more.372 Given the level of devastation on the Gulf Coast, it was clear to Assistant Secretary McHale that “a much greater 

level of DOD activity was going to be required.”373 On the morning of Saturday, September 

3, shortly before the President announced his decision to deploy 7,200 active duty troops 

to Louisiana, Assistant Secretary McHale and Deputy Secretary Jackson met at the White 

House. According to Deputy Secretary Jackson, the President wanted “to get these troops 

on the ground as fast as possible, and we were determined to get the additional support 

missions defi ned with clarity and the assets that might be needed to be brought along with 

them to move them as quickly as possible.”374
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502

Meanwhile, the President had announced the deployment, and the Army and Marine forces 

had begun to mobilize. Deputy Secretary Jackson and Assistant Secretary McHale met later 

that day with Deputy Secretary England at the Pentagon to begin “aggregating and classifying and categorizing what types of mission assignment activities we thought were needed by 

DOD.375 Assistant Secretary McHale reported that they then “drew up a list of approximately 10 mission areas” in which DOD help had not yet been, but was likely to be, requested.376

Th e intent, according to Deputy Secretary Jackson, was to formulate “what are we trying 

to accomplish, what do we need to get done, how are we going to do it?”377 On Saturday, 

September 3, and the following day, DOD and DHS offi cials “at very senior levels”378 draft ed 

a group of new DOD mission assignments:379

• conduct search-and-rescue operations,

• perform security-capabilities assessment and provide security-capabilities 

advice and technical assistance, 

• collect and evacuate live persons to temporary processing centers,

• collect and remove bodies of deceased persons,

• restore fl ood-control systems, 

• transport and distribute ice, water, food and medical supplies,380

• disease prevention and control, 

• planning for the quarantine of areas within New Orleans,

• quartering and sustaining of FEMA headquarters support element and relief 

workers,

• health and medical support, 

• debris removal, 

• restoration of basic utilities and key transportation routes (land and water), 

• geospatial-surveillance products and evaluations, 

• logistical support at key air and sea distribution nodes, 

• temporary housing, and 

• long-range communications between headquarters nodes and fi refi ghting.381

Between Saturday, September 3, and Monday, September 5, as the Army and Marine troops 

converged upon Louisiana by air and land from Texas, North Carolina, and California, DHS 

and DOD offi cials draft ed and refi ned seven separate Requests For Assistance derived from 

the broader aggregated request.382 Th ese seven requests, totaling an estimated cost of $805 

million,383 were approved by the Secretary of Defense the evening of September 5.384 Th e next 

morning, Tuesday, September 6, as the convoys of troops from the 82nd Airborne Division 

closed on New Orleans,385 DHS Deputy Secretary Jackson sent an e-mail to Assistant Secretary 

McHale thanking him “for your help with the RFAs and all other things. Very grateful.”386

As Assistant Secretary McHale and Admiral Keating both said, many of the requests in the 

second DHS set “already were in active execution” on September 5, when they were offi cially 

approved by the Secretary of Defense.387 Deputy Secretary Jackson described the process as 

“one of the best examples of cutting through bureaucratic red tape and getting on with the 

job that I participated in during the course of these fi rst several weeks.”388

Th is investigation has shown that DOD was moving assets in many respects before they 

were either requested by FEMA or approved by the Secretary of Defense. Th e record indi-
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503

cates that DOD logisticians were gathering information and developing a plan to execute 

the logistics mission assignment on Friday, September 2, prior to its oral approval by the 

Secretary of Defense later that same day, and prior to its formal approval on Saturday, September 3. In addition, DOD was already involved in search-and-rescue operations,389 evacuation operations,390 health and medical support,391 geospatial surveillance,392 and logistical 

support at key air and sea transportation nodes,393 restoring fl ood control systems,394 and 

transporting commodities.395

FEMA witnesses corroborated DOD’s claim that DOD was working on the requests for 

assistance in advance of formal approval.396 FEMA, DHS, and state witnesses also praised 

DOD for its work in response to requests from FEMA.397 Even Deputy Federal Coordinating Offi cer in Louisiana, Scott Wells, who criticized DOD for taking too long to approve 

mission assignments, said that DOD never failed to complete a mission assignment in 

timely fashion.398 Wells’ superior in Louisiana, Lokey, went further, stating “I do not think 

any military people I was working with were delaying doing anything but leaning extremely 

far forward.”399 Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour described the MREs fl own in with the 

assistance of Department of Defense personnel as a “godsend.”400

Mississippi

On August 26, in advance of Hurricane Katrina, Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour issued 

Executive Order 939, activating the National Guard under the command of Major General 

Harold A. Cross.”401 Th e Mississippi National Guard has fi ve primary missions in hurricane 

response: (1) search and rescue; (2) law-enforcement operations; (3) commodity distribution; 

(4) casualty evacuation; and (5) debris removal from roads and along major power grids.402

General Cross called up several National Guard units, including engineering and militarypolice units, which deployed to Camp Shelby, 70 miles north of the Mississippi Gulf Coast, 

and Camp McCain, in north central Mississippi, by Sunday, August 28, the day before 

landfall. About 175 other soldiers were positioned in Mississippi’s three coastal counties of 

Hancock, Harrison, and Jackson to assist in preparation for and immediate response to the 

storm. Th at day General Cross began to order 10 more units into action. By landfall the next 

day, 3,088 Mississippi service members had been activated, remaining units had been placed 

on alert, and requests for assistance from other states had been identifi ed.403

Th ough search-and-rescue and evacuation operations continued during and immediately 

aft er landfall, the bulk of the forces were ordered to the coast once the winds died down early Monday evening. When the level of devastation became apparent, General Cross ordered 

all remaining Mississippi National Guard troops into action and executed pre-planned 

assistance agreements from other states. General Cross also requested assistance from other 

states under Emergency Mutual Assistance Compact (EMAC) agreements.404

Th rough EMAC, the National Guard was able to pull together a division-size force of over 

14,000 soldiers and airmen from 40 states, including Mississippi, by September 4.405 Total 

out-of-state force numbers peaked at nearly 12,000 by September 12, resulting in a combined force of over 16,000.406

Governor Barbour “emphatically” said that he never saw a need for federal troops and was 

never directly asked to federalize the Mississippi National Guard.407 General Cross also 

stated that he never requested federal troops.408 However, U.S. military personnel stationed 

at bases in Mississippi participated in the federal response to Katrina.409
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504

By Wednesday evening, August 31, the National Guard began assisting with commodity 

distribution and began airlift ing supplies to stranded residents.410 Colonel Benjamin “Joe”

Spraggins, Director of the Harrison County Emergency Management Agency, singled out 

this aspect of the National Guard’s response for praise.411

In the storm’s aft ermath, the National Guard also had to contend with false alarms, which 

diverted crucial forces, as General Cross explained: 

But the fi rst couple of days. ... I had a need to get patrols out in communities and towns where there was looting reports. By the way, a lot of this was 

paranoia. People would call in saying they’re looting this town, they’re breaking into the hospital and la, la, la. And I would send MPs up there and no such 

thing was happening. And then we got a couple of reports of trucks being hijacked and we would send helicopter reconnaissance and MPs to that location 

and you’d see trucks stopped but they weren’t being hijacked, they were just 

refusing to drive without a military escort.412

General Cross said his forces also supported local law enforcement:

We didn’t go in and take charge anywhere. We would go in and report to the 

sheriff or the police chief or the mayor and say, “Where do you need us?” And 

my standing orders were that you were to have at least one sworn offi cer with 

each squad of MPs so that they actually do the arrest.413

In an aft er-action report, the Mississippi National Guard said it had:

• cleared over 3,900 miles of roadway;

• directly or indirectly assisted in over 600 rescues;

• airlift ed 1.2 million MREs, 1 million gallons of water and critical medicines;

• conducted over 3,000 presence patrols, assisting in 65 arrests for crimes ranging from looting to domestic-abuse violations; and

• distributed by ground and distribution points over 39 million pounds of ice, 

5.4 million gallons of water, and 2.7 million MREs in 37 counties. 414

Deployments of National Guard and Active-Duty Military Troops 

Th e obligations and duties of the Guard in time of war should be carefully 

defi ned, and a system established by law under which the method of procedure 

of raising volunteer forces should be prescribed in advance. It is utterly 

impossible in the excitement and haste of impending war to do this satisfactorily if the arrangements have not been made long beforehand. 

 –Th eodore Roosevelt, First Annual Message to Congress, Dec. 3, 1901.415

Summary

In the aft ernoon of Monday, August 29, several hours aft er Katrina’s landfall, Governor 

Blanco telephoned President Bush. “We need your help,” the Governor told the 

President. “We need everything you’ve got.”416 Based on their conversation, the Governor 

believed the President had “every intention to send all of the resources and assistance within 

the power of the federal government.”417 Yet although over the next several days Governor 

Blanco made at least two more personal pleas to the President, by phone and in person 

aboard Air Force One, asking for a total of 40,000 federal troops, it was not until Saturday, 
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505

September 3, fi ve full days aft er landfall, that the President ordered 7,200 Army and Marine 

ground forces to Louisiana. 

One of the key questions about the response to Katrina is, “Why did it take so long for the 

President to respond to the Governor’s requests for federal troops?”418

Unfortunately, much of the story of the President’s decisions remains opaque. Th e White 

House refused to permit the Committee to interview White House personnel about the 

President’s decision or the actions of the White House staff . DOD instructed its personnel 

not to discuss communications with the White House. Because the Committee has been 

unable to develop a complete and accurate record regarding these decisions, it is unable to 

make any fi ndings regarding the President’s decision to order deployment of federal active-duty troops on Saturday, September 3, including the reasons why the President did not 

order that deployment sooner. 

Nevertheless, the Committee has extensively interviewed Louisiana, DOD, and National 

Guard offi cials about their own decisions and actions. From their recollections, the Committee has been able to assemble a picture of a rapid but uncoordinated military response to 

the various requests for assistance. 

Two more specifi c fi ndings also have emerged. First, the large numbers of National Guard 

troops deploying into Louisiana were a major factor in DOD’s decision not to deploy additional active-duty troops into Louisiana prior to the President’s deployment order.

Second, the diff erence in opinion between state and federal offi cials about whether more 

active-duty military ground troops should have been deployed sooner appears to stem, in 

part, from the lack of coordination in the formulation and consideration of the various state 

and federal requests for military support. Requests for troops were made to the EMAC and 

the National Guard Bureau within DOD. Requests for troops also were made directly to the 

President, White House offi cials, and the commander of the military forces in Louisiana, 

General Honoré. Other requests for military assistance were made through FEMA according 

to the process set forth in the NRP for requesting DOD support. Many of the state and federal 

requests for military support lacked adequate specifi city as to the missions to be performed or 

the capabilities being requested. Th e responses to the requests for military support oft en were 

poorly coordinated with each other. One result from this lack of specifi city and coordination 

at all levels was that local, state, and federal offi cials had diff ering perceptions of the numbers 

of federal troops that would be arriving, the missions they would be performing, who was in 

command of the military forces, and who should be in command of those forces. 

Discussion

Th e Constitution of the United States provides for two distinct chains of command for military forces within the United States: state governors command and control the state militias; 

and the President is Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United States. Th e NRP 

recognizes that either of these two military forces may be called upon for support in the event 

of a disaster or emergency: the National Guard, under the command of the governor; federal 

active-duty forces, under the command of DOD; and, ultimately, the President. Th e NRP 

provides for two distinct avenues for requesting these two types of military assistance. 

Under the NRP, a state may request federal military support through FEMA, the agency 

responsible for coordinating requests for federal disaster support. Although FEMA may direct 

other federal agencies to perform a “mission assignment,” because the Secretary of Defense is 

the only federal offi cial, other than the President, who may issue an order deploying U.S. military forces, DOD considers a FEMA mission assignment to be a “request for assistance.” DOD 

evaluates each FEMA request for assistance to determine if the request is appropriately tasked 
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506

to DOD and whether DOD has the ability and assets to perform the request. If DOD approves 

the request, the Secretary of Defense, or his designee, issues an order to the military to provide 

the requested assistance to FEMA. 

Within FEMA, the Federal Coordinating Offi cer (FCO) is responsible for coordinating the 

requests for support made to the various federal agencies, including DOD.419 Th e FCO is stationed at the Joint Field Offi ce (JFO), which is the temporary federal facility established aft er a 

disaster for the coordination of federal, state, and local response activities.420 Th e FCO, among 

others, works with the DOD Defense Coordinating Offi cer (DCO), who is also stationed at the 

JFO and is responsible for coordinating and processing all requests for assistance to DOD.421

Unless DOD establishes a diff erent command structure for a particular disaster – which it will 

usually do for a major event like Katrina – the DCO will also be the on-site commander in 

charge of the DOD response. 

FEMA issued 93 requests for specifi c federal military assets and capabilities to DOD; in general, DOD quickly and eff ectively responded to these requests.422 None of these requests, however, involved large numbers of ground troops.423 Th e DCO in Louisiana “did not ever receive 

any specifi c request for large-scale federal forces that came from the state.”424 Rather, requests 

for large numbers of military troops were made directly to the President, other high-ranking 

Administration offi cials, and the military commander in the fi eld. 

Th e lack of specifi city in these requests for federal military support, and the failure to coordinate their consideration through the coordination mechanisms used for the other requests for military assistance, was one of the sources of ongoing confusion and uncertainty 

regarding the scope and timing of the military response. Th e proliferation of processes used 

to request National Guard troops was yet another source of confusion. 

In most circumstances – unless they are “federalized” for a specifi c purpose – National Guard 

forces will be operating under the command of the governors of the states. Typically, in a 

disaster, state National Guard troops will be called up or activated to full-time duty by a governor into “state active-duty” status, meaning they are under the command of the governor, 

performing state missions, such as humanitarian relief or law enforcement, and are paid for 

by state funds.

National Guard troops may also be under the control of a governor when activated under 

32 U.S.C. § 502(f) (“Title 32” status). Th is provision allows the National Guard troops to be 

activated by DOD to perform training or “other duty,” with federal pay and benefi ts, yet remain under the control of the governor. Such “other duty” may include disaster-relief work 

or law enforcement. For example, Title 32 was used to provide federal pay and benefi ts to 

the National Guard troops who temporarily provided additional security to a number of 

airports aft er the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.425

National Guard troops under the command of a governor, either in state active duty or Title 

32 status, are not subject to the prohibitions in the Posse Comitatus Act against the use of 

any part of the military for law enforcement.426 In Katrina, the fl exibility to use the National 

Guard to perform law enforcement was a signifi cant motive for the primary reliance on the 

National Guard rather than active-duty military troops. Th e retention of this fl exibility was 

also one of the major reasons Governor Blanco resisted attempts to “federalize” her National Guard troops – i.e., place those troops into active-duty status and under the President’s 

command.

Th e President may directly activate the National Guard, or “federalize” National Guard 

troops already in state active duty or Title 32 status, under a variety of circumstances. Under 

the Insurrection Act, the President may place the National Guard into federal service to sup-
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507

press an insurrection against a state government, at the request of the state; enforce 

federal laws in the event of “unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or 

rebellion against the authority of the United 

States”; or to prevent an interference within 

the state of a constitutional right.427 Similarly, 10 U.S.C. §12406 provides the President the authority to call into federal service 

the members of the National Guard in the 

event of an invasion by a foreign nation, a 

rebellion, or if the President is “unable with 

the regular forces to execute the laws of the 

United States.”428 Th e Insurrection Act was 

recently invoked in 1992, at the request of 

the Governor of California, to quell the Los 

Angeles riots, and in 1989, in response to 

reports of looting in St. Croix, U.S. Virgin 

Islands, in the wake of Hurricane Hugo.429

Th e President may also employ active-duty 

troops under the Insurrection Act. DOD 

has prepared guidance for the use of activeduty troops to perform law enforcement 

missions, entitled “Military Assistance 

for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS).” Th e 

MACDIS guidance governs “planning and 

response by the DOD Components for military assistance to federal, state, and local 

government ... and their law enforcement 

agencies for ... civil disturbance operations, 

including response to terrorist incidents.”430

National Guard troops called into federal 

service under these authorities operate 

under the command of the President, receive federal pay or benefi ts, and are not subject 

to the prohibitions in the Posse Comitatus Act against the use of federal troops to perform 

law-enforcement activities. National Guard troops called into federal active duty under 

other authorities, however, are subject to the Posse Comitatus Act restrictions. Th ese other 

authorities permit the President to call up the National Guard in time of war, a declared 

national emergency, or when otherwise authorized by law.

Th e NRP states that National Guard forces under the command of the governor, either under 

state active duty or Title 32 status, “are providing support to the Governor of their state and 

are not part of federal military response eff orts.”431 Accordingly, unlike requests for military 

assets under the control of DOD, requests for National Guard troops not under the control of 

the governor are not coordinated and processed through either the FCO or the DCO.432

In those instances in which National Guard troops from outside an aff ected state are needed 

for disaster response, a governor may use the EMAC to obtain those troops from other 

states. Th e EMAC is a congressionally approved interstate compact that permits a state to 

request and receive whatever type of assistance it might need from another state, including 

state National Guard forces, to respond to a domestic emergency.433

National Guard helicopters 

fl ying medical evacuations

U.S. Air Force photo
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508

During Katrina, Louisiana began requesting National Guard assets through the EMAC 

process on Friday, August 26, three days before landfall. Th e fi rst EMAC support – National 

Guard helicopters from Oklahoma – arrived in Louisiana on Monday, August 29, the day 

of landfall. On Tuesday, August 30, more helicopters from Texas and Oklahoma and about 

230 ground troops from Florida, Georgia, and Texas arrived through the EMAC process.434

In Katrina, the EMAC process proved neither suitable nor capable to handle the type of 

large-scale deployments of troops needed in the Gulf region. Th e EMAC was never intended 

or designed to coordinate large military troop deployments. As a result, both Louisiana and 

Mississippi turned to the National Guard Bureau to “expedite” the deployment of National 

Guard troops from other states. Th e National Guard Bureau is the DOD entity responsible 

for advising the Army and Air Force on National Guard matters and communicating with 

state governments including state National Guards.435 Although the National Guard Bureau 

successfully expedited these troop deployments, they were not well coordinated with the 

other military responses, thereby contributing to the confusion as to the scope and eff ectiveness of the overall military response. 

Th e National Guard Bureau’s application for Title 32 status for these troops recognized the 

unsuitability of the state-to-state EMAC process for this type of large-scale military deployment. On September 5, the Bureau requested DOD to grant Title 32 status for all of “the 

National Guard forces currently responding to Hurricane Katrina” under the EMAC compact, retroactive to August 29, the day of landfall.436 “Th e escalation from what was a local 

and regional response to one of national scope, and international attention, risks exceeding 

the capability and intent of the EMAC,” the Bureau wrote.437 “Th is development compels the 

transition of National Guard forces from State Active Duty (SAD) status under the EMAC 

to a federally funded status. Title 32 maintains DOD’s fl exibility to utilize federally funded 

National Guard troops in a federal response and support-to-law enforcement role without 

Posse Comitatus raising issues.” Th e Bureau stated this change was imperative, as the EMAC 

arrangement was not “sustainable” or a “practical solution” for the maintenance of a military 

force this size.438 On September 7, DOD granted the request for Title 32 status and funding.439

Prior to and shortly aft er Katrina’s landfall, federal offi cials also recognized the possibility 

that military forces may be required for law enforcement. On August 28, the Vice President’s Counsel, David Addington, wrote to William Haynes, the DOD General Counsel: 

“Given the potential massive size of the problem there could be civil unrest during the aftermath ... you might want to have an [Insurrection Act] proclamation ... in the can in case 

it is needed.”440 On the morning of Wednesday, August 31, as the media reported a deterioration in civil order in New Orleans, Northern Command’s Operations Director, General 

Rowe, advised Pentagon offi cials, “recommend looking at ‘what if’ MACDIS required.”441

Later that morning, the Joint Director of Military Support described to General Rowe the 

statutory and Constitutional authorities governing the use of armed forces for law enforcement. She told General Rowe that she planned to advise “senior leadership” that such action could be taken by the President invoking the Insurrection Act following either a state 

request through the Department of Justice, or a unilateral decision by the President.442

Th e following discussion presents the record developed by the Committee regarding the 

State of Louisiana’s requests for large-scale deployments of troops and the responses to 

those requests. 

Tuesday, August 30: Governor Blanco asks General Landreneau, Adjutant 

General of the Louisiana National Guard, to request federal military assistance

As Governor Blanco toured New Orleans by helicopter and visited the Superdome Tuesday 

aft ernoon, the need for massive federal assistance became clear and urgent. Floodwaters 
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509

were spreading and rising throughout the city. Th e crowd of people at the Superdome was 

growing by the thousands, as residents fl ooded out of their homes fl ocked to dry ground 

and people “plucked off the roofs” from around the city were deposited there as well.443 Tensions rose too, due to concerns over food, water, security, and the fate of separated family 

members. Th e Governor determined that the people stranded there had to be evacuated “as 

soon as possible.” She asked Major General Bennett Landreneau, the Adjutant General of 

the Louisiana National Guard, for information about the location of the buses to be used 

for the evacuation, and instructed him to “ask for all available assistance from the National 

Guard and the United States Government, specifi cally federal military assistance.”444

Tuesday, August 30: General Landreneau speaks to General Honoré and to 

General Steven Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau

According to General Landreneau, he quickly relayed Governor Blanco’s request for 

military troops to General Steven Blum, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and then to 

General Honoré, who later that day was appointed Commander of Joint Task Force Katrina, consisting of all the active-duty military forces in the Gulf Coast region responding to 

Katrina.445 Both General Honoré and General Blum, however, stated that General Landreneau fi rst asked them for troops on Wednesday, August 31.446

Although the Governor’s timeline indicates that she spoke with General Landreneau 

regarding the need for troops following her aft ernoon visit to the Superdome, General Landreneau stated that in a telephone conversation with General Honoré on Tuesday morning he “conveyed the Governor’s desire for federal troops, in particular an Army division 

headquarters to plan, coordinate, and execute the evacuation of New Orleans.”447 General 

Landreneau stated that on that same day he asked General Blum to help obtain thousands 

of National Guard troops for relief eff orts in Louisiana.448

General Honoré recalled that he fi rst spoke with General Landreneau sometime Tuesday 

evening. Although General Landreneau mentioned the need to evacuate the Superdome, 

his main concern was the search and rescue eff orts, which required helicopters, not ground 

troops.449 According to General Honoré, General Landreneau said he had already spoken 

to General Blum, who had assured him that “a lot of ground capacity was on the way.”450

General Honoré stated that General Landreneau did not make any “particular request” for a 

large deployment of federal active-duty troops. 451

Although General Blum recalled that he spoke with General Landreneau on Tuesday 

evening, he was unable to recall whether General Landreneau made a specifi c request for 

troops at that time.452

Although recollections diff er as to whether General Landreneau specifi cally requested 

military assistance during either of these conversations on Tuesday, it is nonetheless clear 

that as of this date the state had established two new avenues, in addition to the traditional 

processes through the EMAC and the DCO, for requesting military support: (1) through 

General Blum and the National Guard Bureau, and (2) through General Honoré, the Commander of Joint Task Force Katrina. Th ere were now four separate avenues for requests for 

military support; there would be little coordination among them. 

Early hours, Wednesday, August 31: Louisiana National Guard Offi cers discuss with General Landreneau the need for more troops

Prior to and during landfall, Louisiana National Guard Brigadier General Gary Jones and 

the rest of his contingent had been stationed at Jackson Barracks, the headquarters of the 
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510

Louisiana National Guard in New Orleans, but by late Monday rising fl oodwaters forced 

him and his contingent to relocate to dry ground at the Superdome. 

By late Tuesday, as it became apparent the Superdome would need to be evacuated, the 

senior Louisiana National Guard offi cers at the Superdome became concerned whether they 

had suffi cient manpower to undertake this additional responsibility.453 Sometime between 2 

a.m. and 4 a.m. on Wednesday,454 General Jones, his deputy Brigadier General Brod Veillon, 

and Colonel Steve Dabadie, Chief of Staff of the Louisiana National Guard, consulted with 

General Landreneau in Baton Rouge. General Jones recalled the conversation: 

And I told General Landreneau that I felt like taking on the mission of evacuating all those people, in addition to the security missions and the engineer 

missions, and so forth, I had, was probably beyond the capability, not of my 

troops, but of my planning staff to execute, the people I had on the ground. 

And I asked for some support. And what he told me was they planned on 

asking for an active-duty division headquarters to come in and take over the 

evacuation. But he also gave me a key piece of information in that. And that 

was, there ain’t going to be nobody get there until they get there. Until you get 

relieved of that mission, that is your mission. So from that point on I took that 

mission, and that’s how we got it. And we never did give it up, because no one 

else ever stepped up to the plate to pick that thing up.455

Colonel Dabadie similarly remembered that General Landreneau agreed with the need for 

an active “division headquarters” unit – meaning a team of one or two dozen active duty 

personnel with expertise in planning, command, and logistics – for coordination and execution of evacuation. 456

According to General Veillon, General Landreneau had also said, “I am ahead of you. I have already called General Blum and we have additional assets that will be arriving in the morning.”457

7:21 a.m., Wednesday, August 31: General Landreneau asks the National 

Guard Bureau to expedite the deployment process for National Guard troops 

from other states

By Wednesday morning, Louisiana offi cials recognized that the EMAC process was inadequate for this catastrophe. General Landreneau telephoned General Blum and asked for his 

help in expediting the EMAC process to send 5,000 National Guard soldiers to Louisiana. 

General Blum related the conversation:

He said that he needed 5,000 soldiers more to help, and I’m going to tell you 

at this point, it was clear in his voice that it was pretty imminent need ... [H]e 

communicated some emotion over the phone that he needed it, and he needed 

it now and that he reiterated that the armory at Jackson Barracks had fl ooded 

and that the Louisiana National Guard command and control had been relocated to the Superdome parking lot and that the Superdome is being cut off by 

rising water, it’s becoming an island.458

Within minutes of General Landreneau’s phone call, the Army National Guard began 

calling and e-mailing the Adjutant Generals of the National Guards across the country to 

alert them of the urgent need for National Guard military police, engineers, and high-water 

trucks.459 On a noon video-teleconference with the Adjutant Generals from all of the states, 

General Blum reiterated the immediate need for these National Guard capabilities. 

Th e National Guard Bureau’s improvised process proved extremely eff ective in mobilizing 

tens of thousands of National Guard troops and assets. Th e process that began Wednesday 
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511

morning resulted in the deployment of over 30,000 National Guard troops within approximately 96 hours.460 Partially as a result of their rapid deployment, however, most of the 

National Guard troops dispatched to Louisiana through this process did not know what 

their mission would be or where it would be performed until they arrived in Louisiana. Th e 

deployment process was “P for plenty,” according to General Vaughn. “Th ere was not a lot 

of preciseness.”461

Table 1: Activated National Guard Personnel Serving in Louisiana and Mississippi 462

Date Number Serving in Louisiana Number Serving in Mississippi

Louisiana 

National Guard 

Personnel

National Guard 

Personnel from 

Other States

Total

Mississippi 

National Guard 

Personnel

National Guard 

Personnel from 

Other States

Total

Aug. 30 5,804 178 5,982 3,822 16 3,838

Aug. 31 5,804 663 6,467 3,822 1,149 4,971

Sept. 1 5,804 2,555 8,359 3,823 2,861 6,684

Sept. 2 6,779 5,445 12,224 3,823 3,719 7,542

Sept. 3 6,779 10,635 17,414 3,823 6,314 10,137

Sept. 4 6,779 12,404 19,183 4,017 9,399 13,416

Sept. 5 6,779 16,162 22,941 4,017 10,999 15,016

Sept. 6 6,779 20,510 27,289 4,023 11,095 15,118

Sept. 7 6,779 22,589 29,368 4,023 11,388 15,411

Sept. 8 6,779 23,476 30,255 4,023 11,506 15,529

Source: Congressional Research Service, Hurricane Katrina: DOD Disaster Response, January 24, 2006, p. 12.

Although the National Guard Bureau’s mission was to expedite the EMAC process, the 

deployments initiated from the Bureau were not well coordinated with the EMAC process. 

As the National Guard Bureau’s Draft Aft er Action Review found, National Guard forces 

were deployed “piece meal” into and out of Louisiana and Mississippi, and in many cases 

the Bureau’s process overlapped the EMAC process, “causing confusion and duplicated 

eff orts.”463 Th e review concluded, “the large-scale and sustained operations required for this 

disaster requires a more systematic approach.”464

Even at the outset of the deployment process, the National Guard Bureau recognized the 

need for the National Guard to deploy a robust command and control capability along with 

the large number of troops that would be fl owing into the state. General Blum immediately 

determined that additional command and control capability was needed in both Louisiana 

and Mississippi because National Guard combat brigades from each of those states were 

in Iraq.465 Headquarters elements from the 35th Infantry Division in Kansas deployed into 

Louisiana and from the 38th Infantry Division in Indiana deployed into Mississippi.466

“Both of these divisions had served in Bosnia and Kosovo and knew how to do Ph.D. level 
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command and control elements,” Lt. Gen Blum explained.467 Th ey began arriving in theater 

on Friday, September 2.468 General Blum stated that command and control improved immediately aft erwards. 

Once they were on the ground, the command and control improved 100 percent in less than 

24 hours. I mean, it started coming together. Th at’s the only place where I wish I had been 

a little faster on the trigger shooting those guys downrange, because they brought a great 

capability that was very well needed, because frankly, the guys that were there were getting 

tired. It was like bringing in, you know, the relief team.469

Th e National Guard deployment process was not well coordinated with the command of 

the active-duty military forces either. Assistant Secretary McHale testifi ed to the Congress, 

“Military command and control was workable, but not unifi ed. National Guard planning, 

though superbly executed, was not well integrated with the Joint Staff in NORTHCOM.”470

Senior DOD offi cers also expressed concern that the rapid, poorly coordinated state-to-state 

EMAC deployments, in eff ect “preempted” a large part of DOD’s role to coordinate the overall military response in the event of a domestic catastrophe. General Rowe, Director of Operations at NORTHCOM, observed that although this process provided “incredible amounts of 

manpower,” there was no integration or tasking of these forces until they arrived in the state. 

“It’s a heck of a way to do military business,” General Rowe commented. 471 Admiral Keating, 

Commander of NORTHCOM, stated that in a catastrophic event NORTHCOM, on behalf of 

DOD, should have a greater control over the deployment process.472 Former Joint Chiefs of 

Staff Chairman General Myers agreed with both of these observations. 473

9:30 a.m., Wednesday, August 31: General Honoré meets with General Landreneau and General Jones at the Superdome

General Honoré arrived at the Superdome at around 9:30 a.m. on Wednesday to assess 

the deteriorating conditions.474 “When I got there Wednesday morning,” General Honoré 

recalled, “it was hell.”475

General Honoré informed General Landreneau about some of the military assets that were 

en route, including U.S. Navy ships, but there was no discussion of ground troops at this 

meeting.476 General Honoré then met with New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin, and Scott Wells, 

the FEMA Deputy FCO in Louisiana. Wells was the senior FEMA representative at the 

Superdome, reporting to William Lokey. Th ey discussed how to evacuate the Superdome. 

Wells asked General Honoré if he could take the lead for the evacuation. According to 

Wells, General Honoré replied, “Whoa, wait a minute, I need to get my people here and 

then we’ll talk later.”477

As this exchange between Wells and General Honoré refl ects, neither FEMA nor Louisiana 

offi cials had a clear understanding of General Honoré’s role and capabilities. Phil Parr, the 

head of one of FEMA’s emergency-response teams that was sent into Louisiana, was under 

the incorrect impression that General Honoré had been placed in charge of the Superdome 

evacuation.478 He also was disappointed that General Honoré had not brought more troops: 

“He had no troops on the ground to do what needed to be done early on.”479

State offi cials also did not have a clear understanding of the capabilities under General 

Honoré’s command. General Landreneau stated, “I was expecting troops to arrive.”480 Other 

Louisiana National Guard offi cers echoed this expectation.481

General Honoré acknowledged that others may have misinterpreted his initial presence 

as the vanguard of a much larger military deployment of ground troops. General Honoré 
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explained, however, that this was not a classic military operation, where a commanding 

general appears at the battlefront only in the presence of a large number of troops: 

In a classic military operation, I would have sat here in Atlanta and put a brigadier 

or a major general in Camp Shelby and maybe send a brigadier to New Orleans 

and to Biloxi. Th at’s the classic. Th e general will sit back, get the feeds in from the 

troops. ... So in this case, I reversed a paradigm. I left my staff at home and went 

forward on the battlefi eld, which may have given a perception to people when 

they saw me that all the federal troops were there, which was not the case. And 

I never [pretended] that that was the fact when I got there, but people come up 

with their own assumptions. Well, damn, if the general is here, his troops must be 

outside the city. ... Th is is a humanitarian operation, not an attack on a foreign 

country where it gets secured and then the general comes in.482

Immediately aft er he found out that General Landreneau had made a direct request to 

General Honoré for federal military troops, Wells explained to Colonel Jeff Smith, General 

Landreneau’s deputy at the Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, how this direct request to General Honoré disrupted the “unifi ed command” the 

state and FEMA were trying to achieve – i.e., a coordinated process for requesting assistance 

and directing response activities: 

And I said, the state does not go to DOD directly, you’re supposed to come to 

[FEMA], we will go to DOD to get whatever support you need. ... Th at breaks 

– that not only violates protocol, but it breaks the whole unifi ed-command 

approach, when you go out to another agency and then this three-star general 

just shows up.483

Morning, Wednesday, August 31: Governor Blanco calls the White House to 

ask for “signifi cant resources” 

According to the Governor’s timeline: 

Governor Blanco places an urgent morning call to the White House in an effort to reach President Bush and express the need for signifi cant resources. She 

is unable to reach President Bush or his Chief of Staff , Andrew Card. A later 

phone call reaches Maggie Grant in the White House Offi ce of Intergovernmental Aff airs. Th e Governor receives a call from Homeland Security Advisor 

Frances Townsend. Andrew Card returns her call too, and she requests his 

help in getting the promised FEMA buses into the New Orleans area.484

As the following events demonstrate, the transmission of the state’s request for resources 

directly to the White House does not appear to have expedited the response to the state, at 

least with respect to federal military resources. White House offi cials did not understand 

what the Governor was requesting. Th ere also appears to have been poor coordination 

between the White House and FEMA. Even aft er the Governor clarifi ed the nature of her 

request directly with the President – that she wanted federal troops but not “federalization” 

– Brown continued to advocate to the White House that the response be “federalized.” 

Additionally, Brown does not appear to have consulted with DOD regarding the need for 

federalization, either prior to or aft er advocating that position to the White House. 

12:43 p.m., Wednesday, August 31: U.S. Senator David Vitter of Louisiana 

informs Terry Ryder, Executive Counsel to Governor Blanco, of a conversation with Karl Rove, White House Deputy Chief of Staff , regarding Rove’s 

comments on “federalization”
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In addition to former White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card, it appears that Governor 

Blanco’s request to White House Homeland Security Advisor Townsend was passed along 

to Deputy Chief of Staff Karl Rove. Senator Vitter relayed to Ryder that Rove “understands 

that the Governor is asking to federalize the evacuation piece.”485 Th e Committee has been 

unable to determine what Rove’s understanding at this time may have been regarding the 

Governor’s request – whether he believed the Governor was seeking federal assistance in 

evacuating the Superdome, or seeking federal control of the evacuation. 

2:30 p.m., Wednesday, August 31: Governor Blanco tells President Bush she 

does not want “federalization” 

According to Ryder, immediately aft er he relayed Sen. Vitter’s conversation with Rove to 

Governor Blanco, the Governor telephoned President Bush to clarify her request – she 

wanted federal assistance, but did not want to give up her command of the National Guard 

troops within the state. 486

According to Ryder’s notes, the Governor made it clear she did not want to “federalize” the 

evacuation. “I’m not asking for federalization,” the Governor told the President. “It’s not a 

federalization request.”487 Rather, the Governor told the President she wanted “to be a partner in a unifi ed command.”488 Under a “unifi ed command,” the Governor would remain 

in command of the National Guard troops, and the President would be in command of the 

active-duty forces. Ryder also reported that the Governor also told the President, “We have 

a communication problem and [it] needs improvement.”489 Th e Governor repeated her request for federal military assistance.490 At the Committee’s hearing, when asked whether she 

was seeking National Guard or active-duty troops, Governor Blanco replied, “It was both. 

We needed troops.”491

Mid-aft ernoon, Wednesday, August 31: FEMA offi cials consider federalization 

At about the same time that the Governor informed the President that she did not want federalization, senior FEMA offi cials began discussing it. Lokey recalled a conversation with Brown: 

I remember going to Michael Brown and saying, this is beyond me, this is beyond FEMA, this is beyond the state. We need to, and I used the term, we need 

to federalize this or get a massive military invasion in here to get some help. 

And Mike said, “I’ll talk to headquarters. I’ll talk to DHS about that and I’ll talk 

to the attorneys.”492

Lokey told the Committee staff he did not understand what he meant when he used the 

term “federalization”: 

I don’t exactly know what I meant. What I meant was that – what I was talking 

about was turning this over to somebody that can manage something this size. 

I’ve never done something like this. I was trying my best. I wasn’t doing very 

good at it. So that was just a term I used.493

 Brown confi rmed Lokey’s account. 494 On Wednesday, Brown concluded that FEMA, 

state, and local capabilities were inadequate. He stated that Louisiana, “for whatever reason 

– culture, their system, their lack of resources,” was “dysfunctional.”495 In Brown’s view, the 

inability to establish a unifi ed command was evidence of this dysfunction:

Th ere was not a unifi ed command yet. Th e Governor was overwhelmed, and 

the Governor didn’t have a good decision-making process set up around her 

where she could make decisions; bless her heart. I mean, it really bugged me. 

She had too many people coming in telling her what she needed to do, from 
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U.S. Senators all the way down to, I mean, I don’t know who they were, just 

showing up in her little room coming in just hodgepodge saying, you need to 

be doing this and that and everything else. 

And you just can’t have that. You need to have a unifi ed command where that stuff comes 

in and gets sorted out, and then [LOHSEP Acting Deputy Director] Jeff Smith or somebody 

comes in and says, Governor, here are your decision points, you need to go to X, or Y, or Z 

and make those.496

Brown stated that he recommended the entire response be “federalized,” meaning that the 

President invoke the Insurrection Act and place the National Guard under the control of 

the active-duty forces:

Because at that time, we’re looking at these stories of shootings and looting and 

everything else going on, and I’m fearful that’s spiraling out of control, and 

I want active-duty troops that are ready, willing and able to kill in that area, 

because we can’t do search and rescue with that kind of stuff going on.497

Brown stated that he telephoned either White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card or Deputy 

Chief of Staff Joe Hagin to recommend federalization of the response in Louisiana. “I had 

conversations that said, Andy, we need to federalize this thing.”498

Although Brown told the Committee that for the next 72 hours he was a “strong advocate” 

of this position499 – i.e., that a “massive military” involvement was necessary, including active-duty ground troops that were “ready, willing and able to kill” – there is scant evidence 

that he or anyone else in FEMA discussed this view with DOD. It appears that he did not 

discuss this issue with General Honoré, who told the Committee that nobody had ever 

expressed to him any need for active-duty ground troops.500 Furthermore, it apparently was 

not until the next day, Th ursday, September 1, that FEMA began discussing with DOD the 

need for DOD to take over the logistics mission.501

Assistant Secretary McHale stated that possibly as early as Wednesday, offi cials in the Pentagon began considering what role the military should play in restoring order, and whether 

active-duty troops should be used for law enforcement activities in addition to the 4,200 

National Guard military police who were already deploying to the region.502 On Saturday, 

September 3, the President ordered the deployment of 7,200 active-duty troops from the 

Army and the Marine Corps to Louisiana. Assistant Secretary McHale explained that they 

were sent “not for the purposes of law enforcement, but for ... humanitarian relief. It was 

clear, however, that ... they would be available and readily deployable for law enforcementrelated missions if the President, under the Insurrection Act, were to use his statutory and 

Constitutional authority, to reassign those units for purposes of enforcing constitutional 

rights or other provisions of federal law.”503

Mid-aft ernoon, Wednesday, August 31: Governor Blanco tells FEMA Director Brown and Louisiana Federal Coordinating Offi cer Lokey she does not 

want federalization 

According to Lokey, “within an hour” of his conversation with Brown about federalization, 

Governor Blanco requested to see him. “What’s this about you taking over my disaster?” she 

asked Lokey.504 Governor Blanco later explained that she objected to federalization because 

it could have subjected the state’s National Guard troops to the Posse Comitatus Act prohibition against federal troops conducting law enforcement activities.505 “I did not want the 

Guard federalized,” Governor Blanco testifi ed. “It’s very important for a governor to be able 

to retain control of the National Guard precisely for its law enforcement capabilities.”506
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Louisiana offi cials also believed there was no need to federalize the Guard. “Let me remind 

you the state is still sovereign,” a member of the Governor’s staff told Lokey and Brown. 

“We can handle it,” General Landreneau added. 507 “Fine, good,” Brown said.508

 6 p.m., Wednesday, August 31: Governor Blanco asks General Honoré to 

coordinate the evacuation of New Orleans.

Late Wednesday aft ernoon, General Honoré arrived at the State Emergency Operation Center (EOC) in Baton Rouge, and met with Governor Blanco and General Landreneau. Th ey 

discussed the state’s priority missions, particularly search and rescue and the evacuation of 

New Orleans and the surrounding area. FEMA Director Brown was also present.509 “Federalization” was not discussed. Governor Blanco asked General Honoré “to coordinate the 

evacuation eff orts in New Orleans, so that General Landreneau can concentrate on saving 

lives, search and rescue, and law and order issues.”510

In the midst of this discussion, General Graham, Deputy Commander of Fift h U.S. Army, 

arrived at the EOC, aft er driving seven hours from his headquarters in San Antonio, TX. 

General Graham brought with him 24 other personnel from Fift h Army headquarters for 

the purpose of providing support to the DCO in Baton Rouge. 511 Shortly aft er General Graham joined the discussion about the state’s priorities, General Honoré turned to him and 

said, “Mark, evacuate the City of New Orleans and the Greater New Orleans area.” “Yes, 

sir,” General Graham replied.512

Again, the principal participants in these conversations expressed diff ering perceptions and 

expectations as to the numbers and types of military troops that would be following. Governor Blanco and General Landreneau appear to have been under the impression that General 

Honoré would use a large number of federal troops to conduct the evacuation; General 

Honoré believed large numbers of additional active-duty troops were not needed for this 

mission. At the very least, the persistence of these diff ering expectations and perceptions 

amongst these principals appears to indicate a failure in communication among the principals and among the various organizations they represented. 

According to the Governor’s timeline, the Governor asked General Honoré “if he brought 

a large number of soldiers, and learns that he arrived with only a small support staff . Th e 

evacuation must be conducted by National Guard troops, as the federal contingent has 

not arrived.”513

General Landreneau told the Committee, “Th e Governor was very clear that she needed 

troops on the ground, that she needed a federal assistance. ... She said she needed – she was 

using the number 40,000 and she was saying she needed soldiers, she needed boots on the 

ground.”514 General Landreneau added, however, that the Governor never specifi ed which 

type of troops she was seeking. “I don’t recall her ever defi ning or diff erentiating between 

active or National Guard. She wanted the help.”515

General Landreneau recalled General Honoré “stating that he was aware that the National 

Guard EMAC forces were going to be fl owing into the state.”516 “I don’t recall the Governor 

ever saying that’s not good enough,” General Landreneau stated.517

Similarly, General Honoré did not recall the Governor’s making any specifi c request for 

more federal ground troops.518 Nor did General Honoré believe additional federal ground 

troops were necessary to meet the state’s priorities. “Th e National Guard was fl owing a lot 

of troops in there. And at the point in time, the priority mission was search and rescue.”519

General Honoré believed that for the search-and-rescue mission he needed “thousands of 

helicopters, not troops,” and that for the Superdome evacuation mission he needed buses. 
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Based on this assessment of the resources needed to accomplish these missions, General 

Honoré did not request additional federal ground troops.520

Likewise, General Graham did not believe he needed additional troops. “I needed buses,” 

General Graham said.521 Shortly aft er enough buses were located, General Graham and his 

team coordinated the eff orts of the Louisiana National Guard, Louisiana State Police, and 

other supporting agencies – whose personnel were already present – to actually conduct 

evacuations of the Superdome, the I-10 overpass, and the Convention Center. 

 6:05 p.m., Wednesday, August 31: General Richard Rowe, NORTHCOM, 

informs General Honoré that Governor Blanco is asking for federal activeduty troops

In an e-mail sent at 6:05 p.m., Major General Richard Rowe, Director of Operations at 

NORTHCOM, sought General Honoré’s views on the Governor’s requests for “federal troops”:

Th ere should be calls coming your way. Th ere is a desire to concentrate National 

Guardsmen into [New Orleans] for [law-enforcement]/security tasks. Governor 

has asked that federal troops pick up rest of the tasks being uncovered by Guard 

in state. Th oughts? What does this mean in terms of scale? Type capabilities?522

 6:23 p.m., Wednesday, August 31: General Honoré’s staff informs General 

Rowe there are enough National Guard troops 

Replying to General Rowe, Colonel James Hickey, General Honoré’s Executive Offi cer, 

wrote that “[We] think there are enough ARNG [Army National Guard] Soldiers and volunteers to perform all these missions,” but that General Honoré would try to obtain more 

information about the state’s request while in Baton Rouge that evening.523

8:40 p.m., Wednesday, August 31: DOD puts ground troops on alert 

At 8:40 p.m., Army Forces Command put several of its forces with rapid-deployment ability on 

high alert (“Be Prepared to Deploy” status):524 the 82nd Airborne Division of XVIII Airborne 

Corps, which describes its mission as, “Within 18 hours of notifi cation, the 82nd Airborne Division strategically deploys, conducts forcible entry parachute assault and secures key objectives 

for follow-on military operations in support of U.S. national interests;”525 and the 1st Cavalry 

Division of III Corps, which describes itself as the “Army’s largest division and only armored 

contingency force, ready to deploy anywhere in the world on a moment’s notice.”526

Th ursday, September 1: President Bush meets with Secretary of Defense 

Rumsfeld and General Blum to discuss the military response 527

Th e Committee has been unable to obtain any details about this meeting. 

11:46 a.m., Th ursday, September 1: General Honoré tells General Rowe National Guard troops are suffi cient

Aft er meeting with Governor Blanco and General Landreneau the previous evening, General Honoré again informed General Rowe that he did not believe additional federal ground 

troops were necessary. Personally responding to General Rowe, General Honoré wrote:

PUSH BACK. I WILL SEE GOV TODAY. WILL SHOW HER FLOW OF NG 

TROOPS. NG HAS GROUND FIGHT IN HAND WITH [24,000] IN NEXT 

R6 HOURS.528
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General Blum confi rmed that he and General Honoré were in agreement that the number of 

National Guard troops in the state and on the way was adequate: 

When I went down there on one of my trips, and we actually sat down on two 

buckets under a tree and we had a conversation, I mean, between the two of 

us saying hey, this is what I got coming down here, Russ, and he’s going, It 

sounds right; it sounds good.529

1:46 p.m., Th ursday, September 1: General Honoré urges Marines to “GET 

HERE AS FAST AS YOU CAN” 

Early Th ursday aft ernoon, General Honoré exchanged e-mail messages with General James 

Amos, Commander, II Marine Expeditionary Force, urging him to get to the New Orleans 

area as quickly as possible, along with the various assets he had placed aboard Navy amphibious ships that were steaming toward the Gulf Coast region. “HELLO BROTHER. GET 

HERE AS FAST AS YOU CAN,” General Honoré wrote.530 General Honoré explained to 

the Committee that he desired the capability that the Marines were bringing which included 

search-and-rescue helicopters, airspace command and control, and ground troops to assist 

with search and rescue and delivery of food and water. 531

At the Committee’s hearing, Senator Levin asked whether General Honoré’s request for 

the Marines to deploy into New Orleans was inconsistent with the “push back” to the 

Governor’s request for more active-duty troops. Admiral Keating, Commander of NORTHCOM, responded that it was his understanding the Governor was seeking military police, 

for which active-duty troops would have been unsuitable due to the restrictions in the Posse 

Comitatus Act, whereas General Honoré was seeking the particular capabilities the Marines could bring, such as helicopters and troops to conduct search and rescue.532 However, 

General Rowe’s e-mail of the previous day indicated that the Governor was seeking federal 

active-duty troops to perform non-law-enforcement activities so the National Guard troops 

could concentrate on law-enforcement activities. 

General Honoré stated that there “wasn’t a big cry for federal ground troops” at the time 

he wrote the e-mail,533 but that on Friday, he believed additional active-duty ground forces 

would be helpful.534 Th e record therefore remains unclear why the Marines were preparing 

to deploy ground troops at the same time that DOD offi cers were stating there was a suffi cient number of National Guard troops on the ground. 

1:50 p.m., Th ursday, September 1: General Rowe tells General Honoré the offi -

cial DOD guidance is to use National Guard forces to the fullest extent possible

Continuing the e-mail chain regarding the Governor’s general desire for federal troops, 

General Rowe reports back to General Honoré:

Guidance is “guard” in NO and “guard” to fullest extent possible for tasks in 

LA and MS. NGB [National Guard Bureau] supports. EMAC working. OSD 

[Offi ce of Secretary of Defense] and CJCS [Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff ] 

agree with this.535

Th is DOD position is refl ected in the DOD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, which in the fi rst instance relies upon the National Guard and military reserves for 

civil-support missions.536 “Th e National Guard has more than three centuries of experience 

in dealing with domestic response,” Assistant Secretary McHale explained. “It makes sense 

to use active-duty military forces primarily for overseas missions, war fi ghting missions, and 

to rely on Reserve component capabilities, most especially the National Guard, for homeland defense and civil support.”537
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Th e Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , General Myers, confi rmed that this e-mail accurately refl ected DOD’s view, at the time, that in light of the large numbers of National Guard 

troops fl owing into the region, there was not a need for additional active-duty troops.538

 3:30 p.m., Th ursday, September 1: Governor Blanco meets with General 

Honoré 

Th e Governor’s timeline does not mention this meeting;539 General Honoré does not recall 

any request for federal troops at this meeting.540

 7:45 p.m., Th ursday, September 1: Rear Admiral Robert F. Duncan, U.S. 

Coast Guard, urges Governor Blanco to federalize the response 

Early Th ursday evening, Rear Admiral Robert F. Duncan, Commander, Eighth Coast Guard 

District, recommended to the Governor that she “federalize” the response. Terry Ryder, 

Executive Counsel to Governor Blanco, described Admiral Duncan’s advice:

He had been in the fi eld with his folks on helicopters. He had one change of 

clothes. Many of the people – his house was under water. ... He was having to 

use a Coast Guard credit card to buy water. He was mad at Mike Brown. Th at 

is why he was there. He ran into the Governor. While he is talking to the Governor, he does tell her ... we need to get armed people on the street. He advised 

her to federalize, which that time was kind of clear he wanted to bring in the 

Department of Defense people forces.541

Th e record is not clear whether Admiral Duncan was recommending that additional DOD 

forces be brought in or, in addition, that the state National Guard troops be placed under 

federal command, as is suggested by the term “federalize.” 

9:20 p.m., Th ursday, September 1: General Blum urges Governor Blanco not 

to federalize the response 

On Th ursday evening Governor Blanco met with General Blum. Th ey discussed troop levels 

and the appropriate command-and-control structure for the military forces in the state. Th e 

Governor told General Blum that although she was “very happy” with the response of the 

National Guard, she was still not satisfi ed because she needed an additional 30,000 troops 

– to make a total of 40,000 troops within the state – and very few active-duty forces had arrived.542 General Blum committed to work with General Landreneau to get the capabilities 

that the state needed, although General Blum did not believe that would necessarily entail 

30,000 more ground troops.543

General Blum also recommended against placing the state National Guard forces under federal control. General Blum told the Governor and her staff that federalization was “not necessary to receive more federal assets,” and “would have signifi cantly limited [the state’s] capacity 

to conduct law-enforcement missions.”544 He recommended the continuation of the joint 

command structure, whereby General Landreneau would continue to command the National 

Guard forces, and General Honoré would continue to command the active-duty forces. 

Early mid-morning, Friday, September 2: Department of Defense offi cials 

discuss how to obtain greater federal control over the response in Louisiana 

Th e Administration spent much of Friday, September 2, searching for ways to assert greater 

federal control over the response in Louisiana.545 Th ese eff orts began with a series of meetings at the Pentagon involving Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff General Myers, Assistant Secretary McHale, and Lieutenant General James Conway, 
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520

Director of Operations for the Joint Staff . According to DOD documents, the discussions 

concerned various options for gaining greater federal control over the military forces in 

Louisiana, including the National Guard forces. Th ese options included use of the Insurrection Act and the designation of a single military offi cer to be in command of both the 

National Guard and active duty forces – a so-called “dual hat” commander.546

On several recent occasions prior to Katrina, DOD and several states had used a dual-hat 

commander to integrate the operations of the National Guard and active-duty forces. 

Th e single dual-hat offi cer reported to the Governor when exercising command and control 

over the National Guard forces, and to the President when exercising command and control over the active-duty forces. Th is structure was employed at the 2004 Democratic and 

Republican National Conventions, and the 2004 G-8 Summit, where both active-duty and 

National Guard forces worked together to provide security. 

Although the Committee was not able to interview White House offi cials about the President’s actions or decisions, the military advantages of the dual-hat command structure – an 

integrated command structure for all of the military forces in the region – appear to have 

been a signifi cant motivation underlying DOD’s support for the proposal. Both General 

Myers and Assistant Secretary McHale advocated the dual-hat approach. For General Myers, establishing a single chain of command for all military forces was “a basic tenet of how 

we like to do our business.”547 At the time, Assistant Secretary McHale also supported the 

proposal because it would provide a more integrated command structure. According to 

Assistant Secretary McHale, he recommended the dual-hat command to the Secretary of 

Defense, who “reviewed that recommendation, concurred in that recommendation, and 

took it to the President for the President’s consideration.”548

Late morning, Friday, September 2: President Bush and Governor Blanco 

discuss the deployment of federal troops 

President Bush arrived aboard Air Force One at the New Orleans Louis Armstrong Airport 

late Friday morning. Mayor Nagin, FEMA Director Brown, General Blum, White House 

Chief of Staff Card, White House Deputy Chief of Staff Hagin, Louisiana Senators Landrieu 

and Vitter, and several Louisiana congressmen were present for an initial meeting with the 

President and Governor Blanco. Aft er the initial meeting, President Bush and Governor 

Blanco met privately.549

Aboard Air Force One, late Friday morning, September 2: Mayor Nagin 

recommends the federal government assume control

During the initial meeting aboard Air Force One, Mayor Nagin recommended that General 

Honoré be placed in charge.550 Mayor Nagin testifi ed: 

I probably was a bit pushy at that meeting, because in the midst of all the 

rhetoric that was going on around the table, I stopped everyone and basically 

said, “Mr. President, Madame Governor, if the two of you don’t get together 

on this issue, more people are going to die in this city, and you need to resolve 

this immediately.” And they said yes. And I said, “Well, everybody else in this 

room, let’s leave and let them work this out right now.”551

Aboard Air Force One, late Friday morning, September 2: Governor Blanco 

asks President Bush for more troops and rejects federalization 

Still aboard Air Force One, Governor Blanco, President Bush, and Deputy White House 

Chief of Staff Hagen met privately for about 30 to 45 minutes. Governor Blanco again 
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521

pressed the President for federal troops, as only about 13,000 of the 40,000 troops that she 

had requested had arrived. “I needed people,” the Governor testifi ed.552 Th e President raised 

the issue whether the National Guard forces should be placed under federal command; the 

Governor made her position “very clear” that she did not want to give up her authority over 

the National Guard. “I told the President that the proper way to do business would be for 

me as governor to retain control of the National Guard and for him to simply send troops 

in.”553 Th e Governor told the President that if she changed her mind, she’d let him know 

within 24 hours.554

Approximately a week later, the New Orleans Times-Picayune reported what happened at 

that meeting as follows:

Aft er the session with Blanco, the President invited Nagin into his offi ce and 

told the mayor that he was “ready to move today” on the troop deployments 

and had off ered two command options to Blanco, Nagin said. Th e mayor did 

not identify the options. However, the President said Blanco wanted 24 hours to 

make a decision, according to Nagin, who later roasted the governor in national 

TV interviews for the delay: “It would have been great if we could have left Air 

Force One, walked outside, and told the world that we had this all worked out,” 

Nagin told an interviewer. “It didn’t happen, and more people died.”555

Th e Committee has attempted to determine whether the deployment of federal troops 

was delayed in order to give the Governor time to reconsider her position on the Administration’s proposal. On Friday, September 2, active-duty ground forces were prepared to 

deploy,556 but the President did not issue the deployment order until late Saturday morning. 

Both the White House557 and the Governor’s offi ce558 deny that this decision to deploy these 

or other active-duty ground troops was delayed by the President’s request or the Governor’s 

refusal to accede. General Blum, who was aboard Air Force One Friday morning as well, has 

said that this was also his impression.559

General Myers told the Committee that from a military perspective, it was necessary to 

establish the command-and-control structure before a sizeable number of troops would be 

deployed.560 Th en-FEMA Director Brown told the Committee that he and other Administration offi cials told the Governor that troops could be deployed more quickly if there 

were a more unifi ed military command – i.e. all under federal control – but the President’s 

request for greater authority over the military forces within the state was not part of any 

type of “carrot and stick” approach toward the Governor.561 Because the White House has 

refused to permit White House offi cials to be interviewed by the Committee, and DOD offi cials have refused to discuss their conversations with White House offi cials, the Committee’s record on this issue is incomplete. 

Late aft ernoon, Friday, September 2: Pentagon offi cials continue to discuss 

options for assuming greater command of the response.

Th roughout Friday, DOD offi cials continued to analyze various options for strengthening 

the federal response. Th ese options included (1) invoking the Insurrection Act as a basis for 

asserting federal control over all of the military forces in the region, (2) appointing an activeduty offi cer to be “dual-hat” commander of both the National Guard and active duty forces, 

and (3) “Beef up FEMA,” presumably meaning provide additional support to FEMA.562

11:32 p.m., Friday, September 2: White House faxes “dual-hat” proposal to 

Governor Blanco 
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Late Friday night, the White House faxed to the Governor a proposal, accompanied by a 

draft letter prepared for the Governor to transmit to the President, that would have established General Honoré as a dual-hat offi cer, providing him with command and control over 

the Louisiana National Guard, reporting to the Governor, while retaining command and 

control over active-duty forces in Louisiana, reporting through the DOD chain of command to the President. 

Th e White House dual-hat proposal faxed to the Governor diff ered from the dual-hat commands used for the G-8 Summit and the 2004 political conventions in that in those previous 

instances, the dual-hat commander was a state National Guard offi cer who was placed into 

active-duty (Title 10) status for the purpose of also exercising command and control over the 

active-duty forces. Th e President’s dual-hat proposal to Governor Blanco would have placed 

an active-duty offi cer rather than a National Guard federal offi cer in the dual-hat position. 

Th is active-duty offi cer would have exercised command and control over both the activeduty forces, acting under a chain of command that reported to the President, and command 

and control of the National Guard forces, reporting to Governor Blanco. Th e proposal also 

provided that in the event of a confl ict, the federal chain of command would prevail. 

Terry Ryder, the Governor’s Executive Counsel, received the fax when it arrived at the Executive Mansion in Baton Rouge, near midnight:

What happens is that fax comes in and I looked at it and realized it was an 

arrangement which was in the direction of so called federalization. ... I immediately called the Governor. ... I believe I told her I wanted to pull all of her 

senior advisors together immediately, and this is probably about midnight, to 

have them all look at it and to get back to her aft er we read that in the MOU. 

... I woke them all up and brought them back to the OEP and we all read it, 

brainstormed for a while, and at some point ...we called the Governor back 

and said, “Governor, this is the so called federalization and this is what it 

does,” and in that conversation with Landreneau, with [former FEMA Director 

James Lee]Witt, we refreshed our recollection on Gen. Blum’s conversation on 

the night before.563

Andy Kopplin, Governor Blanco’s Chief of Staff , told the Committee the Governor’s immediate reaction: 

Th e Governor said, I’m not signing anything in the middle of the night. You 

guys do a thorough review of the issues surrounding it. ... If it could save lives 

and deliver more resources, that’s something that I would want to do.564

Later that night, Kopplin spoke to White House Chief of Staff Card. According to Kopplin, 

Card said, “Th ey’d like the Governor to sign this letter asking for this [agreement].” Kopplin also said, “He indicated that it would improve coordination and speed the delivery of 

federal assets.”565

Card and General Blum also spoke to Governor Blanco.566 Governor Blanco told General 

Blum that she “certainly didn’t want to make midnight decisions, even though I happened 

to be very wide awake.”567 When asked whether she felt “under pressure at that point, as 

compared to the conversation with the President earlier in the day,” Governor Blanco answered, “Well, it was a very diff erent kind of pressure, but I still told him no. ... I was very 

defi nitive, sir. Th ere was never a question in my mind as to the lines of authority.”568

General Blum related that Governor Blanco never wavered from the position that she remained in charge of the National Guard forces in Louisiana:
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Th e bottom line of it is there were many off ers and overtures made to the Governor on command and control, but they all centered on a Federal offi cer being 

in charge of the Governor’s National Guard, and that was rejected. It was offered by several messengers, and it was sent in various forms or variations. But 

the option was always – the bottom part of the option, the overriding piece of 

the option never deviated from it will be a federal offi cer that will be in charge 

of your National Guard and the federal troops that are there, and the Governor 

rejected the off er.569

 8:56 a.m., Saturday, September 3: Governor Blanco telephones White House 

Chief of Staff Card to reject the dual-hat proposal

“In retrospect,” Assistant Secretary McHale testifi ed, “I’m glad that we did not invoke 

either a dual-hatted commander or the statutory authority under the Insurrection Act.” He 

explained that “in a crisis environment, I think it’s almost inevitable that a president and a 

governor will have diff erences of opinion. To put an offi cer in the crossfi re between the two 

of them I think is untenable.”570

11 a.m., Saturday, September 3: Th e President announces the deployment of 

7,200 active-duty forces from the 82nd Airborne, 1st Cavalry, and II Marine 

Expeditionary Force 571

Th ese active-duty forces were placed under the command of General Honoré, and the 

National Guard forces remained under the command of Governor Blanco and General 

Landreneau. 

Governor Blanco testifi ed that she never needed these federal troops for law enforcement: “I had the National Guard for that.”572 Assistant Secretary McHale stated that DOD 

considered that these troops would be a contingency if additional forces were required to 

supplement the National Guard Military Police for law enforcement. But the President did 

not invoke the Insurrection Act, and the active-duty troops were never called to perform 

law enforcement. Rather they performed numerous other humanitarian missions, including door-to-door search and rescue, debris removal, and logistics support. Moreover, their 

mere presence had a reassuring eff ect, according to many witnesses. “Th at was a recognition by people that the administration and the nation was responding,” said Colonel Terry 

Ebbert, the Director of Homeland Security for the City of New Orleans.573

Two days later, Admiral Keating expressed his confi dence in the dual-command structure 

for the National Guard and active-duty forces. In response to a question about “what advantage or disadvantage federalizing the operation would have meant,” Admiral Keating stated:

From our perspective it would not have provided an advantage over our current situation. I think this is a topic of, I know it’s a topic of discussion between 

the President, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, and Secretary 

Chertoff , but from this headquarters through General Honoré. ... We’re satisfi ed with the current command and control arrangement where the Governors of Mississippi and Louisiana exercised their constitutional prerogative of 

control of the National Guard, and Russ Honoré as Joint Task Force Katrina’s 

commander has command of the active-duty forces.574
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524

Conclusion

To a large degree, the divergence of opinion between state and federal offi cials on the federal military response to troop-deployment requests appears to be the result of the ad-hoc 

processes by which the large-scale requests for troops were made and evaluated. Th e process 

envisioned by the NRP for requesting DOD assistance was not used for the large-scale 

requests for military troops. Instead, these requests were made through a variety of other 

channels, both state and federal. Th e requests were not specifi c; the responses were not 

coordinated. Communication among all of the entities involved in this issue ranged from 

poor to non-existent. It therefore is no surprise that there has never been a “meeting of the 

minds” on DOD’s responsiveness to the state requests.

Th e Katrina response, as detailed in this section, indicates the need for better coordination 

between the states and the principal federal agencies involved in coordinating the military 

response – DOD, DHS, and FEMA. Th is response also indicates the need to better coordinate the responses of the military forces under the diff erent state and federal commands 

– the National Guard and the active duty forces – especially in a catastrophic event. 

Recommendations: 

• Th e Department of Defense (DOD) and the state governors should develop 

an integrated plan for the employment of National Guard units and personnel 

in state status when large-scale military support is requested by a state to respond to a catastrophic incident or disaster. Th e plan should include a process 

for identifi cation of National Guard units with the capabilities required to 

respond to the incident or disaster, and should take into account the availability of National Guard units for mobilization for national-defense missions. Th e 

plan should include expedited procedures for requesting and approving federal 

funding under Title 32, United States Code, for National Guard forces employed in accordance with the plan, and procedures for DOD and governors, 

during a catastrophe, to coordinate the process of matching units and capabilities of National Guard forces with the requirements of governors. 

• All DOD support activities should be coordinated with the other federal support activities provided under the framework of the National Response Plan in 

the event of an emergency or disaster. Th e entire spectrum of potential DOD 

support activities should be integrated into the overall planning and preparedness activities led by the Department of Homeland Security at the federal, state, 

and local levels. 

Department of Defense Conclusion

Th e Department’s contributions to the Katrina response fl ow directly from its professional, 

sustained emphasis on education, training, retention, and rigorous adherence to standards, 

coupled with a budget and resources unparalleled across the government. Military culture 

also played a role, as many offi cials reported to the Committee that their eff orts in response 

to Katrina were the most rewarding and satisfying missions of their oft en extensive careers. 

Lieutenant Colonel Gordon Ellis of the Ohio National Guard commanded a battalion that 

deployed to the Superdome during the fi rst week, and reported:

Like all commanders, my soldiers were there about seven days before they had 

their fi rst shower. Th ey never once complained while they were there, and to 

see the professionalism and the dedication that those young soldiers displayed 
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525

throughout that diffi cult time makes me immensely proud to have been a part 

of that.575

However, as with all agencies and all levels of government, Katrina exposed weaknesses of, 

and raised questions about, the military’s mechanisms for responding to disasters. Given 

DOD’s unmatched power and size, and its unique Constitutional status, these questions 

merit careful consideration. 

To what extent should the nation rely upon the Department of Defense in disaster response? 

Th e Department of Homeland Security was created, in part, to respond to domestic emergencies, but Katrina revealed that in critical missions, particularly in logistics, search and rescue, 

and command and control, it was unprepared to address a catastrophe of Katrina’s magnitude. At the same time, Department of Defense, since September 11, 2001, and since establishing U.S. Northern Command, has revised its mission to refl ect a greater focus on homeland 

defense. Its capabilities in this arena have therefore grown more robust. But Assistant Secretary McHale cautioned against placing too much reliance upon the military’s capabilities:

I would urge you to think simultaneously about speed and the fundamental 

public policy missions, public policy questions associated with the role of the 

military within domestic American society and constitutional government. ... 

We have to balance not only what the military is capable of doing, questions of 

speed and resources, but what the military ought to be doing consistent with the 

historically constrained role of the military within domestic American society.576

Is it wiser to further develop these capabilities in DHS? If DOD’s resources were already 

engaged in an overseas mission, military support might not be available to the extent that it 

was during Katrina. In that case, a more capable DHS would be preferable, especially since 

many of the missions DOD performed were not uniquely military. DHS could adopt 

military models of logistics, training, career development, and centralized incident management to improve its ability to function independently. 

At the same time, when military assistance is required, to what degree should we rely on a 

system in which specifi c assets are requested? Aft er-action reviews stressed, just as they had 

following Hurricane Andrew, that DOD must not wait for requests to push assets forward. 

But Katrina revealed a tension between a system of planned, coordinated movement, and the 

value of commanders’ initiative in moving in advance of orders. Initiative, in this case, proved 

essential to the swift deployment of resources, but it also contributed to an uncoordinated 

response, in which strategic commanders lacked clear visibility over the force structure. 

Katrina also revealed tension between gubernatorial and Presidential executive powers, underlying a delicate federalist balance: should governors retain full control of their National 

Guard forces aft er catastrophic events? Th e governors of the two most seriously aff ected 

states here answered “yes” unequivocally.577 Yet at the height of the crisis, the President 

and senior military and civilian DOD leaders grew concerned that the scale of the military 

response – both the size of the National Guard force and the addition of federal activeduty ground troops – required a single commander. Governor Blanco’s rejection of their 

proposed solution, however, has led DOD offi cials to realize that unity of command, long a 

staple of military operations, can also prove inconsistent with states’ Constitutional powers. 

Th e fi nal resolution was to achieve unity of eff ort through the close coordination of federal 

and state-controlled military forces. But as has been widely documented, numerous factors challenged this coordination. While the Committee has not determined that a lack of 

coordination impaired the eff ectiveness of the military response to Katrina, many leaders 

agree that we must establish mechanisms now to ensure unity of eff ort between the Guard 
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and active-duty forces the next time they are called for such a common cause. Only through 

forethought, planning, and consensus among the agencies and levels of government can we 

ensure that we do not encounter a political or leadership crisis in a catastrophe that may be 

even more destructive, and provide less warning, than Katrina.

1 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan. Washington: Government Printing Offi ce, Dec. 2004, p. 

8 [hereinaft er NRP].

2 Committee staff interview of Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, U.S. Department of 

Defense, conducted on Jan. 4, 2006, transcript p. 85.

3 NRP, p. 43.

4 McHale interview, Jan. 4, 2006, p. 88.

5 National Academy of Public Administration, Th e Role of the National Guard in Emergency Preparedness and Response, 

Jan. 1997, pp. 18, 123-126.

6 U.S. Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, June 2005, p. 35.

7 NRP, p. 8.

8 National Emergency Managers Association, “What is EMAC?” http://www.emacweb.org/?9. Accessed on Apr. 19, 2006.

9 National Emergency Managers Association, “How does EMAC Work?” http://www.emacweb.org/?142. Accessed on Apr. 

19, 2006.

10 P.L. 104-321, 110 Stat. 3877, and 3879-3880.

11 National Guard Bureau, National Guard Aft er Action Review: Hurricane Response, Dec. 21, 2005, p. 63.

12 Th e White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5: Management of Domestic Incidents, Feb. 28, 2003.

13 See: NRP.

14 Th e White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5: Management of Domestic Incidents, Feb. 28, 2003.

15 Committee staff interview of Col. Don Harrington, U.S. Army, Military Liaison to FEMA, conducted on Jan. 6, 2006, 

transcript pp. 6-8.

16 Committee staff interview of Col. Anthony F. Daskevich II, U.S. Army, Louisiana Defense Coordinating Offi cer, conducted on Jan. 10, 2006, transcript p. 10.

17 NRP, p. 42.

18 Col. Daskevich interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 15.

19 McHale interview, Jan. 4, 2006, p. 134.

20 Committee staff interview of Clair Blong, Liaison to U.S. Northern Command, FEMA, conducted on Dec. 8, 2005, 

transcript p. 9.

21 Blong interview, Dec. 8, 2005, p. 93.

22 NRP, p. 10; 10 U.S.C. § 162.

23 NRP, p. ESF–v.

24 NRP, p. ESF #1–4.

25 NRP, p. ESF #2–12.

26 NRP, pp. ESF #3–5 through 3–8.

27 NRP, p. ESF #4–4.

28 NRP, pp. ESF #5–1 through 5–6.

29 NRP, p. ESF #6–6.

30 NRP, pp. ESF #7–1 through 7–6.

31 NRP, p. ESF #8–9.

32 NRP, p. ESF #9–6.

33 NRP, p. ESF #10–10.

34 NRP, p. ESF #11–10.

35 NRP, p. ESF #12–4.

36 NRP, p. ESF #13–6.
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37 NRP, p. ESF #14–5.

38 NRP, p. ESF #15–5.

39 31 U.S.C. § 1535.

40 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206.

41 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-335.

42 U.S. General Accounting Offi ce, DOD Can Combat Fraud Better by Strengthening Its Investigative Agencies, Mar. 21, 

1983, p. 15.

43 18 U.S.C. § 1385.

44 U.S. General Accounting Offi ce, Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for Domestic Military Missions, July 11, 2003, p. 11.

45 10 U.S.C. §§ 111, 3013, 3062, 3203-3207, 4301, 5013, 5062, 8013, 8062, 8201.

46 Committee staff interview of Lt. Gen. Russel L. Honoré, U.S. Army, Commanding General, First U.S. Army, conducted 

on Jan. 9, 2006, transcript p. 14.

47 Paul Wolfowitz, Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments and others, “Reporting ‘Immediate Response’ Requests from Civil Authorities,” Apr. 25, 2005. Provided to Committee; U.S. Department of Defense, Directive 

Number 3025.1, “Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA),” Jan. 15, 1993, pp. 7-8 [hereinaft er DOD Directive 3025.1, 

MSCA].

48 Paul Wolfowitz, Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments and others, “Implementation Guidance 

Regarding the Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense,” May 25, 2003. Provided to Committee.

49 NRP, p. 9.

50 McHale interview, Jan. 4, 2006, pp. 90, 109.

51 DOD Directive 3025.1, MSCA, pp. 5-7.

52 NRP, p. 10; 10 U.S.C. § 162.

53 Testimony of Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, before 

the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Defense 

Department’s Role in the Response, Feb. 9, 2006.

54 Offi ce of Management and Budget, A Review of Existing Authorities and Procedures for Using Military Assets in Fighting 

Wildfi res, May 17, 2004, p. 7.

55 Committee staff interview of Col. Darryl Roberson, U.S. Air Force, Assistant Deputy Director, Antiterrorism and Homeland Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, conducted on Nov. 10, 2005, transcript p. 4

56 Committee staff interview of Maj. Gen. Terry Scherling, U.S. Air Force, Director of the Joint Staff , National Guard 

Bureau, U.S. Department of Defense, conducted on Jan. 19, 2006, transcript p. 8.

57 DOD Memorandum, Implementation Guidance Regarding the Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland 

Defense, Mar. 25, 2003, p. 1.

58 U.S. Department of Defense, Directive Number 3025.12, “Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS),” Feb. 4, 

1994, pp. 3-5 and 8 [hereinaft er DOD Directive 3025.12, MACDIS].

59 DOD Directive 3025.1, MSCA, p. 2; U.S. Department of Defense, Directive Number 3025.15, “Military Assistance to 

Civil Authorities,” Feb. 18, 1997, p. 5; DOD Directive 3025.12, MACDIS, p. 6.

60 Joint Staff Washington, Message, “Transfer of the Army Director of Military Support Mission to the Joint Staff ,” May 

2003. Provided to Committee.

61 DOD Directive 3025.1, MSCA, p. 4.

62 U.S. Joint Forces Command, “11: New Name, Future, Focus.” http://www.jfcom.mil/about/History/abthist6.htm. Accessed on Apr. 20, 2006. 

63 U.S. Northern Command, “U.S. Northern Command: History.” http://www.northcom.mil/about_us/history.htm. Accessed on April 20, 2006.

64 U.S. Northern Command, “U.S. Northern Command: History.” http://www.northcom.mil/about_us/history.htm. Accessed on April 20, 2006. 

 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Feb. 6, 2006.

65 U.S. Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, June 2005, pp. 2-3

66 Committee staff interview of Maj. Gen. William Caldwell, U.S. Army, Commander, 82nd Airborne Division, U.S. Department of Defense, conducted on Feb. 28, 2006, transcript p. 8; Committee staff interview of Lt. Gen. Steven Blum, Chief, 

National Guard Bureau, U.S. Department of Defense, conducted on Jan. 19, 2006, transcript pp. 110-111.

67 10 U.S.C. § 111.

68 10 U.S.C. §§ 3013, 5013, 8013.
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69 10 U.S.C. §§ 162, 164.

70 U.S. Department of Defense, “Unifi ed Command Plan: Th e World with Commanders’ Areas of Responsibility.” http://

www.defenselink.mil/specials/unifi edcommand/. Accessed on Feb. 28, 2006.

71 U.S. General Accounting Offi ce, Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for Domestic 

Military Missions, July 11, 2003, p. 5; U.S. Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, June 

2005, p. 8.

72 U.S. General Accounting Offi ce, Homeland Defense: DOD Needs to Assess the Structure of U.S. Forces for Domestic Military Missions, July 11, 2003, p. 11.

73 U.S. Northern Command, “About Us.” http://www.northcom.mil/about_us/about_us.htm. Accessed on Feb. 28, 2006.

74 U.S. Northern Command, “Joint Task Force Alaska.” http://northcom.mil/about_us/JTF_Alaska.htm. Accessed on Feb. 

28, 2006; U.S. Northern Command, “Joint Force Headquarters National Capital Region.” http://www.northcom.mil/about_

us/JFHQ_NCR.htm. Accessed on Feb. 28, 2006; U.S. Northern Command, “Standing Joint Force Headquarters North.” 

http://www.northcom.mil/about_us/SJFHQN.htm. Accessed on Feb. 28, 2006.

75 U.S. Northern Command, “About Us.” http://www.northcom.mil/about_us/about_us.htm. Accessed on Feb. 28, 2006.

76 Testimony of Adm. Timothy Keating, U.S. Navy, Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. 

Northern Command, U.S. Department of Defense, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Defense Department’s Role in the Response, Feb. 9, 2006.

77 U.S. Department of Defense, DOD Dictionary of Military Terms, 2005. http://www.dtic.mil/jel.doddict/data/o/03883.

html. Accessed on May 4, 2006. 

78 Col. David Rhodes, e-mail to Tom Eldridge, Dan Berkovitz, Brian Lepore and Eric Andersen, Senate Committee staff 

members, Feb. 16, 2006, 6:33 p.m.

79 U.S. Department of Defense, “EXORD for DOD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina,” Aug. 29, 2005. 

80 McHale interview, Jan. 4, 2006, transcript p. 118; U.S. Northern Command, message to Joint Staff Washington, “Request 

for Forces,” Aug. 30, 2005, 1745 Z, p. 1-4. Provided to Committee (Z corresponds to Zulu time, the military designation for 

Greenwich Mean Time. It refers to the time at the prime meridian.); 10 U.S.C. § 162; Committee staff interview of Margaret 

Kruse, Joint Forces Command, U.S. Department of Defense, conducted on Nov. 16, 2005, record of interview pp. 1-2. 

81 NRP, p. 42.

82 NRP, p. 42.

83 McHale interview, Jan. 4, 2006, p. 49 (Between Aug. 29 and Sept. 10, 2005, 72,000 military personnel were deployed 

to the Gulf Coast area: 50,000 National Guardsmen from every state and territory as well as the District of Columbia and 

22,000 active-duty troops.).

84 Maj. Gen. Caldwell interview, Feb. 28, 2006, pp. 40-41.

85 Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense), Hurricane Katrina/Rita/Ophelia Interim Timeline, 

Nov. 2, 2005, pp. 1-2. Provided to Committee. 

86 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , Message to Commander, U.S. Northern Command and others, “Severe Weather 

Execute Order (EXORD) for DOD Support to FEMA (FEMA),” Aug. 19, 2005, 2300 Z. Provided to Committee.

87 NRP, p. 37. Also, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , Homeland Security, Joint Publication 3-26, Aug. 2, 2005, p. GL-7. 

(“A military or civilian offi cial who has been designated by the Department of Defense to exercise some delegated authority 

of the Department of Defense executive agent to coordinate military support to civil authorities activities.”).

88 Col. Roberson interview, Nov. 10, 2005, p. 29.

89 Col. Harrington interview, Jan. 6, 2006, p. 8.

90 U.S. Northern Command, Message to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others, “Mod 3 to EXORD Katrina,” 

Aug. 28, 2005, 1200 Z. Provided to Committee.

91 Col. Daskevich interview, Jan. 10, 2005, p. 27; Col. Damon C. Penn, e-mail to Col. Mark Fields and Col. Anthony 

Daskevich, Aug. 27, 2005, 3:07 p.m. Col. Anthony Daskevich deployed the day before from the Fift h U.S. Army in Fort Sill, 

Oklahoma, to Baton Rouge, Louisiana, arriving at the temporary FEMA offi ce by 6:30 p.m. Saturday, August 27. On the 

same day, Col. Damon Penn deployed from First Army and arrived in Jackson, Mississippi by 10 p.m. 

92 U.S. Northern Command, Message to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others, “Mod 2 to EXORD Katrina,” 

Aug. 27, 2005, 2230 Z; U.S. Northern Command, Message to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others, “Mod 3 to 

EXORD Katrina,” Aug. 28, 2005, 1200 Z. Provided to Committee.

93 U.S. Department of Defense, “Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense OASD(HD) 

DCIP.” http://www.dod-ap.msiac.dmso.mil/oasd.htm. Accessed on Mar. 1, 2006 (“Th e Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for Homeland Defense (ASD(HD)) is the overall supervisor of homeland defense (HD) activities for the Department 

of Defense. Th e ASD(HD) will oversee HD activities, develop policies, conduct analysis, provide advice, and make 

recommendations on HD, support to civil authorities, emergency preparedness and domestic crisis management matters 

within the Department.”). 

94 Committee staff interview of Col. Richard Chavez, U.S. Air Force, Senior Military Advisor for Civil Support, Offi ce of 
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529

the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, conducted on Nov. 9, 2005, transcript p. 36.

95 Col. Chavez interview, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 41. However, Col. Chavez did state in his interview that Katrina demonstrated 

the value of examining the availability of other assets; for example, having learned the value of an immediate employment 

of watercraft for the purpose of performing water rescues, Chavez stated that he intends to include low-draft and shallowdraft boats among his pre-landfall assessments during the coming year’s hurricane season. Col. Chavez interview, Nov. 9, 

2005, p. 27.

96 Col. Chavez interview, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 27.

97 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-26, “Homeland Security,” Aug. 2, 2005, p. IV–10.

98 Col. Roberson interview, Nov. 10, 2005, pp. 31-32.

99 U.S. Northern Command, Message to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others, “NORTHCOM Mod 2 to EXORD Katrina,” Aug. 27, 2005, 2230 Z; U.S. Northern Command, Message to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others, “NORTHCOM Mod 3 to EXORD Katrina,” Aug. 28, 2005, 1200 Z. Provided to Committee. Brig. Gen. Scherling said 

that Katrina showed that additional assets might have been useful had they been deployed earlier, and that consideration 

was being given to broadening the Order for next year’s season: 

Th ere are certain types of capabilities that certainly should be considered, and the fi rst thing that we want 

to do is gain situational awareness, so we want to have the ability to go in and assess a situation. We want 

to be able to save lives. And so, you want the capability to have search and rescue. And then, you want to 

be able to go in and stabilize the situation where you probably need potentially the Corps of Engineers 

and many of the things that are somewhat outlined broadly in the emergency support functions of the 

National Response Plan. 

Maj. Gen. Scherling interview, Jan. 19, 2006, p. 81.

100 FEMA, Mission Assignment, 3212EM-LA-DOD-01, Aug. 28, 2005. Provided to Committee.

101 U.S. Northern Command, USNORTHCOM Hurricane Katrina Timeline (Draft ), p. 1. Provided to Committee.

102 U.S. Northern Command, Message to U.S. Joint Forces Command and others, “WARNORD FOUR/Tropical Storm 

Katrina,” Aug. 25, 2005, 0014 Z. Provided to Committee.

103 Committee staff interview of Col. Th omas Muir, U.S. Army, Deputy Chief, Current Operations, J33, U.S. Northern 

Command, U.S. Department of Defense, conducted on Dec. 6, 2005, transcript pp. 11-12.

104 Col. Muir interview, Dec. 6, 2005, p. 14.

105 Committee staff interview of Col. Roberta Woods, U.S. Army, Chief, Plans and Operations Division, U.S. Northern 

Command, U.S. Department of Defense, conducted on Dec. 7, 2005, transcript pp. 14, 37-38.

106 Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 12.

107 Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 14.

108 Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, pp. 38, 12 (“Pre-incident we don’t have any set actions that we take because we 

must respond to an approved mission assignment. So it’s monitoring, trying to anticipate where there might be shortfalls 

and advise as – as appropriate if we see indications of shortfalls.”).

109 Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 38.

110 Lt. Gen. Honoré interview, Jan. 9, 2006, p. 10.

111 U.S. Department of Defense, First U.S. Army, Joint Task Force Katrina, Hurricane Katrina Chronology. Provided to 

Committee. 

112 First U.S. Army, Message to U.S. Northern Command, “Request for Force Capabilities (Title X) ISO possible DSCA operations as a result of Hurricane Katrina,” Aug. 28, 2005, 1656 Z. Lt. Gen. Honoré requested assets as follows: 24 hours aft er 

landfall: satellite phones, light or utility helicopters for reconnaissance, damage assessment, and command/control shallowdraft boats for Search and Rescue and supply transportation. 48 hours aft er landfall: medium lift aviation for transportation 

of supplies and personnel medical units for Search and Rescue and evacuation, engineer units for construction, utility and 

transportation, power generators, military police units, high-water trucks.

113 U.S. Army Forces Command, Message to U.S. Joint Forces Command, “Request for Force Capabilities (Title X) is possible DSCA operations as a result of Hurricane Katrina,” Aug. 28, 2005.

114 Maj. Gen. Richard Rowe, e-mail to NC-JOC – Director – OMB, Aug. 28, 2005, 5:31 p.m. Provided to Committee.

115 Maj. Gen. Terry Scherling, e-mail to Maj. Gen. Rowe, Aug. 28, 2005, 3:41 p.m. Provided to Committee.

116 Committee staff interview of Maj. Gen. Richard Rowe, Director of Operations, J3, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. 

Department of Defense, conducted on Jan. 20, 2006, transcript p. 31.

117 Maj. Gen. Richard Rowe, e-mail to Lt. Gen. Russel Honoré and Lt. Gen. Joseph Inge, Aug. 29, 2005, 6:46 p.m. Provided 

to Committee.

118 Col. Daskevich interview, Jan. 10, 2005, p. 28.

119 Col. Daskevich interview, Jan. 10, 2005, p. 30.
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120 Col. Damon Penn, e-mail to Col. Anthony Daskevich, Aug. 28, 2005, 8:16 a.m. Provided to Committee.

121 Col. Daskevich interview, Jan. 10, 2005, pp. 24-25; Committee staff interview of William Lokey, Federal Coordinating 

Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, FEMA, conducted on Nov. 4, 2005, transcript pp. 81-84.

122 Col. Daskevich interview, Jan. 10, 2005, pp. 39-40.

123 Col. Daskevich interview, Jan. 10, 2005, pp. 46-47. He and the leadership of Fift h Army decided to deploy the rest of his 

staff Sunday morning, but as the storm’s path was still unclear, they sent the staff to Houston to await further direction. Col. 

Daskevich interview, Jan. 10, 2005, p. 30.

124 Committee staff interview of Vice Adm. Mark Fitzgerald, U.S. Navy, Commander, U.S. Second Fleet, U.S. Department of Defense, conducted on Nov. 15, 2005 (untranscribed). It is important to note that as a Fleet Commander, he did 

not possess the authority to command an operational mission; as directed by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, all Fleet-commanded missions must be classifi ed as either training or equipping. Because NORTHCOM had not yet designated the 

Gulf as a Joint Operational Area, and because FEMA had not requested Navy assistance, Bataan’s movement on Aug. 

28 was classifi ed as training. But she proved to be one of the earliest, and therefore, most essential assets available in the 

critical fi rst days aft er landfall. 

125 U.S. Fleet Forces Command, briefi ng slides, “Hurricane Katrina Navy Mission: Providing Rescue and Civil Support 

Relief from the Sea, Air and Land,” Nov. 14, 2005, p. 7. Provided to Committee. 

126 U.S. Fleet Forces Command, briefi ng slides, “Hurricane Katrina Navy Mission: Providing Rescue and Civil Support 

Relief from the Sea, Air and Land,” Nov. 14, 2005, p. 7. Provided to Committee.

127 Committee staff interview of Maj. Gen. Douglas O’Dell, U.S. Marine Corps, Commanding General, 4th Marine Division, U.S. Department of Defense, conducted on Dec. 14, 2005, transcript p. 12.

128 Maj. Gen. O’Dell interview, Dec. 14, 2005, pp. 16-18. It is important to note that he did not activate or move units into 

the gulf region prior to landfall or prior to receiving an order from NORTHCOM, but merely assessed availabilities and 

placed units on alert within the Marine Corps, similar to the process Lt. Gen. Honoré sought to achieve with his request 

message to NORTHCOM.

129 Committee staff interview of Lt. Gen. James Amos, U.S. Marine Corps, Commander, Second Marine Expeditionary 

Force, conducted on Dec. 14, 2005, transcript, p. 9.

130 Lt. Gen. Amos interview, Dec. 14, 2005, p. 11.

131 Committee staff interview of Brig. Gen. Paul Selva, U.S. Air Force, Director of Operations, U.S. Transportation Command, U.S. Department of Defense, conducted on Feb. 16, 2006, transcript p. 13.

132 U.S. Northern Command, USNORTHCOM Hurricane Katrina Timeline (Draft ), p. 4. Provided to Committee.

133 Committee staff interview of Adm. Timothy Keating, U.S. Navy, Commander, North American Aerospace Defense 

Command and U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Department of Defense, conducted by Senator Susan Collins, Feb. 3, 

2006, (untranscribed). Admiral Keating “woke up Tuesday morning saying New Orleans dodged a bullet.” McHale 

interview, Jan. 4, 2006, p. 34. “At that point, the magnitude of the disaster was still unknown, Hurricane Katrina made 

landfall on Monday, August 29. Th e news reports that we had all read on the following morning prior to the meeting 

that is the subject of my testimony were consistently inaccurate. If you take a look at Th e Washington Post or other publications, it’s clear that for reasons that I think we understand a little better now but have not yet fully explained, initial

media reports were more optimistic than warranted. Th ere were references in news stories to having dodged the bullet. 

Th is is not a criticism of the media coverage. Th is was a huge storm, the scope of the damage was vast, and situational 

awareness was not yet clear. In any event, we went into the meeting on Tuesday morning with media reports that were 

less sobering than the scope of the actual damage.”

134 1A JOC Watch Battle Captain, e-mail to 5th Bde, 87th Div, S-3 Ops and others, Sept. 1, 2005, 4:03 p.m. Lt. Gen. Honoré 

was among the recipients and “DoD Force Protection Lessons Learned: Hurricane Andrew, 24 August 1992, South Florida” 

was attached. Provided to Committee.

135 Joint Staff , Message to U.S. Northern Command, “DOD Support to FEMA,” Aug. 29, 2005, 2300 Z. Provided to Committee. (Authorized by Brig. Gen. Scherling.). 

136 Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 28.

137 Committee staff interview of Col. Dan Shanahan, U.S. Army, Commander, 1st Air Cavalry Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, U.S. Department of Defense, conducted on Feb. 23, 2006 (not yet transcribed).

138 FEMA, Mission Assignment, 3212EM-LA-DOD-01, Aug. 28, 2005. Provided to Committee.

139 FEMA, Mission Assignment Task Order Form, Aug. 28, 2005.

140 McHale interview, Jan. 4, 2006, p. 12.

141 See e.g.: Committee staff interview of Edward Buikema, Acting Director, Response Division, FEMA, conducted on Nov. 

21, 2005, transcript p. 168. See also: Buikema interview, Nov. 21, 2005, p. 183 (“I think the process from beginning to end 

probably takes longer than it should.”). However, Mr. Buikema was basing his statement that he was frustrated on a false 

premise, i.e., that the billion dollar logistics request was not “done” until Sept. 5. In fact, as discussed above, it was approved 

on Sept. 2. Buikema admitted that he “lost visibility” of this particular request and so had diffi culty accounting for what 

he perceived caused a delay in its approval, but he still had an “instinct” that DOD was the cause for the delay. Buikema 

interview, Nov. 21, 2005, p. 171.
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142 Buikema interview, Nov. 21, 2005, p. 213.

143 U.S. Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, Th e Federal Response to Hurricane 

Katrina: Lessons Learned. Washington: Government Printing Offi ce, Feb. 2006, p. 54 [hereinaft er, Th e White House, Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned] (“From the time a request is initiated until the military force or capability is delivered to 

the disaster site requires a 21-step process.”). Th e source for this statement is the U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Center 

for Operational Analysis, “Incident Command Request Briefi ng,” Nov. 1, 2005. Th at PowerPoint briefi ng includes a slide 

depicting the DOD approval process, and includes the statement “21 steps to get a truck.” Th e White House, Hurricane 

Katrina Lessons Learned, p. 54. Th e report then states that DOD’s processes resulted in “critical needs not being met” citing 

a written statement by Mayor-President Melvin “Kip” Holden submitted for a hearing before the Senate Homeland Security 

and Governmental Aff airs Committee on Sept. 28, 2005. Upon review, the statement by Mayor-President Holden does not 

support the factual assertion made by the Townsend Report because it does not relate to DOD.

144 Committee staff interview of William Lokey, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, FEMA, 

conducted on Jan. 20, 2006, transcript pp. 130-134. (One-billion dollar request was “negotiated with DOD”)

145 Committee staff interview of Scott Wells, Deputy Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, 

FEMA, conducted on Nov. 15, 2005, transcript p. 124.

146 Committee staff interview of Col. Richard Chavez, U.S. Air Force, Senior Military Advisor for Civil Support, Offi ce of 

the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, conducted on Nov. 22, 2005, pp. 

147-150; Col. Chavez interview, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 30 (DOD liaison offi cers helped FEMA offi cials “with the verbiage of the 

mission assignment.”).

147 Committee staff interview of Gen. Richard Myers, U.S. Air Force (Ret.), former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff , U.S. 

Department of Defense, conducted on Feb. 28, 2006, transcript p. 77. 

148 Gen. Myers interview, Feb. 28, 2006, p. 79.

149 McHale, Senate Committee Hearing, Feb. 9, 2006.

150 Committee staff interview of Capt. Michael McDaniel, U.S. Navy, Navy Emergency Preparedness Liaison Offi cer to 

FEMA, conducted on Dec. 2, 2005, transcript p. 156.

151 Col. Harrington interview, Jan. 6, 2006, pp. 27-28.

152 Col. Harrington interview, Jan. 6, 2006.

153 Maj. Gen. Richard Rowe, e-mail to Lt. Gen. Russel Honoré and Lt. Gen. Joseph Inge, Aug. 29, 2005, 6:46 p.m. Provided 

to Committee.

154 Maj. Gen. Rowe interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 31.

155 Wells interview, Nov. 15, 2005, p. 123.

156 Wells interview, Nov. 15, 2005, p. 124.

157 Michael Ritchie, e-mail to Anthony Capra, Aug. 29, 2005, 1:14 p.m. Provided to Committee.

158 Col. Richard Chavez, e-mail to Anthony Capra and Michael Ritchie, Aug. 29, 2005, 2:35 p.m. Provided to Committee 

(“Does not fi t policy for Immediate Response.”).

159 McHale interview, Jan. 4, 2006, p. 29.

160 Committee staff interview of Gordon England, Deputy Secretary of Defense, conducted by Senator Susan Collins on 

Feb. 3, 2006 (untranscribed). 

161 England interview, Feb. 3, 2006. 

162 Anthony Capra, e-mail to Paul McHale, Aug. 29, 2005, 5:25 p.m. Provided to Committee.

163 Col. David Rhodes, e-mail to Tom Eldridge and Dan Berkovitz, Senate Committee staff members, May 3, 2006, 5:28 

p.m. 

164 Anthony Capra, e-mail to POL DoD HD Coordination Group and others, Aug. 30, 2005, 1:47 p.m. Provided to Committee.

165 Mark Roupas, e-mail to Paul McHale, Aug. 30, 2005, 3:15 p.m. Provided to Committee. It is unclear what constituted 

confi rmation of the breach to Assistant Secretary McHale’s offi ce. Col. Chavez stated that Assistant Secretary McHale’s offi ce received confi rmation from the Corps at sunrise Wednesday morning. Col. Chavez interview, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 85.

166 McHale interview, Jan. 4, 2006, p. 97.

167 NRP, p. 33.

168 McHale interview, Jan. 4, 2006, pp. 131-132.

169 Capt. Frank Th orp, e-mail to Lt. Gen. Walter Sharp, Aug. 30, 2005, 8:15 p.m. Provided to Committee.

170 Testimony of Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, before 

the U.S. House, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing 

on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the Department of Defense, the Coast Guard, and the National Guard 

of Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama, Oct. 27, 2005.
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171 U.S. Northern Command, USNORTHCOM Hurricane Katrina Timeline (Draft ), p. 1.

172 NC JOC-Director-OMB, e-mail to Maj. Gen. Richard Rowe and Rear Adm. Gene Brooks, Aug. 29, 2005, 4 p.m. Provided to Committee.

173 Committee staff interview of Capt. Brett Markham, U.S. Navy, Deputy Director of Intelligence, U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command, U.S. Department of Defense, conducted on Dec. 7, 2005, 

transcript pp. 61-62.

174 Committee staff interview of Capt. Brett Markham, U.S. Navy, Deputy Director of Intelligence, U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command, U.S. Department of Defense, conducted on Dec. 8, 2005, 

transcript p. 5.

175 Capt. Markham interview, Dec. 8, 2005, pp. 4-5.

176 Capt. Markham interview, Dec. 8, 2005, pp. 7-8.

177 Committee staff interview of Col. Wesley McClellan, U.S. Navy, Navy Emergency Preparedness Liaison to FEMA, U.S. 

Department of Defense, conducted on Jan. 23, 2006, transcript p. 18. 

178 Adm. Keating interview, Feb. 3, 2006. 

179 Committee staff interview of Brig. Gen. Moulton, U.S. Air Force, Director, Standing Joint Headquarters-North, U.S. 

Northern Command, U.S. Department of Defense, conducted on Dec. 5, 2005, transcript pp. 69-70.

180 Col. Daskevich interview, Jan. 10, 2005, p. 69.

181 Col. Daskevich interview, Jan. 10, 2005, p. 79.

182 Col. Daskevich interview, Jan. 10, 2005, pp. 78-80.

183 Col. Daskevich interview, Jan. 10, 2005, p. 85.

184 Col. Daskevich interview, Jan. 10, 2005, pp. 68-69.

185 Adm. Edmund Giambastiani, e-mail to Adm. Timothy Keating, Aug. 30, 2005, 4:59 p.m. Provided to Committee.

186 Col. Richard Chavez, e-mail to Tony Capra, Aug. 30, 2005, 8:25 a.m. Provided to Committee (“We need to keep these 

actions in the proper lane to avoid confusion and duplication of eff ort. FEMA is the lead and is the conduit for all Federal 

response coordination, planning and execution.”).

187 McHale interview, Jan. 4, 2006, pp. 34-35.

188 Gen. Myers interview, Feb. 28, 2006, p. 9.

189 Col. David Rhodes, e-mail to Eric Andersen and Brian Lepore, Senate Committee staff members, Mar. 28, 2006, 4:25 

p.m.; McHale interview, Jan. 4, 2006, p. 30.

190 Gordon England, memorandum to SECDEF [Donald Rumsfeld], Aug. 30, 2005. Provided to Committee. 

191 Offi ce of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , “Meetings Regarding Hurricane Katrina,” Sept. 7, 2005. Provided to 

Committee.

192 Gen. Myers interview, Feb. 28, 2006, pp. 9-10 (“And so with a verbal order from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, I 

called all the service chiefs, and I ask them...what we’ve got to do is...we gotta lean forward. We know we’re going to get 

asked to do things, so you services know what you provide and these kind of things, so work with Northern Command; 

make sure what you’re doing is smart, but start to lean forward. And if you need to preposition or move stuff , start to move 

and preposition stuff , because you know we’re going to get...the requests.”).

193 Adm. Keating interview, Feb. 3, 2006. 

194 Offi ce of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , “Meetings Regarding Hurricane Katrina,” Sept. 7, 2005. Provided to 

Committee.

195 England interview, Feb. 3, 2006. 

196 McHale interview, Jan. 4, 2006, p. 37.

197 Adm. Timothy Keating, e-mail to Gen. Richard B. Myers and others, Aug. 30, 2005, 12:24 p.m. Provided to Committee.

198 McHale interview, Jan. 4, 2006, pp. 30-31.

199 Capt. McDaniel interview, Dec. 2, 2005, p. 69.

200 Col. Harrington interview, Jan. 6, 2006, p. 81.

201 U.S. Joint Forces Command, Hurricane Katrina Comprehensive Timeline, Nov. 15, 2006, p. 5. Provided to Committee.

202 Maj. Gen. Rowe interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 42. 

203 Adm. Timothy Keating, e-mail to Brig. Gen. Frank Helmick and others, Aug. 30, 2005, 9:18 p.m. Provided to Committee.

204 McHale interview, Jan. 4, 2006, pp. 14-15 (“During that week, before ...we had received a modest number of requests 

for assistance from the Department of Homeland Security. During that period of time, when the Department of Defense 

were prepared to review and approve a greater number of RFAs covering a wider range of missions than those we actually 
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533

received – in short, we were leaning forward in anticipation of RFAs from Department of Homeland Security, but because 

of the magnitude of the event and the complexity of some of the mission requirements, the RFAs had not yet begun to appear in large numbers...during that fi rst week, the RFAs we had received were fairly specifi c and modest in scope.”).

205 Col. Roberson interview, Nov. 10, 2005, p. 114.

206 McHale interview, Jan. 4, 2006, pp. 14-15, 39.

207 Brig. Gen. Moulton interview, Dec. 5, 2005, p. 43.

208 U.S. Northern Command, Message to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others, “NORTHCOM Mod 6 to 

EXORD Katrina,” Aug. 31, 2005, 0300 Z. Provided to Committee.

209 U.S. Fleet Forces Command, Hurricane Katrina, Navy Mission: Providing Rescue & Civil Support Relief from the 

Sea, Air and Land, Aft ermath. Provided to Committee; JTF-Katrina, Commander’s Assessment, Sept. 3, 2005. Provided 

to Committee.

210 U.S. Northern Command, USNORTHCOM Hurricane Katrina Timeline (Draft ), p. 1.

211 Vice Adm. Fitzgerald interview, Nov. 15, 2005.

212 Vice Adm. Fitzgerald interview, Nov. 15, 2005. 

213 Vice Adm. Fitzgerald interview, Nov. 15, 2005.

214 Committee staff interview of Vice Adm. Vivien Crea, U.S. Coast Guard, Commander, Coast Guard Atlantic Area and 

Commander, Maritime Defense Zone Atlantic, conducted on Jan. 3, 2006, transcript p. 40. 

215 Committee staff interview of Capt. Richard Snyder, U.S. Navy, Executive Offi cer, USS Bataan, conducted on Nov. 14, 

2005 (untranscribed); JTF-Katrina, Commander’s Assessment, Sept. 3, 2005. Provided to Committee.

216 Capt. Snyder interview, Nov. 14, 2005.

217 Capt. Snyder interview, Nov. 14, 2005.

218 Committee staff interview of Capt. Bruce Jones, U.S. Coast Guard, Commanding Offi cer, Coast Guard Air Station New 

Orleans, conducted on Nov. 9, 2005 (untranscribed). Evidence suggests that DOD had debated whether USS Bataan was 

authorized to provide assistance with its helicopters prior to being requested or ordered. Col. Chavez wrote in an e-mail to 

a DOD liaison at DHS that although Vice Adm. Fitzgerald had publicly announced the availability of USS Bataan and her 

helicopters, the ship’s captain does not have the authority to assist unless specifi cally ordered: “Does not fi t policy for Immediate Response.” Col. Richard Chavez, e-mail to Tony Capra, Aug. 29, 2005, 2:35 p.m. Provided to Committee.

219 Capt. Snyder interview, Nov. 14, 2005.

220 Committee staff interview of Rear Adm. Joseph Kilkenny, U.S. Navy, former Joint Forces Maritime Component Commander, JTF Katrina, conducted on Nov. 30, 2005 (untranscribed).

221 U.S. Northern Command, USNORTHCOM Hurricane Katrina Timeline (Draft ), p. 11. Provided to Committee.

222 Rear Adm. Kilkenny interview, Nov. 30, 2005. 

223 Rear Adm. Kilkenny interview, Nov. 30, 2005; Vice Adm. Fitzgerald interview, Nov. 15, 2005.

224 Rear Adm. Kilkenny interview, Nov. 30, 2005. 

225 JTF-Katrina, Commander’s Assessment, Sept. 3, 2005. Provided to Committee. 

226 Committee staff interview of Rear Adm. Reuben Bookert, U.S. Navy, Joint Force Maritime Component Commander, 

U.S. Second Fleet, conducted on Nov. 16, 2005 (untranscribed). 

227 U.S. Northern Command, message to Joint Staff , “Request for Forces,” Sept. 2, 2005, 0530 Z. Provided to Committee. 

Th e message also requested the USS Whidbey Island and four logistics ships from Military Sealift Command. 

228 JTF-Katrina, Commander’s Assessment, Sept. 4, 2005. Provided to Committee.

229 Vice Adm. Crea interview, Jan. 3, 2006, p. 41.

230 U.S. Fleet Forces Command, “Hurricane Katrina, Navy Mission: Providing Rescue and Civil Support Relief from the 

Sea, Air and Land,” p. 9. Provided to Committee.

231 Rear Adm. Anthony Winns, e-mail to Lt. Gen. James Conway, Sept. 15, 2005, 1:20 p.m. Provided to Committee. 

232 Insung Lee, e-mail to HSOC.SWO and others, Aug. 31, 2005, 11:50 a.m. Provided to Committee.

233 U.S. Fleet Forces Command, “Hurricane Katrina, Navy Mission: Providing Rescue and Civil Support Relief from the 

Sea, Air and Land,” p. 9. Provided to Committee.

234 Committee staff interview of Cmdr. Th omas Quinn, U.S. Navy, Director of Operations, Naval Air Forces, Atlantic, 

conducted on Nov. 15, 2005 (untranscribed).

235 Vice Adm. Mark Fitzgerald, e-mail to Adm. Michael Mullen, Sept. 2, 2005, 5:53 p.m. Provided to Committee. 

236 Lt. Gen. Honoré interview, Jan. 9, 2006, p. 48.

237 Lt. Gen. Honoré interview, Jan. 9, 2006, p. 46.

238 Col. Tom Muir, e-mail to Maj. Gen. Richard Rowe, Aug. 29, 2005, 4 p.m. Provided to Committee.
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239 Lt. Gen. Honoré interview, Jan. 9, 2006, p. 33.

240 U.S. Department of Defense, First U.S. Army, Joint Task Force Katrina, “Hurricane Katrina Chronology.” Provided to 

Committee.

241 Lt. Gen. Honoré interview, Jan. 9, 2006, p. 29.

242 U.S. Northern Command, Message to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others, “NORTHCOM Mod 4 to 

EXORD Katrina,” Aug. 30, 2005, 0200 Z. Provided to Committee.

243 U.S. Northern Command, Message to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others, “NORTHCOM Mod 5 to 

EXORD Katrina,” Aug. 30, 2005, 2100 Z. Provided to Committee.

244 U.S. Department of Defense, First U.S. Army, Joint Task Force Katrina, Hurricane Katrina Chronology. Provided to 

Committee.

245 Brig. Gen. Graham interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 24-27.

246 Maj. Gen. Caldwell interview, Feb. 28, 2006, p. 8. 

247 U.S. Forces Command, Message to III Corps and XVIII Corps, “FORSCOM Frago #8 Provides Support of BDE Size 

Forces ISO Hurricane Katrina Relief Operations,” Sept. 1, 2005, 0039 Z. Provided to Committee.

248 Maj. Gen. Caldwell interview, Feb. 28, 2006, p. 20.

249 Maj. Gen. Caldwell interview, Feb. 28, 2006, pp. 25-26. Notes from the Forces Command teleconference at 8 a.m. correspond to this time frame, and state that the command was “just waiting for the trigger to deploy,” and that a phased deployment plan was in place to commit the Brigade to the response. U.S. Forces Command, notes of FORSCOM Teleconference, 

Sept. 2, 2005. Provided to Committee.

250 Col. Michael Okita, e-mail to Maj. Gen. William Caldwell and others, Sept. 3, 2005, 10:02 a.m. Provided to Committee. 

According to Maj. Gen. Caldwell, “It was no longer be prepared now, it was on order. When you change to an on order, 

that means you need to plan on it occurring at some time in the future. It doesn’t mean it will, but it just says you need now 

to plan on it. And they said, on order deploy your Division Headquarters [approx. 180 people] and a Brigade Task Force 

[approx. 3,200 people] in support of JTF Katrina...with the purpose of operating distribution centers, crowd control and 

security, in the New Orleans area.” Maj. Gen. Caldwell interview, Feb. 28, 2006, pp. 23-24.

251 President George W. Bush, “President Addresses Nation, Discusses Hurricane Katrina Relief Eff orts,” radio address, 

Sept. 3, 2005, 10:06 a.m. ET. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/20050903.html. Accessed on Apr. 21, 2006. 

252 U.S. Forces Command, Message to Commanders of III Corps and others, “FORSCOM Exorder Deploys Units in Support of JTF-KAT,” Sept. 3, 2005, 1729 Z. Provided to Committee.

253 Maj. Gen. Caldwell interview, Feb. 28, 2006, pp. 31-32.

254 Maj. Gen. Caldwell interview, Feb. 28, 2006, p. 36 (“Th e fact that we moved that force and did not kill, maim or injure a 

single person is absolutely incredible. Th ey went from a cold start. I don’t keep 1,383 vehicles prepped and ready to go on a 

key moment’s notice. I keep about – I’d have to guess, about 180 to 240. So we literally were going across the Division grabbing vehicles, people, because we just realized the great need for command and control, logistics support, medical support, 

so we put that all on the road.”).

255 Maj. Gen. Caldwell interview, Feb. 28, 2006, p. 49.

256 Maj. Gen. Caldwell interview, Feb. 28, 2006, pp. 50-53.

257 Col. Shanahan interview, Feb. 23, 2006. 

258 U.S. Northern Command, Message to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others, “NORTHCOM Mod 8 to 

EXORD Katrina,” Sept. 2, 3005, 0015 Z. Provided to Committee.

259 Col. Shanahan interview, Feb. 23, 2006. 

260 Col. Shanahan interview, Feb. 23, 2006. 

261 U.S. Forces Command, Message to III Corps and XVIII Corps, “Frago 8,” contained in e-mail from First Army Joint 

Operations Center Watch Team to LTG Honoré and others, Sept. 1, 2005, 4:23 p.m. Provided to Committee.

262 Committee staff interview of Col. Bryan Roberts, U.S. Army, Commander, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry 

Division, U.S. Department of Defense, conducted on Feb. 23, 2006 (untranscribed). 

263 Col. Roberts interview, Feb. 23, 2006.

264 President George W. Bush, “President Addresses Nation, Discusses Hurricane Katrina Relief Eff orts,” radio address, 

Sept. 3, 2005, 10:06 a.m. ET. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/20050903.html. Accessed on Apr. 21, 2006. 

265 Col. Roberts interview, Feb. 23, 2006.

266 U.S. Department of Defense, Hurricane Katrina Comprehensive Review Task Force, “Standing Rules for the Use of 

Force,” Sept. 2, 2005. Provided to Committee.

267 Col. Roberts interview, Feb. 23, 2006.

268 Lt. Gen. Amos interview, Dec. 14, 2005, p. 10.

269 Second Marine Expeditionary Force, Hurricane Katrina Timeline. Provided to Committee; Lt. Gen. Amos interview, 
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535

Dec. 14, 2005, p. 14.

270 Lt. Gen. Amos interview, Dec. 14, 2005, pp. 15-16; Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, 

Timeline, What Marine forces were deployed, when were they deployed, and on what authority were they deployed? Provided to Committee (states that on Sept. 1, multiple aircraft “self-deploy to NAS Pensacola, FL”).

271 Lt. Gen. Amos interview, Dec. 14, 2005, p. 21.

272 Lt. Gen. Amos interview, Dec. 14, 2005, p. 22. “JTF Katrina Commander’s Assessment, Sept. 2, 2005” confi rms that as 

of 7 a.m. Friday, “SPMAGTF assessment team in Belle Chase. ADVON COB today. CE 03 Sept. 130 Pax CE total,” and also 

“Reserve AAV platoon closed on ISB Gulf Port, MS. BPT posture.” JTF-Katrina, Commander’s Assessment, Sept. 2, 2005. 

Provided to Committee.

273 Lt. Gen. Amos interview, Dec. 14, 2005, p. 75.

274 Lt. Gen. James Amos, e-mail to Lt. Gen. Honoré, via First Army JOC Watch Battle Captain, Sept. 1, 2005, 8:25 a.m. 

Provided to Committee.

275 Lt. Gen. Russel Honoré, e-mail to Lt. Gen. Amos, via 1A JOC Watch Battle Captain, Sept. 1, 2005, 7:48 p.m. Provided to 

Committee.

276 Lt. Gen. Russel Honoré, e-mail to Lt. Gen. James Amos, Sept. 2, 2005, 10:08 a.m. Provided to Committee.

277 Lt. Gen. Amos interview, Dec. 14, 2005, pp. 23-24.

278 Capt. Robert Reininger, e-mail to Maj. Gen. Richard Rowe, Sept. 2, 2005, 6:35 a.m. Provided to Committee.

279 Maj. Gen. O’Dell interview, Dec. 14, 2005, p. 28.

280 Lt. Gen. Amos interview, Dec. 14, 2005, p. 75.

281 Marine Forces Atlantic, Message to Commanding General, II MEF and Commander of Marine Forces Reserve, “COMMARFORLANT Deployment order,” Sept. 2, 2005, 1850 Z. Provided to Committee. 

282 Par. 3.A.2 of the COMMARFORLANT Deployment order states: “Concept of op. COMMARFORLANT requests 

ROMMARFORRES to ID, Prep, and deploy aviation assets into ISB NAS Pensacola, FL and det AAV vic Gulfport, MS for 

further movement into aff ected areas iso SPMAGTF GC. COMMARFORLANT dir CG II MEF to ID, prep and deploy 

a SPMAGTF iso comdr JTF Katrina HA/DR operations in and around the states of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and 

Florida. SPMAGTF deploys via sea, land, and hcptr NLT 03 Sep 05.” Marine Forces Atlantic, Message to Commanding 

General, II MEF and Commander of Marine Forces Reserve, “COMMARFORLANT Deployment order,” Sept. 2, 2005, 

1850 Z. Provided to Committee.

283 Maj. Gen. Rowe interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 80.

284 Lt. Gen. Amos interview, Dec. 14, 2005, p. 25.

285 Lt. Gen. Amos interview, Dec. 14, 2005, pp. 27-28.

286 Maj. Gen. O’Dell interview, Dec. 14, 2005, p. 32.

287 Maj. Gen. O’Dell interview, Dec. 14, 2005, p. 33.

288 Maj. Gen. O’Dell interview, Dec. 14, 2005, p. 34.

289 Brig. Gen. Selva interview, Feb. 16, 2006, pp. 12-15.

290 FEMA, Mission Assignment, 1603DR-LA-DOD-01, Aug. 30, 2005. Provided to Committee.

291 Committee staff interview of Col. Glen Joerger, U.S. Air Force, Former Vice Commander, 436th Airlift Wing, Dover 

Air Force Base, pre-designated Director of Mobility Forces, Air Mobility Command, U.S. Transportation Command, U.S. 

Department of Defense, conducted on Jan. 6, 2006, transcript p. 15.

292 Col. Joerger interview, Jan. 6, 2006, p. 17.

293 FEMA, Mission Assignment, 1603DR-LA-DOD-14, Sept. 1, 2005. Provided to Committee.

294 Col. Joerger interview, Jan. 6, 2006, p. 27.

295 Col. Joerger interview, Jan. 6, 2006, p. 20.

296 William Lokey, e-mail to Michael Lowder, Edward Buikema, Nicol Andrews and Th omas Bossert, Aug. 31, 2005, 12:30 

a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS 0004688.

297 Col. Joerger interview, Jan. 6, 2006, p. 28.

298 Maj. Gen. Caldwell interview, Feb. 28, 2006, pp. 25-26.

299 Maj. Gen. Caldwell interview, Feb. 28, 2006, p. 34.

300 McHale, Committee hearing, Feb. 9, 2006.

301 Maj. Gen. Richard Rowe, U.S. Army, e-mail to Maj. Gen. Paul Sullivan, Sept. 1, 2005, 7:28 a.m.; Capt. Robert Reininger, 

U.S. Coast Guard, e-mail to Maj. Gen. Richard Rowe, Sept. 1, 2005, 10:54 a.m.

302 Adm. Keating interview, Feb. 3, 2006.

303 Maj. Gen. Rowe interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 84.
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304 Maj. Gen. Richard Rowe, e-mail to Lt. Gen. Russel Honoré, Sept. 4, 2005, 10:47 p.m. Provided to Committee.

305 Brig. Gen. Moulton interview, Dec. 5, 2005, p. 24. NORTHCOM directed the deployment in message “Mod 12 to 

EXORD Katrina,” Sept. 3, 2005, 1200 Z. Provided to Committee. 

306 He and his Louisiana National Guard counterpart, Brig. Gen. Hunt Downer, who had taken on the task of Reception, 

Staging, Onward Movement and Integration of Guard forces, derived a draft solution of the problem: “So we sort of, on 

the back of a napkin, if you will, drew up a basic construct, which is we would try to take over some of the key mission sets 

to then probably utilize National Guard forces for those missions that Title 10 guys could not do.” Brig. Gen. Moulton 

interview, Dec. 5, 2005, p. 42.

307 Brig. Gen. Moulton interview, Dec. 5, 2005, pp. 52-53.

308 Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 54.

309 Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, pp. 54-55.

310 Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, pp. 54-55.

311 Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 40. Woods and her staff were “aware of a need to get food into the Superdome,” 

but did not interpret that as something the NORTHCOM staff had to work because they understood it was being worked at 

the state and JTF level. Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 40.

312 Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, pp. 18, 40.

313 Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 20 (“Our ability to support is dependent upon a mission assignment which gives 

us that authority to provide the support.”).

314 Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 41.

315 FEMA, Mission Assignment, 1603DR-LA-DOD-14, Sept. 1, 2005. Provided to Committee. 

316 FEMA, Mission Assignment, 1603DR-LA-DOD-12, Sept. 1, 2005. Provided to Committee (requesting “DOD/NG 

(EMAC) provide 50,000 MRE’s/Water to people located in the vicinity of the LA Superdome NLT [not later than] daybreak 

01 Sept. 05. Also provide 1,000 MREs/water to people located in the vicinity of Clover Leaf” in the amount of $100,000.00); 

FEMA, Mission Assignment, 1603DR-LA-DOD-13, Sept. 1, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS 0000525 

(requesting “DOD/NG (EMAC) to air drop food (MRE) & water along Gulf Coast areas aff ected by Hurricane Katrina and 

City of New Orleans” in the amount of $300,000.00). Th ese mission assignments are diff erent from the one billion dollar 

mission assignment to have DOD take over logistics discussed below. Th e 50,000 cases of MREs delivered to Mississippi 

on Sept. 3-4, 2005 were delivered pursuant to the one billion dollar assignment, not these two assignments. Col. Woods 

interview, Dec. 7, 2005, pp. 46-47, 75-76.

317 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 133, 140.

318 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 134. Lokey said that’s when he told Brown, “that we needed to get help.” 

319 Committee staff interview of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 23, 2006, transcript pp. 198-

199.

320 For example, Ken Burris, FEMA’s acting director of operations, told staff in his interview that, prior to Buikema’s 

visit that Th ursday morning, he did not believe DOD needed to play a larger role in logistics. Committee staff interview 

of Ken Burris, Chief of Operations, FEMA, conducted on Dec. 29, 2005, transcript p. 82. Col. Al Jones, a defense liaison 

who was assigned permanently to assist Brown and was with him on Th ursday when Brown met with General Honoré 

stated that Brown told Honoré DOD “could possibly” help with logistics. Committee staff interview of Col. Al Jones, 

U.S. Army, Senior Army Advisor, Georgia Army National Guard, conducted on Mar. 2, 2006, transcript p. 36. Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense Paul McHale said that he spoke with Brown on Wednesday, August 31, and 

that Brown did not mention that he wanted DOD to take over FEMA’s logistics function. Committee staff interview of 

the Hon. Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, conducted 

on Feb. 17, 2005 (untranscribed).

321 Buikema interview, Nov. 21, 2005, pp. 156-157.

322 Buikema interview, Nov. 21, 2005, p. 166.

323 Buikema interview, Nov. 21, 2005, p. 169.

324 Buikema interview, Nov. 21, 2005, p. 169.

325 Buikema interview, Nov. 21, 2005, p. 170.

326 Burris interview, Dec. 29, 2005, p. 82. Initially, Burris stated that FEMA wanted DOD to “take over the process of 

distributing [commodities] into the forward operating areas.” Source: Burris interview, Dec. 29, 2005, p. 117; however, aft er 

reviewing the actual mission assignment, Burris stated that DOD was being asked to assume FEMA’s responsibility. Source: 

Burris interview, Dec. 29, 2005, p. 124.

327 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 137.

328 Burris interview, Dec. 29, 2005, p. 112. 

329 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 138.

330 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 134.
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331 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 137 (“At the time this took place, we did not need that help from them ... As a matter 

of fact, I’m not sure they ever took over that.”).

332 Brown interview, Jan. 23, 2006, p. 186 (“as I recall the meeting, it was more I want you to do logistics. I want you just 

to take over logistics completely”). Aside from Brown’s statements in his staff interview, we have not found corroborating 

evidence that Brown made a request to Honoré on Wednesday that DOD take over all logistics. General Honoré did not 

mention it in connection with his staff interview when he discussed what he said was a brief “sidebar” meeting with Brown 

on this date. Source: Lt. Gen. Honoré interview, Jan. 9, 2006, p. 103. Honoré also does not include any meeting with Brown 

in his timeline of events for Wednesday August 31, but he does include a meeting with Brown the next day, Sept. 1, 2005. 

Source: U.S. Department of Defense, First U.S. Army, Joint Task Force Katrina, Hurricane Katrina Chronology. Provided 

to Committee. In addition, Brown testifi ed to staff that he thought he met with Honoré on a diff erent day than August 31, 

the day he had a telephone conversation with the General. Source: Brown interview, Jan. 23, 3005, p. 181. Th us, Brown may 

have made his request for logistics assistance the next day. Th is is consistent with the recollection of Col. Al Jones, who 

testifi ed to Committee staff that Brown mentioned logistics to Honoré in a meeting with him on Th ursday, Sept. 1, 2005. 

However, Jones remembered that Brown said DOD “could possibly” help with logistics, which is a diff erent recollection 

from Brown’s. Source: Col. Jones interview, Mar. 2, 2006, p. 36. In light of this confl icting testimony, we have not been able 

to resolve when Brown fi rst raised this issue with DOD offi cials or what specifi c request he made when he did raise it. 

333 Although a number of witnesses testifi ed that this exchange and other events related to this assignment took place on 

Th ursday, Sept. 1, the documentary evidence we have reviewed (cited below) suggests it may have taken place on Friday, 

Sept. 2.

334 Burris interview, Dec. 29, 2005, pp. 82, 84.

335 Col. Richard Chavez, e-mail to Th omas Kuster, Sept. 2, 2005, 9:38 a.m. Provided to Committee. In his staff interview, 

Chavez recalled the request as “take over all logistical operations for FEMA.” Source: Col. Chavez interview, Nov. 9, 2005, 

pp. 118-119. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense Paul McHale recalled the initial request as “full logistics 

support throughout the entire area of responsibility.” Source: McHale, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 9, 2006.

336 Col. Chavez interview, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 121.

337 Col. Chavez interview, Nov. 9, 2005, p. 133.

338 Col. Richard Chavez, e-mail to Th omas Kuster, Sept. 2, 2005, 9:38 a.m. Provided to Committee; Col. Chavez interview, 

Nov. 9, 2005, pp. 119, 121.

339 ESF-1 – Transportation, for example, includes as a “function” that DOD “Provides military transportation capacity 

from the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) to move essential resources and assist in the contracting for 

civilian airlift when requested and approval by the Secretary of Defense.” NRP, p. ESF #1–4.

340 Captain Mike McDaniel, e-mail to the DOD Joint Directorate of Military Support and others, Sept. 2, 2005, 10:48 a.m. 

(“I received a hard copy of an e-mail from Mr. Ken Burris just now with the following wording:

Gentlemen,

Th is is the request that was made of DOD this morning. I spoke with Col. Chaves [sic] in the Dep Sec offi ce of DOD that instructed me that the request must come from Secretary to Secretary.

‘FEMA request that DOD provide the support the planning and execution of the full logistical support to 

the Katrina disaster in all declared states in coordination with FEMA.’

We currently have DOD lashed up with our Response Division to make this happen and our DOD reps 

are moving forward.

Mr. Burris indicated to me that the wording was very important.”). 

See also: Col. Chavez interview, Nov. 22, 2005, p. 134 (“From that point on, again, there were a number of e-mails, as 

we saw ... that went between Mr. Burris and Chertoff saying that the Secretaries should talk. Whatever happened in the 

interim, the next e-mail I got from Ken Burris and phone call was okay, I’m revising the request for assistance, and the 

request for assistance now stated that DOD provide support to FEMA for procurement and distribution of ice, food, water, fuel, and medical supplies.”). Col. Chavez thought it was signifi cant that the request submitted on Friday requested 

DOD’s “support” in the Katrina response in “specifi c areas” rather than the initial request which requested that DOD 

take over logistics from FEMA. Col. Chavez interview, Nov. 22, 2005, pp. 122-123. 

341 Burris interview, Dec. 29, 2005, p. 83. We have not been able to establish whether Secretary Chertoff called Secretary 

of Defense Rumsfeld. However, an e-mail establishes that Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense Paul 

McHale spoke with Chertoff ’s Deputy Michael Jackson, so the matter ultimately may have been handled at a level below 

the Secretaries. Paul McHale, e-mail to Michael Jackson, Sept. 2, 2005, 7:41 p.m. Provided to Committee (“Th ought you 

might be interested in reading this follow-up to our conversation.”).

342 McHale, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 9, 2006; Adm. Keating interview, Feb. 3, 2006.

343 Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense), Hurricane Katrina/Rita/Ophelia Interim Timeline, 

Nov. 2, 2005, p. 8. Provided to Committee; Col. Chavez interview, Nov. 22, 2005, p. 118.

344 Col. Chavez interview, Nov. 22, 2005, pp. 118, 114.

345 FEMA, Mission Assignment, 1604DR-MS-DOD-19, Sept. 2, 2005.

346 FEMA, Mission Assignment, 1604DR-MS-DOD-19, Sept. 2, 2005. As discussed below, this amount was an estimate. 
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347 Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, pp. 82-83. Although some amount of this assignment was de-obligated, this had no 

eff ect on DOD’s logistics operation. Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 83; Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 134, 137 

(Assignment was to “cover the eventualities.”).

348 Written Statement of Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, 

for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Defense Department’s Role in the Response, Feb. 9, 2006, p. 8; McHale, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 9, 2006.

349 U.S. Department of Defense, “DOD FEMA Mission Assignment Summary,” as of Feb. 28, 2006, p. 1. Provided to Committee. Although FEMA de-obligated $500 million dollars from this mission and then re-obligated the same amount, we 

have not been able to discern any eff ect on DOD’s activities in carrying out the mission from those fi scal decisions.

350 McHale interview, Jan. 4, 2006, pp. 43-45; McHale, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 9, 2006.

351 Paul McHale, e-mail to Michael Jackson, Sept. 2, 2005, 7:41 p.m. Provided to Committee (“Michael – Th ought you 

might be interested in reading this follow-up to our conversation. SECDEF has agreed to support your RFA for broad 

logistics support, throughout the entire four state AOR. We’re working on the specifi c language – and a planning staff to 

implement it. We may actually be able to do more than you have requested. We will get back to you with written confi rmation tomorrow AM. Keep up the good work. Paul”).

352 U.S. Department of Defense, “MOD 8 to EXORD for DOD Support to FEMA for Hurricane Katrina,” signed by Peter 

F. Verga, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, and others, Sept. 3, 2005. Provided to Committee. 

MOD 8 ordered NORTHCOM to begin logistical support operations, “upon CJCS approval of CONOPS.”

353 On that Friday morning, Gary Moore, the Director of Logistics for FEMA, spoke with Col. Roberta Woods, Chief of 

Plans and Operations in NORTHCOM’s Logistics Division in Colorado Springs, Colorado, and said, “Robbie I need help. 

... We need help with commodity distribution: food, water, ice. ... We’re sending a mission assignment to ... DOD for 

this.” Woods’ impression was that the Moore’s request was “Pretty much open-ended, start to fi nish.” Source: Col. Woods 

interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 36. Woods said that this call was a major turning point. “Th at’s when life changed for me personally and for the bulk of the J4 staff .” Source: Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 36. Woods asked Moore, “Who do I 

talk to ... to fi gure out what’s going on and what’s needed?” Source: Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 43. She got the 

information and “immediately began doing detailed tracking as best we could, understanding processes, systems. I mean, 

we were ... massively in the information gathering mode at this time because we had not had direct access to information. 

We had sort of eavesdropped.” Source: Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 44. 

354 Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 44.

355 Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 57.

356 Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 51.

357 Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 52.

358 Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 46.

359 Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 59; Brig. Gen. Mike Lally, e-mail to Brig. Gen. Paul Selva, Sept. 4, 2005, 12:34 

p.m. Provided to Committee (discussing diffi culties of having too many aircraft converge on Norfolk. Virginia to airlift 

MREs because it was diffi cult to put the MREs on pallets “in this short amount of time”).

360 Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, pp. 46, 53-53.

361 Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 62 (“And ... that’s what ... our experience ... in military logistics taught us, is 

you prioritize. Everything can’t be all the same equal importance right now because it requires all the same kinds of transportation.”).

362 Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, pp. 46-48.

363 NRP; Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 50. 

364 Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 50.

365 Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 45 (“We tried to grasp the magnitude of the task, you know, what is it you really 

want us to do, because FEMA did not step out. And ... for a little while, we were in the is FEMA going to completely back 

out and DOD has it all, or is FEMA staying and we’re just going to assist?”). See also: JTF-Katrina, Commander’s Assessment, Sept. 2, 2005, 7 p.m. Provided to Committee.

366 NORTHCOM’s logistics staff thought it likely that the distribution infrastructure at the state level – in other words, after the operational staging area managed by FEMA – “would remain in place to execute that piece of the task.” Source: Col. 

Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 63. Admiral Keating said NORTHCOM did not want to take over distributing commodities for the last part of the distribution chain because DOD could not legally command National Guard forces involved in 

that task. Source: Admiral Keating interview, Feb. 3, 2006. Col. Jones, the military advisor to PFO Brown, who was involved 

with developing DOD’s commodities distribution plan during the fi rst weekend aft er the storm, told the Committee that 

the National Guard advised they would remain in control of distribution from the PODs. Source: Col. Jones interview, Mar. 

2, 2006, p. 40.

367 Rear Adm. Steven Maas, e-mail to Lt. Gen. Robert Dail, Sept. 3, 2005, 2:59 p.m. Provided to Committee; Col. Roberta 

Woods, e-mail to Col. James Hodge, Sept. 5, 2005, 8:24 p.m. Provided to Committee (“NORTHCOM Headquarters have 

responsibility for distribution management from the depot (either DLA or USACE contract, etc) to the Forward Operational Staging Area [FOSA] – that’s from the strategic level into the J[oint] O[perating] A[rea]. J[oint] T[ask] F[orce]-Katrina 
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539

... has responsibility for management at the FOSA (in coordination with FEMA) down to the state designated distribution 

points. (Th at’s the operational level.) Th e state has responsibility for the tactical level distribution to individuals.”).

368 Col. James Hodge, e-mail to Rear Adm. Steven Maas, Sept. 6, 2005, 9:18 p.m. Provided to Committee.

369 Col. James Hodge, e-mail to Rear Adm. Steven Maas, Sept. 6, 2005, 9:18 p.m. Provided to Committee. See also: Lt. Gen. 

Robert Dail, e-mail to Lt. Gen. Duncan McNabb, Sept. 3, 2005, 11:56 a.m. Provided to Committee (DOD “will not execute 

‘tactical distribution’.”).

370 Wells interview, Nov. 15, 2005, p. 91 (“I don’t recall distribution of supplies being I’ll call it, a red item. Maybe an amber 

item, but it was working. We had the op – we had the staging area at Beauregard working; we had an oversight feeding that 

[was] working, and then we were putting stuff forward. Now, from that point forward, we had problems. But people were 

getting food, people were getting water, people in the Superdome got food and water every day.”).

371 Col. Woods interview, Dec. 7, 2005, pp. 45-46.

372 Paul McHale, e-mail to Michael Jackson, Sept. 2, 2005, 7:41 p.m. Provided to Committee. 

373 McHale interview, Jan. 4, 2006, p. 16.

374 Committee staff interview of Michael Jackson, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, conducted on 

Jan. 27, 2006, transcript p. 25.

375 Jackson interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 26.

376 McHale interview, Jan. 4, 2006, pp. 15-16.

377 Jackson interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 26-27.

378 McHale interview, Jan. 4, 2006, p. 16. Edward Buikema, the acting Director of FEMA’s Response Division was present 

at the meeting and described England’s view of whether DOD was willing to take on large portions of the response eff ort: 

“He was – he was more than willing to help out, as I recall. He was very positive, very much no resistance. It was a very 

frank discussion. As I mentioned, Deputy Secretary Jackson was there. I was there, but just observing more than anything, 

but it was a positive, very positive discussion.” Buikema interview, Nov. 21, 2005, p. 259. Th e colloquy continued, “Q: So 

people at the top level seemed to want to get this done. A: Yes, sir.” 

379 Col. Darryl Roberson, e-mail to Maj. Gen. Rich Rowe, Sept. 3, 2005, 10:39 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

no. DHS-HSOC-0004-0003817; Buikema interview, Nov. 21, 2005, pp. 160-162.

380 Th is requirement appears redundant vis a vis the earlier $1 billion logistics mission assignment, and indeed, one draft 

version of this mission assignment indicates “portions of which may already be covered on MS-DOD 19,” the logistics mission assignment. Col. Darryl Roberson, e-mail to Maj. Gen. Rich Rowe, Sept. 3, 2005, 10:39 p.m. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates no. DHS-HSOC-0004-0003817.

381 Paul McHale, e-mail to Matthew Broderick and others, Sept. 5, 2005, 5:07 p.m. Provided to Committee (including 

e-mail chain among DHS and DOD offi cials regarding the large FEMA Mission Assignment attached to this e-mail); 

Col. Darryl Roberson, e-mail to Maj. Gen. Rich Rowe, Sept. 3, 2005, 10:39 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 

DHS-HSOC-0004-0003817 (enclosing a very similar list that appears to have been draft ed earlier in the process but which 

contains substantially the same list of missions, and which states “Sir, there was a meeting this evening with representatives 

of DHS, FEMA, OSD, JS, and COE to craft a RFA/mission statement that would refl ect the increased responsibilities DoD 

is taking on with Hurricane Katrina. Th e following two products [one an organization chart and one a list of the missions 

described above] have been agreed to at the ASD level.”).

382 Th is original list was approved by the Deputy Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security in the evening on Saturday, Sept. 3, 2005. Source: Matthew Broderick, e-mail to Gail Kulisch and Admiral Timothy Sullivan, Sept. 4, 2005, 12:30 

p.m. Provided to Committee (referencing the attachment and stating, “Results are a series of meetings between both Dep 

Secs and lower level staffi ng actions”). On Sunday, Sept. 4, Deputy Secretary England sent a memorandum to the Secretary 

of Defense setting forth the draft in written text. Source: Deputy Secretary of Defense and Vice Chairman Joint Chiefs of 

Staff , memorandum to Secretary of Defense, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff , and Admiral Keating, Sept. 4, 2005, 1:30 p.m. 

Provided to Committee (“If you agree with the draft it will be sent to DHS to be put on the normal RFA form. It will then be 

processed and appear in an orders book for your fi nal approval.”). Th e Secretary of Defense, who was traveling to the Gulf 

Coast when he received this memorandum via facsimile, “responded favorably to the substantive content of this document” 

but instructed that the various requests be broken out into “more logical and operationally eff ective component parts” because “the topics included ... related resources.” Source: McHale interview, Jan. 4, 2006, p. 19. McHale stated that there was 

“no resistance on the part of this department to the underlying substance of the RFA.” Rather, “Th e Secretary instructed me 

to disaggregate a very brief, very broad single RFA into more logical and operationally eff ective component parts so that 

mission areas that were discretely defi ned would not be illogically folded into a single document.” 

383 Written Statement of McHale, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 9, 2006, p. 9.

384 McHale interview, Jan. 4, 2006, p. 20. See also: Frank DiFalco, e-mail to Ken Burris, Sept. 5, 2005, 7:28 p.m. Provided to 

Committee (“please process the attached RFAs and submit to DOD this evening.”). Although we cannot pinpoint the time 

of approval, these two sources indicate that the Secretary of Defense approved the RFAs aft er 7:28 p.m. the evening of Sept. 

5, 2005, although he vocally approved them earlier. Paul McHale, e-mail to Frank DiFalco, Sept. 5, 2005, 7:37 p.m. Provided 

to Committee (“SecDef gave VOCO to the draft RFA we sent you.”).

385 Maj. Gen. Caldwell interview, Feb. 28, 2006, p. 36.

386 Michael Jackson, e-mail to Paul McHale, Sept. 6, 2005, 11:17 a.m. Provided to Committee.
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387 Written Statement of McHale, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 9, 2006, p. 9; Keating interview, Feb. 3, 2006. 

388 Jackson interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 27-28.

389 Th e USS Bataan launched helicopters for search and rescue and logistics missions at 6 p.m. ET, Tues. Aug 30, 2005, in 

coordination with U.S. Coast Guard District Eight. Capt. Snyder interview, Nov. 14, 2005.

390 Brig. Gen. Graham interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 25-28, 44-45.

391 U.S. Northern Command, USNORTHCOM Hurricane Katrina Timeline (Draft ), p. 11. Provided to Committee (indicates Wednesday, Aug. 31, 2005.: Aeromedical Evacuation mission (47 patients).).

392 U.S. Joint Forces Command, Hurricane Katrina Comprehensive Timeline, Nov. 15, 2006, p. 8. Provided to Committee 

(indicates Friday, Sept. 2: “Navy P-3 conduct streaming video mission to assess hurricane impact.”).

393 U.S. Joint Forces Command, Hurricane Katrina Comprehensive Timeline, Nov. 15, 2006, p. 7. Provided to Committee 

(indicates Th ursday, Sep 1: “468,000 MREs shipped.”).

394 Col. Joerger interview, Jan. 6, 2006, pp. 13-16; U.S. Northern Command, USNORTHCOM Hurricane Katrina Timeline 

(Draft ), p. 15. Provided to Committee (indicates that on Friday, Sept. 2, 2005: “Navy CH-53 helos dumping sand bags [in] 

levee breaches.”).

395 U.S. Northern Command, USNORTHCOM Hurricane Katrina Timeline (Draft ), p. 17. Provided to Committee (indicates that on Saturday, Sept. 3, 2005: “Slingload of MRE’s are made along the Gulf Coast.”).

396 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 135 (Q: So they were already helping with this [the one billion dollar logistics request]? A: Oh heavens, yes. Oh, yes.).

397 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 136 (“But what I will speak to is Col. [Daskevich] and his people. Th ey busted 

their ass to do anything I asked them to do. Our bureaucratic processes are slow.”). Lokey described DOD’s assistance 

in evacuating the Superdome, stating “Th ey did the planning for it and their people – they had people down at the bus 

distribution, or the collection points, staging areas, and at the Dome, they were helping organize the National Guard 

folks and the other folks on scene, lined the people up and get them on the buses. Th ey did it for us and I thought they 

did an excellent job.” Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 140. See also: Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 205 (“Honoré’s a 

guy, he makes things happen. ... He was picking up garbage, he was rescuing people, he was doing all sorts of stuff that 

he had the people and the stuff to do.”). 

 U.S. Joint Forces Command, Hurricane Katrina Comprehensive Timeline, Nov. 15, 2005, p. 8. Provided to Committee 

(indicates Friday, Sept. 2: “Navy P-3 conduct streaming video mission to assess hurricane impact.”).

 U.S. Joint Forces Command, Hurricane Katrina Comprehensive Timeline, Nov. 15, 2005, p. 7. Provided to Committee 

(indicates Th ursday, Sept. 1: “468,000 MREs shipped.”).

 U.S. Northern Command, USNORTHCOM Hurricane Katrina Timeline (Draft ), p. 15. Provided to Committee (indicates 

that on Friday, Sept. 2, 2005: “Navy CH-53 helos dumping sand bags in levee breaches.”).

 U.S. Northern Command, USNORTHCOM Hurricane Katrina Timeline (Draft ), p. 17. Provided to Committee (indicates 

that on Saturday, Sept. 3, 2005: “Slingload of MRE’s are made along the Gulf Coast.”).

Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 135.

Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 136 (“But what I will speak to is Col. [Daskevich] and his people. Th ey busted their ass to 

do anything I asked them to do. Our bureaucratic processes are slow”). Lokey described DOD’s assistance in evacuating the 

Superdome, stating “Th ey did the planning for it and their people – they had people down at the bus distribution, or the 

collection points, staging areas, and at the Dome, they were helping organize the National Guard folks and the other folks 

on scene, lined the people up and get them on the buses. Th ey did it for us and I thought they did an excellent job.” Source: 

Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 140. See also: Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 205 (“he makes things happen, and quite 

frankly, when he started making things happen, I didn’t care because he was making things happen and he was picking 

up garbage, he was rescuing people, he was doing all sorts of stuff that he had the people and the stuff to do.”); Buikema 

interview, Nov. 21, 2005, p. 181 (“I believe they did” fulfi ll all mission assignments that FEMA gave them; “In terms of the 

communications and cooperation between us, it was good ... it was good.”); Committee staff interview of Maj. Gen. Bennett Landreneau, U.S. Army, Adjutant General, Louisiana, conducted on Jan. 11, 2006, transcript p. 78 (“I believe he [Brig. 

Gen. Graham] was helping a lot.”).

398 Wells interview, Nov. 14, 2005, pp. 122, 123.

399 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 135.

400 Testimony of Gov. Haley Barbour, Mississippi, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Role of the Governors in Managing the Catastrophe, Feb. 2, 2006 (“Ultimately, the United States military provided us 1.5 million MREs that – I remember them fl ying in C-17s, if I remember 

right, there at Gulfport, Biloxi, and started unloading tens of thousands of cases of MREs. Again, I don’t know whether to 

attribute that to FEMA being agile or the military just fi lling in for them, but for us, it was a godsend.”).

401 Gov. Haley Barbour, Mississippi, Executive Order 939, Aug. 26, 2005; Written Statement of Maj. Gen. Harold A. Cross, 

Adjutant General, Mississippi Army and Air National Guard, before the U.S. House, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by 

the State of Mississippi, Dec. 7, 2005.

402 Joint Force Headquarters, Mississippi National Guard, Memorandum, “Hurricane Katrina Narrative,” Oct. 20, 2005, p. 
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541

1. Provided to Committee.

403 Written Statement of Maj. Gen. Cross, House Select Committee hearing, Dec. 7, 2005.

404 Written Statement of Maj. Gen. Cross, House Select Committee hearing, Dec. 7, 2005.

405 Joint Force Headquarters, Mississippi National Guard, Memorandum, “Hurricane Katrina Narrative,” Oct. 20, 2005, p. 

9. Provided to Committee.

406 Joint Force Headquarters, Mississippi National Guard, Memorandum, “Hurricane Katrina Narrative,” Oct. 20, 2005, p. 

7. Provided to Committee.

407 Gov. Barbour, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 2, 2006. 

408 Committee staff interview of Maj. Gen. Harold Cross, Adjutant General, Mississippi Army and Air National Guard, 

conducted on Jan. 26, 2006, transcript p. 12.

409 Th ese forces included the Seabee base in Gulfport, Keesler Air Force Base in Biloxi, and Columbus Air Force Base. 

General Cross interview, Jan. 26, 2006, p. 15.

410 Written Statement of Maj. Gen. Cross, House Select Committee hearing, Dec. 7, 2005.

411 Committee staff interview of Col. Joe Spraggins, U.S. Air Force, Director, Harrison County Emergency Management 

Agency, MS, conducted on Nov. 17, 2005, transcript pp. 131-132.

412 Maj. Gen. Cross interview, Jan. 26, 2006, pp. 38-39.

413 Maj. Gen. Cross interview, Jan. 26, 2006, p. 41.

414 Joint Force Headquarters, Mississippi National Guard, Memorandum, “Hurricane Katrina Narrative,” Oct. 20, 2005, p. 

4. Provided to Committee.

415 Th eodore Roosevelt, First Annual Message to Congress, Dec. 3, 1901. 14 Messages and Papers of the President 6672.

416 Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Response to the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs Document and Information Request Dated October 7, 2005 and to the U.S. House of Representatives Select 

Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, Overview of Gov. Kathleen Babineaux 

Blanco’s Actions in Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, Dec. 2, 2005, p. 7 [hereinaft er Louisiana Offi ce of 

the Governor, Governor’s Timeline]. See also: Eric Lipton, Eric Schmitt, and Th om Shanker, “Political Issues Snarled Plans 

for Troop Aid,” Th e New York Times, Sept. 9, 2005, Section A, p. 1. 

417 Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 7.

418 See: Eric Lipton, Eric Schmitt, and Th om Shanker, “Political Issues Snarled Plans for Troop Aid,” Th e New York 

Times, Sept. 9, 2005, , p. 1; Robert Travis Scott, “Politics delayed troops dispatch to N.O.,” New Orleans Times-Picayune, 

Dec. 11, 2005, p. 1; Susan B. Glasser and Michael Grunwald, “Th e Steady Buildup to a City’s Chaos; Confusion Reigned 

At Every Level of Government,” Th e Washington Post, Sept. 11, 2005, p. A01; Nicole Gaouette, and others, “Katrina’s 

Aft ermath, Th e Response; Put to Katrina’s Test; Aft er 9/11, a master plan for disasters was drawn. It didn’t weather the 

storm,” Los Angeles Times, Sept. 11, 2005, p. 1.

419 NRP, p. 34.

420 Th e National Response Plan (NRP) describes the Joint Field Offi ce (JFO) as “a multiagency coordination center established locally. It provides a central location for coordination of Federal, State, local, tribal, nongovernmental, and privatesector organizations with primary responsibility for threat response and incident support. Th e JFO enables the eff ective and 

effi cient coordination of Federal incident-related prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery actions.” NRP, p. 28. 

421 Th e NRP designates the Defense Coordinating Offi cer (DCO) as “DOD’s single point of contact in the JFO,” and 

assigns him the responsibility to “coordinate and process” requests for assistance, “orchestrate the accomplishment of 

approved mission assignments,” and “refer problematic or contentious issues” to higher military authorities. NRP, p. 

42. Th e NRP excepts three types of requests for assistance from the requirement to coordinate through the Defense Coordinating Offi cer: (1) requests to the Army Corps of Engineers, which itself is considered a primary supporting agency 

under the Plan; (2) requests to the Army and Air National Guard, which under the NRP “are not part of Federal military 

response eff orts”; and (3) requests for support to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for law enforcement and domestic 

counterterrorism activities. Th e NRP states that the DCO “may continue to perform all duties” in the NRP even if a Joint 

Task Force is established. NRP, p. 42. 

422 McHale, House Select Committee hearing, Oct. 27, 2005.

423 Col. Daskevich interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 132.

424 Col. Daskevich interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 132. William Lokey, the FEMA Federal Coordinating Offi cer, also stated 

FEMA did not make requests for large numbers of troops. Committee staff interview of William Lokey, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, FEMA, conducted on Nov. 4, 2005, transcript p. 224. 

425 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Hurricane Katrina: DOD Disaster Response, by Steve 

Bowman, Lawrence Kapp, and Amy Belasco, Jan. 24, 2006, p. CRS–8.

426 10 U.S.C. §§ 12301, 12302, 12304. Th e Congressional Research Service states that in the event of a catastrophic 

natural disaster, 10 U.S.C. § 12302 – which permits the President to activate the National Guard “in time of war or of 

national emergency declared by the President or when otherwise authorized by law” – “would probably be the authority 

that would be most useful for calling large numbers of National Guard personnel and other reservists to federal active 
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542

duty for an extended period of time. ... Historically, however, 10 U.S.C. § 12302 has only been used for national security 

purposes and it could be controversial to use this authority for disaster relief purposes.” U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Hurricane Katrina: DOD Disaster Response, by Steve Bowman, Lawrence Kapp, and Amy 

Belasco, Jan. 24, 2006, p. CRS-10.

427 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-335. 

428 10 U.S.C. § 12406. Th is section requires such an order to be issued through the governors of the aff ected states. 

429 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Th e Use of Federal Troops for Disaster Assistance: Legal 

Issues, by Jennifer K. Elsea, Sept. 16, 2005, p. CRS-3.

430 DOD Directive 3025.12, MACDIS.

431 NRP, p. 42.

432 Th e National Response Plan states:

Nothing in this plan alters or impedes the ability of federal, State, local, or tribal departments and 

agencies to carry out their specifi c authorities or perform their responsibilities under all applicable laws, 

Executive orders, and directives. Additionally, nothing in this plan in intended to impact or impede the 

ability of any Federal department or agency head to take an issue of concern directly to the President, 

the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, the Assistant to the President for National Security, or any other member of the President’s staff . NRP, p. 2. 

433 Article II of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) Articles of Agreement states: 

Th e prompt, full, and eff ective utilization of resources of the participating states, including any resources onhand or available from the Federal Government or any other source, that are essential to the 

safety, care and welfare of the people in the event of any emergency or disaster declared by a party state, 

shall be the underlying principle on which all articles of this compact shall be understood.

National Emergency Management Association, “EMAC Articles of Agreement.” http://www.emacweb.org/?146. Accessed on May 18, 2006.

434 Louisiana National Guard, Timeline of Signifi cant Events Hurricane Katrina, Dec. 7, 2005; National Guard Bureau, 

Hurricane Katrina Update Brief, Sept. 11, 2005, 11 a.m. Provided to Committee.

435 10 U.S.C. §§ 10501, 10502. Lt. Gen. Blum interview, Jan. 19, 2006, p. 23.

436 Lt. Gen. Steven Blum, memorandum for Secretary of Defense, through Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland 

Defense), Sept. 5, 2005, p. 1. Provided to Committee. 

437 Lt. Gen. Steven Blum, memorandum for Secretary of Defense, through Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland 

Defense), Sept. 5, 2005, p. 1. Provided to Committee.

438 Lt. Gen. Steven Blum, memorandum for Secretary of Defense, through Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland 

Defense), Sept. 5, 2005, p. 1. Provided to Committee.

439 Gordon England, memorandum for Secretary of the Army and Acting Secretary of the Air Force, Sept. 7, 2005. 

Provided to Committee. 

440 David S. Addington, e-mail to William J. Haynes, Aug. 28, 2005, 8:41 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 

000007. Mr. Addington recommended that Mr. Haynes prepare a “Proclamation to Disperse,” whereby the President 

would “immediately order the insurgents to disperse and retire peaceably within their abodes” (10 U.S.C. §334), and 

executive orders for 10 U.S.C. 332, “Use of militia and armed forces to enforce Federal authority,” and 10 U.S.C. §334, 

“Interference with State and Federal Law.”

441 Maj. Gen. Richard Rowe, e-mail to Maj. Gen. Th omas Miller, Aug. 31, 2005, 7:46, a.m. Provided to Committee. 

442 Maj. Gen. Terry Scherling, e-mail to Maj. Gen. Rowe and others, Aug. 31, 2005, 10:25 a.m. Provided to Committee.

443 Committee staff interview of Col. Th omas Beron, Commander, 61st Troop Command, Louisiana Army National 

Guard, and Lt. Col. Douglas Mouton, Commander, 225th Engineering Group, Louisiana National Guard, conducted on 

Dec. 1, 2005, transcript p. 102.

444 Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 9.

445 For an explanation of Lt. Gen. Honoré’s activities prior to being designated Commander of Joint Task Force Katrina, 

see prior text regarding the “First Army” and “Army Commanders.”

446 See: National Guard Bureau, Aft er Action Review, “Hurricane Response September 2005,” Dec. 21, 2005, p. 13. 

Provided to Committee (second entry for “31 August Wednesday”: “CNGB asks to talk with MG Landreneau, TAG 

LA”). Lt. Gen. Blum’s recollection and the NGB timeline is consistent with notes dated at 7:21 a.m. on Wednesday the 

31st taken by National Guard Bureau Major Karl Konzelman, of a conversation between Maj. Gen. Landreneau, Army 

National Guard Director Lt. Gen. Clyde A. Vaughn, and Lt. Gen. Blum, as well as the recollection of Lt. Gen. Vaughn. 

Major Konzelman’s notes are reprinted in: U.S. House, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for 

and Response to Hurricane Katrina, A Failure of Initiative. Washington: Government Printing Offi ce, 2006, p. 206 [hereinaft er U.S. House, A Failure of Initiative]. See also: Committee staff interview of Lt. Gen. Clyde A. Vaughn, U.S. Army, 

Director, Army National Guard, U.S. Department of Defense, conducted on Jan. 18, 2006, transcript pp. 22-23. 

447 Testimony of Maj. Gen. Bennett C. Landreneau, U.S. Army, Adjutant General, Louisiana, before the U.S. Senate, 
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543

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Defense Department’s 

Role in the Response, Feb. 9, 2006. In his interview with the Committee staff , Maj. Gen. Landreneau said he requested 

an active-duty division. “I told him that we felt like we needed active-duty support in the state. I felt like we needed an 

active-duty division to help us – to help with the planning and execution of the movement of displaced persons out of 

New Orleans.” Source: Maj. Gen. Landreneau interview, Jan. 11, 2006, p. 9. Maj. Gen. Landreneau’s testimony that he 

requested an active-duty headquarters element rather than an entire division is consistent with the recollections of other 

LANG offi cers, see below. Maj. Gen. Landreneau also told the Committee staff he informed FEMA Director Brown and 

FCO Lokey of his request to Lt. Gen. Honoré for a headquarters division of active-duty troops. Brown “turned to his 

staff and said we need to make sure we log that request and that it’s properly funneled through the right request chain.” 

Source: Maj. Gen. Landreneau interview, Jan. 11, 2006, pp. 56-57. Neither Brown nor Lokey could recall that conversation or any other conversation in which Maj. Gen. Landreneau requested federal active-duty troops. Source: Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 98 (Q. “At any time, did General Landreneau relate to you any request that he made to General 

Honoré for Federal troops?” A. “I don’t recall it.”); Brown interview, Jan. 23, 2006, p. 188 (Q. “Do you remember the fi rst 

time you learned of a request for signifi cant numbers of troops, National Guard or Federal active-duty?” A. “You know, 

counsel, I don’t.”); Compare with: Committee staff interview of Col. Steven Dabadie, Former Chief of Staff , Louisiana 

National Guard, conducted on Jan. 12, 2006, transcript p. 118 (“He told me that the fi rst conversation that he had shortly 

aft er I talked to him was with General Honoré, and they talked about a division headquarters and tasking that division 

headquarters with planning, coordinating, executing evacuation.”).

448 “I told him the need for troops and that I needed his [help] with the EMAC [Emergency Management Assistance 

Compact] push, and gave him an assessment of what I thought we needed at that time. ... At that time that we were 

talking about 10,000 or more, and then I called him back later and I said it’s going to be more.” General Landreneau 

interview, Jan. 11, 2006, pp. 12-14. See also: Task Force Pelican, Louisiana National Guard Timeline of Signifi cant Events 

Hurricane Katrina, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 6 (sixth entry for “30 Aug 05”: “Requested additional EMAC assistance through 

NGB”). Maj. Gen. Landreneau’s testimony that he fi rst sought assistance from the National Guard Bureau on Tuesday, 

August 30, is consistent with the recollections of Lt. Gen. Honoré and three of his subordinate offi cers in the Louisiana 

National Guard: Brig. Gen. Gary Jones, the Commander of the LANG’s Joint Task Force Pelican, Brig. Gen. Brod Veillon, Assistant Adjutant General for the Louisiana National Guard and Commander of the Louisiana Air National Guard, 

and Col. Steve Dabadie, Chief of Staff for Maj. Gen. Landreneau. (All witnesses interviewed by the Committee were 

instructed not to discuss their testimony with other potential witnesses and agreed to abide by this instruction.) 

Maj. Gen. Landreneau also stated that in a subsequent conversation he relayed the substance of his conversation with Lt. 

Gen. Blum to Lt. Gen. Honoré. Source: Maj. Gen. Landreneau interview, Jan. 11, 2006, General Honoré. Source: General 

Landreneau interview, Jan. 11, 2006, p. 12. As a result of diff ering recollections, the Committee is unable to determine 

whether Maj. Gen. Landreneau had more than one conversation with Lt. Gen. Honoré on Tuesday, or the precise time 

when any such conversation occurred.

449 Lt. Gen. Honoré interview, Jan. 9, 2006, pp. 72-74. 

450 Lt. Gen. Honoré interview, Jan. 9, 2006, p. 67.

451 Lt. Gen. Honoré interview, Jan. 9, 2006, pp. 67, 75. Lt. Gen. Honoré also said he told Maj. Gen. Landreneau that 

“We had about 5,000 troops that possibly could be ready to deploy,” including the 82nd Airborne Division and the 1st 

Cavalry Division of the 5th Army. Lt. Gen. Honoré interview, Jan. 9, 2006, p. 67. Maj. Gen. Landreneau recalled this 

conversation occurring on Wednesday, August 31, when Lt. Gen. Honoré arrived at the Superdome. Source: Maj. Gen. 

Landreneau interview, Jan. 11, 2006, pp. 8-9. 

452 Referring to the NGB’s timeline, which reports a request for 5,000 troops from Maj. Gen. Landreneau fi rst occurring 

early Wednesday morning, Lt. Gen. Blum stated, “I talked to him at home one night before that, which probably was 

Tuesday night, but I don’t see that in here [the NGB timeline], because this is generated from my operations center, not 

from my home phone.” Lt. Gen. Blum interview, Jan. 19, 2006, p. 33. 

453 Louisiana National Guard Brig. Gen. Brod Veillon recounted how his concerns over security became magnifi ed 

when the rising waters fl ooded the generator providing power to the Superdome:

About 11 on Tuesday night, they came to us and said, “Boys, the water is rising. Th e generator has 

about a foot to go. You will lose the generator when the water tops the wall.” I asked the man, “What 

happens when we lose a generator?” He said, “All the lights go out.” I said, “Every light in the Dome?” 

“Every light.” So I knew the Dome would go dark, and I was concerned at that point for what we were 

going to do if the whole place went black.

Committee staff interview of Brig. Gen. Brod Veillon, Assistant Adjutant General – Air, Louisiana National Guard, 

conducted on Nov. 29, 2005, transcript p. 58. 

454 A number of witnesses, including Col. Dabadie, provided confl icting and inconsistent accounts of when this conversation and other conversations about the need for additional troops occurred. Col. Dabadie interview, Jan. 12, 2006, 

pp. 99-103, 107. Th e Committee cannot rule out the possibility that there was more than one related conversation on this 

subject at diff erent times from early Tuesday to early Wednesday. Th e weight of the evidence and testimony indicates 

that this particular conversation occurred in the wee hours of Wednesday morning. 

455 Committee staff interview of Brig. Gen. Gary Jones, Assistant Joint Forces Commander/Army, Louisiana Army 

National Guard, conducted on Dec. 7, 2005, transcript pp. 92-93, 139-40. 

456 Col. Dabadie interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 99-100. According to Col. Dabadie, “a little bit aft er” that conversation, Maj. 

Gen. Landreneau told him that he had asked Lt. Gen. Honoré “about a division type headquarters.” Col. Dabadie added: 
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544

“And I think that is kind of where General Graham came into the picture, and then the rest of the forces were National 

Guard – conversation with General Blum and the rest of the forces were National Guard through EMAC.” Col. Dabadie 

interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 102-103, 118. 

457 Brig. Gen. Veillon interview, Nov. 29, 2005, p. 191. 

458 Lt. Gen. Blum interview, Jan. 19, 2006, p. 34. Referring to notes taken by his assistant, Major Karl Konzelman of the 

Army National Guard, Lieutenant General Clyde Vaughn, Director of the Army National Guard, provided a similar 

recollection of this conversation. Lt. Gen. Vaughn understood Maj. Gen. Landreneau’s primary need was for additional 

security forces. Source: Lt. Gen. Vaughn interview, Jan. 18, 2006, p. 23. Major General Harold Cross, the Adjutant General 

of the Mississippi National Guard, called General Blum about the same time, and also asked the National Guard Bureau to 

expedite the EMAC process for Mississippi. Source: Maj. Gen. Cross interview, Jan. 26, 2006, pp. 12-14. See also: Maj. Gen. 

Landreneau interview, Jan. 11, 2006, pp. 49-50; Lt. Gen. Vaughn interview, Jan. 18, 2006, p. 49.

459 Lt. Gen. Blum interview, Jan. 19, 2006, p. 36. 

460 National Guard Bureau, Hurricane Katrina Update Brief, Sept. 10, 2005, 10 a.m. Provided to Committee. 

461 Lt. Gen. Vaughn interview, Jan. 18, 2006, p. 31. Th e Committee asked Lt. Gen. Vaughn: 

Q: Is it correct to characterize the process as follows, that initially General Landreneau, when he called and 

said I need 5,000 that he was saying this is big, I’m going to need a lot; I don’t know exactly what I’m going 

to need, but I’m going to need a lot. And then, on the Guard’s end, you interpreted that ... [t]hey’re going 

to need a lot, let’s just send whatever we’ve got in, and we’ll refi ne it? Was that what you were doing?

LT. GEN. VAUGHN: I think that’s right on the money. I think it’s exactly like that. 

Lt. Gen. Vaughn interview, Jan. 18, 2006, p. 33. 

462 National Guard Bureau, Hurricane Katrina Update Brief, Sept. 10, 2005, 10 a.m. Provided to Committee.

463 National Guard Bureau, Aft er Action Review, “Hurricane Response September 2005,” Dec. 21, 2005, p. 6. Provided 

to Committee. 

464 National Guard Bureau, Aft er Action Review, “Hurricane Response September 2005,” Dec. 21, 2005, p. 6. Provided 

to Committee.

465 Lt. Gen. Blum interview, Jan. 19, 2006, p. 54. 

466 National Guard Bureau, Aft er Action Review, “Hurricane Response September 2005,” Dec. 21, 2005, p. 20. Provided 

to Committee. 

467 Lt. Gen. Blum interview, Jan. 19, 2006, p. 54 

468 National Guard Bureau, Aft er Action Review, “Hurricane Response September 2005,” Dec. 21, 2005, p. 20. Provided 

to Committee. 

469 Lt. Gen. Blum interview, Jan. 19, 2006, pp. 54-55.

470 McHale, House Select Committee hearing, Oct. 27, 2005. 

471 Maj. Gen. Rowe interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 125-126.

472 Adm. Keating interview, Feb. 3, 2006. 

473 Gen. Myers interview, Feb. 28, 2006. 

474 U.S. Department of Defense, First U.S. Army, Joint Task Force Katrina, “Hurricane Katrina Chronology.” Provided 

to Committee.

475 Lt. Gen. Honoré interview, Jan. 9, 2006, pp. 71-72.

476 Maj. Gen. Landreneau interview, Jan. 11, 2006, pp. 43-44.

477 Wells interview, Nov. 15, 2005, p. 121; Lt. Gen. Honoré interview, Jan. 9, 2006, pp. 76-77. Although Gen. Honoré 

talks about evacuation planning, he does not state that he was asked to take over the evacuation.

478 Committee staff interview of Phil Parr, Federal Coordinating Offi cer, Region I, FEMA, conducted on Nov. 16, 2005, 

transcript p. 47.

479 Parr interview, Nov. 16, 2005, p. 69. Th ere were similar uninformed expectations in FEMA headquarters. Col. Don 

Harrington, the lead DOD liaison to FEMA, was asked whether at FEMA there was “any expectation that [Lt. Gen. Honoré] 

would be bringing a large number of forces with him?” “Yes, yes,” Col Harrington responded and then explained: 

I had to kind of let them know that the troop presence he brought, he didn’t control the Guard. Th ey had 

to understand that. But that he was not necessarily going to bring a huge number of troops initially. You 

know, he had to get an assessment, and plus you had a large number of National Guard troops.

Col. Harrington interview, Jan. 6, 2006, p. 100.

480 Maj. Gen. Landreneau interview, Jan. 11, 2006, p. 44.

481 Committee staff interview of Col. Glenn Curtis, Chief of Staff , Louisiana National Guard, and Lt. Col. Jacques 

Th ibodeaux, Joint Director of Military Support to Civilian Authorities and Branch Chief, Louisiana National Guard, conducted on Dec. 6, 2006, transcript pp. 270-271. 
Military Operations

545

482 Lt. Gen. Honoré interview, Jan. 9, 2006, pp. 131-134. 

483 Wells interview, Nov. 15, 2005, p. 67. Lt. Col. Jacques Th ibodeaux of the Louisiana National Guard, the Joint Director 

of Military Support during Katrina, responded to Mr. Wells’s concern, as raised by Committee staff during the interview, 

by stating that it was Mayor Nagin, not Lt. Gen. Honoré, who was at all times in charge of the evacuation of the Superdome 

and New Orleans: 

Mayor Nagin was also there and Col. Ebert, who is his emergency operations manager – I think Col. 

Ebert’s title is Director of Homeland Security for New Orleans – were both also involved in that meeting. ... So it was, once again, not a break in protocol. It was a civilian entity, a civilian representative 

trying to facilitate the evacuation of his city. And General Landreneau and General Honoré were both 

there in any attempt to facilitate that. Basically a unifi ed command system; a meeting amongst commanders of certain areas to facilitate DOD support, both National Guard and active component. 

Lt. Col. Th ibodeaux interview, Dec. 6, 2006, pp. 267-269. 

484 Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 9.

485 Committee staff interview of Terry Ryder, Executive Counsel, Offi ce of the Governor, LA, conducted on Jan. 10, 

2006, transcript pp. 192-194. Andy Kopplin, Chief of Staff to Governor Blanco, recalled a similar conversation with 

Senator Vitter: 

Either Mr. Ryder or Senator Vitter mentioned to me Senator Vitter wanted to visit with the Governor 

about his conversation with Mr. Rove about federalization in regard to the Governor’s conversation 

that morning with Ms. Townsend, the Homeland Security advisor. And the question was, did the 

Governor’s request for additional federal assistance constitute a request for federalization, because that 

was the way it had been reported to the Senator per his – at some point, whether it was Senator Vitter 

fi rst or Terry or – well, I talked to both Terry, and I talked to Senator Vitter about that. 

Committee staff interview of Andy Kopplin, former Chief of Staff , Offi ce of the Governor, LA, conducted on Jan. 6, 2006, 

transcript p. 122. 

486 Ryder interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 202.

487 Ryder interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 203.

488 Ryder interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 203. Andy Kopplin, Governor Blanco’s Chief of Staff , expounded on the 

Governor’s comments regarding the appropriate command structure for the response. Aft er receiving Senator Vitter’s 

question whether the Governor’s request for additional federal assistance constituted a request for federalization, 

Kopplin sought the advice of Col. Smith, the Deputy Director of LOHSEP, on the consequences of federalization: 

I think the conclusions were fairly clear that the Governor’s request, which was for additional federal 

assistance to help in particular with the evacuation, would not benefi t from federalization but, in fact, 

the law enforcement functions of the guard could, in fact be compromised. ... So the Governor took 

immediate action to clarify by placing a second call of the day looking for the President. Th is time, she 

got him, and she made the point that she’s looking for assistance, that she needed assistance, but the 

unifi ed command she felt was the appropriate structure to continue to use.

Kopplin interview, Jan. 6, 2006, pp. 122-125.

489 Ryder interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 203.

490 Ryder interview, Jan. 10, 2006, p. 203. Th e Governor’s timeline characterizes the conversation between the Governor 

and the President as follows:

She stresses to him that the situation is extremely grave and asks for additional resources. Governor 

Blanco also specifi cally stresses that she wants to continue to be his partner in a unity of eff ort as is called 

for under the National Response Plan. To relay the urgency and magnitude of the need at that point in 

time, the Governor tells the President she estimates 40,000 troops would be needed, and again reiterates 

her frustration about the FEMA buses. 

Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 10.

491 Testimony of Gov. Kathleen Blanco, Louisiana, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Role of the Governors in Managing the Catastrophe, Feb. 2, 2006.

492 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 71. Lokey provided a similar recollection at another point during the interview: 

I went to Brown and said, we’ve got to do something, sir. Th is is more than we can do. Our programs 

aren’t designed for this. Our resources aren’t there, so whatever. ... We had to do something, and the only 

group I know that knows how to do stuff that big and has done it before was the United States military. 

Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 91. 

493 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 88-89.

494 Brown interview, Jan. 23, 2006, p. 198.

495 Committee staff interview of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, conducted on Feb. 23, 2006, transcript p. 113. 

496 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, pp. 115-116. Dolph Diemont, the U.S. Department of Transportation’s representative 

at the state EOC, described how Brown communicated his frustration to the federal staff at the EOC: 
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546

When he came in and they closed the door he turned beet red and said this is unacceptable. You guys are 

all incompetent. Th is is not going the way we want. We’ve got to change it. You know, I don’t know what 

the hell’s going on. You know, screaming and yelling at us, at everybody. It was hard to take because we 

were pouring our hearts out, trying to get the job done, and instead of encouragement, we got that kind of 

– it was ... demoralizing. 

Committee staff interview of Dolph Diemont, Region X Regional Emergency Transportation Representative, Offi ce of 

Intelligence, Security and Emergency Response, U.S. Department of Transportation, conducted on Jan. 6, 2006, transcript 

p. 80.

497 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, p. 114. 

498 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, pp. 114-115. 

499 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, p. 123. 

500 Lt. Gen. Honoré interview, Jan. 9, 2006, p. 141.

501 Th is point is discussed in the Logistics portion earlier in this chapter.

502 McHale interview, Jan. 4, 2006, pp. 57-62.

503 McHale interview, Jan. 4, 2006, p. 61. Lt. Gen. Inge, U.S. Army, Deputy Commander of U.S. Northern Command, 

stated in a press conference following the President’s deployment orders on Sept. 3, 2005, that the Title 10 Troops “will not 

take on a law enforcement role [nor] have they been directed in any way to do so. Th ey will provide security. Th ey will ... be 

available to relieve National Guard soldiers who are in state status should there be a requirement for National Guard guys to 

do law enforcement. ... I am not aware of any discussion of waiver of Posse Comitatus that’s taken place.” Lt. Gen. Joseph 

Inge, U.S. Northern Command, “Defense Department Briefi ng on Ongoing DoD Response to Hurricane Katrina,” news 

briefi ng, Sept. 3, 2005. http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2005/tr20050903-3849.html. Accessed on May 16, 2006. 

504 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 71.

505 Th e Posse Comitatus Act restrictions do not apply if the National Guard troops are activated under the Insurrection 

Act. See: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Th e Posse Comitatus Act and Related Matters: A Sketch, 

by Jennifer Elsea, June 6, 2005. 

506 Gov. Blanco, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 2, 2006. 

507 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 72.

508 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 72. Although Lokey recalled the state’s reaction as unambiguously negative, Brown 

interpreted it diff erently: “Th ere was enough ambiguity that I thought we might actually be able to pull it off , that she might 

actually agree to this. And she did say...she needed more time; she needed to talk to her staff about it, which I fully understood and respected, but I really thought I had kind of made some inroads there.” Brown interview, Jan. 23, 2006, p. 201.

509 FEMA Director Brown telephoned Lt. Gen. Honoré prior to his arrival in Baton Rouge. According to Brown, “[Lt. Gen. 

Honoré] already had a litany of things he wanted to do, and I had to back him down and say, “I may want all of those things 

done, but until we get federalized or however we work this out, I’m still in control, and you need to let me know what you 

want to do.” Source: Testimony of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Roles of DHS and FEMA Leadership, Feb. 10, 

2006. Maj. Gen. Landreneau recalled a similar conversation aft er General Honoré arrived at the EOC in Baton Rouge. According to Maj. Gen. Landreneau, Brown told General Honoré “that he was the primary federal offi cial, P.F.O., and General 

Honoré was not going to anything in the way of marshalling resources or doing anything without his concurrence.” “Yes, 

sir,” Lt. Gen. Honoré replied. Source: Maj. Gen. Landreneau interview, Jan. 11, 2006, p. 54. In his second interview with the 

Committee, Brown related that he was not dissatisfi ed with Lt. Gen. Honoré’s performance; in fact, Brown believed that Lt. 

Gen. Honoré was doing an excellent job of operating within DOD’s role under the unifi ed command. Rather, according to 

Brown, he engaged in this colloquy with Lt. Gen. Honoré in order to strengthen the unifi ed command that Lt. Gen. Honoré 

and Maj. Gen. Landreneau were attempting to establish. Source: Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, pp. 118-119.

510 Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 10. Lt. Gen. Honoré stated that the Governor’s timeline fairly 

refl ected the substance of this conversation. Lt. Gen. Honoré interview, Jan. 9, 2006, pp. 121-122.

511 Brig. Gen. Graham interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 22-26. 

512 Brig. Gen. Graham interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 27-28. General Graham had begun his assignment at the 5th Army headquarters on August 15. From that time until his assignment in Hurricane Katrina, General Graham’s duties had focused on 

the 5th Army’s transition to its newly focused mission of homeland defense and defense support to civil authorities. Brig. 

Gen. Graham interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 5-10, 24-26. 

513 Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 10; Col. Curtis and Lt. Col. Th ibodeaux interview, Dec. 6, 

2006, pp. 270-271.

514 Maj. Gen. Landreneau interview, Jan. 11, 2006, pp. 57-58.

515 Maj. Gen. Landreneau interview, Jan. 11, 2006, p. 58.

516 Maj. Gen. Landreneau interview, Jan. 11, 2006, p. 58.

517 Maj. Gen. Landreneau interview, Jan. 11, 2006, p. 61.

518 Col. Anthony Daskevich, the Defense Coordinating Offi cer in Baton Rouge also was present at this meeting and re-
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547

called that the Governor did not make a specifi c request for additional federal ground troops. Source: Col. Daskevich interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 130-132. General Graham also stated that the Governor did not make any request for federal troops 

during the part of the conversation in which he was present. Source: Brig. Gen. Graham interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 29-30.

519 Lt. Gen. Honoré interview, Jan. 9, 2006, pp. 103-105. 

520 Lt. Gen. Honoré interview, Jan. 9, 2006, p. 130. At another point during the Committee’s interview Lt. Gen. Honoré 

identifi ed several other types of assets that DOD provided during that fi rst week: 

We knew we needed helicopters. We knew we needed COMs [communications] capability. We knew we 

needed MEDEVAC. And these started to fl ow...Th is is Wednesday morning, and we’re doing this without 

an open request. We’ve got no request for any specifi c capability, but what we have done is an assessment 

that these types of capabilities could be used, and started to fl ow them. 

Lt. Gen. Honoré interview, Jan. 9, 2006, pp. 123-124. 

Lt. Gen. Honoré addressed why he did not call on the 82nd Airborne Division for the deployment of a large number of 

ground troops on day one: “Th e type of capability we needed wasn’t necessarily the 82nd. Th ey’d jump in and secure for 

us, recon for us. Th e type of capability we needed at that time was evacuation capability. ... I don’t recall any serious conversation on why we didn’t have the 82nd Airborne there on day one.” Source: Lt. Gen. Honoré interview, Jan. 9, 2006, 

p. 127. General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during Katrina, told the Committee that another 

consideration was the primary mission of the 82nd Airborne was to be prepared for potential overseas missions. Source: 

Gen. Myers interview, Feb. 28, 2006, pp. 33-34. Col. Don Harrington, the DOD liaison to FEMA, explained, “Th ere is a 

reticence, too, to deploy the 82nd down range. It’s not something really – keep in mind, that next year, the [terrorists] 

may take advantage of this. You know, that’s a very big concern. So do you want to kick everybody out in, what I call the 

Hindenburg disaster mode? Everybody goes out, the Hindenburg is burning. Everybody goes down range, and you don’t 

realize that some people may be taking advantage of that.” Source: Col. Harrington interview, Jan. 6, 2006, p. 101. Assistant Secretary McHale commented, “We don’t want to turn the 82nd Airborne into a fi rst responder, always available on 

a moment’s notice for law enforcement activity throughout the United States. To be prepared for such a mission would 

require a change in the training and equipment of the 82nd. It would also produce a signifi cant change in the historically 

defi ned role of the military within domestic American society.” Source: McHale interview, Jan. 4, 2006, pp. 90-91.

521 Brig. Gen. Graham interview, Jan. 12, 2006, pp. 143-145.

522 Maj. Gen. Richard Rowe, e-mail to Col. James Hickey, Aug. 31, 2005, 6:05 p.m. Provided to Committee. General 

Honore was cc’d on the e-mail and the subject was “LA Security mission.” Col. Hickey was General Honoré’s executive 

offi cer. In the context of this e-mail, the term federal troops appears to refer to federal troops that are not National Guard 

troops – in other words, active-duty troops. 

523 Maj. Gen. Richard Rowe, e-mail to Col. James Hickey, Aug. 31, 2005, 6:05 p.m. Provided to Committee. 

524 U.S. Army Forces Command, Message to Commander, First Army, and others, “FORSCOM FRAGO #8,” Sept. 1, 2005, 

0039 Z. Provided to Committee. See also: JTF-Katrina, Commander’s Assessment, Sept. 3, 2005. Provided to Committee. 

525 82nd Airborne Division, “82nd Airborne Division Mission.” http://www.bragg.army.mil/82dv/Mission.html. Accessed on Apr. 13, 2006. 

526 1st Cavalry Division , ”Reorganization.” http://pao.hood.army.mil/1stcavdiv/index.htm. Accessed on Apr. 13, 2006.

527 U.S. Department of Defense, Hurricane Katrina Major Events Timeline, Draft , Dec. 28, 2005, 12:52 p.m. Provided to 

Committee.

528 Lt. Gen. Russel Honoré, e-mail to Maj. Gen. Rowe, Sept. 1, 2005, 11:46 a.m. Provided to Committee; Lt. Gen. Honoré interview, Jan. 9, 2006, p. 139.

529 Lt. Gen. Blum interview, Jan. 19, 2006, p. 78. 

530 Lt. Gen. Russel Honoré, e-mail to Lt. Gen. James Amos, Sept. 1, 2005, 1:46 p.m. Provided to Committee. 

531 Lt. Gen. Blum interview, Jan. 19, 2006, p. 288.

532 Adm. Keating, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 9, 2006. 

533 Lt. Gen. Blum interview, Jan. 19, 2006, p. 139.

534 Lt. Gen. Blum interview, Jan. 19, 2006, pp. 250-251.

535 Maj. Gen. Richard Rowe, e-mail to Lt. Gen. Russel Honoré, Sept. 1, 2005, 1:50 p.m. Provided to Committee. Approximately 15 minutes later, Lt. Gen. Honoré responded, “GOT IT.” 

536 U.S. Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, June 2005, p. 35. 

537 McHale interview, Jan. 4, 2006, p. 56. 

538 Gen. Myers interview, Feb. 28, 2006, pp. 30-31. Gen. Myers stated that DOD continued to hold this view on Friday 

aft ernoon, even aft er the Governor made an additional request to the President for more federal troops on Friday morning 

aboard Air Force One. Nonetheless, according to Gen. Myers, DOD sent additional troops requested by the Governor. Th e 

troops already were on high alert status, Gen. Myers noted, “so you said okay, if the Governor thinks we need more, we’ll 

send more.” Source: Gen. Myers interview, Feb. 28, 2006, p. 39. Lt. Gen. Blum, who met with both the President and the 

Governor on that Friday, stated, “It was clear in my mind that by 3:00 on Sept. 2 that there were suffi cient forces in Louisiana to manage the security condition, to complete the search and rescue operation, and that the Governor of Louisiana 
Chapter 26

548

agree to that assessment and personally expressed it to me as well as Mayor Nagin.” Source: Lt. Gen. Blum interview, Jan. 

19, 2005, p. 72.

539 Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, pp. 11-12; Lt. Gen. Honoré interview, Jan. 9, 2006, pp. 183-184.

540 “I don’t recall a specifi c request from the governor for Title X troops at that time.” Lt. Gen. Honoré interview, Jan. 9, 

2006, p. 184.

541 Ryder interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 213-215.

542 Lt. Gen. Blum interview, Jan. 19, 2006, p. 57; Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 12.

543 Lt. Gen. Blum interview, Jan. 19, 2006, p. 57.

544 Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 12. Lt. Gen. Blum told the Committee that this description of 

his views is “entirely consistent with my recollection.” Lt. Gen. Blum interview, Jan. 19, 2006, p. 68.

545 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, p. 125.

546 Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense), Hurricane Katrina/Rita/Ophelia Interim Timeline, 

Oct. 31, 2005, p. 9; Offi ce of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense), Hurricane Katrina/Rita/Ophelia Interim Timeline, Nov. 2, 2005, p. 9. Earlier that morning the President met with Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Lt. Gen. 

Blum to receive “a hurricane status brief.” U.S. Department of Defense, Draft Hurricane Katrina Major Events Timeline, 

Dec. 28, 2005, 12:52 p.m. Provided to Committee.

547 Gen. Myers interview, Feb. 28, 2006, p. 43; England interview, Feb. 3, 2006.

548 McHale, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 9, 2006. 

549 Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 14.

550 Testimony of Mayor C. Ray Nagin, New Orleans, LA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Managing the Crisis and Evacuating New Orleans, Feb. 1, 

2006. When asked by the Committee whether he was advocating that the National Guard be federalized, Mayor Nagin 

replied, “It was just a question of who had fi nal authority. I’m not sure of the details of what they were debating.” Source: 

Mayor Nagin, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 1, 2006. It is not clear what “fi nal authority” would have meant other than 

federal control of the National Guard, since the mayor, as head of the local government, was the incident commander. 

“He’s the civilian, the lead civilian authority in charge of that municipality. He is really the only one that can control that

operation.” Source: Lt. Col. Th ibodeaux interview, Dec. 6, 2006, pp. 268-269. See also: Mayor Nagin, Senate Committee 

hearing, Feb. 1, 2006 (affi rming role as incident commander for New Orleans). 

551 Mayor Nagin, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 1, 2006. Governor Blanco testifi ed, “the Mayor was not in our meeting that I had with the President, per se. ... At that point in time, Mayor Nagin had not been in good communication 

with us. You know, the communication system had fallen down.” Gov. Blanco, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 2, 2006.

552 Gov. Blanco, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 2, 2006. Th e Governor also sent a letter to the President on Sept. 2, 

requesting additional federal troops and other resources: 

Based on our initial assessment, I have previously requested signifi cant federal support to include: an 

additional 40,000 troops; trailers of water, ice and food; commercial buses; base camps; staging areas; 

amphibious personnel carriers; deployable morgues; urban search and rescue teams; airlift ; temporary 

housing; and communications systems. Even if these initial requests had been fully honored, these assets would not be suffi cient to address our critical, immediate needs.

Governor Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, letter to President George W. Bush, Sept. 2, 2005. 

553 Gov. Blanco, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 2, 2006. Th e Governor’s timeline elaborated:

Th e Governor has a private conversation with President Bush about the command structure of the operations, and reiterates her need for a signifi cant number of federal troops. Th e President asks Governor 

Blanco to put her troops, the Louisiana National Guard and EMAC National Guard, under control of 

a Department of Defense appointed General. By the time of Friday’s conversation, the situation has 

evolved and the immediate needs on the ground are far diff erent than the needs when federal troops 

were fi rst requested earlier in the week. 

Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 14.

554 Gov. Blanco, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 2, 2006. 

555 Robert Travis Scott, “Politics delayed troops dispatch,” New Orleans Times-Picayune, Dec. 11, 2005, National, p. 1.

556 In particular, elements of the 24 Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) were prepared to deploy and could have deployed on Friday. Lt. Gen. Amos told the Committee:

I anticipated [the Special Air Contingency Marine Air Ground Task Force] leaving on Friday. I fi gured 

the DEP [deploy] order was going to be signed on Friday. ... I kind of expected the DEP order was going to happen on Friday, and that’s because all the news was reporting the President was going to make 

an announcement on one of his public things while he was going around New Orleans. ... So I expected 

them to actually start moving out on Friday. So I put them on their what we call, aff ectionately, put 

them on their packs probably – I either did that Wednesday aft ernoon, the 31st, or the fi rst.

Lt. Gen. Amos interview, Dec. 14, 2005, p. 75.
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549

557 White House Briefi ng to Committee, given by Kenneth Rapuano, Deputy Assistant to the President for Homeland 

Security, Dec. 12, 2005.

558 Th e Governor’s timeline addresses this issue:

Erroneous reports have been circulated that she denied federal troops or delayed help for 24-hours. Th e 

facts are clear and evidence confi rms that the Governor requests early and oft en the need for additional 

federal military presence, including a federal military presence and assets. At no time does anyone 

from the federal government tell her that federal troops are withheld because the existing structure was 

inadequate. In fact, the new proposal is fi rst presented to her aboard Air Force One on Friday, four days 

aft er the storm struck on Monday, and the President never suggests that federal troops were reliant on 

this new structure nor did he convey that the joint command structure is insuffi cient.

Source: Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 15. Regarding the Mayor’s charge that the Governor’s 

position delayed the deployment of federal troops and impeded the overall response in Louisiana, the Governor testifi ed, 

“I will tell you at that point in time, Mayor Nagin had not been in good communication with us. You know the communication system had fallen down.” Source: Gov. Blanco, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 2, 2006. 

559 Lt. Gen. Blum interview, Jan. 19, 2006, pp. 100-101. 

560 Gen. Myers interview, Feb. 28, 2006, pp. 38-43.

561 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, p. 121. 

562 Th omas Kuster, e-mail to Col. Richard Chavez, Sept. 2, 2005, 5:31 p.m. Provided to Committee.

563 Ryder interview, Jan. 10, 2006, pp. 237-238. Witt was serving as a consultant to the Governor. 

564 Kopplin interview, Jan. 6, 2006, pp. 159-160.

565 Kopplin interview, Jan. 6, 2006, p. 153.

566 According to Governor Blanco, “It was Blum, Blum, Blum, and then Card came in on the third.” Gov. Blanco, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 2, 2006.

567 Gov. Blanco, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 2, 2006. Th e Governor’s timeline summarizes these exchanges:

Close to midnight on Friday, Gov. Blanco receives phone calls from Gen. Steve Blum, just aft er his return to DC, and White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card, who want to discuss with her their proposed 

organizational restructuring. She hears them out, but continues to believe, given the stabilization now 

underway and the massive National Guard buildup on the ground, that bringing in the federal forces 

and putting them under the command of Gen. Honoré to coordinate with Gen. Landreneau who leads 

the Guard forces is the most eff ective solution.

Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline, p. 15. 

568 Gov. Blanco, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 2, 2006.

569 Lt. Gen. Blum interview, Jan. 19, 2006, pp. 83-86.

570 McHale, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 9, 2006. 

571 President George W. Bush, “President Addresses Nation, Discusses Hurricane Katrina Relief Eff orts,” radio address, 

Sept. 3, 2005, 10:06 a.m. ET. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/20050903.html Accessed on May 16, 2006.

572 Gov. Blanco, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 2, 2006.

573 Committee staff interview of Col. Terry Ebbert, U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.), Director, New Orleans Offi ce of Homeland 

Security, LA, conducted on Jan. 10, 2006, transcript pp. 170-171.

574 Adm. Timothy J. Keating, “Defense Department Briefi ng on Ongoing DoD Response to Hurricane Katrina,” news 

briefi ng, Sept. 5, 2005. http://www.dod.mil/transcripts/2005/tr20050905-3851.html. Accessed on May 16, 2006. At a 

press conference on Tuesday, Sept. 6, Gen. Myers was asked whether the response would have been quicker had it been 

federalized:

GEN. MYERS: I think the response by the National Guard, which is under state authority in both Louisiana and Mississippi, and I assume Alabama and Florida as well, was, I think, very quick. I think if you asked the TAGs of that state, I think

they responded very quickly.

Sec. Donald Rumsfeld and Gen. Richard Myers, “Defense Department Operational Update Briefi ng,” news briefi ng, Sept. 6, 

2005. http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2005/tr20050906-secdef3862.html. Accessed on May 16, 2006.

575 Committee staff interview of Lt. Col. Gordon Ellis, U.S. Army, former Commander of First Battalion, 148th Infantry, 

Ohio National Guard, conducted on Feb. 16, 2006, transcript pp. 88-89.

576 McHale interview, Jan. 4, 2006, pp. 88, 110.

577 Gov. Barbour, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 2, 2006 (“I made very plain from day one that we didn’t ... need the 

federal government to run our National Guard. ... I was very emphatic it was the wrong thing to do.”); Gov. Blanco, Senate 

Committee hearing, Feb. 2, 2006 (“It’s very important for a governor to be able to retain control of the National Guard 

precisely for its law enforcement capabilities.”).
Admiral Allen giving Principal 

Federal Offi cer’s views for TV

U.S. Coast Guard photo
551

Failures in National Response 

Plan: Unifi ed Command

Failures in Design, Implementation, and Execution of the 

National Response Plan

The National Response Plan (NRP) aims to be a comprehensive framework for managing domestic incidents, whether terrorist attacks or natural disasters. It seeks to 

delineate the mechanisms for coordinating federal support to states, localities, and 

tribes; for interacting with nongovernmental and private-sector entities; and for directly 

exercising federal authority when appropriate.

Th e Department of Homeland Security (DHS) developed the NRP pursuant to Homeland 

Security Presidential Directive-51

 and in accordance with section 502(6) of the Homeland 

Security Act.2

 DHS released the NRP on January 6, 2005.3 It was to be “fully implemented” 

by April 14, 2005; at that date, response plans that had remained in eff ect during the 

implementation period were superseded.4

 Implementation of the NRP (and the associated 

National Incident Management System) was deemed a “national priority” in DHS’s Interim 

National Preparedness Goal.5

Th e NRP was set up to guide the national response to actual and potential Incidents of National Signifi cance – “high-impact events that require a coordinated and eff ective response 

by an appropriate combination of federal, state, local, tribal, private sector, and nongovernmental entities in order to save lives, minimize damage, and provide the basis for long-term 

community recovery and mitigation activities.”6

 Th e NRP applies to all federal agencies that 

may be requested to provide assistance or conduct operations during an actual or potential 

Incident of National Signifi cance.7

 Th e heads of 30 federal agencies and two nongovernmental organizations signed the document. 8

Incidents of National Signifi cance include all Presidentially declared disasters and emergencies under the Staff ord Act, which establishes the most commonly used programs for disaster 

and emergency assistance to states, local governments and individuals.9

 Incidents of National 

Signifi cance can also include incidents not covered by the Staff ord Act, such as high-profi le 

“National Special Security Events” like national political conventions or the Super Bowl.10

Although smaller incidents warranting a Staff ord Act declaration occurred in the months 

aft er the NRP was issued, Hurricane Katrina was the fi rst major test of the NRP. Th e response to Katrina exposed fl aws in the design and pre-storm implementation of the NRP as 

well as in its execution during the disaster. Some of the more prominent of these problems 

are discussed below.11

Failures in the Design and Implementation of the NRP

Insuffi cient Training and Exercises

Th e NRP was publicly issued with fanfare in January 2005. Tom Ridge, then DHS Secretary, 

said, “America is better prepared today, thanks to the National Response Plan.”12 He contrasted the NRP with other plans and reports routinely issued in Washington: “Instead of promising results in the future, it is a deliverable that we believe will bring defi nite results now.”13

Chapter 27
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552

Th e NRP, however, was not a self-executing document. It is a complex, ambitious, 400-pluspage, high-level plan that was well described in a document produced to the Committee by 

the Offi ce of the Vice President as “a very detailed, acronym-heavy document that is not 

easily accessible to the fi rst-time user.”14 Th e NRP, moreover, entails signifi cant departures 

from the primary plan it replaced, the Federal Response Plan,15 including shift ing leadership from FEMA to the new Department of Homeland Security; introducing a new lead 

coordinating fi gure, the Principal Federal Offi cial (PFO), to supplement the existing Federal 

Coordinating Offi cial (FCO) position; and assigning new emergency-support functions to 

federal agencies, including, for the fi rst time, public-safety and security responsibilities.

Without a systematic training and implementation eff ort, the NRP was unlikely to be widely 

or readily understood, and unlikely to off er eff ective guidance, just four months aft er its 

implementation, for the massive federal, state, and local response necessary for Katrina. 

DHS’s implementation eff ort appears to have been entirely inadequate. Aft er the NRP was 

issued, DHS conducted a wave of training for headquarters staff of component agencies.16

Beyond that, it appears no one at DHS was charged with ensuring that the NRP would be well 

implemented. Th e National Incident Management System (NIMS) Integration Center is responsible for federal, state, and local NRP awareness training as an adjunct to its primary mission of fostering the widespread adoption of the NIMS, a nationwide approach for diff erent 

jurisdictions and levels of government to work together in domestic incidents, but its staffi ng 

(fewer than 10 people) inherently limited its impact.17 Th e Integration Center relies largely on 

self-administered online training, in which sessions could last as little as 15-20 minutes.18

Only one large-scale exercise of the NRP took place before Katrina, the Top Offi cials 3 

exercise (TOPOFF 3) in April 2005, at about the time the NRP was to take full eff ect and 

supersede other plans. TOPOFF 3, sponsored by DHS, involved responders from all levels 

of government. A report by the DHS Inspector General in November 2005 found that “the 

exercise highlighted – at all levels of government – a fundamental lack of understanding for 

the principles and protocols set forth in the NRP and NIMS.”19 It appears that little was done 

to correct this shortcoming, and that widespread unfamiliarity with the NRP persisted.20

In addition, the absence of any other exercises of the NRP meant that there were no further 

formal opportunities to understand and fl esh out the roles allocated by the plan, to clarify 

ambiguities, to identify potential problems, and to incorporate lessons recognized back into 

the NRP as lessons learned. DHS’s lack of substantial and sustained eff ort to familiarize 

offi cials and responders with the NRP and to exercise the NRP under simulated conditions 

meant, as one expert testifi ed, that “the NRP was only a plan – it was not a functioning, 

practiced, operable, system.”21

Principal Federal Offi cial and Federal Coordinating Offi cer Roles

Th e NRP does not clearly defi ne the role of the PFO or distinguish it from that of the FCO. 

Th is was an obstacle to an eff ective, coordinated response to Katrina.

Th e FCO position, authorized by the Staff ord Act, predates the NRP. Th e Staff ord Act 

requires that the President appoint an FCO immediately upon issuing a major disaster or 

emergency declaration.22 Th e FCO is to appraise the types of relief most urgently needed, 

establish fi eld offi ces, coordinate the administration of relief, and take other necessary action to help citizens and public offi cials obtain proper assistance.23 Before the NRP, the FCO 

led the federal response on the ground.

Th e NRP created a new PFO position that is not explicitly provided for in the Staff ord 

Act, so the PFO remains a non-statutory position. According to the NRP, the PFO is to be 

“personally designated” by the Secretary of Homeland Security and is to represent the Sec-
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553

retary as “the lead federal offi cial.”24 Th e PFO is also, among other things, to ensure overall 

coordination of federal incident-management activities and of resource allocation and serve 

as a “primary, though not exclusive” point of contact for state and local offi cials, the media, 

and the private sector.25 But the NRP also says that the PFO is not to “direct or replace” the 

incident-command structure, and that the PFO does not have “directive authority” over the 

FCO or other federal and state offi cials.26

Tasked with leading the federal response but lacking authority to direct others, the PFO 

position has inherent challenges. Moreover, the division of responsibilities between the PFO 

and the FCO – who leads the federal response in Staff ord Act situations where no PFO has 

been assigned27 – is not clear. Both positions have coordination responsibilities, but they are 

not clearly distinguished.28 Th eir relationship is also unclear: the PFO can “coordinate” but 

not direct the FCO, who is to “work closely with” the PFO.29

Bruce Baughman, President of the National Emergency Management Association and 

Director of the Alabama Emergency Management Agency, testifi ed that “basically, in Louisiana, we had two people in charge. ... And it wasn’t real clear what the roles and responsibilities of each were.30

Comptroller General David Walker, the head of the Government Accountability Offi ce 

(GAO), found that “shift ing roles and responsibilities” of the PFO, FCO and the DHS Secretary (who is to provide strategic, national leadership) resulted in “disjointed eff orts of many 

federal agencies involved in the response, a myriad of approaches and processes for requesting and providing assistance, and confusion about who should be advised of requests and 

what resources would be provided within specifi c time frames.”31 William Lokey, FCO for 

Louisiana during Katrina, and Colonel Jeff Smith, Deputy Director of the Louisiana Offi ce 

of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, each testifi ed that problems arose due 

to the unclear chain of command.32

Vice Admiral Th ad Allen of the U.S. Coast Guard, who succeeded then-FEMA Director 

Michael Brown as PFO during Katrina, acknowledged the diffi culties in sorting out the PFO 

and FCO roles: “If you need to invoke the Staff ord Act for whatever reason, you’re always 

going to have an issue with the relationship of the PFO and the FCO together.”33 Approximately three weeks aft er he was designated PFO, Allen accepted an appointment to be FCO 

for Katrina in each of the three Gulf Coast states as well – eff ectively merging the two roles.34

Potentially Overlapping Agency Roles

Another NRP design fl aw revealed by Katrina was the failure to delineate areas of potentially overlapping responsibility among federal agencies. Th e NRP includes 15 Emergency 

Support Functions (ESF), groupings of substantive capabilities – communications or urban 

search and rescue, for example – that may be needed in a disaster. Each of these ESFs has 

a designated primary agency, which is to lead that ESF’s mission in an incident; a list of 

other support agencies, which are to provide support for that mission in an incident; and a 

designated coordinating agency, which coordinates the eff orts and planning of the primary 

agency or agencies and support agencies on an ongoing basis.35

A striking example of the problem of overlapping responsibilities, discussed at greater 

length in the law-enforcement portion of this report (see Chapter 25), is the NRP’s assignment of both the coordinating-agency role and the primary-agency role for ESF-13, public 

safety and security, jointly to DHS and the Department of Justice. Nowhere does the 

ESF-13 Annex to the NRP spell out the respective roles of the two agencies, how they are 

to divide or share responsibilities or circumstances where one or the other is to have 

primacy.36 Compounding this lack of NRP guidance were the agencies’ own failures to 

clarify the ambiguities prior to a major disaster. Such activities should have been completed 
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during the initial 60-day “transitional period” aft er the NRP was issued.37 Predictably, this 

led to signifi cant confusion, and ultimately contributed to a delayed federal law-enforcement response in the Gulf Coast. 

Greater clarity in the responsibilities of Primary and Support Agencies for Emergency 

Support Functions (ESFs) might also have helped avoid other confl icts. For instance, the 

NRP assigns lead responsibility for ESF-8, public health and medical services, to the federal 

Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).38 But one of the response mechanisms, 

the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), is part of FEMA, a DHS agency that deploys 

NDMS’s Disaster Medical Assistance Teams as FEMA assets. In the response to Katrina, 

FEMA and HHS engaged in minimal coordination on pre-positioning and deploying Disaster Medical Assistance Teams.39

Contingency and Catastrophic Planning

Th e NRP is a high-level plan, with a core set of principles meant to apply to a wide range of 

possible events. It was not designed to address specifi c scenarios or geographic areas, or to 

provide operational details. Th e NRP does contemplate that such plans may be developed, 

but it sets neither a process nor a timetable for doing so.40 More detailed planning, particularly for catastrophic events, might have made possible a more eff ective response to Katrina.

Under the Federal Response Plan, the NRP’s predecessor, FEMA developed plans adapted 

to each FEMA region; each plan could then be tailored to individual states.41 Th e plan for 

FEMA Region VI, based in Denton, TX, and covering Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, 

Oklahoma, and Texas, included a hurricane plan for Louisiana.42 Th is investigation found 

no indication that equivalent work has been done under the NRP, nor any indication that 

earlier regional plans have been updated.43

It also appears that no plans have been developed under the NRP to deal with specifi c risk 

scenarios such as the 15 homeland-security planning scenarios developed by the White 

House Homeland Security Council in 2004, which included a hurricane situation.44 Admiral 

Allen suggested using more specifi c “sub-plans” to fl esh out how plans would actually be 

executed. He observed:

Th is [NRP] is a high-level document. I think as you’re able to establish the parameters of almost a spectrum of an all hazards type of an approach to things 

that you need to be more detailed planning on how you would respond to it ... 

a natural disaster is one thing; a natural disaster with a radiological event is an 

entirely diff erent issue.45

Detailed, more specifi c planning is likely to be particularly important in responding to 

catastrophes. Comptroller General Walker has stressed the crucial need for strong planning 

for catastrophic events, and recommended that the NRP and its Catastrophic Incident Annex – the portion of the NRP that provides for a proactive, national response to a catastrophe – “should be supported and supplemented by more detailed and robust operational 

implementation plans.”46

Certainly the NRP, as it had been implemented and without the necessary associated planning to support it, was found inadequate to the catastrophe of Katrina. Th ough the NRP 

was intended to address a wide spectrum of events of varying size, in an actual situation 

where upwards of a million people were aff ected – tens of thousands of whom continued to 

face serious danger to life, health or safety aft er the storm itself had passed – and in which 

the capabilities of local responders had been decimated, the NRP’s procedures were not yet 

ready for use and simply fell short. As Admiral Allen noted, the NRP as written “doesn’t 

contemplate” an event on the massive scale of Katrina: “When it goes off the scale, you 
Failures In National Response Plan: Unifi ed Command

555

know, you need a separate plan for how to deal with something that massive. In this case, 

there were some things that were unique to this event that can only be handled by an almost 

diff erent approach to what you’re doing.”47

Th e NRP’s Catastrophic Incident Annex and its associated but still-to-be-released Catastrophic Incident Supplement were intended to provide this separate plan for a catastrophe, but, 

incomplete and largely untested, they went unused. Th e Catastrophic Incident Annex sets out 

the broad principles of a proactive response; the Catastrophic Incident Supplement was supposed to fi ll in signifi cant, operational details.48 Unfortunately, when Katrina hit, nearly nine 

months aft er the NRP had been announced, the Supplement still had not been issued. 

According to David Garratt, Acting Director of FEMA’s Recovery Division, who had 

chaired the interagency Catastrophic Incident Planning Group that was charged with developing the Catastrophic Incident Supplement, the Supplement had been 99 percent completed by late 2004,49 roughly the same time the NRP itself was fi nished. Garratt explained that 

when it came time to get the concurrence of the relevant federal agencies to the Catastrophic Incident Supplement, all approved except the Department of Defense (DOD). DOD had 

concerns about a Memorandum of Agreement related to the National Disaster Medical 

System and, in particular, provisions related to reimbursement for certain costs of care in 

a public-health emergency.50 Th e Memorandum of Agreement (to which DOD, FEMA, the 

Department of Health and Human Services, and the Department of Veterans Aff airs were 

parties) went unresolved and unsigned until approximately September 6, 200551 – eight days 

aft er Katrina made landfall and apparently only aft er the White House’s Homeland Security 

Council got involved.52 Th e Supplement, meanwhile, has never been issued.53

Th e delay in issuing the Catastrophic Incident Supplement – and developing the agency 

plans and procedures that were required to support it – deprived the federal government 

of a potential tool in its response to Hurricane Katrina. Th e heart of the Supplement is an 

Execution Schedule that provides an agency-by-agency (and hour-by-hour) list of the assets 

various federal agencies are to deploy automatically to the aff ected area once the Secretary of 

Homeland Security orders implementation.54 Had it been issued and high-priority resources 

pre-identifi ed and made ready to deploy, the Catastrophic Incident Supplement might have 

sped delivery of supplies and personnel to mobilization centers close to the disaster or, in 

certain circumstances, directly to the incident scene without a need for requests from state 

and local authorities, or from any other federal agency.

Even if the Supplement had been implemented, however, it is not clear that it would have 

been adequate to the task at hand. Th e Execution Schedule is essentially a method of pre-prioritizing a certain set of assets – an important and potentially very useful function, but not by 

itself likely to constitute a suffi cient response to an event of catastrophic magnitude. Garratt, 

chair of the Catastrophic Incident Planning Group, characterized the Supplement as “basically 

just an acceleration model for resources that are already identifi ed under the NRP.”55 Indeed, 

the fact that the Catastrophic Incident Supplement, while complete, has not yet been issued, 

apparently refl ects questions about whether it needs further modifi cation.56 To be truly eff ective, the Supplement would need to move beyond its important but narrowly focused Execution Schedule, and incorporate more robust, catastrophe-focused planning.57

Failures in the Execution of the NRP

Declaration of an Incident of National Signifi cance

Under the NRP, every event that provokes a Presidential declaration under the Staff ord Act 

automatically becomes an Incident of National Signifi cance.58 Th us, when the President 
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556

issued an emergency declaration for portions of Louisiana on Saturday, August 27, 2005, 

Hurricane Katrina became an Incident of National Signifi cance. Despite this, on the aft ernoon of Tuesday, August 30, Secretary Chertoff issued a memorandum “declaring” Katrina 

an Incident of National Signifi cance as well as appointing Brown PFO.59 Th e next day, 

Secretary Chertoff appeared at a press conference at which he reiterated his declaration and 

noted that this was the fi rst time that such a declaration had been made.60

Th e superfl uous Tuesday “declaration” has caused confusion. In testimony before the 

House of Representatives, the Secretary said, “I did it because we were going to have a Cabinet meeting the next day and I wanted to have some kind of a documented notifi cation of 

the steps I had taken. I didn’t have to do it.”61 He echoed this explanation in testimony before the Committee, again citing the pending Cabinet meeting and saying, “In truth, I didn’t 

need to do it. I was told I didn’t need to do it. But I just did it to formalize it.” He also stated 

that “my understanding of the plan and my reading of the plan then and now is that by dint 

of declaring the emergency, it automatically made it an Incident of National Signifi cance.”62

At minimum, the Secretary’s redundant declaration of an Incident of National Signifi cance 

confused an already diffi cult situation and suggested a lack of familiarity with core concepts 

of the NRP within the Secretary’s offi ce. Robert Stephan, Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection, and the individual who led the Department’s development of the NRP, also 

addressed the Tuesday “declaration.” In an account similar to that provided by the Secretary’s Chief of Staff , John Wood, Stephan explained that his staff produced the initial draft 

of the Tuesday announcement, and that as originally written it only addressed the appointment of Brown as PFO. According to Stephan, the “declaration” of an Incident of National 

Signifi cance was subsequently added to the statement by someone in the Secretary’s offi ce. 

When, in the wake of press coverage raising questions about the declaration, Stephan realized that this language had been added, he contact the Secretary’s offi ce and explained the 

issue.63 Stephan further testifi ed that he “got the sense” that the Secretary’s front offi ce staff 

did not realize the error until he told them, and he noted that the Secretary was “not very 

excited” when informed that the error had occurred.64

Appointment of Michael Brown as Principal Federal Offi cial

Secretary Chertoff also departed from the NRP in his appointment of a PFO. In Chapter 12, 

this report discusses the advantages that might have been gained by appointing a PFO prior 

to Katrina’s landfall. Questions have also been raised about the wisdom of appointing Brown, 

who had little experience as an emergency manager, as PFO. But apart from these issues of 

judgment, Brown’s appointment as PFO violated the literal requirements of the NRP. 

It is inadvisable to appoint any FEMA Director PFO. Th e NRP prohibits the PFO from 

being “dual-hatted” – that is, from occupying another position or having another set of confl icting or distracting obligations at the same time. Specifi cally, the NRP states that, “Once 

formally designated, the PFOs relinquish the conduct of all normal duties and functions. 

PFOs may not be ‘dual-hatted’ with any other roles or responsibilities that could detract 

from their overall incident management responsibilities.”65 Notwithstanding this requirement, at the time of his appointment as PFO, Brown also served as Under Secretary for 

Emergency Preparedness and Response and as the Director of FEMA. Some of his duties 

appeared to be assumed by his Deputy, Patrick Rhode, but he took no formal steps, nor was 

he asked to take any, to relinquish his other responsibilities.66

Michael Jackson, Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security,67 and Secretary Chertoff defended 

Brown’s “dual-hatted” role, arguing that the PFO and FEMA responsibilities complemented 

each other.68 FEMA Director and PFO responsibilities, however, are far from identical. 

Th e FEMA Director has responsibilities for managing an organization that are distinct from 

overseeing any individual incident, however large. Not only may administrative issues – of 
Failures In National Response Plan: Unifi ed Command

557

personnel, budget, contracting, and the like – arise back in Washington that will either distract 

from the incident coordination or be neglected, but other disasters may occur as well that will 

demand attention from the FEMA Director. Indeed, on September 1, 2005 – three days aft er 

Katrina made landfall – an earthquake struck California.69 Th ough fortunately minor, it demonstrates that potential problems that can occur where the FEMA Director is also assigned the 

day-to-day responsibilities as the PFO for a specifi c incident. Th e development of another potentially devastating hurricane, Hurricane Rita, a mere four weeks aft er Katrina further underscores 

the problems inherent in tying the Director to the management of a single, specifi c incident.

Brown also failed to satisfy the NRP requirement that individuals – except in “extenuating” 

circumstances – must complete a formal training program before serving as PFO,70 as he 

had never participated in such training.71

Another form of “dual-hatting” occurred aft er Coast Guard Vice Admiral Th ad Allen 

replaced Brown as PFO. As discussed above (and at greater length in the unifi ed-command 

section), approximately three weeks aft er his appointment as PFO, Adm. Allen was also 

appointed to be the FCO for Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. Th ese dual appointments 

appear to be inconsistent with the NRP, which clearly envisions the PFO as separate and 

distinct from the FCO position. Robert Stephan confi rmed that the “dual-hatting” of the 

PFO and FCO “was never contemplated” by the NRP.72

Non-Implementation of the Catastrophic Incident Annex

In failing to implement the National Response Plan’s Catastrophic Incident Annex (NRPCIA), Secretary Chertoff ignored a potentially powerful tool that might have alleviated diffi culties in the federal response to Katrina. 

As discussed above, the Catastrophic Incident Supplement, with its detailed Execution 

Schedule, had not been issued at the time Katrina came ashore, but the NRP-CIA, released in 

January 2005, provides important tools on its own for a faster and more eff ective response.73

Th e NRP-CIA explicitly provides for a proactive federal response to catastrophic events.74

Th e NRP defi nes a catastrophic event as “any natural or manmade incident, including terrorism, that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely 

aff ecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or 

government functions.”75 Th e Secretary of Homeland Security or the Secretary’s designee 

may initiate implementation of the NRP-CIA.76 Th e NRP-CIA was not accompanied by 

changes in the Staff ord Act or other legislation and thus does not provide new authority to 

federal offi cials. It does, however, set a policy and tone for an urgent and proactive response 

that moves beyond the usual procedures in responding to an “ordinary” disaster.77 For 

a “typical” disaster, the standard practice is that the federal government does not extend 

aid until a state requests assistance. During a catastrophe, however, NRP-CIA activation 

prompts the government to help without waiting for requests. 

Th e NRP-CIA recognizes that, in a catastrophe, “Federal and/or national resources are 

required to augment overwhelmed state, local, and tribal response eff orts” and therefore 

provides for the identifi cation and rapid deployment of essential resources expected to be 

urgently needed to save lives and contain incidents.78 Upon notifi cation that the NRP-CIA 

has been implemented, federal agencies are to “take immediate actions to protect life, 

property, and critical infrastructure under their jurisdiction, and provide assistance within 

the aff ected area.”79 In addition, the NRP provides that normal procedures for certain Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) may be “expedited or streamlined to address the magnitude of urgent requirements of the incident.”80 And while the federal government must still 

notify and coordinate with states, “the coordination process should not delay or impede the 

rapid mobilization and deployment of critical Federal resources.”81
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In short, the NRP-CIA turns what is traditionally a “pull” system, in which the federal 

government waits to receive requests from state and local offi cials, or from other federal 

agencies, into a “push” system, where federal authorities proactively deploy resources to 

mobilization centers close to the disaster or, in certain circumstances, directly to the incident scene to assist in responding to the incident.

When the President issued an emergency declaration in the days before landfall, it should have 

been apparent that Katrina had signifi cant potential to cause a “catastrophe” as defi ned by the 

NRP-CIA. Aft er landfall, it should have been immediately apparent that the catastrophe had 

occurred. Indeed, Secretary Chertoff would eventually describe Katrina as an “ultra catastrophe.”82 But the NRP-CIA was never activated. It is unknown whether DHS leaders ever considered activating the NRP-CIA, although both Secretary Chertoff ’s Chief of Staff Wood, and Garratt, a FEMA employee who headed the Catastrophic Incident Planning Group, were unaware 

of any discussions concerning the NRP-CIA in the days before Katrina made landfall.83

In the aft ermath of Hurricane Katrina, DHS and other federal offi cials have suggested that it 

was not appropriate to invoke the NRP-CIA to respond to the hurricane because the NRP-CIA 

was intended only for “no-notice” events – for which there is no time to go through normal 

procedures – whereas there was notice that Katrina was heading toward the Gulf Coast.84 Th e 

Catastrophic Incident Annex itself, however, does not contain any language that would limit 

it to no-notice events. Th e yet-to-be-issued Catastrophic Incident Supplement was somewhat 

more explicit, stating that it is intended to apply to “no-notice” or “short-notice” events.85

Th ese terms are left undefi ned in the Supplement. While DHS offi cials contend that Hurricane 

Katrina was not a no-notice or a short-notice event, a contrary view is just as plausible. Specifi -

cally, it could be argued that a massive hurricane hurtling towards a major American city with 

two or three days’ notice meets some common-sense defi nition of a short-notice event.

Indeed, the Catastrophic Incident Supplement’s Execution Schedule makes specifi c reference to hurricanes, events for which there is typically some notice, suggesting further that 

these documents would apply to an event such as Katrina.86 Nonetheless, federal offi cials 

have argued that Katrina provided too much notice to qualify as a “short-notice” event.87 Th e 

basis for this argument is respect for the states – with prior notice the normal NRP process 

of consultation with the states about their needs should apply. Th ere are, of course, countervailing considerations: some known events can still be so overwhelming and urgent that the 

NRP-CIA may be the appropriate tool. If it were deliberate policy to exclude an event such 

as Katrina from the purview of the Catastrophic Incident Annex, there may be a signifi cant 

fl aw in the policy underlying the NRP-CIA and the Catastrophic Supplement. As Comptroller General David Walker testifi ed, “the idea that we would be less proactive in dealing with a 

known natural disaster [than with a no-notice event] just defi es common sense.”88

Failures to Establish an Incident Command System Structure or 

Unifi ed Command 

Background: Incident Command System and Unifi ed Command

Emergencies create confusion. Even in the case of a minor incident involving a single 

response agency, response personnel must quickly determine what is happening and then 

coordinate and control many separate activities at the scene to ensure everyone is working 

toward a common, productive goal. If the incident is a disaster or catastrophe, the failure to 

coordinate multiple agencies from diff erent jurisdictions, each with its own internal lines of 

communication and authority, can seriously degrade the capabilities of the government as a 

whole to respond eff ectively. Th e absence of interoperable communications or an eff ectively 

trained and exercised plan will further undermine the response.
Failures In National Response Plan: Unifi ed Command

559

In the event that an emergency or disaster necessitates a response from more than one 

entity or jurisdiction, use of the Incident Command System (ICS) and establishment of a 

unifi ed command will normally greatly improve chances of an eff ective response.

Hurricane Katrina brought about an attempt to establish a unifi ed command among multiple agencies during a signifi cant natural disaster. Th e story of that eff ort points to the need 

for agreement on goals and strategies, for understanding and training, for communication 

and coordination – and illustrates the practical diffi culties of becoming ready and maintaining readiness with the NIMS-ICS doctrine including the concept of unifi ed command. 

Th e NRP, which utilizes ICS as part of the National Incident Management System (NIMS), 

the system that provides a nationwide approach for federal, state, and local governments 

and others to work together in domestic incidents, states that a unifi ed command should be 

established:

when there is more than one agency with incident jurisdiction or when incidents cross political jurisdictions. Agencies work together through the designated members of the Unifi ed Command to establish their designated Incident 

Commanders at a single [location] and to establish a common set of objectives 

and strategies and a single Incident Action Plan.89 

Unifi ed command does not mean that a single person or agency directs others involved in a 

response (an arrangement known as “unity of command”) Unifi ed command, in the words 

of the NIMS manual, “allows agencies with diff erent legal, geographic, and functional authorities and responsibilities to work together eff ectively without aff ecting individual agency 

authority, responsibility, or accountability.”90

Th e challenges faced by the City of New York’s emergency response agencies immediately 

aft er the attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, demonstrate the need 

for a common incident-command system and a unifi ed command in a major disaster. As 

reported by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the “9/11 

Commission”), defi ciencies in the City’s unifi ed-command structure signifi cantly impaired 

the ability of the New York Fire Department, the New York Police Department, and the Port 

Authority to coordinate their responses.91 Exacerbating and complicating the lack of a unifi edcommand structure were the poor communications systems and separate command posts 

that failed to eff ectively share information among the various emergency-response agencies.92

To ensure that diff erent agencies work well together in a disaster, the 9/11 Commission 

recommended: 

Emergency response agencies nationwide should adopt the Incident Command System (ICS). When multiple agencies or multiple jurisdictions are 

involved, they should adopt a unifi ed command. Both are proven frameworks 

for emergency response.93

Even before the 9/11 Commission made this recommendation, the federal government had begun developing the NRP, as well as NIMS. Th e Incident Command System, the incident-management component of NIMS, embraces the concept of unifi ed command. Homeland Security 

Presidential Directive/HSPD-5, issued in February 2003, directed the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security to develop a National Response Plan, as well as a National Incident 

Management System “to provide a consistent nationwide approach for Federal, State, and local 

governments to work eff ectively and effi ciently together to prepare for, respond to, and recover 

from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size, or complexity.”94 Th e Presidential directive 

specifi ed that NIMS should incorporate the concepts of the Incident Command System.95
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560

DHS issued NIMS in March 2004. NIMS identifi es the advantages of utilizing ICS and specifi cally of establishing a unifi ed command:

• a single set of objectives, 

• a collective approach to develop strategies to achieve incident objectives,

• improved information fl ow and coordination between all jurisdictions and 

agencies involved, 

• all involved agencies have an understanding of joint priorities and restrictions,

• protection from the compromise of each participating agency’s legal authorities, and 

• optimization of combined eff orts through a single Incident Action Plan.96

Unifi ed command is achieved through a team approach to incident management. Th e precise nature of a unifi ed command structure will depend on particulars of the incident, but in 

general, each agency with jurisdictional authority or functional responsibility will participate in a collaborative process.97 Th at is, each of the responding agencies with incident 

jurisdiction shares in the responsibility to establish a unifi ed command. 

Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 directed federal departments and agencies to 

“make adoption of the NIMS a requirement ... for providing federal preparedness assistance 

through grants, contracts, or other activities.”98

Th e NRP, which incorporates NIMS, was to be “fully implemented” 120 days aft er issuance.99 During this period, which ended April 15, 2005, states and local governments were 

requested to “modify [their] existing incident management and emergency operations plans 

... to ensure proper alignment with NRP coordinating structures.”100 DHS, however, did not 

require states to be in full compliance with NIMS until the fi scal year beginning October 1, 

2006.101 Federal compliance was to have been met by October 1, 2005.102

 Gil Jamieson, Director of the NIMS Integration Center at FEMA, explained the rationale 

for this multi-year, phased approach for the states to adopt NIMS: 

You’re asking for a cultural change in terms of the way that people do business. Th e National Incident Management System and ICS grew up from the fi re 

service [due to the frequent need to coordinate fi refi ghting of wildfi res ranging 

across many jurisdictions]. Th ere’s still a tendency on the part of law enforcement to view it as a fi re-centered process. Health and medical folks, while they 

want to comply with it, are just not familiar with it. So as opposed to having a 

knee-jerk reaction to a very hard-hitting federal mandate, we thought it was 

an appropriate response to phase it in over time, do the cultural awareness, 

migrate; while there were negative incentives in there in terms of provision of 

grant assistance, where we were trying to get to was that we were moving in that 

direction because it was a good idea, not because it was a federal mandate.103

At the time the NRP became eff ective in early 2005, it was apparent that many local, state, and 

federal agencies still were unfamiliar with the plan and NIMS. Th is lack of familiarity was observed in April 2005, during DHS’s Top Offi cials Exercise (TOPOFF) 3, “by any measure the 

most ambitious civilian terrorism response exercise ever conducted.”104 Involving representatives from 27 federal departments, 30 state, 44 local, and 156 private-sector organizations, 

TOPOFF 3 simulated the simultaneous outbreak of pneumonic plague in Union and Middlesex Counties, New Jersey, and the dispersal of mustard gas and high-yield explosives in the 

city of New London, Connecticut.105 TOPOFF 3 was the fi rst national preparedness exercise 

that used the NRP and NIMS as the framework for the incident response and management.106
Failures In National Response Plan: Unifi ed Command

561

In a Quick Look Report on TOPOFF 3 issued in May 2005, DHS recognized that the exercise 

had revealed a fundamental lack of understanding of unifi ed command.107 Th e Report noted 

that “confusion at all levels regarding identifi cation and clarifi cation of roles and levels of 

responsibilities.”108 In November 2005, the DHS’s Inspector General found that while “overall, objectives were addressed and met,” the TOPOFF 3 exercise demonstrated “at all levels of 

government – a fundamental lack of understanding for the principles and protocols set forth 

in the NRP and NIMS.”109 Th e Inspector General highlighted “confusion over the diff erent 

roles and responsibilities performed by the Principal Federal Offi cial (PFO) and the Federal 

Coordinating Offi cer (FCO),”110 an issue that also plagued the Katrina response. 

In light of the incomplete understanding of the NRP and NIMS “at all levels of government” 

just prior to the 2005 hurricane season, it is not surprising that a number of the defi ciencies 

in understanding and implementing the NRP surfaced in the wake of Katrina. It was the 

fi rst time that the NRP and NIMS were used in a real-life major-disaster response.111

Diffi culties in Establishing an ICS Structure and Unifi ed Command 

Louisiana

In the days surrounding Hurricane Katrina’s assault on the Gulf Coast, FEMA’s top operatives in Louisiana struggled to establish a unifi ed-command structure with the state and 

other entities. But the eff orts did not succeed. Although FEMA was contending with its own 

staffi ng and training issues, the main problem was the state’s lack of emergency-management capacity. As Deputy FCO Scott Wells put it, “at some point we saw there was . . . nothing for the federal government to stick on to.”112

As envisioned under the NRP and NIMS, a unifi ed command should include:

• the FCO who, in the absence of a PFO, serves as the lead federal offi cial;

• the State Coordinating Offi cer (SCO), the lead state offi cial; and

• representatives of a variety of other entities who have authorities or resources 

important to the response, including the Department of Defense (DOD) 

(through a Defense Coordinating Offi cer (DCO)) and other federal and state 

agencies.113

Together, the individuals in the unifi ed command are to make collective decisions about 

priorities and plans in responding to the disaster. In Louisiana, FEMA’s William Lokey 

served as FCO, Scott Wells was his deputy, and Colonel Jeff Smith of the Louisiana Offi ce of 

Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness served as the SCO.

Lokey, Wells, and Colonel Smith worked alongside one another in the State Emergency 

Operations Center in Baton Rouge. Later, they moved to the Joint Field Offi ce (JFO).114

But a unifi ed command was not achieved. As Lokey frankly noted, “I can pretty much 

honestly say I was not in charge of all the federal operations in the fi eld.”115 Complicating 

the situation, many requests for assistance were addressed outside the unifi ed-command 

structure. For instance, Major General Bennett Landreneau, the Adjutant General and head 

of Louisiana’s National Guard, requested troops through the interstate Emergency Management Assistance Compact, the National Guard Bureau, and the commander of the DOD 

forces responding to Katrina, General Honoré. According to the DOD’s DCO for Louisiana, requests for large numbers of active-duty forces did not come to FEMA or to him, as a 

representative of DOD.116 Although Lokey did not think General Landreneau’s actions were 
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inappropriate,117 he was frustrated that, overall, many requests for assistance did not go 

through the unifi ed command and thought this impaired the response to Katrina:

People down there were asking everybody for everything, so when the fi nal analysis is done, and everybody gets all the records of who asked who when, there’s a 

tremendous amount of duplication and there’s a tremendous amount of gaps.118

Th e geographic scope and physical intensity of the devastation, and the urgent human needs 

that faced responders in the immediate aft ermath of Katrina in Louisiana, created a level of 

challenge not seen before in this country. Th e storm’s decimation of much of the incidentcommand structure beneath the state-level unifi ed command also undermined eff ective toplevel command. Th e ICS incorporates the expectation that most incidents will be managed 

at the most local level possible, but the storm and its massive fl ooding largely incapacitated 

local responders. As William Carwile, the FCO for Mississippi, explained, “In a situation, a 

catastrophic disaster, it is very diffi cult to build from the bottom up if there is no bottom.”119

Th is situation was exacerbated by the destruction of vast swaths of communication infrastructure in New Orleans and the surrounding parishes, substantially undermining the 

ability of those in the EOC in Baton Rouge to communicate with responders in the hardesthit parts of the state.120 Th e lack of communication limited the unifi ed command’s ability to 

form an accurate picture of what has happened in the aff ected areas, to receive and act on 

requests for assistance, and to fully understand what some of the goals and objectives for 

response should be.

Th e result was that essential features of a unifi ed command were not achieved. Th e DHS Inspector General found that the FCO and SCO in Louisiana did not establish joint priorities 

and objectives for the response – a requirement of NIMS and eff ective unifi ed command 

– until September 11 and did not develop the fi rst joint incident-action plan until September 14.121 Katrina had made landfall on August 29.

A catastrophe, of course, is exactly when the need for unifi ed command and an eff ective incident-command structure is most acute. Th e failure in Louisiana refl ects not only the overwhelming diffi culties of the moment, but longer-term problems such as insuffi cient training; widespread lack of understanding of the NRP, NIMS-ICS and unifi ed command; and 

an overall lack of preparation. Katrina, like the TOPOFF 3 national preparedness exercise 

just a few months earlier, exposed – at all levels of government – diff ering levels of knowledge, training, and ability to implement the principles of the ICS and unifi ed command. 

During the response to Katrina, these abstract weaknesses became very real liabilities.

Perhaps the most signifi cant reason for the failure to establish unifi ed command in Louisiana is the lack of NIMS and NRP training. While FEMA as an institution must do a better 

job of training its emergency managers,122 the top FEMA offi cials in Louisiana – including 

Lokey and Wells – appear to have been well-versed in the doctrine needed to establish 

unifi ed command. Th e real problem was that Louisiana’s emergency managers were unfamiliar with the NRP and NIMS. Indeed, the state brought in consultants a few days aft er

Katrina made landfall to give basic ICS courses to EOC participants and to members of the 

Louisiana National Guard.123 Both Lokey and Wells expressed frustration with the Louisiana’s lack of training and the problems this caused. As Wells put it: 

Two days aft er the storm hit [Louisiana emergency-management staff ] had 

a consultant come in and show them ICS, explain ICS. In the middle of a 

catastrophic disaster. Th is is how ICS works. Th ere was no unifi ed command 

under the National Response Plan. Th ey didn’t understand it. Th ey had no 

idea. ... My point is we have an architecture, we have [the] National Response 
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563

Plan. Th e states agreed to use NIMS. Th ey agreed to ICS. What does it tell you 

when two days into a catastrophic disaster a state gets somebody in to explain 

ICS to them?124

Louisiana also lacked both adequate staff to support the needed ICS structure and appropriate resources to support the unifi ed command. “Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security 

and Preparedness is a small organization, 44, 47 people,” Tony Robinson, FEMA’s Deputy 

FCO for Special Projects, explained. “So I think this event challenged them to build an ICS 

organization to respond and to fi eld geographic teams or liaisons. ... It stretched their staff 

extremely thin.”125

Staffi ng was a problem for FEMA as well, though it is not clear to what extent the staff -

ing shortfalls impacted the ability to establish unifi ed command. Th e National Emergency 

Response Team (ERT-N) was to form the nucleus of support for the FCO in Baton Rouge. 

Yet, according to Lokey, prior to landfall, only about half of the 25 members of the ERT-N 

team had arrived.126 An internal aft er-action review by FEMA aft er Katrina estimated that 

the ERT team had only 25 percent of the needed staff .127 FEMA’s Chief of Planning, who 

was responsible for producing each day’s Incident Action Plan (IAP) – a fundamental requirement of NIMS-ICS and integral to an eff ective unifi ed command – did not arrive at the 

Baton Rouge EOC until aft er landfall.128

Inadequate physical space also presented obstacles. According to Lokey, lack of meeting space at the Louisiana EOC hindered the ability of state and federal offi cials to work 

together. “We had much better communication and coordination among everybody when 

we could [get everybody around the table], because the State EOC was very crowded and we 

had a lot of our staff meetings in the hallways.”129 Although a JFO is normally set up within 

three days, the JFO established by FEMA in Louisiana was not operational until 12 days 

aft er landfall.130 Brown had reserved “Red October,” the large FEMA tractor-trailer with 

meeting space and communications equipment, for his work, so Lokey and his team were 

rarely able to use it for their meetings with state offi cials.131

Th e combined eff ect of these problems was that unifi ed command and an incident-command structure were not established in Louisiana until, at the earliest, weeks aft er the disaster.132 Th is failure had unfortunate consequences. As put succinctly by Wells, “if we can’t do 

ICS, we cannot manage disasters.”133

Mississippi

Federal and state offi cials in Mississippi, spared the continuing dangers that affl icted southeastern Louisiana even aft er Katrina had passed, were able to successfully implement a unifi ed-command system more quickly, though they confronted some of the same challenges.

Carwile was asked if he had found enough qualifi ed people to staff his command. “Absolutely not,” he said.134 Like Lokey, his counterpart in Louisiana, Carwile attributed these 

defi ciencies to the failure of DHS to approve funding requests for training and exercises. 

Beginning in 2004, according to Carwile, there was “no more money to plan; no more 

money to exercise; no more money for equipment; that money went away.”135 “You know, 

I honestly felt bad,” Carwile told the Committee, “because the [emergency response] teams 

were reported as ready, and I didn’t feel that they really were.”136

Robert Latham, Executive Director of the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, was 

particularly critical of federal agencies’ weak knowledge of the NIMS and the ICS: 

I don’t think most people understood it at all. I don’t think anybody read the 

National Response Plan. ... It’s just too many agencies. Th ey didn’t understand 
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unifi ed command. I mean, you almost had to learn it on the job. Th ey didn’t understand NIMS. I almost hate to bring this up ... but I don’t think people understood what a PFO was, what an FCO was, what the authority of an FCO was.137

Nevertheless, Carwile and Latham both believed that aft er a period of “chaos” that lasted 

two to three days aft er landfall, they were able to establish in Mississippi a successful ICS 

structure and a broadened unifi ed command that included the State’s Adjutant General and 

its Commissioner of Public Safety.138 Carwile and Latham attributed this success, in part, to 

the extensive prior training on the Incident Command System received by state and local 

responders in Mississippi.139 Carwile also had people on his team who had taught ICS; one 

member of his team had written an ICS handbook.140

Carwile also credited his pre-landfall relationship with Latham and Latham’s deputy.141

Latham described himself and Carwile as “joined at the hip from Saturday ... I mean, 

neither one of us did anything or made a decision that the other one didn’t know about.”142

Before Katrina’s landfall in Mississippi, Carwile had also strengthened his coordination 

with the state by assigning a FEMA employee to be with state and local offi cials at each of 

three local EOC sites in areas expected to be hardest hit.143

Th e joint planning pre-landfall served federal and state managers well in the chaos that followed the storm. As in Louisiana, storm damage hindered maintenance of an ICS structure 

for several days. For 48 to 72 hours aft er the disaster, the primary response agencies for Mississippi, MEMA, the National Guard, and the Department of Public Safety, were engaged 

in their own areas of response. Since the diff erent agencies had representatives at MEMA’s 

Mobile Command Center, offi cials at MEMA had some idea of what the diff erent agencies 

were doing, but poor communications prevented them from achieving a fully functioning 

ICS structure and a broadened unifi ed command that included each of these agencies for 

the fi rst few days aft er landfall.144

Latham described the diffi culty of establishing an ICS structure in the immediate aft ermath 

of any major disaster:

I think that it’s important to understand that in any disaster there is a period of 

chaos. And I don’t care how good your plan is. ... And what you hope is that 

at some period of time, as quick as possible, that you can shorten the period of 

chaos and the plan kicks in.145 

Despite his overall conclusion that Mississippi was able to operate an eff ective ICS structure 

and unifi ed command, Latham said that “it wasn’t easy.”146 He echoed Carwile’s observation 

that keeping the other participating federal agencies within the unifi ed command was “like 

herding cats.”147

Moreover, Admiral Allen’s appointment as PFO, aft er which he began to exercise operational command, highlighted the NRP’s ambiguity about the respective roles of the PFO 

and FCO, which had been evident during the TOPOFF 3 exercise. Admiral Allen, Lokey, 

Colonel Smith, and various other observers have commented that the appointment of a 

PFO in eff ect meant that there were “two people in charge” in each state.148

To resolve this ambiguity, approximately three weeks aft er he was designated PFO, Admiral 

Allen was concurrently appointed FCO for each of the three Gulf Coast states as well – effectively merging the PFO and FCO positions. Admiral Allen’s concurrent appointment resulted in the simultaneous revocation of the appointments of the existing FCOs in Louisiana, 

Mississippi, and Alabama; they became Deputy FCOs. From the perspective of Carwile, the 

FCO in Mississippi prior to the concurrent appointment, the appointment of a single PFO-
Failures In National Response Plan: Unifi ed Command

565

FCO created other problems, including the impairment of the unifi ed command where it 

already had been solidly established. Carwile found it “extraordinarily unusual” to designate 

a single FCO for three states, “knowing that at least in my view that a Federal Coordinating 

Offi cer had to be a full participant in the unifi ed command.” Although, according to Carwile, 

an FCO “belongs in a state working closely as part of that unifi ed command,” prior to his appointment Admiral Allen had devoted “none of his attention on Mississippi.”149

Conclusion

Establishing a unifi ed command and incident-command structure can be tremendously 

important in coordinating a large incident that involves offi cials and responders from many 

diff erent jurisdictions and diff erent levels of government.

Th e situation on the Gulf Coast presented many challenges to establishing a broad, unifi ed 

command and eff ective incident-management structure, particularly in the early days aft er 

the storm including: the size and chaos of the situation itself; the severely impaired ability to 

communicate across agencies or with front-line fi rst responders; and the disruption to the 

potential supporting incident-command structure when many responders became victims. 

Th e Gulf Coast experience demonstrated that, despite the many challenges of the incident, 

additional experience with and training on NIMS-ICS, an adequate number of suffi ciently 

trained support personnel, and the discipline in adhering to the doctrine of the incident 

command system made a diff erence in the success of the eff orts to establish a unifi ed command and incident-command structure in the response where these circumstances existed.

1 Th e White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5: Management of Domestic Incidents, Feb. 28, 2003, 

Section 16. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030228-9.html. Accessed on Apr. 7, 2006.

2 6 U.S.C. § 312(6).

3 Tom Ridge, former Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Remarks by Secretary of Homeland Security 

Tom Ridge at a Press Conference Announcing the National Response Plan,” Jan. 6, 2005. http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/

display?content=4301. Accessed on Feb. 28, 2006. As discussed in greater detail below, DHS also developed the National 

Incident Management System (NIMS) as the incident management system to be used for incidents under the NRP. 

NIMS was released by DHS in Mar. 2004. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary Tom Ridge Approves National Incident Management System (NIMS),” press release, Mar. 1, 2004. 

4 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan. Washington: Government Printing Offi ce, Dec. 2004, 

p. ix (Letter of Instruction) [hereinaft er NRP]. Although the NRP was released publicly on Jan. 6, 2005, it is dated, and 

was completed in, December 2004. Th e 120-day implementation period provided for in the NRP was calculated based on 

the December date and offi cially ended on Apr. 14, 2005.

5 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Interim National Preparedness Goal, Mar. 31, 2005, p. 10. http://www.ojp.

usdoj.gov/odp/docs/InterimNationalPreparednessGoal_03-31-05_1.pdf. Accessed on Apr. 6, 2006. Th e Interim Preparedness Goal was prepared pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 and is intended to establish the 

“national vision and priorities” that are to guide preparedness eff orts.

6 NRP, p. 3. Th e NRP bases its defi nition of an Incident of National Signifi cance on the four criteria set forth in HSPD-5 

to describe the situations when the Secretary of Homeland Security is to coordinate the Federal Government’s resources 

in response to or recovery from terrorists attacks, major disaster or other emergencies:

1. A Federal department or agency acting under its own authority has requested the assistance of the 

Secretary of Homeland Security. 

2. Th e resources of State and local authorities are overwhelmed and Federal assistance has been requested by the appropriate State and local authorities. Examples include:

• Major disasters or emergencies as defi ned under the Staff ord Act; and 

• Catastrophic incidents (as defi ned elsewhere in the NRP). 

3. More than one Federal department or agency has become substantially involved in responding to an 

incident. Examples include: 

• Credible threats, indications or warnings of imminent terrorist attack, or acts of terrorism 
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directed domestically against the people, property, environment, or political or legal institutions 

of the United States or its territories or possessions; and 

• Th reats or incidents related to high-profi le, large-scale events that present high-probability 

targets such as National Special Security Events (NSSEs) and other special events as determined by 

the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with other Federal departments and agencies.

4. Th e Secretary of Homeland Security has been directed to assume responsibility for managing a 

domestic incident by the President. NRP, p. 4.

7 NRP, p. 3.

8 NRP, pp. v-viii.

9 NRP, p. 7. Note that “emergencies” under the Staff ord Act include “any occasion or instance” for which federal assistance is needed, whether man-made or the result of natural disaster. Source: 42 U.S.C. § 5122 (1). In contrast, “major disasters” under the Staff ord Act include “any natural catastrophe . . . or, regardless of cause, any fi re, fl ood, or explosion,” 

suggesting that events other than natural disasters, including terrorist events, are covered only insofar as they result in 

fi re, fl ood or explosion. Source: 42 U.S.C. § 5122(2). DHS’s Inspector General has raised concerns that the defi nition of 

“major disaster” does not cover all WMD events. See: Department of Homeland Security, Offi ce of Inspector General, “A 

Review of the Top Offi cials 3 Exercise,” Nov. 2005, p. 30. http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/OIG_06-07_Nov05.

pdf. Accessed on Feb. 28, 2006 [hereinaft er “TOPOFF 3,” Nov. 2005].

10 NRP, p. 4.

11 Th e discussion in this section is not intended to constitute a comprehensive assessment of the development and functioning of the National Response Plan. Th e Committee, for example, has not looked at the initial development process 

of the NRP, which reportedly encountered some diffi culties, nor has the Committee conducted a systematic assessment 

of the ways in which the NRP interacts with state-to-state assistance mechanisms such as the Emergency Management 

Assistance Compact (EMAC). Rather, this section is intended to touch on some of the more conspicuous problems that 

came to light in the preparations for and response to Katrina.

12 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Remarks by Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge at a Press Conference Announcing the National Response Plan,” Jan. 6, 2005. http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=4301. 

Accessed on Feb. 28, 2006.

13 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Remarks by Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge at a Press Conference Announcing the National Response Plan,” Jan. 6, 2005. http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=4301. 

Accessed on Feb. 28, 2006.

14 Offi ce of the Vice President, “National Response Plan and Response Structure.” Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

nos. OVP 003422 through 003424.

15 FEMA, Federal Response Plan, Apr. 1999.

16 Committee staff interview of Robert Stephan, Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for Infrastructure Protection, 

Preparedness Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, conducted on Jan. 13, 2006, transcript pp. 126-128. 

Stephan, who led the development of the NRP at DHS, stated that other agencies that were signatories to the NRP were 

also required, in the NRP’s 120-day implementation period to conduct appropriate training and awareness courses for 

the NRP. Stephan interview, Jan. 13, 2006, pp. 126-127. Th e Committee has not investigated to what extent other federal 

agencies carried out such NRP training.

17 Committee staff interview of Gil Jamieson, Acting Director, National Incident Management System Integration 

Center, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), conducted on Dec. 20, 2005, transcript p. 29. Mr. Jamieson 

indicated that the NIC was authorized for 10 employees but that only seven slots were fi lled.

18 Jamieson interview, Dec. 20, 2005, pp. 37-39. Jamieson recognized that such training was not suffi cient and that 

additional training tailored to specifi c jobs, as well as exercises and actual fi eld assignments, were important as well. In 

explaining why more had not been done, Jamieson indicated that they were at the beginning of a gradual process and 

that FEMA needed additional resources. Jamieson interview, Dec. 20, 2005, pp. 8-10.

19 “TOPOFF 3,” Nov. 2005, p. 2.

20 Various offi cials acknowledged to us their lack of familiarity with the NRP. For example, ICE offi cial Michael Vanacore who was sent down to the Gulf Coast to address DHS’s public safety and security responsibilities under ESF-13, 

stated: “I . . . had a fl eeting familiarity with it. To be honest, wasn’t something that was high on my radar screen with 

my particular responsibilities.” Source: Committee staff interview of Michael Vanacore, Director, Offi ce of International 

Aff airs, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, conducted on Jan. 27, 2006, 

transcript p. 8. During his fi rst three days in Baton Rouge, “a lot of it seemed to be in a foreign language there because 

that whole National Response Plan had a language all its own, which I had never heard up until that point.” Source: 

Vanacore interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 35. Brig. Gen. Graham, Deputy Commanding General for Army North, Fift h U.S. 

Army who worked for General Honoré in Joint Task Force Katrina testifi ed that he read the NRP on his way to Louisiana. Committee staff interview of Brig. Gen. Mark Graham, Deputy Commanding General, Fift h U.S. Army, conducted 

on Jan. 12, 2006, transcript p. 26.

21 Written Statement of Herman B. Leonard, Professor, John F. Kennedy School of Government and Harvard Business 

School, Harvard University, and Arnold M. Howitt, Professor, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: 
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567

Recommendations for Reform, Mar. 8, 2006, p. 3.

22 42 U.S.C. § 5143. Pursuant to Executive Order 12148 (July 20 1979 – Sec. 4-203), as amended by Executive Orders 13286 

(68 Fed. Reg. 10619, Feb. 28, 2003), Sec. 52 and 12673 (54 Fed. Reg. 12573, Mar. 29, 1989 – Sec. 1) the responsibility to appoint an FCO is delegated to the Secretary of Homeland Security, though traditionally the President has continued to make 

the initial appointment that accompanies a disaster or emergency declaration, based upon the recommendation of FEMA. 

23 42 U.S.C. § 5143.

24 NRP, p. 33. Depending on the magnitude of the disaster, a PFO need not always be designated for an incident covered 

by the Staff ord Act; if no PFO is designated, then, according to the NRP, the FCO is to serve as the federal lead. NRP, pp. 

29, 34.

25 NRP, pp. 33-34.

26 NRP, p. 33.

27 NRP, p. 34.

28 According to the NRP, the FCO is to “coordinate Federal resource support activities,” while the PFO is to ensure 

“overall coordination of Federal domestic incident management and resource allocation activities.” NRP, pp. 33-34.

29 NRP, p. 34. Not surprisingly, the DHS Offi ce of Inspector General found, in its review of the Department’s Apr. 2005 

TOPOFF-3 exercise that there was confusion over the diff erent roles and responsibilities of the PFO and FCO; the IG 

suggested that developing a better understanding of these roles would enhance implementation of the NRP. “TOPOFF 

3,” Nov. 2005, p. 13.

30 Testimony of Bruce Baughman, President, National Emergency Management Association and Director, Alabama 

State Emergency Management Agency, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 

Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Recommendations for Reform, Mar. 8, 2006.

31 Written Statement of David M. Walker, Comptroller General of the United States, for the U.S. Senate, Committee 

on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Recommendations for Reform, Mar. 8, 

2006, p. 11.

32 Committee staff interview of William Lokey, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, 

FEMA, conducted on Jan. 20, 2006, transcript pp. 191-192. See also: Written Statement of Col. Jeff Smith, Deputy 

Director, Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP), before the U.S. House, Select 

Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing on Hurricane 

Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana, Dec. 14, 2005, p. 16 (“One of the complaints in the 

testimony before the House that Jeff Smith had was he had three chains of command to deal with. He had the PFOs, he 

had mine, and he had headquarters. Well, I’m working as much as I can with the whole, now that PFO is operational, 

which it wasn’t supposed to be. You know, the ERT-N ought to be working for that person, not having them create a 

separate thing. Th ey were doing their own plans and all that kind of stuff like that and made it very confusing.”).

33 Committee staff interview of Vice Adm. Th ad Allen, U.S. Coast Guard, Chief of Staff , conducted on Feb. 3, 2006, 

transcript p. 76.

34 70 Fed. Reg. 56929 (Sept. 29, 2005) (Louisiana); 70 Fed. Reg. 57308 (Sept. 30, 2005) (Alabama); 70 Fed. Reg. 57309 

(Sept. 30, 2005) (Mississippi). 

35 NRP, pp. ESF–iii through ESF–iv.

36 NRP, p. ESF–13.

37 NRP, pp. ix-x.

38 NRP, p. ESF–8.

39 See: Chapter 24: Medical Assistance for more information.

40 NRP, pp. 60-62. 

41 Committee staff interview of David Garratt, Acting Director of Recovery, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 9, 2006, transcript pp. 170-171.

42 FEMA, Hurricane Plan for Louisiana: An Attachment to the Regional Supplement to the Federal Response Plan, May 

2002. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0058-0001773 through 0001785. 

43 Th e NRP does appear to contemplate that certain regional plans may be developed. Source: NRP, p. 61. David Garratt, 

a 10-year veteran of FEMA who chaired the interagency Catastrophic Incident Planning Group, said he couldn’t say 

whether he had seen a regional supplement for the NRP, but stated that he “would be shocked if there were not regional 

supplements to the NRP.” Source: Garratt interview, Jan. 9, 2006, p. 174.

44 Homeland Security Council and U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Planning Scenarios, Version 20.2 

Draft , Apr. 2005. Provided to Committee; Homeland Security Council and U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Planning Scenarios, “Scenario 10: Natural Disaster – Major Hurricane,” Version 20.2 Draft , Apr. 2005. Provided 

to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. WHK 17500 through 17511; See also: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research 

Service, Th e National Preparedness System: Issues in the 109th Congress, by Keith Bea, Mar. 10, 2005, pp. 8-10. 

45 Vice Adm. Allen interview, Feb. 3, 2006, p. 122. Elsewhere in the interview Adm. Allen gives an example of a “natural 

disaster with a radiological event” as a disaster that somehow impacted a nuclear power plant. Source: Vice Adm. Allen 
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interview, Feb. 3, 2006, pp. 89-90 (“I think there are a spectrum of hazards that we have to deal with, and I think we need 

better clarity and maybe some more detail about the types of incidents PFOs are likely to encounter, and we need to plan 

against those particular threats rather than just having the three generics, you know, the NSSE, the natural disaster, and 

the terrorist attack.”). Adm. James Loy, former Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security, suggested a similar approach 

in a non-transcribed interview with Committee Staff , proposing that more specifi c plans should be developed around 

particular scenarios. Source: Committee staff interview of Adm. James Loy, former Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security, conducted on Nov. 16, 2005 (untranscribed).

46 Written Statement of Walker, Senate Committee hearing, Mar. 8, 2006, p. 13.

47 Vice Adm. Allen interview, Feb. 3, 2006, p. 106.

48 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan, Catastrophic Incident Annex. Washington: Government Printing Offi ce, Dec. 2004, p. CAT-1 [hereinaft er NRP-CIA].

49 Garratt interview, Jan. 9, 2006, pp. 9-12. In the interview, Garratt initially stated that the fi nal draft of the Catastrophic Incident Supplement was completed in September 2004, but subsequently modifi ed that estimate to “sometime 

approaching the end of 2004.”

50 Garratt interview, Jan. 9, 2006, pp. 12-13; See also: Jamieson interview, Dec. 20, 2005, pp. 24-25; U.S. Department 

of Homeland Security, National Response Plan, Catastrophic Incident Supplement, “National Disaster Medical System, 

Memorandum of Agreement Among the Departments of Homeland Security, Health and Human Services, Veterans 

Aff airs, and Defense,” Draft for Offi cial Use Only, Sept. 2005, p. 2. Both Mr. Garratt and Mr. Jamieson described the dispute as involving payment for defi nitive medical care, defi ned in the Memorandum of Agreement as “medical treatment 

or services beyond emergency care, initiated upon inpatient admission to an NDMS treatment facility and provided for 

injuries or illnesses resulting directly from a specifi ed public health emergency, or for injuries, illnesses and conditions 

requiring non-deferrable medical treatment or services to maintain health when such medical treatment and services are 

temporarily not available as a result of the public health emergency.”

51 Jamieson interview, Dec. 20, 2005, p. 25. Th e signature pages to the Memorandum of Agreement refl ect fax dates of 

Sept. 5 and 6, 2005. Th e version of the Catastrophic Incident Supplement produced to the Committee and attaching the 

Catastrophic Incident Supplement is dated Sept. 2005.

52 Rajeev Vankayya, e-mail to Tom Sizemore and Brian Kamoie, Sept. 2, 2005, 7:36 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led 

as Bates no. OPHEP 24179. Th is e-mail between the Senior Director for Biodefense at the Homeland Security Council 

and HHS offi cials said in part “Could you give me a call to discuss the MOU [Memorandum of Understanding]? We 

discussed in the DC this morning and there was agreement that it should be signed immediately.” An e-mail from Mr. 

Kamoie to Mr. Sizemore and Robert Claypool of HHS sent approximately one hour later forwarded Dr. Vankayya’s 

e-mail message and said, in part, “I assume from this the Deputies want this document signed immediately. We did not 

get to work through the issues Monday. You will recall our concerns as discussed last Friday. Bob, I suggest you raise this 

with Stewart and get guidance on whether in the middle of all of this he wants us to go to the mat and work through the 

document or wait until response activities allow a meeting.” Source: Brian Kamoie, e-mail to Tom Sizemore and Robert 

Claypool, Sept. 2, 2005, 8:31 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. OPHEP 24179. Th e “DC” and “Deputies” 

referred to in the e-mail messages are presumably references to the Homeland Security Council’s Deputies Committee, 

the “senior sub-cabinet interagency forum for consideration of policy issues aff ecting homeland security” and made up 

of the Deputy Secretaries of Treasury, Defense, Health and Human Services, Transportation, Homeland Security; the 

Deputy Attorney General; the Deputy Directors of Central Intelligence, FBI, FEMA, and OMB; and the Chief of Staff 

to the Vice President, as its regular members. Source: Th e White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-1: 

Organization and Operation of the Homeland Security Council, Oct. 29, 2001. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011030-1.html. Accessed on Apr. 7, 2006.

53 Even once issued, the Catastrophic Incident Supplement was not designed to take eff ect immediately. Instead, it was 

to be phased in over a number of months, to allow agencies to make the preparations necessary to be able to comply with 

the provisions of the Supplement. Garratt interview, Jan. 9, 2006, pp. 37-38; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 

National Response Plan, Catastrophic Incident Supplement, Draft for Offi cial Use Only, Sept. 2005, p. 2. Provided to 

Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0109-0000003 (providing for a 120-day “process institutionalization period”) 

[hereinaft er Catastrophic Incident Supplement].

54 Catastrophic Incident Supplement, Annex 1. Th e Execution Schedule varies depending on the nature of the catastrophic incident – i.e., whether it is a natural disaster, biological incident, explosion, etc. 

55 Garratt interview, Jan. 9, 2006, p. 44.

56 Jamieson interview, Dec. 20, 2005, p. 60. Asked what had happened since to the Catastrophic Incident Supplement 

since the Memorandum of Understanding had been signed on Sept. 6, 2005, Mr. Jamieson stated “I think the whole issue 

has been put on hold in terms of the revision of the NRP and whether or not what we’re doing is still relevant in the 

context of the post-Katrina environment.” See also: U.S. Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, Th e Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned. Washington: Government Printing Offi ce, Feb. 

2006, p. 163 (“our experience in Katrina suggests [the Catastrophic Incident Supplement] must now be reconsidered to 

make it more robust in ensuring the Federal assistance arrives as soon as possible.”) [hereinaft er Th e White House, Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned].

57 One possible starting point for such planning may be the 15 National Planning Scenarios which have already been developed under the auspices of the Homeland Security Council. Th e Scenarios represent a diverse array of plausible, high-consequence all-hazards events, ranging from a biological attack to a major hurricane; they are currently used as a preparedness 
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tool to help identify necessary capabilities for fi rst responders. One measure of an eff ective catastrophic plan is that it should 

be capable of addressing these or similar scenarios. See: Homeland Security Council and U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security, National Planning Scenarios, Version 20.2 Draft , Apr. 2005; U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research 

Service, Th e National Preparedness System: Issues in the 109th Congress, by Keith Bea, Mar. 10, 2005, pp. 8-10.

58 NRP, p. 7.

59 Sec. Chertoff , memorandum to various DHS offi cials, “Designation of Principal Federal Offi cial for Hurricane Katrina,” Aug. 30, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FRNT-0010-0000768 through 0000769 (“In accordance with the guidance provided in the National Response Plan (NRP), I hereby declare Hurricane Katrina an Incident 

of National Signifi cance.”).

60 Sec. Chertoff , “Press Conference with Offi cials from Homeland Security, the Environmental Protection Agency, and 

the Departments of Health and Human Services, Energy, Transportation, and Defense,” Aug. 31, 2005. http://www.dhs.

gov/dhspublic/display?content=4773. Accessed on Mar. 15, 2006 (“Th e Department of Homeland Security has declared 

this an Incident of National Signifi cance, the fi rst ever use of this designation under the new National Response Plan.”).

61 Testimony of Sec. Michael Chertoff , U.S. Department of Homeland Security, before the U.S. House, Select Bipartisan 

Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e 

Role of the Department of Homeland Security, Oct. 19, 2005. 

62 Testimony of Sec. Michael Chertoff , U.S. Department of Homeland Security, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on 

Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Homeland Security Department’s 

Preparation and Response, Feb. 15, 2006.

63 Stephan interview, Jan. 13, 2006, pp. 88-92. Mr. Wood identifi ed Scott Weber, Counselor to the Secretary, as the 

individual who he believed had inserted the language about an Incident of National Signifi cance into the statement. 

According to Mr. Wood, Mr. Weber was the individual responsible for FEMA matters in the Secretary’s Offi ce. Committee staff interview of John Wood, Chief of Staff , U.S. Department of Homeland Security, conducted on Jan. 27, 2006, 

transcript pp. 34-38.

64 Stephan interview, Jan. 13, 2006, pp. 92-93.

65 NRP, p. 33.

66 Testimony of Patrick Rhode, former Acting Deputy Director and Chief of Staff , FEMA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Roles of DHS and FEMA 

Leadership, Feb. 10, 2006. Rhode stated: “I’m not certain as I sit here that I was made aware that Mr. Brown’s title as 

Director had been removed, even temporarily. I honestly can’t say that I remember hearing that. ... I’m not aware during the time of the early days of Katrina, as Brown was initially named Principal Federal Offi cer, I’m not aware of any 

additional impacts to me or how I was conducting myself in the offi ce.” Asked if he gave up his role as FEMA Director 

when appointed PFO, Brown replied “Great question. I don’t know. I tried not to, and I tried to keep the FCOs – I tried 

to keep them in the traditional mode of operations; you guys keep doing what you need to do, and when you have policy 

issues or questions, feed those to me, and I will just deal with those, and the same with the NRCC. Everybody just keep 

operating as you think we normally should, and I’ll just try to deal with this PFO designation on my own.” He also stated 

that no one asked him to relinquish his role as Director of FEMA. Source: Committee staff interview of Michael Brown, 

former Director, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 23, 2006, transcript p. 75. When asked whether Michael Brown’s designation 

as PFO was consistent with his remaining director of FEMA, Robert Stephan, who led DHS’s development of the NRP, 

stated “Well you could remain director of FEMA, but you would have had to have passed of the duties associated with 

being the director of FEMA to whoever his deputy was, so that Michael Brown could have focused exclusively on the 

duties as principal Federal offi cial.” Source: Stephan interview, Jan. 13, 2006, p. 123.

67 Committee staff interview of Michael Jackson, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, conducted 

on Jan. 27, 2006, transcript pp. 49-50. When asked about the NRP and whether Brown was not supposed to continue on 

as Director of FEMA aft er being named PFO, Jackson stated: “Th ere is this unique relationship ... between the FEMA 

Director managing an event like this and a PFO managing an event like this in which their existing organizational and 

legal responsibilities are aligned very directly and where there is really, it seems to me, not the inherent confl ict that 

might be anticipated by some portion of this text with a diff erent fact set.” 

68 Questions for the Record of Sec. Michael Chertoff , U.S. Department of Homeland Security, for the U.S. Senate, 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Homeland Security 

Department’s Response, Feb. 15, 2006, p. 8.

69 69 FEMA Operations Center, e-mail to Michael Brown and others, Sept. 1, 2005, 9:07 p.m. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates no. DHS 003140; “Swarm of Small Earthquakes Shakes Calif,” Th e Associated Press, Sept. 1, 2005.

70 NRP, p. 34.

71 Brown interview, Jan. 23, 2006, p. 132. Vice Adm. Th ad Allen, who replaced Brown as PFO, also had not participated in 

the requisite PFO training prescribed by the NRP. However, Vice Adm. Allen’s many years of experience in response eff orts 

with the Coast Guard makes his lack of specifi c PFO training far less troubling. Vice Adm. Allen interview, Feb. 3, 2006, p. 5.

72 Stephan interview, Jan. 13, 2006, p. 105. Stephan nonetheless declined to criticize the decision to make Allen simultaneously PFO and the FCO of three states, stating “if that’s what [Admiral Allen] said needed to be done and the 

Secretary supported him . . . the dumbest thing I ever did would be to second-guess that.”

73 One expert noted to Committee staff that “only a lawyer” would look at the NRP-CIA, even without the Catastrophic 
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Incident Supplement, and not recognize it as an excellent tool for an emergency response manager to create a “sense of 

urgency.” Committee staff interview of Chuck Mills, Vice President, Emergency Management Services International, 

Inc., conducted on Feb. 14, 2006 (untranscribed). Mills is a 30-year veteran and Type-I Incident Commander with the 

U.S. Forest Service.

74 NRP-CIA, p. CAT–1; NRP, p. 43.

75 NRP, p. 43; NRP-CIA, p. CAT–1.

76 NRP-CIA, p. CAT–1.

77 For an example of the tone set by the NRP-CIA, see Chapters 13 and 24, describing how, even in the absence of the 

formal activation of the Catastrophic Incident Annex, offi cials at the Department of Health and Human Services invoked 

the Annex in requesting assistance from the Department of Defense and in “leaning forward” to begin to deploy signifi -

cant medical assets in anticipation of the needs on the Gulf Coast.

78 NRP-CIA, pp. CAT–1 through CAT–3 (recognizing that “[t]he response capabilities and resources of the local jurisdiction . . . may be insuffi cient and quickly overwhelmed. Local emergency personnel who normally respond to incidents 

may be among those aff ected and unable to perform their duties.”).

79 NRP-CIA, p. CAT–4.

80 NRP-CIA, p. CAT–2.

81 NRP-CIA, p. CAT–4.

82 Sec. Chertoff , House Select Committee hearing, Oct. 19, 2005. 

83 Two days before landfall, David Garratt, the Deputy Director of FEMA’s Recovery Division and the chair of the Catastrophic Incident Planning Group charged with developing the Catastrophic Incident Supplement, told Janet Benini, a 

former Homeland Security Council offi cial who had worked with him to develop the Catastrophic Incident Supplement, 

that he had heard no talk activating of the NRP-CIA. David Garratt, e-mail to Janet Benini, Aug. 27, 2005, 12:36 p.m. 

Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0096-0000395. See also: Wood interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 54-55.

84 See: Altshuler interview, Dec. 15, 2005, pp. 55-59; Wood interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 46-47; Questions for the Record 

of Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 2006, p. 3; Jamieson interview, Dec. 20, 2005, pp. 67-71. In written answers to questions posed by the Committee, Secretary Chertoff also asserted that “With regard to Katrina, the 

Department’s analysis suggests that 100% of the assets called for by the [Catastophic Incident Supplement] in the fi rst 

48 hours aft er landfall were, in fact, deployed prior to landfall.” Th erefore, the Secretary stated, “any conclusion that use 

of the CIA would have improved FEMA’s performance in Katrina is mistaken and contradicted by the facts.” Source: 

Questions for the Record of Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 2006, pp. 3-4 (emphasis in original). A 

table provided by DHS that purports to demonstrate that the requirements of the Supplement had been fully complied 

with, however, contains inaccurate entries and, with respect to certain items, is misleading in its portrayal of the extent 

of DHS’s pre-landfall eff orts as well as the diff erence implementing the Catastrophic Incident Annex (including, if available, the execution schedule in the Catastrophic Incident Supplement) might have made. 

For example, the Supplement specifi es that the Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG) is to be activated 

within 15 minutes of an incident and a PFO is to be designated within one hour; though these entries are marked as 

completed in the table submitted by DHS, in fact, as described elsewhere in this report, the IIMG was not activated nor 

the PFO designated until Tuesday, Aug. 30, the day aft er landfall. Another entry – juxtaposed against a requirement that 

DHS initiate deployment of 11 Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMATs) – indicates that 18 DMATs were “in theater” on Aug. 25, 2005; in fact, as of late on Sunday, Aug. 28, only four full DMAT teams and two partial DMAT teams 

had been pre-staged and, with the exception of one team in Baton Rouge, these DMATs were outside the aff ected states 

of Louisiana and Mississippi. In addition, in entries corresponding to the Supplement’s requirement that DHS initiate 

action to immediately deploy various quantities of everything from ice and water to tents and sleeping bags, DHS’s 

chart notes that each of these items were “loaded at Logistics Centers and available.” Such items, however, are permanently stored at such logistics centers throughout the country; their inclusion in this table therefore does not refl ect any 

action on DHS’s part in response to Katrina nor does it necessarily indicate items that were quickly transported to the 

Gulf Coast. Source: Committee staff interview of Gary Moore, Director, Logistics, FEMA, conducted on Dec. 9, 2005, 

transcript p. 10. Finally, DHS’s table does not refl ect the many actions that the Catastrophic Incident Supplement would 

have directed other agencies to undertake had it been completed and the Annex activated. 

85 NRP-CIA, p. CAT–5.

86 Catastrophic Incident Supplement, p. 1-1. 

87 Jamieson interview, Dec. 20, 2005, pp. 67-71.

88 Walker, Senate Committee hearing, Mar. 8, 2006. “Because it is possible to respond to incidents maturing to catastrophic magnitude in a more proactive manner than surprise catastrophic incidents, it does not make sense to exclude 

evolving catastrophic incidents from the scope of the annex’s coverage.” Written Statement of Walker, Senate Committee hearing, Mar, 8, 2006, p. 12.

89 NRP, p. 73. Th e NRP also explains that the Unifi ed Command “provides direct on-scene control of tactical operations 

and utilizes a NIMS ICS incident management team organization.” Source: NRP, p. 39. Th e Unifi ed Command concept 

“utilized by civil authorities is distinct from the military chain of command.” Source: NRP, p. 10.

90 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Incident Management System, Mar. 1, 2004, pp. 11-12 [hereinaft er 
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571

NIMS].

91 Th e defi ciencies in unifi ed command reported by the 9/11 Commission included the Fire Department’s inability to 

coordinate excess personnel from West Street to support Fire Chiefs that needed more personnel at the South Tower, 

and the Police department’s inability to control non-Emergency Service Unit personnel inside the towers. National 

Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Th e 9/11 Commission Report. Washington: Government 

Printing Offi ce, 2004, pp. 319-320 [hereinaft er Th e 9/11 Commission Report].

92 Th e 9/11 Commission Report, p. 321.

93 Th e 9/11 Commission Report, p. 397.

94 Th e White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5: Management of Domestic Incidents, Feb. 28, 2003.

95 Th e White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5: Management of Domestic Incidents, Feb. 28, 2003.

96 NIMS, pp. 14, 15. 

97 Th e National Incident Management System explains:

As a team eff ort, [Unifi ed Command] overcomes much of the ineffi ciency and duplication of eff ort that 

can occur when agencies at diff erent functional and geographic jurisdictions, or agencies at diff erent 

levels of government, operate without a common system or organizational framework. All agencies with 

jurisdictional authority or functional responsibility for any or all aspects of an incident and those able to 

provide specifi c resource support participate in the [Unifi ed Command] structure and contribute to the 

process of determining overall incident strategies; selecting objectives; ensuring that joint planning for tactical activities is accomplished in accordance with approved incident objectives; ensuring the integration 

of tactical operations; and approving, committing, and making optimum use of all assigned resources.

NIMS, p. 14. 

98 Th e White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5: Management of Domestic Incidents, Feb. 28, 2003. In 

2004, the 9/11 Commission recommended more specifi cally that DHS “should consider making funding contingent on 

aggressive and realistic training in accordance with incident command system and unifi ed command procedures.” Th e 

9/11 Commission Report, p. 397.

99 Th e National Response Plan is dated Dec. 2004, but was issued – i.e. released – by the Secretary of the Department of 

Homeland Security on Jan. 6, 2005. Th e NRP became eff ective upon issuance but its implementation was phased in over 

a one-year period: 

Phase I – Transitional Period (0 to 60 days): Th is 60-day timeframe was intended to provide a transitional period for departments and agencies and other organizations to modify training, designate staff -

ing of NRP organizational elements, and become familiar with NRP structures, processes and protocols. 

Day 60 was Feb. 13, 2005.

Phase II – Plan Modifi cation (60 to 120 days): Th is second 60-day timeframe was intended to provide 

departments and agencies the opportunity to modify existing federal interagency plans to align with the 

NRP and conduct necessary training. Day 120 was Apr. 14, 2005.

Phase III – Initial Implementation and Testing (120 days to 1 year): Four months aft er its issuance, 

the NRP was to be fully implemented and the Initial NRP, Federal Response Plan, U.S. Government 

Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan, and Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan 

were superseded. Other existing plans remained in eff ect, modifi ed to align with the NRP. During this 

timeframe, DHS is to conduct systematic assessments of NRP coordinating structures, processes and 

protocols implemented for actual Incidents of National Signifi cance, national-level homeland security 

exercises, and National Special Security Events. Th ese assessments are to gauge the plan’s eff ectiveness 

in meeting specifi c objectives outlined in Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5. At the end of this 

period, DHS is to conduct a one-year review to assess the implementation process and make recommendations to the DHS’ Secretary on necessary NRP revisions. Following this initial review, the NRP 

was to begin a deliberate four-year review and re-issuance cycle. Th e one-year date was Dec. 15, 2005.

NRP, ix. 

100 NRP, x.

101 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Fiscal Year 2005 Homeland Security Grant Program: Program Guidelines 

and Application Kit,” p. 49.

102 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Text of Secretary Ridge’s Letter to National Response Plan (NRP) Federal 

Departments and Agencies Regarding NIMS Implementation in FY 2005.” http://www.fema.gov/doc/nims/nrp_letter_

from_secretary_ridge.doc. Accessed on Apr. 30, 2006 (“All Federal departments and agencies are required to adopt the 

NIMS and use it in their individual domestic incident management and emergency prevention, preparedness, response, 

recovery, and mitigation activities, as well as in support of all actions taken to assist State or local entities.”).

103 Jamieson interview, Dec. 20, 2005, pp. 10-11.

104 “TOPOFF 3,” Nov. 2005, p. 1.

105 “TOPOFF 3,” Nov. 2005, pp. 1, 4.
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106 “TOPOFF 3,” Nov. 2005, p. 5.

107 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Top Offi cials 3 (TOPOFF 3) Full Scale Exercise: Quick Look Report,” 

Draft , May 26, 2005, p. 5.

108 Specifi cally, the Quick Look Report found:

• “... autonomous UCP [Unifi ed Command Post] oft en circumvented the state [Emergency Operations 

Center] EOC and the PFO highlighting the confusion at all levels regarding identifi cation and clarifi cation of roles and responsibilities.”

• “Th e UCP lost track of overall site management and personnel accountability at the site became 

inconsistent.”

• “Th e PFO worked within the framework of the unifi ed command structure however the physical 

separation of the FCO and the Secretary’s Emergency Response Team representative within the JFO 

impacted eff ective communication and coordination.”

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Top Offi cials 3 (TOPOFF 3) Full Scale Exercise: Quick Look Report,” Draft , 

May 26, 2005, p. 5. Similar defi ciencies in establishing an eff ective command had previously been observed in FEMA’s 

responses to Hurricanes Charley, Frances, and Ivan in 2004. See: William L. Carwile III, FEMA White Paper: Th e 2004 

Hurricane Season, Issues and Recommendations, Apr. 2, 2005. 

109 Th e Inspector General’s recommendations included “more emphasis on training and exercising NRP and NIMS; 

developing standard operating procedures to defi ne roles, clarifying Incident of National Signifi cance designations; 

developing systems to track and share information more openly and effi ciently.”

“TOPOFF 3,” Nov. 2005, p. 2. 

110 “TOPOFF 3,” Nov. 2005, p. 12. 

111 Written Statement of William Carwile III, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Mississippi, 

FEMA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane 

Katrina: Perspectives of FEMA’s Operations Professionals, Dec. 8, 2005, p. 3. 

112 Committee staff interview of Scott Wells, Deputy Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, 

FEMA, conducted on Nov. 14, 2005, transcript p. 224.

113 NRP, p. 29.

114 Lokey interview, Nov. 4, 2005, pp. 41-43, 128.

115 Testimony of William Lokey, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, FEMA, before the 

U.S. House, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing 

on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Louisiana, Dec. 14, 2005.

116 Committee staff interview of Col. Anthony Daskevich, U.S. Army, Louisiana Defense Coordinating Offi cer, conducted on Jan. 10, 2006, transcript p. 132. Scott Wells, the Deputy Federal Coordinating Offi cer, related how the separate 

process for requesting and deploying military resources bypassed the unifi ed command:

It was about 6:00 or 7:00 [Wednesday] morning, and [Maj. Gen. Landreneau] says, I called General 

Honore up and asked him for help. I said, what? And he said, yeah, I asked him for help. I said, you did?

And then I talked to Jeff Smith right aft er that. And I said, Jeff , he shouldn’t have done that. And he 

said, why? And I said, the state does not go to DOD directly, you’re supposed to come to Bill Lokey, to 

the FCO, we will go to DOD to get whatever support you need.

Th at breaks – that not only violates protocol, but it breaks the whole unifi ed command approach, when 

you go out to another agency and then this three star general just shows up. 

Wells interview, Nov. 14, 2005, p. 67. Lt. Col. Jacques Th ibodeaux of the Louisiana National Guard, the Joint Director 

of Military Support during Katrina, responded that aft er Lt. Gen. Honore arrived his activities at the Superdome were 

coordinated through the unifi ed command. Committee staff interview of Lt. Col. Jacques Th ibodeau, Joint Director 

of Military Support to Civilian Authorities and Branch Chief, Louisiana National Guard, conducted on Dec. 6, 2006, 

transcript pp. 267-269. 

117 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 67-68.

118 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 81; Lokey attributed these problems in part to the diffi culties in communications, 

noting “one thing that frustrated me was nobody could call the Louisiana Emergency Operations Center, but nobody 

had a problem calling the White House or their Senator’s offi ce.”

119 Testimony of William Carwile III, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Mississippi, FEMA, before 

the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Perspectives of FEMA’s Operations Professionals, Dec. 8, 2005. Carwile also noted that, as currently constructed, the NRP “calls 

for unifi ed command only at the top of a few people” but that it was his view that “unifi ed command has to go all the 

way down the structure, and we have got to be able to use State and Federal personnel to prop up local communities that 

have been totally destroyed by something like Katrina.” Carwile, Senate Committee hearing, Dec. 8, 2005. 

120 Although the lack of a communications infrastructure does not eliminate the ability to form either an Incident 

Command Post (ICP) at the local level or a Unifi ed Command at the state level, NIMS emphasizes the importance of 
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573

functioning communications infrastructure to support the overall ICS structure which in turn supports the unifi ed 

command. “On activation of a local EOC [Emergency Operations Center], communications and coordination must be 

established between the [Incident Command] or [unifi ed command] and the EOC, when they are not collocated. ICS 

fi eld organizations must also establish communications with the activated local EOC, either directly or through their 

parent organization. Additionally, EOCs at all levels of government and across functional agencies must be capable of 

communicating appropriately with other EOCs during incidents.” NIMS, pp. 26-27.

121 Written Statement of Richard Skinner, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, before the U.S. 

Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Recommendations 

for Reform, Mar. 8, 2006, p. 5.

122 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 192. At the time Katrina hit, FEMA had not yet produced an Incident Management Handbook to adapt ICS to FEMA operations. Source: Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 194; FEMA, Draft ERT-N 

Concept of Operations, June 6, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0115-0000010 through 

0000011. Lokey partially attributed the gaps in training to lack of funding. “We’ve had no training dollars. We’ve had no 

opportunity to bring the folks together.” Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 193. 

123 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 193; Wells interview, Nov. 14, 2005, pp. 225-226 (“We didn’t really have a unifi ed 

command in the EOC. Two days aft er – we didn’t have a unifi ed command in the EOC. Two days aft er, the EOC is 

getting training in ICS. Two days aft er the storm hit they had a consultant come in and show them ICS, explain ICS. In 

the middle of a catastrophic disaster. ... Th ere was no unifi ed command under the National Response Plan. Th ey didn’t 

understand it. Th ey had no idea. [State emergency management staff ] were getting training in the middle of a disaster 

response operation. ... My point is we have an architecture, we have [the] National Response Plan. Th e states agreed to 

use NIMS. Th ey agreed to ICS. What does it tell you when 2 days into a catastrophic disaster a state gets somebody in to 

explain ICS to them?”).

Although training individuals on ICS during a disaster may seem like a sign of dysfunction, in fact, William Carwile has 

subsequently recommended that staff at JFOs all receive basic ICS training as a short-term measure. When Adm. Allen 

arrived in Louisiana, he tasked one of his assistants with training those who inevitably arrived without ICS knowledge. 

See: William Carwile III, White Paper, “Th e Response and Initial Recovery to Hurricane Katrina in Mississippi: A Field 

Perspective,” Feb. 22, 2006, p. 19. Provided to Committee.

124 Wells interview, Nov. 14, 2005, pp. 225-226.

125 Tony Robinson also noted there were a number of state offi cials at the EOC who did not appear to be familiar with 

the ICS. Committee staff interview of Tony Robinson, Director, Response and Recovery Division, Region VI, FEMA, 

conducted on Nov. 15, 2005, transcript pp. 42-43. Th e DHS IG also found that Louisiana did not have suffi cient trained 

emergency management staff to be able to provide a counterpart to all federal ICS positions. U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security, Offi ce of Inspector General, “A Performance Review of FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities in 

Response to Hurricane Katrina,” Mar. 2006, p. 21. 

126 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 41-42.

127 FEMA, DHS/FEMA Initial Response Hotwash: Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, Feb. 13, 2006, p. 32.

128 Committee staff interview of William King, Branch Chief, Region V, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 17, 2006, transcript 

pp. 9-11, 95-96.

129 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 25.

130 Committee staff interview of Lucy Brooke, Emergency Management Program Specialist, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 

24, 2006, transcript p. 16. 

131 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 24-25.

132 Vice Adm. Allen interview, Feb. 3, 2006, pp. 27-29. 

133 Testimony of Scott Wells, Deputy Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, FEMA, before 

the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Perspectives of FEMA’s Operations Professionals, Dec. 8, 2005.

134 Committee staff interview of William Carwile III, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Mississippi, 

FEMA, conducted on Dec. 6, 2005, transcript p. 76. 

135 Carwile interview, Dec. 6, 2005, pp. 39, 46. 

136 Carwile interview, Dec. 6, 2005, p. 39. 

137 Committee staff interview of Robert Latham, Executive Director, MEMA, conducted on Jan. 27, 2006, transcript pp. 

149-50. Th is lack of understanding of the basic principles of the National Response Plan, ICS and the concept of unifi ed 

command surfaced during the Committee’s interview of Patrick Rhode, the Acting Deputy Director of FEMA during 

Katrina and at the same time Chief of Staff to FEMA Director Brown. During the interview, Rhode stated he believed 

“there was diffi culty in establishing a unifi ed chain of command within those early days, particularly within Louisiana.” 

In a unifi ed command involving multiple jurisdictions, however, there is no single “chain of command.” Rhode was unable to elaborate on what he meant by a “unifi ed chain of command:” 

Q. Unity of command and unity of eff ort, are you familiar with the distinction between those two 

concepts? 
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A. Maybe, not, No. 

Q. Do you know whether Louisiana, the State, at the time of the incident was trying to establish unity 

of command or unity of eff ort? Do you know in the Emergency Operations Center [whether] they were 

trying to establish a unity of eff ort or a unity of command?

A. I’m not – I’m not certain, going back to your last question, that I understand what you mean by unity 

of eff ort.

Committee staff interview of Patrick Rhode, former Acting Deputy Director, FEMA, conducted on Dec. 22, 2005, 

transcript p. 147.

138 Carwile, Senate Committee hearing, Dec. 8, 2005; Latham interview, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 92-93, 95-96.

139 Carwile, Senate Committee hearing, Dec. 8, 2005; Testimony of Robert Latham, Executive Director, MEMA, before 

the U.S. House, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of Mississippi, Dec. 7, 2005. 

140 Carwile interview, Dec. 6, 2005, p. 49. 

141 Carwile interview, Dec. 6, 2005, pp. 98-99

142 Latham interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 147.

143 Carwile interview, Dec. 6, 2005, pp. 97-98. State offi cials are sometimes reluctant to allow federal offi cials direct 

access to local offi cials and their operations. Robert Block and Amy Schatz, “Local and Federal Authorities Battle to 

Control Disaster Relief,” Th e Wall Street Journal, Dec. 8, 2005, p. A1.

144 Committee staff interview of Th omas McAllister, Director of Response and Recovery, MEMA, conducted on Jan. 27, 

2006, transcript pp. 87-90.

145 Latham interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 95.

146 Latham interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 146.

147 Latham interview, Jan. 27, 2006, p. 146.

148 See earlier discussion in this chapter.

149 Carwile interview, Dec. 6, 2005, pp. 102-104.
584
576

FEMA trailers in transit 

AP/Wide World photo
577

Chapter 28

FEMA Waste and Fraud

Poor Controls and Decisions in FEMA Spending

Besides overwhelming many government emergency-response capabilities, Hurricane 

Katrina severely aff ected the government’s ability to purchase goods and services 

and properly track and verify its costs when it contracted for them.

It takes money to prepare, respond, and recover from a disaster. As of March 8, 2006, the 

federal government has committed $88 billion to the response, recovery, and rebuilding 

eff orts for Katrina.1

 Unfortunately, not all of this money has been wisely spent. Precious 

taxpayer dollars have been lost to fraud, waste, and abuse.

Th e Committee did not specifi cally include pre- and post-Hurricane Katrina spending by 

FEMA and other federal agencies as part of its investigation. However, almost from the time 

Katrina hit, the Committee was aware of wasteful, and sometimes fraudulent and abusive, 

spending practices and fi scal decision making. Th e Committee carefully followed reports of 

wasteful spending, conducting a number of oversight activities to understand how funds were 

being spent and to encourage measures to prevent wasteful spending. Th e full Committee held 

two hearings on Hurricane Katrina spending by FEMA, and its Federal Financial Management, Government Information, and International Security Subcommittee held another.2

Wasteful Spending: Nothing New

What is particularly troubling about the wasteful practices in the wake of Katrina is the 

similarity to wasteful spending examined by this Committee in a May 18, 2005, hearing, 

“FEMA’s Response to the 2004 Florida Hurricanes: A Disaster for Taxpayers?”3

In the span of just six weeks in August and September 2004, Florida was hit by four powerful hurricanes: Charley, Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne. Parts of Florida suff ered tremendous 

devastation. More than 10 percent of the state’s housing stock was damaged or destroyed by 

the hurricanes, aff ecting more than 700,000 residents. Property damage exceeded $21 billion and 117 Floridians lost their lives. A disaster of this scale required a rapid and substantial response. FEMA distributed more than $2 billion in immediate relief to Floridians as 

they rebuilt their battered state.4

In the wake of these hurricanes, however, it became clear to the Committee that FEMA’s 

provision of assistance was marred by payments for fraudulent claims, wasteful spending, and ineff ective internal and management controls. When scarce resources are wasted, 

fraudulent claims are paid, and safeguards are ignored, there are new victims – the taxpayers. Th en Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response and Director of 

FEMA, Michael Brown, said:

Among the many challenges we face when responding to disasters, the most diffi cult oft en 

involves balancing the tradeoff between ensuring a timely and eff ective response to those in 

need, and the responsibility to protect the fi scal integrity of the program. It is a classic competing tension between the provision of immediate disaster assistance and administrative 

perfection. As you move closer to one, you move farther away from the other.5

Th e Committee rejects this argument. Saying that government cannot protect taxpayers 

while responding eff ectively to the urgent needs of disaster victims is a false dichotomy.
Chapter 28

578

Subsequent to the May 18, 2005, hearing, the Chairman and the Ranking Member of the 

Committee, Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman, sent a letter to Brown, urging FEMA to 

address some of the serious issues revealed by the 2004 Florida hurricanes.6

 In his response, 

Brown wrote, “FEMA is always seeking to improve upon its successes as well as improve 

upon other practices to best serve our stakeholders.”7

 Th is echoed his statement at the 

hearing that “We take the opportunity aft er every major disaster to review and analyze our 

performance so we can institutionalize best practices, identify issues and concerns, and correct problems, all to face the next disaster better prepared.”8

 Unfortunately, the response to 

Katrina showed that FEMA was still inadequately prepared to exercise good stewardship of 

taxpayer dollars while carrying out its mission of assisting disaster victims.

Hurricane Katrina: Same Story

On February 13, 2006, the Committee held a hearing, “Hurricane Katrina: Waste, Fraud, 

and Abuse Worsen the Disaster.”9

 Like the May 18, 2005, hearing, this one revealed that 

taxpayer dollars intended to help hurricane victims were once again being lost to waste, 

fraud, and abuse.

Th e U.S. Government Accountability Offi ce (GAO) testifi ed about its preliminary review 

of some Hurricane Katrina expenditures, recognizing that it will be many months, and 

perhaps years, before a complete assessment can be conducted. However, GAO concluded 

from its initial work that weak controls in the Individuals and Households Program (IHP) 

that provides temporary help with housing and fi nancial aid for other needs, left FEMA 

vulnerable to waste, fraud, and abuse. 

GAO testifi ed that there were fl aws, including weaknesses or outright failures of controls 

and safeguards, in the process of registering those receiving assistance under the IHP. For 

instance, GAO found that when applying for benefi ts over the Internet, applicants were 

screened by checking for valid Social Security numbers before benefi ts were approved. 

When people applied by telephone, however, FEMA did not perform this screening before 

paying initial IHP benefi ts, which allowed thousands of false and fraudulent applications. 

Of the more than 2.5 million registrations recorded in FEMA’s database, 60 percent (more 

than 1.5 million) were not subject to identity verifi cation because they were submitted via 

the telephone; some of these registrations were found to be fraudulent. 

GAO outlined several other examples of fraud, abuse, or poor management, including the 

following:

• FEMA made expedited-assistance payments to tens of thousands of individuals whose registrations contained false or duplicative information, including 

Social Security numbers that had never been issued, or had been issued to another individual, or to an individual since deceased. It is important to note that 

not all duplicate information was submitted fraudulently. GAO is continuing 

to investigate both payments resulting from individuals intentionally trying to 

defraud the government and those resulting from errors in FEMA’s system or 

registration process.

• GAO found thousands of Social Security numbers that were used on more 

than one registration associated with the same disaster. A Social Security 

number is a unique number assigned to an individual. Because individuals are 

eligible to receive disaster relief only on their primary residence, the same 

Social Security Number should not be used more than once to receive assistance for the same disaster. 
579

FEMA Waste and Fraud

• GAO found that $10 million in duplicate payments were made when 5,000 

registrants received both a debit card and a check worth $2,000 each, when 

they should have received either a debit card or a check.10

Th e Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS IG) has conducted 

oversight of Katrina response and recovery activities, and testifi ed about some specifi c examples of wasteful spending by FEMA. One of the most egregious examples presented, 

as discussed more fully below, is the purchase of approximately 25,000 manufactured homes 

that are virtually useless to Katrina victims because FEMA’s own regulations prohibit their 

installation in a fl ood plain. At the time of the hearing, at least 10,000 of these homes were 

sitting unused in Hope, AK.11 Making one bad decision aft er another, FEMA decided to 

make sure that no home had better amenities than others, so they removed some equipment, 

including microwaves and televisions. Th e DHS IG indicated that in the immediate aft ermath of Katrina, decision making was mostly reactive, lacking planning or coordination.12

Another area of waste occurred in temporarily housing evacuees in hotels. As evacuees were 

moved out of shelters, FEMA instructed hotels across the country to allow anyone with a 

driver’s license from the aff ected areas to check in and then send FEMA the bill. Th ere were 

virtually no controls in place. Th e DHS IG found hotels charging for empty rooms, individuals holding multiple rooms, hotel rooms being used as storage units for personal goods, 

individuals staying at resorts, and hotels charging rates above even the “rack rate” (the 

maximum or full price the hotel will charge for the room) – at times costing taxpayers up to 

$400 per night.13

Th e DHS IG indicated that his investigators had seen more waste in contracts than actual 

fraud at that point, but attributed this partly to the fact that FEMA was in the very early 

stages of the major contracting activity. At the time of the February 13, 2006, hearing, DHS 

had reported awarding contracts valued at over $5 billion, with other federal agencies reporting an additional $4.2 billion. Th e DHS IG indicated that the federal Inspectors General 

will continue their oversight activities through the life of these contracts.

As government agencies rushed to meet requirements in the immediate aft ermath of Katrina, they used expedited contracting methods authorized by the Federal Acquisition Regulations. Th e DHS IG found cases in which procurement personnel authorized contractors 

to begin work without a defi nitive statement of work, sometimes on a sole-source basis with 

no attempt to independently estimate costs. Some of the contractors performed the work 

effi ciently and in good faith, but some did not. Under some of the most questionable contracts, the government may have little legal recourse to recoup payments made to contractors who did not perform required work or who overcharged for work they did perform.14

On September 8, 2005, the Department of Justice established the Hurricane Katrina Fraud 

Task Force to deter, investigate, and prosecute hurricane-related fraud in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, stating “Th e message of our collective eff ort is clear: we will not tolerate this 

kind of behavior in our compassionate society. Fraud will not go unpunished.”15 U.S. Attorneys have never before implemented a “zero tolerance” policy with respect to disaster-related assistance and contracting fraud. Th e chair of the Task Force indicated that this policy 

did have an impact. She reported that individuals returned payments to FEMA or requested 

to arrange repayment plans, coincident with publicized arrests for fraud.16
Chapter 28

580

The Odyssey of the Ice

In the immediate aft ermath of a disaster, some of the commodities most in demand include 

water, food, and ice. FEMA’s problems in moving commodities are well known. In the case 

of ice, plenty of movement occurred – but not always to places one would expect.

FEMA ordered 182 million pounds of ice to respond to Hurricane Katrina. Aft er a typical 

hurricane, evacuees soon return to their homes, but may be without electric power for some 

time. Ice helps keep food and medicine cold until power is restored. Aft er Katrina, however, 

hundreds of thousands of evacuees were sent to shelters across the country and did not 

return home for days and weeks aft er the storm. Th us, the household need for ice was much 

lower in some areas than anticipated.17 While there was a severe shortage of ice in some 

aff ected areas, and many hurricane victims who remained in the area did not have access to 

ice,18 in the end FEMA had excess ice and used less than 50 percent of what it had ordered.19

Some of the ice ended up in Portland, ME – 1,600 miles from the disaster area. Th e cost of 

handling and storing the 200-plus truckloads of ice that went to Portland was approximately $275,000.20 More ice went to other distant locations around the country because FEMA 

decided it made more sense to move the ice to cold-storage facilities for use in new disasters 

than to let it melt.21 It is not clear that this was the most cost-eff ective choice, given the lack 

of planning that resulted in trucks being rerouted multiple times, and sometimes sitting idle 

for days, while costs to the government were mounting. 

On September 16, NBC News reported that it had found trucks full of ice in locations such 

as Maryland, Missouri, Georgia, and Tennessee. Some of the trucks had been driving and/or 

sitting idle with their full loads for two weeks. One truck driver reported that he had begun his 

trip in Oshkosh, Wisconsin, traveled to Louisiana, then was sent to Georgia, but was rerouted 

to South Carolina, before being sent to Cumberland, MD.22 NBC News later reported that the 

truck was then sent to Iowa, where the ice was put into cold storage.23 Th e driver reported that 

this cost taxpayers at least an extra $9,000.24 When multiplied by hundreds of truckloads that 

also took circuitous routes to cold storage, the wasted taxpayer dollars begin to add up.

Some of the ice shipped to cold-storage facilities around the country has already been used for 

other disasters. But one truckload ended up at the Reid Park Zoo in Tucson, AZ, to be enjoyed 

by the polar bears and other animals. Th e truck driver who donated the ice to the zoo did so 

aft er traveling through 22 states without delivering a single bag of ice to hurricane victims.25

No-Bid Contracts

FEMA typically has a contingency Individual Assistance Technical Assistance Contract 

(IATAC) in place to assist when disaster strikes. When Katrina hit, FEMA was “competing” 

this contract – bids had been solicited and evaluated, and contract negotiations had begun, 

but the process was not complete, so no competitively awarded IATAC was in place. Faced 

with an overwhelming demand for technical assistance, FEMA contracted with four major 

engineering fi rms to provide technical assistance to the Individual Assistance Program, 

the scope of which included “supporting staging areas for housing units (travel trailers and 

mobile homes), installation of housing units, maintenance and upkeep, site inspections and 

preparations, site restoration, group site design, group site construction, site assessments, 

property and facility management, as well as housing unit deactivation and rehabilitation.”26

One of the contracts was awarded on the basis of competition (Fluor had won, but the contract had not yet been negotiated), and the other three contracts (awarded to Shaw Group, 

Bechtel, and CH2M Hill) were awarded as letter-contracts based on FEMA’s critical need 
FEMA Waste and Fraud

581

for expedited assistance.27 Essentially, these were sole-source contracts. Each had an original 

ceiling value of $100 million, but this was raised to $500 million late in 2005.28 Th e ceiling 

on two of the contracts was raised again in early 2006.29

On October 6, 2005, Acting FEMA Director R. David Paulison pledged in a Committee 

hearing to “compete” the requirements covered by the contracts,30 holding an open competition, as normally required by federal contracting regulations, where all companies can 

compete for the work. It is generally accepted that only through full and open competition 

is the government assured of getting the best price for supplies and services. Th e Committee was disappointed that this was not done. FEMA did compete a subset of the requirements for future work, such as maintenance and deactivation of the travel trailers, but these 

awards were not made until April 2006.31 FEMA decided to allow the four contractors to 

continue work under the sole-source contracts. To respond to future disasters, FEMA offi cials have said the agency intends to competitively award a number of national IATACs 

before the 2006 hurricane season. 

Unusable Manufactured Housing

As part of its Individual Assistance Program, FEMA typically provides travel-trailers to 

house individuals whose homes have been badly damaged or destroyed while they rebuild 

or fi nd alternative housing. When Hurricane Katrina hit and FEMA realized the scope of 

temporary-housing needs, the agency began buying all of the travel trailers it could fi nd. 

Unfortunately, in this buying frenzy, FEMA purchased approximately $900 million worth 

of manufactured homes and modular homes that could not be used because FEMA’s own 

regulations do not allow for these types of homes to be placed in fl ood plains. Further, some 

of the homes purchased did not fi t FEMA’s size standards.32

Th e Committee held a hearing on the manufactured housing in Hope, Arkansas, on April 

21, 2006, and learned more about FEMA’s poor decision making and wasteful spending. 

FEMA purchased 24,967 manufactured homes and 1,295 modular homes in response to the 

need for transitional housing to assist displaced evacuees.33 However, FEMA seemingly had 

no plans for how the homes would be used when the purchases were made. FEMA issued 

a mission assignment to the U.S. Forest Service to set up eight emergency storage sites, including one in Hope, Arkansas.34 To house some of the manufactured and modular homes, 

FEMA leased a staging area at the Hope Municipal Airport at a cost of $25,000 per month

– equivalent to a rent of $300,000 per year. Th e Committee learned that prior to the lease 

with FEMA, the City of Hope had rented the same site to a hay farmer for $5,000 per year.35

As of the April hearing, there were 15,603 manufactured and modular homes as well as 

7,229 travel trailers staged at the eight emergency housing sites. While FEMA was able to 

use some of the homes in other disasters, and had plans to use more, they still had no plan 

for thousands of manufactured and modular homes. Th e Committee learned that FEMA 

had already hired sales staff to sell the homes as surplus property if they are not eventually 

used,36 but typically this type of sale recoups only pennies on the dollar.37 Th e manufactured 

and modular homes purchased represent some of the most serious waste discovered to date.

Conclusion

Th e Committee is not the only organization looking into the fraud, waste, and abuse issues 

related to Katrina. Th e DHS IG, GAO, and other federal Inspectors General are investigating these issues as well. It may well be years before the full scope of taxpayer dollars lost 
Chapter 28

582

to waste, fraud, and abuse is determined, but the preliminary fi ndings should be noted as 

the more expensive recovery and rebuilding phases proceed. New natural or man-made 

disasters are inevitable, but they need not also become fi scal disasters where taxpayer funds 

meant to provide speedy, eff ective relief are lost to fraud, waste, and abuse.

1 Th e White House, “Fact Sheet: Gulf Coast Update: Hurricane Relief, Recovery, and Rebuilding Continues,” press 

release, Mar. 8, 2006. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060308-8.html. Accessed on Apr. 21, 2006. 

2 U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Waste, Fraud, and 

Abuse Worsen the Disaster, Feb. 13, 2006; U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing 

on FEMA’s Manufactured Housing Program: Haste Makes Waste, Apr. 21, 2006; U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, and International 

Security, hearing on Katrina and Contracting: Blue Roof, Debris Removal, Travel Trailer Case Studies, Apr. 10, 2006. 

3 U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on FEMA’s Response to the 2004 

Florida Hurricanes: A Disaster for Taxpayers?, May 18, 2005.

4 Written Statement of Sen. Susan M. Collins, for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 

Aff airs, hearing on FEMA’s Response to the 2004 Florida Hurricanes: A Disaster for Taxpayers?, May 18, 2005.

5 Written Statement of Michael Brown, then-Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), for the U.S. 

Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on FEMA’s Response to the 2004 Florida 

Hurricanes: A Disaster for Taxpayers?, May 18, 2005, pp. 5-6.

6 Senators Susan M. Collins and Joseph I. Lieberman, letter to Michael Brown, July 8, 2005.

7 Michael Brown, letter to Chairman Susan M. Collins and Senator Joseph I. Lieberman, Aug. 4, 2005, p. 1.

8 Written Statement of Brown, Senate Committee hearing, May 18, 2005, p. 7.

9 U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Waste, 

Fraud, and Abuse Worsen the Disaster, Feb. 13, 2006.

10 Written statement of Gregory D. Kutz, Managing Director, Forensic Audits and Special Investigations, U. S. Government Accountability Offi ce, for the U.S. Senate, Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs Committee, hearing on 

Hurricane Katrina: Waste, Fraud, and Abuse Worsen the Disaster, Feb. 13, 2006.

11 Written Statement of Richard L. Skinner, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, for the U.S. 

Senate, Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs Committee, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Waste, Fraud, and 

Abuse Worsen the Disaster, Feb. 13, 2006, p. 7. 

12 Written Statement of Skinner, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 13, 2006.

13 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Offi ce of the Inspector General, briefi ng by Richard L. Skinner, Inspector 

General, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, given to Committee staff , Jan. 31, 2006. 

14 Written Statement of Skinner, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 13, 2006.

15 Alberto R. Gonzales, “Remarks at the Hurricane Katrina Fraud Task Force Conference,” Oct. 20, 2005. http://www.

usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2005/ag_speech_0510201.html. Accessed on Apr. 21, 2006. 

16 Written Statement of Alice S. Fisher, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Chairman, Hurricane Katrina 

Fraud Task Force, U.S. Department of Justice, for the U.S. Senate, Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs Committee, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Waste, Fraud, and Abuse Worsen the Disaster, Feb. 13, 2006.

17 “FEMA Responds to Ice Issues,” MSNBC, Oct. 11, 2005. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9665486/from/RL.1. Accessed on Apr. 19, 2006.

18 Matthew Brown, “Th e Ice Trucks Cometh to the Relief of Many; For Th ose in Th eir Homes, the Cubes are 

‘Like Gold’,” New Orleans Times-Picayune, Sept. 6, 2006, p. A06; Arnold Lindsay, “Firms Work to Relieve Scarcity 

of Ice,” Th e Clarion-Ledger, Sept. 2, 2006. http://www.clarionledger.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20050902/

NEWS0110/509020352/1260. Accessed on May 25, 2006. 

19 “FEMA Responds to Ice Issues,” MSNBC, Oct. 11, 2005. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9665486/from/RL.1. Accessed on Apr. 19, 2006.

20 Michael W. Lowder, letter to Senator Susan M. Collins, Nov. 4, 2005, p. 1.

21 “FEMA Responds to Ice Issues,” MSNBC, Oct. 11, 2005. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9665486/from/RL.1. Accessed on Apr. 19, 2006.

22 Lisa Myers and the NBC Investigative Unit, NBC News, “Th e FEMA Ice Follies: How come ice can’t effi ciently reach 

those in need?” Sept. 16, 2005. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9369937/print/1/displaymode/1098. Accessed on Apr. 19, 

2006.

23 Lisa Myers and the NBC Investigative Unit, NBC News, “Th e FEMA Ice Follies Revisited: Agency Opts to store millions of pounds for next disaster,” Oct. 11, 2005. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9665434/print/1/displaymode/1098. 
FEMA Waste and Fraud

583

Accessed on Apr. 19, 2006.

24 Lisa Myers and the NBC Investigative Unit, NBC News, “Th e FEMA Ice Follies: How come ice can’t effi ciently reach 

those in need?” Sept. 16, 2005. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9369937/print/1/displaymode/1098. Accessed on Apr. 19, 

2006.

25 Lisa Myers and the NBC Investigative Unit, NBC News, “Th e FEMA Ice Follies Revisited: Agency Opts to store millions of pounds for next disaster,” Oct. 11, 2005. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9665434/print/1/displaymode/1098. 

Accessed on Apr. 19, 2006.

26 Written Statement of Skinner, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 13, 2006, p. 12

27 Written Statement of Skinner, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 13, 2006, p. 12

28 Committee staff interview of Elaine Duke, Chief Procurement Offi cer, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, conducted on Feb. 24, 2006 (untranscribed).

29 Duke interview, Feb. 24, 2006.

30 Testimony of R. David Paulison, Acting Undersecretary of Homeland Security for Emergency Preparedness and 

Response and Acting Director, FEMA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 

Aff airs, hearing on FEMA Status Report on Recovery Eff orts in the Gulf States, Oct. 6, 2005.

31 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “FEMA, Small Business Administration Work Together to Award Hurricane 

Katrina Recovery Contracts to Small and Minority-Owned Businesses,” press release, Mar. 31, 2006. http://www.fema.

gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=24682. Accessed on May 9, 2006.

32 Skinner, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 13, 2006.

33 Testimony of Richard L. Skinner, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, before the U.S. Senate, 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on FEMA’s Manufactured Housing Program: 

Haste Makes Waste, Apr. 21, 2006.

34 Skinner, Senate Committee hearing, Apr. 21, 2006.

35 Committee staff interview of Mayor Dennis Ramsey, City of Hope, AR, conducted on Apr. 6, 2006 (untranscribed); 

Andy Davis, “Hope Airport to See 5,000 Homes Go, Rest Stay: FEMA Has Long-Term Emergency Supply Plans for Site,” 

Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, Mar. 22, 2006. Accessed on LexisNexis.

36 Written Statement of Skinner, Senate Committee hearing, Apr. 21, 2006, p. 5.

37 Skinner, Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 13, 2006.
584
585

Overview: Conclusions 

and Findings 

1. Four overarching factors contributed to the failures of Hurricane Katrina: 

(i) long-term warnings went unheeded and government offi cials neglected their 

duties to prepare for a forewarned catastrophe; 

(ii) government offi cials took insuffi cient actions or made poor decisions in the 

days immediately before and aft er landfall; 

(iii) systems on which offi cials relied to support their response eff orts failed, and 

(iv) government offi cials at all levels failed to provide eff ective leadership. 

Th ese individual failures, moreover, occurred against a backdrop of failure, over time, to 

develop the capacity for a coordinated, national response to a truly catastrophic event, 

whether caused by nature or man-made. 

2. During a catastrophe, which by defi nition almost immediately exceeds state and local 

resources and signifi cantly disrupts governmental operations and emergency services, the 

role of the federal government is particularly important. 

3. It has long been standard practice that emergency response begins at the lowest possible jurisdictional level – typically the local government, with state government becoming 

involved at the local government’s request when the resources of local government are (or 

are expected to be) overwhelmed. Similarly, while the federal government provides ongoing 

fi nancial support to state and local governments for emergency preparedness, ordinarily it 

becomes involved in responding to a disaster at a state’s request when resources of state and 

local governments are (or are expected to be) overwhelmed. Louisiana’s Emergency Operations Plan explicitly lays out this hierarchy of response.

4. While several engineering analyses continue, the Committee has found deeply disturbing 

evidence of fl aws in the design and construction of the levees protecting New Orleans. For 

instance, two major drainage canals – the 17th Street and London Avenue Canals – failed 

at their foundations. Equally troubling was the revelation of serious disagreement – still 

unresolved months aft er Katrina – among offi cials of several government entities over 

who had responsibility, and when, for key levee issues including emergency response and 

levee repair. Such confl icts prevented any meaningful emergency plans from being put in 

place and, at the time of Katrina, none of the relevant government agencies had a plan for 

responding to a levee breach.

5. Top offi cials at every level of government – despite strongly worded advisories – did not 

appear to truly grasp the magnitude of the storm’s potential for destruction before it made 

landfall. Over the weekend, there was a drumbeat of warnings: FEMA held video-teleconferences on both days, where the danger of Katrina and the particular risks to New Orleans 

were discussed; Max Mayfi eld of the National Hurricane Center called the governors of the 

aff ected states, something he had only done once before in his 33-year career; President 

Bush took the unusual step of declaring in advance an emergency for the states in the impact zone; numerous media reports noted that New Orleans was a “bowl” and could be left 

submerged by the storm; the Department of Homeland Security’s Simulation and Analysis 

i

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared
586

Group generated a report stating that the levees protecting New Orleans were at risk of 

breaching and overtopping; and internal FEMA slides stated that the projected impacts of 

Katrina could be worse than those in the “Hurricane Pam” exercise.

6. Beginning in 2004, the federal government sponsored a planning exercise with participation from federal, state, and local offi cials, based on a scenario whose characteristics foreshadowed most of Katrina’s impacts. While this hypothetical “Hurricane Pam” exercise 

resulted in draft plans beginning in early 2005, they were incomplete when Katrina hit. 

Nonetheless, some offi cials took the initiative to use concepts developed in the draft s, with 

some success in the critical aspects of the Katrina response. However, many of its admonitory lessons were either ignored or inadequately applied. 

7. Th e City of New Orleans, with primary responsibility for evacuation of its citizens, had 

language in its plan stating the city’s intent to assist those who needed transportation for 

pre-storm evacuation, but had no actual plan provisions to implement that intent.

8. Th e Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development, whose secretary had personally accepted departmental responsibility under the state’s emergency-operations plan to 

arrange for transportation for evacuation in emergencies, had done nothing to prepare for 

that responsibility prior to Katrina.

9. Some coastal towns in Mississippi went to extraordinary lengths to get citizens to evacuate, including sending people door-to-door to convince residents to move out of harm’s 

way. Th e State of Louisiana activated more than twice the number of National Guard troops 

called to duty in any prior hurricane, and achieved the largest evacuation of a threatened 

population ever to occur. Th e City of New Orleans issued its fi rst-ever mandatory evacuation order.

10. Th e U.S. Coast Guard conducted extensive planning and training for disasters, and put 

that preparation to use when disaster struck, leading to the successful and heroic searchand-rescue eff orts that saved more than 33,000 people.

11. FEMA was unprepared for a catastrophic event of the scale of Katrina. Well before 

Katrina, FEMA’s relationships with state and local offi cials, once a strength, had been 

eroded in part because certain preparedness grant programs were transferred elsewhere in 

the Department of Homeland Security; with its importance to state and local preparedness 

activities reduced, FEMA’s eff ectiveness was diminished. 

12. FEMA’s Director, Michael Brown, lacked the leadership skills that were needed for his 

critical position. Before landfall, Brown did not direct the adequate pre-positioning of critical personnel and equipment, and willfully failed to communicate with Secretary Chertoff , 

to whom he was supposed to report.

13. Th e Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leadership failed to bring a sense of 

urgency to the federal government’s preparation for Hurricane Katrina, and Secretary 

Chertoff himself should have been more engaged in preparations over the weekend before 

landfall. Secretary Chertoff made only top-level inquiries into the state of preparations, and 

accepted uncritically the reassurances he received. He did not appear to reach out to the 

other Cabinet secretaries to make sure that they were readying their departments to provide 

whatever assistance DHS – and the people of the Gulf Coast – might need.

14. Had Secretary Chertoff invoked the Catastrophic Incident Annex (CIA) of the National 

Response Plan, he could have helped remove uncertainty about the federal government’s 

need and authority to take initiative before landfall and signaled that all federal government 

Overview: Conclusions and Findings
587

agencies were expected to think – and act – proactively in preparing for and responding to 

Katrina.

15. DHS was slow to recognize the scope of the disaster or that FEMA had become overwhelmed. On the day aft er landfall, DHS offi cials were still struggling to determine the 

“ground truth” about the extent of the fl ooding despite the many reports it had received 

about the catastrophe; key offi cials did not grasp the need to act on the less-than-complete 

information that is to be expected in a disaster. DHS leaders did not become fully engaged 

in recovery eff orts until Th ursday, when, in Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson’s words, they 

“tried to kick it up a notch”; aft er that, they did provide signifi cant leadership within DHS 

(and FEMA) as well as coordination across the federal government. But this eff ort should 

have begun sooner.

16. Problems with obtaining, communicating, and managing information plagued many 

other aspects of the response as well. FEMA lacked the tools to track the status of shipments, interfering with the management of supplying food, water, ice, and other vital commodities to those in need across the Gulf Coast. So, too, did the incompatibility of the electronic systems used by federal and state authorities to manage requests for assistance, which 

made it necessary to transfer requests from the state system to the federal system manually.

17. Katrina resulted in the largest National Guard deployment in U.S. history, with 50,000 

troops and supporting equipment arriving from 49 states and four territories within two 

weeks. Th ese forces participated in every aspect of emergency response, from medical care 

to law enforcement and debris removal, and were considered invaluable by Louisiana and 

Mississippi offi cials. However, the deployments of National Guard troops were not coordinated with the federal Northern Command, which was overseeing the large-scale deployments and operations of the active-duty military.

18. While large numbers of active-duty troops did not arrive until the end of the fi rst week 

following landfall – although National Guard troops did – the Department of Defense 

(DOD) contributed in other important ways during that period. Early in the week, DOD ordered its military commanders to push available assets to the Gulf Coast. Th ey also streamlined their ordinarily bureaucratic processes for handling FEMA requests for assistance and 

emphasized movement based on vocal commands with the paperwork to follow, though 

some FEMA offi cials believe that DOD’s approval process continued to take too long. Th ey 

provided signifi cant support to search-and-rescue missions, evacuee airlift s, logistics management of buses arriving in the State for evacuation, and other matters.

19. Pervasive and widespread communications failures substantially hampered rescue and 

response eff orts.

20. Law enforcement was a problem, and was fueled by several contributing factors, including erroneous statements by top city offi cials that infl amed the public’s perception of the 

lawlessness in New Orleans. Without eff ective law enforcement, real or imagined safety 

threats interrupted virtually every aspect of the response.

21. Federal law-enforcement assistance was too slow in coming, in large part because the 

two federal departments charged under the NRP with providing such assistance – DHS and 

the Department of Justice (DOJ) – had done almost no pre-storm planning. In fact, they 

failed to determine even well into the post-landfall period which of the two departments 

would assume the lead for federal law enforcement under the NRP. As a result, later in the 

week, as federal law-enforcement offi cers did arrive, some were distracted by a pointless 

“turf war” between DHS and DOJ over which agency was in the lead. In the end, federal assistance was crucial, but should have arrived much sooner.

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared
588

22. While both FEMA and the Department of Health and Human Services made eff orts to 

activate the federal emergency health capabilities of the National Disaster Medical System 

(NDMS) and the U.S. Public Health Service, only a limited number of federal medical teams 

were actually in position prior to landfall to deploy into the aff ected area. Only one such 

team was in a position to provide immediate medical care in the aft ermath of the storm.

23. Th e Committee also identifi ed signifi cant planning failures that predated Katrina. One 

of the most remarkable stories from this investigation is the history of planning for the 

100,000 people in New Orleans believed to lack the means to evacuate themselves.

24. Almost exactly four years aft er 9/11, Katrina showed that the nation is still unprepared 

to respond to a catastrophe.

Overview: Conclusions and Findings
589

Findings 

Emergency Management Along The Gulf Coast: Federal, State, And 

Local – Louisiana 

1. First responders in Louisiana played an indispensable role in the response to Hurricane 

Katrina.

2. Th e Louisiana state government failed to provide suffi cient resources to the Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP). Its planning, preparedness and response to Katrina suff ered as a result.

3. LOHSEP failed to ensure that state agencies adequately understood their emergency-response obligations. 

Emergency Management On The Gulf Coast: State And Local 

– Mississippi

4. First responders in Mississippi played an indispensable role in the response to Katrina. 

5. Mississippi’s use of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact interstate mutual-aid arrangement was vital to its response to Hurricane Katrina. 

6. Many residents found shelter conditions quite diffi cult because of shortages of food and 

water, and sanitation problems. Th ough their challenges regarding mass care were formidable, state and local governments and the American Red Cross could have prepared better 

for a catastrophic disaster on the scale of Hurricane Katrina. In addition, state and local 

governments in Mississippi could have been better prepared to shelter the special-needs 

population on the Mississippi Gulf Coast.

Hurricane Pam: Katrina Is Predicted

7. Hurricane Pam was an elaborate planning exercise that anticipated many of the challenges of responding to Katrina. 

8. Hurricane Pam and other planning exercises put federal, state, and local offi cials on notice of the potential consequences of a hurricane of the magnitude of Katrina. 

9. Louisiana should have given greater consideration to fi lling gaps in federal funding of the 

Hurricane Pam exercise.

Legacy Effects Of Environmental, Engineering Changes 

10. Changes in Louisiana’s coastal landscape, including wetlands loss and soil subsidence, 

have made New Orleans and coastal Louisiana more vulnerable to hurricanes and may have 

contributed to damage from Hurricane Katrina. Th ese changes are in large part an unintended consequence of human activities that have altered the natural fl ow of the Mississippi 

River and other coastal processes. 

i

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared
590

11. Until addressed, the continued subsidence, loss of wetlands, and other changes to the 

coastal landscape will make New Orleans and other regions of the Louisiana deltaic plain 

increasingly vulnerable to hurricanes.

12. Th e building of the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MRGO) and the combined Gulf Intracoastal Waterway (GIWW/MRGO) channel resulted in substantial environmental damage, including a signifi cant loss of wetlands which had once formed a natural barrier against 

hurricanes threatening New Orleans from the east. 

13. MRGO and the combined GIWW/MRGO provided a connection between Lake Borgne 

and Lake Pontchartrain that allowed the much greater surge from Lake Borgne to fl ow into 

both New Orleans and Lake Pontchartrain. Th ese channels further increased the speed and 

fl ow of the Katrina surge into New Orleans East and the Ninth Ward/St. Bernard Parish, increasing the destructive force against adjacent levees and contributing to their failure. As a 

result, MRGO and the combined GIWW/MRGO resulted in increased fl ooding and greater 

damage from Hurricane Katrina. 

Levees 

14. Confusion, ambiguity, and uncertainty characterized the perceptions of the Army Corps 

of Engineers, the local levee boards, and other agencies with jurisdiction over the levee 

system of their respective responsibilities, leading to failures to carry out comprehensive 

inspections, rigorously monitor system integrity, or undertake needed repairs. 

15. Louisiana law imposes on local levee boards the responsibility to protect their respective 

jurisdictions from fl ooding and gives them extraordinary taxing authority to carry out that 

duty.

16. Congress tasked the Army Corps of Engineers with designing and constructing a levee 

system in and around New Orleans, but that responsibility does not diminish the Orleans 

Levee District’s statutory duty to protect its jurisdiction from fl ooding.

17. Th e Orleans Levee District performed modest maintenance of the levees, such as mowing the grass. Nevertheless, ambiguities, confusion, and disputes between the Orleans Levee 

District and Army Corps of Engineers over responsibility led to inadequate maintenance of 

the levee system and to a lack of eff ective emergency plans and preparations. 

18. Local levee districts, including the Orleans Levee District, did not have the engineering 

expertise or diagnostic equipment to ensure that the hurricane-protection systems provided 

the level of protection for which they were designed.

19. Th e Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development failed to fully carry out 

its responsibilities under state statutes, such as the need to: (a) train levee-board members 

and their appointed inspectors or watchmen on how to care for and inspect levees; and (b) 

review the emergency plans of local levee districts to ensure that the levee districts could 

adequately respond to emergency situations. 

20. Th e Orleans Levee District focused time, attention, and resources on business interests 

unrelated to levees, such as casinos, restaurants, a karate club, and a beautician school, to 

the detriment of fl ood protection.

21. Inspections of the Lake Pontchartrain Project administered jointly by the Army Corps 

of Engineers and the Orleans Levee District failed to ensure that the project provided the 

level of protection for which it was designed and constructed.

 Findings
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Uprepared 

591

22. Th e forensic teams investigating the fl ooding have concluded that: (a) the fl ood walls 

along the 17th Street and London Avenue Canals failed in that they did not withstand 

the forces for which they were supposedly designed or constructed; and (b) fl ooding was 

exacerbated as many levees and fl oodwalls were breached because of design and construction defi ciencies, including not having protection against the scour and erosion caused by 

overtopping.

23. In designing, constructing, and maintaining the hurricane-protection system, the Corps 

did not adequately address: (a) the eff ects of local and regional subsidence of land upon 

which the protection system was built; and (b) then-current information about the threat 

posed by storm surges and hurricanes in the region.

24. For several years, the Corps has inaccurately represented to state and local offi cials and 

to the public the level of protection that the hurricane system provided. Th e Corps claimed 

the system protected against a fast-moving Category 3 storm even though: (a) there was no 

adequate study or documentation to support this claim; and (b) information known to or 

provided to the Corps demonstrated that the claim was not accurate. 

Preparing For The Storm: State And Local Governments

25. Governor Blanco and Mayor Nagin failed to meet expectations set forth in the National 

Response Plan to coordinate state and local resources “to address the full spectrum of actions” needed to prepare for and respond to Hurricane Katrina. Funding shortages and 

inadequacies in long-term planning doomed Louisiana’s preparations for Katrina.

26. Governor Blanco submitted an inadequate and erroneous request for assistance to the 

President and generally failed to ask the federal government for suffi cient assistance before 

the storm.

27. Th e Louisiana National Guard pre-positioned too many resources at Jackson Barracks 

in the lower Ninth Ward, where many of them were lost to fl ooding.

Preparing For The Storm: Federal Government

28. DHS, the agency charged with preparing for and responding to domestic incidents, 

whether terrorist attacks or natural disasters, failed to eff ectively lead the federal response to 

Hurricane Katrina.

29. In advance of landfall, Secretary Chertoff failed to make ready the full range of federal 

assets pursuant to DHS’s responsibilities under the National Response Plan (NRP). 

30. DHS leaders failed to bring a sense of urgency to the federal government’s preparation 

for Hurricane Katrina.

31. Secretary Chertoff failed to appoint a Principal Federal Offi cial (PFO), the offi cial 

charged with overseeing the federal response under the NRP, until 36 hours aft er landfall.

32. Th e Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG), intended to coordinate the federal response to a catastrophe, was not activated until the day aft er landfall, and then added 

little value to the federal response eff ort, leaving federal agencies without an intermediate 

inter-agency dispute resolution mechanism.
592

33. Secretary Chertoff failed to activate the Catastrophic Incident Annex (CIA) of the NRP, 

which could have led to a more proactive federal response. 

34. Secretary Chertoff appointed a fi eld commander, Michael Brown, who was hostile to 

the federal government’s agreed-upon response plan and therefore was unlikely to perform 

eff ectively in accordance with its principles. Some of Secretary Chertoff ’s top advisors were 

aware of these issues but Secretary Chertoff has indicated that he was not. Secretary Chertoff should have known of these problems and, as a result, should have appointed someone 

other than Brown as Principal Federal Offi cial. 

35. Although the Hurricane Pam exercise, among other things, put FEMA on notice that 

a storm of Katrina’s magnitude could have catastrophic impact on New Orleans, Michael 

Brown and FEMA leadership failed to do the necessary planning and preparations:

a. to train or equip agency personnel for the likely needed operations;

b. to adequately prearrange contracts to transport necessary commodities;

c. to pre-position appropriate communications assets; or

d. to consult with DOD regarding back-up capability in the event a catastrophe 

materialized, among other defi ciencies. 

36. National Hurricane Center (NHC) and National Weather Service (NWS) warnings 

–including a video-conference appearance by NHC Director Max Mayfi eld – put FEMA on 

notice as of August 26, 2005, for Katrina’s catastrophic potential as the hurricane moved 

toward the Gulf Coast. DHS notifi ed the White House of that potential.

37. FEMA did not adequately pre-position critical personnel and equipment before landfall.

38. Despite pre-positioning unprecedented amounts of relief supplies, FEMA’s eff orts were 

inadequate.

39. FEMA’s inadequate preparations for Katrina were in part a consequence of insuffi cient 

long-term catastrophic planning.

40. Before landfall, it does not appear that FEMA asked the Department of Defense (DOD) 

to employ its assets. 

DHS’s Roles And Responsibilities

41. Statutory authorities and presidential directives establish the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) as the central federal entity for preparedness for and response to disasters.

42. Th e Secretary of Homeland Security has a clear duty to lead and manage the federal 

response to disasters such as Katrina. 

43. When eff ective response is beyond the capabilities of the state and the aff ected local 

governments, the Staff ord Act provides for federal assistance upon the request of the state 

and local governments.

44. Under our system of federalism, state and local governments bear the primary responsibility for responding to emergencies. As such, they generally manage the response to an 

incident in the fi rst instance. 

45. Following a catastrophic disaster, the traditional mode of operation may not work if 

state and local governments are so overwhelmed that they can’t eff ectively make specifi c 

Findings
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Uprepared 

593

requests for assistance. In such circumstances the National Response Plan’s Catastrophic 

Incident Annex provides for a more proactive federal response.

46. Th e United States Coast Guard distinguished itself during the Hurricane Katrina emergency by protecting its vessels and aircraft from the initial attack of the storm, by anticipating the critical missions it would need to conduct, by immediately moving in as soon as 

conditions allowed, and by heroically sustaining a massive eff ort that rescued more than 

33,000 people from danger of death. 

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

47. FEMA was unprepared – and has never been prepared – for a catastrophic event of the 

scale of Katrina.

48. FEMA had been operating at a more than 15 percent staff -vacancy rate for over a year 

before Katrina struck. 

49. FEMA’s senior political appointees, including Director Michael Brown and Deputy 

Director Patrick Rhode, had little or no prior relevant emergency-management experience 

before joining FEMA.

50. FEMA’s emergency-response teams were inadequately trained, exercised, and equipped. 

51. FEMA failed to adequately develop emergency-response capabilities assigned to it under 

the National Response Plan. 

52. FEMA had budget shortages that hindered its preparedness.

53. Michael Brown, FEMA’s Director, was insubordinate, unqualifi ed, and counterproductive, in that he:

a. sent a single employee, without operational expertise or equipment and from 

the New England region to New Orleans before landfall;

b. circumvented his chain of command and failed to communicate critical 

information to the Secretary; 

c. failed to deliver on commitments made to Louisiana’s leaders for buses;

d. traveled to Baton Rouge with FEMA public-aff airs and congressional-relations employees and a personal aide, and no operational experts; 

e. failed to organize FEMA’s or other federal eff orts in any meaningful way; 

and

f. failed to adequately carry out responsibilities as FEMA’s lead offi cial in the 

Gulf before landfall and when he was appointed as the Principal Federal Offi cial aft er landfall. 

Government Response: The Role Of The White House

54. Th e White House knew or should have known that Hurricane Katrina could turn into 

the long-feared “New Orleans Scenario,” and could wreak devastation throughout the Gulf 

region. Th e White House also may have been aware that FEMA was not prepared for such a 

catastrophe.
594

55. Th e President did take extraordinary steps to prepare for the storm – such as issuing 

emergency declarations in advance of landfall – but could have done more to marshal federal resources.

56. Despite receiving information from multiple sources on the extent of the damage in 

New Orleans, the White House does not appear to have been aware that levees had broken 

and the city was fl ooding on the day of the storm and, indeed, appears to have been under 

the misimpression, for some time, that the levees did not break until the day aft er Katrina 

made landfall.

57. Th e initial response to Katrina was halting and inadequate, in part due to poor situational awareness. Ultimately, the President and his team brought the full resources of the federal 

government to bear on the catastrophe.

Evacuations: Pre-Storm

58. Before landfall, Louisiana successfully evacuated people with vehicles who wanted to 

leave. 

59. Prior to Katrina, New Orleans offi cials did not fulfi ll a commitment in their emergency 

plan to provide transportation for people without vehicles.

60. Mayor Nagin wasted time in waiting to order a mandatory evacuation until Sunday 

morning, while his staff worked out details of the order that should have been settled long 

before the crisis. 

61. Th e City of New Orleans, the State of Louisiana, and the federal government failed to 

retain drivers for the pre-landfall evacuation, even though city offi cials informed state and 

federal offi cials of this need over a month before landfall.

62. Governor Blanco missed opportunities to ask the federal government to help evacuate 

New Orleans before landfall. For example, she failed to ask for transportation assistance in 

her request for an emergency declaration, which was promptly granted by the President.

63. Th e state’s lead agency for transportation, the Louisiana Department of Transportation 

and Development, failed to meet its responsibility under the state’s emergency operations 

plan as lead agency for identifying, mobilizing, and coordinating transportation to assist 

with a pre-landfall evacuation.

64. Th e Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness did not exercise suffi cient oversight to ensure that the Louisiana Department of Transportation and 

Development would fulfi ll its responsibilities under the state’s April 2005 plan.

65. Th e federal government did not engage state or local authorities about transportation 

alternatives for those lacking means for pre-landfall evacuation.

66. Th e federal government could have off ered assistance with pre-landfall evacuation without waiting for requests from state and local government.

67. Hurricane Katrina revealed that consideration of the needs of those with pets should be 

a factor in emergency planning for evacuations and sheltering.

Findings
595

Communications Voids

68. Hurricane Katrina resulted in a pervasive and widespread breakdown in communications, signifi cantly aff ecting the ability of fi rst responders and government offi cials in their 

rescue and response eff orts.

69. Th e National Communications System failed to develop plans to support fi rst-responder 

communications, assess the damage to the communications systems, and maintain awareness of the federal government’s available communications assets. Local governments either 

had inadequate plans or were unable to rapidly repair damage to their fi rst responder communications systems. 

70. Th e response to Katrina was also hampered by the lack of data interoperability – that 

is, responders’ inability to electronically share data including patient medical records and 

information needed to track missing children and adults, to coordinate search-and-rescue 

operations, and to verify eligibility for benefi ts.

71. During Katrina, many of the 911 systems citizens call fi rst during emergencies failed. 

Because of widespread destruction of call centers, many calls could not be rerouted; when 

they were rerouted, there were no systems in place to share critical data, for example, about 

the call’s point of origin. Offi cials also had no plans to provide additional 911 operators 

needed to fi eld thousands of calls for help.

72. When terrestrial-based communications networks were damaged or destroyed, some 

responders were able to use satellite phones for limited communications capabilities. For 

example, the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency provided satellite phones to all of 

its employees in the fi eld; it also had a mobile communications unit with satellite capability. 

73. Th e private sector deployed massive resources to restore their communications infrastructure, but their eff orts were hampered because (a) government did not provide repair 

workers with uniform credentials to gain access to devastated areas; (b) government sometimes diverted fuel resources needed for generators; and (c) industry was justifi ably reluctant to go into some areas without security, a principal responsibility of the government. 

Lack Of Situational Awareness

74. Michael Brown willfully failed to report key information directly to DHS leadership, 

instead reporting straight to White House offi cials. 

75. Th e Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) failed to take timely steps to create a 

system to identify and acquire all available, relevant information. 

76. Th e HSOC failed in its responsibility under the National Response Plan (NRP) to 

provide “general situational awareness” and a “common operational picture,” particularly 

concerning the failure of the levees, the fl ooding of New Orleans, and the crowds at the 

Convention Center. 

77. On the day of landfall, senior DHS offi cials received numerous reports that should have 

led to an understanding of the increasingly dire situation in New Orleans, yet they were not 

aware of the crisis until Tuesday morning. 

78. Louisiana was not equipped to process the volume of information received by its emergency operations center aft er landfall. 

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Uprepared 
596

79. Lack of situational awareness regarding the status of deliveries created diffi culties in 

managing the provision of needed commodities in Louisiana and Mississippi.

Critical Infrastructure; ESF-15, Public Affairs

80. Hurricane Katrina demonstrated that it is an enormous and complex task for government to assess damage to critical infrastructure and work with the private sector to coordinate its restoration. At the time Katrina struck, the Department of Homeland Security 

had not completed its planning and assessment work to prioritize the protection of critical 

infrastructure; this plan might have been helpful in coordinating the restoration of critical 

infrastructure. 

81. Federal and state offi cials failed to fulfi ll their responsibilities under federal and state 

plans to disseminate timely and accurate information to the public.

Search And Rescue

82. Federal, state, and local agencies rescued approximately 60,000 people in the aft ermath 

of Katrina. Of this 60,000, the Coast Guard missions alone accounted for 33,000 rescues. 

Th e Louisiana Department of Wildlife & Fisheries (W&F), along with the out-of-state agencies that assisted the Department through the EMAC process, accounted for 21,000 rescues. 

Th e Coast Guard, DOD and the National Guard conducted an extensive helicopter searchand-rescue mission. 

83. Th e NRP does not adequately address the organizational structure and the assets needed 

for search and rescue in a large-scale, multi-environment catastrophe. Under the NRP, 

Emergency Support Function 9 (ESF-9, Urban Search and Rescue) is focused on missions 

to rescue people in collapsed structures. ESF-9 gives the U.S. Coast Guard a support role 

for water rescue. However, the NRP does not provide a comprehensive structure for water 

and air rescues, which constituted a signifi cant portion of the necessary search-and-rescue 

missions in the Katrina response. 

84. Th e lack of a strategic intergovernmental plan to address search and rescue in a disaster 

environment that required tactical planning and organization, communications, air traffi c 

control, and the reception of victims, led to ineffi cient employment of resources, hazardous 

fl ight conditions, and protracted waits by victims in need of rescue. 

85. Th e City of New Orleans left the New Orleans Fire Department (NOFD) and the New 

Orleans Police Department (NOPD) unprepared to conduct water search-and-rescue missions by repeatedly denying budget requests by those departments for watercraft . Consequently, the NOFD entered Katrina with no boats, and the NOPD entered Katrina with fi ve 

boats.

86. Th e Louisiana National Guard stationed many boats and high water vehicles at Jackson 

Barracks, one of the lowest points in the city. Jackson Barracks fl ooded during Katrina and 

rendered many of these assets unavailable for search-and-rescue missions. 

87. Th e individuals working on behalf of federal, state, and local agencies to rescue victims 

worked in chaotic situations oft en at great risk to themselves. Yet search-and-rescue resources, including boats and helicopters, were insuffi cient despite their accelerated deployment through the fi rst week of landfall. 

Findings
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Uprepared 

597

88. Despite the large number of helicopters in the Gulf by the end of the fi rst week, the 

number of helicopters capable of performing search and rescue – the most critical of all 

missions – was still inadequate for the number of victims in immediate need of rescue.

89. Regarding the need for additional boats, the state asked for rubber raft s, but FEMA did 

not provide them because FEMA decided rubber raft s would not be sturdy enough to maneuver in debris-laden water. However, state offi cials disagree and believe these raft s would 

have been valuable for such things as towing groups of rescued victims behind regular 

boats. 

90. Planning and coordination by the designated lead federal and state agencies, FEMA, and 

the Louisiana Department of Wildlife & Fisheries, were inadequate and impaired the overall 

eff ectiveness of the search-and-rescue mission. 

91. Th e Hurricane Pam exercise predicted fl ooding in New Orleans and called for boat- and 

helicopter-based rescues, but emergency planners at all levels of government did not anticipate before landfall the need for large-scale rescue operations. 

92. FEMA did not equip or train its SAR teams for water search and rescue. FEMA SAR 

teams did not begin search-and-rescue missions until Tuesday morning.

93. Communications failures abounded at the local, state, and federal level, undermining 

the ability of agencies and rescuers to coordinate their work.

94. Th e Emergency Management Assistance Compact proved to be a valuable resource for 

Louisiana to obtain necessary equipment and teams. However, bureaucracy related to and 

confusion over the approval process delayed its utility to the State of Louisiana. 

95. Concerns about lawlessness forced some FEMA and NOFD search-and-rescue teams to 

pull back their operations temporarily because they lacked security.

96. Th e Department of Homeland Security was slow to deploy equipment that could have 

assisted in the response to Katrina. For example, the Department did not deploy, until 

nearly a week aft er the storm, pre-positioned equipment “pods,” each of which was capable 

of providing lifesaving equipment to 150 fi rst responders. DHS waited until at least two 

days aft er landfall to advise either Louisiana or Mississippi of their availability.

Search And Rescue For Mississippi

97. Th e number of communities and the geographic area aff ected by Katrina created manpower and logistical diffi culties for search-and-rescue operations, especially given the timesensitive nature of the work.

98. Th e amount of debris hindered search-and-rescue operations. Mississippi National 

Guard engineering unit and others oft en had to clear debris before rescuers could access 

areas to conduct operations. 

99. Th e collapse of communications along the Gulf Coast made coordination diffi cult from 

the start and presented challenges for the duration of search-and-rescue missions.

100. Despite the many challenges, search-and-rescue operations proceeded successfully 

along the Mississippi Gulf Coast, with operations beginning even before the fl ood waters 

had receded. Search-and-rescue responders and assets were eff ectively marshaled from 
598

the ranks of Mississippi communities, FEMA, EMAC states, the Coast Guard, Mississippi 

National Guard, and other sources.

Post-Landfall Evacuation

101. Th e failure to eff ect a complete pre-landfall evacuation amplifi ed the challenges of the 

post-landfall evacuation.

102. While the need for post-landfall evacuation of New Orleans was foreseeable, no level of 

government took the steps necessary to prepare for it.

103. FEMA Director Michael Brown failed to follow through on his promise to Louisiana 

offi cials to arrange for speedy delivery of buses to evacuate New Orleans.

104. Lack of communication among city offi cials resulted in the missed opportunity to use 

as many as 200 safely positioned city buses to begin the evacuation of New Orleans shortly 

aft er Katrina passed.

105. Th e Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development’s lack of preparedness 

contributed to the delay in locating in-state buses to evacuate New Orleans.

106. Delays in arranging transportation to evacuate New Orleans led to unnecessary suff ering of people stranded there.

107. Provisions for sheltering were inadequate, and the State of Louisiana was at least partially responsible.

108. Concerns about security slowed the post-landfall evacuation.

109. No level of government addressed the evacuation of the Convention Center until Friday, two days aft er large numbers of people began congregating there. 

Logistics 

110. DHS leaders knew or should have known that FEMA’s logistics system suff ered from 

signifi cant and long-standing problems, yet they did not take suffi cient steps to fi x the system. 

111. Prior to landfall, FEMA failed to pre-stage enough commodities in either Mississippi 

or Louisiana.

112. FEMA’s logistics system failed out of the box, but with revisions and assistance from 

DOD logistics specialists, the FEMA system began to improve in the second week aft er 

landfall.

113. Louisiana’s failure to adequately prioritize its requests to FEMA wasted FEMA’s time 

and limited resources.

114. Louisiana’s Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness failed to eff ectively coordinate the distribution of commodities. 

115. Th e ARF and E-Team methods by which response resources were requested were 

incompatible and ill-equipped to handle a disaster of this magnitude.

Findings
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Uprepared 

599

116. FEMA lacked the ability to track the shipment of commodities. Th e lack of visibility 

disrupted the ability to respond eff ectively to the aft ermath of Katrina. 

117. Fuel is a crucial commodity during the response to any disaster. In Katrina’s immediate aft ermath, a shortfall in the fuel supply hindered the response as early attempts to 

mitigate the disruptions appear to have been inadequate.

118. Th e Louisiana National Guard (LANG) failed to anticipate and adequately plan for the 

large-scale commodity distribution necessitated by Katrina. LANG did not have enough 

manpower and equipment available to complete its distribution mission.

119. During approximately the fi rst ten days following the storm, the federal logistics system was unable to provide the requested level of Meals Ready to Eat (MRE) rations, water, 

and ice in Mississippi. 

120. Th e commodity pipeline Florida set up to bring supplies into south Mississippi was 

crucial to alleviating additional suff ering in that area. 

121. Early in the response, Mississippi recognized how severely Katrina had disrupted the 

state’s infrastructure, and the resulting inability of many residents of south Mississippi to 

travel to the Points of Distribution to acquire life-saving supplies. Th e resulting “push” of 

supplies by the National Guard to residents was crucial to preventing additional hardship in 

south Mississippi. 

Medical Assistance

Federal

122. Th e federal government’s medical response suff ered from a lack of planning, coordination, and cooperation, particularly between the U.S. Department of Health and Human 

Services (HHS) and the Department of Homeland Security.

123. Despite its lead role as the primary agency in charge of coordinating the federal medical response, HHS did not deploy its on-scene response-coordination teams as rapidly as it 

should have, and lacked adequate emergency-coordination staff and resources.

124. Th e federal agencies involved in providing medical assistance did not have adequate 

resources or the right type or mix of medical capabilities to fully meet the medical needs 

arising from Katrina, such as the needs of large evacuee populations, and were forced to use 

improvised and unproven techniques to meet those needs.

125. Unlike Disaster Medical Assistance Teams, the U.S. Public Health Service is not organized or equipped to serve as medical fi rst responders and have no pre-established, readily 

deployable teams, personnel practices, transportation and other logistical diffi culties.

126. Although FEMA eventually deployed virtually all of its National Disaster Medical 

System resources – having started with only a single team – there was a greater need for 

such teams than could be fi lled, and those teams that did deploy experienced diffi culties in 

obtaining necessary logistical, communications, security, and management support.

127. Despite eff orts by both FEMA and HHS to activate federal emergency-health capabilities of the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) and the U.S. Public Health Service as 

Katrina approached the Gulf Coast, only a limited number of federal medical teams were 

actually in position prior to landfall to deploy into the aff ected area, of which only one (the 
600

Oklahoma – 1 Disaster Medical Assistance Team) was in a position to provide immediate 

medical care in the aft ermath of the storm.

128. Although a shipment of medical supplies was dispatched from the Strategic National 

Stockpile to Louisiana late on Sunday, August 28, in response to a last-minute request from 

the City of New Orleans, it was not possible to get it to Louisiana before landfall, and no 

other federal medical supplies were pre-positioned in the Gulf region. 

Louisiana

129. Th e State of Louisiana failed to ensure that nursing homes and hospitals were incorporated into the state’s emergency-planning process, and as a result failed to ensure that 

they had eff ective evacuation plans or were genuinely prepared to shelter their critical-care 

patients in place, causing loss of life and avoidable suff ering.

130. Louisiana failed to plan for known emergency medical-response needs, such as poststorm evacuation of patients from hospitals or moving large numbers of patients to medical-treatment facilities.

131. Louisiana State University failed to carry out its responsibilities under the state emergency-operations plan to ensure adequate emergency preparedness for health-care facilities, and the Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness failed to 

ensure that its functions were implemented. 

Public Safety And Security

132. Actual and perceived lawlessness hampered the emergency response during Katrina.

133. In statements to the media, New Orleans offi cials perpetuated unsubstantiated rumors 

about violent crimes that had not occurred.

134. Th e NOPD was overwhelmed by Katrina. Under extraordinarily diffi cult circumstances, most of its offi cers performed their duties.

135. Th e NOPD failed to adequately provision personnel or coordinate fully the pre-staging 

and pre-positioning of its assets, which reduced its eff ectiveness.

136. DHS and DOJ’s failure to understand, plan for, and implement their ESF-13 responsibilities in natural disasters prior to Katrina led to delays in providing law enforcement 

assistance. 

137. Neither DHS nor DOJ planned for or coordinated their joint ESF-13 roles and responsibilities relating to a natural disaster. 

138. Th e lack of advance planning by DHS and DOJ delayed the deployment of federal law 

enforcement into the Gulf region and New Orleans, in particular. 

139. Inadequate planning by local offi cials for the evacuation of detention facilities and the 

identifi cation of back-up facilities for new arrests contributed to the public-safety problems 

in New Orleans.

140. Th ere was insuffi cient coordination of the processes that procured and deployed National Guard and civilian law-enforcement assistance. 

Findings
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Uprepared 

601

Military Operations

Overall

141. Th e National Guard and active-duty military troops and assets deployed during Katrina constituted the largest domestic deployment of military forces since the Civil War. Th e 

National Guard and active-duty military response saved lives; provided urgent food, water, 

shelter, and medical care to many hurricane victims; and helped restore law and order, reestablish communications, and rebuild damaged roads.

142. Although the Department of Defense’s preparations for Katrina were consistent with 

its procedures and prior practices in civil-support missions, they were not suffi cient for a 

storm of Katrina’s magnitude. Additional preparations in advance of specifi c requests for 

support could have enabled a more rapid response.

143. Th e deployments of National Guard and active-duty forces were not well coordinated. 

A major cause of this was that there was no pre-existing plan or process for the large-scale 

deployment of National Guard forces from multiple states in response to a catastrophic 

disaster. NORTHCOM did not have full and timely information on the capabilities of National Guard troops deploying to the Gulf Coast. 

144. In part because of the lack of a pre-existing plan for large scale deployments, some National Guard units arrived before there was established an adequate command-and-control 

structure for the number of forces deployed, resulting in a failure to effi ciently employ all 

available troops. 

145. While some active-duty and National Guard units are designed and structured to deploy rapidly as part of their military missions, the Department of Defense is not organized, 

funded, or structured to act as a fi rst responder for all domestic catastrophic disasters. 

146. Th e dual military-command structure in Katrina exposed a fundamental tension 

– inherent in our system of government – between the principles of unity of command and 

federalism.

147. DOD has unique resources and capabilities to provide humanitarian relief in a catastrophe. FEMA’s failure to request these assets sooner delayed the Department’s delivery of 

these critical assets.

148. On the whole, the performance of the individual Coast Guard personnel, sailors, 

soldiers, airmen, and Marines – active, Guard, and Reserve – was in keeping with the high 

professional standards of the United States military, and these men and women are proud 

of their service to help the victims of this natural disaster.

Pre-Landfall Preparation

149. Th e Department of Defense prepared for Hurricane Katrina in a manner consistent 

with its interpretation of DOD’s role under the National Response Plan, which is to respond 

to requests for assistance from FEMA. However, this approach was inadequate to prepare 

for a catastrophe of the magnitude of Katrina. 

150. Th e Department of Defense’s preparations prior to landfall largely consisted of deploying Defense Coordinating Offi cers and Defense Coordinating Elements, identifying 

staging bases, identifying some assets and units for potential disaster support, participating 

in conference calls and meetings led by FEMA, monitoring the progress of the storm, and 

identifying available commodities.
602

151. Based on their previous experience in hurricanes, prior to landfall a number of commanders took additional actions to prepare assets for deployment in advance of any specifi c 

request or order for those assets. 

152. NORTHCOM and First Army commanders requested that certain DOD assets be 

identifi ed before landfall in anticipation of requirements, but the Joint Directorate of Military Support failed to respond in a timely manner.

153. Because the Department has denied the Committee access to NORTHCOM’s plans for 

its preparation for and response to domestic catastrophes, even though they are not classifi ed, the Committee was unable to assess their status and adequacy. Th e Committee has 

received directly contradictory testimony as to whether these plans are complete, so it is 

unclear to what extent the Department, especially NORTHCOM, had planned its response 

to Katrina or whether the plans would have addressed the problems of coordination identifi ed by this investigation. 

Initial Response After Landfall

154. During the initial 24 hours aft er landfall, the Department of Defense lacked timely and 

accurate information about the immediate impact of Hurricane Katrina. DOD and DHS did 

not coordinate adequately for the use of DOD assets to make such assessments during this 

period. 

155. During this initial period aft er landfall, a number of military commanders within the 

services were proactive, identifying, alerting, and positioning assets for potential response, 

prior to receiving requests from FEMA or specifi c orders. Many of these preparations 

proved essential to the overall response; however, they refl ected the individual initiative of 

various commanders rather than a pre-planned, coordinated response as is necessary for a 

disaster of this magnitude.

156. During this initial period aft er landfall, the offi ce of the Joint Director of Military Support took the position that DOD should provide support or mobilize assets only aft er DOD 

had received, evaluated, and approved a specifi c request for assistance from FEMA. As a 

result, DOD did not act quickly to process and approve the fi rst request it received from 

FEMA for two helicopters for rapid needs assessment. 

157. On Tuesday, August 30, as DOD offi cials became concerned about the extent of the 

damage, DOD prepared and mobilized many assets to be able to respond quickly to requests for assistance and provide military support to the hurricane response. Th e Acting 

Deputy Secretary of Defense gave direction that eliminated much of the internal review 

and approval process, and encouraged the deployment of assets that commanders deemed 

potentially necessary prior to receiving requests for such assets. Th e Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff provided guidance to the Service Chiefs on Tuesday to exercise their own 

judgment in pushing assets forward. Th e services followed this guidance. Some commanders moved quickly to mobilize and position assets for potential deployments in advance of 

formal requests or approvals. 

158. Not all deployments were fully coordinated among the services, NORTHCOM, and the 

Joint Task Force. NORTHCOM did not have a complete picture of the movement of troops 

and resources within its area of responsibility.

Responses to FEMA’s Requests for Assistance

159. DOD’s normal, “21 step” process for accepting assignments from FEMA to assist in 

responding to a disaster is cumbersome and unlike the processes followed by all other fedFindings
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Uprepared 

603

eral agencies. It also caused tension between DOD and FEMA and slowed certain of DOD’s 

initial eff orts in the response.

160. On Tuesday, August 30, in an eff ort to speed DOD’s response, the Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense suspended the regular approval process, including the requirement that 

formal written approval by the Secretary of Defense precede the actual execution of a mission. Following this decision, DOD appears to have responded quickly to FEMA requests 

for assistance. 

161. Despite the assignment of numerous DOD liaison offi cers, some FEMA offi cials still 

did not have a good understanding of the assets and resources that DOD could provide. 

Similarly, some FEMA offi cials did not have a good understanding of the DOD’s processes 

for responding to FEMA requests for assistance. 

162. In many instances, discussions between FEMA or DHS offi cials and DOD offi cials were 

necessary to clarify requests for assistance or to ensure that DOD would be providing the 

most eff ective resources in response to the request. Some FEMA offi cials believed that these 

discussions and DOD’s approval process took too long. 

National Guard Troop Deployments

163. Th ere is no established process for the large-scale, nationwide deployment of National 

Guard troops in response to a governor’s request for large-scale deployment of troops for 

civil support. 

164. During Katrina, neither the State of Louisiana, the State of Mississippi, nor the Emergency Management Assistance Compact was able to manage the large-scale deployments of 

National Guard troops from all 50 states and four other jurisdictions.

165. Th e National Guard Bureau solicited the rapid deployment of National Guard troops 

from all 50 states and four other jurisdictions. Although this process successfully deployed 

a large number of National Guard troops, it did not proceed effi ciently, or according to any 

pre-existing plan or process.

Federal Troop Deployments

166. Some active-duty units, including elements of the 82nd Airborne Division and the Second Marine Expeditionary Force, are maintained on alert for rapid deployment, and were 

placed on higher alert on Wednesday, August 31. Th ese forces could have deployed sooner 

into Louisiana had the President or the Department of Defense made a decision to deploy 

them. 

167. Due to the restrictions placed by the White House and DOD on the Committee’s ability to interview White House and senior civilian and military offi cials within DOD about 

deployment decisions, the Committee has been unable to conclude why the President 

ordered the deployment of federal active-duty troops on Saturday, September 3, including reasons why the President did not order the deployment of federal active-duty troops 

sooner. However, the Committee has been able to make fi ndings about DOD offi cials’ views 

on these topics. 

168. Th e deployment of National Guard forces before active-duty troops was consistent 

with the DOD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, which relies on the National Guard in the fi rst instance for civil support.

169. Th e large numbers of National Guard troops that were deploying into Louisiana were 

a major factor in the Department of Defense’s decision not to deploy additional active-duty 
604

troops prior to Saturday, September 3. DOD offi cials said that the choice to deploy National 

Guard troops fi rst was correct because the National Guard is designated as the fi rst military 

responder under the DOD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, and because National Guard forces, unlike active duty troops, are not restricted from performing 

law-enforcement duties under the federal Posse Comitatus Act.

170. Federal and state offi cials did not coordinate well the requests and consideration of 

requests for National Guard and active-duty troop deployments. Th e Governor of Louisiana 

asked for 40,000 troops, but federal offi cials did not interpret this as a specifi c request for 

active-duty troops.

171. Local, state, and federal offi cials had diff ering perceptions of the numbers of federal 

troops that would be arriving and the appropriate command structure for all troops, causing confusion and diverting attention from response activities. In Louisiana, a stronger 

unifi ed command might have avoided this confusion and diversion of attention.

Poor Controls And Decisions In FEMA Spending

172. Taxpayer dollars meant for relief and recovery were lost to waste and fraud.

173. Wasteful practices and program-control weaknesses that FEMA indicated it had 

identifi ed and was addressing aft er the 2004 Florida hurricanes were not remedied prior to 

Katrina.

174. Due to a lack of planning and preparation, much of FEMA’s initial spending was reactive and rushed, resulting in costly purchase decisions and utilization of no-bid, sole-source 

contracts that put the government at increased risk of not getting the best price for goods 

and services.

Failures In Design, Implementation, And Execution Of The National 

Response Plan

175. DHS did not eff ectively implement the National Response Plan, although it was released in January 2005 and required to be implemented in April 2005. 

176. Th e NRP lacked clarity on a number of points, including the role and authorities of 

the Principal Federal Offi cial and the allocation of responsibilities among multiple agencies 

under the Emergency Support Functions, which led to confusion in the response to Katrina. 

Plan ambiguities were not resolved or clarifi ed in the months aft er the NRP was issued, 

either through additional operational planning or through training and exercises.

177. Although DHS was charged with administering the plan and leading the response 

under it, DHS offi cials made decisions that appeared to be at odds with the NRP, failed to 

fulfi ll certain responsibilities under the NRP on a timely basis, and failed to make eff ective 

use of certain authorities under the NRP.

178. By not implementing the NRP’s Catastrophic Incident Annex (NRP-CIA) in response 

to Hurricane Katrina, the Secretary of DHS did not utilize a tool that may have alleviated 

some of the diffi culties with the federal response. Th e Secretary’s activation of the NRP-CIA 

could have increased the urgency of the federal response and led the federal government to 

respond more proactively rather than waiting for formal requests from overwhelmed state 

and local governments. 

Findings
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Uprepared 

605

179. DHS had not completed the Catastrophic Incident Supplement referred to in the 

NRP-CIA, had not engaged in adequate catastrophic planning, and had not developed 

regional or situation specifi c plans that could have improved the usefulness of the NRP in 

a catastrophe. 

180. In the absence of additional operational planning and without adequate implementation, the NRP was insuffi cient to address this catastrophic event. 

181. Th e Incident Command System doctrine includes the concept of Unifi ed Command, 

which is designed to allow all agencies with responsibility for an incident to work together 

eff ectively. It establishes a process through which strategies and objectives are determined 

collectively so that agencies under diff erent jurisdictional control can work under a single 

incident action plan toward common objectives.

182. FEMA, as well as other federal agencies, did not have an adequate number of personnel familiar with and trained in the Incident Command System and the principles of unifi ed 

command to be able to respond to a catastrophe of the magnitude of Katrina.

183. Th e Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness suff ered 

problems such as inadequate funding; not enough staff ; insuffi cient training, (demonstrated 

by the need of Louisiana offi cials to hire consultants to train EOC participants and National 

Guard members in basic NIMS ICS courses two days aft er Katrina made landfall); widespread lack of understanding of NIMS ICS and unifi ed command; an overall lack of preparation, and a lack of emergency-management capacity to respond eff ectively to Katrina. 

Together, these were the primary reasons for the failure to establish unifi ed command and 

establish an incident-command structure in Louisiana. 

184. Mississippi established a unifi ed command with FEMA, conducted joint planning prior 

to landfall, and was able to broaden the unifi ed command and establish an incident-command structure aft er a short period of chaos following Katrina.

185. Senior leaders and individuals in Mississippi with responsibilities for emergency management had been given extensive prior training on NIMS ICS, and FEMA’s senior personnel in Mississippi possessed a very high level of knowledge and understanding of NIMS ICS.

186. Where and when personnel with experience and training on NIMS ICS were in control 

with an adequate number of trained support personnel, coupled with the discipline to 

adhere to the doctrine of NIMS ICS, it made a positive diff erence in the quality and success 

of implementing an incident command structure, establishing a unifi ed command, and the 

response.
607

Recommendations

I

n the recommendations that follow, we set out seven core recommendations meant to 

help establish a sturdy underpinning for the nation’s emergency-management structure. Based on the weaknesses and challenges we uncovered in our investigation, we 

believe the core recommendations are the essential fi rst steps in the successful construction 

of an eff ective system. 

Th ese recommendations are then followed by what will be the building blocks for the structure, the more tactical actions that must be taken – by federal, state, and local governments, 

non-governmental organizations, the private sector, and individual citizens – to make the 

system strong, agile, eff ective, and robust. Th e foundation is crucial, and every building 

block we can add will make the system stronger. We believe these measures, if implemented, will signifi cantly improve the nation’s ability to prepare for and respond to disasters and 

catastrophes, providing better safety and security for our citizens.

Core Recommendations

Core Recommendation #1 – Create a New, Comprehensive Emergency-Management 

Organization within DHS to Prepare for and Respond to All Disasters and Catastrophes.

Hurricane Katrina exposed fl aws in the structure of the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that are too substantial to mend. We propose to abolish FEMA and build a stronger, more capable structure 

within DHS. Th e structure will form the foundation of the nation’s emergency-management 

system. It will be an independent entity within DHS, but will draw on the resources of the 

Department and will be led and staff ed by capable, committed individuals.

We must create a robust National Preparedness and Response Authority (NPRA) within the 

Department of Homeland Security. Th e NPRA would fuse the Department’s emergencymanagement, preparedness, and critical-infrastructure assets into a powerful new organization that can confront the challenges of natural or man-made catastrophes. It will provide 

critical leadership for preparedness and response by combining key federal personnel and 

assets, as well as federal partnerships with state and local offi cials and the private sector to 

prepare for and respond to terror attacks or natural disasters. 

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared
608

Recommendations

The NPRA Will Have the Following Characteristics:1

Distinct Entity within DHS, with Access to the Full Resources of the Department. It is essential that NPRA be located within DHS, but it should be situated as a “distinct entity” – the 

same status accorded the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Secret Service. Th e organization’s 

mission and components should also be protected from internal reorganizations or diminution by the Department.

DHS is the central agency in the federal government for protecting the nation from the effects of terrorist attacks and natural disasters, and NPRA’s mission is a necessary part 

of that. Maintaining NPRA within DHS allows the new organization to take full advantage 

of the substantial range of resources DHS has at its disposal – the Coast Guard, the 

National Communications System, SAFECOM (which provides research and support for 

interoperable communications), and one of the largest bodies of law-enforcement agents in 

National Preparedness and Response Authority

Director

National Preparedness

and Response Authority

Advisor to the President

(and the Secretary) for

national emergency

management

Direct line to the

President during

catastrophic events

President and HSC

Secretary DHS

Deputy Director Deputy Director Deputy Director

10 Regional Offices

Deputy Secretary DHS
609

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Uprepared 

any federal agency. DHS’s prevention and intelligence resources also represent potentially 

valuable assets, as more eff ective identifi cation of risks and vulnerabilities can lead to better 

and more targeted preparedness. In short, DHS has a substantially greater and wider range 

of resources that can be brought to bear on the challenge of natural or man-made catastrophes in a disaster than was or would be the case with an independent FEMA; what was 

formerly the responsibility of a small 2,500-person independent agency is now the responsibility of a 180,000 person, Cabinet-level department. 

Removing NPRA (or FEMA as it currently exists) from the Department, moreover, would 

do nothing to solve the key problems that Katrina has revealed, including a lack of resources 

and weak and ineff ective leadership. Separating NPRA from DHS could, in fact, cause new 

diffi culties, including the need to replicate a number of key functions, such as facilities to 

maintain situational awareness, in two diff erent agencies. It would also place a hardship on 

states that would have to coordinate their preparedness and response eff orts through two 

separate federal agencies. Katrina has made it clear that we need more integration in federal 

preparedness and response, not less, and that we need to eff ectively integrate, not bifurcate, 

prevention, preparedness, protection and response initiatives with state, local, and non-governmental and private-sector partners.

It is important to distinguish between preventing a terrorist attack and preventing damage 

from a terrorist attack or natural disaster. Prevention activities related directly to preventing 

a terrorist incident from occurring – largely a law-enforcement and intelligence function 

– are not included in the NPRA. Neither would be the grants that support this function.

Director with Sufficient Access and Clout. Th e Director of National Preparedness and Response should be a Level II offi cial – that is, of the same rank as the Deputy Secretary – and 

would report directly to the Secretary of DHS. Th e Director would also serve as the Advisor 

to the President for national emergency management, in a manner akin to the Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff . Th e Director would have a direct line of communication to the 

President during catastrophes. 

Th e Director should also have the political authority to direct appropriate personnel within 

DHS and in other departments and agencies of the federal government to carry out their 

assigned emergency-management responsibilities under the Staff ord Act, the National 

Response Plan (NRP), Emergency Support Functions (ESFs), and other appropriate emergency-management doctrine.

Capable and Qualified Leadership. Th ose leading NPRA should have skills commensurate 

with the organization’s critically important mission of protecting American lives and property in the event of a terrorist attack or natural disaster. Th e three Deputy Directors – for 

Preparedness and Mitigation, Response, and Recovery – would serve under the Director 

and would be Level III, Senate-confi rmed appointees. Each of the ten regional offi ces would 

be headed by a Senior Executive Service-level Regional Director qualifi ed to act as a senior 

Federal Coordinating Offi cer (FCO) to provide strategic oversight of incident management 

when needed. 

Th e Director and each of the three Deputy Directors should have signifi cant experience 

in crisis management, in addition to substantial management and leadership experience, 

whether in the public, private, or nonprofi t sector. For example, appropriate experience 

could include a military career with broad leadership experience; emergency-management 

experience and a proven track record of leading complex preparedness and response eff orts; 

or private-sector experience successfully leading a company or organization through a crisis. 
610

Recommendations

Th ose with direct technical and operational responsibilities during disasters should be 

individuals with emergency or crisis-management knowledge, training, and experience. Th e 

nation’s preparedness and response agency requires a cadre of seasoned professionals with 

knowledge of crisis management and government operations, who have exhibited leadership and commitment and will build trusted relationships with other federal agencies, state 

and local governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), volunteer organizations, 

and the private sector. 

Core Recommendation #2 – From the Federal Level Down, Take 

a Comprehensive All-Hazards Plus Approach to Emergency 

Management. 

Th e new organization should bring together the full range of responsibilities that are core 

to preparing for and responding to disasters. Th ese include the four central functions of 

comprehensive emergency management – preparedness, response, recovery and mitigation 

– which need to be integrated. Actions in recent years that removed preparedness grants 

from FEMA and separated preparedness from response weakened FEMA’s relationship 

with state offi cials and undermined its ability to utilize “the power of the purse,” in the form 

of grant funding, to encourage states to improve their preparedness and response functions. A more comprehensive approach should be restored. If NPRA is going to eff ectively 

respond to major events, for example, it needs to have been involved in the preparations 

for such events. Th e Director, moreover, must be responsible for administering and distributing preparedness grants to state and local governments and for national preparedness 

training, as these are key tools for ensuring a consistent and coordinated national response 

system.

All-Hazards Plus. NPRA would adopt an “all-hazards plus” strategy for preparedness. In 

preparing our nation to respond to terrorist attacks and natural disasters, NPRA must focus 

on building those common capabilities – for example survivable, interoperable communications and evacuation plans – that are necessary regardless of the incident. At the same time, 

it must not neglect to build those unique capabilities – like mass decontamination in the 

case of a radiological attack, or water search and rescue in the case of fl ooding – that will be 

needed for particular types of incidents.

Natural Hazards-Specific 

Capabilities

Common Emergency Management Elements

• Evacuations

• Search and Rescue

• General Medical Support

• Temporary Housing

• Food, Water, and Fuel

• Integrating Private Sector and NGO Support

• Evacuee Registration

• Communications

Terrorism-Specific 

Capabilities
611

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Uprepared 

Protect Critical Infrastructure. NPRA’s mandate would also include overseeing protection 

of critical infrastructure, such as energy facilities and telecommunications systems, both 

to protect such infrastructure from harm and to ensure that such infrastructure is restored 

as quickly as possible aft er a natural disaster or terrorist attack – an essential part of an effective response. Th e critical-infrastructure programs would work with the Department’s 

intelligence arm and other Department assets to help prevent terror attacks, and should 

establish priorities for the protection and restoration of critical infrastructure during an 

emergency and should help support restorative eff orts.

Core Recommendation #3 – Establish Regional Strike Teams and 

Enhance Regional Operations to Provide Better Coordination 

Between Federal Agencies and the States.

Most of the essential work of emergency management does not happen in Washington, 

D.C., but on the front lines, with state and local offi cials and fi rst responders having lead responsibility in a disaster. Regional offi ces – building on FEMA’s 10 existing regional offi ces 

– should play a key role in coordinating with and assisting states and localities in preparing for and responding to disasters. Regional offi ces can facilitate planning tailored to the 

specifi c risks and needs of a particular geographic area: for example, the risks faced, and the 

types of preparedness necessary, in Gulf Coast states may diff er markedly from that of cities 

along the Northeast Corridor that were attacked on 9/11, or of those areas that lie along the 

New Madrid seismic fault in the central Mississippi Valley.

Federal Strike Teams. Th e regional offi ces should provide the federal government’s fi rstline response to a disaster when a state requests assistance. A critical feature of the regional 

structure should be a robust, deployable, multi-agency Strike Team at each of the regional 

offi ces that consists of, at a minimum: a designated FCO; personnel trained in incident 

management, public aff airs, response and recovery, and communications support; a Defense Coordinating Offi cer (DCO); and liaisons to other federal agencies. Th ese regional 

Strike Teams should coordinate their training and exercises with the state and local offi cials 

and the private-sector entities they will support when disasters occur. 

Coordination and Assistance to States. Th e regional offi ces should provide coordination 

and assist in planning, training, and exercising of emergency preparedness and response 

activities; work with states to ensure that grant funds are spent most eff ectively, based on 

the specifi c risks and weaknesses identifi ed at the regional level; coordinate and develop inter-state agreements; enhance coordination with NGOs and the private sector; and provide 

personnel and assets, in the form of Strike Teams, to be the federal government’s fi rst line of 

response to a disaster.

Adequate Regional Staffing. Regional offi ces would be staff ed based on the needs in that 

region, but would likely include any or all of the following: a regional Strike Team; a dedicated staff and FCO for each state in the region; regional grants administration and oversight coordinator(s); regional and interstate planning; training, and exercise support and 

coordination offi cer(s); a federal interagency liaison; an interstate cooperation coordinator, 

designated state DCOs and National Guard liaisons; a private-sector, NGO, and volunteerorganization coordinator; mitigation specialist(s); and response-and-recovery specialist(s).

Multi-Agency Regional Efforts. Th e regional offi ces should coordinate with personnel from 

other components of DHS as well as from federal agencies outside DHS who are likely to 

be called upon to respond to a signifi cant disaster in the region, including the Coast Guard, 

and the Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS), Defense (DOD), Transportation (DOT), Justice (DOJ), and others.
612

Recommendations

Core Recommendation #4 – Build a True, Government-Wide 

Operations Center to Provide Enhanced Situational Awareness 

and Manage Interagency Coordination in a Disaster. 

During Katrina, the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) had diffi culty maintaining accurate situational awareness and failed to ensure that those in DHS’s leadership 

had an accurate picture of the situation on the Gulf Coast, particularly about the failing 

levee system in New Orleans. Currently, a multiplicity of interagency coordinating structures with overlapping missions attempt to facilitate an integrated federal response. Th ree 

of these structures – the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC), the National 

Response Coordination Center (NRCC), and the Interagency Incident Management Group 

(IIMG) – should be consolidated into a single, integrated entity – a new National Operations Center (NOC). 

Common Operating Picture. Th e NOC, housed within DHS, should include representatives 

from all relevant federal agencies. In an actual or potential disaster, the operations center 

should supply government-wide situational awareness, facilitate information sharing, and 

provide overall operational coordination through agency mission assignments and the 

NRP’s Emergency Support Function (ESF) process. All federal and relevant state and local command centers would feed relevant information to the NOC, which would develop 

a common operating picture not just for DHS, but for the entire federal government, as 

well as states and local jurisdictions involved in an incident. Th e NOC should provide for 

one clearly defi ned emergency-management line of communication from the states to the 

federal government and from the federal government to the states. DHS should work with 

the NOC to develop protocols for disseminating information on the status of relief eff orts to 

decisionmakers, responders, the private sector, and aff ected individuals.

Replace the IIMG. Th e IIMG would be disbanded and replaced by a permanent policy staff 

composed of detailees from relevant federal agencies who would conduct planning for 

emergencies and would help resolve confl icts among diff erent federal entities. Confl icts that 

could not be resolved at this level would be forwarded to higher-level agency offi cials or 

the HSC for resolution. Th e NOC would include a strong analytic team capable of sorting 

through and assessing information and determining which pieces would become part of the 

common operating picture. 

Improved Performance. To improve its performance in future disasters, the NOC should 

establish clear protocols and procedures to ensure that reports are received and reviewed, 

at appropriate levels, in a timely manner. When there is notice of a potential major disaster, 

the NOC should implement plans, including one for securing information from DOD, for 

obtaining post-disaster situational awareness, including identifying sources of information 

and data particular to the region in which the disaster may occur and, where appropriate, 

bringing in individuals with particular knowledge or expertise about that region.

Core Recommendation #5 – Renew and Sustain Commitments 

at All Levels of Government to the Nation’s Emergency 

Management System.

Commitment from State and Local Government. Although the federal government should 

play a more proactive role in responding to catastrophic events when state and local offi cials 

may be overwhelmed, states and localities will continue to provide the backbone of response 

– the fi rst response – for all disasters, catastrophic or not. State and local offi cials must take 

responsibility for their citizens’ welfare and conduct the planning, training, and exercising 

that will prepare them to meet this obligation.
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Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Uprepared 

Commitment Commensurate with the Mission. Th e importance of providing for the safety of 

American citizens in the event of a natural disaster or terrorist attack can hardly be overstated. Yet this investigation showed that FEMA did not have the resources to fulfi ll the 

mission and respond eff ectively in a catastrophic event. Resources are needed for additional 

planning, more frequent and ambitious training and exercises, enhancement of regional 

offi ces, staffi ng and preparation of regional Strike Teams, better development of a trained 

cadre of reservists, and development of new logistics capabilities. If the federal government 

is to improve its performance and be prepared to respond eff ectively to the next disaster, 

it must give NPRA – and the other federal agencies with central responsibilities under the 

NRP – the necessary resources to accomplish this. NPRA funding must be commensurate 

with the signifi cance of its mission, with assurance that those funds are well-spent.

To be full partners in the national preparedness eff ort, states and localities will need additional resources as well. Th e pattern over the last three years of steadily declining funds for 

state and local preparedness needs to be reversed. NPRA should be given suffi cient funds 

for homeland security and emergency-management grants to assist state and local governments in developing and exercising emergency plans, providing training, and attaining and 

maintaining essential capabilities, such as survivable and interoperable communications. 

But the states and localities must do their part as well. Every homeland security dollar, 

whether provided by the federal government or through state and local resources, must 

be spent only on those things that truly support the homeland-security mission. Th e new 

NPRA regional offi ces should be tasked with working with states to ensure that homelandsecurity expenditures are based on the risks and needs identifi ed for that state or locality.

Federal Commitment. Th e President, DHS, and Congress must ensure that the NPRA is 

funded, staff ed and equipped consistent with the range of risks facing American citizens. 

Th e federal government must provide protection no less robustly for all domestic hazards 

than it does for the defense from threats abroad.

Th e Administration and DHS must ensure that federal leaders understand their key responsibilities under the NRP and the resources they need to eff ectively carry out the comprehensive planning required, while also training and exercising on the National Incident 

Management System (NIMS), NRP and other operational plans. Each agency that has a 

role under an ESF, whether primary, coordinating, or supporting, should have a suffi cient 

number of full-time staff whose primary responsibilities are to prepare for executing the 

agency’s responsibilities under the ESF. Such preparedness activities should include training people who will be deployed to DHS’s operational center for disaster response or to the 

disaster scene. Th ese individuals must have suffi cient authority and experience to be able to 

effi ciently and eff ectively execute the agency’s responsibilities under the ESFs.

State and Local Advisory Council. Any attempt to develop a full-fl edged national system 

of preparedness and response must fully integrate state and local offi cials into the system. 

Th ere should be established an advisory council to NPRA made up of state and local offi -

cials and fi rst responders. Th e advisory council should play an integral role in ensuring that 

the full range of activities of the new organization – including developing response plans, 

conducting training and exercises, formulating preparedness goals, and eff ectively managing grants and other resources – are done in full consultation and coordination with, and 

take into account the needs and priorities of, states and localities.

Better Integrate Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and the Private Sector. Aft er 

Katrina struck, private companies and their employees provided important and even 

life-saving, relief to citizens across the Gulf Coast region; many other companies sought to 

off er assistance. Yet there was no system in place to eff ectively incorporate many privatesector resources into the response eff ort. Nor was there a system to effi ciently incorporate 
614

Recommendations

important contributions from faith-based and other charitable and community organizations that sought to off er assistance.

DHS and NPRA should more fully integrate the private and nonprofi t sectors into their 

planning and preparedness initiatives. Among other things, they should designate specifi c 

individuals at the national and regional levels to work directly with private-sector organizations. Where appropriate, private-sector representatives should also be included in 

planning, training, and exercises. In all cases, advance planning for how to most eff ectively 

utilize these nongovernmental resources is essential.

Core Recommendation #6 – Strengthen the Plans and Systems for 

the Nation’s Response to Disasters and Catastrophes.

Despite their shortcomings and imperfections, the NRP and National Incident Management System (NIMS), including the ESF structure that has taken years to develop, currently 

represent the best approach available to respond to multi-agency, multi-jurisdictional emergencies of any kind, and should be retained and improved. Federal, state and local offi cials 

and other responders must commit to supporting the NRP and NIMS and work together 

to improve the performance of the national emergency-management system. We must undertake further refi nements of the NRP and NIMS, develop operational plans, and engage 

in training and exercises to ensure that everyone involved in disaster response understands 

them and is prepared to carry them out.

Th e NRP should be amended to add an ESF responsible for assessing the damage to critical 

infrastructure, taking measures to mitigate the impact on the economy and national security, and restoring critical infrastructure. DHS should be responsible for leading this ESF, 

but it should have the involvement of the private sector, other federal agencies, and state 

and local governments, as appropriate.

Successfully implementing the NIMS during a disaster or catastrophe requires a true unity 

of eff ort. Katrina showed that a unity of eff ort generates much better outcomes than the lack 

thereof. Th e NRP should be strengthened to make the unity of eff ort concept very clear, so 

that everyone understands the concept and their roles in establishing unity. Th e NRP should 

clearly demonstrate the importance of establishing a unifi ed command in which the principal 

incident-management organizations – the Federal Joint Field Offi ce (JFO), the DOD Joint 

Task Force (JTF), and the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC) – are co-located where 

the Incident Command System (ICS) and ESF staff s can be fully integrated. Th e NRP should 

also be revised to further clarify the importance of integrating agencies with ESF responsibilities into the ICS, rather than their operating in “stovepipes.” Agencies should not function as 

independent “cells,” but should be represented by functional areas throughout the ICS. For 

example, agency representatives working on transportation issues should be sitting together, 

whether they are from DOT, NPRA, or DOD. Likewise, agencies supporting ESF-13 (Public 

Safety and Security), which may include the DOJ, NPRA, the Coast Guard, and the State 

Police, should all be physically located and working together in a unity of eff ort.

Th e roles and responsibilities of the Principal Federal Offi cial (PFO) and the FCO overlap and were a source of confusion during Hurricane Katrina. Th e Staff ord Act should be 

amended to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the FCO, and the NRP should be revised 

to eliminate the PFO position for Staff ord Act-declared emergencies and disasters.

DHS should work with state and local governments to clarify expectations for such governments within the NRP. For the federal response to be eff ective, all levels of government 

must follow the same game plan. Th is did not always occur in Katrina.
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Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Uprepared 

Th e Staff ord Act should be amended to address responses to all disasters and catastrophes, 

whether natural or man-made.

Core Recommendation #7 – Improve the Nation’s Capacity to 

Respond to Catastrophic Events.

As documented in this report, FEMA does not have the capacity to respond to large-scale 

disasters and catastrophes. Th e United States was, and is, ill-prepared to respond to a 

catastrophic event of the magnitude of Hurricane Katrina. Catastrophic events are, by their 

nature, diffi cult to imagine and to adequately plan for, and the existing plans and training 

proved inadequate in Katrina. Yet it is precisely events of such magnitude – where local 

responders may be rendered victims, where hundreds of thousands of citizens are rendered 

homeless and thousands may need medical attention, where normal communications 

systems may fail, and where the usual coordination mechanisms may not be available – that 

most require advance planning. As stated previously, preparation for domestic incidents 

must be done as robustly as that for foreign threats. We would not tolerate a DOD that was 

not prepared for a worst-case catastrophic attack, nor should we tolerate a FEMA that is 

unprepared for domestic catastrophes.

Catastrophic Incident Annex and Supplement. DHS should ensure that the Catastrophic 

Incident Annex (NRP-CIA) is fully understood by the federal departments and agencies 

with associated responsibilities. Th e NRP-Catastrophic Incident Supplement (NRP-CIS) 

should be clarifi ed and published, and the supporting operational plans for departments 

and agencies with responsibilities under the NRP-CIA should be completed. Th ese plans 

should be reviewed and coordinated with the states, and on a regional basis, to ensure they 

are understood, trained, and exercised prior to an emergency. In addition, ambiguities in 

the plans – such as whether commodities are to be pre-positioned to mobilization centers 

or directly to incident sites absent a state request – must be clarifi ed. Th e NRP-CIS itself 

should also be continuously reviewed and revised based upon the lessons of Katrina and 

future catastrophes.

DHS should defi ne the circumstances under which the NRP-CIA and NRP-CIS may be invoked, both for known and no-notice events. Finally, the Staff ord Act should be amended to 

more clearly refl ect the proactive responsibility of the federal government for catastrophic 

events represented in the NRP-CIA, including authorizing funding for federal agencies to 

pre-deploy necessary assets before a disaster when the NRP-CIA is activated by the Secretary or NPRA Director.

Surge Capacity. DHS must develop the national capabilities – especially surge capacity – it 

needs to respond to catastrophic disasters, ensuring it has suffi cient full-time staff , response 

teams, contracting personnel, and adequately trained and suffi ciently staff ed reserve corps 

to ramp up capabilities, as needed. Th ese capabilities must be scalable so that NPRA can 

draw on the appropriate resources from supporting ESF agencies to respond to a disaster 

regardless of cause, size, or complexity. Th e Disaster Assistance Employee (DAE) corps 

should be modifi ed/revamped so that it more closely resembles a reserve corps that can 

quickly and reliably respond with trained personnel in the case of a large-scale catastrophic 

event. Funds should be made available to ensure that these reservists receive appropriate 

and regular training, as well as adequate compensation for their time when called upon. 

DHS should investigate cross-training some of its 180,000 employees to become part of this 

reserve cadre.
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Recommendations

Building Blocks: Coordination

Reviewing, Aligning and Improving the Stafford Act, the National Response Plan, and 

the National Incident Management System

Recommendation 8: Th e NRP should be reviewed and revised to provide clear guidance 

to federal agencies and clear information to state, local, and tribal offi cials, private-sector 

organizations and non-governmental organizations, eliminating ambiguities. Th e NRP 

should be a clear and accessible document that can be readily understood by those preparing for or participating in the response to a disaster. DHS should build commitment to the 

National Incident Management System (NIMS) from federal, state, and local offi cials, and 

other responders. 

Recommendation 9: Th e Staff ord Act and the NRP should be updated to better address and 

provide guidance for short- and long-term recovery activities, so that DHS, the Executive 

Branch, and Congress are not forced to react, but will already have plans and a structure 

in place to guide short- and long-term recovery eff orts. Within the Recovery Branch of the 

new organization, there should be a long-term recovery offi ce, able to ramp up and coordinate the federal government’s long-term recovery assistance, as needed.Recommendation 

10: Th e Staff ord Act should be reviewed, and if, appropriate, amended, to provide statutory authority for committing resources and technical assistance to enable state and local 

governments and eligible non-profi ts to conduct short-term assessments and long-term 

recovery activities to meet the environmental mitigation needs of aff ected communities.

Recommendation 11: Th e scope of ESF-8 (Public Health and Medical Services), as defi ned 

in the NRP, should be expanded to clearly include the public-health and medical needs not 

only of victims of an emergency, but also those of evacuees, special-needs populations, and 

the general population who may be impacted by the event or may need to be evacuated or 

sheltered in place. Th e NRP should also clarify that responsibility for all mortuary activities, 

including collection of victims, resides with ESF-8, and appropriate mass fatality plans and 

capabilities should be developed.

Planning, Training, Exercising (39-41)

Waste/Fraud/Abuse (42-43)

Evacuation and Sheltering (44-50)

Search and Rescue (51-52)

Mitigation (53-55)

Credentialing (56-58)

Education (59-62)

Special Needs Awareness (63-64)

Military Preparations (65-72)

State and Local (73-83)

Levees (84-88)

Building the Nation’s Emergency-Management System

Coordination

Stafford Act/NRP/NIMS (8-14)

Interagency Coordination (15-22)

NGO/Private Sector Involvement (23-25)

Technological Support

Communications/Interoperability (26-31)

Information Systems (32-38)

 Readiness 

New Structure

Core Recommendations (1-4)

Commitment

Core Recommendations (5-7)
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Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Uprepared 

Recommendation 12: Th e NRP should be revised to include language assigning a single federal 

maritime-salvage coordinator who will be responsible for responses to maritime-salvage needs 

during times of national disasters (man-made or natural) and clarify federal-agency responsibilities (NPRA, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Navy, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers). 

Recommendation 13: DHS should amend the NRP to designate which agency should have 

primary responsibility for ESF-13 (Public Safety and Security) in which circumstances, and 

clarify relationships between the Senior Federal Law Enforcement Offi cial (SFLEO) designation and ESF-13 functions described in the NRP support annex. 

Recommendation 14: Th e NRP should be revised to refl ect the broad range of search and 

rescue requirements that may arise in a disaster or catastrophe. ESF-9 (currently Urban 

Search and Rescue) should be expanded to encompass the multiple environments and requirements that may arise in a disaster or catastrophe, and should designate the appropriate 

lead agency and supporting agencies, as determined by the nature of the disaster. 

Interagency Coordination

Recommendation 15: DOD and DHS should improve their coordination. 

• DOD should continue to provide experienced offi cers to assist DHS offi cials 

in the execution of their responsibilities during an incident or disaster;

• DHS and NPRA offi cials should receive better training as to the capabilities 

and authorities of DOD during an emergency; 

• DOD should streamline its existing, cumbersome process for Mission Assignments (MAs), particularly as applied in the event of a catastrophe;

• Key DOD personnel who may be called to participate in DOD’s response efforts should receive training on the NRP, NIMS, and ICS; 

• DOD should coordinate with the Secretary of DHS to develop a plan for 

commodities distribution in the event that DOD is called upon to augment 

DHS’s commodities distribution in a catastrophic event. 

• DOD and DHS should coordinate to expand the presence of DHS offi cials 

at U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and, as appropriate, U.S. Pacifi c 

Command (PACOM), and integrate DHS offi cials into NORTHCOM and 

PACOM’s planning, training, exercising, and responding to an incident or 

disaster.

• DOD and DHS should develop an inventory of assets under DOD’s control 

that are most likely to be needed in response to a disaster in order to enable 

expeditious deployment should they be required. Such assets may include, for 

example, utility and heavy-lift helicopters, medium-lift helicopters capable of 

performing search and rescue, shallow-draft boats, communications equipment, medical equipment and personnel, and engineering equipment. 

Recommendation 16: DHS and HHS should improve their coordination.

• Th e Secretary of HHS should strengthen the Department’s emergency preparedness and response organization (Offi ce of Public Health Emergency Preparedness) by giving it greater authority to coordinate and integrate programs 

across HHS that relate to emergency, bioterrorism- and public-health preparedness. In addition, the Secretary of HHS should increase the capabilities 

of the regional emergency-coordination offi cers in the fi eld and direct them to 

coordinate eff orts with the regional NPRA offi ces.
618

Recommendations

• Th e Secretary of DHS and the Secretary of HHS should enter into a formal 

memorandum of understanding between the two agencies specifi cally describing how the departments will coordinate ESF-8 (Public Health and Medical 

Services) resources on all aspects of preparedness and deployment, as well as 

clearly defi ning responsibility for logistical, security, and other support, including mortuary activities, required by health care facilities and organizations 

providing emergency medical care in a disaster or catastrophe.

• DHS, in conjunction with HHS, should develop and implement a system to 

identify, deploy and track federal public health and medical assets (human, 

fi xed, and materiel) used in preparation for or response to national disasters 

and catastrophes.

• Th e National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) is a critical medical-response 

asset whose capabilities must be increased. In particular, the Secretary of DHS 

should develop a strategic plan and a management structure that recognizes 

the unique nature of NDMS teams (i.e., highly skilled, all-volunteer staff 

and outside-sponsor relationships). Th is should include providing adequate 

resources to equip, staff , and train NDMS teams; improving transportation, 

logistics, and communications capabilities; and developing more eff ective 

management-support team capability. NDMS should remain in DHS – possibly reporting to the Chief Medical Offi cer (CMO) – but should coordinate 

closely with HHS in preparing for disaster response.

Recommendation 17: DOJ and DHS should inventory their law-enforcement assets and 

identify other available assets, including units with particular skill sets, in advance of a domestic incident. Planning for the deployment of law-enforcement personnel should include 

how to transport offi cers to the aff ected region, which may require coordination with the 

Department of Defense and the Department of Transportation. Planning also should include arrangements to provide personnel with food, sheltering, supplies, and vehicles once 

they arrive. Federal law-enforcement units should be self-sustaining so that they do not 

impose any additional burden on state and local responders.

Recommendation 18: Federal agencies and departments, including DOD, HHS, and DOJ, 

should work with DHS to create an inventory of physical and support assets within the 

agencies and departments that can be used in responding to disasters. For assets most likely 

to be used in responding to future disasters, DHS should develop pre-scripted Mission 

Assignments/Requests for Assistance (MAs/RFAs). Th e purpose of the pre-scripted MAs/

RFAs should be to expedite the submission and approval of MAs/RFAs and the provision of 

commonly requested assets and support in the event of a disaster. Th ese MAs/RFAs should 

include provisions to pre-position assets and personnel.

Recommendation 19: Th e NPRA, through the National Communications System (NCS), 

should develop a database for monitoring the inventory of all federal, including DOD and, 

where appropriate, private-sector communications equipment that can be deployed following a catastrophic incident to assist fi rst responders and restore commercial communications services. In addition, DHS should maintain an inventory of what federal resources are 

necessary to support the deployment and operation of such assets.

Recommendation 20: DHS should work with all federal departments and agencies with 

responsibilities under the NRP, including the ESFs, to pre-identify areas in policy, doctrine, 

and guidance that can be streamlined, or that provide an opportunity for regulatory fl exibility, where appropriate or necessary during a disaster or catastrophe. DHS should ensure 

that policies and procedures provide emergency-management experts suffi cient regulatory 

and policy fl exibility so that they are empowered to make decisions that are critical to a 
619

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Uprepared 

quick and eff ective response during a catastrophic event. For example, during a catastrophe, 

it may be appropriate to waive certain training requirements.

Recommendation 21: NPRA should develop data-sharing arrangements with other federal 

agencies and other appropriate organizations, prior to the next disaster, to more eff ectively 

respond to disasters, while protecting privacy and protecting against waste, fraud, and 

abuse. For example:

• A data-sharing agreement between NPRA, HHS, DOJ, and other appropriate organizations (such as the National Center for Missing and Exploited 

Children) could facilitate tracking missing children and adults and reunifying 

families separated during evacuation. Th ese data-sharing arrangements should 

have protections in place to address privacy concerns and to comply with 

child-custody agreements.

• A data-sharing agreement between NPRA and the Social Security Administration would allow NPRA to ensure that a disaster victim registering for assistance is using a valid Social Security number, helping to prevent fraudulent 

registrations.

Recommendation 22: Th e lack of easily understandable, policy-based, fi eld operations guides 

available to responders at all levels contributed to misunderstandings and ineffi ciencies, 

and degraded overall operations. DHS should develop and publish a comprehensive Federal 

Disaster Field Operations Guide and make the guide available to all federal, state, and local 

response offi cials, so that all responders are better informed of what to expect from federal 

agency operations.

NGO and Private-Sector Involvement

Recommendation 23: DHS should coordinate with the private sector and NGOs at the state, 

regional, and national level to incorporate those entities, where appropriate, into their planning, training, and exercises, to the greatest extent possible.

Recommendation 24: Th ere needs to be a balance, even in a time of disaster, between 

procuring essential goods and services and maintaining fairness and reasonableness in the 

procurement process to the extent possible. 

• Th e federal government should establish pre-negotiated contracts for priority resources prior to disasters, especially in the areas of food, water, ice, fuel 

distribution, and housing. DHS should include provisions in pre-negotiated 

contracts to provide the surge capacity needed to respond to catastrophic 

disasters.

• Th e federal government, working with the private sector, should develop 

standard-form agreements tailored for various needs to facilitate faster procurement for disaster relief operations. 

• Th e federal government should consider expanding the cooperative purchasing authority of state and local governments to use all of the General Services 

Administration (GSA) Schedules (not just Information Technology Schedule 70), for the purchase of goods and services that are designed to facilitate 

response to and recovery from a presidentially declared disaster or catastrophe. 

Under the expanded authority, state and local governments would use the 

same procedures as GSA already has adopted for IT Schedule 70 cooperative 

purchasing.
620

Recommendations

Recommendation 25: DHS should develop a policy for accepting and directing corporate inkind donations. Th e U.S. Department of State, in coordination with DHS, should develop a 

policy for accepting and directing foreign donations.

Technological Support

Communications and Interoperability

Recommendation 26: DHS should develop a national strategy, including timeframes, for 

implementing a survivable and resilient national interoperable-communications network. 

DHS should establish a plan to migrate to the use of (1) interoperable platforms for communications networks; (2) equipment that permits sharing of resources in times of crisis; and (3) 

systems to promote high-precedence data communications and interoperability during disasters so that information such as medical, victim registration, and Geographic Information 

Systems (GIS) data can be electronically shared among responders, as needed, at all levels of 

government. Th is process of developing a national strategy should recognize existing state 

plans and provide a mechanism for states to collaborate on interoperability and the ability 

to provide emergency assistance to other states through shared communications resources. 

DHS should condition the award of grants for public-safety communications equipment 

on their being used to purchase interoperable communications systems that operate under 

open-architecture standards developed by the SAFECOM unit within DHS. 

Recommendation 27: Th e NPRA, through the regional Strike Teams, should coordinate with 

NCS, state-level ESF-2 (Communications) agencies, and private-sector partners to be prepared to deploy in an emergency to facilitate reestablishment of public and private communications systems that work across jurisdictions. Th is should be done with the recognition 

that maintaining and/or reestablishing communications capabilities is critical to an eff ective 

emergency response. Although most of the physical damage to telecommunications equipment may occur in a central area, it can adversely aff ect large portions of the surrounding 

areas. DHS should take a lead role to facilitate and encourage cooperation among local jurisdictions to address mutual restoration and redundant routing that will help create a more 

resilient network to aid public-safety fi rst responders.

Recommendation 28: DHS should strengthen its mobile emergency-response teams’ (now 

incorporated into the regional Strike Teams) ability to provide communications support 

during disasters. DHS should acquire and position at regional offi ces mobile-communications suites or caches of secure, interoperable emergency-communications equipment and 

systems that can be deployed when normal land line, mobile, and radio systems are disrupted or destroyed, as does the National Interagency Fire Center.

Recommendation 29: Th e NPRA, through NCS, should work with all communications 

providers to encourage development of and adherence to best practices to ensure reliability 

in the event of a disaster, or quick restoration of services and facilities in the event service is 

disrupted. Th ese best practices should address, among other things, (1) maintaining service 

during extended commercial power outages through the use of back-up generators and 

equipment; (2) building communications towers, transmitters, and repeaters to withstand a 

severe storm; and (3) implementing regional, interoperable communications networks that 

would increase the survivability of communications by allowing fi rst responders’ radios to 

operate via towers in a neighboring jurisdiction that survived the disaster. DHS and state 

and local governments should develop plans for better direct, redundant lines of communications between the emergency-operations centers used by all levels of government.
621

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Uprepared 

Recommendation 30: States should be encouraged to purchase communications systems 

such as satellite phones that can operate when land-based infrastructures are damaged or 

destroyed.

Recommendation 31: DHS should work with state and local offi cials to encourage 911 call 

centers to develop plans to route calls to other centers in case the center is not functional 

and should encourage the inclusion of 911 communicators in Emergency Management Assistance Compacts (EMACs).

Information Systems

Recommendation 32: DHS should adopt a common computer-soft ware standard for use by 

all federal and state entities involved in incident management that will serve as the information architecture for shared situational and operational awareness. Based on this standard, 

the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) may be improved, or a new system 

may need to be developed. Th e system might include a Geographic Information System capability to support functions such as tracking commodities, Search and Rescue (SAR), and 

status of evacuation shelters, among others. 

Recommendation 33: DHS should refi ne and streamline the Action Request Form (ARF) 

system (through which state and local governments request disaster-related assistance from 

the federal government) and work with state and local governments to ensure that federal 

and state systems are compatible and provide for seamless interfacing.

Recommendation 34: DHS should complete and/or adopt technology and informationmanagement systems to eff ectively manage disaster-related activities. DHS should develop 

an effi cient ordering system that minimizes delays and provides order-status visibility and 

accurate, timely commodity tracking, and a transportation protocol that moves commodities and resources directly from the supplier to the usage area. 

Recommendation 35: Th e states, in coordination with DHS, DOJ, HHS and other appropriate agencies and organizations, should establish evacuee-registration systems to facilitate reunifi cation of family members separated as a result of a disaster or catastrophe. DHS should 

work with the states to encourage development of systems that can share data across states, 

including the use of a model intake form with standard information to be collected.

Recommendation 36: Given the importance of providing as much warning as possible to 

coastal populations in the event of a major hurricane, the National Oceanographic and 

Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the National Hurricane Center (NHC) should 

review their protocols for issuing hurricane advisories and related forecast products to 

ensure that critical information is made available to the public as soon as possible, in a form 

that is as complete and understandable as possible. Further, NOAA and the NHC should 

identify any technical or resource constraints that limit their ability to do so.

Recommendation 37: Because storm surge is historically the most deadly element in major 

hurricanes, NOAA and the NHC should examine the use of additional forecasting models, 

such as the Advanced Circulation Model (ADCIRC) sponsored by the U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers (the Corps), to provide additional confi dence and perspective to their periodic modeling and publication of storm-surge projections and pre-landfall storm-surge 

forecasts, as is currently done for forecasting hurricane intensity and track. As part of this 

review, the NHC should also reexamine its practice of making pre-landfall storm-surge 

forecasts for major hurricanes no earlier than 24 hours before landfall.

Recommendation 38: NOAA, utilizing expertise within the NWS, the NHC, and the National 

Geodetic Survey, should routinely revise its models and published impacts of hurricane 
622

Recommendations

storm-surge projections to take into account changes in modeling and forecasting technology and regional conditions, such as regional subsidence, loss of coastal wetlands, and 

sea-level rise. Changes in projected impacts as a result of such revisions should be clearly 

documented and published.

Readiness

Planning, Training, and Exercising

Recommendation 39: DHS should ensure that the NRP becomes more than just words on 

paper – it must be operationalized if it is to be eff ectively executed in response to disasters 

and catastrophes. In doing so, DHS should direct all federal departments and agencies with 

responsibilities in the NRP, including DOD, in the completion of a coordinated, operational, federal disaster-response plan that is then exercised, with lessons learned incorporated 

into a revised plan. DHS should simultaneously coordinate with the states to ensure that 

the states’ emergency-response plans are aligned with the NRP, including ESF responsibilities, to the highest degree possible and exercised, with lessons learned incorporated into a 

revised plan, and should provide necessary support for any additional planning required to 

achieve this level of preparedness. DHS should lead an eff ort, coordinated with the states, 

to develop response plans for specifi c geographic regions and for specifi c types of high-risk 

events that will augment the NRP and provide additional operational detail.

Recommendation 40: Federal departments and agencies with responsibilities under the NRP 

should be required to conduct exercises to ensure that their plans are continually revised 

and updated. Th e exercises should include broad, all-encompassing federal disaster and 

catastrophic exercises. DHS, in conjunction with DOD, other federal agencies, and state and 

local participants should stage exercises simulating a large-scale catastrophe to improve the 

training for all personnel, familiarize responding agencies with one another’s personnel and 

capabilities, address issues of command and control, and improve the working relationships 

between DHS and other response agencies. 

Recommendation 41: Emergency agencies at the federal, state, and local levels of government, as well as fi rst-responder groups outside of government, should receive regular 

training on NRP and NIMS, integrating the ESF structure, including statutorily required exercises and simulations to expose unaddressed challenges, provide feedback about progress, 

and maintain pressure to improve. Th ese exercises and simulations should be objectively 

assessed by an independent evaluator. DHS should consider tying future cost-share requirements for preparedness grant funds to performance and results of these exercises.

Protecting Against Waste, Fraud, and Abuse

Recommendation 42: Fraud related to disaster assistance and contracting is not tolerable. 

DHS should work with DOJ and other federal agencies to ensure that a cooperative eff ort is 

made to investigate and prosecute fraud. DHS should also strengthen controls on the Individuals and Households Program (IHP), and other programs where appropriate, to reduce 

fraud and abuse, while continuing to off er speedy assistance and relief to the true victims of 

a disaster.

Recommendation 43: In a disaster where the government is entering into contracts and 

other procurement vehicles (grants, cooperative agreements, direct purchase orders, etc.) 

quickly and with expedited procedures and oversight, it is all the more important that the 

agencies making these procurements be thoroughly committed to full transparency. Th is 

transparency must occur from the outset so that waste, fraud, abuse, or simple mismanagement or ineffi ciency can be identifi ed before additional fi nancial liability is incurred by the 
623

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Uprepared 

taxpayers. Th ere is no federal dollar that is spent on disaster relief and recovery for which 

the government is not accountable to taxpayers. DHS should:

• Ensure that NPRA has suffi cient contracting staff to handle the fl ow of 

disaster assistance and should identify and train procurement staff from other 

agencies who can provide additional surge capacity.

• Develop procurement plans, based on past experience, for a variety of disaster scenarios and use those plans as a guide in future disasters so that spending 

is not simply reactive.

• Engage in more rigorous procurement planning and execution to ensure that 

one or more competitively awarded technical-assistance contracts are always in 

place.

• Improve acquisition-process accountability post-disaster, discouraging and 

strictly reviewing sole-source and no-bid contracts (where necessary), as well 

as reviewing purchase decisions by the government that appear excessive, 

unwise, or poorly managed.

• Make non-proprietary information related to disaster-related procurements 

available to the general public in an easily accessible format. 

Evacuation and Sheltering

Recommendation 44: As the primary federal agency under ESF-1 (Transportation), the 

Department of Transportation, in coordination with DHS, should:

• Develop plans to assist in conducting mass evacuations when an eff ective 

evacuation is beyond the capabilities, or is likely to be beyond the capabilities, of the state and aff ected local governments. DOT should develop plans 

to quickly deploy transportation assets to an area in need of mass evacuation. 

DHS should, in coordination with DOT, assist state and aff ected local governments in evacuating populations when requested.

• In coordination with the states, plan, train, and exercise for evacuations 

including medical patients and others with special needs, in coordination 

with other relevant federal agencies, the American Red Cross, and state and 

local partners. DOT should consider using a variety of transportation modes, 

including air medical services.

• Work with state and local emergency planners – in particular, state and 

local agencies charged with ESF-1 responsibilities – to help them assess the 

resources needed to assist with evacuations, those that are locally available, and 

what shortfalls exist; determine unique geographical/demographic obstacles to 

evacuation in particular areas; and develop catalogues of regionally available 

evacuation-related assets, including transit agencies from various municipalities.

• Establish liaisons with ESF-6 (Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services) to 

coordinate sheltering destinations for evacuees from various areas, and work 

with ESF-13 (Public Safety and Security) to ensure that air, bus, and other 

transportation providers have appropriate security escorts to ensure safety during evacuation activities.

Recommendation 45: All evacuation plans must provide for populations that do not have 

the means to evacuate. DHS and DOT should make available assistance to state and local 

governments for developing plans to ensure that the nation’s most vulnerable citizens are 

not left behind in a disaster.
624

Recommendations

Recommendation 46: DHS should support state and local governments in planning, training, and exercising evacuation plans and ensure that these plans address the challenges 

posed by evacuating hospitals, nursing homes, and individuals with special needs. 

Recommendation 47: DHS, in conjunction with HHS, DOD, the U.S. Department of Veterans Aff airs (VA), and state and local partners in the patient-movement system, should 

develop a specifi c concept of operations (CONOP), training and outreach programs, and 

patient triage and tracking capabilities to execute domestic patient movement/evacuations 

utilizing the NDMS patient-movement capability. Non-governmental emergency-response 

and emergency-management entities, including private air medical services, should be integrated into the planning and response process.

Recommendation 48: DHS and DOT should support state and local governments in developing evacuation plans that prevent, to the extent practicable, families being separated from 

one another during an evacuation and that facilitate rapid reunifi cation in the event that 

families are separated.

Recommendation 49: DHS should coordinate with DOT to annually evaluate state evacuation plans, as well as evacuation plans for large urban areas.

Recommendation 50: DHS should encourage individuals, and state and local governments 

to plan for evacuating and sheltering pets.

• Due to various health, safety, and other concerns, pets may be separated from 

their owners during transportation or sheltering. State and local agencies should 

work with animal-welfare organizations to develop procedures for animal identifi cation and processing to facilitate the return of the pets to their owners.

• State and local agencies should establish memorandums of understanding 

with animal- welfare organizations to ensure their assistance with the transport, sheltering, and rescue of pets. 

• State and local evacuation plans should include consideration of transportation and sheltering of pets owned by residents in need of transportation or 

shelter themselves.

Search and Rescue

Recommendation 51: Signatory agencies to the National Search and Rescue Plan should 

develop a comprehensive plan for search and rescue in a multi-environment disaster. Th e 

plan should provide for a unifi ed coordination structure, with subordinate coordination of 

air, land, and water-borne assets, and should establish the means for obtaining the necessary 

assets and personnel. Th e plan should also provide for a unifi ed communications network, a 

common grid-reference system, and standardized procedures and methods for utilizing and 

sharing local situational awareness acquired by search and rescue operational units. 

Recommendation 52: Policies, plans, and procedures, as defi ned by the National Search and 

Rescue Plan, need to be incorporated into personnel recovery training at the operational 

and strategic levels of NORTHCOM and, as appropriate, PACOM, so that DOD can more 

eff ectively participate in future domestic mass-rescue operations.

Mitigation

Recommendation 53: In order to protect coastal areas from becoming increasingly 

vulnerable to damage from hurricanes, ecological-restoration eff orts must be integrated 

into hurricane protection in a comprehensive manner that addresses the root causes of 

ongoing ecological and geological processes, such as the loss of coastal wetlands and regional subsidence.
625

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Uprepared 

Recommendation 54: Future decision making regarding the Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet 

(MRGO) and other navigation channels should recognize, account for, and mitigate not 

only the direct role that navigation channels can play in increasing, speeding, or transferring storm surges, but also the impact of the channels on wetland loss and the coastal environment, and the resulting long-term implications for hurricane vulnerability.

Recommendation 55: DHS, with the participation of the Corps, the U.S. Department of the 

Interior, NOAA, and other relevant agencies, should establish an interagency review board, 

including state and local offi cials, to examine the level of vulnerability of communities located in fl oodplains and coastal regions to hurricanes and fl oods, and specifi cally examine the 

adequacy of existing and planned fl ood and hurricane protection for levees and fl ood-control structures, the contribution of environmental and ecological conditions, and the impact 

of non-structural programs, such as the federal fl ood-insurance program and pre- and postdisaster mitigation programs.

Credentialing

Recommendation 56: DHS should ensure that all federal emergency-response personnel 

from federal departments and agencies with responsibilities under the NRP have a standard 

credential (a Red Card system) that details the emergency-management positions the person is qualifi ed for based on measurable criteria, performance, objectives and standards so 

that they may easily integrate into emergency response operations. DHS should coordinate 

with state governments to ensure that all state emergency-response personnel from departments and agencies with responsibilities under the state emergency-response plan, and 

volunteers, also have a standard credential based on the same credentialing system.

Recommendation 57: HHS, in conjunction with DHS, should lead a federal, state, and local 

initiative to roster and credential, in a centralized or linked manner, medical personnel and 

volunteers (National Disaster Medical System, Medical Reserve Corps, U.S. Public Health 

Service, etc.) to ensure that in case of national emergencies, properly qualifi ed medical providers are quickly identifi ed and are able to gain appropriate access to the aff ected area.

Recommendation 58: Private-sector telecommunications, utility, critical infrastructure, and 

other private entities should be included in emergency-response planning and be assured 

appropriate access to disaster areas to repair critical infrastructure and restore essential services. DHS should coordinate with federal, state, local, and other emergency management 

offi cials to develop a standardized national credential that would allow emergency management professionals, fi rst responders, and other response personnel from the private sector 

access to disaster areas, as appropriate.

Professional and Public Education

Recommendation 59: DHS should, during the transition to the NPRA organizational structure, conduct an agency-wide training assessment (inventory) of the current state of capabilities to meet the FEMA/NPRA mission. Based on this assessment, DHS should develop and 

implement strategies, including appropriate incentives and rewards, to recruit, retain, and 

build a cadre of trained, practiced, and experienced professional emergency-response professionals; develop career paths that reward and promote individuals who have served in multiple state and federal agencies with emergency-management responsibilities; and, as part of 

the NPRA career track, require all personnel to engage in continuous learning and education.

Recommendation 60: DHS should establish and maintain a Homeland Security Academy to:

• Develop and provide a course of instruction on Homeland Security matters, 

including the nation’s emergency-preparedness and response system, to meet 

the specifi c needs of political offi cials (Cabinet offi cials, agency heads, gover-
626

Recommendations

nors, mayors, and other federal, state and local offi cials) who must provide 

leadership during emergency-response operations; and

• Develop and provide a course of instruction, and maintain a Web-based 

“lessons recognized-lessons learned” and best-practices program that can be 

accessed by emergency-management professionals at the federal, state, and 

local levels.

Recommendation 61: DHS should strengthen and expand the Emergency Management 

Institute’s (EMI) courses for emergency-management personnel. In order to reach the widest audience, EMI should develop “train the trainer” courses to expedite building a cadre of 

emergency-management experts around the country. Course schedules should be designed 

around the heaviest emergency “seasons,” so that experienced instructors are available to 

teach the courses.

Recommendation 62: DHS should develop and implement a comprehensive strategy to 

develop a culture of preparedness in America. DHS should coordinate with state and local 

offi cials to ensure that emergency plans are community-based and include outreach and 

education to the public, through community and faith-based organizations and other institutions to promote individual preparedness based on the risks in their communities. Th is 

information should be widely distributed in languages appropriate to the relevant constituencies.

Special Needs Awareness 

Recommendation 63: DHS should ensure and direct that all federal departments and agencies with responsibilities under the NRP, including the ESFs, take into consideration the 

special needs of persons with physical, mental, and other disabilities, the most vulnerable 

and those least able to help themselves, in their response and recovery plans. DHS should 

coordinate with state and local governments to ensure that their response and recovery 

plans also address persons with special needs. 

Recommendation 64: DHS should coordinate with the private sector and NGOs, including 

the American Red Cross, to ensure that the response and recovery plans of those participating in emergency-preparedness and response operations take into consideration the special 

needs of persons with physical, mental, and other disabilities.

Military Preparations

Recommendation 65: DOD should continue to provide the Commander, U.S. Northern 

Command (NORTHCOM) and, as appropriate, the Commander, U.S. Pacifi c Command 

(PACOM), with authority to assign DCOs and Defense Coordinating Elements, and identify staging bases as necessary and prudent, to provide anticipated support for a domestic 

emergency or catastrophe. DOD should expand this authority to include the ability to deploy pre-packaged or pre-identifi ed basic response assets (such as helicopters, boats, medical supplies and personnel, food and water, and communications equipment). DOD should 

develop procedures and guidelines for pre-positioning assets. 

Recommendation 66: DOD should make the position of DCO in NPRA regional offi ces a 

full-time assignment for senior offi cers. Th e DCO should receive training and education on 

DOD’s role under the NRP, and should coordinate closely with DHS, NORTHCOM, and 

PACOM, as appropriate, and state offi cials in plans, training, and exercises. 

Recommendation 67: NPRA should work with DOD and the state governors to assist them 

in developing an integrated plan for the deployment of National Guard units and personnel in state status when large-scale military support is requested by a state to respond to a 

catastrophic incident or disaster. Th e plan should include a process for identifi cation of Na-
627

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Uprepared 

tional Guard units with the capabilities required to respond to the incident or disaster, and 

should take into account the availability of National Guard units for mobilization for national-defense missions. Th e plan should include expedited procedures for requesting and 

approving federal funding under Title 32, United States Code, for National Guard forces 

employed in accordance with the plan, and procedures for DOD and the governors, during a catastrophe, to coordinate the process of matching units and capabilities of National 

Guard forces with the requirements of the governors. Th e integrated plan should ensure 

that there is suffi cient command and control and reception, staging and onward integration 

capability for any such large-scale National Guard deployment.

Recommendation 68: In developing a federal catastrophic-disaster response plan, DHS 

should work with DOD to develop a plan for the employment of active-duty units and personnel when wide-scale military support is requested by a state or ordered by the President 

to respond to a catastrophic incident or disaster. Th e plan should include a process for identifi cation of active-duty units with the capabilities required to respond to the incident or 

disaster, include planning for reception, staging and onward integration of the active-duty 

forces and commodities distribution, and should, via the National Guard Bureau, take into 

account the availability and capability of National Guard units. 

Recommendation 69: DHS, DOD, and the states should develop detailed operational plans 

for Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) missions, including specifi c plans for 

response to hurricanes, wildfi res, earthquakes, pandemics, and other natural disasters.

Recommendation 70: DOD and the States should develop the systems and processes of 

communication, coordination, and command and control, to ensure unity of eff ort when 

National Guard and Title 10 forces are deployed in integrated disaster-response missions.

Recommendation 71: NORTHCOM and the National Guard Bureau should coordinate to 

expand the presence of the National Guard Bureau at NORTHCOM and integrate National 

Guard Bureau offi cials into NORTHCOM’s planning, training, exercising, and responding 

to an incident or disaster. 

Recommendation 72: DOD should require that offi cers selected for general-offi cer or fl ag 

rank are trained on the NRP, NIMS, ICS, and DOD’s Defense Support to Civil Authorities 

(DSCA) missions. 

State and Local Preparations

Recommendation 73: At least annually, state emergency-preparedness offi ces should audit 

plans of agencies with ESF responsibilities under the state’s emergency-operations plan to 

ensure they: (1) take an all-hazards approach to emergency management; (2) comprehensively address the agency’s ESF responsibilities; (3) are up-to-date; and (4) include provisions for regular training and exercising. Governors should require their state emergencypreparedness offi ces to then report to them the state of the emergency-preparedness offi ce, 

all supporting agencies, and the state emergency-operations plan. Th e audit should review, 

at a minimum:

• Realistic, comprehensive evacuation plans to provide for the safety of the 

state’s population in a disaster, especially those who lack their own transportation or have physical, mental, or other disabilities;

• Th e staffi ng needs of agencies with emergency-operations responsibilities and 

long-range plans to attract and maintain qualifi ed staff ;

• Laws, regulations, and plans to ensure clear responsibilities for ordering 

evacuations and to address liability issues that may be impediments to evacuation orders;
628

Recommendations

• Laws, regulations, and plans that clarify the governor’s authority to assume 

control of emergency response where local governments’ response capabilities 

are signifi cantly damaged;

• Pre-contracting for emergency supplies to address needs of shelters in disaster-stricken areas; plans for sheltering and then evacuating people who have 

remained in an area struck by a disaster; and evaluations of the capacity, suitability, and structural strength of shelters in the state; 

• Plans for alternative means of distributing commodities in situations where 

distribution through central distribution points may not be possible;

• Plans that outline resource needs, such as volunteers for emergency support 

functions, transportation providers, and medical supplies, and where they will 

be obtained when disaster strikes;

• Plans under ESF-9 (Urban Search and Rescue) of the state emergency operations plan, to ensure there is appropriate equipment and resources, based on 

the state’s terrain and risks, to eff ectively carry out this function; and

• Plans for ensuring the protection of vital records, whether paper or electronic, such as property titles, court-case fi les, and driver’s license and voter 

information.

Recommendation 74: States should coordinate with the NPRA to assess or upgrade their 

logistics-management capabilities and address any asset-tracking defi ciencies. 

Recommendation 75: States should coordinate through the NPRA regional offi ces to develop 

plans adequate to address shelter needs in a catastrophe or when needs exceed a state’s 

capacity. 

Recommendation 76: State and local governments should review and resolve, to the extent 

possible, legal and operational issues incident to the issuance of evacuation orders, and 

should be prepared to issue a mandatory-evacuation order quickly in the event of a disaster.

Recommendation 77: States with high-risk urban areas should develop multi-phased evacuation plans that provide for the speediest evacuation of residents most at risk, particularly 

those who lack the means to evacuate on their own. States with high-risk urban areas should 

consider whether a contrafl ow plan is advisable, and if so, should develop agreements with 

bordering states to secure their participation in the contrafl ow plan. Neighboring political 

entities should work together to coordinate evacuation plans in advance, and state and local 

governments should publicize their evacuation plans and ensure that citizens are familiar 

with one or more evacuation options. States whose location puts them at high risk of recurring hurricanes and tropical storms should use updated storm-surge estimates to establish 

evacuation zones and evacuation-clearance times. States whose locations put them at risk of 

other types of natural disasters should evaluate those risks and consider evacuation zones 

and clearance times in line with them.

Recommendation 78: States should develop estimates of populations that will require shortterm sheltering in the event of a catastrophic event. Th is estimate should particularly focus 

on special-needs populations. In consultation with NPRA, states should then develop plans 

for providing shelter for these estimated populations. Such plans should include a way to 

create a voluntary database of people in the shelters so victims can be accounted for. States 

should develop a catastrophic medical-response plan that is integrated with its evacuation 

and shelter plan and documents the availability of nurses and health-care professionals with 

emergency medical and trauma training in the state.
629

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Uprepared 

Recommendation 79: States should establish neighborhood pre- and post-disaster information centers at schools, shopping centers, places of worship, and other community institutions, to provide information on evacuations and the location of disaster assistance sites.

Recommendation 80: States should ensure that eff ective communications lines and information-sharing systems exist between the state emergency operations centers and all facilities 

or mobile units that provide medical care or other assistance to victims of a catastrophic 

event. 

Recommendation 81: State agencies responsible for licensing of hospitals and nursing 

homes should ensure those facilities have evacuation plans and audit them annually, including evaluation of availability of transportation resources, to verify that they are viable. 

Recommendation 82: State agencies responsible for special-needs shelters, working with 

local counterparts and emergency-support organizations, should consider developing and 

maintaining a voluntary database of special-needs persons residing in the area. 

Recommendation 83: Th e EMAC system should (1) be refi ned to pre-certify qualifi ed 

out-of-state fi rst responders, such as those with specialized skills like search and rescue or 

medical services, in order to shorten the response time; (2) develop National Guard civil 

aff airs support teams trained in continuity of government operations (these could be the 

same teams that are already constituted for a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) event); 

(3) streamline the required paperwork process; and (4) streamline the deputization process 

with regard to various law-enforcement agencies that may assist during the disaster response.

Levees

Recommendation 84: Th e Interagency Performance Evaluation Taskforce (IPET), along 

with the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) External Review Panel (ERP), should 

be continued beyond the scope of the current task and should have the ongoing responsibility to evaluate and review the design, construction, operation, reconstruction, and improvements to the hurricane-protection levee system in southeast Louisiana. Formal charters for 

the IPET and the ASCE ERP should be created for this purpose and should ensure that the 

IPET process is independent from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ operational organizations. Th e independent review task forces should be extended to other levee systems that 

protect signifi cant population centers throughout the country.

Recommendation 85: Th e Corps, in conjunction with the State of Louisiana, the local levee 

districts, and other relevant federal, state, and local agencies, should assume responsibility 

for development of a comprehensive emergency plan for the hurricane-protection and Mississippi River levees systems, including high-water accidents, breaches, and fl oods. Current 

plans, including, but not limited to, the New Orleans Unwatering Plan, must be re-examined and brought into conformance with this comprehensive plan. Th e emergency plan 

must address incident command, interoperable communications, repair, and fl ood-fi ghting 

resources, monitoring of levee conditions, the acquisition of assets or alternative arrangements that allow the Corps to have real-time (or close to real-time) situational awareness of 

levee and fl ood conditions in the New Orleans area, and reporting and exercise procedures.

Recommendation 86: Th e Corps and local levee sponsors should immediately clarify and 

memorialize responsibilities and procedures for the turn-over of projects to local sponsors, 

and for operations and maintenance, including, but not limited to, procedures for the repair 

or correction of levee conditions that reduce the level of protection below the original design level (due to subsidence or other factors) and also emergency response. It must always 

be clear – to all parties involved – which entity is ultimately in charge of each stage of each 
630

Recommendations

project. Th e Corps should also provide real-time information to the public on the level of 

protection aff orded by the levee system. A mechanism should be included for the public to 

report potential problems and provide general feedback to the Corps.

Recommendation 87: In states where applicable, governors should ensure that the equivalent of ESF-3 (Public Works and Engineering) of the state emergency plan is clarifi ed to 

ensure that hurricane-protection levee systems and other fl ood-control infrastructures 

within the state are included within the defi nition of critical infrastructure, that a designated 

state agency is responsible for ensuring that state and local agencies and levee districts prepare for, and are able to respond to, emergencies involving these structures, whether they 

are directly owned by the state or not, and that the designated state agency executes this 

responsibility.

Recommendation 88: State statutes governing the operation of levee districts, such as preparation of emergency plans and training for levee board members and staff , must be re-examined and revised to ensure that levee districts exercise state-of-the art care and inspection 

of levees and are prepared to meet their primary obligation of fl ood protection and respond 

to emergencies. Th e inspection regime should include the use of advanced inspection techniques that are commensurate with the potential threat to life and property posed by the 

failure of a fl ood control project. 

1 While the entirety of DHS’s Preparedness Directorate would become part of NPRA, we continue to review the appropriate placement of individual offi ces (e.g., Infrastructure Protection, the Chief Medical Offi cer, and Cyber- and 

Telecommunications). 
631

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared

Appendix 1 

Common Acronyms

(All agencies named are federal, unless otherwise noted)

ARF. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Action Request Form

ATF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives

CBP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Customs and Border Protection (DHS)

CDC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

CDT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Central Daylight Time

CEMP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan

CT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Central Time

DAE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Disaster Assistance Employee (FEMA)

DCO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Defense Coordinating Offi cer

DHH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Department of Health and Hospitals (Louisiana)

DHS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Department of Homeland Security

DLA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Defense Logistics Agency

DMAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Disaster Medical Assistance Team

DMORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team 

DOD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Department of Defense

DOI. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Department of the Interior

DOJ. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Department of Justice

DOT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Department of Transportation

DOTD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Department of Transportation and Development (Louisiana)

DSCA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Defense Support to Civil Authorities

DTE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Disaster Temporary Employees

EDT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Eastern Daylight Time

EMAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Emergency Management Assistance Compact

EMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Emergency Medical Services

EOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Emergency Operations Center

EOP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Emergency Operations Plan

ERT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Emergency Response Team

ERT-A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Emergency Response Team, Advance Element

ERT-N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Emergency Response Team, National 

ESF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Emergency Support Function

ESG. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Expeditionary Strike Group

ET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Eastern Time

FBI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Federal Bureau of Investigation

FCO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Federal Coordinating Offi cer
632

FEMA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Federal Emergency Management Agency

FIRST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . First Incident Response Support Team

FMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Federal Medical Shelter

FOSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Federal Operational Staging Area

FPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Federal Protective Service

FRAGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fragmentary Order

FRP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Federal Response Plan

GAO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Government Accountability Offi ce (pre-2004, the General 

Accounting Offi ce)

GIWW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Gulf Intracoastal Waterway

GSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . General Services Administration

HHS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Department of Health and Human Services

HQ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Headquarters

HRSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Health Resources and Services Administration

HSC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Homeland Security Council

HSGAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs Committee

HSOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Homeland Security Operations Center

HSPD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Homeland Security Presidential Directive 

IATAC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Individual Assistance Technical Assistance Contract

ICCOH. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Interagency Coordinating Committee on Hurricanes

ICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Immigration and Customs Enforcement

ICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Incident Command System

IEM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Innovative Emergency Management, Inc.

IIMG. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Interagency Incident Management Group

IPET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Interagency Performance Evaluation Taskforce

JDOMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Joint Directorate of Military Support

JFO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Joint Field Offi ce

JIC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Joint Information Center

JIS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Joint Information System

JOC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Joint Operations Center

JTF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Joint Task Force

LA DOTD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development 

LANG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Louisiana Army National Guard

LEEP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Louisiana Emergency Evacuation Plan

LNHA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Louisiana Nursing Home Association

LOEP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Louisiana Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness (became LOHSEP 

in 2003)

LOHSEP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (as of March 2006, Governor’s Offi ce of Homeland 

Security and Emergency Preparedness, or GOHSEP) 

LSP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Louisiana State Police

Common Acronyms
633

LSU. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Louisiana State University

MACDIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances

MA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mission Assignment

MDH. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mississippi Department of Health

MDHS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mississippi Department of Human Services

MDOT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mississippi Department of Transportation

MEMA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mississippi Emergency Management Agency

MERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mobile Emergency Response Support

MEU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Marine Expeditionary Unit 

MOU. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Memorandum of Understanding 

MRE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Meal Ready to Eat

MRGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Mississippi River Gulf Outlet 

MST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Management Support Team

NCS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . National Communications System

NDMS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . National Disaster Medical System

NEMA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . National Emergency Management Association

NEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . National Emergency Management System

NGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Non-governmental organization

NHC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . National Hurricane Center

NIMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . National Incident Management System

NOAA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

NOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . National Operations Center

NOFD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . New Orleans Fire Department

NOOEP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . New Orleans Offi ce of Emergency Planning

NOPD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . New Orleans Police Department

NORTHCOM. . . . . . . . . . . . . Northern Command

NRCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . National Response Coordination Center

NRP-CIA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . National Response Plan – Catastrophic Incident Annex

NRP-CIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . National Response Plan – Catastrophic Incident Supplement

NSF. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . National Science Foundation

NWC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . National Weather Center

NWS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . National Weather Service

O&M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Operations & Maintenance

OEP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness

OFRD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Offi ce of Force Readiness and Deployment (HHS)

OPHEP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Offi ce of Public Health and Emergency Preparedness (HHS)

PACOM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Pacifi c Command

PFO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Principal Federal Offi cial 

PHS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Public Health Service

POD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Point of Distribution

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared
634

PSA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Protective Security Advisor

RFA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Request for Assistance

RRCC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Regional Response Coordination Center

RTA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Regional Transit Authority (New Orleans)

SAC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Special Agent in Charge

SAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Search and Rescue

SARBOO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Search-and-Rescue Base of Operations

SERT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Secretary’s Emergency Response Team (HHS)

SFLEO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Senior Federal Law Enforcement Offi cials

SLOSH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sea, Lake, and Overland Surges from Hurricanes (NHC soft ware)

SNS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Strategic National Stockpile 

SPH. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Standard Project Hurricane

TMOSA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Temporary Medical-and-Operations Staging Area

TOPOFF 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Top Offi cials 3 (DHS Conference)

TRANSCOM . . . . . . . . . . . . . Transportation Command

USAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Urban Search and Rescue

USPHS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . U.S. Public Health Service 

UTC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Universal Time Coordinated, Coordinated Universal Time (See Z)

VMAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Veterinary Medical Assistance Team

VOAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster

VTC. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Video teleconference

W&F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Department of Wildlife & Fisheries (Louisiana)

WFO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Weather Forecast Offi ce

WLF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Department of Wildlife and Fisheries

Z . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Zulu Time (also known as Greenwich Mean Time and UTC; standard time at zero degrees longitude, fi ve hours later than U.S. East 

Coast time; usually given on a 24-hour clock basis where 7 a.m. is 

0700 hours, noon is 1200 hours, 10:30 p.m. is 2030 hours, etc.) 

Common Acronyms
635

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared

Appendix 2

Emergency Support 

Functions (ESFs) 

“Th e ESFs provide the structure for coordinating Federal interagency support for Incidents of 

National Signifi cance. Th e ESF structure includes mechanisms used to provide Federal support 

to States and Federal-to-Federal support, both for declared disasters and emergencies under the 

Staff ord Act and for non-Staff ord Act incidents. ... Th e ESF structure provides mechanisms for 

interagency coordination during all phases of incident management. ... Th e National Response 

Coordination Center (NRCC), a component of the Homeland Security Operations Center 

(HSOC), develops and issues operation orders to activate individual ESFs based on the scope 

and magnitude of the threat or incident. ... ESF primary agencies notify and activate support 

agencies as required for the threat or incident, to include support to specialized teams. Each ESF 

is required to develop standard operating procedures (SOPs) and notifi cation protocols and to 

maintain current rosters and contact information.”

– National Response Plan, “Emergency Support Function Annexes: Introduction” (Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland Security, December 2004), ESF–i.

ESF-1: Transportation

• Federal and civil transportation support

• Transportation safety

• Restoration/recover of transportation infrastructure

• Movement restrictions

• Damage and impact assessment

ESF-2: Communications

• Coordination with telecommunications and industry

• Restoration/repair of telecommunications infrastructure

• Protection, restoration, and sustainment of national cyber and information technology 

resources

ESF-3: Public Works and Engineering

• Infrastructure protection and emergency repair

• Infrastructure restoration

• Engineering services, construction management

• Critical infrastructure liaison

ESF-4: Firefi ghting

• Firefi ghting activities on Federal lands

• Resource support to rural and urban fi refi ghting operations

ESF-5: Emergency Management

• Coordination of incident management eff orts

• Issuance of mission assignments

• Resource and human capital

• Incident action planning

• Financial management
Emergency Support Functions (ESFs)

636

ESF-6: Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services

• Mass care

• Disaster housing

• Human services

ESF-7: Resource Support

• Resource support (facility space, offi ce equipment and supplies, contracting services, etc.)

ESF-8: Public Health and Medical Services

• Public health

• Medical

• Mental health services

• Mortuary services

ESF-9: Urban Search and Rescue

• Life-saving assistance

• Urban search and rescue

ESF-10: Oil and Hazardous Materials Response

• Oil and hazardous materials (chemical, biological, radiological, etc.) response

• Environmental safety and short- and long-term cleanup

ESF-11: Agriculture and Natural Resources

• Nutrition assistance

• Animal and plant disease/pest response

• Food safety and security

• Natural and cultural resources and historic-properties protection and restoration

ESF-12: Energy

• Energy-infrastructure assessment, repair, and restoration

• Energy-industry utilities coordination

• Energy forecast

ESF-13: Public Safety and Security

• Facility and resource security

• Security planning and technical-resource assistance

• Public safety/security support

• Support to access, traffi c, and crowd control

ESF-14: Long-Term Community Recovery and Mitigation

• Social and economic community-impact assessment

• Long-term community recovery assistance to states, local governments, and the private 

sector

ESF-15: External Affairs

• Emergency public information and protective-action guidance

• Media and community relations

• Congressional and international aff airs

• Tribal and insular aff airs
637

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared

Appendix 3

Committee Hearings on 

Hurricane Katrina 

Date: Sept. 14, 2005

Title: Recovering from Hurricane Katrina: Th e Next Phase

Witnesses:

Hon. Pete Wilson, former Governor, California 

Hon. Patricia A. Owens, former Mayor, Grand Forks, North Dakota 

Hon. Marc H. Morial, President and CEO, National Urban League, and former Mayor, 

New Orleans, Louisiana 

 Iain B. Logan, Operations Liaison, International Federation of Red Cross and Red 

Crescent Societies

Date: Sept. 28, 2005

Title: Recovering from Hurricane Katrina: Responding to the Immediate Needs of Its 

Victims

Witnesses:

Hon. Robert A. Eckels, County Judge, Harris County, Texas 

Hon. Melvin L. Holden, Mayor/President, Baton Rouge, Louisiana 

Hon. Robert V. Massengill, Mayor, Brookhaven, Mississippi 

Hon. Dan Coody, Mayor, Fayetteville, Arkansas

Date: Oct. 6, 2005

Title: Hurricane Katrina: How is FEMA Performing Its Mission at Th is Stage of Recovery?

Witness:

 R. David Paulison, Acting Undersecretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response, 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and Acting Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency

Date: Oct. 20, 2005

Title: Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans: A Flooded City, a Chaotic Response

Witness:

 Marty J. Bahamonde, Regional Public Aff airs Director, Region I, Federal Emergency 

Management Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Date: Nov. 2, 2005

Title: Hurricane Katrina: Why Did the Levees Fail?

Witnesses:

Ivor van Heerden, Ph.D., Head, State of Louisiana Forensic Data Gathering Team

 Paul F. Mlakar, Ph.D., P.E., Senior Research Scientist, U.S. Army Engineer Research 

and Development Center 

 Raymond B. Seed, Ph.D., Professor, University of California at Berkeley, on behalf of 

the National Science Foundation 
Committee Hearings on Hurricane Katrina

638

 Peter Nicholson, Ph.D., P.E., Associate Professor, University of Hawaii, on behalf of the 

American Society of Civil Engineers

Date: Nov. 9, 2005

Title: Always Ready: Th e Coast Guard’s Response to Hurricane Katrina

Witnesses:

 Rear Admiral Robert F. Duncan, U.S. Coast Guard, Commander, Eighth Coast Guard 

District 

 Captain Frank M. Paskewich, U.S. Coast Guard, Commander, Coast Guard Sector New 

Orleans 

 Captain Bruce C. Jones, U.S. Coast Guard, Commanding Offi cer, Coast Guard Air Station New Orleans

Date: Nov. 16, 2005

Title: Hurricane Katrina: What Can Government Learn from the Private Sector’s Response?

Witnesses:

David M. Ratcliff e, President and CEO, Southern Co. 

 Stanley S. Litow, Vice President, Corporate Community Relations, and President, IBM 

International Foundation, IBM Corp. 

 Kevin T. Regan, Regional Vice President, Hotel Operations, Starwood Hotels and Resorts Worldwide, Inc. 

 Jason F. Jackson, Director of Business Continuity, Global Security Division, Wal-Mart 

Stores, Inc.

Date: Dec. 8, 2005

Title: Hurricane Katrina: Perspectives of FEMA’s Operations Professionals

Witnesses:

 Scott Wells, Federal Coordinating Offi cer, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 

Joint Field Offi ce, Baton Rouge, Louisiana 

 Philip E. Parr, Deputy Federal Coordinating Offi cer, Federal Emergency Management 

Agency, Joint Field Offi ce, Austin, Texas 

 William L. Carwile III, former Federal Coordinating Offi cer, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Joint Field Offi ce, Biloxi, Mississippi

Date: Dec. 15, 2005

Title: Hurricane Katrina: Who’s In Charge of the New Orleans Levees?

Witnesses:

 Col. Richard P. Wagenaar, District Engineer, New Orleans District, U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers 

 Alfred C. Naomi, Senior Project Manager, New Orleans District, U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers 

 Gerard A. Colletti, Operations Manager, Completed Works, New Orleans District, U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers 

 Edmond J. Preau Jr., Assistant Secretary, Public Works and Inter-Modal Transportation, Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development 

 James P. Huey, former President, Board of Commissioners, Orleans Levee District 
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared

639

Max L. Hearn, Executive Director, Orleans Levee District

Date: Jan. 17, 2006

Title: Hurricane Katrina: Mississippi’s Recovery

Witnesses:

Panel 1 

 Hon. Donald E. Powell, Coordinator of Recovery and Rebuilding in the Gulf Coast 

Region, U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Panel 2

Hon. Gene Taylor, U.S. Representative, U.S. House of Representatives

Hon. Brent E. Warr, Mayor, Gulfport, Mississippi

Hon. Edward Favre, Mayor, Bay St. Louis, Mississippi

 Dr. Gavin Smith, Director, Governor’s Offi ce of Recovery and Renewal, State of Mississippi

Date: Jan. 24, 2006

Title: Preparing for a Catastrophe: Th e Hurricane Pam Exercise

Witnesses:

 Wayne Fairley, Chief, Response Operations Branch, Federal Emergency Management 

Agency, Region VI, Denton, TX

 Sean R. Fontenot, former Chief, Planning Division, Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland 

Security and Emergency Preparedness, Baton Rouge, LA

 Jesse St. Amant, Director, Plaquemines Parish Homeland Security and Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness 

 Madhu Beriwal, President and CEO, Innovative Emergency Management Inc.

Date: Jan. 30, 2006

Title: Hurricane Katrina: Urban Search and Rescue in a Catastrophe

Witnesses:

 William M. Lokey, Chief, Operations Branch, Response Division, Federal Emergency 

Management Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

 Brigadier General Brod Veillon, Assistant Adjutant General, Louisiana National Guard 

 Lietenant Colonel Keith LaCaze, Assistant Administrator, Law Enforcement Division, 

Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries 

 Captain Tim Bayard, Commander, Vice Crimes and Narcotics Section, New Orleans 

Police Department

Date: Jan. 31, 2006

Title: Challenges in a Catastrophe: Evacuating New Orleans in Advance of Hurricane 

Katrina

Witnesses:

Panel 1:

 Hon. Johnny B. Bradberry, Secretary, Louisiana Department of Transportation and 

Development 

Colonel Terry J. Ebbert, Director, New Orleans Offi ce of Homeland Security 

 Walter S. Maestri, Ph.D., Director, Jeff erson Parish Department of Emergency 

Management 
Committee Hearings on Hurricane Katrina

640

Panel 2:

 Jimmy Guidry, M.D., Medical Director and State Health Offi cer, Louisiana Department 

of Health and Hospitals 

Kevin U. Stephens, M.D., J.D., Director, New Orleans Health Department 

 Joseph A. Donchess, Executive Director, Louisiana Nursing Home Association

Date: Feb. 1, 2006

Title: Hurricane Katrina: Managing the Crisis and Evacuating New Orleans

Witnesses:

Panel 1:

Hon. C. Ray Nagin, Mayor, New Orleans, Louisiana

Panel 2:

 Brigadier General Mark A. Graham, Deputy Commanding General, Fift h U.S. Army 

 Vince Pearce, Manager, National Response Program, U.S. Department of Transportation 

 Dwight Brashear, CEO and General Manager, Capital Area Transit System, Baton 

Rouge, Louisiana

Date: Feb. 2, 2006

Title: Hurricane Katrina: Th e Role of the Governors in Managing the Catastrophe

Witnesses:

Hon. Haley Barbour, Governor of Mississippi 

Hon. Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, Governor of Louisiana

Date: Feb. 6, 2006

Title: Hurricane Katrina: Managing Law Enforcement and Communications in a Catastrophe

Witnesses:

 Michael J. Vanacore, Assistant Director, Offi ce of Investigations, U.S. Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

 Kenneth W. Kaiser, Special Agent in Charge, Boston Field Offi ce, Federal Bureau of 

Investigation 

Warren J. Riley, Superintendent of Police, New Orleans Police Department 

 Peter M. Fonash, Ph.D., Deputy Manager, National Communications System, U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security 

 Colonel FG Dowden, Regional Liaison, New Orleans Department of Homeland Security 

and Public Safety 

William L. Smith, Chief Technology Offi cer, Bell South Corp.

Date: Feb. 9, 2006

Title: Hurricane Katrina: Th e Defense Department’s Role in the Response

Witnesses:

Panel 1:

Hon. Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, U.S. Department of Defense

 Admiral Timothy J. Keating, Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Northern Command 
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared

641

Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, Chief, National Guard Bureau 

Panel 2: 

 Lieutenant General Russel L. Honoré, Commanding General, First U.S. Army 

 Major General Bennett C. Landreneau, Adjutant General, Louisiana National Guard, 

and Director, Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness

Date: Feb. 10, 2006

Title: Hurricane Katrina: Th e Roles of DHS and FEMA Leadership

Witnesses:

Panel 1:

 Hon. Michael D. Brown, former Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and 

Response, and Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security 

 Patrick J. Rhode, former Acting Deputy Director and Chief of Staff , Federal Emergency 

Management Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Panel 2:

 Robert B. Stephan, Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection, U.S. Department 

of Homeland Security

 Matthew E. Broderick, Director for Operations Coordination, U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security

Date: Feb. 13, 2006

Title: Hurricane Katrina: Waste, Fraud, and Abuse Worsen the Disaster

Witnesses:

 Gregory D. Kutz, Managing Director, Forensic Audits and Special Investigations, U.S. 

Government Accountability Offi ce 

 Richard L. Skinner, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

 Alice S. Fisher, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, and Chairwoman, Hurricane Katrina Fraud Task Force, U.S. Department of Justice

Date: Feb. 15, 2006

Title: Hurricane Katrina: Th e Homeland Security Department’s Preparation and Response

Witness:

Hon. Michael Chertoff, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Date: Mar. 8, 2006

Title: Hurricane Katrina: Recommendations for Reform

Witnesses:

Panel 1:

Hon. Barbara A. Mikulski, U.S. Senator, Maryland

Panel 2:

Hon. David M. Walker, Comptroller General, U.S. Government Accountability Offi ce

Richard L. Skinner, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Panel 3:

 Bruce P. Baughman, President, National Emergency Management Association and 

Director, Alabama State Emergency Management Agency
Committee Hearings on Hurricane Katrina

642

 Frank J. Cilluff o, Associate Vice President for Homeland Security and Director, Homeland Security Policy Institute, Th e George Washington University

 Herman B. Leonard, Ph.D., Professor of Public Management, John F. Kennedy School 

of Government, and Professor of Business Administration, Harvard Business School, 

Harvard University

Date: Apr. 21, 2006

Title: FEMA’s Manufactured Housing Program: Haste Makes Waste 

(Field Hearing in Hope, Arkansas)

Witnesses:

Panel 1:

Hon. Mike Ross, U.S. House of Representatives, 4th Congressional District, Arkansas

Panel 2:

 David Garratt, Acting Director of Recovery Eff orts, Federal Emergency Management 

Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Richard L. Skinner, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Panel 3: 

Hon. Dennis Ramsey, Mayor, City of Hope, Arkansas

 J. D. Harper, Executive Director, Arkansas Manufactured Housing Association
643

Name Date of Interview Title

Accordo, Dexter Nov. 9, 2005 Director, Emergency Management and Homeland 

Security, St. Tammany Parish, Louisiana

Acton, Rear Adm. John, 

USCG Jan. 23, 2006 Deputy Area Commander, Mobilization and Reserve Affairs, Coast Guard Atlantic Area

Adam, Brian Nov. 16, 2005

Director, Emergency Management Agency, and 

Director of Homeland Security, Fire Marshal/Investigator, Hancock County, Mississippi

Adams, Steve Feb. 14, 2006

Deputy Director, Strategic National Stockpile, 

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. 

Department of Health and Human Services

Aiken, James, M.D. Jan. 11, 2006 Medical Director, Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness, Medical Center of Louisiana in New Orleans

Allen, Vice Adm. Thad, USCG Feb. 3, 2006 Chief of Staff, U.S. Coast Guard 

Altshuler, Brooks Dec. 15, 2005 Acting Deputy Chief of Staff and Policy Director, 

Federal Emergency Management Agency 

Amos, Lt. Gen. James, USMC Dec. 14, 2005 Commanding General, Second Marine Expeditionary Force, U.S. Marine Forces Atlantic Command

Andrews, Nicol Oct. 26, 2005;

Nov. 8, 2005

Deputy Director of Public Affairs, Federal Emergency Management Agency

Attaway, James Jan. 13, 2006

Telecommunications Specialist, Mobile Emergency 

Response System, Region VI, Federal Emergency 

Management Agency

Atterberry, Linda Nov. 16, 2005 Director, Biloxi Emergency Management, Mississippi

Aycock, Col. David Jan. 4, 2006 Operations Offi cer, Louisiana National Guard

Appendix 4

HSGAC Interviews

Th e following people were interviewed as part of the Committee’s investigation. Titles 

listed are as of Aug. 31, 2005, unless otherwise indicated. (Abbreviations: USA = U.S. 

Army, USCG = U.S. Coast Guard, USMC = U.S. Marine Corps, USN = U.S. Navy, 

USNR = U.S. Navy Reserve, USAF = U.S. Air Force, ANG = Army National Guard, 

AirNG = Air National Guard, LANG = Louisiana National Guard .)

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared
HSGAC Interviews

644

Babb, Rear Adm. John Feb. 8, 2006

Director, Offi ce of Force Readiness and Deployment, U.S. Public Health Service, U.S. Department 

of Health and Human Services

Bahamonde, Marty Oct. 14, 2005; 

Oct. 7, 2005

Regional Director, External Affairs, Region I, Federal Emergency Management Agency

Ballow, James Dec. 21, 2005; 

Jan. 4, 2006

Senior Operations Offi cer, Louisiana Offi ce of 

Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness

Barbour, Marsha Jan. 26, 2006 First Lady, Mississippi

Barksdale, Jim Jan. 10, 2006

Chairman, Governor’s Commission on Recovery, 

Rebuilding, and Renewal, Mississippi (named on 

Sept. 20, 2005)

Baumy, Walter, Jr. Nov. 15, 2005 Chief of Engineering Division, New Orleans District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

Bayard, Capt. Tim Nov. 21, 2005 Commander, Vice Crimes and Narcotics Section, 

New Orleans Police Department, Louisiana

Beall, Jack Jan. 10, 2006 Chief, National Disaster Medical System, Federal 

Emergency Management Agency

Beeman, Michael Jan. 20, 2006 Director, National Preparedness Division, Region II, 

Federal Emergency Management Agency

Ben-Iesau, Lt. Cmdr. Shari, 

USCG

Oct. 18, 2005; 

Nov. 18, 2005

Public Affairs Offi cer, New Orleans Sector, U.S. 

Coast Guard

Bennett, Jean Mar. 1, 2006

Regional Emergency Coordinator, Region VI, Offi ce 

of Public Health and Emergency Preparedness, U.S. 

Department of Health and Human Services

Bennett, Paul Dec. 8, 2005 Deputy Chief of Police, Gulfport Police Department, Mississippi 

Berkely, Vince Feb. 16, 2006

Acting Deputy Director and Chief Medical Offi cer, 

Phoenix (AZ) Area, Indian Health Service, U.S. 

Department of Health and Human Services

Bernazzani, James Jan. 25, 2006 Special Agent in Charge, New Orleans Division, 

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Beron, Col. Thomas Dec. 1, 2005 Commander, 61st Troop Command, Louisiana 

Army National Guard

Besser, Rich Feb. 14, 2006

Director, Coordinating Offi ce for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response, Centers for 

Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Department 

of Health and Human Services
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared

645

Blankenship, Maj. Walter Jan. 25, 2006 State Partnership Program Coordinator, Mississippi 

Air National Guard 

Blitzer, Robert Feb. 2, 2006

Deputy Assistant Secretary, Operations and Security Program, Offi ce of Public Health Emergency 

Preparedness, U.S. Department of Health and 

Human Services

Blong, Clair, Ph.D. Dec. 8, 2005 Liaison to U.S. Northern Command, Federal Emergency Management Agency

Blum, Lt. Gen. H. Steven, 

USA Jan. 19, 2006 Chief, National Guard Bureau, U.S. Department of 

Defense

Bohnert, Roger Dec. 2, 2005

Acting Director, Offi ce of Intelligence, Security 

and Emergency Response, U.S. Department of 

Transportation

Bookert, Rear Adm. Reubin, 

USN Nov. 16, 2005 Commander, Amphibious Group 2

Booth, Lt. Col. Joseph Oct. 12, 2005; 

Dec. 9, 2005

Deputy Superintendent, Crisis Response and 

Special Operations, Louisiana State Police

Bossert, Thomas Dec. 20, 2005 Deputy Director of Legislative Affairs, Federal 

Emergency Management Agency

Bottcher, Denise Jan. 9, 2006 Press Secretary, Offi ce of the Governor, Louisiana

Bouchard, Michael Jan. 24, 2006

Assistant Director For Field Operations, Bureau of 

Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms and Explosives, 

U.S. Department of Justice

Boudreaux, Jill Oct. 12, 2005 Deputy Undersecretary, Public Safety Services, 

Louisiana

Boyd, Lt. Valerie, USCG Nov. 7, 2005 Command Center Watch Offi cer, 8th District Offi ce 

Headquarters, New Orleans, Louisiana

Bradberry, Johnny Nov. 17, 2005; 

Dec. 21, 2005

Secretary, Louisiana Department of Transportation 

and Development

Brashear, Dwight Jan. 5, 2006

Chief Executive Offi cer and General Manager, 

Capital Area Transit System, Baton Rouge, Louisiana

Bridges, Jim Dec. 1, 2005 Director, Southern Antiterrorist Regional Training 

Academy

Brinson, Jim Dec. 14, 2005 Response Coordinator, Offi ce of Homeland Security, Mississippi Department of Public Safety 
HSGAC Interviews

646

Brock, George Feb. 27, 2006

Chief of Plans and Policies Division, Plans, Policies 

and Strategies Directorate, National Guard Bureau, 

U.S. Department of Defense

Broderick, Matthew Jan. 19, 2006 Director, Homeland Security Operations Center, 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Brommel, Ty Jan. 10, 2006 Executive Director, Governor’s Offi ce of Rural 

Development, Louisiana

Brooke, Lucy Jan. 24, 2006 Emergency Management Program Specialist, 

Federal Emergency Management Agency

Broun, Laurence Mar. 21, 2006 Emergency Coordinator, U.S. Department of the 

Interior

Brown, Michael Jan. 23, 2006; Feb. 

23, 2006

Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency; 

(Resigned September 2005) 

Brown, Randy Dec. 8, 2005 Support Bureau Commander, Gulfport Police 

Department, Mississippi 

Brown, William Jan. 26, 2006 Operations Branch Chief, Mississippi Emergency 

Management Agency

Buikema, Edward Nov. 21, 2005 Regional Director, Region V, Federal Emergency 

Management Agency

Burris, Ken Dec. 29, 2005 Former Acting Director of Operations, Federal 

Emergency Management Agency

Butcher, Tim Jan. 20, 2006 Former Emergency Management Director, Medical 

Center of Louisiana in New Orleans

Caldwell, Maj. Gen. William, 

USA Feb. 28, 2006 Commander, 82nd Airborne Division, U.S. Department of Defense

Cardwell, Jeff Nov. 16, 2005 Area 13 Coordinator, Western Branch Offi ce, North 

Carolina Division of Emergency Management

Carwile, William, III Dec. 6, 2005

Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina 

in Mississippi, Federal Emergency Management 

Agency

Cerise, Fred, M.D. Oct. 26, 2005; Dec. 2, 

2005; Dec. 6, 2005

Secretary, Louisiana Department of Health and 

Hospitals

Cerveny, Lt. Steve, USCG Oct. 26, 2005 Pilot, Aviation Special Operations Division, Aviation Training Center Mobile, Alabama

Chapman, Bob Dec. 13, 2005; Dec. 

14, 2005

State Transportation Emergency Coordinator, Mississippi Department of Transportation
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared

647

Chatelain, Myron Jan. 9, 2006 Manger, Louisiana Nursing Home Service Corporation

Chavez, Col. Richard, USAF Nov. 9, 2005; Nov. 

22, 2005

Senior Military Advisor for Civil Support, Offi ce of 

the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland 

Defense, U.S. Department of Defense

Claypool, Robert, M.D. Feb. 15, 2006

Deputy Assistant Secretary, Director of Mass Casualty Planning, Offi ce of Public Health Emergency 

Preparedness, U.S. Department of Health and 

Human Services

Coachman, Sandy Nov. 15, 2005 Federal Coordinating Offi cer, Region VI, Federal 

Emergency Management Agency

Colletti, Jerry Nov. 22, 2005; Dec. 

9, 2005

Operations Manager for Completed Projects, New 

Orleans District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

Compass, Eddie Jan. 12, 2006 Superintendent of Police, New Orleans Police 

Department, Louisiana 

Cooper, Lt. Cmdr. Tom, USCG Oct. 18, 2005 Helicopter Pilot and Engineering Offi cer, Air Station New Orleans, Louisiana

Costello, Capt. John, USN Nov. 15, 2005 Assistant Chief of Operations, Commander Task 

Force 20

Craig, Jim Jan. 25, 2006 Director, Offi ce of Health Protection, Mississippi 

Department of Health

Crea, Vice Adm. Vivien, 

USCG Jan. 3, 2006 Commander, Coast Guard Atlantic Area and Commander, Maritime Defense Zone Atlantic 

Crosbie, William Feb. 17, 2006 Senior Vice-President of Operations, The National 

Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak)

Cross, Maj. Gen. Harold Jan. 26, 2006 Adjutant General, Mississippi Army and Air 

National Guard

Crumholt, Kenneth Nov. 16, 2005

Resident Engineer, Construction Division, West 

Bank Hurricane Protection Project, New Orleans 

District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

Cuber, Bruce Jan. 9, 2006 Former Disaster Management Director, Southeast 

Louisiana, American Red Cross 

Cucolo, Brig. Gen. Tony, USA Nov. 17, 2005

Director of Joint Center for Operational Analysis, Joint Forces Command, U.S. Department of 

Defense

Curtis, Col. Glenn Dec. 6, 2005 Deputy Chief of Staff, Louisiana National Guard 

Dabadie, Col. Steven Jan. 12, 2006 Chief of Staff, Louisiana National Guard 
HSGAC Interviews

648

Dancer, Maj. David Dec. 21, 2005; Dec. 

22, 2005

Operations Offi cer, Military Support Division, 

Louisiana National Guard 

Daskevich, Col. Anthony, II, 

USA Jan. 10, 2006 Commander, 4th Brigade, 75th Division Training 

Support, Fort Sill, Oklahoma

Dawkins, Richard Dec. 13, 2005 Program Manager, Division of Economic Assistance, Mississippi Department of Human Services

Day, Don Jan. 17, 2006

Region VI Regional Emergency Transportation 

Representative, Offi ce of Intelligence, Security 

and Emergency Response, U.S. Department of 

Transportation

Delacroix, Scott, M.D. Feb. 21, 2006

PGY-2 Urology Resident, Department of Urologic 

Surgery, Ochsner Clinic Foundation, New Orleans, 

Louisiana; PGY-2 Urology Resident, Department of 

Urologic Surgery, Louisiana State University, New 

Orleans, Louisiana

DeLorenzo, Mike Feb. 9, 2006

Bureau Chief, Bureau of Preparedness and 

Response, Florida Division of Emergency Management

Deville, William Nov. 22, 2005 General Manager and Chief Executive Offi cer, Regional Transit Authority of New Orleans, Louisiana

Diemont, Dolph Jan. 6, 2006

Region X Regional Emergency Transportation 

Representative, Offi ce of Intelligence, Security 

and Emergency Response, U.S. Department of 

Transportation

DiFalco, Frank Jan. 13, 2006 Deputy Director, Homeland Security Operations 

Center, U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Donchess, Joseph Jan. 9, 2006 Executive Director, Louisiana Nursing Home 

Service Corporation

Doran, Lt. Col. William, 

Louisiana AirNG

Dec. 2, 2005; Dec. 8, 

2005

Chief, Operations Division, Louisiana Offi ce of 

Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness

Dowden, FG Nov. 8, 2005 Regional Liaison, New Orleans Department of 

Homeland Security, Louisiana

Downey, Erin Jan. 20, 2006

Louisiana Hospital Association, Director of 

Emergency Preparedness (Liaison to Health and 

Resources Services Administration)

Drake, Chris Oct. 20, 2005 Program Manager for Interoperability, Mayor’s Offi ce of Technology, City of New Orleans, Louisiana

Duke, Elaine Feb. 4, 2006 Chief Procurement Offi cer, U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared

649

Dunagan, Bruce Jan. 18, 2006 Chief of Police, Biloxi Police Department, Mississippi

Duncan, Rear Adm. Robert, 

USCG

Oct. 18, 2005; Oct. 

29, 2005 Commander, Eighth Coast Guard District 

Duthu, Robert Dec. 8, 2005 Enforcement Captain, Louisiana Department of 

Wildlife and Fisheries

Ebbert, Col. Terry, USMC 

(Ret.)

Oct. 6, 2005; 

Oct. 13, 2005; Oct. 

14, 2005; Jan. 10, 

2006

Director, New Orleans Offi ce of Homeland Security, 

City of New Orleans, Louisiana 

Eller, Ronald Jan. 23, 2006 Liaison to North American Aerospace Defense 

Command, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

Ellis, Lt. Col. Gordon, USA Feb. 16, 2006 Commander, First Battalion, 148th Infantry, Ohio 

National Guard

England, Gordon Feb. 3, 2006 Deputy Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of 

Defense

English, Patricia Jan. 5, 2006 Senior Procurement Executive, Federal Emergency 

Management Agency

Fairley, Wayne Jan. 18, 2006 Response Operations Branch Chief, Region VI, 

Federal Emergency Management Agency

Farlow, Matt Dec. 1, 2005

Information Technology Division Chief, Louisiana 

Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency 

Preparedness

Favre, Eddie Jan. 9, 2006 Mayor, City of Bay St. Louis, Mississippi

Fenton, Robert Dec. 22, 2005 Response Branch Chief, Region IX, Federal Emergency Management Agency

Fincher, Capt. Joseph Nov. 7, 2005 Captain, Engine 18, Third Platoon, Fifth District, 

New Orleans Fire Department, Louisiana

Fitzgerald, Allison Nov. 12, 2005 Attorney, Louisiana Department of Public Safety

Fitzgerald, Vice Adm. Mark, 

USN Nov. 15, 2005 Commander, U.S. Second Fleet, U.S. Department 

of Defense

Flores-Arias, Saraya Dec. 19, 2005 Executive Assistant to the Director, New Orleans 

Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness, Louisiana

Fonash, Peter, Ph.D. Jan. 27, 2006 Deputy Manager, National Communications System, U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
HSGAC Interviews

650

Fontenot, Sean Jan. 10, 2006

Former Chief, Preparedness Division, Louisiana 

Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency 

Preparedness

Foran, Michael Jan. 17, 2006

Region IV Regional Emergency Transportation 

Representative, Offi ce of Intelligence, Security 

and Emergency Response, U.S. Department of 

Transportation

Forman, Sally Jan. 10, 2006 Communications Director, Offi ce of the Mayor, City 

of New Orleans, Louisiana

Fowler, Erin Jan. 30, 2006

Senior Analyst, Regional Emergency Coordinator 

Program, Offi ce of Public Health and Emergency 

Preparedness, U.S. Department of Health and 

Human Services

Frazier, Tami Dec. 19, 2005 Press Secretary, Offi ce of the Mayor, City of New 

Orleans, Louisiana 

Frels, Col. Mary, USA Dec. 7, 2005 Command Force Protection Offi cer, U.S. Northern 

Command, U.S. Department of Defense

French, Capt. Art, M.D. Mar. 2, 2006 Offi cer, U.S. Public Health Service, U.S. Department 

of Health and Human Services

Fudge, Lt. Robert, LANG Dec. 21, 2005; Jan. 

6, 2006

Chief, Preparedness Division, Louisiana Offi ce of 

Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness

Garratt, David Jan. 9, 2006 Acting Director of Recovery, Federal Emergency 

Management Agency

Glick, Jeffrey Feb. 3, 2006

Chief, Critical Infrastructure Protection Division, 

National Communications System, U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Glynn, Capt. Steve Dec. 20, 2005 Chief of Special Operations Division, New Orleans 

Fire Department, Louisiana

Graham, Brig. Gen. Mark, 

USA Jan. 12, 2006 Deputy Commanding General, Fifth U.S. Army, U.S. 

Department of Defense

Grass, Brig. Gen. Frank, USA Jan. 18, 2006 Deputy Director, Army National Guard (Army 

National Guard Bureau) 

Gray, Avis Dec. 8, 2005

Regional Administrator, Region I, Offi ce of Public 

Health, Louisiana Department of Health and 

Hospitals

Gray, Richard Jan. 20, 2006 Acting Chief, National Response Coordination 

Center, Federal Emergency Management Agency 

Guidry, Jimmy, M.D. Dec. 20, 2005 Medical Director and State Health Offi cer, Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared

651

Guidry, Roland Jan. 11, 2006 Oil Spill Coordinator, Offi ce of the Governor, 

Louisiana

Gusman, Marlin Jan. 10, 2006 Criminal Sheriff, Offi ce of the Criminal Sheriff, City 

of New Orleans, Louisiana

Guttman-McCabe, Christopher Jan. 24, 2006 Vice President for Regulatory Affairs, Cellular 

Telecommunications and Internet Association

Hall, Michael Nov. 28, 2005; Dec. 

1, 2005

Acting Director of Human Resources, Federal 

Emergency Management Agency

Harrald, John, Ph.D. Feb. 14, 2006 Co-Director, The George Washington University 

Institute for Crisis, Disaster, and Risk Management

Harrington, Col. Don, USA Jan. 6, 2006 Liaison to National Response Coordination Center, 

U.S. Department of Defense

Harris, Julie Dec. 21, 2005

Director of Federal and State Programs and 

Deputy Director of Intergovernmental Relations, 

Mayor’s Offi ce, City of New Orleans, Louisiana

Harry, Jim Jan. 24, 2006 Policy Director, Offi ce of the Governor, Mississippi

Hatfi eld, Brenda, Ph.D. Dec. 21, 2005 Chief Administrative Offi cer, City of New Orleans, 

Louisiana

Hearn, Max Nov. 14, 2005; Dec. 

8, 2005 Executive Director, Orleans Levee District 

Heath, Michael Nov. 10, 2005 Special Assistant, Offi ce of the Director, Federal 

Emergency Management Agency

Hellmers, Capt. Paul Nov. 7, 2005 Captain Engine 18, Second Platoon, Fifth District, 

New Orleans Fire Department, Louisiana

Hitchings, Daniel Nov. 15, 2005

Regional Business Director and Task Force HOPE, 

Mississippi Valley Division, U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers

Holloway, A.J. Jan. 5, 2006 Mayor, City of Biloxi, Mississippi

Holman, Rear Adm. Brenda Feb. 9, 2006

Regional Director, Food and Drug Administration 

– Pacifi c Region, and Offi cer, U.S. Public Health 

Service, U.S. Department of Health and Human 

Services

Honoré, Lt. Gen. Russel, USA Jan. 9, 2006 Commanding General, First U.S. Army, U.S. Department of Defense

Hornsby, Irby Jan. 5, 2006 Special Needs Shelter Manager, New Orleans 

Region, Louisiana Department of Social Services 
HSGAC Interviews

652

Huey, James Nov. 29, 2005 Former President, Board of Commissioners, 

Orleans Levee District, Louisiana 

Huff, Willie Dec. 14, 2005 Director, Enforcement, Mississippi Department of 

Transportation

Hurst, Jules Jan. 27, 2006 Transportation Supervisor, Logistics Branch, Federal Emergency Management Agency 

Hurst, Paul Jan. 30, 2006 Chief Counsel, Offi ce of the Governor, Mississippi

Ingargiola, Larry Oct. 26, 2005

Director, Department of Homeland Security and 

Emergency Preparedness, St. Bernard Parish, 

Louisiana

Jackson, Michael Jan. 27, 2006 Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security

James, Lt. Gen. Daniel, III Jan. 3, 2006

Director, Air National Guard; Vice Chief of Staff, 

Department of the Air Force, U.S. Department of 

Defense

Jamieson, Gil Dec. 20, 2005

Acting Director, National Incident Management 

System Integration Center, Federal Emergency 

Management Agency

Joerger, Col. Glen, USAF Jan. 6, 2006 Wing Commander, Charleston Air Force Base 

Johnson, Edward Nov. 29, 2005 Safety and Training Manager, New Orleans Public 

Schools, City of New Orleans

Jones, Col. Al, USA Mar. 2, 2006 Senior Army Advisor, Georgia Army National Guard

Jones, Art Dec. 8, 2005

Chief, Disaster Recovery Division, Louisiana Offi ce 

of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness

Jones, Capt. Bruce, USCG Oct. 12, 2005; Nov. 

12, 2005

Commanding Offi cer, Air Station New Orleans, 

Louisiana 

Jones, Gary Jan. 11, 2006 Acting Regional Director, Region VI, Federal Emergency Management Agency

Jones, Brig. Gen. Gary Dec. 7, 2005 Director, Standing Joint Headquarters-North, U.S. 

Northern Command, U.S. Department of Defense

Jones, Greg Jan. 6, 2006 Federal Highway Administration, U.S. Department 

of Transportation

Jones, Reggie Jan. 17, 2006

ESF-1 Program Manager, Offi ce of Intelligence 

and Emergency Response, U.S. Department of 

Transportation 

Jones, Wayne Feb. 9, 2006 Forest Area Supervisor, Florida Division of Forestry
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared

653

Jordan, Col. John, USA Feb. 28, 2006 Inspector General, Florida National Guard

Joseph, Capt. Michael Nov. 8, 2005 Liaison to New Orleans Offi ce of Homeland Security, New Orleans Fire Department, Louisiana

Jowett, Jack Oct. 31, 2005 Chair, Emergency Management Assistance 

Compact

Kaiser, Ken Jan. 25, 2006 Special Agent in Charge, Boston Field Offi ce, 

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Keating, Adm. Timothy, USN Feb. 3, 2006

Commander, North American Aerospace Defense 

Command and U.S. Northern Command, U.S. 

Department of Defense

Keeling, Col. Barry, Oct. 18, 2005 Commander, State Aviation Command, Louisiana 

Army National Guard

Kessler, Gary Jan. 27, 2006 Executive Vice President, Operations, Carey International, Inc.

Kilkenny, Rear Adm. Joseph, 

USN Nov. 30, 2005 Commander, Carrier Strike Group Ten, U.S. Department of Defense

King, William Jan. 17, 2006

Branch Chief, Region V, Radiological Emergency 

Preparedness Program, Technical Services Branch, 

Federal Emergency Management Agency

Kirkpatrick, Col. Tom Dec. 7, 2005 Citizen Corps Coordinator, Louisiana Offi ce of 

Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness

Kleinpeter, Leonard Jan. 11, 2006

Special Assistant to the Governor, Offi ce of the 

Governor and Director, Offi ce of Community 

Programs, Louisiana

Kohlman, Col. James Dec. 6, 2005

Deputy, J6, U.S. Northern Command and North 

American Aerospace Defense Command, U.S. 

Department of Defense

Kopplin, Andy Jan. 6, 2006 Chief of Staff, Offi ce of the Governor, Louisiana 

Kruse, Margaret Nov. 16, 2005

Head of White House Pacifi c Command, CounterDrug and Force Protection Division, Joint Forces 

Command, U.S. Department of Defense

LaBuda, Capt. Gary, USN Dec. 2, 2005

Emergency Preparedness Liaison Offi cer to 

National Response Coordination Center, U.S. 

Department of Defense

LaCaze, Lt. Col. Keith Nov. 30, 2005 Assistant Administrator, Law Enforcement Division, 

Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries

Lampard, Patrick Jan. 11, 2006 Chief, Fifth District, New Orleans Fire Department, 

Louisiana
HSGAC Interviews

654

Landreneau, Maj. Gen. Bennett, USA Jan. 11, 2006 Adjutant General, Louisiana, Director, LOHSEP

Landreneau, Dwight Nov. 30, 2005 Secretary, Louisiana Department of Wildlife and 

Fisheries

Lapeyrolerie, Kitty Dec. 20, 2005

Regional Manager, Louisiana Rehabilitative Services and Emergency Preparedness Coordinator, 

Louisiana Department of Social Services

Latham, Robert Jan. 27, 2006 Executive Director, Mississippi Emergency Management Agency 

Lavender, Robert, Jr. Feb. 3, 2006

Deputy Director of Information Technology Communications, Offi ce of Public Health and Emergency Preparedness, U.S. Department of Health 

and Human Services

Lee, Harry Jan. 10, 2006 Sheriff, Jefferson Parish, Louisiana

Lloyd, Rear Adm. Dan, USCG Dec. 8, 2005

Division Chief, Joint Inter-Agency Coordination 

Group, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Department 

of Defense

Lokey, William Nov. 4, 2005; 

Jan. 20, 2006

Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina 

in Louisiana, Federal Emergency Management 

Agency

Loper, Butch Dec. 6, 2005 Director, Emergency Management Agency, Jackson 

County, Mississippi

Lowder, Michael Nov. 10, 2005 Deputy Director of Response, Federal Emergency 

Management Agency

Lowe, Michael Nov. 15, 2005 Emergency Manager, New Orleans District Corps 

of Engineers, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

Loy, Adm. James, USCG 

(Ret.) Nov. 16, 2005 Former Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security

Ludgood, Gary Jan. 20, 2006 Vice President for Integrated Network Planning 

and Implementation, BellSouth Corp. 

Lumpkin, Dee Nov. 16, 2005 Deputy Director of Emergency Management 

Agency, Hancock County, Mississippi 

Lyle, Mary Ann Jan. 25, 2006 Night Manager, National Response Coordination 

Center, Federal Emergency Management Agency

Maestri, Walter, Ph.D. Oct. 26, 2005; Oct. 

27, 2005

Director, Jefferson Parish Offi ce of Emergency 

Management, Louisiana

Maner, Andrew Feb. 2, 2006 Acting Chief Financial Offi cer, U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared

655

Markham, Capt. Brett, USN Dec. 7, 2005

Deputy Director of Intelligence, U.S. Northern 

Command and North American Aerospace Defense 

Command, U.S. Department of Defense

Martin, Bruce Nov. 10, 2005 Deputy of Administration, New Orleans Fire 

Department, Louisiana 

Martin, Ronald Jan. 13, 2006

Deputy Commander, Management Support Team, 

National Disaster Medical System, Federal Emergency Management Agency

Mason, Maj. Gen. James Feb. 14, 2006 Commander, 35th Infantry Division, Kansas Army 

National Guard

Massengill, Robert Sept. 16, 2005 Mayor, City of Brookhaven, Mississippi

Matthews, Joseph 

Oct. 14, 2005; Nov. 

23, 2005; Jan. 10, 

2006

Director, New Orleans Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness, Louisiana

Mayeaux, Jadwin, Col., 

LANG (Ret.) Nov. 29, 2005

Deputy Director, Homeland Security, Louisiana 

Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency 

Preparedness

Mayer, Matt Jan. 26, 2006

Chief of Staff and Senior Policy Advisor, Offi ce of 

Domestic Preparedness Security and Acting Executive Director, Offi ce of Domestic Preparedness, U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security

Mayfi eld, Max, Ph.D. Jan. 27, 2006

Director, Tropical Prediction Center and National 

Hurricane Center, National Weather Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

Mayne, Jeff Nov. 30, 2005

Supervisor, Special Investigator Section, and Legislative Liaison, Louisiana Department of Wildlife 

and Fisheries

McAllister, Tom Jan. 25, 2006; Jan. 

27, 2006

Director of Response and Recovery, Mississippi 

Emergency Management Agency 

McCall, Jim Nov. 30, 2005 Director, Youth Challenge Program, Carville, 

Louisiana

McClellan, Col. Wesley Jan. 23, 2006

Division Chief, Joint Interagency Coordination 

Group, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Department 

of Defense

McDaniel, Capt. Michael, 

USNR Dec. 2, 2005

Navy Emergency Preparedness Liaison to Federal 

Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Department 

of Defense

McHale, Paul

Jan. 4, 2006; 

Feb. 3, 2006; 

Feb. 17, 2006

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland 

Defense, U.S. Department of Defense
HSGAC Interviews

656

McKeon, Capt. Tom, USN Nov. 14, 2005 Deputy Director of Operations (N3A) for U.S. Fleet 

Forces Command, U.S. Department of Defense

Mercer, William Jan. 26, 2006; Feb. 

23, 2006

Principal Associate Deputy Attorney General, 

Offi ce of the Attorney General and U.S. Attorney, 

Montana District, Executive Offi ce for United 

States Attorneys, U.S. Department of Justice

Milani, William Jan. 12, 2006 Chief, Mobile Operations Section, Logistics Branch, 

Federal Emergency Management Agency

Miller, Maj. John Dec. 14, 2005 Chief Inspector (Southern Region), Highway Safety 

Patrol, Mississippi Public Safety Department

Mills, Chuck Feb. 14, 2006 Vice President, Emergency Management Services 

International, Inc.

Misczak, Mark Nov. 14, 2005 Individual Assistance Branch Chief, Region VI, 

Federal Emergency Management Agency

Modicut, Joseph Jan. 5, 2006

Emergency Services Coordinator, Operations Offi ce, Louisiana Department of Transportation and 

Development

Monette, Ted Nov. 15, 2005 Acting Director, Response and Recovery Division, 

Region I, Federal Emergency Management Agency

Montz, Cindy Jan. 12, 2006 Senior Planner, Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland 

Security and Emergency Preparedness

Moore, Gary Dec. 9, 2005 Director, Logistics Branch, Federal Emergency 

Management Agency

Moulton, Brig. Gen. Harold, 

USAF Dec. 5, 2005 Director, Standing Joint Headquarters-North, U.S. 

Northern Command, U.S. Department of Defense

Mouton, Lt. Col. Doug Dec. 1, 2005 Commander, 225th Engineering Group, Louisiana 

National Guard

Muir, Col. Thomas, USA Dec. 6, 2005 Deputy Chief, Current Operations, U.S. Northern 

Command, U.S. Department of Defense

Murillo, Luis Dec. 7, 2005 Deputy Director, New Orleans Offi ce of Emergency 

Preparedness, Louisiana

Myers, Gen. Richard, USAF Feb. 28, 2006 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Department 

of Defense 

Naomi, Alfred Nov. 16, 2005; Dec. 

9, 2005

Senior Project Manager, Lake Pontchartrain and 

Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project, New Orleans 

District, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

Neely, Daryl Jan. 24, 2006 Policy Advisor, Offi ce of the Governor, Mississippi
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared

657

Nelms, Bill Jan. 6, 2006

Acquisitions Branch Manager, Federal Aviation 

Administration Southwest Region, Federal Aviation 

Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation

Nelson, Gordon Jan. 6, 2006 Assistant Secretary for Operations, Louisiana 

Department of Transportation and Development

Noble, Ellen Dec. 13, 2005 Chapters Solution Manager, Southeast Service 

Area, American Red Cross

O’Dell, Maj. Gen. Douglas, 

USMC Dec. 14, 2005 Commanding General, 4th Marine Division, U.S. 

Department of Defense

Oliver, Col. Cliff Nov. 30, 2005 Installation Commander, Gillis W. Long Center, 

Louisiana National Guard

Otterstedt, Col. Chuck, USA Nov. 16, 2005 Deputy Director of Operations, Joint Forces Command, U.S. Department of Defense

Oxley, Col. Mark Oct. 12, 2005; Dec. 9, 

2005; Mar. 13, 2006 Chief of Staff, Louisiana State Police

Parent, Charles Nov. 10, 2005 Superintendent, New Orleans Fire Department, 

Louisiana 

Parker, Gerald, D.V.M., Ph.D. Feb. 10, 2006

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Offi ce of 

Public Health Emergency Preparedness, U.S. 

Department of Health and Human Services

Parr, Philip Nov. 16, 2005 Federal Coordinating Offi cer, Region I, Federal 

Emergency Management Agency

Paskewich, Capt. Frank, 

USCG Oct. 12, 2005 Commander, Coast Guard Sector New Orleans, 

U.S. Coast Guard 

Payne, Maj. Wayne Dec. 6, 2005 Director of Operations, Harrison County Sheriff’s 

Department, Mississippi

Pearce, Vince Jan. 6, 2006

Manager, National Response Program, Offi ce of 

Intelligence, Security and Emergency Response, 

U.S. Department of Transportation 

Penoyer, Lt. Cmdr. Brian Mar. 2, 2006 Operations Integration Staff, U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security

Petillo, Jay Feb. 13, 2006

Operations Offi cer, Offi ce of Public Health and 

Emergency Preparedness, U.S. Department of 

Health and Human Services 

Pevey, Lt. Joe Dec. 6, 2005

Deputy Director, Southern Regional Public Safety 

Institute, Harrison County Sheriff’s Department, 

Mississippi
HSGAC Interviews

658

Phillips, George Jan. 26, 2006 Commissioner, Mississippi Department of Public 

Safety

Phillips, Jeff Nov. 1, 2005 Director, Emergency Operations Center, Offi ce of 

Emergency Management, New Mexico 

Pinner, Richard Nov. 16, 2005

Section Chief, Geotech Branch, Engineering Division, New Orleans District, U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers

Powell, Don Jan. 11, 2006

Coordinator of Recovery and Rebuilding in the 

Gulf Coast Region, U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security (named Nov. 1, 2005)

Pratts, Roseanne Jan. 31, 2006 Director of Emergency Preparedness, Louisiana 

Department of Health and Hospitals

Preau, Edmond, Jr. Nov. 17, 2005

Assistant Secretary, Public Works and Inter-Modal 

Transportation, Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development 

Prechter, Col. Pat Jan. 6, 2006

State Chief Nurse, Louisiana Army National Guard 

and Deputy Commander, Louisiana Medical Command

Prevo, Dan Jan. 17, 2006

Former Region VI Regional Emergency Transportation Representative, Offi ce of Intelligence, Security 

and Emergency Response, U.S. Department of 

Transportation 

Quinn, Cmdr. Tom, USN Nov. 15, 2005 Director of Operations, Naval Air Forces, Atlantic

Ramsey, Dennis Apr. 4, 2006 Mayor, City of Hope, Arkansas

Reese, Lou Oct. 14, 2005; Nov. 

21, 2005

Assistant to the Director, New Orleans Offi ce of 

Emergency Preparedness, Louisiana

Reininger, Capt. Bob, USCG Dec. 5, 2005

Chief, Future Operations Division, Operational 

Planning Group, U.S. Northern Command, U.S. 

Department of Defense

Rembert, Brenda Jan. 26, 2006 Director, Planning, Training and Exercise Bureau, 

Mississippi Emergency Management Agency

Reppel, Charles, Sr. Oct. 18, 2005 Special Assistant to the Parish President, St. 

Bernard Parish

Rhode, Patrick Dec. 22, 2005; Jan. 4, 

2006; Jan. 10, 2006

Acting Deputy Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency

Rice, Joseph Oct. 4, 2005 Director of Operations, Carson Helicopters, Inc

Riemann, Kris Dec. 8, 2005 Director of Public Works, City of Gulfport, Mississippi
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared

659

Riley, Warren Dec. 20, 2005; Jan. 

12, 2006

Former Deputy Superintendent, New Orleans 

Police Department, Louisiana 

Roberson, Col. Darryl, USAF Nov. 10, 2005

Assistant Deputy Director, Antiterrorism and 

Homeland Defense, Joint Staff, U.S. Department of 

Defense

Roberts, Col. Bryan, USA Feb. 23, 2006 Commander, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st 

Cavalry Division, U.S. Department of Defense

Roberts, David Jan. 18, 2006 Director, Biloxi Fire Department, Mississippi

Robinson, Tony Nov. 15, 2005 Director, Response and Recovery Division, Region 

VI, Federal Emergency Management Agency

Rodriguez, Junior Oct. 18, 2005 President, St. Bernard Parish, Louisiana

Rowe, Maj. Gen. Richard, 

USA Jan. 20, 2006 Director of Operations, U.S. Northern Command, 

U.S. Department of Defense

Russo, Nick Dec. 21, 2005 Federal Coordinating Offi cer, Region I, Federal 

Emergency Management Agency

Ryder, Terry Jan. 10, 2006 Executive Counsel, Offi ce of the Governor, Louisiana

Sanders, Rev. Torrin Nov. 23, 2005 President, Orleans Parish School Board, Louisiana

Santos, Col. Earl Dec. 21, 2005 Joint Director of Military Support, Louisiana 

National Guard

Scherling, Maj. Gen. Terry, 

USAF Jan. 19, 2006

Deputy Director for Antiterrorism and Homeland 

Defense, and Joint Director for Military Support, 

Operations Directorate, Joint Staff, U.S. Department of Defense

Selva, Brig. Gen. Paul, USAF Feb. 16, 2006 Director of Operations, U.S. Transportation Command, U.S. Department of Defense

Sexton, Alfred Dec. 19, 2005 Commander of Administration, Gulfport Police 

Department, Mississippi

Shaffer, Wilson, Ph.D. Feb. 24, 2006

Chief, Evaluations Branch, National Weather 

Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration

Shanahan, Col. Dan, USA Feb. 23, 2006 Commander, 1st Air Cavalry Brigade, 1st Cavalry 

Division, U.S. Department of Defense

Shingler, Wendell Jan. 31, 2006; Feb. 

14, 2006

Director, Offi ce of Federal Protective Service, Border and Transportation Security, U.S. Department 

of Homeland Security
HSGAC Interviews

660

Simonson, Stewart Feb. 16, 2006

Assistant Secretary, Offi ce of Public Health and 

Emergency Preparedness, U.S. Department of 

Health and Human Services

Sloan, Marie Mar. 1, 2006 Section Chief, Disaster Workforce, Response Division, Federal Emergency Management Agency

Smith, Jeffrey, Jr. Jan. 13, 2006

Acting Deputy Director, Emergency Management, 

Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness

Smith, Gavin Jan. 11, 2006 Director, Governor’s Offi ce of Recovery and 

Renewal, Mississippi

Smith, Col. George, USAF Dec. 6, 2005 Chief, Joint Planning Group, J5, U.S. Northern 

Command, U.S. Department of Defense

Smith, John Sept. 16, 2005 Mayor, City of Meridian, Mississippi

Smith, Kenya Dec. 20, 2005

Executive Assistant, Division of Intergovernmental Relations, Offi ce of the Mayor, City of New 

Orleans, Louisiana

Smith, Patricia Jan. 11, 2006 Director of Scheduling and Administration, Offi ce 

of the Mayor, City of New Orleans, Louisiana 

Smith, William Jan. 20, 2006 Chief Technology Offi cer, BellSouth Corp 

Smithburg, Don Feb. 7, 2006

Executive Vice President and Chief Executive Offi cer, Health Care Services Division, Louisiana State 

University

Smithson, Lt. Col. Lee Jan. 25, 2006 Director of Military Support, Mississippi Army 

National Guard

Snyder, Capt. Rick, USN Nov. 14, 2005 Executive Offi cer, USS Bataan

Spangenburg, Clayton Jan. 24, 2006 Program Specialist, Preparedness Division, Federal 

Emergency Management Agency

Spencer, Stevan, P.E. Nov. 14, 2005 Chief Engineer, Orleans Levee District, Louisiana

Spohrer, Gerry Nov. 15, 2005 Executive Director, West Jefferson Levee District, 

Louisiana

Spraggins, Col. Joseph, Nov. 17, 2005 Director, Harrison County Emergency Management 

Agency, Mississippi 

St. Amant, Jesse Nov. 9, 2005 Director, Homeland Security Offi ce of Emergency 

Preparedness, Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana

St. Martin, Marcia Dec. 9, 2005 Executive Director, New Orleans Sewerage and 

Water Board, Louisiana
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared

661

Stack, Michael Nov. 17, 2005

Engineer, New Orleans District Design Water 

Resources, Louisiana Department of Transportation 

and Development

Stanley, Ron Jan. 27, 2006 President, Landstar Express America, Inc.

Stanton, Larry Feb. 6, 2006

Deputy Director, Risk Management Division, Offi ce 

of Infrastructure Protection, Preparedness Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Stephan, Robert Jan. 13, 2006

Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for Infrastructure Protection, Preparedness Directorate, 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Stephens, Kevin, M.D. Nov. 9, 2005; Nov. 

10, 2005

Director, New Orleans Health Department, 

Louisiana

Strickland, Jim Jan. 25, 2006 Team Member, Urban Search and Rescue, Federal 

Emergency Management Agency 

Sullivan, Pat Dec. 7, 2005 Fire Chief, Gulfport Fire Department, Mississippi

Swain, Lonnie Nov. 9, 2005 Assistant Superintendent, New Orleans Police 

Department, Louisiana 

Taylor, Cynthia Oct. 14, 2005; Oct. 

17, 2005

Deputy Director, Offi ce of Public Affairs, Federal 

Emergency Management Agency

Thibodeaux, Lt. Col. Jacques Dec. 6, 2005; Jan. 12, 

2006

Joint Director of Military Support to Civilian 

Authorities, Louisiana National Guard

Tillie, James Dec. 19, 2005 Safety Director, Regional Transit Authority, New 

Orleans, Louisiana 

Tolbert, Eric Nov. 8, 2005; Dec. 1, 

2005

Former Director, Response Division, Federal Emergency Management Agency

Torres, Lt. Roberto, USCG Oct. 18, 2005 Pilot, Air Station New Orleans, Louisiana 

Tullier, Terry Nov. 22, 2005

Director, New Orleans Offi ce of Emergency 

Preparedness and former Deputy Director, New 

Orleans Fire Department, Louisiana 

Turner, Fredrick Nov. 23, 2005 Transportation Manager, Transportation Department, Orleans Parish School Board, Louisiana

Vallarautto, Terry Dec. 2, 2005 Interoperability Coordinator, Louisiana Offi ce of 

Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness

Vanacore, Michael Jan. 27, 2006

Director, Offi ce of International Affairs and Assistant Director, Offi ce of Investigations, Immigration and Custom Enforcement, U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security
HSGAC Interviews

662

Vanderwagen, Rear Adm. 

Craig Feb. 7, 2006

Acting Chief Medical Offi cer, Indian Health Service, 

and Offi cer, U.S. Public Health Service, U.S. Department of Health and Human Service

Vaughn, Lt. Gen. Clyde., USA Jan. 18, 2006 Director, Army National Guard, U.S. Department 

of Defense

Veillon, Brig. Gen. Brod, 

Louisiana AirNG Nov. 29, 2005 Assistant Adjutant General, Louisiana Air National 

Guard 

Villar, Chris Jan. 26, 2006 Owner, Go-Cans, LLC

Vislay, Lt. Cmdr. Mark, USCG Oct. 26, 2005

HH-60J Instructor Pilot, Training Division, Aviation 

Training Center Mobile, Alabama, U.S. Coast 

Guard

Wagenaar, Col. Richard, USA Nov. 15, 2005 District Engineer, New Orleans District, U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers 

Waguespack, Leslie Nov. 16, 2005

Task Force Guardian, New Orleans District Support 

Team, Mississippi Valley Division, U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers

Wainwright, Sherry Jan. 23, 2006 Assessment and Exercise Branch Chief, Region VI, 

Federal Emergency Management Agency

Wallace, Mark Jan. 20, 2006 Region VI, Operations Offi cer, Federal Emergency 

Management Agency

Warr, Brent

Nov. 15, 2005; Nov. 

17, 2005; Jan. 9, 

2006

Mayor, City of Gulfport, Mississippi

Weatherford, Alan Dec. 8, 2005 Operations Bureau Commander, Gulfport Police 

Department, Mississippi

Webb, David Feb. 7, 2006

Program Specialist, Program Offi ce, National 

Search and Rescue, Urban Search and Rescue 

Response System, Federal Emergency Management Agency

Wells, Scott Nov. 15, 2005

Deputy Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane 

Katrina in Louisiana, Federal Emergency Management Agency 

White, Marva Nov. 23, 2005 Director, Transportation Department, Orleans Parish School Board, Louisiana

Whitehorn, Col. Henry Nov. 29, 2005

Superintendent, Louisiana State Police and Deputy 

Secretary, Public Safety Services and Corrections, 

Louisiana

Wiley, Jeffery Nov. 4, 2005 Sheriff, Sheriff’s Offi ce, Ascension Parish, Louisiana
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared

663

Wilkins, Kay Dec. 20, 2005 Chief Executive Offi cer, Southeast Louisiana Chapter, American Red Cross

Williamson, Ann Dec. 7, 2005 Secretary, Louisiana Department of Social Services

Willow, Capt. Mark Nov. 9, 2005 Commander, Homeland Security Division, New 

Orleans Police Department, Louisiana

Womack, Thomas Jan. 27, 2006 Deputy Director, Mississippi Emergency Management Agency 

Wood, John Jan. 27, 2006 Chief of Staff, U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security

Woods, Col. Roberta, USA Dec. 7, 2005 Chief, Plans and Operations Division, U.S. Northern 

Command, U.S. Department of Defense

Young, Maj. Gen. Ronald Jan. 17, 2006 Acting Director, Joint Staff, National Guard Bureau, 

U.S. Department of Defense

Ziegler, D.J. Dec. 9, 2005 Harbor Master, Gulfport Harbor, Mississippi
584
665

Appendix 5

Additional Views

Senator Susan M. Collins, Senator Ted Stevens, 

Senator Norm Coleman, Senator Tom Coburn, M.D., 

Senator Robert F. Bennett, and Senator Pete V. Domenici. 

On White House and Department of Homeland Security Cooperation

Th e Committee’s seven-month investigation into the preparedness for and response to 

Hurricane Katrina, by all levels of government, has been an extraordinary undertaking. Th e 

Committee has held 22 hearings with 85 witnesses, has received and analyzed 838,000 pages 

of documents, and has formally interviewed more than 325 individuals. Th is investigation 

has been the most comprehensive of the Katrina reviews, each of which has been useful in 

advancing the public’s understanding.

Th e Committee has been relentless in its eff orts to secure the information it has needed to 

ensure that the investigation is thorough and comprehensive. And we have succeeded. On 

October 7, 2005, the Committee sent extensive requests for documents and information to 

the White House and the Offi ce of the Vice President. On January 12, 2006, the Committee 

sent another letter to the White House prioritizing the requests and asking for more documents and information. Th roughout the process, we have been in direct communications 

with the White House to secure the documents and information that we required. 

Th e Committee has been similarly adamant in its pursuit of documents and information from 

federal departments and agencies. Th e Department of Homeland Security alone has produced 

350,000 pages of documents and made available more than 70 witnesses for interviews.

Moreover, when one federal entity refused to make key witnesses available for interviews, 

the Committee issued fi ve subpoenas for Department of Justice personnel, who were 

promptly interviewed by Committee staff .

Th e Executive Offi ce of the President has produced more than 17,000 pages of documents. 

Th ese documents include memos, policy analyses, and e-mails with electronic attachments 

sent to individuals in the White House. Th e Committee also has received transcripts of the 

FEMA-hosted video teleconferences, including those in which the President or other White 

House offi cials participated. Collectively, these documents show us the information that the 

White House was receiving from various agencies before landfall and during the response 

phase. Th e production contains documents relating to the White House Task Force Katrina 

and includes lists of individuals attending White House-organized meetings and summaries 

of agency eff orts. Also produced were documents that included information provided to the 

most senior offi cials within the White House during the critical period.

In addition to the documents, the White House has provided two extensive briefi ngs on its role 

in the preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina, and a third briefi ng on the White 

House Lessons Learned report. All three briefi ngs were presented by Ken Rapuano, the Deputy 

Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, who was deeply involved in the response to 

Hurricane Katrina at the White House. Th ese briefi ngs included signifi cant question-and-answer sessions where Committee staff had the opportunity to explore issues in depth. 

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared
666

In addition to the information the Committee has received from the White House document productions and briefi ngs, the Committee has analyzed the Lessons Learned report, 

which further details the White House’s involvement in – and shortcomings relating to 

– the response to Hurricane Katrina. Th e 125 specifi c recommendations in the report 

include several suggestions that recognize problems with the White House’s role before or 

following the catastrophe.

Th e Offi ce of the Vice President (OVP), too, produced documents that have helped us piece 

together its role, and that of the White House, with respect to Hurricane Katrina. Among 

the more than 6,300 pages of documents produced are substantive e-mails, policy memos, 

and reports on the economic impact of Hurricane Katrina. Some of the e-mails were from 

David Addington, Counsel to the Vice President (and now Chief of Staff ). Th e OVP also 

produced daily reports of the White House Hurricane Katrina Task Force and Homeland 

Security Council agendas.

Finally, the Committee has gained insight into the White House role through the testimony 

and subsequent interview of former FEMA Director Michael Brown. In his February 10, 

2006, testimony before the Committee and interview with Committee staff two weeks later, 

as well as through documents he produced directly to the Committee, Mr. Brown gave us 

his detailed view into the workings and deliberations of the White House during this critical period. As a result, the Committee has a well-developed picture of the White House’s 

interaction with the top federal offi cial on the ground before and during the critical days 

aft er Katrina made landfall. We know that, through Mr. Brown’s communications with 

Deputy White House Chief of Staff Joseph Hagin, the White House was aware, on the day 

of the storm, of the devastation that New Orleans had suff ered. And we know, from documents produced to us by Mr. Brown, that White House Chief of Staff Andy Card was aware 

of what Mr. Brown had told Mr. Hagin.

While, as noted, the Committee has received extensive briefi ngs from Homeland Security 

Council staff as well as more than 23,000 pages of documents from the White House and 

OVP, much of the Committee’s information on alleged communications between Mr. 

Brown and the President and his staff comes from Mr. Brown, and Mr. Brown alone. Th e 

White House staff declined the opportunity to be interviewed, which would have allowed 

for an even more complete understanding of what transpired.

As a result of the Committee’s eff orts, we have a clear window into the functioning and role 

of the White House in the days before and aft er Hurricane Katrina made landfall. Th e Committee had ample evidence to draw conclusions on how to strengthen our nation’s ability to 

prepare for and respond to future catastrophes.

Additional Views
667

Additional Views

Senator Joseph I. Lieberman, Senator Carl Levin, 

Senator Daniel K. Akaka, Senator Th omas R. Carper, 

Senator Frank R. Lautenberg, and Senator Mark L. Pryor 

On White House Katrina Failures, Administration Lack of Cooperation 

With the Investigation, and Failure to Establish Unifi ed Command

As it did with the investigation that preceded the issuing of this Report, the Committee has 

produced a thorough and thoughtful piece of work, which we are proud to have worked on 

and wholeheartedly support. Indeed, the conduct of this investigation and the draft ing of 

the Report should serve as a model for future such endeavors. In its comprehensiveness and 

non-partisanship, the Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs Committee’s Hurricane Katrina investigation did exactly what the American people have a right to expect 

from a Congressional investigation. For that, we are very grateful to Chairman Collins and 

Ranking Member Lieberman, who have worked closely since they fi rst announced, last 

September, their intent to investigate the tragedy that Katrina – and the fl awed government 

response to it – wrought upon the citizens of the Gulf Coast.

We write separately here to express our additional views on three matters on which the 

Chairman and the Ranking Member were ultimately unable to reach a meeting of the 

minds: Th e role of the White House and the President in the events leading to and following 

last August’s storm; the level of cooperation provided by the Administration to this investigation; and the failure to establish a unifi ed command in Louisiana to respond to Katrina.

Th e Committee’s eff orts to understand the role the White House played in events leading 

up to and following the catastrophe were severely hindered by the White House’s failure to 

comply with Committee requests for information, documents, and interviews. As a result, 

we learned much too little about what the White House and the Executive Offi ce of the 

President were doing during the critical days before and aft er Katrina struck. 

Based on the information the Committee was able to obtain, we have reached the following 

conclusions: 

1. As the head of the federal government, the President has a unique responsibility to ensure government preparedness and response at critical times. For 

Hurricane Katrina, the President failed to provide critical leadership when it 

was most needed, and that contributed to a grossly ineff ective federal response 

to Hurricane Katrina.

2. Th e White House was aware long before Katrina struck that FEMA did not 

have the capability to handle a catastrophe, but failed to adequately address the 

critical shortcomings in preparedness.

3. Th e White House had been aware of the “New Orleans Scenario,” a catastrophic hurricane hitting New Orleans. Despite this awareness, the White 

House failed to ensure that the federal government was prepared to respond to 

this catastrophic scenario. 

4. Despite the clear warnings before landfall that Katrina would be catastrophic, the President and the White House staff were not suffi ciently engaged and 

failed to initiate a suffi ciently strong and proactive response. 

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared 
Additional Views

668

5. Although the President and the White House were following events aft er 

landfall, they seemed surprisingly detached until two days later, Wednesday, 

August 31, 2005. 

6. Aft er the hurricane, the White House continued to demonstrate a lack of 

understanding of the magnitude of the catastrophe.

7. Th e White House’s failure to cooperate with this Committee’s investigation 

wrongly deprived the Committee and the American people of the ability to assess a key aspect of the federal government’s response to Hurricane Katrina. 

Part I: The Role of the White House

As the head of the federal government, the President has a unique responsibility to ensure government preparedness and response at critical times. For 

Hurricane Katrina, the President failed to provide critical leadership when 

it was most needed, and that contributed to a grossly ineff ective federal 

response to Hurricane Katrina.

A catastrophic event in the United States requires clear, decisive, and constant Presidential leadership. 

Th e President is the head of the federal government. Th e Constitution vests executive 

power in him. He is personally charged with taking care that the nation’s laws are faithfully 

executed. And while he has the apparatus of the entire federal government to aid him in discharging his Constitutional functions, he is no titular head of government. To the contrary, 

only he – or those working in the White House on his behalf – has the authority to order 

all federal agencies to take action, to resolve disputes among participating federal agencies, 

and to ensure that the government as a whole functions as it should in a time of crisis and 

catastrophe.

He has another, more symbolic role, which is also very important. As Presidential scholar 

Clinton Rossiter has written, the President is “the one-man distillation of the American 

people.”1

 President Bush showed the power of that role in the wake of 9/11, when he made 

clear to the nation that he was in control of the response.

But in the events leading up to and following Hurricane Katrina’s landfall, the President 

and his staff did not provide early, urgent, and strong public leadership, and the nation suffered. 

The White House was aware long before Katrina struck that FEMA did not have the 

capability to handle a catastrophe, but failed to adequately address the critical shortcomings in preparedness.

Th roughout his term as FEMA Director, Michael Brown sounded the alarm to White House 

offi cials about the degradation of FEMA’s capabilities and that the agency was not prepared 

to handle a catastrophe. For example, aft er the tsunami that struck Southeast Asia in 2004, 

Brown told President Bush that FEMA did not have the resources to respond to a catastrophe of that magnitude.2

Brown also repeatedly told then-White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card, Deputy Chief 

of Staff Joe Hagin, and then-Offi ce of Management and Budget Director Josh Bolten that 

FEMA did not have the capabilities to respond adequately to a catastrophe and sought additional resources.3

 Brown said that he told these offi cials several times that “We [FEMA] 

weren’t getting the money we needed; we weren’t getting the personnel that we needed, 
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared 

669

that DHS was – I don’t think I ever used with them the word emaciating us, but I described 

to them, you know, DHS was not really following the Homeland Security Act and giving 

[emergency preparedness and response] the muscle that it was supposed to have.”4

We do not know what the White House did with Brown’s requests, but we do know that 

FEMA was underfunded and unprepared heading into the 2005 hurricane season. As the 

chief executive of the federal government, the President bears responsibility for FEMA’s 

lack of preparedness.

Th e White House had been aware of the “New Orleans Scenario,” a catastrophic hurricane hitting New Orleans. Despite this awareness, the White 

House failed to ensure that the federal government was prepared to respond 

to this catastrophic scenario. 

As discussed in the Committee’s report, the threat of a Category 3 storm to New Orleans 

was well known, and the White House was among those who clearly knew of it. In early 

2004, for example, Assistant to the President and Homeland Security Advisor General John 

A. Gordon traveled to New Orleans to receive a briefi ng on the region’s catastrophic-hurricane planning eff orts. Th e briefi ng was comprehensive and detailed. Gen. Gordon learned 

about the catastrophic consequences of a Category 3 hurricane striking New Orleans, and 

reported the information to the White House with a request for funding that resulted in the 

Hurricane Pam exercise, the fi rst inter-governmental exercise to test preparation for and 

response to such a contingency.5

Another White House aide, Janet Benini, Director of Response and Planning for the White 

House Homeland Security Council, attended the Hurricane Pam exercise (although she did 

not work at the White House during the Katrina response).6

 Benini also chaired the group 

that developed the National Planning Scenarios, a set of 15 plausible, high-consequence 

events used by the federal government to come up with preparedness goals and lists of 

emergency-response capabilities necessary for federal, state, and local responders. One of 

the scenarios was a hurricane hitting New Orleans.7

Both Benini and Kirstjen Nielsen, the Senior Director for Preparedness and Response at 

the White House Homeland Security Council, received an e-mail in February 2005 indicating that fl ooding in New Orleans “could cause similar devastation” as the tsunami did in 

Southeast Asia.8

When Katrina landed in the United States in August 2005, we found a federal government 

that was unprepared for a catastrophic hurricane. Th e White House’s failure to ensure such 

preparedness is therefore particularly profound, in light of its understanding of the catastrophic New Orleans scenario for close to two years before Katrina hit.

Despite the clear warnings before landfall that Katrina would be catastrophic, the President and the White House staff were not suffi ciently engaged and 

failed to initiate a suffi ciently strong and proactive response. 

Th e White House’s – and the President’s – knowledge of the risk of a massive storm to New 

Orleans became even more specifi c in the days leading up to Hurricane Katrina. Katrina 

was a lesser challenge to the nation’s emergency-management apparatus than the 9/11 attacks in one critical way: It was preceded by 72 hours of increasingly dire predictions. In the 

days before landfall, the White House received repeated warnings from top offi cials at the 

National Weather Service and the National Hurricane Center that Katrina’s impact would 

be catastrophic. FEMA and DHS’s National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center 

echoed the alarm in direct messages to the White House, as did senior state offi cials.9
Additional Views

670

Saturday, August 27, 2005 (Two Days before Landfall)

Th ese warnings began on Saturday, August 27, 2005, two days before landfall. FEMA Director Brown says he spoke directly to President Bush, saying that Katrina could be catastrophic – “the big one” that meteorologists, emergency-management experts, and government 

offi cials had feared for years.10

On Saturday, White House staff in Crawford, Texas, where the President was vacationing, 

members of the White House Homeland Security Council, and other White House offi ces 

participated in a noon video teleconference call organized by FEMA. Th e potentially catastrophic nature of Katrina was discussed during this conversation as well.11 Brown said: 

I know I am preaching to the choir on this one, but I’ve learned over the past 

four and a half, fi ve years, to go with my gut on a lot of things, and I’ve got to 

tell you my gut hurts on this one. It hurts. I’ve got cramps. So, we need to take 

this one very, very seriously.12

During the same call, a National Hurricane Center forecaster discussed the danger of 

Katrina’s storm surge: 

Well, obviously, where it’s headed, you’re at the worst possible locations for 

storm surge. You remember [Hurricane] Camille and its 26 feet. I would advise 

all the folks that are in the potential path of this storm to be looking at their 

maximum off the storm surge models, the meows [maximum envelopes of 

water] and whatnot off of a Category 4 or 5 storm, and plan accordingly.13

Yet White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joe Hagin, the senior White House offi cial participating in the FEMA video teleconference, asked no questions aft er Brown’s severe forecast. 

Instead, Hagin limited himself to a perplexingly optimistic assessment of FEMA’s readiness: “We’re here, and anything we can do, obviously, to support you, but it sounds like the 

planning, as usual, is in good shape, and good luck to the States and just know that we’re 

watching, and we’ll do the right thing as fast as we can.”14

Th e warnings continued through the night. At 11:24 p.m., the White House received a 

National Weather Service–National Hurricane Center report which said: “Th e bottom line 

is that Katrina is expected to be an intense and dangerous hurricane heading towards the 

North Central Gulf Coast ... and this has to be taken very seriously.”15

Sunday, August 28, 2005 (Day before Landfall)

Th ere was another FEMA video teleconference at noon on Sunday. Th is time, President 

Bush took part, along with offi cials from DHS, FEMA, Louisiana, and Mississippi.16 Dr. 

Max Mayfi eld, Director of the National Hurricane Center, predicted Katrina would be a 

“very dangerous hurricane,” adding that the possibility that levees could be overtopped was 

a “very, very grave concern.17

FEMA Director Michael Brown reiterated his concern: “My gut tells me – I told you guys 

my gut was that this [missing] is a bad one and a big one,” and that Katrina could be “a 

catastrophe within a catastrophe.”18 Bill Doran, the Chief of Operations for Louisiana’s Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, said that the state was undergoing 

“planning for a catastrophic event.”19

Neither the President nor his staff made any inquiries. Th e President off ered only the following statement: 

I want to assure the folks at the state level that we are fully prepared to not only 

help you during the storm, but we will move in whatever resources and assets 
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared 

671

we have at our disposal aft er the storm to help you deal with the loss of property. And we pray for no loss of life, of course. 

Unfortunately, we’ve had experience at this in recent years, and I – the FEMA 

folks have done great work in the past, and I’m confi dent, Mike, that you and 

your team will do all you can to help the good folks in these aff ected states. 

Again, I want to thank [Louisiana] Governor [Kathleen] Blanco and [Alabama] 

Governor [Bob] Riley and [Mississippi] Governor [Haley Barbour], Governor 

[Jeb] Bush of Florida, for heeding these warnings, and doing all you can possibly do with your state folks and local folks to prepare the citizenry for this 

storm. 

In the meantime, I know the nation will be praying for the good folks in the 

aff ected areas, and we just hope for the very best.20

Th e White House continued to receive warnings about the storm’s projected force throughout the day.21 Early Sunday morning, it had been notifi ed that Katrina had been upgraded 

to a Category 5 storm; at approximately 5 p.m. ET, DHS’s Homeland Security Operations 

Center sent to the White House a report that included a National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration update, which repeated Dr. Mayfi eld’s warning about fl oodwaters overtopping New Orleans’ levees.22

Th e warnings continued throughout late Sunday night and early Monday morning, just 

hours before landfall. At 1:47 a.m. ET, the Homeland Security Operations Center sent the 

White House a report from DHS’s National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center, 

which predicted: “Any storm rated Category 4 or greater on the Saffi r-Simpson scale will 

likely lead to severe fl ooding and/or levee breaching. Th is could leave the New Orleans area 

being submerged for weeks or months. ... Th e magnitude of this storm is expected to cause 

massive fl ooding.”23

To his credit, the President did take at least two steps that showed some understanding of 

the urgency of the impending crisis: First, at the requests of Governors Blanco, Barbour, 

and Riley, the President issued a pre-storm declaration of emergency for the Gulf Coast 

states, which ensured that the federal government would fi nance many pre-landfall and 

post-landfall activities undertaken by state and local offi cials.24 Th is had only been done 

once in the previous 15 years, when President Clinton issued four pre-landfall declarations, 

all for Hurricane Floyd in 1999. Second, on the day before landfall, at the urging of FEMA 

Director Brown,25 the President called Governor Blanco to urge a mandatory evacuation 

of New Orleans; however, that call occurred “just before she walk[ed] into the news conference” with Mayor Nagin to announce the evacuation of New Orleans.26 Th erefore, the 

President’s call came too late, as the Governor and Mayor had already decided to announce 

the mandatory evacuation.

With the exception of these two steps, in the face of dire warnings of the catastrophe before 

landfall, there was a failure of presidential leadership and initiative.

Although the President and the White House were following events aft er 

landfall, they seemed surprisingly detached until two days later, Wednesday, 

August 31, 2005. 

Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff has said that the President was “acutely 

aware of Katrina and the risk it posed” during the weekend before landfall.27 “[W]e went into 

the weekend before,” Secretary Chertoff said, “with an understanding and with warnings that 
Additional Views

672

this was potentially the nightmare scenario that I think people have talked about for years in 

terms of New Orleans.”28

Unfortunately, the President’s behavior didn’t refl ect this awareness. Instead of exercising 

the actual and symbolic leadership of the President, he seemed detached. 

Th e President didn’t return to Washington until two days aft er Katrina hit,29 sending a clear 

message to the rest of the federal government about the storm’s perceived importance in the 

federal hierarchy, and depriving the government of the clear and signifi cant focus the storm 

required at that point. As Congressman Tom Davis, Chairman of the House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina aptly 

put it, “Th e director ... of the National Hurricane Center said this was the big one,” but 

“when this happened ... Bush is in Texas. Card is in Maine. Th e vice president is fl y-fi shing. 

I mean, who’s in charge here?”30

Th e White House’s failure to set in motion a more proactive set of pre-landfall preparations 

by the federal government was part of the reason the response was so ineff ective. 

Th is presidential detachment is particularly unacceptable because of the fl ow of specifi c information coming into the White House about the growing catastrophe that was occurring 

on America’s Gulf Coast.

Monday, August 29, 2005 (Day of Landfall)

Katrina came ashore in Louisiana at 6:10 a.m. CT, Monday morning, August 29, 2005.31

As early as 11:13 a.m. ET, the White House’s own Homeland Security Council circulated a 

report with the following information:

• A levee in New Orleans had broken;

• Based on a report from the Homeland Security Operations Center, water was 

rising in the city’s Lower Ninth Ward; 

• Based on a report from Governor Blanco, water was rising at one foot per 

hour; and

• Based on a report from Mayor Nagin, problems with a pumping station were 

undermining the city’s ability to relieve fl ooding.32

Minutes later, the Homeland Security Operations Center e-mailed the White House that 

at 7:30 a.m. CT, Mayor Nagin had announced that there was “water coming over the levee 

system in the Lower Ninth Ward;”33 that the State of Louisiana’s Adjutant General, Maj. 

Gen. Bennett Landreneau, had confi rmed that water was rising in the Lower Ninth Ward;34

and that local offi cials had said that “fl oodwaters are encroaching on roads in the lower-lying parishes of St. Bernard and Plaquemines.”35

At noon, White House Deputy Chief of Staff Hagin, who was traveling with the President on 

Air Force One, participated in a conference call with state and local offi cials who reported 

fl ooding of eight to 10 feet in St. Bernard Parish.36 Th e President did not take part in the call.

Th e White House, and Hagin in particular, also received direct reports from FEMA Director Brown.37 According to Brown, he informed Hagin no later than 6 p.m. CT Monday that 

New Orleans’ 17th Street levee had broken, and that the city was fl ooding.38 Brown testifi ed that he was certain that the information reached the President: “I never worried about 

whether I talked directly to the President because I knew that in speaking to Joe [Hagin], I 

was talking directly to the President.”39
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared 

673

FEMA Director Brown testifi ed that he made some 30 calls to the President, White House 

Chief of Staff Andrew Card, Deputy Chief of Staff Joe Hagin, and other senior White House 

offi cials throughout the weekend before landfall.40 Because the White House refused to 

cooperate with the Committee’s requests, we don’t know what the President and his staff 

did with the information about the impending disaster from Brown and others. What questions did they ask? What instructions did they give? Card and Hagin were getting direct and 

unequivocal assessments of a catastrophe from the federal offi cial charged with coordinating the response to the storm. Brown recalls telling Hagin in a Sunday aft ernoon call “how 

bad this one was going to be” and was “adamant” that the White House should understand 

his concern about New Orleans.41 Did Hagin tell the President, as Brown assumed? Were 

there discussions about marshaling federal assets? Were calls made from the White House 

to Secretary Chertoff ? Did Card or Hagin reach out to other Cabinet secretaries? Did they 

contact Secretary Rumsfeld about the readiness of the military to enter the Gulf Coast to 

help? Th e White House has declined to answer such important questions, and so the Committee therefore is unable to off er any insights into these critical issues.

What we do know is that instead of responding to the ominous reports from the Gulf Coast, 

the President spent the day of landfall discussing Medicare in Arizona and California, as 

well as joining Arizona Senator John McCain at his birthday celebration.42

At 4:40 p.m. New Orleans time, as Hurricane Katrina was fl ooding and battering the city, 

the President was in Rancho Cucamonga, California, delivering a speech on Medicare and 

new prescription-drug benefi ts. He off ered only this brief assessment of the unfolding crisis 

in the Gulf during a 30-minute speech: 

We’re in constant contact with the local offi cials down there. Th e storm is 

moving through, and we’re now able to assess damage, or beginning to assess 

damage. ... For those of you who are concerned about whether or not we’re 

prepared to help, don’t be. We are. We’re in place. We’ve got equipment in 

place, supplies in place. And once the – once we’re able to assess the damage, 

we’ll be able to move in and help those good folks in the aff ected areas.

43

President Bush had off ered similar assurances to survivors of the storm earlier in the day, 

during a “Conversation on Medicare” at the Pueblo El Mirage RV Resort and Country Club 

in El Mirage, Arizona:

When the storm passes, the federal government has got assets and resources 

that we’ll be deploying to help you.44

As we now know – and the President should have known then – this was not the case: As 

the Committee has demonstrated throughout this report, various levels of government were 

not prepared to help. 

Th e White House received additional reports that the levees had broken in the early hours 

of Tuesday, August 30 (the day aft er landfall), but continued to operate as if it hadn’t. At 

12:02 a.m. ET, the White House received a report from the Homeland Security Operations 

Center that included this chilling assessment by the lone offi cial FEMA had sent to New 

Orleans, public-aff airs offi cer Marty Bahamonde: “Th ere is a quarter-mile breech (sic) in the 

levee near the 17th Street Canal about 200 yards from Lake Pontchartrain allowing water to 

fl ow into the City ... an estimated 2/3 to 75% of the city is under water.”45

Another DHS situation report, at 6:33 a.m. ET, confi rmed the extent of fl ooding and damage in New Orleans:
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674

Widespread and signifi cant fl ooding has occurred throughout the city of New 

Orleans, extending eastward, across the Mississippi gulf coast into coastal 

Alabama. Th e following fl ood reports have been received for the city of New 

Orleans:

• Industrial Canal at Tennessee St.: levee has been breached, with water to a 

depth of 5 feet at Jackson Barracks

• 17th St. at Canal Blvd.: levee has been breached – breach extends several 100 

meters in length

• Much of downtown and east New Orleans is underwater, depth unknown at 

this time.

Th e U.S. Army Corps of Engineers estimates are in progress and project that it 

could take months to dewater the City of New Orleans.46

A 10:23 a.m. ET report from the Homeland Security Operations Center detailed the locations of the breached levees and noted specifi c concerns about the 17th Street Canal and 

Tennessee Street levees.47

Th ese reports notwithstanding, no one from the White House participated in an inter-governmental conference call at noon organized by FEMA. Instead, the President was at a naval base 

in San Diego, where, once again, he off ered a falsely reassuring assessment of the crisis: “Our 

teams and equipment are in place and we’re beginning to move in the help that people need.”48

In fact, it seems as if President Bush and, consequently, the Administration, did not grasp 

that Katrina was a catastrophe until later in the day – a full day and a half aft er landfall 

– when Michael Brown informed President Bush, Vice-President Cheney, Secretary Chertoff , and Deputy Chief of Staff Karl Rove in a telephone call that at least 90 percent of New 

Orleans’s population had been displaced and that responders “needed military assets; this 

was the big one.”49 He added that FEMA “needed the help of the entire cabinet ... DOD and 

HHS and everybody else.”50

Brown testifi ed that this, at last, may have been the turning point in the President’s comprehension of the catastrophe:

And as I recall my fi rst statement to him was, you know, Mr. President, I 

estimate right now that 90 percent of the population of New Orleans has been 

displaced. And he is like, My God you mean it is that bad? Yes, sir, it was that 

bad.51

Brown added that he thought the offi cials on the call continued to fail to grasp how badly 

FEMA and the state were overwhelmed,52 but Brown’s alarm seems to have prompted a 

“discussion about convening the Cabinet.”53

On Tuesday morning, while in California, White House Press Secretary Scott McClellan 

announced that the President would return to Washington, D.C., on Wednesday in order to 

“oversee the response eff orts from there.”54

Soon aft er, the President began to take steps to amplify and organize the government’s 

response. At 5:11 p.m., nearly 60 hours aft er landfall, President Bush, surrounded by his 

Cabinet, addressed the nation from the Rose Garden, announcing that he had convened the 

Cabinet and “directed Secretary of Homeland Security Mike Chertoff to chair a Cabinetlevel task force to coordinate all our assistance from Washington.”55 Notably, the task force 

demanded a list of available resources from each federal agency assigned responsibility in a 
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared 

675

disaster under the National Response Plan.56 For example, FEMA was asked for “the inventory of all department agency operations/activity. ... Are [there] any Federal powers or other 

processes that could be implemented to expedite the response or make it more effi cient. ... 

What are the plans for providing housing to ... displaced people by hurricane damage?”57

Th ese questions were being asked for the fi rst time more than two days aft er landfall.

When Hurricane Rita threatened the Gulf Coast weeks later, the nation saw what can happen when the White House becomes more actively engaged in catastrophe preparedness before landfall. For example, on September 20, 2005, three days before landfall, the President 

participated in a hurricane briefi ng shortly aft er Rita had become a Category 1 hurricane.58

Aft er the briefi ng, the President announced that a Coast Guard admiral would be stationed 

in Texas to coordinate the response59 and later that day made an emergency declaration for 

the State of Florida at the request of its Governor. On September 21, two days before Rita 

made landfall, the President also issued disaster declarations for Louisiana and Texas.60 On 

September 22, the day before the storm hit, the President visited Texas to “get a fi rsthand 

look at the preparations”61 and then traveled to Northern Command, the domestic military headquarters in Colorado, where he participated in a series of briefi ngs detailing the 

response and coordination between DOD, other government agencies, and state and local 

governments62

In the case of Katrina, the President did not take equally meaningful action until two days 

aft er landfall. Th e President should have made these critical moves – returning to Washington, convening the Cabinet, taking stock of the federal government’s readiness for Katrina, 

making sure key White House staff were at their posts, and directly addressing the people of 

the Gulf Coast – before landfall. 

Aft er the hurricane, the White House continued to demonstrate a lack of 

understanding of the magnitude of the catastrophe.

Even several days aft er landfall, statements from the President and the White House suggested that they still did not understand or appreciate what had happened to New Orleans.

On the Th ursday, September 1, edition of “Good Morning America,” the President said that 

“I don’t think anybody anticipated the breach of the levees.”63 He was later given an opportunity to correct his statement. Th e President said he was not misinformed and affi rmed his 

view, continuing:

When that storm came by, a lot of people said we dodged a bullet. When that 

storm came through at fi rst, people said, Whew. Th ere was a sense of relaxation, and that’s what I was referring to. And I, myself, thought we had dodged 

a bullet. You know why? Because I was listening to people, probably over the 

[airwaves], say, the bullet has been dodged. And that was what I was referring 

to. Of course, there were plans in case the levee had been breached. Th ere was a 

sense of relaxation in the moment, a critical moment.64

But the President was wrong. 

Th e levees breached soon aft er the storm came ashore,65 as was noted in the reports that 

arrived at the White House.66 Th e vulnerability of the levees to a catastrophic storm was 

known long before Katrina.67 Besides, the city was threatened as much by fl ooding from 

overtopping as it was from breaches, a danger forewarned in the years before Katrina and 

reiterated in the months before landfall by federal agencies.68

During a press conference in Mobile, Alabama on Friday following landfall, President Bush 

infamously said of Brown, “Brownie, you’re doing a heck of a job.”69 Brown’s performance 
Additional Views

676

was anything but worthy of praise. Th is comment was totally at odds with what was apparent to all – that the federal government’s response, which was supposed to have been led in 

part by then FEMA Director Brown, was grossly inadequate. It serves as an example of just 

how disengaged President Bush was from the failed response. It illustrates the President’s 

failure to understand Katrina’s devastation and the suff ering of Katrina’s victims. 

Th e White House received a massive amount of information from a wide range of authoritative sources describing in dire terms the catastrophe unfolding in the Gulf.70 While some 

media reports inaccurately described the storm as a near-miss that had mostly spared the 

city, the President of the United States should have been fully and accurately informed and 

should have acted urgently on that information. 

Decisive presidential leadership before and immediately aft er Katrina was missing. How 

much it could have mitigated the loss of life and anguish of survivors in the Gulf Coast will 

never be known.

Part II: Lack of Administration Cooperation in Investigation

Th e Administration’s failure to cooperate with the Committee’s investigation had regrettable consequences. In too many instances, the Committee faced agencies and Departments 

that saw its eff orts as a nuisance – and their own response as up to their discretion. And 

the worst off ender was the entity that should have stood above the fray and worked hardest 

with the Committee to uncover the government’s failings in Katrina: the White House.

Despite President Bush’s pronouncement early on that he recognized that “Congress also 

has an important oversight function to perform” and his commitment that “I will work 

with members of both parties to make sure this eff ort is thorough,”71 our Committee faced 

a White House less willing to cooperate with a Senate investigation than any we have 

witnessed in our many years in this body. Th at is why we ultimately concluded that the 

Committee should issue subpoenas to the White House to produce the material that the 

Committee asked for during its investigation. Unfortunately, the Chairman disagreed with 

Senator Lieberman’s request to issue subpoenas, and so, the Committee did not obtain all 

that we believe was necessary for a comprehensive investigation.

Th ere are matters that we could not fully explore because of agency and Administration 

recalcitrance and, in some cases, intransigence. We don’t know what we don’t know – for 

example, as a result of the Justice Department’s failure to produce large volumes of what the 

Committee had requested. But one thing we do know is that because we were denied the 

opportunity to fully explore the role the White House played in preparing for and responding to Katrina, we have little insight into how the President and his staff monitored, managed, and directed the government’s disaster preparedness in the post-9/11 world, how they 

coordinated the rest of the federal bureaucracy in response to Katrina, or how leadership 

was exercised by the only entity in the federal government with the authority to order all the 

others to act. Without this information, the Committee’s investigation necessarily lacked 

the ability to fully and fairly analyze and assess a critical element of the response to Katrina.

We have plenty of circumstantial evidence to believe that there were signifi cant failures of 

leadership at the top and actions that should have been taken but were not. Th at evidence 

is discussed in the previous section of these additional views. But there remain too many 

important questions that cannot be answered conclusively because the White House did not 

provide the information necessary to do so. 
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared 

677

Clearly, our government was unprepared to deal with the catastrophe of Katrina. Only 

through a thorough and comprehensive investigation of what went wrong could we be assured that the government will know what steps are necessary to get it right the next time. 

Full cooperation in this investigation was critical, but was denied.

The White House

A Chronology of Efforts to Obtain Information from the White House

On October 7, 2005, the Committee sent a letter, signed by Chairman Collins and Senator Lieberman, to White House Chief of Staff Andrew H. Card, Jr. Th e letter was similar to 

those sent to over twenty federal agencies and Departments, as well as to the Governors of 

Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama, the Mayors of New Orleans, Biloxi, Gulfport, and Mobile, and a number of other state and local agencies. Th e goal of these letters was to help the 

Committee collect a comprehensive set of documents and information that would allow it 

to understand what those at all levels of all relevant governments did or didn’t do to prepare 

for and respond to Hurricane Katrina. 

Th e White House letter sought a variety of documents and information. Some requests 

were basic, like those that asked the White House to identify its various components with 

emergency-preparedness and response responsibilities, to explain how the White House 

learns of and monitors hurricanes, and to provide an organizational chart of the relevant 

White House components. Others sought more detailed, Katrina-specifi c information, 

such as how the White House and the President fi rst learned about the storm, who was 

responsible for processing requests from the Governors for emergency declarations, how 

much the White House understood about the vulnerability of New Orleans to fl ooding, 

and, perhaps most importantly, a description of what the White House specifi cally did to 

prepare for and respond to the hurricane. Th e Committee also asked for documents related 

to all of these issues.

Th e closest cognates we have to the White House – the governors of the aff ected states – responded well to similar letters. Louisiana Governor Kathleen Blanco’s offi ce, for example, 

produced over 8,000 pages of substantive documents, including a large number of e-mails 

to or from the Governor herself, and granted the Committee access to all six members 

of her staff with whom it requested interviews. Similarly, Mississippi Governor Haley 

Barbour’s offi ce provided the information that the Committee asked for, including material directly involving the Governor’s offi ce and his staff , and the Committee interviewed 

both members of the Governor’s staff for whom it asked. Th e cooperation the Committee 

received from these offi ces greatly enhanced the Committee’s ability to understand what 

happened, and helped ensure that it could be confi dent in the Committee report’s fi ndings 

and conclusions.

Th e White House was an entirely diff erent story. On November 3, 2005, the Committee 

received its initial response. In a letter signed by Deputy Counsel to the President William 

K. Kelley, the White House started off well, pledging that “[t]he Administration is committed to cooperating with your Committee.” Unfortunately, it then off ered very little to show 

for that commitment. Kelley’s letter and the accompanying documents made clear that the 

White House had little intention of giving the Committee what it had requested. His letter 

noted that the Committee had sought information and documents from other Executive 

Branch agencies and observed:

As is customary for any examination of an issue addressed by many components of the federal Government, the Administration’s principal form of 
Additional Views

678

assistance will be through the production of information from those agencies 

and departments most directly involved in preparing for and responding to 

Hurricane Katrina. . . . As is traditional for responses to Congressional Committee requests for information, the [White House] stands ready to assist your 

Committee in appropriate ways once the scope and content of the agencies’ 

and departments’ production of information can be assessed in relation to 

your Committee’s remaining requirements.

As discussed further below, the views expressed by Kelley were neither customary nor 

traditional, but given them, it was not surprising that the near entirety of the nearly 4,000 

accompanying pages of documents were publicly available. In fact, a portion of this production – White House press releases, copies of press conferences, and copies of press gaggles 

– could be found on the White House’s web site. Th e production also included situation 

reports and updates that were sent to many recipients, only one of which was the White 

House, from other federal agencies and departments, as well as widely circulated e-mails 

sent by DHS as part of its responsibility under the National Response Plan to disseminate 

information throughout the federal government. Th ese latter e-mails primarily consisted 

of DHS and FEMA press releases as well as Department “Talking Points.” In sum, not only 

did Kelley’s letter decline to answer a single one of the questions posed in the Committee’s 

October 7 letter; it also did not bring with it much in the way of responsive or informative 

documents.

To make matters worse, the Committee soon learned that despite the White House’s suggestion that the Committee seek its information elsewhere, the White House was in fact 

directing the federal agencies that were producing documents and witnesses for the Committee’s investigation to withhold from the Committee any material or testimony relating to 

the agencies’ or witnesses’ interactions with the White House.

Th e Committee spent the next two months attempting to work these matters out at a staff 

level. Committee pressure yielded marginally more documents and a three-hour briefi ng 

from the White House’s Deputy Homeland Security Advisor, Ken Rapuano. Many of the 

additional documents were of the same type as previously produced. Th e White House provided several e-mails, updates, and reports it had received from DHS’s Homeland Security 

Operations Center (HSOC), consisting primarily of repackaged material that other agencies, including federal and state entities, sent to the HSOC. In many cases, the White House 

produced multiple copies of the same widely distributed material. As for material actually 

generated within the White House, though the Committee did receive a small number of 

substantive e-mails from a very small number of lower-level White House Homeland Security Council (HSC) staff , those e-mails off ered little insight into what the White House was 

actually doing, and the Committee received nothing from the fi les of those in higher-level 

positions.

In short, the Committee did not receive information or documents showing what actually 

was going on within the White House and was still left with little insight into the White 

House’s substantive actions in preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina. And 

Rapuano’s briefi ng, while informative, focused primarily on what the White House had 

learned about the federal response writ large; it did not address roles played by specifi c 

White House offi cials or specifi c actions taken by the Executive Offi ce of the President 

(EOP). 

Frustrated by the White House’s omissions (its failure to produce what the Committee had 

requested), as well as its commissions (its interference with productions and testimony 

from other agencies), the Committee sent Card a second letter on January 12, 2006. Th e 

letter, again signed by both Chairman Collins and Senator Lieberman, expressed concern 
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared 

679

about the White House’s response to the investigation. It assessed the status of the White 

House production this way:

We have received several boxes of documents, which we do appreciate. However, a majority of that material was either publicly available or originated in 

other agencies, off ering little insight into what the EOP knew or did during this 

catastrophic event. We also received a briefi ng from the Homeland Security 

Counsel (HSC), which we view as a constructive and useful attempt to convey to the Committee some information about the HSC’s “Lessons Learned 

Review” as well as, generally, some of the key events the EOP was aware of in 

the days leading up to and following Hurricane Katrina. Th e briefi ng did not, 

however, address roles played by specifi c EOP offi cials or specifi c actions taken 

by the EOP. As a result, to date, we have yet to receive the bulk of what we 

requested, and the Committee is unable to fully understand and assess actions 

involving White House personnel during the preparations for and response to 

Hurricane Katrina.

Th e Committee’s letter saved its harshest language for its assessment of the White House’s 

directions to agency counsel to keep White House-related information from the Committee: “Th is practice,” Senators Collins and Lieberman wrote, “simply must cease.” Th ey 

continued:

We are willing to discuss claims of executive privilege asserted by the White 

House, either directly or through a federal agency. But we will not stand for 

blanket instructions to refuse answering any questions concerning any communications with the EOP.

Th e Committee’s letter also took issue with another of the White House’s arguments: Th at 

the White House was acting within tradition by telling the Committee that it must wait for 

the White House’s response until aft er other agencies provided theirs: “Respectfully,” Chairman Collins and Senator Lieberman wrote:

We are aware of no such tradition. Indeed, this Committee, as well as others, 

has repeatedly conducted investigations of matters involving this and previous 

White Houses and has never held White House requests in abeyance.

In an eff ort to end the impasse, the Committee off ered the White House a signifi cantly 

pared-down list of priorities and asked that it produce particular documents and provide 

specifi c individuals for interviews by January 23, 2006.

On January 27, 2006, the White House responded. In a letter again signed by Kelley, the 

White House once again paid homage to “Congress’s important role in examining events 

surrounding Hurricane Katrina and the need for the Executive Branch to assist those inquiries.” Th en, once again, it declined to provide what the Committee had asked for. Instead, 

it off ered to address the Committee’s requests through a combination of a briefi ng and additional documents. It declined to furnish any of the requested witnesses.

As for the complaint about the White House’s hindering of Committee eff orts to obtain 

from other agencies information related to the White House, Kelley explained that the 

White House was allowing agency personnel to “discuss factual and operational communications involving nearly all EOP personnel other than a relatively small number of 

offi cials most directly involved in supporting the President’s actions and determinations.” 

Th is category was later described to Committee staff as including all individuals at the level 

of Deputy Assistant to the President and above and all individuals, regardless of level, in 
Additional Views

680

the Chief of Staff ’s offi ce. While Kelley’s letter suggested that this left a wide area of inquiry 

open to the Committee, the reality was that it walled off documents and testimony involving virtually anyone in the White House who had any level of responsibility or involvement 

with Katrina, regardless of whether that person actually had anything to do with advising 

the President.

On February 3, 2006, the Committee received its second briefi ng from Rapuano, and by 

February 8, it had in hand the additional documents the White House promised in its 

January 27 letter. Rapuano’s briefi ng, while again helpful in answering questions about the 

activities of some of the federal agencies and about the White House, off ered few of the 

additional specifi c details the Committee had sought about the White House’s actions. Th e 

documents did not diff er markedly in type from those received already: Th e Committee had 

obtained virtually all of them previously from other agencies; consequently, they off ered 

little new insight. As an example, the Committee asked for all White House documents related to the deployment of federal troops to the Gulf region. Given the weighty implications 

of deploying our premier fi ghting force on domestic soil, and the controversies surrounding 

the timing of those deployments and the allegations that Governor Blanco was responsible 

for the delay, the Committee believed that access to this information from the White House 

was critical to understanding and informing the American people of this important part 

of the Katrina story. But the documents provided by the White House consisted mainly of 

situation reports, most of which already had been produced to the Committee by the Pentagon, and did not address the issue of troop deployment.

Around the time of this exchange, the Committee gained virtually its only signifi cant 

insight into what actually happened within the White House immediately before and aft er 

Katrina’s landfall. It learned this information only because former FEMA Director Michael 

Brown refused to decline to answer the Committee’s questions about his communications 

with the White House absent an assertion of executive privilege by the President. When the 

President declined to invoke that privilege, Brown testifi ed before the Committee on Friday, 

February 10, and shortly thereaft er sat for a more detailed, transcribed interview with Committee staff . In both instances, Brown made clear that he saw the White House as a critical 

player in the preparations for and response to Hurricane Katrina.

Brown testifi ed that, before landfall, he had conveyed to the President that, depending on 

where it struck, the storm could be catastrophic.72 He also told the Committee that he believed that on Monday, August 29, the day of Katrina’s landfall, he spoke with Deputy White 

House Chief of Staff Joe Hagin on at least two occasions to inform him of the situation on the 

ground in New Orleans.73 Brown testifi ed that in a call with Hagin – placed aft er Brown received FEMA employee Marty Bahamonde’s eyewitness account of the extent of the devastation – “I think I told [Hagin] that we were realizing our worst nightmare, that everything we 

had planned about, worried about, that FEMA, frankly, had worried about for 10 years, was 

coming true.”74 According to Brown’s interview, by Monday evening there was no doubt that 

Hagin knew from Brown that the 17th Street Canal levee had broken and that New Orleans 

was fl ooding.75 Additionally, at approximately 10 p.m. that night, White House Chief of Staff 

Andy Card informed Brown in an e-mail exchange that Hagin had kept him “well-informed” 

of Brown’s reports. Brown reiterated to Card that “this is a bad one.”76

Just as importantly, Brown made clear that he believed that informing and seeking action 

from the White House was capable of producing faster results than contacting the designated leader of the federal response, Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff .77 Brown’s 

testimony made clear that he believed that the White House had a signifi cant role to play in 

coordinating and helping to manage the response to Katrina. Aft er putting that testimony 

together with what the investigation had already revealed about the federal government’s 
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared 

681

activities during the week aft er landfall, Senator Lieberman concluded that the Committee 

would be remiss if it did not follow up on the multiple questions regarding White House 

action left unanswered by Brown’s testimony and the rest of our investigation.

In sum, despite the Committee’s detailed requests, intended to enable an understanding 

of the actions taken by the White House during Hurricane Katrina, the Committee had 

received interviews with none of the requested White House witnesses, written answers to 

none of the questions posed in the October 7, 2005, letter to the White House, and roughly 

17,000 pages of documents, the vast majority of which consisted of publicly available material, material otherwise generated by other agencies, and reports and updates from DHS’s 

Homeland Security Operations Center. In addition, the Committee failed to receive from 

federal agencies an unknown volume of responsive material as a result of White House 

orders to withhold anything related to or referencing virtually anyone of signifi cance in the 

White House.

Aft er reviewing that response, Senator Lieberman wrote Chairman Collins on March 15, 

2006, asking her to issue subpoenas to (1) the White House for the documents requested 

in their joint January 12, 2006, letter; (2) to fi ve members of the White House staff most 

involved in the response, ordering them to sit for Committee depositions; and (3) to each 

federal agency to which they previously sent request letters, compelling them to produce 

previously withheld White House-related material.78 Th e Chairman declined. And we believe that the investigation is the worse for it.

Analysis of the White House’s Arguments

We do not believe that the White House, or any Executive Branch agency, must automatically turn over material to a Congressional committee simply because it has been asked 

to do so. What we do believe – indeed, know – is that Congressional committees have 

signifi cant authority to seek and obtain material from the White House and Executive 

Branch agencies when they are conducting legitimate oversight or investigations on matters 

within their jurisdiction, absent an assertion of a valid privilege to the contrary. During the 

Committee’s months of eff orts to obtain the information sought from the White House, the 

White House provided no satisfactory reason for its limited response.

We have already referenced the fallacy of the White House’s assertion that it appropriately 

directed the Committee elsewhere for its information. As noted above, Chairman Collins 

and Senator Lieberman rejected that argument in their January 12, 2006, letter to Card. 

And, in a November 29, 2005, report, the non-partisan Congressional Research Service 

(CRS) agreed that the White House was wrong to assert that custom or tradition allows 

it to point Congressional investigative committees elsewhere to seek information or that 

the White House is permitted to defer answers to specifi c requests until it has assessed the 

Committee’s needs:

Without question, under Senate rules, your Committee has jurisdictional 

responsibility and authority to conduct an investigation of the preparations for 

and response to Hurricane Katrina by all governmental entities that had roles, 

responsibilities and authorities in dealing with that catastrophic event. Th at 

investigative authority reaches the White House and concerned elements of 

the Executive Offi ce of the President. We are aware of no legal authority that 

allows a targeted entity, whether it is a government agency, including the EOP, 

or private party, to dictate to a jurisdictional committee the manner, order or 

timing of the exercise of its exercise of investigative authority.79

Kelley’s January 27, 2006, letter also suggested that our requests implicated “very important 

Executive Branch interests,” including “avoiding the burden on offi cials most directly sup-
Additional Views

682

porting the President, threatening to impair the President’s ability to discharge his constitutional duties; preserving the confi dentiality required to support Presidential decision-making; and adhering to the course of dealings between the branches, in analogous contexts, 

regarding the occasions for broad inquiry into EOP policymaking and deliberations.”

But the Committee tried to accommodate those interests to the extent they were legitimate. 

In informal conversations throughout the fall and then in the Chairman’s and Senator 

Lieberman’s January 12, 2006, letter, the Committee sought to prioritize its requests, but 

that prioritization yielded precious little additional information in return. Perhaps even 

more importantly, the virtually complete immunity from our inquiry claimed by the White 

House to protect its asserted interests was far out of proportion with those interests and 

highly inconsistent with the manner in which Congressional investigations have been conducted in the past.

Th is Committee has repeatedly conducted investigations touching on or directly involving the White House. But never before have we seen a White House that not only denies 

the Committee most relevant information, but also precludes the Committee from receiving from other agencies most material relating to the White House’s involvement. In his 

January 27, 2006, letter, Kelley asserted that the White House was giving the Committee 

access to material involving “factual and operational communications involving nearly 

all EOP personnel other than a relatively small number of offi cials most directly involved 

in supporting the President’s actions and determinations.” But, as already discussed, this 

exception neutralized the rule: Virtually anyone in the White House whose actions had operational signifi cance to the preparation for and response to Katrina falls into the category 

made off -limits to the Committee.

And, of course, the Committee was denied requested interviews with even those lower-level 

employees about whom the White House said it was willing to give us information. Th is left 

the Committee unable to obtain any real sense of what the White House did or didn’t do to 

direct or assist the federal response to Katrina. And it kept the Committee from obtaining 

key information from Executive Branch agencies about the government’s response to Katrina. For months, Committee staff repeatedly asked White House staff for precedent for the 

White House’s sweeping assertion of near-immunity from inquiry. Th ey were given none.

Th e Congressional Research Service confi rmed that the White House position was wrong. 

According to a February 9, 2006, CRS memorandum prepared for the Committee:

Th e Supreme Court has held that “the scope of [Congress’] power of inquiry ... 

is as penetrating and far-reaching as the potential power to enact and appropriate under the Constitution,” “encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes,” and 

is at its peak when the subject is alleged waste, fraud, abuse or maladministration. [citations omitted] In the last 80 years, Congress has consistently sought 

and obtained documents and testimony that refl ects deliberations in agencies, 

including almost every offi ce and bureau in the Department of Justice and the 

Executive Offi ce of the President (EOP). Th ere have been some 75 instances in 

which EOP offi cials have testifi ed before congressional committees, a list that 

includes chiefs of staff to the President, White House counsels and National 

Security Advisers.

80

In short, while we certainly recognize that there are important Executive Branch interests 

at stake whenever the Congress seeks to conduct oversight – interests which we believe the 

Committee tried to accommodate – the White House failed to recognize in return that there 

are countervailing and constitutionally based Legislative Branch interests at stake as well, 
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared 

683

namely the uncontested authority of the Congress to inquire into the Executive Branch’s 

administration of federal programs. 

It is the traditional view of the Congress that the only basis on which the Executive Branch 

may ultimately resist providing information requested by a Congressional committee is an 

assertion by the President of executive privilege. Th is Constitutional safeguard ensures that 

the Legislative Branch’s determination that its constitutional functions require certain information may be outweighed only if the President is willing to conclude and assert that his 

constitutional interests demand otherwise. Of course, even then, the privilege is a qualifi ed 

one and may be overcome, but the competing interests can’t even be weighed if the President is unwilling to meet Congress’s assertion of Constitutional authority with an equivalent assertion of his own. In the words of this Committee’s former Chairman Fred Th ompson, when addressing the previous Administration’s eff orts to resist a document request on 

a basis short of executive privilege:

If the President is claiming special status because he is President, then his 

assertion is really one of executive privilege and not attorney-client privilege. 

While I can still remember [Watergate Committee chair] Sam Ervin’s repeated 

admonitions that no man is above the law and that we are entitled to every 

man’s evidence, I still concede that executive privilege can be a valid claim, 

under some circumstances. However, the President must assert it.81

Th is is a point the Committee itself recognized when Brown testifi ed. Having asked the 

White House whether the President wished to assert executive privilege and having heard 

that it did not, the Chairman instructed Brown to answer questions regarding his contacts 

with the White House.82

It is due to this experience with Brown that we must respectfully disagree with one of the 

reasons the Chairman provided for declining Senator Lieberman’s request to issue subpoenas, namely that it would merely force the President to assert executive privilege.83

Based on the experience with Brown – and the fact that a signifi cant portion of the material 

the Committee requested likely falls outside any legitimate claim of privilege – we fi rmly 

believe a subpoena would have been met with at least a modicum of compliance that would 

have aided the Committee’s investigation signifi cantly. Aft er all, previous Administrations 

repeatedly have been willing to provide information of this sort to Congress. Th e current 

Administration also has provided to investigators even material that clearly could have been 

subject to a claim of privilege. Both the President and the Vice-President, for example, sat 

for a personal interview with the 9/11 Commission. Surely, the White House would have 

provided the Committee with more information than it did had it faced a Congressional 

subpoena.

Before leaving this topic, we want to comment on one more issue raised by at least some 

Administration representatives in response to the Committee’s information and document 

requests. In seeking to justify the demonstrably lower level of cooperation seen from this 

Administration than from its predecessor, we heard that a diff erent standard should apply 

in this investigation because of the absence of any allegations of criminal conduct.

We could not disagree more. Congress surely has a role to play in the investigation of 

conduct that may violate the law, and we have supported such investigations in the past, 

regardless of the political affi liation of the Administration. But if the case for White House 

cooperation is more persuasive for one type of investigation than the other, surely it would 

be for an investigation like the one into Katrina. 
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684

To the extent Congressional investigations involve allegations of criminal wrongdoing, a 

Congressional investigation simply isn’t necessary to discover facts or hold perpetrators 

responsible, as it is likely to be accompanied by a parallel investigation by the Department 

of Justice, as we’ve seen with many of the recent scandal investigations.

Th ankfully, there has been no such criminality on the part of government workers alleged 

here; instead, this was an investigation into wholesale errors, and, in many cases, incompetence. No other independent investigator with the authority to go fully where the facts lead 

has or will review this matter, and so the need for a full and fair review by the Congress is 

absolutely critical.84

The Department of Homeland Security

Th e Department of Homeland Security (DHS) presents a diff erent case from the White 

House. In contrast to the White House, DHS did provide the Committee with a signifi -

cant amount of information and access to a large number of witnesses – material without 

which the Committee could not have conducted its investigation or issued its report. But 

the Department did so in an oft en slow, spotty, and incomplete manner. On one hand, the 

Committee received a large amount of information and many witnesses from the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). But on the other, when we sought documents 

and witnesses from elsewhere in the Department, and particularly from DHS leadership, 

the Department frequently dragged its feet, taking an adversarial posture and ultimately 

producing only a small fraction of the documents and witnesses that reasonably could have 

been expected. For example, it took until January 13, 2006, for the Department to produce a single witness from outside FEMA or the Coast Guard. Similarly, the Committee 

did not receive documents from the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC)– an 

entity at the center of DHS’s emergency-response mandate – until January 12, 2006. And 

despite increasingly urgent requests for the document, it took the Department until January 11, 2006, to give the Committee the Catastrophic Incident Supplement to the National 

Response Plan, a foundational document that the Committee could have used to question 

witnesses more knowledgeably had it only had it sooner. When combined with the Department’s practice of waiting until the last minute to tell the Committee who it would supply 

as witnesses and providing a witness’s e-mails and documents as late as the night before a 

scheduled interview, there is no doubt that the way in which the Department responded 

to the Committee’s document, information, and witness requests signifi cantly hampered 

the Committee’s ability to conduct its investigation. As a result, though the Committee 

has gathered key facts, it still does not have as complete a picture as we would have liked of 

DHS’s preparations and response to Katrina. Given Secretary Chertoff ’s public statements 

asserting the importance of learning the lessons, “even painful lessons,” from Katrina, reasonably we had hoped for more.85

Chronology of DHS’s Production 

It was clear from the start that much of this Committee’s investigation would turn on 

information provided by and about the Department of Homeland Security. DHS is the 

Department given the offi cial responsibility to lead and coordinate preparations for and 

response to disasters, whether natural or man-made. Various DHS component agencies had 

signifi cant operational responsibilities in the response as well; eventually, some 16 DHS offi ces became involved in the response.86 Th is included not only the high-profi le involvement 

of agencies such as FEMA and the U.S. Coast Guard, but also the National Communications System (NCS), an agency charged with coordinating the federal government’s disaster 

communications support, and the Department’s law enforcement assets – Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement (including the Federal Protective Service), the U.S. Secret Service, 
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared 

685

Customs and Border Patrol, among others – many of which provided assistance with public 

safety and security in the Gulf Coast aft er Katrina.

Th erefore, on September 28, 2005, the Committee sent four letters to DHS: (1) to FEMA; (2) 

to the Coast Guard; (3) to NCS (through the Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection); and (4) to Secretary Chertoff for the remainder of the Department. Th ese letters asked 

for a range of information and documents related to the Department’s and its components’ 

response to Katrina. In addition, in the weeks and months that followed, the Committee 

sought to interview witnesses with relevant knowledge from throughout the Department.

Responses to the Committee’s four request letters to DHS were due October 27, 2005. Th e 

following day, FEMA produced its fi rst documents to the Committee; the Coast Guard followed with a small production approximately a week later. And even before these documents 

arrived, the Committee began interviewing FEMA witnesses, beginning with Marty Bahamonde, an External Aff airs employee who was stationed in New Orleans during the storm, on 

October 7, 2005. Interviews with Coast Guard witnesses began not long thereaft er.

During this time, however, the Committee received no response at all to its two other request letters, to the National Communications System and to Secretary Chertoff for the remainder of DHS. Concerned as time continued to pass, in November, Committee staff sent 

to DHS a short list of initial witnesses from other parts of the Department that we thought it 

important to interview.

Notwithstanding this request, no witnesses from outside FEMA or the Coast Guard were 

made available for interviews at that time. And by the end of the year – three months aft er 

the request letters had been sent – only a small number of documents had been produced 

in response to the letter to Secretary Chertoff . No documents related to NCS had been 

produced at all. On December 30, 2005, Senators Collins and Lieberman expressed their 

concerns directly to Secretary Chertoff . Th ey wrote him that the Committee lacked the 

“documents, information, and access to Department personnel that we need to conduct a 

thorough and timely investigation” and included a prioritized list of documents, information, and witnesses that they wanted in the following two weeks.

On January 9, 2006, the Committee received a disappointing response from Philip Perry, 

the General Counsel of DHS, in which Perry off ered little that was new, but made clear that 

much of what the Committee asked for would not be forthcoming in the requested time 

frame. Specifi cally, he indicated that the Department was declining to respond to any of 

the information requests the Committee had submitted and stated only that the Department “should” be able to provide the Committee with a “substantial number” of the priority 

documents by the revised January 13, 2006, deadline (in fact, only a small number were 

provided by that date). He indicated that three of the twelve priority non-FEMA witnesses 

the Committee had requested would be made available for interviews, but made no further 

commitments on the remaining ones. 

Finding little reassurance in Perry’s response, Senator Lieberman wrote to Chairman Collins on January 12, 2006, requesting that the Committee issue subpoenas to DHS. Th ree and 

a half months aft er sending the Committee’s initial request letter and with three weeks of 

intensive Committee hearings on Hurricane Katrina rapidly approaching, the letter argued, 

the time had come to insist on the additional documents, information, and witnesses that 

were crucial if the Committee were to attain an accurate understanding of what occurred in 

the days leading up to and following Katrina, and how the government’s response could be 

improved in the future. Chairman Collins declined to issue a subpoena to DHS, but she did 

personally intervene with the Secretary and insisted upon greater cooperation.
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686

DHS’s cooperation in the following weeks – eff ectively the fi nal weeks of the investigation 

before attention would turn to craft ing the report – improved, somewhat, with some additional witnesses and documents produced to the Committee. With respect to non-FEMA 

matters, however, it never reached the level the Committee had the right to expect from the 

Department.

In the end, 300,000 of the approximately 344,000 pages of documents that DHS produced 

to the Committee – 87 percent – were produced by FEMA. Th e National Communications 

Systems (NCS) produced approximately 3,100 pages of documents (roughly one box’s 

worth), with its fi rst materials not provided to the Committee until January 18, 2006. Th e 

Coast Guard provided a total of some 7,400 pages of documents. Approximately 33,000 

pages of documents – the rough equivalent of fewer than a dozen boxes – were produced 

in response to the Committee’s letter to Secretary Chertoff from the remainder of DHS, 

including its law enforcement components, the Homeland Security Operations Center, and 

front-offi ce personnel.

Interviews broke down in somewhat the same fashion: Th e Committee conducted formal 

interviews with 46 FEMA, or ex-FEMA, employees; 11 representatives of the Coast Guard; 2 

NCS employees; and 12 individuals from the remainder of DHS. 

Apart from the numbers, it is clear that DHS failed to fully comply with the majority of the 

requests for documents and information contained in all but one of the Committee’s original letters. Th e same goes for a signifi cant portion of even the priority requests set out in the 

Committee’s letter of December 30, 2005.87 DHS did eventually make available all but one 

of the non-FEMA witnesses on the Committee’s December 30, 2005 priority list,88 although 

subsequent requests for additional non-FEMA DHS witnesses were, with two exceptions, 

ignored.

Specifi c Concerns

Limitations on witness interviews

Signifi cant delays in producing witnesses. Th e Department did not provide the Committee 

with any witnesses from its leadership staff , from the HSOC, from NCS – indeed, from any 

component outside FEMA or the Coast Guard – until January 13, 2006, a full three months 

aft er the Committee began to conduct investigative interviews. In contrast, by mid-October, 

the Committee staff had already begun to speak to state and local offi cials in Louisiana and 

Mississippi, as well as to FEMA and Coast Guard personnel. By mid-November, interviews were underway with Department of Defense personnel, as well as with the U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers, among others. Th e signifi cant delay in providing witnesses from DHS’s 

leadership, the HSOC, NCS, and the Department’s law enforcement components inevitably 

constrained the Committee’s investigation. Th e late start in interviewing these important 

witnesses, as intensive weeks of hearings were underway and the investigation was coming to a close, meant that there was simply insuffi cient time to follow up eff ectively on new 

information that invariably and predictably came to light in those interviews. Unlike the 

Committee’s scrutiny of the performance of FEMA or the State of Louisiana, for example, 

the examination of the actions of other parts of DHS was not permitted to evolve organically based on what was learned at each stage. Although the Committee was ultimately able 

to uncover important and enlightening facts even from the limited number of witnesses and 

documents made available, we simply cannot know where those facts would have led if the 

Committee had been allowed greater time to pursue leads to their logical conclusions. 
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared 

687

Failure to produce additional witnesses. Even within the signifi cant time constraints, the 

Committee staff was able to identify a relatively small number of additional DHS witnesses 

who appeared to have information important to the investigation; eff orts to bring in these 

additional non-FEMA, non-Coast Guard witnesses were largely ignored.89

For example, as discussed in Chapter 19 of the report, the Committee discovered during 

the course of its investigation that the HSOC, the central organization within DHS charged 

with maintaining situational awareness, issued a report at 6 p.m. on the day Katrina made 

landfall stating that preliminary reports indicated that the levees had not been breached.90

Th is unfortunate report, issued despite considerable evidence to the contrary, may have 

falsely reassured a variety of government offi cials, who went home Monday, August 29, 

ignorant of the ongoing catastrophe in New Orleans, and it may well have contributed to a 

delayed federal response. Th erefore, Committee staff sought to interview the HSOC’s Senior 

Watch Offi cer who was on duty at the time and who would have been responsible for issuing that erroneous report. Notwithstanding Committee staff ’s request, the individual was 

never made available. Th e Department, moreover, has never provided any explanation for 

not complying with the Committee’s request. 

DHS also failed, without explanation, to produce, in response to a Committee staff request, 

Scott Weber, Senior Counselor to the Secretary and the member of the Secretary’s immediate staff responsible for FEMA-related issues.91

DHS limitations on the terms under which witness interviews were conducted. Even 

when DHS made witnesses available, it oft en did so under conditions that limited the effectiveness of the interview. It became routine for DHS counsel to produce witnesses with 

unreasonably short notice, limiting Committee staff ’s ability to prepare. In one case, for 

example, staff was informed only Tuesday morning that a FEMA witness would be made 

available that aft ernoon; when questioned, the witness revealed that he had been informed 

of the interview by the previous Th ursday or Friday and had arrived in Washington on 

Monday aft ernoon.92 In some cases, none of the witness’s e-mails or other documents were 

made available to the Committee before the interview.

Perhaps the practice that most directly restricted the ability of staff to gather information 

was DHS Counsel’s unilateral insistence, in almost all the interviews with DHS employees 

outside of FEMA and the Coast Guard, on limiting the time the witness would be made 

available to a single session lasting three to four hours.93 Th is artifi cial time constraint was 

not imposed (or accepted) by other agencies or in other contexts. Th us, for example, staff 

conducting interviews with state and local offi cials in Louisiana were routinely given access 

to signifi cant witnesses for extended periods of time: Among others, Major General Bennett 

Landreneau, Adjutant General of Louisiana, was interviewed for approximately eight hours 

and Terry Ebbert, Director of New Orleans’ Offi ce of Homeland Security and Public Safety, 

sat three times for interviews for a total of approximately 10 hours. Th e Department of 

Defense, for its part, made Lieutenant General Russel Honoré, Commander of First Army 

and Commander of Joint Task Force-Katrina, available for a seven-hour interview. But with 

high-level staff at DHS, relatively short time limits were almost always imposed. 

A particularly notable example of this was the interview Committee staff conducted with 

Robert Stephan. By his own count, Stephan wore fi ve “hats” at DHS at the time Katrina hit. 

Among others, he was Acting Under Secretary for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection; Director of the Interagency Incident Management Group; and Manager 

of the National Communications System. He also had led the development of the National 

Response Plan, the central document guiding the federal response. By virtue of these various responsibilities, Stephan appeared to possess a wealth of information important to the 

Committee’s investigation, and as the relatively short period that had been allotted for his 
Additional Views

688

interview came to a close, it was obvious that the range of critical topics had only begun to 

be explored. Appropriately, the Committee’s Minority staff asked to continue the interview 

at another time.94 Stephan, however, was not made available again to Committee staff .

Inadequate Document Production

As outlined above, DHS produced only a fraction of the documents and information 

requested by the Committee – particularly in response to those requests contained in the 

three letters that were sent to components of the Department other than FEMA – and failed 

to fully comply even with many of the Committee’s priority requests. Notably, DHS at no 

time asserted any basis for withholding the material from a legitimate Congressional inquiry, nor, in most cases, did its lawyers seek to reach agreement with the Committee on the 

scope of the material to be produced. Rather, it frequently appeared to be the case that DHS 

simply unilaterally decided what material it would and would not produce to the Committee. As a result, there are gaps, perhaps signifi cant, in the materials (and, in particular, the 

non-FEMA materials) that the Committee has in its possession. A handful of prominent 

ones are noted below.

FEMA budget documents. Although DHS produced a substantial number of documents 

the Committee requested from FEMA, the Department largely refused to provide documents related to FEMA’s budget. As the report discusses, concerns were raised by several 

FEMA witnesses that FEMA’s budget was not suffi cient to fulfi ll its mission and about 

DHS’s “taxing” of FEMA to support the overall operations of the Department, and how 

these budget matters may have aff ected FEMA’s preparedness for a catastrophic disaster 

such as Katrina. DHS refused to provide all but a very few of the relevant requested documents – a request made in the Committee’s original September 28, 2005, letter and reiterated in the priority list submitted to DHS on December 30, 2005. As with other areas in 

which DHS declined to produce documents, information, or witnesses, the Department did 

not cite any authority that would exempt it from the Committee’s oversight jurisdiction 

other than its own preference. Th is refusal has prevented the Committee from fully addressing and resolving these issues.95

HSOC documents. As is evident from the Committee’s report, the problems in maintaining accurate situational awareness during the storm became a focus of the investigation. For 

that reason, both in the Committee’s original September 28, 2005, letter and in its December 30, 2005, priority request, we sought all the communications into or out of the HSOC 

that related to Katrina in the days immediately before and aft er landfall. DHS, however, 

chose to produce to the Committee only e-mails that were sent from or to a computer account associated with the Senior Watch Offi cer on duty;96 although some 45 agencies staff 

desks at the HSOC, information coming in to these individuals was ignored. 

Th e signifi cance of this came to light in one instance where the Committee obtained, 

through other sources, an e-mail that the Coast Guard had sent to the HSOC at 1:51 pm on 

the day of landfall, informing the HSOC that a levee in New Orleans had breached;97 this 

e-mail, though obviously important and clearly within both the Committee’s original and 

priority requests, had not been produced to the Committee. 

In another area of concern, though sources at the Coast Guard indicated to the Committee 

that the Coast Guard had produced documents to DHS responsive to many of the Committee’s requests, DHS had not turned all of them over to the Committee. Because DHS has 

not produced a log of withheld documents, however, we do not know if DHS is deliberately 

withholding documents, based on a claim of privilege or otherwise, or whether it simply 

determined that the documents were not responsive.
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared 

689

No answers to information requests. Finally, DHS declined to answer any of the requests 

for information contained in each of the four letters that were sent to the Department 

– even basic information such as which components of the Department were involved in 

the response to Katrina,98 or the identities of key personnel at NCS. DHS has not posed 

any objection to the questions raised, although in his January 9, 2006, letter, Perry asserted 

that DHS “cannot fully respond to several of these questions before it completes its lessons 

learned process and has a trustworthy understanding of the underlying facts” – though he 

did not identify to which questions he objected on these grounds. He also argued that so 

much information has already been provided to staff through documents and interviews 

that the Committee already had much of the information it sought; and that if the Committee would provide access to transcripts of witness interviews, DHS would produce responses 

more quickly. Th ese arguments are unpersuasive, especially when they apply across the 

board even to requests to which the Department surely knows the answer and to which 

none of its objections apply. For example, the Committee asked for a statement of when the 

National Response Plan was activated and which annexes were activated. Th ere is no reason 

why that information cannot have been provided by the Department during the past six 

months.

The Department of Justice

Th e Department of Justice (DOJ) was highly uncooperative with the Committee. DOJ has 

important responsibilities under the National Response Plan, most signifi cantly for maintaining security during a disaster when local and state law enforcement personnel are overwhelmed. In addition, the Department, as the Executive Branch’s principal legal advisor, 

surely played a role in off ering advice on the very controversial issues involved in deploying 

the military to aid the Katrina response, among other matters. DOJ was necessarily a critical 

part of the Committee’s investigation.

Yet DOJ was utterly uncooperative throughout the Committee’s investigation. Th e Committee sent its initial request letter on October 7, 2005, asking for information and documents by November 3, 2005. On October 24, 2005, the Committee received its fi rst communication back from the Department, in which the Department simply acknowledged 

receipt. Not until November 18, 2005, did DOJ produce its fi rst installment of documents. 

Th e Department ultimately produced a very limited quantity of documents (approximately 

2,000 pages) and answered only some of the questions that the Committee asked in its 

October 7, 2005, letter and none of those asked in its February 21, 2006, follow-up list of 

prioritized items. Most disturbingly, DOJ’s refusal to make any witnesses available for transcribed interviews ultimately required the Committee to serve its only witness subpoenas of 

the investigation on the Department.

Th ese defi ciencies seriously impeded the Committee’s ability to investigate DOJ’s preparations for and response to Hurricane Katrina. Most signifi cantly, the delay in providing 

information or interviews necessarily kept the Committee from pursuing important leads 

generated by the little information it had received. For example, on August 30, 2005, the 

head of the Louisiana State Police, Colonel Henry Whitehorn, wrote to FBI Director Robert 

Mueller requesting “any assistance you can provide,” noting that New Orleans had “suffered massive damage”; that the state police were “utilizing all state assets to stabilize the 

situation” but that “looting continues to be a signifi cant problem.”99 Yet at his January 26, 

2006, interview, William Mercer, Principal Associate Deputy Attorney General, said that 

DOJ was limited in its ability to provide law-enforcement assistance because the request did 

not come sooner, and from the Governor.100 Th is assertion made us especially interested in 

DOJ’s response to the Committee’s request to identify all requests for assistance that it re-
Additional Views

690

ceived and its response to those requests, including “the date and time orders were issued to 

fulfi ll the request”; “the entity within the Department tasked to provide the assistance”; and 

“the key personnel involved in processing and responding to the request.” But DOJ never 

answered this question, nor did it provide the documents the Committee requested that 

would have shed light on DOJ’s reaction to the Whitehorn letter at the time. As a result, the 

Committee is left unable to fully understand why DOJ did not respond to the letter from 

Col. Whitehorn, either by soliciting the letter from the Governor it claims was required or 

otherwise,101 and why it took the position that it hadn’t received an adequate request.

As for the documents the Committee did receive, the production was, plainly, incomplete. 

For example, the Committee received documents from Mercer’s fi les refl ecting communications with individuals in the Attorney General’s offi ce and showing the signifi cant – albeit 

belated – involvement of that offi ce in the Katrina response, but received virtually no materials originating in the Attorney General’s offi ce itself.102 Mercer’s documents also show discussions on the National Response Plan with Senior Counsel for National Security Aff airs 

James McAtamney, but McAtamney’s fi les were not produced.103 Th e Committee received 

no aft er-action reports or similar documents examining the response of the Department or 

its various components to Katrina, raising the troubling possibility that DOJ has made no 

systematic eff orts to examine its own conduct for future benefi t.

Equally disturbingly, the Committee received a scant amount of e-mails from many component agencies involved in the response, including, notably, the FBI. FBI e-mails likely 

would have off ered insight into the circumstances under which the FBI operated in the fi rst 

days of the response. Hundreds of FBI agents were deployed to the area, but the Committee 

has no e-mails concerning this deployment exchanged between personnel at FBI headquarters; between agents in the fi eld; or between headquarters personnel and agents in the fi eld. 

E-mails produced by DHS law-enforcement offi cials convey a sense of confusion about the 

respective roles of DOJ, FBI, and DHS, and suggest that there was, at least for a time, a “turf 

war” between the FBI and DHS.104 Th is investigation is not complete without full insight 

into these issues. 

Finally, because the Department has attempted to excuse its tardy response to Katrina by 

claiming that its authority to provide the types of support contemplated under the National 

Response Plan is limited by federal statute,105 it is important that the Committee see any 

internal DOJ documents that analyze DOJ’s authority and that refl ect when this issue was 

researched and/or resolved.

In short, DOJ’s response was one of the investigation’s true disappointments. By treating 

the requests of a duly authorized Congressional investigative committee so cavalierly, we 

cannot but conclude that DOJ obstructed the Committee’s investigation and prevented the 

Committee – and, through it, the American people – from knowing the full story of the 

government’s failed response to this catastrophe.

The Department of Health and Human Services

Th e Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) also did not cooperate with Committee eff orts to obtain information. HHS plays a signifi cant role in the federal response to 

disasters. Th e National Response Plan charges it with coordinating the federal government’s 

health and medical assistance to state and local authorities. During Katrina, HHS deployed 

over 2,100 U.S. Public Health Offi cers to assist in the response. HHS also sent over $38 

million of medical supplies to aff ected states through its Division of the Strategic National 

Stockpile at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, providing essential supplies 

to a region where large parts of the health-care system were damaged or destroyed. As the 
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared 

691

federal government’s primary agency for public health and medical assistance, HHS was 

also responsible for ensuring that other federal medical assets, such as the National Disaster 

Medical System, were used eff ectively.

Th e Committee raised serious questions about the federal government’s fulfi llment of its 

mandate, ranging from the role it played in evacuating hospital and other acutely ill patients 

from New Orleans to recovering the bodies of Katrina’s victims. Th e Committee could not 

truly assess the adequacy of the federal medical response to Katrina nor make informed 

judgments for future recommendations without a comprehensive assessment of HHS’s actions. For that, the Committee needed HHS to have answered the questions and provided 

the documents the Committee had requested in its September 28, 2005, letter.

Yet, HHS was oft en unresponsive to the Committee’s requests and, to this day, its production remains incomplete. Key witnesses have not been interviewed and important information remains undelivered. Delays in providing access to information and witnesses severely 

hampered the ability of investigators to fully examine HHS’s performance prior to and 

during Katrina. 

Perhaps most disturbingly, HHS did not respond to the Committee’s September 28, 2005, 

information request until February 24, 2006.106 Even then, the HHS response had major 

gaps and shortcomings. For example, the Committee’s original request asked HHS to 

provide all emergency and contingency plans for all Department elements and relevant 

regional offi ces that were in eff ect at the time of Katrina. What HHS gave the Committee 

included, in essence, only one headquarters-level plan.107 Th e Committee requested aft er-action reports for emergency events and drills for the past fi ve years. While the Department’s 

response identifi ed 60 events and drills in this time frame, not a single aft er-action report 

was provided until April 7, 2006. In several cases, such as two Committee questions about 

the provision of mental-health services, there was no response whatsoever. Similarly, the 

Committee asked HHS to describe the extent to which two volunteer credentialing systems 

were used to help process volunteer medical personnel seeking to provide medical care in 

Mississippi and Louisiana during Katrina, but no response was provided.

Th e Committee’s original request also requested “copies of all communications, including, but 

not limited to, all records or logs of such communications” for numerous activities related to 

HHS’s response. HHS did not begin to provide relevant documents until December 2, 2005. 

Without exception, the responses for “all communications” were incomplete. For example, no 

records or logs of communications were provided. Th is was true even with regard to information logged into the HHS electronic incident-tracking system described by the Department (at 

the Committee’s request). Even documents produced by HHS were incomplete. For example, 

numerous e-mails provided in response to the Committee’s request did not include attachments – even when the sole purpose of the e-mail was to transmit the attachment.

Frustrated by this unacceptable lack of compliance, Chairman Collins and Senator Lieberman wrote to HHS Secretary Michael Leavitt on January 13, 2006, expressing concern 

about the Department’s response. Th e letter noted that HHS “has been slow and disorganized – failing to provide attachments to e-mails, preparatory or pre-landfall materials, interrogatory responses, and basic situation reports.”108 Th e letter went on to identify 

priority items for production and stated that “[a]t this point, nearly four months aft er we 

fi rst requested the Department’s assistance, we must insist on a production of the requested 

documents by Wednesday, January 25, 2006.” Not having received a satisfactory answer, 

on February 17, 2006, they again wrote to Secretary Leavitt asking for a status report, no 

later than February 24, 2006, detailing when fi nal production would be complete. Some of 

the priority materials were fi nally provided on February 24, 2005. Still, a great deal of material remained outstanding. 
Additional Views

692

HHS’s response to requests to interview Department employees was also unsatisfactory. Although two informational briefi ngs were provided to Committee investigators on December 

9, 2005, by staff of the Offi ce of Public Health Emergency Preparedness, and on January 12, 

2006, by offi cers of the U.S. Public Health Service who deployed to Katrina, HHS resisted 

eff orts to schedule staff interviews. Th e fi rst did not take place until Monday, January 30, 

2006. Ultimately, the Department did make a number of requested witnesses available. 

However, the delay in initiating the process hampered the ability of investigators to conduct 

a thorough investigation and left inadequate time to interview several important witnesses.

Part III: Failure to Establish a Unifi ed Command

We want to comment on one more issue. Th e report places primary blame on the State of 

Louisiana for the inability of all the response agencies to establish a unifi ed command in 

that state during the fi rst week aft er landfall. In our view, the issue is far more complex. 

We believe that the failure to establish a unifi ed command resulted from three factors: Th e 

severity of the disaster; the failure of FEMA to have adequate numbers of personnel with 

suffi cient expertise and training to cope with a disaster of this magnitude; and the failure 

of the State of Louisiana to have suffi cient expertise and trained personnel to cope with a 

disaster of this magnitude. 

As the report acknowledges, local, state, and federal response agencies were responsible for 

establishing a unifi ed command under the Incident Command System (ICS). As the lead 

federal response agency, FEMA shared this responsibility. Th e evidence before the Committee is that the ability of many of the local responders to participate in a unifi ed command 

was severely impaired by extensive fl ooding and the destruction of much of the communications infrastructure. Neither FEMA nor Louisiana had a suffi cient number of trained 

personnel to establish an Incident Command System and a unifi ed command in the face of 

such extensive damage and the incapacitation of local offi cials. Both FEMA and Louisiana 

had to train additional personnel during the crisis. 

William Lokey, the FEMA Federal Coordinating Offi cer in Louisiana, told the Committee, 

“Th e locals were overwhelmed. We were going to be overwhelmed. Th ere was no way, with 

my experience and what I had to bring to the table, I was taking a knife to a gunfi ght.”109

Lokey said that FEMA employees, including those in Baton Rouge responding to Katrina, 

had not had suffi cient ICS training,110 and that FEMA’s requirement that National Emergency Response Team (ERT-N) members be profi cient in ICS by January 1, 2006, was just 

“wishful thinking” because “we’ve had no training dollars [and] we’ve had no opportunity 

to bring the folks together.”111 William Carwile, FEMA’s Federal Coordinating Offi cer in 

Mississippi, testifi ed similarly: “Th ose of us who were somehow responsible for the teams 

felt very uncomfortable that the teams weren’t really ready to go.”112 As a result, William 

King, FEMA’s Chief of Planning in Louisiana during Katrina, reported, FEMA had to train 

its own people in the midst of the response: “We had to what I call ‘crawl, walk, run’ it and 

do the training of people and implement it over several days.”113 Tony Robinson, FEMA’s 

Operations Section Chief in Louisiana during Katrina, agreed that FEMA would have been 

able to respond better if it had more personnel available for deployment.114

Th is testimony leads us to conclude that neither FEMA nor Louisiana had a suffi cient 

number of trained personnel to establish the appropriate command-and-control structure 

in Louisiana. As FEMA and Louisiana shared the responsibility to establish a unifi ed command, FEMA and Louisiana share the accountability for the failure to do so. 
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared 

693

1 Clinton Rossiter, Th e American Presidency, 2nd Ed. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1960, p. 4.

2 Commitee staff interview of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, conducted on Feb. 23, 2006, transcript p. 141.

3 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, transcript p. 143.

4 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, transcript pp. 137-138, 141. Brown did not address these concerns publicly or in 

writing with Congress. However, during his appearance in front of the U.S. House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina on Sept. 27, 2005, Brown alluded to having had some conversations with Members of Congress, though not with any Members of this Committee, regarding FEMA’s emaciation. 

When asked about the “emaciation” of FEMA, Brown suggested that for several years, he privately discussed how FEMA 

would become extremely limited in both personnel and fi nancial resources hindering its capacity to handle a disaster. In 

response to a question about Brown expressing his concerns about FEMA privately, but not publicly, Brown stated: “I 

can go to bed at night and sleep because I know I fought that battle.” In addition, later in the hearing when asked why he 

expressed his views about FEMA’s emaciation privately versus publicly, Brown testifi ed that he wanted to work within 

the system to make the needed changes. Source: Testimony of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, before the U.S. 

House, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Role of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Sept. 27, 2005.

5 Committee staff interview of Gary Jones, Acting Director, Region VI, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 11, 2006, transcript 

pp. 48-49, 149-152; Committee staff interview of Wayne Fairley, Response Operations Branch Chief, Region VI, FEMA 

conducted on Jan. 18, 2006, pp. 2, 57-58.

6 Eric Tolbert, e-mail to Janet Benini and Ron Castleman, July 1, 2004, 4:24 p.m. ET. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. DHS-0058-0000261.

7 Janet Benini, e-mail to Eric Tolbert and Ron Castleman, July 1, 2004, 4 p.m. ET. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

no. DHS-0058-0000261 (“Th e Louisiana Hurricane is one of the potentially ‘catastrophic’ scenarios we’ve been working 

on at HSC”). 

8 Stephen Black, e-mail to Kirstjen Nielsen and Janet Benini, Feb. 22, 2005, 4:41 p.m. Provided to the Committee; fi led as 

Bates nos. WHK 001059 through 001061.

9 Th e White House does not dispute that the President received these warnings and communications before landfall: 

“Th e President ‘received regular briefi ngs, had countless conversations with Federal, State, and local offi cials, and took 

extraordinary steps prior to landfall.’” Source: U.S. Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, Th e Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned. Washington: Government Printing Offi ce, Feb. 2006, 

pp. 28-29 [hereinaft er Th e White House, Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned]. But the White House did not detail in 

either its report, Th e Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, Frances Fragos Townsend’s February 13, 

2006, speech at the National Emergency Management Association’s mid-year conference, or elsewhere, any specifi c details about the briefi ngs or conversations. Source: Th e White House, Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, pp. 28-29, 174. 

10 Testimony of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Roles of U.S Department of Homeland Security and Federal 

Emergency Management Agency Leadership, Feb. 10, 2006; Deposition of Michael Brown, before U.S. House Select Committee staff , Feb. 11, 2006, p. 11 (testifying that during a call to the President, he said that Hurricane Katrina could be 

“the big one”).

11 FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 27, 2005, transcript pp. 22-23. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. 

DHS-FEMA-0105-000061 through 0000062.

12 Michael Brown, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 27, 2005, transcript p. 22. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0105-00000061.

13 Bill Reed, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 27, 2005, transcript pp. 5-6. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

nos. DHS-FEMA-0105-0000044 through 0000045.

14 Joseph Hagin, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 27, 2005, transcript p. 24. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0105-0000063.

15 Andrew Akers, e-mail to Homeland Security Operations Center Senior Watch Offi cer and others, Aug. 27, 2005, 

11:24 p.m. Provided to the Committee; fi led as Bates nos. WHK 05865 through 05867. Th e other addressees for the 

e-mail are DL-NSC-WHSR, Bethany Nichols, Elliot Langer, Kirstjen Nielsen, Joel Bagnal, Elizabeth Farrell, Julie Bentz, 

Daniel Kaniewski, Matthew Broderick, Frank DiFalco, Bob Stephan, John Chase, Tom Dinanno, Edward McDonald, 

Gail Kulish, Tom Paar, Michael Jackson, John Wood, National Interagency Coordination Center, Secretary Briefi ng 

Staff , Homeland Security Operations Center, Homeland Security Information Network. Attached to that e-mail was 

“Fast Analysis Report (Update to Refl ect Category 5 Status) to DHS IP on Hurricane Katrina, Gulf Coast,” the Department of Homeland Security’s National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center, Aug. 28, 2005, p. 1.

16 FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 28, 2005, transcript pp. 1, 14-16, 20. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

no. DHS-FEMA-0105-0000066, -0000079 through 0000081, 0000085.

17 Max Mayfi eld, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 28, 2005, transcript pp. 2, 6. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0105-0000067, 0000071.
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694

18 Michael Brown, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 28, 2005, transcript p. 37. Provided to the Committee; fi led 

as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0105-0000102. During his staff interview on February 23, 2006, Brown discussed a telephone 

call with Joe Hagin aft er the noon VTC. He described the conversation as follows: “And Hagin and I were having a 

conversation just about . . . how bad this one was going to be and, you know, dad-gamut all the – I mean, I was really 

bitching at Hagin about all of the planning I’d been asking for and you know, the catastrophic planning we’d been wanting to do, you know, now – and now here we are, and, you know, saying to him, you know, dad-gamut, why didn’t I quit 

earlier – then, you know, you guys knew I wanted to quit. I mean, we’re having this sparring match about all of this stuff 

that I was really mad about because I knew I was walking into this hornets’ nest . . . I’m really ticked off , because I know 

how bad this thing’s going to be.” Brown further described the conversation: “ . . . I’m just adamant that they understand 

my concern about New Orleans. I mean, I don’t know how to get this across to people that I have pushed and pushed for 

catastrophic disaster planning; we had chosen New Orleans as the fi rst place to do catastrophic disaster planning; and 

now, damn it, here was a, you know, a Cat 5 bearing down on – on New Orleans.” Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, pp. 

34, 36-37.

19 Bill Doran, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 28, 2005, transcript pp. 16-17. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0105-0000081 through -0000090.

20 President Bush, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 28. 2005, transcript pp. 14-15. Provided to Committee; fi led 

as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0105-0000079 through 0000080. Th e White House’s own report, Th e Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, describes the President as actively engaged the weekend prior to landfall, communicating 

with state and local offi cials and off ering federal assets. Th e White House’s report also cites the August 28 video teleconference as the mechanism used by the President to communicate with offi cials and off er federal assets. Source: Th e White 

House, Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, pp. 28, 174. But on March 2, 2006, Trent Duff y, a spokesman for the President, downplayed the utility of that call: “I hope people don’t draw conclusions from the president getting a single briefi ng 

... He received multiple briefi ngs from multiple offi cials, and he was completely engaged at all times.” Source: Robert 

Block, “Tape of Pre-Katrina Briefi ng Shows Bush Was Warned Of Dangers,” Wall Street Journal, Mar. 2, 2006, p. A3.

21 breakingnews@foxnews.com, e-mail to BREAKINGNEWS Subscribers, Aug. 28, 2005, 7:51 a.m., Provided to Committee; Bates no. WHK-08489 (printed out by Landon Gibbs).

22 Steven York, e-mail to Andrew Akers and others, Aug. 28, 2005, 5:21 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. 

WHK 05319 through 05320. Th e other addressees of this e-mail are Homeland Security Operations Center Senior Watch 

Offi cer, DL-NSC-WHSR, Bethany Nichols, Elliott Langer, Kirstjen Nielsen, Joel Bagnal, Elizabeth Farrell, Julie Bentz, 

Daniel Kaniewski and copied to Matthew Broderick, Frank DiFalco, Bob Stephan, John Chase, Tom Dinanno, Edward 

McDonald, Gail Kulisch, Tom Paar, Michael Jackson (DepSec), John Wood, NICC, Secretary Briefi ng Staff , Homeland 

Security Operations Center Homeland Security Information Network; breakingnews@foxnews.com, e-mail to BREAKINGNEWS Subscribers, Aug. 28, 2005, 7:51 a.m. Provided to Committee; Bates no. WHK-08489.

23 Andrew Akers, e-mail to Homeland Security Operations Center Senior Watch Offi cer, Aug. 29, 2005, 1:47 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. WHK 15894 through 15937. Th e other addresses of the e-mail are DL-NSC-WHSR, 

Bethany Nichols, Elliott Langer, Kirstjen Nielsen, Joel Bagnal, Elizabeth Farrell, Julie Bentz, Daniel Kaniewski, Richard 

Davis, Michael Barton, Matthew Broderick, Frank DiFalco, Bob Stephan, John Chase, Tom Dinanno, Edward McDonald, 

Gail Kulisch, Tom Paar, Michael Jackson (DepSec), John Wood, NICC, Secretary Briefi ng Staff , HSOC HSIN. 

24 Th e White House lauded the President’s issuance of the emergency declarations as “extremely rare, and indicative 

of the recognition that Katrina had the potential to be particularly devastating.” Th e White House, Hurricane Katrina: 

Lessons Learned, p. 27.

25 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, p. 33; White House Briefi ng to Committee, conducted by Kenneth Rapuano, Deputy 

Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, Dec. 13, 2005.

26 Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Response to the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs Document and Information Request dated October 7, 2005, and to the U.S. House of Representatives Select 

Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, Overview of Governor Kathleen 

Babineaux Blanco’s Actions in Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, Dec. 2, 2005, p. 6 [hereinaft er Louisiana Offi ce of the Governor, Governor’s Timeline]. (Stating that she received the call from the President “just before she 

walks into the news conference,” at which she announced with Mayor Nagin the mandatory evacuation of New Orleans).

27 Testimony of Sec. Michael Chertoff , Department of Homeland Security, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Homeland Security Department’s Preparation and Response, Feb. 15, 2006.

28 Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 2006.

29 Th e White House, “President Outlines Hurricane Katrina Relief Eff orts,” press release, Aug. 31, 2005. http://www.

whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/print/20050831-3.html. Accessed on Mar. 29, 2006. 

30 Spencer Hsu and Amy Goldstein, “Administration Faulted on Katrina,” Washington Post, Feb. 2, 2006, p. A5.

31 Richard D. Knabb, Jamie Rhome, and Daniel Brown, National Hurricane Center, Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane 

Katrina, Dec. 20, 2005, p. 3. http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/TCR-AL122005_Katrina.pdf. Accessed on Mar. 30, 2006.

32 Daniel Kaniewski, e-mail to Dan Bartlett and others, Aug. 29, 2005, 11:13 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. OVP 004795. Th e other addressees are Todd Beyer, Bill Burck, Trent Duff y, Joseph Hagin, Brian Hook, Brett 

Kavanaugh, Emily Kropp, William McGurn, Stephen McMillin, Harriet Miers, Bruce Miller, Susan Ralston, Kenneth 

Rapuano, Scott Sforza, Kristen Silverberg, Heidi Smith, Frances Townsend, and copied to Steven Atkiss, Jessica Bennett, 
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared 

695

Stephen Black, Jamie Brown, John Burke, Shannon Burkhart, John Currin, Robert DeServi, DL-HSC-BTS, DL-HSCCHEM-BIO, DL-HSCEXECSEC, DL-HSC-Front, DL-HSC-PPR, DL-NSC-WHSR, Lindsey Drouin, Debbie Fiddelke, 

Erin Healy, Taylor Hughes, Lauren Kane, Karyn Richman Kendall, Matthew Kirk, Ross Kyle, Jeannie Mamo, Christopher Michel, Alexander Mistri, John Mitnick, Derrick Morgan, Erin Nagle, Neil Patel, Dana Perino, Douglas Pitkin, 

Heather Roebke, Daniel Wilmot, Candace Wysocki, DeWitt Zemp. (“Flooding signifi cant throughout the region and 

a levee in New Orleans has reportedly been breached sending 6 to 8 feet of water throughout the 9th Ward area of the 

city. Per the Governor, water is rising at 1 foot per hour and the New Orleans mayor reports problems with a pumping 

station, causing fl ooding. HSOC reports that due to the rising water in the 9th Ward, residents are in their attics and 

on their roofs.”). Th e President’s knowledge of when New Orleans’ levees breached has been the subject of much media 

attention. In the week aft er landfall, the President himself made statements regarding the levee breaches. For instance, 

on Friday, September 2, 2005, during a press conference in Biloxi, Mississippi, the President stated: “Th e levees broke 

on Tuesday in New Orleans. On Wednesday, we – and Th ursday we started evacuating people. A lot of people have left 

that city. A lot of people have been pulled out on buses. It’s – I am satisfi ed with the response. I’m not satisfi ed with all 

the results. Th ey started pulling people off roofs immediately. Th ey started rallying – we started rallying choppers to get 

people off rooft ops, started savings lives. I mean, thousands of peoples’ lives have been saved immediately, and that’s 

good news. Th is is one of the worst storms in our nation’s history. New Orleans got hit by two storms, one the hurricane, 

and then the fl ood. And it’s going to take a monumental eff ort to continue moving forward, but we will.” Th e White 

House, “President Tours Biloxi, Mississippi, Hurricane Damaged Neighborhoods,” press release, Sept. 2, 2005. Provided 

to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. WHK 01656, 01658. As set forth herein, the President’s statements contradict the reality of the situation as several pieces of evidence show the levees breached on Monday.

33 Insung Lee, e-mail to Kirstjen Nielsen, Aug. 29, 2005, 11:16 a.m. Provided to the Committee; fi led as Bates no. WHK 

16111. Th e other addressees of the e-mail are Homeland Security Operations Center Senior Watch Offi cer, Matthew Broderick, Frank DiFalco, Interagency Incident Management Group, and Homeland Security Operations Center-All-Desks. 

34 Insung Lee, e-mail to Homeland Security Operations Center Senior Watch Offi cer, Aug. 29, 2005, 11:32 a.m. Provided to the Committee; fi led as Bates no. WHK 11923. Th e other addressees of the e-mail are DL-NSC-WHSR; Bethany 

Nichols, Elliott Langer, Kirstjen Nielsen, Joel Bagnal, Elizabeth Farrell, Julie Bentz, Daniel Kaniewski, Richard Davis, 

Michael Barton, Matthew Broderick, Frank DiFalco, Bob Stephan, John Chase, Tom Dinanno, Edward McDonald, Gail 

Kulisch, Tom Paar, Michael Jackson (DepSec), John Wood, NICC, Secretary Briefi ng Staff , HSOC.HSIN.

35 Insung Lee, e-mail to Homeland Security Operations Center Senior Watch Offi cer, Aug. 29, 2005, 11:32 a.m. Provided to the Committee; fi led as Bates no. WHK 11923. Th e other addressees of the e-mail are DL-NSC-WHSR; Bethany 

Nichols, Elliott Langer, Kirstjen Nielsen, Joel Bagnal, Elizabeth Farrell, Julie Bentz, Daniel Kaniewski, Richard Davis, 

Michael Barton, Matthew Broderick, Frank DiFalco, Bob Stephan, John Chase, Tom Dinanno, Edward McDonald, Gail 

Kulisch, Tom Paar, Michael Jackson (DepSec), John Wood, NICC, Secretary Briefi ng Staff , HSOC.HSIN.

36 FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 29, 2005, transcript p. 24. Provided to Committee. 

37 On the noon video teleconference, Brown said he spoke with President Bush at least twice on the day of landfall, likely 

prior to noon. Brown stated: “I talked to the President twice today, once in Crawford and then again on Air Force One.” 

Michael Brown, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 29, 2005, transcript p. 14. Provided to Committee. Brown also 

testifi ed that he spoke to White House Deputy Chief of Staff Joe Hagin on at least two occasions on the day of landfall. 

Testimony of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Roles of DHS and FEMA Leadership, Feb. 10, 2006; Andrew 

Card, e-mail to Michael Brown, Aug. 29, 2005, 9:51 p.m. Provided to Committee (showing that Brown spoke with 

Hagin on August 29 to provide updates of the situation in New Orleans.). Interestingly, when asked whether he spoke 

directly to the President on the night of landfall concerning Bahamonde’s over fl ight, Brown said he could not recall if he 

spoke to the President then. Brown stated: “I really don’t recall if the President got – normally during my conversations 

with Deputy Chief of Staff Hag[i]n, sometimes the President would get on the phone for a few minutes, sometimes he 

wouldn’t, and I don’t recall specifi cally that night whether he did or not.” Testimony of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane 

Katrina: Th e Roles of DHS and FEMA Leadership, Feb. 10, 2006. 

38 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, transcript pp. 23-25 (“Question: Is there any reason for us to doubt that aft er you 

talked to Joe Hagin 5 or 6 o’clock on Monday evening, August 29th, that he then knew from you that the 17th Street Canal 

levee had broke and the city was fl ooding? Answer: I don’t think there is any reason for any of us to doubt that they knew 

that. Question: Okay. And that they knew that at least in part from your phone conversation with Joe Hagin, correct? 

Answer: Th at’s correct.”). Th e substance of the Brown’s reports to the White House on August 29 concerned the situation 

on the ground in New Orleans, including the early reports from Marty Bahamonde, a FEMA Public Aff airs offi cial and the 

only FEMA offi cial on the ground in New Orleans the day of landfall. More specifi cally, Brown said he spoke with Hagin 

on Monday evening to discuss Bahamonde’s report of his New Orleans fl yover over New Orleans, but could not recall 

whether he specifi cally told Hagin in that call that the levees had broken. Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, transcript p. 21 

(“I think I used the phrase to Joe that, you know, our – the worst nightmare is occurring. ... I can’t recall all of the words I 

used other than, this is, you know, our worst – this is the worst scenario; this is, you know my worst fears are coming true. 

You know, I used the phrase, you know we have breaches of the canals.”); Testimony of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane 

Katrina: Th e Roles of U.S. DHS and FEMA Leadership, Feb. 10, 2006 (“I think I told him that we were realizing our worst 

nightmare, that everything we had planned about, worried about, that FEMA, frankly, had worried about for 10 years was 

coming true.”). Brown said he told Hagin or White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card about the levee breaches late in the 

aft ernoon on Monday because he recalled they were “debating” at the state Emergency Operations Center whether the 

levees were breached or overtopped. Testimony of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, before the U.S. Senate, Com-
Additional Views

696

mittee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, Hurricane Katrina: Th e Roles of U.S. DHS and FEMA Leadership, Feb. 10, 2006; Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, transcript pp. 15-16; Deposition of Michael Brown, before the House 

Katrina Select Committee Staff , Feb. 11, 2006, p. 114. Brown also received an e-mail from White House Chief of Staff 

Andrew Card at 9:51 p.m., Monday, in which Card acknowledged Brown’s continued contact with White House Deputy 

Chief of Staff Joe Hagin and said: “Joe Hagin has kept me well-informed of your reports.” Andrew Card, e-mail to Michael 

Brown, Aug. 29, 2005, 9:51 p.m. Provided to Committee. Brown responded and stated: “Th anks for writing, Andy. Th is is 

a bad one.” Michael Brown, e-mail to Andrew Card, Aug. 29, 2005, 10 p.m. Provided to Committee.

39 Testimony of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Aff airs, Hurricane Katrina: Th e Roles of U.S. DHS and FEMA Leadership, Feb. 10, 2006. 

40 Testimony of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Aff airs, Hurricane Katrina: Th e Roles of U.S. DHS and FEMA Leadership, Feb. 10, 2006.

41 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, transcript pp. 34-36.

42 Th e White House, “President Participates in Conversation on Medicare,” press release, Aug. 29, 2005. http://www.

whitehouse.gov/new/releases/2005/08/print/20050829-5.html. Accessed on Apr. 26, 2006; Th e White House, “President 

Discusses Medicare, New Prescription Drug Benefi ts,” press release, Aug. 29, 2005. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/print/20050829-11.html. Accessed on Apr. 26, 2006; Th e White House, “Recent Photo Essay,” Aug. 29, 

2005. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/images/20050829-5_p082905pm-0125-515h.html. Accessed on 

Apr. 26, 2006 (including a picture of the President with Senator McCain holding a birthday cake and the caption, “President George W. Bush joins Arizona Senator John McCain in a small celebration of McCain’s 69th birthday.”).

43 Th e White House, “President Discusses Medicare, New Prescription Drug Benefi ts,” press release, Aug. 29, 2005. 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050829-11.html. Accessed on Mar. 7, 2006.

44 Th e White House, “President Participates in Conversation on Medicare,” press release, Aug. 29, 2005. http://www.

whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/20050829-5.html Accessed on Mar. 7, 2006.

45 HSOC Spot Report #13: Th e Report further stated: “Only one of the main pumps is reported to still be working but 

cannot keep up with the demand and its longevity is doubtful.” Th e White House received this report at 12:02 a.m., 

Tuesday, Aug. 30, 2005. Michael Izner, e-mail to Homeland Security Operations Center – Homeland Security Information Network and others, Aug. 30, 2005, 12:02 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. WHK 07158 through 

07160. Th e other addressees for the e-mail are DL-NSC-WHSR, the National Interagency Coordination Center, as well 

as the following offi cials, Bethany Nichol, Elliott Langer, Kirstjen Nielsen, Joel Bagnal, Elizabeth Farrell, Julie Bentz, 

Daniel Kaniewski, Richard Davis, Michael Barton and copied to Matthew Broderick, Frank DiFalco, Bob Stephan, John 

Chase, Tom Dinanno, Edward McDonald, Gail Kulish, Tom Parr, Michael Jackson, and John Wood. 

46 Michael Izner, e-mail to DL-NSC-WHSR, Aug. 30, 2005, 6:33 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. WHK 

06264. Th e other addresses of the e-mail are Bethany Nichols, Elliott Langer, Kirstjen Nielsen, Joel Bagnal, Elizabeth 

Farrell, Julie Bentz, Daniel Kaniewski, Richard Davis, Michael Barton, and copied to Matthew Broderick, Frank DiFalco, 

Bob Stephan, John Chase, Tom Dinanno, Edward McDonald, Gail Kulisch, Tom Paar, Michael Jackson, (DepSec), John 

Wood, (COS), NICC, Secretary Briefi ng Staff , HSOC.HSIN, HSOC.SWO. 

47 E-mail from Insung Lee to DL-NSC-WHSR and others, Aug. 30, 2005, 10:23 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as 

Bates no. WHK 07910. Th e other addressees of the e-mail are Bethany Nichols, Elliott Langer, Kirstjen Nielsen, Joel Bagnal, Elizabeth Farrell, Julie Bentz, Daniel Kaniewski, Richard Davis, Michael Barton, Matthew Broderick, Frank DiFalco, 

Bob Stephan, John Chase, Tom Dinanno, Edward McDonald, Gail Kulisch, Tom Paar, Michael Jackson, John Wood, 

(COS), NICC, Secretary Briefi ng Staff ; HSOC.HSIN, HSOC.SWO, HSOC.FEMA, HSOC.DOD, HSOC.State&Local.

48 Th e White House, “President Commemorates 60th Anniversary of V-J Day,” press release, Aug. 30, 2005. http://www.

whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/08/images/20050830-1.html. Accessed on Mar. 11, 2005.

49 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, transcript pp. 89-90; Deposition of Michael Brown before the House Katrina Select 

Committee, Feb. 11, 2006, pp. 111-112 (warning the President, Vice President, Secretary Chertoff , and Deputy Chief 

of Staff Karl Rove that “probably 90 percent of the population of New Orleans had been displaced, that we had a true 

catastrophic disaster on our hands, that this was probably one of the most serious things that the country had faced; that 

it was. We needed to be doing everything possible.”).

50 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, transcript pp. 89-90. 

51 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, transcript pp. 97-98.

52 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, transcript pp. 97-98.

53 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, transcript pp. 89-91.

54 Th e White House. “Press Gaggle by Scott McClellan, Naval Air Station North Island, San Diego, California,” press 

release, Aug. 30, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. WHK 01632 through 01633. (“QUESTION: Th is is 

more – this is more symbolic. Cutting short his vacation is more symbolic because he can do all this from the ranch, 

right? McCLELLAN: No, I think – no, I disagree. Like I said, this is one of the most devastating storms in our nation’s 

history, and the President, aft er receiving a further update this morning, made the decision that he wanted to get back to 

D.C. and oversee the response eff orts from there.”).

55 Th e White House, “President Outlines Hurricane Katrina Relief Eff orts,” press release, Aug. 31, 2005. Provided to 

Committee; fi led as Bates nos. WHK 01636 through 01637.
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared 

697

56 Committee staff interview with Laurence Broun, Emergency Coordinator, U.S. Department of the Interior, conducted 

on Mar. 21, 2006, transcript pp. 15-16.

57 Insung Lee, e-mail to Homeland Security Operations Center, Senior Watch Offi cer, Aug. 31, 2005, 12:41 p.m. 

Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. WHK 12588 through 12598. Th e other addressees of the e-mail are DL-NSCWHSR, Bethany Nichols, Elliott Langer, Kirstjen Nielsen, Joel Bagnal, Elizabeth Farrell, Julie Bentz, Daniel Kaniewski, 

Richard Davis, Michael Barton, Matthew Broderick, Frank DiFalco, Bob Stephan, John Chase, Tom Dinanno, Edward 

McDonald, Gail Kulisch, Tom Paar, Michael Jackson, (DepSec), John Wood, (COS), NICC, Secretary Briefi ng Staff , 

HSOC.HSIN, IMD.

58 Th e White House, “President’s Remarks to the Travel Pool in Louisiana,” press release, Sept. 20, 2005. http://www.

whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/20050920-2.html. Accessed on Apr. 26, 2006. 

59 Remarks by President George W. Bush to the travel pool in Louisiana. White House Regular Briefi ng, Sept. 20, 2005; 

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/20050920-3.html. Accessed on Apr. 24, 2006.

60 Th e White House, “Press Briefi ng by Scott McClellan,” press release, Sept. 22, 2005. http://www.whitehouse.gov/

news/releases/2005/print/20050922-2.html. Accessed on Apr. 26, 2006. 

61 Th e White House, “President Briefed on Hurricane Rita Preparations at FEMA,” press release, Sept. 23, 2005. http://

whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/print/20050923.html. Accessed on Apr. 26, 2006. 

62 White House Press Gaggle (as released by the White House), Sept. 24, 2005 aboard Air Force One en route to Austin, 

Texas http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/20050924-8.html. Accessed on Apr. 26, 2006.

63 President George W. Bush, Good Morning America, ABC, “President George W. Bush Exclusive Interview,” Sept. 1, 

2005. Transcript accessed on LexisNexis.

64 Th e White House. “President, Lieutenant General Honoré Discuss Hurricane Relief in Louisiana,” press release, Sept. 

12, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. WHK 01723.

65 Richard D. Knabb, Jamie Rhume, and Daniel Brown, National Hurricane Center, Tropical Cyclone Report, Hurricane 

Katrina, Dec. 20, 2005, p.9. http://www.nhc.noaa.gov\pdf/TCR-AL122005_Katrina.pdf. Accessed on Mar. 30, 2006. 

(“Th e surge overtopped large sections of the levees during the morning of 29 August east of New Orleans, in Orleans 

Parish and St. Bernard Parish, and it also pushed water up the Intracoastal Waterway and into the Industrial Canal. 

Th e water rise in Lake Pontchartrain strained the fl oodwalls along the canals adjacent to its southern shore, including 

the 17th Street Canal and the London Avenue Canal. Breaches along both the Industrial Canal east of downtown New 

Orleans and the 17th Street Canal northwest of downtown appear to have occurred during the early morning on 29 

August, possibly even before the eye made initial landfall in Louisiana. Breaches along the London Avenue Canal north 

of downtown appear to have occurred later that night.”).

66 Daniel J. Kaniewski, Director of Response and Recovery Homeland Security Council, e-mail to Dan Bartlett and 

others. Th e White House, Aug. 29, 2005, 11:13 a.m., p.1. Provided to Committee. Filed as Bates no. WHK 004795. 

(“Currently Katrina has 127 mph sustained winds, making it a Category 3 storm. Katrina is moving northward, located 

22 miles to the east of New Orleans. Flooding is signifi cant throughout the region and a levee in New Orleans has reportedly been breached sending 6 to 8 feet of water throughout the 9th Ward area of the city. Per the Governor, water is 

rising at 1 foot per hour and the New Orleans mayor reports problems with a pumping station, causing fl ooding. HSOC 

reports that due to the rising water in the 9th ward, residents are in their attics and on their roofs.”)

67 Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Preparedness Study, prepared by U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, Federal Emergency 

Management Agency, and National Weather Service, 1994, p. 5–2 (“Although designed to provide substantial levels 

of protection, these levees and fl oodwalls are subject to overtopping during catastrophic events. Th e surge inundation maps show that for slow moving category 3, category 4, or category 5 storms, only those reaches of St. Tammany 

Parish located north of I-12 would be outside of the potential limits of storm surge.”); Federal Emergency Management 

Agency, “Background Information to Accompany Region VI Hurricane Plan For New Orleans, Corps of Engineers 

Analysis of the Flood Problem in New Orleans,” p. 1 (“Th e most dangerous storm would be a slow-moving category 

3 or stronger hurricane on a path that carries it northward 20 to 30 miles west of and parallel to the Mississippi River 

until it is near New Orleans. Th e worst case would be if a storm on that path then re-curved to the north and continued 

inland. ... Th ere could be extensive and severe erosion of levees and perhaps complete breaches. ... Each of the aff ected 

parishes has a series of one or more levees which normally form a protective ring around the inhabited area, although, 

if a severe hurricane produces fl ooding higher than the levees are designed for, the surge could overtop the levees and 

cause massive fl ooding. Storm surge, rain water, and natural run-off can fi ll these bowl-shaped areas aft er a hurricane. 

Some areas do not have hurricane protection levees, and in those areas, storm surge can rise and recede quickly. But 

when a hurricane storm surge overtops ring-levees and fi lls the bowl, the protective levees may actually trap fl ood-water, 

prevent it from draining out, and prolong the fl ooding.”); in Sherry Wainwright, FEMA Region VI, “Hurricane Plan for 

Louisiana, Attachment to the Regional Supplement to the Federal Response Plan,” May 2002. Provided to the Committee; Southeast Louisiana Hurricane Evacuation and Sheltering Plan, Jan. 2000, p. II-1 (“... worst case Category 3, 4 or 

5 Hurricane Scenario for the Greater New Orleans Metropolitan Area, as determined by the National Weather Service 

(NWS) Sea, Lake, and Overland Surge from Hurricanes (SLOSH) Model, could cause a maximum inundation of 20 feet 

above sea level in some of the parishes in the Region, not including tidal eff ects, wind waves and storm rainfall.”); State 

of Louisiana Hazard Mitigation Strategy – Volume I State of Louisiana Hazard Mitigation Plan, Apr. 15, 2005, p. I-46 

(“In Louisiana, storm surges are large waves of Gulf waters that sweep across coastlines where a tropical storm makes 

landfall. Generally the more intense the storm, the greater the height of the storm surge; the higher the storm surge, the 

greater the damage to the coastline. ... Shallow coastal bathymetry increases the magnitude of a storm surge. Th e coastal 
Additional Views

698

bathymetry of southeastern Louisiana, with its low, fl at topography and land surface elevations that in many places dip 

below sea level, can experience storm surges up to 100 miles inland. Category 3 storms can bring depths up to 24 feet 

as far north as the City of New Orleans. Category 5 storms can produce depths as high as 36 feet. Furthermore, lakes 

along the coast, namely, Lake Maurepas, Lake Borgne, and Lake Pontchartrain, exacerbate the eff ects of coastal fl ooding 

because of wave eff ects that can regenerate over inland lakes.”).

68 Committee staff interview with Wilson Shaff er, Ph.D., National Weather Service, conducted on Feb. 24, 2006, transcript p. 56 (Sea, Lake, and Overland Surge from Hurricane (SLOSH) storm surge studies in New Orleans reported to 

emergency preparedness offi cials in 2004 and 2005, stating that “Th e big change that we saw was that we were going to 

start seeing some fl ooding now with a few category 2 hurricanes,” without any mention of levee breaches); “Hurricanes: 

Nature’s Weapons of Mass Destruction,” presentation by Wilson Shaff er, Ph.D., National Weather Service to the Louisiana Emergency Preparedness Association, June 1, 2005 (including a computer projection showing extensive overtopping 

of New Orleans levees from composite of Category 3 hurricanes, as well as a slide entitled, “Louisiana’s Vulnerability to 

Hurricane Storm Surge”); Brett Herr, e-mail to Jay Baker, Mar. 15, 2004. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHSFEMA-0025-0002638 (“New surge inundation maps show signifi cant portions of Orleans and Jeff erson Parish that are 

susceptible to fl ooding from slow-moving Category 2 and fast Category 3 hurricanes. We had previously thought that 

the city would ... fare pretty well for these types of storm. Th e new maps will result in signifi cantly longer [evacuation] 

clearance times for these scenarios.”).

69 President George W. Bush, CNN Live Today, CNN, “President Bush Visits Gulf Coast: Early Warnings – Part 2,” Sept. 

2, 2005, 10 a.m. Transcript, accessed on LexisNexis.

70 White House Briefi ng to Committee, conducted by Kenneth Rapuano, Deputy Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, Feb. 3, 2006. 

71 Speech of President George W. Bush, Jackson Square, New Orleans, Louisiana, Sept. 15, 2005.

72 Testimony of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Th e Roles of DHS and FEMA Leadership, Feb. 10, 2006.

73 Testimony of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on “Th e Roles of DHS and FEMA Leadership, Feb. 10, 2006; Andrew Card, e-mail to 

Michael Brown, Aug. 29, 2005, 9:51 p.m. Provided to Committee.

74 Testimony of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Th e Roles of DHS and FEMA Leadership, Feb. 10, 2006; Brown interview, Feb. 23, 

2006, transcript p. 21.

75 Brown interview, Feb. 23, 2006, transcript pp. 24-25. Th e following exchange occurred: Question: Is there any reason 

for us to doubt that aft er you talked to Joe Hagin 5 or 6 o’clock on Monday evening, August 29th, that he then knew 

from you that the 17th Street Canal levee had broke and the city was fl ooding? Answer: I don’t think there is any reason 

for any of us to doubt that they knew that. Question: Okay. And that they knew that at least in part from your phone 

conversation with Joe Hagin, correct? Answer: Th at’s correct.

76 Andrew H. Card, Jr., e-mail to Michael Brown, Aug. 29, 2005, 9:51 p.m. Provided to the Committee; Michael Brown, 

e-mail to Andrew Card, Aug. 29, 2005, 10 p.m. Provided to the Committee.

77 Testimony of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Th e Roles of DHS and FEMA Leadership, Feb. 10, 2006.

78 Senator Lieberman stated: At the time, I did not seek a subpoena to the Offi ce of the Vice President (OVP), to which 

the Committee sent a separate request letter, because that Offi ce provided, in some respects, more responsive and useful 

material than did the rest of the White House. Th e OVP produced to the Committee a variety of material referencing 

or originating with its high-level staff , and it did not seek to assert the absolutist position put forth by the White House 

Counsel’s offi ce on behalf of the rest of the White House. While I am skeptical that we received a full production from 

the OVP and believe that the Committee should have pushed harder for a larger production, I nonetheless did not 

include the OVP in my subpoena request because I did not conclude that its response reached the level of egregiousness 

demonstrated by the rest of the White House. Ranking Member Lieberman, letter to Chairman Collins, Mar. 15, 2006.

79 Congressional Research Service, Memorandum to Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs Committee, 

Nov. 29, 2005, p. 13.

80 Congressional Research Service, Memorandum to Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs Committee, 

Feb. 9, 2006, p. 3. (Emphasis added.)

81 Congressional Record, Dec. 20, 1995 p. S18972. (Emphasis added).

82 Testimony of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Aff airs, hearing on “Th e Roles of DHS and FEMA Leadership, Feb. 10, 2006.

83 Chairman Collins, letter to Ranking Member Lieberman, Mar. 15, 2006, p. 1.

84 True, the General Accountability Offi ce and some agency Inspectors General have conducted their own investigations, but none, to our knowledge, are as comprehensive as the Committee’s, nor have any received greater cooperation 

from the White House (to the extent that they have even asked for it).

85 Testimony of Sec. Michael Chertoff , U.S. Department of Homeland Security, before the U.S. House, Select Bipartisan 

Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e 
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared 

699

Role of the Department of Homeland Security, Oct. 19, 2005 (“it is important as we go forward that we learn lessons, even 

painful lessons, from past experiences, things that worked well and things that didn’t work well.”).

86 Questions for the Record of Sec. Michael Chertoff , U.S. Department of Homeland Security, for the U.S. Senate, 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Homeland Security 

Department’s Preparation and Response, Feb. 15, 2006, p. 33.

87 Because only individuals at DHS know if they have produced to us all the responsive documents they have, it can be 

diffi cult for a requestor to state defi nitively whether a request has been fully complied with. However, there are areas 

where the nonresponsiveness is obvious – for instance, in the case of information requests that there has been no attempt to answer or in requests, such as that for Secretary Chertoff ’s schedule or documents in his possession, for which 

clearly no material has been produced. In other cases, a small fraction of the material requested may have been produced 

but the request has nonetheless clearly not been complied with. Th us, for example, in a January 30, 2006 letter to the majority staff director, which was shared with Senator Lieberman’s staff , Gus Coldebella, Deputy General Counsel of DHS 

attached a table purporting to show the extent of DHS’s compliance with the priority document requests included in 

the Committee’s December 30, 2005 letter. A cursory look at the table might suggest that most of the requests have been 

complied with, but in fact any such suggestion would be highly misleading. For example, the December 30 letter asked 

for all documents related to the Federal Protective Service’s preparation for or response to Hurricane Katrina, including 

any actions taken at the Superdome and the Convention Center; what Coldebella’s letter lists as produced in response 

comprises simply the e-mails for a single individual, the head of the Federal Protective Service. Gus P. Coldebella, letter 

to Michael Bopp, Senate Committee staff member, Jan. 30, 2006. 

88 Committee staff agreed to forego interviewing the remaining individual on the list.

89 Th e Committee was permitted to interview only two individuals who were not on the December 30, 2005, priority 

list: the Director of the Federal Protective Service and the Chief of the Critical Infrastructure Protection Division of the 

National Communications System – both in preparation for a hearing focused on law enforcement and communications 

issues, respectively.

90 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, SITREP #7, Aug. 29, 2005, 6 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 

DHS 0001181.

91 Committee staff interview of John Wood, Chief of Staff , U.S. Department of Homeland Security, conducted on Jan. 

27, 2006, transcript p. 38.

92 Committee staff interview of William E. King, Branch Chief, Region V, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program, Technical Services Branch, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 17, 2006, transcript pp. 178-179.

93 Th e only exceptions to this were Matthew Broderick, Director of the HSOC, whose interview lasted for approximately 

a total of six hours over the course of two sessions in a single day, and Wendell Shingler, Director of the Federal Protective Service, who was interviewed in a second session lasting less than 40 minutes two weeks aft er his initial interview, in 

order to clarify a particular issue.

94 Specifi cally, at the end of the session with Robert Stephan, the General Counsel for the Minority stated: “If I may, and 

I don’t mean this in any way – there are a whole lot of – we are sort of circumscribed by time here, and I must tell you, 

you have been most informative, extremely insightful in a lot of ways. But it doesn’t begin to get to a whole lot of other 

issues that we want to spend time with, with somebody who is so central to so many aspects of DHS in connection with 

a catastrophe. I would like to meet with you again. I would like to ask that this be continued. I would like to get documents, particularly e-mails, from you. And that’s central to any good investigation. So while we may fi nish here today, it’s 

a very strong position of the minority that we really do have to speak with you again, and we need to have documents that 

are central to what you were doing, particularly the e-mails. And I would like to have this session be continued on that 

basis.” Committee staff interview of Robert Stephan, Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection, U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security, conducted on Jan. 13, 2006, transcript pp. 148-149. Stephan’s interview represented a convergence of 

a number of DHS’s uncooperative practices. In addition to unreasonably limiting the time of the interview, DHS counsel 

also produced Stephan several hours before he had been scheduled to appear and in lieu of another witness who had been 

scheduled for that time. Moreover, none of Stephan’s e-mails had been produced before his appearance for the interview. 

95 Although DHS eventually made the then-Chief Financial Offi cer, Andrew Maner, available for an interview on February 2, 2006, the virtual absence of any budget-related documents signifi cantly limited the eff ectiveness of any questioning 

Committee staff could pursue.

96 Subsequently, DHS also produced to the Committee documents that were posted on the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) portal.

97 Lt. Robert Walls, e-mail to LANTMHLS Watch, RCCAlameda, CommandCenPAC, Command Center - D1, CC1, 

Command Center - LANTD5, D7CommandCenter, D8 Command Center, Ninth District Command Center, CommandCenD11, D13(cc), D14ccDutyOffi cer, D17-PF-Jun-Command Center, hsoc.uscg@dhs.gov, fl dr-NRC, D05-SMBD5MHLSWatch, D05-SMB-LANTCmdCtr, D05-SMB-LANTMHLSWatch, D8IMTWatch, tsoc.st@dhs.gov, est-mccdot@dhs.gov, CMC-01@rspa.dot.gov, cmc-02@dot.gov, uscg.iimg@dhs.gov, Aug. 29, 2005. Provided to the Committee.

98 Th e Committee recently received information in answer to this specifi c question only by including it, in a modifi ed 

form, in a question for the record to Secretary Chertoff aft er his appearance before the Committee. Questions for the 

Record of Sec. Chertoff , Feb. 15, 2006, pp. 33-41. Other questions remain unanswered, however.

99 Col. Henry Whitehorn, letter to FBI Director Robert Mueller, Aug. 30, 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

no. FBI 000000003.
700

100 Committee staff interview of William Mercer, Principal Associate Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, 

conducted on Jan. 26, 2006, transcript pp. 29-30 (“But I guess if the question is how did the requests come in, let me 

turn to those. Because that’s a very signifi cant part of the Federal statute here. In Title 42 – and I think the provision is 

42 U.S.C. § 10501 – a governor, not a state attorney general, not a mayor – a governor can ask the Attorney General of 

the United States to deploy Federal law enforcement resources if the governor makes a proff er saying, ‘We can’t meet the 

responsibilities that we need to carry out for public safety, and I request that you deploy Federal resources to assist.’ And 

we got a letter from Governor Barbour on Saturday the 3rd. And we responded that same day. It was faxed in on the 

3rd, we met with the Attorney General on Saturday. He issued the order on Saturday. . . . And Governor Blanco faxed us 

a letter the next day.”). Mr. Mercer also said that the Offi ce of the Deputy Attorney General did not receive “any direct 

requests from a state or local offi cial until [it] got the letter from Governor Barbour on the 3rd of September.” Mercer 

interview, Jan. 26, 2006, p. 24. Apparently, Mercer also did not consider a request addressed to the head of the FBI to be 

a “direct request” to the appropriate offi ce. Mercer interview, Jan. 26, 2006, pp. 30-31.

101 Mercer, when asked whether anyone from DOJ had spoken with the governor’s offi ce about the requirement of a 

gubernatorial request, responded that he did not know. Mercer interview, Jan. 26, 2006, pp. 44-45.

102 See, e.g., William Mercer, e-mail to Ted Ulloyt, Kyle Sampson, and Jeff rey Taylor, Sept. 1, 2005, 1:30 a.m. Provided 

to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DAG 000000064 (forwarding a memorandum written by Mercer that has never been 

produced. In the transmittal e-mail, Mercer off ers to put the information into bullet points and notes that “there are 

some important things to pass along to the AG” concerning Mercer’s discussions with the U.S. Attorneys from Baton 

Rouge and New Orleans).

103 See, e.g., James McAtamney, Senior Counsel for National Security Aff airs, Transmittal slip with cover notes and 

ESF-13 excerpt to Ted Ullyot and Bill Mercer. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DAG 000000100 through 

000000106. Th e Committee does not have McAtamney’s e-mails except to the extent they were produced as part of 

Mercer’s fi les.

104 See, e.g., Matthew Broderick, e-mail to John Clark, Sept. 4, 2005, 4:23 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 

DHS-HSOC-0004-0006525. (“Th e dispute is whether FBI or ICE is the lead. I believe we have designated the ICE SAC as 

the lead. DHS and DOJ co-share this ESF and usually (terrorist related) FBI is lead. Th is is a good chance for us to be.”). 

105 42 U.S.C. § 10501 (“Emergency Federal Law Enforcement Assistance Program”). 

106 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Response to the 

Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs Questions regarding Katrina,” undated, received by the Committee on Feb. 24, 2006.

107 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “Concept of Operations Plan (CONOPS) for Public Health and 

Medical Emergencies,” Jan. 2005. Provided to Committee; fi led as OPHEP 16285 through OPHEP 16315.

108 Chairman Collins and Sen. Lieberman, letter to Sec. Michael Leavitt, Jan. 13, 2006.

109 Committee staff interview of William M. Lokey, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, 

FEMA, conducted on Jan. 20, 2006, transcript pp. 75-76.

110 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, pp. 192-193. At the time Katrina hit, FEMA had not yet produced an Incident Management Handbook to adapt ICS to FEMA operations. Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 194. See FEMA ERT-N Draft 

Concept of Operations (6-6-05). Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0115-0000010. 

111 Lokey interview, Jan. 20, 2006, p. 191. William Carwile III, the FCO for Mississippi, also complained about the lack 

of training dollars for ERT-N teams. Committee staff interview of William Carwile, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for 

Hurricane Katrina in Mississippi, FEMA, conducted on Dec. 6, 2005, transcript pp. 22-23, 43. 

112 Carwile interview, Dec. 6, 2005, p. 47.

113 King interview, Jan. 17, 2006, p. 28.

114 Committee staff interview of Tony Robinson, Director, Response and Recovery Division, Region VI, FEMA, conducted on Nov. 15, 2005, transcript p. 40.

Additional Views
701

Additional Views 

Senator George V. Voinovich 

I commend Senators Collins and Lieberman and their investigative staff for producing a 

thorough examination of the government’s response to Hurricane Katrina. 

It is clear there were serious and regrettable defi ciencies in the response at every level of 

government during the days leading up to and following the unprecedented catastrophe 

in the Gulf Coast. Th is country can and must improve its capabilities in preparing for and 

responding to future disasters, whether natural or man-made. 

Th e Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs has produced a 

substantial report, which I am confi dent will contribute positively to the future of emergency management. I wholeheartedly agree with the following recommendations detailed in 

the report: 

• Commitment to emergency management across federal, state, and local governments must be strengthened;

• Th e Department of Homeland Security (DHS) must develop a true all-hazards focus and strike the appropriate balance between addressing terrorism 

and natural disasters; 

• A stronger regional DHS/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 

framework is necessary; 

• Collaboration and coordination must be improved among federal agencies 

and between federal, state, and local governments; 

• FEMA – or the proposed National Preparedness and Response Authority 

(NPRA) – must have capable and qualifi ed leadership with a robust and welltrained workforce; and

• Our nation’s plans and systems for responding to disasters and catastrophes 

should be improved and clarifi ed to establish clear lines of authority, roles, and 

responsibilities by all appropriate federal, state, and local parties. 

While I concur with many of the Chairman and Ranking Member’s fi ndings and recommendations, I appreciate the opportunity to express my diff ering opinion on several key matters. 

I believe too much emphasis has been placed upon reconsidering the organizational structure of FEMA. Whether FEMA is an independent, Cabinet-level agency or reorganized 

within DHS is not the most critical factor. Th e key to FEMA’s eff ectiveness is ensuring the 

agency has capable and qualifi ed leadership, is fully staff ed with a well-trained and experienced workforce, and has the necessary budgetary resources. As this Report details, FEMA 

did not have the appropriate leadership, staffi ng levels, or budgetary resources necessary for 

optimal readiness prior to Hurricane Katrina. 

Th is Report declares that FEMA is beyond repair. I do not share that assessment. Nor do I 

agree at this time that reorganizing and renaming FEMA is the answer. I am concerned that 

yet another reorganization of FEMA and DHS would be disruptive and could cause more 

harm than good. Instead of “moving boxes around” yet again, I believe this Committee 

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared
702

should focus its oversight authority and legislative eff orts on ensuring that DHS and 

FEMA are working as eff ectively as possible to strengthen institutional capabilities, assemble the appropriate leadership team with the optimal staffi ng levels, and make the best use 

of budgetary resources. 

In the past months, DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff , Acting FEMA Director R. David Paulison, and Under Secretary for Preparedness George Foresman have assured this Committee 

that they are rehabilitating FEMA and improving preparedness and response capabilities 

throughout DHS for the impending hurricane season and beyond. DHS is already implementing many of the recommendations in this Committee’s Report. However, Secretary 

Chertoff does not support the Report’s reorganization proposal. As a former government 

executive, I believe the Secretary’s views are critical and deserve serious consideration in 

this matter. Congress must hold DHS accountable for its performance, but should refrain 

from micromanaging the agency. 

Much attention has been paid in this Report to the link between the emergency preparedness and response functions within DHS. While I agree these two functions are necessarily 

interdependent, I am not presently convinced the agency must be reorganized to achieve 

coordination. When Secretary Chertoff conducted his management review of the agency 

last year, he determined that the preparedness and response offi ces should be separated 

– but work together closely – because the two functions require diff erent core competencies. 

Th erefore, he proposed creating a Preparedness Directorate to focus exclusively on grants, 

training, and exercises; while allowing FEMA to focus entirely on its response and recovery 

missions. Th e new Preparedness Directorate became operational only months ago, in October 2005, following Hurricane Katrina. Th erefore, I believe judgments regarding the current 

structure of the preparedness and response functions within DHS are premature. 

I also have reservations regarding the proposed dual-reporting structure for the Director 

of NPRA. Th e chain of command recommended in this report would allow the Director 

of the proposed NPRA to bypass the DHS Secretary and report directly to the President. 

Following the leadership failures during Hurricane Katrina, a dual-reporting structure is a 

tempting recommendation, but one that would ultimately harm accountability and the effectiveness and coherence of the chain of command. If the DHS Secretary is to be held fully 

accountable for the actions of his Department, the NPRA Director should not be allowed to 

circumvent the Secretary’s authority, even during times of crisis. 

Overall, it seems that the recommendations in this Report could entail shift ing an increased 

burden to the federal government for emergency management, which has historically been 

recognized as a shared responsibility between federal, state, and local governments. In 

an environment of limited federal budgetary resources, I would urge that where possible, 

improvements in emergency preparedness and response capabilities should primarily be 

achieved through better management, training, coordination, and leveraging of existing 

resources at all levels of government. 

I feel strongly that we in Congress have an obligation to exercise our oversight capacity to 

ensure our nation develops a more robust and eff ective emergency-management system in 

order to prevent future devastation and suff ering on the scale of Hurricane Katrina. I support the spirit in which this Report is off ered, however, I would caution my colleagues that 

Congress should avoid being overly prescriptive toward the Executive Branch or the States. 

Certain recommendations in this report denote a specifi city with which I am uncomfortable. 

In total, I believe the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Committee have produced a 

solid Report, and I greatly appreciate their eff orts. I hope the Congress and the AdministraAdditional Views
703

tion can work cooperatively in the coming months to identify and implement the appropriate modifi cations to improve our nation’s disaster preparedness and response capabilities.

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared
584
705

Additional Views

Senator Tom Coburn, M.D.

I commend the Committee Chairman, Ranking Member, and investigative staff for their 

arduous investigation into the Hurricane Katrina disaster and the work that went into the 

voluminous Report. To a large extent, this Report provides a detailed account of the events 

leading up to, during and aft er the landfall of Hurricane Katrina. I am concerned, however, 

that the main recommendation of the Report – to abolish FEMA and reconstitute it as the 

National Preparedness and Response Authority – does not adequately address the root cause 

of the disaster. Th at root cause, in my view, was a lack of accountability for performance 

(both before and aft er the hurricane), rather than a fl awed organizational or management 

structure. I would argue that by overemphasizing organizational change rather than performance improvement, these somewhat confl icting recommendations miss the point.

Misplaced Focus: Organization v. Outcomes

Th e Report recommendations focus on micromanaging the “how” and “who” of emergency 

preparedness and response rather than the “what.” Rearranging organization and prescribing 

certain qualities for, tasks of, and relationships between managers, and creating new teams 

and task forces, is not the appropriate role of Congress. We should ensure that taxpayers are 

getting the “product” they pay for with tax revenues, rather than dictating the specifi cs of 

how it is obtained. In other words, the Report recommendations should have focused more 

on developing an accountability system based on meeting actual preparedness and response 

indicators and benchmarks as a condition for receiving federal, state or local funds, using 

whatever management and organizational structures are preferred by a given President, 

Governor, and Mayor or County Executive. Diff erent Executives will naturally have diff erent personalities, management styles and operating procedures. Th ey should be permitted to 

operate and organize in whatever lawful manner they choose. Th e key matter of importance 

to the Congress is that they deliver the level of performance on pre-legislated preparedness 

and response outcomes, improving aft er each exercise and real-life emergency. 

Th e Committee’s investigation did not adequately address this aspect of accountability for 

performance over the long term. It uncovered the symptoms of the disease rather than the 

disease itself. I would argue that under-funding of emergency-planning activities is not a root 

cause, but rather, the result of consistent inattention to meeting emergency-planning goals.

Lack of oversight by accountable government offi cials, including Congress, is the reason 

behind any funding defi ciency. When elected offi cials fail to recognize a dangerous lack of 

readiness, they are unlikely to have either the political will to increase funding or the attention span required to identify which underperforming functions require a redirection of 

existing funding streams. Perhaps, if adequate oversight were being performed, it would have 

been recognized that funding levels were saturated in some areas, but that more important 

or worse-performing areas needed targeted funding redirection. A non-specifi c accusation of 

“under-funding” does not explain why nobody with the power of the purse at the local, state, 

or federal level noticed that preparedness was not being achieved, or if it was noticed, nobody took the steps necessary to remedy the situation. Funding was provided over a period 

of years to achieve preparedness, but it took the massive real-life test of Hurricane Katrina to 

expose what should have been exposed and fi xed by simulated or smaller-scale real-life tests 

such as the 2004 Florida hurricane season or the Hurricane Pam simulated exercise. 

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared
706

I believe that the reason why preparedness was not achieved is that measurable indicators 

of that preparedness were not demanded at any level of government by elected offi cials. If 

preparedness is operationalized using measurable indicators (such as performance during 

drills, testing of communications equipment and systems, testing of staff on certain aspects 

of a plan, and actual performance during smaller disasters), then offi cials have a way of targeting funds to where they are most needed, or conditioning funds on actual performance. 

Instead, the usual process involves automatic funding every year without any reference 

to what the American people are getting for those dollars. I suspect that Americans don’t 

care how the Department of Homeland Security delivers adequate disaster planning and 

response; they simply want the Department to deliver at the point of crisis. Congress should 

take the same approach. A useful model can be found in New Zealand, which reorganized 

its federal legislative and oversight approach during the 1980s and 1990s to become entirely 

outcomes-focused, conditioning funding on performance on certain outcomes that were 

legislated in advance. Th e result was radical improvement in federal performance.

Misplaced Focus: Timeframe

Another weakness of the Report is the timeframe of its focus, which may be why the recommendations miss the mark. Th e primary failure of all levels of government in the Katrina 

disaster occurred years before landfall, and no amount of brilliant performance immediately before or aft er the hurricane would have overcome that neglect. Th at the performance 

wasn’t satisfactory (far from it) is indeed relevant to the observed outcomes, but only marginally so. It should hardly have been the primary focus of the report and its recommendations. Th ere is simply only so much a local, state, or federal government, with its layers of 

bureaucracies, rules, regulations, and systems, can do to help people during a disaster if 

the years of planning and drilling (until all systems and plans have been demonstrably and 

measurably tested) have been neglected. 

As a primary example, the report acknowledges that without the breaking of the levee, 

most of the signifi cant problems would have had far less of an impact on the city of New 

Orleans. Yet, the problems with the city’s levee system go back 40 years or more. In fact, the 

very likelihood of a situation exactly like the one that occurred was predicted for decades by 

experts inside and outside the government. While it is keenly important to obtain the lessons learned from those that commanded the response and recovery activities, it is far more 

important to understand the long-term failures to prepare for this event. 

Misplaced Focus: Expectations of Federal Government

Finally, the Report places too much blame on “last responders” in this disaster, that is, the 

federal government. Unwieldy, distant, slow, and ineffi cient by nature, the federal government is rightly the responder of last resort to any disaster. However, as the biggest source of 

funding for local and state preparedness activities, the federal government has the critical 

obligation to serve as a quality-assurance monitor in advance of any disaster. It is essential 

that the federal government conduct thorough, regular, and well-publicized oversight of 

state, local, and federal offi cials’ performance, to observe whether they are performing in 

a way that reduces the need for a massive federal engagement following an emergency. If 

performance is substandard, then the well-publicized nature of such oversight can serve to 

generate public demand and political will for the conditioning of funds and other “tough 

love” measures that may be the only means of motivating improvement. 

Given that the federal government is not designed to be a fast or fi rst responder in a disaster, any federal bail-out of states and localities in a disaster would itself be a disaster. Th at 

means that the best and most eff ective federal role is to demand excellence, indeed, to condition funding on it, over the years prior to a disaster, ensuring that state and local offi cials 

are so prepared as to preempt the need for federal intervention, and certainly to preempt 

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707

the need for quick and effi cient intervention. Th at the federal government had to take over 

Hurricane Katrina recovery and response, rather than simply help coordinate it, represents 

the real tragedy of the Katrina narrative. Th e Report fails to recognize the inherent inability 

of the federal government to respond well in a situation like this and instead castigates it for 

being what it must be: a large, slow bureaucracy. 

Conclusion

Th e Congress oft en resorts to rearranging agencies in reaction to disasters and then criticizing the very agencies they organized and oversaw for being organized poorly. Th e Department of Homeland Security itself was the product of Congressional bureaucratic reshuffl ing 

aft er 9/11. Perhaps the problem is not fl awed federal organization, but fl awed oversight 

by local, state, and federal legislative and executive offi cials. All Americans, especially the 

victims of Hurricane Katrina, deserve better from us in the future.

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared 
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709

Additional Views 

Senator Pete V. Domenici

On Corps of Engineers and Levee Issues

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared develops its conclusion based on available, 

albeit incomplete, data. Th e Army Corps of Engineers is continuing to collect and synthesize data on the storm. Th e Interagency Performance Evaluation Task Force (IPET) established by the Chief of Engineers to provide credible and objective scientifi c and engineering 

answers to fundamental questions about the performance of the hurricane protection and 

fl ood damage-reduction system in the New Orleans metropolitan area has not yet completed their analysis. Th eir report is scheduled for completion in June 2006. Th e IPET team 

consists of more than 150 experts from more than 50 federal, state, and local agencies, as 

well as international, academia and industry groups.

As this team was established by the Corps, outside oversight was considered essential to validate the team’s results. Th e oversight is set up as follows: the Corps IPET team will collect 

the facts, the National Research Council Committee on New Orleans Regional Hurricane 

Protection Projects will synthesize the facts, and the American Society of Civil Engineers is 

the external review panel to verify the data and develop conclusions.

Th e IPET Mission has fi ve focus areas. Th ey are:

Th e Flood Protection System – What were the design criteria for the pre-Katrina hurricane protection system, and did the design, as-built construction, 

and maintained condition meet these criteria?

Th e Storm – What were the storm surges and waves used as the basis of design, 

and how do those compare to the storm surges and waves generated by Hurricane Katrina?

Th e Performance – How did the fl oodwalls, levees, pumping stations, and 

drainage canals, individually and acting as an integrated system, perform in 

response to Hurricane Katrina, and why?

Th e Consequences – What have been the societal-related consequences of the 

Katrina-related damage?

Th e Risk – Following the immediate repairs, what will be the quantifi able risk 

to New Orleans and vicinity from future hurricanes and tropical storms?

Th e hurricane and fl ood damage-reduction projects in the New Orleans metropolitan area 

were designed for a compact, relatively fast-moving Category 3 storm. Th is was the socalled standard project hurricane.

Katrina was a huge, powerful, relatively slow-moving hurricane. Th e United States Geological Survey (USGS) says that the storm surge from Hurricane Katrina was the largest 

recorded storm surge ever to hit the United States. 

Some of the preliminary information from the report shows that levee subsidence had 

caused some levee segments to be lower than designed, and consequently did not provide 

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared
710

the protection level intended. For instance, the levees along the Industrial Canal were nearly 

three feet below the design elevation due solely to subsidence.

Unanticipated failure mechanisms in the I-wall design resulted in catastrophic failure of 

the I-walls along two of the interior drainage canals with water levels below the tops of the 

fl oodwalls. Th ese failure modes had been modeled, but had not been incorporated in the 

design as they were not anticipated to occur at these locations.

Earthen levees were subjected to long-period ocean waves. Th is type of wave is not usually 

associated with more compact hurricanes typical of the Gulf of Mexico. Th ese long-period 

waves carry tremendous energy and ripped huge chunks out of the levees as the waves 

overtopped the structures. Vivid images of this destruction were captured showing waves 

breaking over the levee along the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet during Hurricane Katrina as 

well as pictures created aft er the storm showing the same levee section and how it was damaged by these breaking waves. Th is type of wave action was not incorporated in the design 

of the earthen levees.

While these preliminary results from the IPET team do not absolve the Corps of Engineers, 

the State of Louisiana, or local offi cials from blame in design and maintenance of the levees, 

Katrina was a huge storm when it made landfall. It packed a Category 5 storm surge even 

though wind speed may have been as low as Category 3 when it made landfall. Th e storm 

surge was the devastating factor on the fl ood-control infrastructure. Further, the interior 

drainage system, developed over a 100-year period mostly by non-Federal interests, proved 

to be inadequate to deal with the fl ooding caused by the storm surge and attendant fl ooding. 

Th e preliminary information from the IPET study shows that the design assumptions that 

were made when the project was authorized and throughout the 40-year period of construction were likely faulty, in hindsight. However, as a storm like Katrina was not considered 

typical for Gulf hurricanes, the same design decisions may well have been repeated if we 

were building the project today, had this storm not occurred. 

Somewhat as a validation of the above statement is that FEMA was in the process of revising 

the 100-year fl ood plain maps for New Orleans prior to Katrina. Had Katrina not occurred, 

these maps would have, in all likelihood, validated existing, but faulty, conclusions. However, aft er Katrina occurred, FEMA reworked their analysis to incorporate the data from 

Katrina. Th e result was drastically altered 100-year fl ood plain maps for the New Orleans 

metro area. Th ese new maps indicate that the levees currently in place do not provide 

protection from a 100-year fl ooding event. Prior to Katrina, it was believed the same levees 

provided a 200-year level of protection. Th is revised analysis demonstrates the power and 

magnitude of Katrina by showing how drastically it altered the hydraulic assumptions in the 

metro area. 

Supplemental appropriations to date have provided the Corps necessary funding to respond 

to immediate disaster needs and restore the hurricane and fl ood-protection system to preKatrina conditions before the start of this year’s hurricane season on June 1st. Additionally, funding has been provided to complete the hurricane and fl ood-protection system as 

originally conceived and designed.

Th e latest supplemental proposal is intended to strengthen the obvious weaknesses in this 

system by closing off the interior drainage canals and the Industrial Canal to storm surge. 

Th is will provide increased protection to the central area of New Orleans. Proposed levee 

raisings will increase protection levels for the New Orleans metropolitan area. Armoring of 

the levees will protect many of the levees in St. Bernard and other hard-hit areas from the 

wave action that was so devastating during Katrina. Restoration of coastal areas will provide 

Additional Views
711

protection by reducing storm surge, and storm-proofi ng the interior pump stations should 

allow this vital system to continue operating during hurricane events.

Studies by the Corps are on-going to determine the ultimate level of protection that should 

be provided for the greater New Orleans and south Louisiana area. Th ese studies will 

provide preliminary interim recommendations in June 2006, with a fi nal report scheduled 

for December 2007. Th ese studies are anticipated to provide the basis for additional investments in hurricane and fl ood-system improvements to the greater New Orleans and south 

Louisiana area.

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared
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713

Additional Views 

Senator John Warner

Th e investigation conducted by this Committee represents a remarkable undertaking 

in contemporary Senate history – 22 investigative hearings calling 85 witnesses, formal 

interviews of 325 witnesses, and nearly 1 million pages of documentation have led to the 

Committee report. Th e enormity of this task cannot be overstated and I wish to applaud the 

tireless work of Chairman Collins, Senator Lieberman, and their staff on their eff orts. All 

Americans share the same goal to prepare for the future and respond when called upon to 

help our fellow citizens. It is the responsibility of all levels of government to serve its people. 

Department of Defense Response

Aft er these investigative hearings and extensive additional interviews, it is my personal view 

that the Department of Defense (DOD) active-duty personnel, National Guard, and Reserves performed with professional distinction in the days and weeks following the landfall 

of Hurricane Katrina. Th ere are many stories of individual service, persons or small groups 

accepting personal risks in helping the victims of this tragic natural disaster. 

Th e Department of Defense response to Hurricane Katrina represents the largest and most 

rapid “domestic” deployment of the military in contemporary military history. Even while 

over 75,000 National Guard and Reserves were deployed overseas fi ghting for freedom in 

Iraq and Afghanistan, an additional 50,000 troops were deployed in response to Hurricane 

Katrina. 

At the peak of the Department of Defense deployment there were 20 ships; 346 helicopters; 

68 fi xed-wing aircraft ; and 72,614 Active Duty, Reserves, and National Guardsmen assisting 

the recovery eff ort. In addition, the DOD delivered 26.6 million Meals Ready to Eat, treated 

26,304 patients, and fl ew 16,525 sorties.1

 While the Committee report deservedly singles out 

the contributions of the Coast Guard in performing 33,000 rescues, it bears mentioning that 

the National Guard and Reserve saved 11,000 people from their rooft ops.2

Th e Department takes seriously its civil-support mission and provided unprecedented support to the response to Hurricane Katrina, as noted by the testimony of Assistant Secretary 

Paul McHale February 9, 2006:

Th e Department of Defense’s deployment of military resources in support of 

civil authorities aft er Hurricane Katrina exceeded, in speed and size, any other 

domestic disaster relief mission in the history of the United States. Th e ability 

of our military forces – Active Duty, Reserves, and the National Guard – to 

respond quickly and eff ectively to an event of this magnitude is a testament 

to their readiness, agility, and professionalism. It is also a refl ection of the 

resources provided by Congress that enable them to organize, train, and equip 

to meet the full range of DOD’s missions.3

Over 72,000 Federal military and National Guard personnel were deployed in response to 

Hurricane Katrina, more than twice the number deployed in response to Hurricane Andrew 

in 1992 (over 29,000).4

As President Bush,5

 DHS Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson,6 LTG General Russel Honoré,7

former FEMA Director Michael Brown,8

 and FEMA federal coordinating offi cer William 

Lokey9

 stated in their public statements, interviews, and testimony, the Department of 

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared
714

Defense performed commendably and responded eff ectively to every request made by 

FEMA for assistance to the Department. As a personal observation, Lieutenant General 

Honoré served with great distinction. 

On the whole, the performance of the individual soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen 

– active, Guard, and Reserve – was in keeping with the high professional standards of the 

United States Military, and these men and women are proud of their service to help the 

victims of this natural disaster. 

Th e Senate as a whole should be proud of these men and women in uniform who responded 

with courage and untiring professionalism on behalf of their fellow citizens who fell victim 

to the destruction of Hurricane Katrina.

National Preparedness and Response Authority and Organizational Recommendations

Th e movement of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) into the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with its creation in 2003 has led to criticism that this 

organizational structure impedes the ability of FEMA to adequately prepare for and respond to incidents. Th e Senate Katrina Report calls for the reorganization of FEMA into a 

quasi-independent agency that would combine preparedness and response functions under 

a “National Preparedness Response Authority” (NPRA) with direct reporting to the President during national emergencies. 

It is my belief that the combination of preparedness and response functions can lead to a 

potential for focus on one of the two missions, leaving the other neglected. Certainly both 

missions are of extreme importance, as adequate preparedness eff orts can contribute signifi cantly to our ability to respond when emergencies take place. Th e current separation of 

these duties in the Department’s framework enables the Department of Homeland Security 

to provide signifi cant resources and attention to both functions without leading to a situation choosing one over the other. 

In addition, my experience in government has shown that a strong reporting structure can 

only serve to strengthen the ability of any organization to work eff ectively in times of crisis. 

Certainly the FEMA Director has the authority to execute his or her mission during national emergencies as granted by the Staff ord Act.10 A dual reporting structure where the FEMA 

or NPRA Director reports to the Secretary of Homeland Security and the President simultaneously would inject confusion into the chain of command. However, as with all chains 

of command, should the President call on the Director, he or she is responsible to act. Th e 

most important factor in the success or failure of any organization rests on the shoulders of 

the individuals in that organization. Experienced leaders and talented staff are essential to 

the ability of FEMA to execute its mission. 

For these reasons, I believe that the creation of the NPRA and elevation of the Director 

position above the Under Secretary level would not provide a more eff ective organizational 

structure for the Department of Homeland Security.

1 Department of Defense, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, Aft er Action Report.

2 Testimony of Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, Chief, National Guard Bureau, before the House Appropriations 

Subcommittee on Defense, Sept. 28, 2005.

3 Testimony of Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, Feb. 9, 2006, p. 2.

4 Testimony of Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, Feb. 9, 2006, p. 4. 

Additional Views
715

5 Statement of President George W. Bush, Aug. 31, 2005.

6 Interview of Michael Jackson, Jan. 27, 2006, pp. 27-28.

7 Testimony of Lieutenant General Russel Honoré, Commander, First U.S. Army, Feb. 9, 2006, pp. 5-9.

8 Interview of former FEMA Director Michael Brown, Jan. 23, 2006, pp. 206-207.

9 Interview of William Lokey, FEMA Federal Coordinating Offi cer, Nov. 4, 2005, pp. 80-87, 136.

10 Robert T. Staff ord Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5143. 

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared
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717

Additional Views 

Senator Carl Levin

Committee Chairman Collins and Ranking Member Lieberman deserve the nation’s gratitude for their determined eff orts in conducting the most detailed Congressional investigation of the events surrounding Hurricane Katrina. Congressional oversight is critical if we 

are to learn from the mistakes made in this disaster and strengthen the nation’s emergency 

management capabilities. 

Th e televised pictures of Americans dislodged from their homes and stranded for days at 

the New Orleans Superdome and Convention Center, without adequate food, water, or 

basic necessities, continue to haunt the public and raise questions about the competency 

of government. Th e Committee Report provides needed factual information about what 

actually happened, and important recommendations for reforms. It is clear, as the Report 

recommends, that we need to choose leaders for federal emergency-management programs 

based on experience and qualifi cations, not cronyism. We need to create a central command 

post that gets and disseminates accurate, real-time information during emergency conditions. We need to restore emergency-preparedness and mitigation initiatives in our federal 

emergency-management programs. It is also painfully clear that Presidential leadership is 

essential during an unfolding disaster. 

FEMA Reorganization

One of the Report’s primary recommendations, the proposed reorganization of FEMA, 

raises diffi cult issues. Clearly, FEMA needs to be strengthened. It needs qualifi ed leadership. 

It needs adequate funding. It needs to regain control of the state emergency-preparedness 

grant programs. It needs to address all types of hazards, including natural disasters. 

Whether FEMA should remain in DHS or return to independent-agency status, however, 

is a complex issue that depends to a large extent on how the legislation reorganizing the 

agency will defi ne its mission, its authorities, its assets, and its funding. Giving FEMA 

independent status would not automatically cure its ills. While it performed well under 

President Clinton as an independent agency, under President George H.W. Bush, it lost 

eff ectiveness as evidenced by FEMA’s bungling response to the 1992 Hurricane Andrew. On 

the other hand, keeping FEMA within DHS would require it to continue to compete against 

a host of important programs, including those to promote border security and prevent terrorism. FEMA lost out to those other programs in the past, and the Committee Report does 

not identify reforms that would ensure FEMA would obtain a priority status or be able to 

protect its budget while within DHS.

Another problem involves issues of accountability and the chain of command. Th e Committee Report recommends that, during “catastrophes,” the head of the newly reconstituted 

FEMA report directly to the President.1

 Th e Report does not, however, defi ne “catastrophe,” 

specify when this direct reporting relationship should take eff ect, or clarify the authority 

of the DHS Secretary during such catastrophes. Moreover, the head of FEMA presumably 

continues to report to the DHS Secretary on routine matters such as the agency’s annual 

budget, long-term priorities, and programs to assist states to prepare for, mitigate, and 

recover from emergencies. Th e Report also recommends that the head of FEMA serve as a 

national emergency-management advisor to the President, in a capacity that presumably 

bypasses the DHS Secretary. Th ese alternative chains of command could create confusion 

and blur accountability. 

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared
718

For these and other reasons, I plan to wait to see the actual legislative proposals for reorganizing FEMA and consider the pros and cons at hearings before taking a position on this 

issue.

National Guard Coordination

I strongly endorse the fi nding in the Report that the “National Guard and active-duty military response saved lives; provided urgent food, water, shelter, and medical care to many 

hurricane victims; and helped restore law and order, re-establish communications, and 

rebuild damaged roads.” Additionally, the Report fi nds that as soon as the DOD leadership 

recognized the severity of the disaster, it adopted an energetic, forward-looking posture 

that brought critical expertise and personnel to support the beleaguered state and federal 

fi rst responders. I also fully agree with the fi ndings and recommendations of the Report on 

how the response of DOD and the National Guard can be improved in the event of a future 

catastrophe or major disaster. 

In particular, it is imperative that both DOD and the National Guard improve their planning and co-ordination in the event a large military response is needed for another catastrophe. 

With respect to the deployment of National Guard forces, there is a clear need to better plan 

for large-scale deployments. As the Report recommends, the Governors should work with 

the Department of Defense to develop a coordinated, integrated process for the large-scale 

deployment of National Guard forces when such a large-scale deployment is requested by a 

Governor during a catastrophe.

Communications. I also endorse the Report’s focus on the importance of emergency 

communications. Th e Report states: “Th e problems of operability and interoperability of 

communications were a central part of the failures in the governments’ response to Hurricane Katrina.” To address this problem, I support the enactment of legislation providing 

a dedicated funding source for the purchase of interoperable communications equipment. 

States cannot aff ord to correct this problem on their own; they need federal assistance. I will 

continue to work with Senators Collins and Lieberman to ensure that any legislation arising 

out of this investigation includes dedicated funding for interoperability equipment.

Separated Families

One particularly disturbing aspect of the Katrina disaster involves the failure of federal, 

state, and local governments to deal eff ectively with the problem of family members who 

became separated during the disaster. During evacuation and search-and-rescue eff orts, 

some family members became separated, ending up in diff erent places within the same state 

and sometimes in diff erent states. Over 5,000 children were reported missing by family 

members, as well as over 13,000 adults. While the reported cases of missing children have 

since been characterized as resolved, it took nearly seven months for the last child to be 

reunited with her family.2

DHS and FEMA failed to take the lead in addressing this devastating problem. FEMA, for 

example, failed for a substantial period of time to make use of an existing database to assist 

in reuniting families. It did not set standards for states to use in evacuation eff orts so that, 

for example, the name, origin, and destination of each evacuated individual was recorded. 

Instead, the Department of Justice tasked a single nonprofi t agency, experienced in locating 

missing persons, to set up a hotline for reporting missing children and adults and to devise 

ways to try to reunite them with friends or family. In addition, charitable organizations, 

businesses, ad hoc groups, and even the media set up websites to help persons locate their 

loved ones.

Additional Views
719

One Web site identifi ed 52 other Web sites with lists of Katrina survivors and missing persons.3

 Th is Web site explained that it was providing the list of these databases to help people 

fi nd missing friends and family members. It also pointed out the obvious: “Th ere needs to 

be a way to pool this data so that people don’t have to go from database to database looking 

for the information they seek.”

FEMA not only failed to utilize a central database to track Katrina survivors and missing 

persons, it also failed to cooperate fully with the nonprofi t agency tasked with reuniting 

families.4

 Citing privacy issues that could have been resolved, FEMA declined to provide 

needed assistance and allowed the problem to fester for months. 

Some have argued that, during the next disaster, state and local governments should assume responsibility for tracking evacuees, resolving missing-person reports, and reuniting 

separated family members. I disagree. People go missing when there are disasters of such 

magnitude that they overwhelm state and local capacity. Th e Committee Report states in 

the “Conclusions and Findings” section: “During a catastrophe, which by defi nition almost 

immediately exceeds state and local resources and signifi cantly disrupts governmental operations and emergency services, the role of the federal government is particularly important.”

Catastrophic events also oft en aff ect multiple states. Even disasters confi ned to a single state 

may see persons evacuated to multiple states, as in the case of the New Orleans fl ood. It is 

unlikely that states will know ahead of time which of them will be involved in a particular 

disaster or in evacuation eff orts. Even if they did, it is naive to think that multiple states 

facing imminent disaster can work out an eff ective plan for tracking evacuated individuals. 

Logic dictates that DHS should take responsibility for addressing the problem beforehand 

by developing standards and forms for collecting evacuee information, providing a common database or means for linking multiple databases to track evacuees and identify missing persons, and resolving privacy issues. Assigning this responsibility to the states instead, 

without a lead federal agency, is impractical and likely to ensure another round of confusion 

and heartache for misplaced persons and their families.

Th e House Committee report does not address this problem.5

 Th e White House report 

briefl y mentions it, but does not hold anyone accountable for the confused and inadequate 

response during Katrina, nor does it recommend corrective actions.6

 Every day that families 

are separated during a disaster brings loss and sadness. Each separation consumes federal 

resources in the search for the missing. Each lost child, suff ering alone without family or 

friends, is a tragedy. Th is is an issue that deserves our full attention. 

Preventive action can avert much of the problem. Forms to track evacuees and identify 

missing persons, designation of a central database to accept and organize this information, 

standards for resolving privacy concerns, and methods to make appropriate information 

accessible are matters which can be worked out before disaster strikes, and then used to 

prevent tens of thousands of future cases of missing persons during disasters. Th ese systems 

need to be developed before the next emergency. Where necessary, Congress needs to appropriate the funds needed to put these systems in place. I urge DHS to take on and complete this task prior to the upcoming hurricane season.

Unifi ed Command 

I agree with the points made by Senator Lieberman in his additional views, which I have 

joined, that FEMA must share the blame for the absence of a unifi ed command in Louisiana 

during Katrina. It is abundantly clear from the record before the Committee that FEMA 

lacked an adequate number of trained personnel in Louisiana to establish a fully functional 

Incident Command System and a unifi ed command for the response to Katrina. Under the 

National Response Plan, FEMA was the lead federal agency responsible for establishing a 

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared
720

unifi ed command in partnership with the state; neither FEMA nor the state had an adequate 

number of trained personnel to deal with a catastrophe of this magnitude. Th e absence of 

a unifi ed command contributed to confusion and delays. Among the lessons learned from 

Katrina is the need for FEMA to take stronger action to ensure a unifi ed command in future 

disasters.

Waste, Fraud, and Abuse. I am disappointed that the Committee’s investigation did not 

more fully tackle the issue of contract waste, fraud, and abuse. Our Committee has jurisdiction over federal procurement issues, and multiple examples of procurement failings came 

up during the Katrina hearings, including allegations involving no-bid contracts, infl ated 

prices, unqualifi ed contractors, and wasteful purchasing. More aggressive Congressional 

oversight could have helped identify the many problems and suggest needed reforms. 

Active involvement by this Committee in Katrina procurement matters could still provide a 

signifi cant boost to eff orts to prevent contract problems during the Katrina recovery eff ort. I 

hope the Committee will redouble its eff orts to prevent, expose, and remedy contract waste, 

fraud and abuse during the Katrina recovery.

FEMA and DOD

Finally, I would like to note one matter that merits a clarifi cation. Th e Report’s Executive 

Summary states that even aft er DOD Deputy Secretary England issued a “blank check” to 

Admiral Keating to provide DOD assistance in the Katrina disaster, and the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff , General Myers, directed DOD commanders to move potentially 

useful assets in advance of FEMA requests, “some FEMA offi cials believe that DOD’s approval process continued to take too long.” As the Report implies, however, the majority of 

FEMA offi cials were satisfi ed with DOD’s approval process and the eff orts it made to assist 

FEMA during the Katrina disaster. As FEMA Federal Coordinating Offi cer William Lokey 

said: “What I will speak to is Colonel Daskevich and his people. Th ey ... [did] anything I 

asked them to do ... everything they could for the people in Louisiana.”7

1 Th e Democratic Staff of the House Committee on Homeland Security recently made a similar recommendation, but 

specifi cally defi ned when the FEMA Director would report to the President. Th e report explains: “We recommend requiring a direct line of reporting between the Director of FEMA and the President of the United States during incidents 

of national signifi cance.” Redirecting FEMA Toward Success: A Report and Legislative Solution, Prepared for Congressman Bennie G. Th ompson, Ranking Member, by the Democratic Staff of the Committee on Homeland Security, Feb. 

2006, page 35.

2 “National Center for Missing and Exploited Children Reunites Last Missing Child Separated By Hurricane Katrina and 

Rita,” press release, Mar. 17, 2006, http://www.missingkids.com/missingkids, accessed on May 4, 2006.

3 www.rexblog.com/2005/09/03, accessed on May 4, 2006.

4 “FEMA Restricts Evacuee Data, Citing Privacy,” Th e Washington Post, October 12, 2005, page A01; “FEMA Slows 

Search for Kids From Katrina,” Th e Washington Post, Dec. 23, 2005, page A06; “Coordinated search for the missing; 

Reuniting children separated from families aft er Hurricane Katrina should be a FEMA priority,” Th e Grand Rapids Press, 

Grand Rapids, MI, Dec. 31, 2005, p. A12.; “FEMA stymies Katrina searches: Agency cites privacy laws in preventing efforts to fi nd missing children,” Charleston Daily Mail, Charleston, WV, Dec. 27, 2005, page 7A.

5 A Failure of Initiative: Final Report, U.S. House of Representatives, Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the 

Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, Feb. 15, 2006. 

6 Th e White House, Th e Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned, Feb. 2006.

7 Interview of William Lokey, FEMA Federal Coordinating Offi cer, Nov. 4, 2005, p. 136.

Additional Views
721

Additional Views

Senator Daniel Akaka, Senator Frank Lautenberg, and 

Senator Mark Pryor 

On Maintaining the Functions of the Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA) within the Department of Homeland Security

While we subscribe to the majority of the Committee Report, we do not believe the Committee’s recommendation for restructuring the Federal Emergency Management Agency 

(FEMA) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) adequately addresses the 

chain of command and budget problems made evident by Hurricane Katrina. We believe 

FEMA was more eff ective and robust as an independent, Cabinet-level agency, and we recommend returning FEMA to that status.

When the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which created DHS, was being debated in Congress, the inclusion of FEMA in the new Department was a controversial subject. Members 

of Congress from both sides of the aisle and emergency-management experts questioned the 

wisdom of folding FEMA into DHS. Th e Brookings Institution issued a study in July 2002, 

Assessing the Department of Homeland Security, stating that only agencies “where the function would not be performed as well in its current agency or would provide a useful synergy 

with other entities” should be included in DHS. “Furthermore, mergers should enhance, not 

detract, from the ability to fulfi ll stated agency missions. Th e merger of a consolidated FEMA 

into a larger Department of Homeland Security does not meet any of these criteria.”1

James Lee Witt, Director of FEMA, 1993-2001, recommended creating the new Department slowly, arguing that DHS should fi rst assume responsibility for critical infrastructure 

protection and intelligence analysis instead of assuming FEMA’s emergency-management 

responsibilities, which “were not broken and didn’t need fi xing.”2

Members of Congress questioned whether FEMA would lose its ability to respond to 

natural disasters. For example, at the confi rmation hearing for Michael Brown to be Deputy 

Director of FEMA, Senator Akaka stated:

Th e President’s proposal for a new Department of Homeland Security will 

include the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). A key question 

is how will this new role for FEMA in homeland security aff ect its traditional 

mission? ... Many of the agencies impacted by this proposal, including FEMA, 

have a number of core responsibilities unrelated to their homeland security 

missions. Most of what FEMA does every day, and what Americans expect 

from FEMA, does not fall under the category of homeland security.3

However, these arguments did not prevail, and four years later Hurricane Katrina has made 

evident to us that incorporating FEMA into DHS was a mistake.

Th ere are three main reasons that FEMA must be an independent agency in order to function eff ectively: chain of command, budget integrity, and fl exibility. 

Chain of Command

Th e Director of FEMA should have a direct – not a dotted – line to the President. In 1996, 

recognizing the importance of emergency response, President Bill Clinton elevated the 

FEMA Director position to the Cabinet level. Being a member of the President’s Cabinet 

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared
Additional Views

722

enabled the FEMA Director to task other federal agencies more eff ectively during a disaster 

and provided an established and direct line of communication to the President.

Th is status was eliminated in 2003 when FEMA was folded into DHS and the FEMA Director was reduced to the rank of Undersecretary requiring that he report to the Secretary of 

Homeland Security instead of the President. 

Under the Robert T. Staff ord Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (P.L. 93-288), 

the FEMA Director has the authority to task other federal agencies to provide specifi c assistance to states overwhelmed by disaster. In today’s current structure, this means that an 

Undersecretary of DHS is tasking Cabinet-level Secretaries, who clearly outrank the FEMA 

Director. In addition, the FEMA Director must go through the DHS Secretary to communicate with the President. Former FEMA Director Michael Brown was criticized heavily for at 

times reporting directly to the White House during Katrina. 

Hurricane Katrina provided countless examples of federal assets not being deployed quickly 

enough, such as the delayed arrival of active-duty military in a chaotic New Orleans,4

possibly due to the lack of authority and clarity in the tasking orders. Th e Department of 

Defense (DOD) describes FEMA’s tasks as “requests” that are evaluated by the Department 

before a decision is made as to whether they will be fulfi lled.5

 Th e FEMA Director should 

speak for the President in order to inspire an expedient and eff ective response. In the wake 

of Hurricane Katrina, former FEMA Director Witt made the comparison between an independent FEMA and today’s structure: “We had all the resources of the federal government. 

We didn’t have to ask anyone to activate the Department of Defense. I did that. I called up 

the President.”6

Because FEMA’s primary function is to provide fast, coordinated relief to oft en unforeseen 

disasters, a speedy response is essential. Th is is no time for red tape, which is why the FEMA 

Director must have a clear, direct reporting line to the President. 

Budget Integrity

DHS has an annual budget of over $40 billion, of which FEMA receives approximately $5 

billion or 12 percent. However, the majority of FEMA’s funding is for the National Flood 

Insurance Fund and the Disaster Relief Fund, which is accessed only aft er a federal disaster 

is declared. FEMA’s annual operating budget is less than $1 billion. 

During this Committee’s Hurricane Katrina hearings, Michael Brown testifi ed that when 

FEMA joined DHS, the Agency was forced to pay a “tax” of approximately 14 percent of 

its budget to fund shared services in the Department such as information technology (IT) 

systems and the Secretary’s offi ce. He further testifi ed that this funding was taken disproportionately from mitigation programs instead of other FEMA accounts because the Bush 

Administration gave mitigation funding “a backseat.”7

 Mr. Brown told the House Select 

Katrina Response Investigation Committee that FEMA requested additional funding for 

preparedness aft er the Hurricane Pam exercise, and that the request was denied by DHS.

Congress and the American public never knew about these funding shortfalls because 

FEMA was buried within DHS. Mr. Brown testifi ed that instead of taking his budget proposal to the President, the FEMA Director fi rst cleared it with another Undersecretary at 

DHS, then the Secretary, and then the President. 

FEMA needs to be an independent agency to avoid having its budget siphoned off for other 

homeland security functions. In addition, as a Cabinet member, the FEMA Director can 

better present the funding needs of FEMA to the President and Congress.
Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared

723

Flexibility

When FEMA was folded into DHS it went from being a small, independent agency of 3,000 

employees to becoming part of a Department of 180,000 employees. FEMA went from a 

nimble and agile agency, to one bogged down in a new, extended chain of command.

During the hearings, we heard numerous examples of information and initiative getting lost 

in DHS during the Hurricane Katrina response. Witnesses described sending information 

updates and requests out to the Department, never knowing where those messages went or 

if action had been taken. DHS appeared to be a black hole where information and accountability were lost, not an asset that enhanced FEMA’s performance. 

Being a part of DHS did provide FEMA with access to more resources during a disaster, but 

it is not clear that FEMA was able to draw eff ectively upon the additional DHS resources 

in the immediate aft ermath of Katrina. Th e senior DHS leadership appeared disengaged 

from the hurricane preparation and response until days aft er the hurricane when the failed 

response had garnered national attention. Furthermore, under the Staff ord Act the FEMA 

Director has the authority to draw upon the resources of other federal agencies during a disaster, leaving no reason why an independent FEMA could not tap into DHS for assistance. 

Former FEMA offi cials have stated publicly that they believe an independent FEMA would 

have been much better equipped to coordinate the resources of the federal government during Hurricane Katrina. 

Conclusion

We acknowledge that the Committee Report makes recommendations that would improve 

upon the current emergency management structure, such as reuniting preparedness and 

response. However, keeping these functions under the DHS umbrella is a mistake. Th e 

proposed National Preparedness and Response Authority (NPRA) would be a super-agency 

within a super-agency. Creating more layers is not the solution. We strongly urge our colleagues in Congress and the Administration to consider separating FEMA from the DHS 

and restoring the FEMA Director to a Cabinet-level position. 

1 Ivo Dalde et al., Assessing the Department of Homeland Security (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, July 2002), 

p. 23.

2 Statement of James Lee Witt, before the U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging 

Th reats and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, hearing on Th e Homeland Security Department’s Plan to Consolidate and Co-locate Regional and Field Offi ces: Improving Communication and Coordination, Mar. 

24, 2002. 

3 Nomination Hearing of Michael D. Brown, Committee on Governmental Aff airs, S. Hrg. 107-616 (2002), p. 6.

4 Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared, 2006, 

Ch. 26. 

5 Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared, Ch. 26-7.

6 Bill Walsh, “Tug of war being played out over who has FEMA control,” New Orleans Times-Picayune, Apr. 13, 2006.

7 Testimony of Michael D. Brown, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, 

hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Roles of DHS and FEMA Leadership, Feb. 10, 2006. 
584
725

Additional Views

Senator Mark Dayton 

I voted not to approve the draft Report in Committee, because it is seriously incomplete 

without the information, documents, and testimony denied by the White House. According 

to the Ranking Member’s “Additional Views,” on March 15, 2006, he asked the Chairman 

to subpoena the withheld documents and witnesses. She declined.

Earlier this year, on January 12, 2006, the Chairman and Ranking Member wrote thenWhite House Chief of Staff , Mr. Andrew Card, regarding the information they had previously requested. Th eir letter stated, in part, “Th is practice (of withholding information) 

must cease.” 

It continued, “We are willing to discuss claims of executive privilege asserted by the White 

House, either directly or through a federal agency. But we will not stand for blanket instructions to refuse answering any questions concerning any communications with the EOP 

[Executive Offi ce of the President].” 

Th eir insistence that either Administration offi cials comply with this oversight committee’s 

rightful demands, or the President invoke his Executive Privilege not to do so, was entirely 

appropriate. Unfortunately, when Mr. Card and his subordinates still refused to comply, 

the Chairman denied the Ranking Member’s request to issue subpoenas. Regrettably, other 

Committee Members (at least, this Member) were not informed of their previous attempts 

to obtain information, or of the decision to give in to the Administration’s recalcitrance. 

Unfortunately, at its mark-up of the draft report, the Committee failed to support my motion to subpoena those documents and witnesses, which were being withheld by the White 

House without claim to Executive Privilege, and which were being wrongfully denied by 

executive agencies.

Th e Administration’s refusal to comply and cooperate with this investigation is deplorable, 

as is the Committee’s failure to back the Chairman’s and Ranking Member’s proper insistence that the White House do so. Th is Committee is charged by the full Senate with the 

responsibility to oversee the agencies, programs, and activities that are related to homeland 

security. Th e Committee was expressly directed by the Senate Majority Leader to examine 

the Bush Administration’s failure to respond quickly or eff ectively to the disasters caused 

by Hurricane Katrina. Th is investigation is not complete without all of the information 

requested from the Administration by the Chairman, the Ranking Member, or their staff s. 

Furthermore, its fi ndings and conclusions can hardly be considered reliable, if the White 

House has decided what information to provide, and what information to withhold, from 

the Committee.

Th is unfortunate acquiescence confi rms the judgment of the Senate Democratic Leader that 

an independent, bi-partisan Commission was necessary to ensure a complete and unbiased 

investigation into the federal, state, and local responses to Hurricane Katrina. His request 

has been repeatedly denied by the Majority, with the assurance that this Committee would 

fulfi ll its responsibilities. Tragically and reprehensibly, it has failed to do so. Th us, the Committee failed the Senate’s Constitutional obligations to be an independent, co-equal branch 

of government from the Executive. It also failed the long-suff ering victims of Hurricane 

Katrina, who deserve to know why their governments failed them, and all the American 

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared
726

people, who depend upon their elected representatives to protect their lives and their interests, without regard to partisan political considerations. Th at partisanship includes unjustifi ed protection of an administration of the same political party, as much as undue criticism 

of one from another party.

Given the information provided to the Committee, the Chairman, the Ranking Member, 

and the Committee staff deserve commendation for their dedication to this undertaking. 

Th ey held 22 hearings, and they arranged for Committee members to tour affl icted sites 

in Mississippi and Louisiana. Th e hearings established an extensive public record, which 

informed Committee members and provided the solid foundation of this Report.

Our January 17, 2006, trip to Gulfport, Mississippi, and New Orleans, Louisiana, allowed us 

to visually inspect areas devastated by Hurricane Katrina and to meet with state and local 

offi cials. Almost fi ve months aft er the hurricane, the observed and reported lack of progress 

in clean-up, repair, and reconstruction, provided further evidence of the federal government’s continuing failure to respond effi ciently or eff ectively. Th ere is no time in which the 

helping hand of government is more urgently needed and more surely deserved than during 

and aft er a disaster. Victims are damaged or devastated – physically, emotional, and fi nancially. Local offi cials and their public services are overwhelmed, if not destroyed. Th ey need 

a federal emergency-response organization composed of experienced, dedicated professionals, who have the resources necessary to alleviate short-term suff ering and commence longterm recovery, and also the authority to expeditiously commit those resources. 

What the failed federal response to Hurricane Katrina showed is the utter ineptitude of the 

Federal Emergency Management Agency. Even worse, FEMA’s indiff erence and incompetence in the aft ermath of Hurricane Katrina was not an isolated instance. In the direct 

experience of this Senator with FEMA’s disaster-relief responses in Minnesota, the agency is 

too oft en a major obstruction to recovery projects, rather than a principal ally. 

I agree with this Report’s “Core Recommendation #1 – Create a New, Comprehensive 

Emergency Management Organization ... to Prepare for and Respond to all Disasters 

and Catastrophes.” I remain open-minded whether this new entity should remain within 

the DHS, as this Recommendation intends, or be established as a separate federal agency. 

Th e challenge for the Committee, for all of Congress, and for the Administration will be 

to actually “re-create” an existing federal agency that has become dysfunctional and nonfunctional. Merely “reforming” FEMA by rearranging some boxes and lines on its organizational chart, revising it, and giving its head a new title, will be usefully inadequate. Th e 

new organization must be more streamlined, centralized, and compact than its predecessor. 

It must be less bureaucratic, less consumed with regulatory minutiae, and less resistant to 

local recovery initiatives. It must spend less time creating complex plans and cumbersome 

procedures, and more time in training and perfecting action responses to emergency 

situations.

Th is new organization cannot be eff ective, however, without a clear defi nition of its role in 

national disasters. Inter-governmental, and even inter-agency, coordination is an oxymoron 

in an emergency. Someone must be in charge. And that “someone” must be clearly understood by everyone in advance of the crisis. It is no coincidence that the most eff ective “First 

Responders” immediately aft er Hurricane Katrina were military organizations: the U.S. 

Coast Guard and the National Guard. Th ey are trained to act in crisis situations. Th ey have 

clear, pre-established chains of command. Th ey act.

Th at is why I am concerned about “Core Recommendation #5,” which states, “Although the 

federal government should play a more proactive role in responding to catastrophic events, 

Additional Views
727

when state and local offi cials may be overwhelmed, states and localities will continue to provide the backbone of response – the fi rst response – for all disasters, catastrophic or not.”

While that approval may be appropriate for “typical disasters” (itself an oxymoron!), 

Hurricane Katrina exposed its fatal fl aws in an extreme or widespread disaster. Lines of 

communication are disrupted, if not temporarily destroyed, in such a catastrophe, which 

makes inter-governmental “coordination” extremely diffi cult, ineffi cient, and delayed. If the 

situation deteriorates in the disaster’s aft ermath, as has occurred in New Orleans, attempts 

to avoid responsibilities and to blame others for failed responses, override eff orts of coordination and cooperation. 

A large-scale catastrophe requires a federally led response. Invoking what is presently 

termed the “Catastrophic Incident Annex of the National Response Plan” should place 

this new organization’s head as the “Situation Commander,” operating directly under, and 

reporting directly to, the President of the United States. All of the other federal, state, local, 

and private emergency-response operations should then become subordinate to, and under 

the direction of, the “Situation Commander,” for as long as the President deems necessary. 

History shows that “If the student does not learn the lesson, the teacher reappears.” Th is 

Report describes some of the most important lessons from the failed response to Hurricane 

Katrina. Th is Committee’s and the Congress’s subsequent actions to correct those serious 

defi ciencies before the next catastrophe will indicate whether those lessons will be learned. 

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared
584
729

Additional Views

Senator Frank R. Lautenberg

1: On Establishing an Independent, Bi-Partisan Katrina Commission

I commend the eff orts of Chairman Collins and Ranking Member Lieberman and their 

staff s in putting together a solid, thoughtful, and comprehensive report which chronicles in 

great and grave detail the failures of all levels of government in preparing for and responding to Hurricane Katrina and the subsequent fl ooding. I fully believe that the Chairman and 

the Ranking Member did the best they could, given the diffi cult political circumstances the 

Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs Committee faced during this seven-month 

investigation.

I say that the Committee labored under diffi cult circumstances because the Administration 

refused to cooperate fully. On page 13 of his dissenting views, Senator Lieberman stated 

that the “worst off ender ... that should have stood above the fray and worked hardest with 

the Committee to uncover the government’s failings in Katrina: the White House.”1

 Senator Lieberman added that “not once in his Senate career of nearly 18 years has he engaged 

a White House less willing to cooperate with a Senate investigation.” Th e Committee 

investigation was the best it could have been given White House intransigence, but what is 

required now is an independent, bi-partisan Katrina Commission with subpoena power.

We all know that the Administration repeatedly failed – or refused – to cooperate with the 

Committee’s Katrina investigation, even aft er assurances by President Bush in September 

2005 to “work with members of both parties to make sure this eff ort is thorough.”2

 In fact, 

the White House became an obstacle to this Committee’s investigation by not producing 

large quantities of information or witnesses the Committee requested. Th e White House opposed Committee eff orts to interview their personnel and interfered with the Committee’s 

ability to get much-needed information from other federal agencies regarding White House 

actions vis-à-vis Hurricane Katrina. Again, in his additional views, Senator Lieberman 

explicitly stated that: 

Th e Committee’s eff orts to understand the role the White House played in events leading 

up to and following the catastrophe were severely hindered by the White House’s failure 

to comply with the Committee requests for information, documents, and interviews. As a 

result, we learned much too little about what the White House and the Executive Offi ce of 

the President were doing during the critical days before and aft er Katrina struck.3

For these reasons, I strongly believe and recommend that an independent commission 

– with subpoena power – should be established immediately to investigate the federal, state, 

and local government preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina and its aft ermath. 

I concur with Senator Lieberman that: 

Th e one thing we do know is that because we were denied the opportunity to fully explore 

the role the White House played in preparing for and responding to Katrina, we have little 

insight into how the President and his staff monitored, managed, and directed the government’s disaster preparedness in the post-9/11 world, how they coordinated the rest of the 

federal bureaucracy in response to Katrina. ... Without this information, the Committee’s 

investigation necessarily lacked the ability to fully and fairly analyze and assess a critical element of the response to Katrina.4

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared
730

Although Senator Lieberman does not concur with my view that an independent Katrina 

Commission should be established without further delay, his dissenting views eloquently 

make the best arguments for its creation.

From the beginning of this investigation, I – along with Senator Clinton and others – called 

for the creation of a Katrina Commission that would be bi-partisan, modeled very closely 

aft er the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the so-called 

9/11 Commission), which was so successful. Th is commission would be charged with 

examining the federal, state, and local responses to the devastation wrought by Hurricane 

Katrina in the Gulf Region of the United States, specifi cally in the states of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, and other aff ected areas. Th e Commission would then make recommendations on immediate corrective measures to improve preparedness for and responses 

to future disasters. 

Th e Katrina Commission would be modeled very closely aft er the 9/11 Commission, but 

would place its primary emphasis on emergency-services preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery. Th e President would appoint the Chair, and the remaining members 

would be appointed by the Republican and Democrat leadership of the House and Senate 

with no more than fi ve individuals from the same political party. Th e Commission would 

report on its fi ndings within six months of its establishment. Th e Commission would begin 

its work as soon as practicable.

Th is independent approach of the 9/11 Commission served this nation well in the aft ermath 

of the worst terrorist attack upon the United States and will serve the nation well in the 

aft ermath of one of the worst natural disasters to strike the United States. 

Th e many fi ndings and 88 recommendations in the Committee’s Katrina Report are very 

useful, but Americans want and deserve more. Th e government failed its citizens before, 

during, and aft er this disaster. Let’s not fail the American people again by denying them 

access to what the White House knew and when they knew it. Let’s listen to them, and appoint an independent, bi-partisan Katrina Commission to complete an investigation into 

what went wrong and why.

2: On the Need to Account for People with Pets in Emergency Planning

One of the many disturbing and heart-rending developments we saw unfold aft er Hurricane Katrina was the peril many people found themselves in because they could not bear to 

evacuate without their pets, and the anguish of those people who were forced to leave their 

pets behind. 

Th ere was much media coverage, both in print and on television, of distraught pet owners 

and of abandoned animals going hungry, thirsty, and full of fear as their world was washed 

away. Millions of people heard or saw the distressing story of one young boy who was so 

traumatized aft er his dog was taken from him when he boarded a bus to leave the Superdome that he became physically ill. One distraught woman reportedly off ered her wedding 

ring to a shelter aide if he would fi nd out what had happened to her dog, which she was not 

allowed to bring inside with her.

Th e evidence suggests that the attachment people have to their pets was a key reason why 

many decided not to evacuate. According to a recent survey of people aff ected by Hurricane 

Katrina who were living in Louisiana, Mississippi, or Alabama, 44 percent of those who did 

not evacuate by choice (as opposed to those who lacked the means to do so), did not leave 

in part because they weren’t willing to abandon their pets.5

Additional Views
731

Th ese were life-and-death decisions, and for some of these people, the decision to stay 

with their pets cost them their lives. Th e Mississippi Sun-Herald recently identifi ed seven 

individuals who died during or aft er Hurricane Katrina because they did not want to leave a 

beloved pet, and so they stayed in harm’s way.6

Moreover, some of the animals left behind, agitated by hunger, thirst, and fear, presented 

threats to the rescue and response personnel who went door-to-door looking for survivors.

As with other aspects of the disjointed and incomplete preparation for and response to 

Hurricane Katrina, there was no plan in place to help people with pets evacuate, or to ensure there were adequate shelters that could accommodate people and their pets. 

I agree with the Committee Report’s fi nding that the needs of those with pets and service 

animals should be a factor in emergency planning for evacuations and sheltering. While 

I support the Committee’s recommendation that the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) should encourage individuals as well as state and local governments to plan for 

evacuating and sheltering pets, I also think it is important that we do more to address this 

issue. To that end, I joined Senator Stevens in introducing the “Pets Evacuation and Transportation Standards (PETS) Act,” S. 2548.

Our bill would require state and local emergency-preparedness plans to take into account 

the needs of individuals with household pets and service animals. In addition, our bill 

would authorize the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to provide technical 

assistance in developing these plans and fi nancial assistance for purchasing, constructing, 

leasing, or renovating emergency shelter facilities that can accommodate people with pets 

and service animals. Finally, our bill would include people with pets and service animals 

among those for whom FEMA may provide essential assistance in response to a major 

disaster. 

I hope that our bill will be included as part of any legislation that this Committee develops 

in response to Hurricane Katrina and its aft ermath.

In addition, I am concerned by reports that despite FEMA’s deployment of more than 200 

veterinarians to assist in the Gulf Coast – the largest simultaneous deployment of veterinary 

relief in U.S. history – the veterinary teams were ill-equipped because of FEMA policies. 

Apparently, FEMA prohibits veterinarians from using their own equipment, accepting 

donations, or buying supplies. As a result, Veterinary Medical Assistance Teams (VMATs) 

– which are identifi ed in the National Response Plan as the source of federal veterinary 

medical treatment during an emergency – did not have what they needed to carry out their 

mission.7

I believe the Committee should work with FEMA, DHS, and other interested parties to address problems like this to ensure that, like the rest of FEMA, VMATs will be appropriately 

staff ed, equipped, and otherwise prepared to fulfi ll their role within the National Response 

Plan.

Conclusion

It is important to note that what happened in the Gulf Coast could happen anywhere in the 

United States the next time disaster strikes. According to the Humane Society of the United 

States (HSUS), Americans currently have over 358 million pets. Sixty-three percent of all 

American households have one or more pets. So wherever a natural or manmade disaster 

could occur, many of the people who would be aff ected will be pet owners – 61 percent of 

Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared
732

whom told national pollsters they would refuse to evacuate ahead of a disaster if they could 

not take their pets with them.8

One of the most important lessons to be learned from Hurricane Katrina is that planning 

and preparedness are essential to avoid aggravating whatever disasters may strike in the 

future. By accounting for the very strong ties that millions of Americans have to their pets 

in preparing for future emergencies, we can ensure a better response and actually save lives. 

As HSUS executive vice president Michael Markarian has said, Hurricane Katrina and its 

aft ermath “made people recognize that helping pets during a disaster is helping people during a disaster.”

1 See, in this Report, Additional Views of Senators Lieberman, Levin, Akaka, Carper, Lautenberg and Pryor on White 

House Katrina Failures, Administration Lack of Cooperation with the Investigation, and Failure to Establish Unifi ed 

Command.

2 Speech, President George W. Bush, Jackson Square, New Orleans, LA, Sept. 15, 2005.

3 See, in this Report, Additional Views of Senators Lieberman, Levin, Akaka, Carper, Lautenberg and Pryor on White 

House Katrina Failures, Administration Lack of Cooperation with the Investigation, and Failure to Establish Unifi ed 

Command.

4 See, in this Report, Additional Views of Senators Lieberman, Levin, Akaka, Carper, Lautenberg and Pryor on White 

House Katrina Failures, Administration Lack of Cooperation with the Investigation, and Failure to Establish Unifi ed 

Command.

5 Fritz Institute, “Hurricane Katrina: Perceptions of the Aff ected,” Apr. 26, 2006.

6 Karen Nelson, “Staying with animals in Katrina was a deadly choice for some, and the hurricane left other owners 

seeking shelter from the storm,” SunHerald.com, posted Apr. 30, 2006. http://www.sunherald.com/mld/sunherald/news/

local/14464093.htm.

7 William Wan, “A Lesson from Katrina: Pets Matter,” Th e Washington Post, Jan. 2, 2006.

8 http://www.zogby.com/news/ReadNews.dbm?ID=1029.

Additional Views