Supreme Court of Florida

____________

No. SC13-1213

____________

TAVARES J. WRIGHT,

Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

[November 23, 2016]

PER CURIAM.

This case is before the Court on appeal from an order denying Tavares 

Jarrod Wright’s initial motion to vacate his convictions and sentences under 

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851, as well as Wright’s renewed motion to 

determine intellectual disability filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 3.203. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

FACTS AND BACKGROUND

On November 13, 2004, a jury found Wright guilty of two counts of firstdegree murder, two counts of kidnapping, two counts of robbery, and one count of 

carjacking. See Wright v. State, 19 So. 3d 277, 289 (Fla. 2009). After Wright 
- 2 -

waived his right to a penalty phase jury, the trial court sentenced Wright to death 

for each murder, as well as life imprisonment for each of his other convictions. 

See id. at 289-91.

On direct appeal before this Court, we detailed the facts leading up to 

Wright’s convictions and sentences:

With the aid of codefendant Samuel Pitts, Wright carjacked, 

kidnapped, robbed, and murdered David Green and James Felker 

while engaged in a three-day crime spree that spanned several areas in 

Central Florida. [FN2] During the crime spree, Wright was 

connected multiple times to a stolen pistol that matched the caliber of 

casings discovered at the scene of the murders. The trial court 

allowed the State to present evidence of these collateral acts to 

demonstrate the context in which the murders occurred and to explain 

Wright’s possession of the murder weapon.

[FN2] Wright and Pitts were tried separately for 

the murders. Pitts was convicted of two counts of firstdegree murder and other offenses related to this incident. 

He received sentences of life imprisonment for the 

murders.

The spree began when Wright stole a pistol and a shotgun from 

the Shank family’s residence in Lakeland on Thursday, April 20, 

2000. On the Friday morning following the burglary, Wright used the 

pistol to commit a drive-by shooting in a neighborhood near the 

Shank residence. [FN3] That evening, Wright and Samuel Pitts 

abducted Green and Felker in Lakeland, drove Green’s vehicle 

approximately fifteen miles to Polk City, and murdered the victims in 

a remote orange grove. Wright shot one victim with a shotgun, which 

was never recovered, and the other victim with a pistol that used the 

same caliber bullets as the gun stolen from the Shank residence. 

Wright then abandoned the victim’s vehicle in a different orange 

grove in Auburndale. In nearby Winter Haven, Wright used the 

Shank pistol in a carjacking that occurred during the morning hours 

on Saturday, April 21, 2000. That afternoon, law enforcement 
- 3 -

responded to a Lakeland apartment complex based on reports of a 

man matching Wright’s description brandishing a firearm.

[FN3] For the drive-by shooting, Wright was 

convicted of attempted second-degree murder and two 

counts of attempted felony murder.

When an officer approached, Wright fled, but he was eventually 

arrested in the neighboring mobile home park. Ammunition matching 

the characteristics of the ammunition stolen from the Shank residence 

was found in his pocket. The stolen pistol was also recovered near the 

location where Wright was arrested. Almost a week later, the bodies 

of the victims were discovered. Thus, the following facts are 

presented in chronological order to demonstrate the geographical 

nexus of the offenses and to provide a complete picture of the 

interwoven events surrounding the double murders.

The Crime Spree

The Shank Burglary: Thursday, April 20, 2000

On Thursday, April 20, 2000, Wright unlawfully entered a 

Lakeland home with two accomplices. Wright testified that they 

separated to search the house for items to steal. In one bedroom, 

Wright found and handled a plastic bank filled with money. One of 

his accomplices discovered a 12-gauge, bolt-action Mossberg shotgun 

and a loaded Bryco Arms .380 semi-automatic pistol with a nineround clip in another bedroom. . . . The accomplice also found four 

shells for the shotgun in a dresser drawer. In exchange for marijuana, 

Wright obtained possession of the pistol from the accomplice.

When Mark Shank returned home after work to discover his 

firearms missing, he notified the Polk County Sheriff’s Office of the 

burglary. The Sheriff’s Office lifted latent prints from the house, 

including several from the plastic bank. An identification technician 

with the Sheriff’s Office matched the latent palm print lifted from the 

plastic bank to Wright’s palm print, confirming that Wright was inside 

the house where the Shank firearms were stolen. The following day, 

Wright used the stolen pistol during a drive-by shooting in a nearby 

Lakeland neighborhood.
- 4 -

The Longfellow Boulevard Drive-By Shooting: Friday, April 21, 

2000

At approximately 9 a.m. on Friday, April 21, 2000, Carlos 

Coney and Bennie Joiner observed a black Toyota Corolla 

approaching slowly on Longfellow Boulevard as they were standing 

outside a nearby house. Wright and Coney had been embroiled in a 

continuing dispute since their high school days. Joiner made eye 

contact with Wright, who was sitting on the passenger side. The car 

made a U-turn and slowly approached the house again. Wright leaned 

out the passenger side window and fired multiple shots. One bullet 

struck Coney in his right leg. Coney’s neighbor carried the wounded 

man to a car and drove Coney and Joiner to a Lakeland hospital where 

a .380 caliber projectile was removed from Coney’s leg.

While Coney was being treated at the hospital, crime-scene 

technicians collected cartridge casings and projectiles from the 

Longfellow Boulevard scene. Two projectiles had entered the house 

and lodged in the living room wall and table. One spent .25 caliber 

casing and three spent Winchester .380 caliber casings were recovered 

from the driveway and the street. The projectile recovered from 

Coney’s leg and the one removed from the living room table were 

fired from the .380 pistol stolen from the Shank residence. [FN5] 

The recovered casings definitely had been loaded in the stolen pistol, 

but the firearms analyst could not state with precision that they had 

been fired from the pistol because the casings lacked the necessary 

identifying characteristics.

[FN5] However, a .380 handgun could not have 

fired the .25 caliber bullet. No explanation for the 

different shell casing was presented at trial, though it was 

implied by the defense that an exchange of gunfire 

occurred between Wright and the victims. Coney and 

Joiner denied having a firearm at the Longfellow 

Boulevard residence.

Approximately one hour after the drive-by shooting, Wright 

unexpectedly visited James Hogan at a house in Lake Alfred, Florida. 

Lake Alfred is approximately fourteen miles away from the 
- 5 -

Longfellow Boulevard location. Wright testified that he and an 

accomplice from the Shank burglary and Samuel Pitts traveled to see 

Hogan because the accomplice wanted to sell the stolen shotgun. 

When they arrived, the accomplice attempted to show Hogan the 

shotgun, but Hogan was not interested. At that point, Wright pulled a 

small pistol from under the floor mat in the front seat of the vehicle. 

This placed Wright in possession of the possible murder weapon on 

the day of the murders.

The Double Murders in the Orange Grove: Friday, April 21, 2000

The trio remained with Hogan for approximately twenty 

minutes and then left together to return to the Providence Reserve 

Apartments on the north side of Lakeland. Wright and Samuel Pitts 

lived at that apartment complex with Pitts’ family and girlfriend, 

Latasha Jackson. To support his theory of defense that he did not 

possess the pistol during the time the murders likely occurred, Wright 

testified that following the drive-by shooting, he informed Samuel 

Pitts of the details of the shooting. Wright explained that he had an 

obligation to disclose his actions to Pitts, who was the leader of a gang 

of which Wright was a member. According to Wright, the drive-by 

shooting upset Pitts, and Pitts demanded that Wright surrender the 

pistol. Wright asserted that he complied with Pitts’ demand.

According to Wright’s testimony, around twilight that Friday 

evening, a customer messaged Wright to inquire about procuring 

marijuana. Wright agreed to meet the customer at a supermarket 

parking lot and started walking toward the store. Shortly after 7:15 

that evening, a female friend saw Wright walking down the street and 

offered him a ride, which Wright accepted. Then, without 

provocation, Wright said, “I ain’t even going to lie, I did shoot the boy 

in the leg yesterday,” more likely than not referring to the Longfellow 

Boulevard drive-by shooting. When they arrived at the store, Wright 

exited the vehicle in the supermarket parking lot without further 

elaboration of the statement.

Some time that night, James Felker and his cousin, David 

Green, were abducted from that parking lot and murdered. The 

cousins left Felker’s house at approximately 8 p.m. in Green’s white 
- 6 -

Chrysler Cirrus for a night of bowling. Both men were carrying at 

least $100 at that time.

Several witnesses testified that Wright had willingly described 

the details of the abduction. Wright had informed the witnesses that 

he approached Felker and Green in the supermarket parking lot and 

requested a cigarette. When they refused, Wright pulled out a pistol 

and forced his way into the backseat of Green’s vehicle. Wright then 

ordered Green to drive to the Providence Reserve Apartments, where 

Pitts entered the vehicle.

As this group left the apartments between 10 and 10:45 p.m., 

Wright ran a stop sign in the victim’s car. A detective observed the 

traffic infraction and conducted a tag check as he followed the 

vehicle. The tag check reported that the license plate was registered 

to an unassigned Virginia plate for a blue, 1988, two-door Mercury, 

which did not match the vehicle to which it was attached.

After receiving this report, the detective activated his 

emergency lights and attempted to stop the white Chrysler. The 

Chrysler sped through another stop sign and accelerated to sixty miles 

per hour. The detective remained in pursuit for ten to fifteen minutes 

before his supervisor ordered the pursuit terminated. An all-county 

alert was issued to law enforcement to be on the lookout for the 

Chrysler. The identification developed from the pursuit connected 

Wright to the victim’s vehicle on the night of the murders.

R.R., a juvenile who also lived at the Providence Reserve 

Apartments, testified that Wright informed him that Wright and Pitts 

drove the victims ten miles from the abduction site to a remote orange 

grove in Polk City. When the victims insisted that they had nothing to 

give the assailants, Wright exited the car. One of the victims also 

exited, possibly by force, and Wright shot him. The other victim then 

exited, and Wright shot him as well. While one of the men continued 

to crawl and moan, Pitts retrieved the shotgun from the trunk and 

handed it to Wright, who then shot this victim in the head executionstyle. Wright and Pitts abandoned the bodies and drove away in the 

Chrysler. [FN6]
- 7 -

[FN6] Wright testified, to the contrary, that after 

he arrived at the supermarket, he conducted a drug 

transaction and then visited other apartments in the area 

to sell more drugs. After making stops at various 

apartments, he began walking back to the Providence 

Reserve Apartments. While he was walking, Pitts drove 

up in a white vehicle. Pitts asked Wright if he wanted to 

drive, and as Wright walked to the driver’s side, he 

noticed blood on the vehicle. Wright suggested that they 

take the vehicle to an apartment to wash it. Wright 

testified that it was while they were driving to the 

apartment that the police chase occurred.

Sometime between 10 p.m. and midnight, Pitts and Wright 

drove the Chrysler to a Lakeland apartment complex to wash blood 

spatter off the vehicle. When they arrived at the apartment, Pitts 

ordered Wright to wash the car while Pitts removed items from the 

vehicle, including a phone, a black bag, and a Polaroid camera. Pitts 

placed the items in his sister’s vehicle. She had arrived with R.R., 

who testified that when they arrived, Pitts and Wright were acting 

nervous and scared. On the ride back to the apartment complex, Pitts 

told R.R. “that they pulled off a lick and that things was getting 

crazy.”

Wright testified that before Pitts left, he ordered Wright to burn 

the car and throw the weapon into a lake. Instead, Wright kept the 

pistol and later drove back to Hogan’s house in Lake Alfred. Hogan 

suggested that Wright dump the car in an Auburndale orange grove, 

and Wright followed that suggestion.

The Winter Haven Carjacking: Saturday, April 22, 2000

In the vicinity of the Auburndale orange grove where the 

homicide victim’s vehicle was abandoned, Ernesto Mendoza and 

Adam Granados were addressing a car battery problem in the parking 

lot of a fast-food restaurant. It was during those early morning hours 

of Saturday, April 21, that Wright allegedly approached them, pointed 

a small handgun at a female with them, and announced that he was 

going to take the car. [FN7] Wright immediately entered Mendoza’s 

vehicle and sped away. Granados and Mendoza quickly entered a 
- 8 -

truck and pursued Wright. The car chase continued through several 

streets before Wright ran the vehicle onto the curb near a car 

dealership in Lake Alfred. Wright exited the vehicle, fired several 

gunshots at Granados and Mendoza, and then escaped across the car 

lot in the direction of James Hogan’s house.

[FN7] Wright refused to testify about the details 

of [this] carjacking because he was not charged with this 

offense.

Several .380 caliber casings were also collected from this scene. 

These casings were later identified as having been fired from the 

pistol stolen from the Shank residence. One latent print was lifted 

from the interior side of the driver’s window of Mendoza’s car, and 

three were lifted from the steering wheel. All of these latent prints 

matched Wright’s known fingerprints.

Hogan, whose house was within walking distance of the car 

dealership from which Wright was seen fleeing, testified that when he 

returned home at approximately 12:30 a.m. on Saturday, he found 

Wright seated there. Wright asked Hogan to drive him back to the 

Providence Reserve Apartments, and on the way there, Wright 

spontaneously said “they had shot these two boys,” and that he had 

also “got into it with some Mexicans.” Wright confessed to Hogan 

that they had transported two white men to an orange grove and shot 

both men with a pistol and a shotgun. Wright also confirmed that they 

engaged in a high-speed chase with police in Lakeland. However, at 

that point, Wright did not disclose the identity of the other person who 

aided in the murders.

The Providence Reserve Foot Chase and Subsequent 

Investigation: Saturday, April 22, 2000

After Hogan returned Wright to the apartment complex 

following the Winter Haven carjacking, Wright was observed 

throughout Saturday handling a pistol at the Providence Reserve 

Apartments. He also spoke with people regarding the murders. 

Wright confessed to R.R. that he received a cellular phone from a 

“lick,” meaning it had been stolen. He also described to R.R. the 
- 9 -

details of the abduction and murders. Wright then gave the stolen 

phone to R.R.

Later that day, Wright was seated with Latasha Jackson on the 

steps of the apartment building, and Wright had a small firearm 

resting in his lap. During their conversation, Wright told Jackson that 

he shot two white men in an orange grove and that he had shot one in 

the head. Soon after this, the police responded to a report of an armed 

man, who matched Wright’s description, at that location. [FN8]

[FN8] Wright was charged with aggravated 

assault related to this incident, but was acquitted.

A uniformed officer approached Wright and Jackson and stated 

that he needed to speak with Wright. Wright jumped over the balcony 

railing and raced down the stairs. As Wright ran from the apartment, 

his tennis shoes fell off. Jackson picked up the shoes and placed them 

by the apartment door. The police later seized these sneakers from the 

apartment during the murder investigation. James Felker’s DNA was 

determined to match a blood sample secured from the left sneaker. 

Though Wright contended that the shoes were not his and that he had 

never worn them, both Wright and Pitts were required to try on the 

shoes. The shoes were determined to be a better fit for Wright than 

for Pitts.

Several officers chased Wright from the Providence Reserve 

Apartments to a nearby mobile home park, which was located across a 

field from the apartment complex. During the chase, the officers 

noticed Wright holding his pants pocket as if he carried something 

inside. Wright was arrested at the mobile home park, and his pocket 

contained live rounds and a box of ammunition containing both .380 

Federal and Winchester caliber of rounds. This was the same caliber 

ammunition as that recovered from the drive-by shooting, the 

murders, and the carjacking.

After the police departed, a resident of that mobile home park 

entered her car to leave for dinner. Her vehicle had been parked there 

with the windows down when Wright had been arrested near her front 

door. As she entered her vehicle, she discovered a pistol, which was 
- 10 -

not hers. This weapon was determined to be the pistol stolen from the 

Shank residence.

Wright was taken into custody pending resolution of the 

aggravated assault charges. While Wright was in custody, 

Auburndale police officers discovered David Green’s white Chrysler 

abandoned in an orange grove. Crime-scene technicians discovered 

blood on both the exterior of the vehicle and on the interior left side. 

Four of the blood samples from the vehicle matched James Felker’s 

DNA profile. Further investigation revealed that prints lifted from 

multiple locations on the vehicle matched known prints of Wright. 

[FN9]

[FN9] None of the latent prints lifted from the 

Chrysler matched the known fingerprints of Pitts or R.R.

A deputy with the Polk County Sheriff’s Office linked this 

abandoned vehicle with a missing persons report for David Green and 

James Felker. After the vehicle was discovered, the family of the 

victims gathered at the orange grove to search for any items that might 

aid in the missing persons investigations. Green had his personal 

Nextel cellular phone and a soft black bag filled with special 

computer tools that he utilized for his work in the Chrysler. A 

Polaroid camera had also been left in Green’s vehicle. Green’s 

fiancée discovered her son’s jacket in that grove, but Green’s 

workbag, tools, cellular phone, and camera were all missing from the 

vehicle.

A couple of days after the murders, Pitts attempted to sell the 

black bag that contained Green’s computer tools to a pawnshop. R.R. 

assisted his stepfather in securing proceeds for the Polaroid camera 

from another pawnshop. The police had begun contacting pawnshops 

looking for the items missing from Green’s car and recovered the 

black computer bag and the pawn tickets, which led them to Pitts and 

R.R. [FN10] Further investigation established that three latent 

fingerprints from the black bag matched Wright’s known fingerprints.

[FN10] During trial, Green’s fiancée identified the 

Polaroid camera as the one she purchased with Green. 

She also identified his black workbag.
- 11 -

Following the information obtained from the pawnshop, the 

police traveled to R.R.’s residence where they identified and seized 

the Nextel cellular phone Wright had given R.R. The phone seized 

from R.R.’s residence matched the serial number of David Green’s 

phone. R.R. told the police that Wright, who was still in jail on the 

aggravated assault arrest, had given him the phone.

A few hours later, a detective questioned Pitts, who revealed the 

general location of the bodies. Six days following the disappearance 

of David Green and James Felker, their bodies were discovered in a 

remote orange grove in Polk City. Each man had been shot three 

times, and spent bullet cases surrounded the bodies. David Green was 

face-up, with bullet wounds in his chest and in his head. From his 

outstretched hand, the police recovered a wallet that contained 

Green’s license. James Felker was face-down in the same area, with 

three bullet wounds in his head. Green’s cause of death was 

determined to be multiple gunshot wounds to the chest, the forehead, 

and the back of his neck. A medical examiner removed a projectile 

from Green’s face and a deformed projectile from his throat. Felker’s 

cause of death was determined to be gunshot wounds to the head, one 

by a .380 caliber projectile to the forehead and two by a shotgun blast 

to the back of the head. Except for the gunshot wound to Green’s 

chest, any of the gunshot wounds would have rendered the victims 

unconscious instantaneously.

Law enforcement never recovered the shotgun used in these 

murders. However, a Florida Department of Law Enforcement 

firearms expert inspected the pistol recovered from the mobile home 

park, which was identified as the pistol stolen from the Shank 

residence, and the firearms-related evidence collected from the 

various crime scenes. The expended projectiles from the pistol and 

those found in Wright’s possession were of the same caliber but were 

different brands. Due to the damage sustained by some of the 

projectiles, the expert was unable to conclusively establish that the 

pistol stolen from the Shank residence fired all .380 caliber bullets 

discovered at the scene of the murders. However, the projectiles and 

the firearm were of the same caliber and displayed similar class 

characteristics. Five Federal .380 caliber casings discovered near the 

victims were positively identified as having been fired from the pistol. 
- 12 -

Thus, the stolen Shank pistol had likely been used in, and connected 

with, the Longfellow Boulevard drive-by shooting, the double 

murders of David Green and James Felker, and the Winter Haven 

carjacking.

The Trial

On October 18, 2004, Wright began his third trial on these 

charges. . . . The jury returned a guilty verdict on all seven counts and 

made specific findings that Wright used, possessed, and discharged a 

firearm, which resulted in death to another. Wright waived his right 

to have a penalty-phase jury. The jury was discharged after the trial 

court conducted a thorough colloquy and determined that the waiver 

was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.

During the combined penalty-phase and Spencer[ v. State, 615 

So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993),] hearing, the State presented impact 

statements from the victims’ families. The State introduced the 

certified judgments and sentences from the Longfellow Boulevard 

drive-by shooting and from two incidents that occurred while Wright 

was imprisoned prior to the capital trial. [FN13] The State also 

presented the testimony of the victims of the jail-related felonies. 

Defense counsel stipulated that the contemporaneous capital 

convictions supported the aggravating circumstance of a prior violent 

felony.

[FN13] Prior to the capital trial, Wright was 

convicted of two violent felonies while in custody—

aggravated battery by a jail detainee and aggravated 

battery. In the former, Wright, along with several other 

inmates, attacked another detainee. In the latter, Wright 

attacked a jail detention deputy.

The defense presented mitigation evidence of Wright’s 

traumatic childhood through the testimony of his family, which 

included virtual abandonment and neglect by his parents. Two 

defense expert witnesses testified that Wright’s exposure to cocaine 

and alcohol in utero caused some microcephaly, which is a condition 

that affects the size of the brain, and mild traumatic injury to Wright’s 

brain. Though one defense expert determined that Wright has 
- 13 -

borderline intellectual functioning, including impairments in his 

frontal lobe functioning for reasoning and judgment, the expert 

testified that Wright did not satisfy the requirements for statutory 

mitigation . . . or qualify as mentally retarded under section 921.137, 

Florida Statutes (2000). . . .

To the contrary, the other defense expert testified that Wright 

was of low intelligence, which approached that of mental retardation 

due to fetal alcohol syndrome. In that expert’s opinion, Wright could 

not balance a checkbook, maintain a household, or keep his 

refrigerator stocked. However, this expert did not consider the 

recognized standardized intelligence tests required by section 921.137

to be the measure of mental retardation and conceded that under the 

statutory definition, Wright would not be considered mentally 

retarded.

A special hearing was held to specifically address whether 

Wright met the statutory criteria for mental retardation. Wright’s 

scores from each doctor’s evaluation fell within the borderline range, 

but did not drop below 70. Thus, the trial court found that under the 

statutory requirements, Wright was not mentally retarded. The court 

noted that there was evidence to the contrary, but held that such 

evidence did not fall within the purview of the applicable statute.

Following this hearing, the trial court found four aggravating 

circumstances, three statutory mitigating circumstances, and several 

nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. [FN16] The trial court 

concluded that the aggravating circumstances far outweighed the 

mitigation and that, even in the absence of any individual aggravating 

circumstance, the trial court would still find that the aggregate of the 

remaining aggravating circumstances outweighed all existing statutory 

and nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. Thus, the court imposed a 

death sentence for each count of first-degree murder and life sentences 

for each of the five noncapital felonies, all to run consecutively.

[FN16] The trial court found four aggravating 

circumstances: (1) Wright was previously convicted of 

another capital felony or of a felony involving the use or 

threat of violence to a person (great weight); (2) Wright 

committed the felony for pecuniary gain (no weight); (3) 
- 14 -

Wright committed the homicide in a cold, calculated, and 

premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or 

legal justification [CCP] (great weight); and (4) Wright 

committed the felony for the purpose of avoiding or 

preventing lawful arrest (great weight).

The trial court found three statutory mitigating 

factors and gave them some weight: (1) Wright 

committed the offense while under the influence of 

extreme mental or emotional disturbance; (2) Wright’s 

capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to 

conform his conduct to the requirements of law was 

substantially impaired; and (3) Wright was 19 years old 

at the time of the crime. Wright offered approximately 

34 nonstatutory mitigating factors, and the trial court 

found the following: (1) Wright suffered emotional 

deprivation during his upbringing (some weight); (2) 

Wright’s low IQ affected his judgment and perceptions 

(some weight); (3) Wright suffered from neurological 

impairments, which affected his impulse control and 

reasoning ability (some weight); (4) Wright suffered 

from low self-esteem (little weight); (5) Wright lacked 

the capacity to maintain healthy, mature relationships 

(little weight); (6) Wright had frustration from his 

learning disability (little weight); (7) Wright lacked 

mature coping skills (some weight); (8) Wright displayed 

appropriate courtroom behavior (little weight); and (9) 

Wright suffered from substance abuse during his 

adolescent and adult life (little weight).

Id. at 283-91 (some footnotes omitted). On September 3, 2009, we affirmed 

Wright’s convictions and sentences. See id. at 305.
- 15 -

On November 5, 2010, Wright filed a motion to vacate his judgment and 

sentence, which he amended on March 9, 2012. A Huff1 hearing was held on 

September 6, 2011, to determine which claims merited an evidentiary hearing. An 

evidentiary hearing was held on October 16-18, 2012, during which Wright 

presented ten witnesses. The postconviction court denied Wright’s amended 

motion in its entirety on May 22, 2013. Wright appealed.

On May 27, 2014, however, while Wright’s postconviction appeal was 

pending before this Court, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in 

Hall v. Florida, in which it held Florida’s intellectual disability scheme

unconstitutional insofar as it conditioned presentation of evidence of adaptive 

functioning on a strict IQ score requirement. See 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1990 (2014). 

As a result, we relinquished jurisdiction of Wright’s case and allowed Wright to 

file a renewed motion for determination of intellectual disability with the 

postconviction court, which he did. The postconviction court subsequently granted 

an evidentiary hearing on the renewed motion. During the evidentiary hearing for 

this motion, Wright presented six witnesses and the State presented thirteen 

witnesses. On March 26, 2015, the postconviction court denied Wright’s renewed 

motion. Wright subsequently appealed that order and we reacquired jurisdiction.

 

1. Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993).
- 16 -

From his amended motion to vacate judgment and sentences, Wright only 

appeals the denial of several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, as well as 

his claim that the cumulative effect of those errors deprived him of a fair trial.2 

Specifically, with regard to his guilt phase trial, Wright maintains that his counsel 

were ineffective for failing to impeach two jail house informants and for failing to 

object to an improper comment made by the prosecutor during closing remarks. 

With regard to the penalty phase, Wright maintains that his counsel were 

ineffective for failing to challenge evidence related to a prior conviction presented 

in aggravation, as well as for failing to adequately investigate and present evidence 

of mitigation. From his renewed motion for intellectual disability, Wright appeals 

the finding that he is not intellectually disabled.

 This review follows.

 

2. Wright does not appeal the denial of his other claims. With regard to the 

guilt phase, Wright had also claimed that: (1) his counsel were ineffective for 

failing to object to evidence of other crimes or wrongful acts, for failing to 

challenge victim family member testimony identifying certain items in evidence as 

belonging to the victims, for failing to investigate alibi witnesses, for failing to 

present evidence of fetal alcohol syndrome, and for failing to strike a juror from 

the jury; (2) the State unconstitutionally withheld exculpatory evidence; and (3) the 

State unconstitutionally presented conflicting theories to the jury. With regard to 

the penalty phase, Wright had also claimed that: (1) his counsel were ineffective 

for failing to assert that he should receive a life sentence due to the superior 

intelligence of his codefendant; (2) section 945.10, Florida Statutes, 

unconstitutionally withholds the identity of the execution team members; and (3) 

Florida’s lethal injection protocol is unconstitutional.
- 17 -

ANALYSIS

Wright’s Renewed Motion for Determination of Intellectual Disability

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that 

“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and 

unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. In 2002, the United 

States Supreme Court interpreted the Eighth Amendment to categorically prohibit 

the imposition of a death sentence on someone who is intellectually disabled. See

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (“Construing and applying the Eighth 

Amendment in the light of our ‘evolving standards of decency,’ we therefore 

conclude that such punishment is excessive and that the Constitution ‘places a 

substantive restriction on the State’s power to take the life’ of a mentally retarded 

offender.” (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986))).

State law, however, governs the determination of which defendants are 

intellectually disabled for purposes of capital punishment. See id. at 317 (“[W]e 

leave to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the 

constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences.” (quoting Ford, 477 

U.S. at 405)). In Salazar v. State, 188 So. 3d 799, 811-12 (Fla. 2016), this Court 

recently explained Florida’s procedures for establishing and reviewing intellectual 

disability:

“Florida law includes a three-prong test for intellectual 

disability as a bar to imposition of the death penalty.” Snelgrove v. 
- 18 -

State, 107 So. 3d 242, 252 (Fla. 2012). A defendant must establish 

intellectual disability by demonstrating the following three factors: (1) 

significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning; (2) 

concurrent deficits in adaptive behavior; and (3) manifestation of the 

condition before age eighteen. See Hurst v. State, 147 So. 3d 435, 

441 (Fla. 2014) rev’d, Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016); § 

921.137(1), Fla. Stat. The defendant has the burden to prove that he is 

intellectually disabled by clear and convincing evidence. Franqui v. 

State, 59 So. 3d 82, 92 (Fla. 2011); § 921.137(4), Fla. Stat. If the 

defendant fails to prove any one of these components, the defendant 

will not be found to be intellectually disabled. Nixon v. State, 2 So.

3d 137, 142 (Fla. 2009). In reviewing intellectual disability 

determinations, this Court has employed the standard of whether 

competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s 

determination. See Cherry v. State, 959 So. 2d 702, 712 (Fla. 2007); 

Brown v. State, 959 So. 2d 146, 149 (Fla. 2007) (“This Court does not 

reweigh the evidence or second-guess the circuit court’s findings as to 

the credibility of witnesses.”). “However, to the extent that the [trial] 

court decision concerns any questions of law, we apply a de novo 

standard of review.” Dufour v. State, 69 So. 3d 235, 246 (Fla. 2011).

In Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014), the United States 

Supreme Court invalidated Florida’s interpretation of its statute as 

establishing a strict IQ test score cutoff of 70. Hall explained that 

“[a]n IQ score is an approximation, not a final and infallible 

assessment of intellectual functioning,” and “[i]ntellectual disability is 

a condition, not a number.” Id. at 2000, 2001. Accordingly, “[the 

Supreme Court] agrees with the medical experts that when a 

defendant’s IQ test score falls within the test’s acknowledged and 

inherent margin of error, the defendant must be able to present 

additional evidence of intellectual disability, including testimony 

regarding adaptive deficits.” Id. at 2001.

Following two evidentiary hearings, including one in which Wright was 

allowed to present evidence of adaptive functioning in accord with Hall, the 

postconviction court concluded that Wright had not proven that he is intellectually 

disabled by clear and convincing evidence. As we will explain, not only do we 
- 19 -

conclude that the postconviction court’s findings are supported by competent, 

substantial evidence, but we are also convinced that Wright has failed to establish 

intellectual disability even by a preponderance of the evidence.3 Accordingly, we 

affirm the postconviction court’s order determining that Wright is not intellectually 

disabled.

Significantly Subaverage General Intellectual Functioning

As explained above, the first prong under Florida law requires a capital 

defendant to prove that he or she has an IQ low enough to qualify as having 

significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning. In Hall, the United States 

Supreme Court explained that for purposes of determining intellectual disability as 

a bar to execution, IQ scores are best evaluated as a range, taking into account the 

standard error of measurement (SEM) and other factors that can affect the accuracy 

of the score:

 

3. Referring us to Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (1996), Wright also

contends that section 921.137(4), Florida Statutes, is facially unconstitutional 

because the clear and convincing evidence standard creates too high of a risk that 

he will be mistakenly determined to not be intellectually disabled. However, in 

light of our holding today, we need not address this issue. Moreover, the claim is 

procedurally barred because Wright raised this claim for the first time in his 

written closing remarks during the supplemental postconviction evidentiary 

hearing. See Deparvine v. State, 146 So. 3d 1071, 1103 (Fla. 2014) (“This 

argument was not specifically raised in either the initial postconviction motion, the 

reply to the State’s response to the motion, or the amended postconviction motion. 

Deparvine raised this specific claim for the first time in closing arguments.”); 

Darling v. State, 966 So. 2d 366, 379 (Fla. 2007).
- 20 -

The professionals who design, administer, and interpret IQ tests 

have agreed, for years now, that IQ test scores should be read not as a 

single fixed number but as a range. . . . Each IQ test has a “standard 

error of measurement[”] often referred to by the abbreviation “SEM.” 

A test’s SEM is a statistical fact, a reflection of the inherent 

imprecision of the test itself. . . . An individual’s IQ test score on any 

given exam may fluctuate for a variety of reasons. These include the 

test-taker’s health; practice from earlier tests; the environment or 

location of the test; the examiner’s demeanor; the subjective judgment 

involved in scoring certain questions on the exam; and simple lucky 

guessing.

. . . .

The SEM reflects the reality that an individual’s intellectual 

functioning cannot be reduced to a single numerical score. For 

purposes of most IQ tests, the SEM means that an individual’s score is 

best understood as a range of scores on either side of the recorded 

score. The SEM allows clinicians to calculate a range within which 

one may say an individual’s true IQ score lies. . . . A score of 71, for 

instance, is generally considered to reflect a range between 66 and 76 

with 95% confidence and a range of 68.5 and 73.5 with a 68% 

confidence. . . . Even when a person has taken multiple tests, each 

separate score must be assessed using the SEM, and the analysis of 

multiple IQ scores jointly is a complicated endeavor. . . . In addition, 

because the test itself may be flawed, or administered in a consistently 

flawed manner, multiple examinations may result in repeated similar 

scores, so that even a consistent score is not conclusive evidence of 

intellectual functioning.

Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1995-96 (internal citations omitted).

In this case, the postconviction court considered expert testimony regarding 

Wright’s IQ scores, how the SEM applies to those scores, how the practice effect 

applies to those scores, how the Flynn effect applies to those scores, and how 
- 21 -

Wright’s effort may have affected the validity of those scores.4 After considering 

that evidence, the postconviction court found that Wright had not established by 

clear and convincing evidence that he is of significantly subaverage intellectual 

functioning. We agree and further hold that Wright has failed to establish this 

prong by even a preponderance of the evidence.

Wright has taken a total of nine IQ tests, seven of which were nonabbreviated IQ tests, and all of which reported full-scale IQ scores of 75 or above. 

When he was ten years old, Wright took three Wechsler Intelligence Scale for 

Children (WISC-R) tests, receiving full-scale IQ scores of 76 (February 1991), 80 

(April 4, 1991), and 81 (September 11, 1991), respectively. On August 25, 1997, 

when Wright was sixteen years old, he took his next non-abbreviated IQ test, a 

Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, Revised Edition (WAIS-R), in which he 

attained a full scale IQ score of 75. On July 15, 2005, when Wright was twentyfour years old, he took a Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale 3rd Edition (WAIS-III) 

and attained a full scale IQ score of 82. Ten days later, he took the same IQ test 

and attained a full-scale IQ score of 75. Thus, as the postconviction court noted, 

 

4. According to the expert testimony presented, the practice effect refers to 

a test taker’s improvement in scores from taking the same test more than once 

within a short time period. The Flynn effect refers to a theory in which the 

intelligence of a population increases over time, thereby potentially inflating 

performance on IQ examinations.
- 22 -

every single IQ test that Wright took reported a score of 75 or above, five points 

above the threshold of 70 utilized under Florida law.

Moreover, the expert testimony in this case makes clear that even when 

adjusting the IQ scores to account for the SEM, Wright cannot prove significantly

subaverage general intellectual functioning by even a preponderance of the 

evidence. Even taking the most favorable testimony concerning the application of 

the SEM to Wright’s scores, at its lowest point, the most favorable range derived 

from Wright’s scores dips just one point beneath the threshold of 70 required for a 

finding of significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning. Wright’s 

expert witness, Dr. Kasper, testified that she adjusted all seven of Wright’s scores 

for the SEM and concluded that the most accurate range of scores for Wright was 

derived from his first IQ examination—a WISC-R yielding a score of 76 in 

February 1991—because it would be free from practice effect concerns as it was 

Wright’s first IQ test. Not only was the range yielded from Wright’s first IQ test 

the most accurate, but it was also the lowest range. Upon applying the SEM to a 

95% confidence interval, the range derived from that score was between 69 and 82. 

According to Dr. Kasper, given the 95% confidence interval, one could expect 

Wright to score within that range on nineteen out of twenty IQ test administrations, 

even taking the practice effect into account for subsequent administrations. 

Indeed, she testified that all of Wright’s subsequent scores fell within that range. 
- 23 -

Most notably, however, Dr. Kasper agreed that Wright’s score of 82 in 2005 was 

valid and free of any practice effect concerns, and she conceded that the score of 

82 was within the 95% confidence interval she determined from applying the SEM 

to Wright’s first IQ exam. Thus, we cannot conclude that Wright has satisfied this 

prong by even a preponderance of the evidence.

Strengthening our confidence in this result, the State’s expert witness, Dr. 

Gamache, testified that he had concerns that Wright had malingered or not offered

a full effort on all of his IQ tests. He reached this conclusion because in 

administering an IQ test to Wright, he also administered a Validity Indicator 

Profile test, which indicated that Wright did not expend a full effort.5 From this 

experience, Dr. Gamache determined that Wright may have been malingering on 

all of his previous IQ exams because Wright had never been given a validity test 

during previous IQ exam administrations. Dr. Gamache explained that although 

Wright’s previous evaluators did not detect any malingering, subjective judgment 

regarding validity of IQ examinations is notoriously poor. Finally, Dr. Gamache 

testified that although one can malinger and fake a low IQ, one cannot fake a 

 

5. In the IQ test administered by Dr. Gamache, Wright scored a 65. 

However, it is undisputed that this testing was rendered invalid by Wright’s scores 

on the Validity Indicator Profile test administered the same day.
- 24 -

higher IQ. Accordingly, he testified that Wright’s highest IQ score of 82 was the 

most accurate representation of his IQ. 

Therefore, Wright has not proven even by a preponderance of the evidence, 

and certainly not by clear and convincing evidence, that he is of subaverage 

intellectual functioning. For this reason alone, Wright does not qualify as 

intellectually disabled under Florida law. See Salazar, 188 So. 3d at 812 (“If the 

defendant fails to prove any one of these components, the defendant will not be 

found to be intellectually disabled.”).

Concurrent Deficits in Adaptive Functioning

We further conclude that Wright cannot demonstrate by even a 

preponderance of the evidence that he suffers from concurrent deficits in adaptive 

functioning, the second prong of a finding of intellectual disability. In Dufour, we 

explained what this prong requires:

As described in section 921.137(1) and rule 3.203(b), the term 

adaptive behavior “means the effectiveness or degree with which an 

individual meets the standards of personal independence and social 

responsibility expected of his or her age, cultural group, and 

community.” The definition in section 921.137 and Florida Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 3.203 states that the subaverage intellectual 

functioning must exist “concurrently” with adaptive deficits to satisfy 

the second prong of the definition, which this Court has interpreted to 

mean that subaverage intellectual functioning must exist at the same 

time as the adaptive deficits, and that there must be current adaptive 

deficits. See Jones v. State, 966 So. 2d 319, 326 (Fla. 2007).

69 So. 3d at 248.
- 25 -

In the past, we have looked to a variety of types of evidence to determine 

whether a postconviction court’s order concerning intellectual disability is 

supported by competent, substantial evidence. Most commonly, we have relied on 

a postconviction court’s consideration of expert testimony and its credibility 

determinations with regard to that testimony. See Diaz v. State, 132 So. 3d 93, 121

(Fla. 2013). Likewise, we have relied on a postconviction court’s consideration of 

lay witness testimony and its credibility determinations. On yet other occasions, 

we have also considered the facts of the underlying crime, including a finding of 

the CCP aggravating circumstance, as well as a defendant’s testimony and other 

involvement during trial. See Hodges v. State, 55 So. 3d 515, 526-37 (Fla. 2010); 

Philips v. State, 984 So. 2d 503, 511 (Fla. 2008); Jones, 966 So. 2d at 328. In this 

case, all of these types of evidence refute that Wright has concurrent deficits in 

adaptive functioning.

First, there was expert testimony that Wright lacked concurrent deficits in 

adaptive functioning. Dr. Gamache, the State’s expert, testified that Wright does 

not have concurrent deficits in adaptive functioning after interviewing Wright for 

five hours, during which time he administered an IQ test to Wright. Taking 

Wright’s low socioeconomic status, lack of education, specific learning disability, 

and neighborhood culture into consideration, Dr. Gamache concluded that Wright 

failed to demonstrate sufficient deficits in all three of the accepted broad categories 
- 26 -

of adaptive functioning—conceptual skills, social/interpersonal skills, and practical 

skills.

With regard to conceptual skills, Dr. Gamache acknowledged that Wright 

has some deficits in reading and writing skills, but attributed them to a lack of 

education and his specific learning disability diagnosis, rather than intelligence. 

He also acknowledged that Wright has some deficits in self-direction and the 

ability to formulate goals or objectives, but none that are significant.

Ultimately, however, Dr. Gamache concluded that Wright’s deficits in 

conceptual skills do not rise to the level required for a determination of intellectual 

disability because he observed that Wright: (1) rewrites draft blog entries in his 

own words; (2) fully communicates with other prisoners and prison staff; (3) 

listens to others and takes advice, as evidenced by his brief period requesting 

Kosher meals; (4) understands numbers and time; (5) knows the time allocated for 

prison activities; (6) manages his prison canteen fund and pays attention to his 

monthly statements; (7) managed his own funds as an adolescent to buy 

necessities; (8) conducted basic transactions before he was incarcerated; (9) was 

attentive to time and number issues during the examination; (10) identifies his 

attorneys by name and estimates the amount of time they have represented him; 

(11) knows the difference between legal mail and regular mail in the prison 

system; (12) understands that he needs his attorneys because he has no legal 
- 27 -

training; (13) is receptive to the suggestions of his attorneys; (14) wants his 

attorneys to prove that he did not commit the crimes for which he was convicted; 

(15) knows that he was sentenced to death and understands the reasoning for his 

sentence; and (16) has performed some work on his case.

Likewise, Dr. Gamache did not find that Wright has sufficient deficits with 

regard to social/interpersonal skills because he observed that Wright: (1) displayed 

good social skills during his examination and followed written and unwritten rules; 

(2) interacted effectively during the examination; (3) is able to engage in social 

conversation with others; (4) has counseled pen pals on how to deal with difficult 

situations; (5) appears to have adapted well to life on death row, as exhibited by his 

lack of disciplinary write-ups and ability to ask correctional staff for help; and (6) 

is able to effectively distinguish between friends and associates, as well as 

recognize and adapt to multiple levels of interpersonal interaction. Dr. Gamache 

further testified that Wright denied that he is a victim of exploitation. 

Finally, with regard to practical skills, Dr. Gamache observed that Wright 

(1) cares for his health by showering and grooming daily, as well as by engaging in 

self-care and health-oriented activities; (2) knows how to obtain the necessities for 

basic living and follow schedules; and (3) knew how to use public transportation in 

his community. Furthermore, although Wright did not have a driver’s license 

because he could not pass the written portion of the driving examination, Wright 
- 28 -

knew how to drive a car. In addition, Dr. Gamache considered Wright’s 

employment at a grocery store, Wright’s gang activity, Wright’s drug dealing, and 

Wright’s statements that he lived independently between the ages of thirteen and 

eighteen.

Even without the testimony of Dr. Gamache, not even Wright’s expert, Dr. 

Kasper, could establish that Wright has concurrent deficits in adaptive functioning. 

Rather, Dr. Kasper could only conclude that Wright currently has some deficits in 

the subcategory of conceptual skills, but not in the other categories of practical 

skills or social skills. Dr. Kasper explained that she twice administered the 

Adaptive Behavior Assessment Scales (ABAS-II) standardized test for adaptive 

functioning, which involves answering questions about a person’s behavior on a 

scale of zero to three, zero indicating the person never performs certain behavior 

and three representing that the person always performs certain behavior. The first 

ABAS-II administration indicated that Wright had deficits in both conceptual skills 

and social skills. By Wright’s second and most recent administration of the 

ABAS-II, however, Wright no longer demonstrated deficits in social skills, and 

therefore only had deficits in conceptual skills. This was the case even after Dr. 

Kasper adjusted the ABAS-II scores for the SEM. Thus, as Dr. Kasper explained, 

Wright only met the statutory criteria for intellectual disability with regard to the 
- 29 -

conceptual skills sub-component of the adaptive skills prong. This is insufficient 

for a finding of intellectual disability.

Moreover, Dr. Kasper conceded during cross-examination that her method 

of administering the ABAS-II was, at best, unorthodox. Although Dr. Kasper 

interviewed many people with regard to the ABAS-II questions, she filled out just 

one copy of the ABAS-II and filled in the answers herself by deciding which

person’s response among many was the most accurate response. She clarified that 

she would try to confirm the result with other responses and apply the weight of 

the evidence, but conceded that her response to each question required her to make 

a credibility determination among all the different responses. As she further 

conceded, this was not the normal way the ABAS-II is administered, giving us 

great pause in considering its validity. In any event, as previously discussed, in a 

light most favorable to Wright, he only had deficits in the conceptual skills 

category, which is just one of three categories. 

Moreover, we need not limit ourselves to expert testimony alone to conclude

that Wright does not have concurrent deficits in adaptive functioning. Wright gave 

extensive testimony during trial, where he told a coherent narrative of his version 

of the events. He testified at length and was not generally aided by leading 

questions. Furthermore, following his testimony, he endured a strong crossexamination by the State in which he demonstrated a clear understanding and 
- 30 -

unwavering invocation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination 

with regard to certain uncharged offenses he was repeatedly questioned about. 

Moreover, the record demonstrates multiple times that Wright assessed the 

performance of his counsel across all three of his trials, sometimes expressing 

dissatisfaction with their inability to elicit certain evidence that had been elicited 

during a previous trial. In addition, during an extensive colloquy, the trial court 

judge questioned Wright concerning his waiver of an advisory penalty phase jury 

and Wright appeared to understand all of the ramifications of such a waiver, a 

waiver we affirmed on direct appeal. Thus, competent, substantial evidence 

supports the postconviction court’s determination that Wright’s testimony during 

trial and interactions with the trial court refute his alleged deficits in adaptive 

functioning.

Furthermore, competent, substantial evidence supports the postconviction 

court’s determination that the facts underlying Wright’s convictions refute deficits 

in adaptive functioning. First, the trial court found that Wright committed the 

murder in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner. See Philips, 984 So. 2d at 

512 (“The actions required to satisfy the CCP aggravator are not indicative of 

mental retardation.”). Specifically, the trial court found, and we affirmed, the 

findings that Wright had killed his victims execution style. Second, the complexity 

of the crime spree reflects someone who is likely not intellectually disabled. In 
- 31 -

addition, the State presented testimony from Aaron Silas, who drove the car during 

the Longfellow Boulevard drive-by shooting and testified that Wright instructed 

him to turn the car around after spotting his victim, someone Wright previously 

knew. 

The State also placed into evidence a transcript of a taped interview with a 

detective who interviewed Wright following his arrest and presented the detective 

as a witness. The interview is inconsistent with an intellectually disabled 

defendant. Wright admitted to running away from the police because he had 

marijuana in his possession, to discarding the marijuana, and to knowing that 

possession of marijuana was a crime. Wright was also questioned during the 

interview about the box of bullets he was carrying, to which he responded, “I think 

they was .380 bullets,” and that he was holding the bullets for a friend. Then, 

when informed a .380 caliber handgun was found nearby, Wright denied 

knowledge of the gun. Furthermore, while it was the detective’s practice to inquire 

about mental illnesses when he suspected it may be a concern, he did not feel the 

need to ask Wright whether he had been diagnosed with any mental illnesses.

Finally, the lay witness testimony from people who know Wright does not 

dissuade us from concluding that Wright cannot demonstrate concurrent deficits 

even by a preponderance of the evidence. Although Wright’s witnesses testified to 

general issues, they all ultimately made concessions that suggest Wright lacks
- 32 -

concurrent deficits in adaptive functioning. For instance, Wright’s cousin 

conceded that Wright: (1) had a fast-paced job selecting items for shelving at a 

grocery store that Wright eventually learned to do on his own, albeit not fluidly; 

(2) has improved somewhat with regard to grammar and punctuation; (3) writes 

him cards from prison for the holidays and his birthday; (4) reads the Bible; (5) 

occasionally calls him on the phone; and (6) has the capacity to learn. Similarly, 

Wright’s aunt conceded that Wright: (1) did not appear to have problems 

understanding her; (2) did not appear to have problems getting along with other 

people; (3) was always clean when she saw him; and (4) sent her cards and letters 

from jail on holidays like Mother’s Day, Christmas, Thanksgiving, Easter, and 

sometimes her birthday. 

Furthermore, the State presented the testimony of Samuel Pitts’s sisters, 

Sandrea Allen, Darletha Jones, and Vontrese Anderson, the latter of whom Wright 

dated for two to three weeks. All three testified that they had known Wright, 

Wright never had trouble understanding them, and they never had trouble 

understanding him.6 All three also testified to having observed Wright ride the city 

 

6. One of the State’s witnesses, Toya Long Ford, testified that Wright had 

trouble understanding her and that she had to ask him yes or no questions. 

However, she further testified that Wright would talk to her about his mother’s 

drug problems and his academic difficulties. Furthermore, Ford testified that 

Wright would abide by the rules whenever he visited her home and that Wright 

would come to her for food and safe haven, but also that Wright’s visits became 
- 33 -

bus to varying degrees. Vontrese also testified that Wright would follow her 

around after they had ended their relationship, and that even though he was advised

by law enforcement to end that activity, he would continue to follow her anyway. 

She believed Wright knew he was not supposed to follow her, but chose to follow 

her regardless. Vontrese added that Wright had memorized her phone number and 

that she received five or fewer jail calls from Wright, but she did not answer them, 

and that she had received a letter from the jail that appeared to be written by 

Wright.

Given that Wright has not even demonstrated by a preponderance of the 

evidence either of the first two prongs for a determination of intellectual disability, 

we conclude that he has not demonstrated that he belongs to that category of 

individuals that are categorically ineligible for execution.7 We therefore affirm the 

 

less frequent when she and her mother could no longer provide Wright with as 

much help as they had in the past.

7. We recognize that the postconviction court suggested that we conduct a 

new proportionality review due its concerns that Wright is borderline intellectually 

disabled. This suggestion, however, is inconsistent with our precedent. See, e.g., 

McKenzie v. State, 153 So. 3d 867, 884 (Fla. 2014) (denying a new proportionality 

review in postconviction for evidence the defendant chose not to present during the 

penalty phase); Lukehart v. State, 70 So. 3d 503, 524-25 (Fla. 2011) (denying a 

new proportionality review in a petition for habeas corpus); Green v. State, 975 So. 

2d 1090, 1115 (Fla. 2008) (denying a new proportionality review due to a lack of 

new evidence); Farina v. State, 937 So. 2d 612, 618 (Fla. 2006) (proportionality 

claim procedurally barred in postconviction). Moreover, Wright has failed to brief 

how a new proportionality review would apply to him and has, therefore, waived 

such a claim. See, e.g., City of Miami v. Steckloff, 111 So. 2d 446, 447 (Fla. 
- 34 -

postconviction court’s determination that Wright is not among those intellectually 

disabled defendants that cannot be executed. 

Wright’s Amended Motion for Postconviction Relief

Hurst v. Florida

Prior to oral arguments in this matter, the United States Supreme Court 

issued its decision in Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016). The Supreme Court 

held that the Sixth Amendment requires a jury to make the findings of fact 

necessary to impose death. See id. at 619 (“The Sixth Amendment requires a jury, 

not a judge, to find each fact necessary to impose a sentence of death. A jury’s 

mere recommendation is not enough.”). 

Although Wright validly waived his right to a penalty phase jury during trial, 

he nevertheless made a facial claim that Florida’s death penalty scheme is 

unconstitutional based on Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). At the time, we 

declined to address Wright’s Ring claim because we concluded that his waiver of a 

penalty phase jury was valid: 

Wright knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to a 

penalty-phase jury, as evidenced by the trial court’s colloquy with 

Wright during which the trial court explained the impact of a waiver 

and specifically informed Wright of the consequences on appeal. 

Wright confirmed that it was his knowing intention to waive his 

 

1959) (“It is an established rule that points covered by a decree of the trial court 

will not be considered by an appellate court unless they are properly raised and 

discussed in the briefs. An assigned error will be deemed to have been abandoned 

when it is completely omitted from the briefs.”).
- 35 -

penalty phase jury. The trial court concluded that the waiver had been 

made after a full consultation with counsel, that it appeared to be a 

tactical decision on the part of the defense based on counsel’s 

statements, and that the waiver was knowingly, intelligently, and 

voluntarily made.

Wright does not present any evidence contrary to the finding of 

the trial court. In fact, Wright concedes that he waived his right to a 

penalty-phase jury, thus barring this claim, and submits that the 

waiver was a strategic decision based on the possible “contamination” 

of the jury by the trial court’s admission of collateral-crime evidence 

during the guilt phase. Wright chose the trial court to be the finder of 

fact because it was his view that the trial court would be more likely

to dispassionately consider the aggravating and mitigating 

circumstances in light of any emotional impact the collateral-crime 

evidence may have had on the guilt-phase jury. This is no different 

from the choice that every capital defendant must make when

deciding whether to waive the right to a penalty-phase jury. Wright’s 

strategic decision to present the penalty phase of the case to the trial 

court instead of a jury constitutes a knowing, intelligent, and 

voluntary waiver and a conscious abandonment of any Ring-based 

challenges to the constitutionality of Florida’s capital-sentencing 

scheme.

Wright, 19 So. 3d at 297-98. Nevertheless, prior to oral argument in this case, we 

sua sponte ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs discussing any application 

of Hurst v. Florida to his case. 

Although Wright did not challenge the validity of his waiver of a penalty

phase jury on direct appeal, he now attempts to challenge it on two bases. First, 

Wright contends that he waived his right to an advisory jury, rather than the jury 

required by the Sixth Amendment under Hurst v. Florida. Wright bases this 

contention on the fact that the trial court repeatedly referenced the advisory jury,
- 36 -

rather than a jury in general terms. However, this reasoning is undermined by his 

attorney’s explanation on the record during trial that Wright preferred that the 

judge determine whether a death sentence was appropriate because he felt that a 

judge would be more objective than the same jury that convicted him. Second, 

Wright challenges the validity of the waiver based on his alleged intellectual 

disability. However, as affirmed above, Wright is not intellectually disabled under 

Florida law. 

Having reaffirmed the validity of Wright’s waiver, we conclude that he is 

not entitled to any Hurst v. Florida relief. See Mullens v. State, 197 So. 3d 16, 38-

40 (Fla. 2016) (declining to grant Hurst v. Florida relief where the defendant had 

knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived a penalty-phase jury prior to the 

decision in Hurst v. Florida).

Penalty-Phase Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “In all 

criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the assistance 

of Counsel for his defence.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. This right, which was 

incorporated to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment, includes the right to effective assistance of counsel. See McMann v. 

Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970); see generally Gideon v. Wainright, 
- 37 -

372 U.S. 335 (1963) (incorporating Sixth Amendment right to assistance of 

counsel to the States). 

However, not all ineffective assistance of counsel is unconstitutional. For 

this reason, a defendant seeking relief on this basis must establish both that his 

penalty phase counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient 

performance prejudiced him so as to deprive him of a reliable proceeding. See

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Hoskins v. State, 75 So. 3d 

250, 254 (Fla. 2011). Because both prongs of the Strickland test present mixed 

questions of law and fact, this Court employs a mixed standard of review, 

reviewing the postconviction court’s legal conclusions de novo, but deferring to 

the postconviction court’s factual findings that are supported by competent, 

substantial evidence. See Mungin v. State, 79 So. 3d 726, 737 (Fla. 2011); Sochor 

v. State, 883 So. 2d 766, 771-72 (Fla. 2004).

In Shellito v. State, 121 So. 3d 445 (Fla. 2013), this Court further explained 

how Strickland applies in the penalty phase context:

Penalty phase claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are also 

reviewed under the two-prong test established by Strickland, and “[i]n 

reviewing a claim that counsel’s representation was ineffective based 

on a failure to investigate or present mitigating evidence, the Court 

requires the defendant to demonstrate that the deficient performance 

deprived the defendant of a reliable penalty phase proceeding.”

Hoskins v. State, 75 So. 3d [at 254]. In determining whether the 

penalty phase proceeding was reliable, “the failure [of counsel] to 

investigate and present available mitigating evidence is a relevant 
- 38 -

concern along with the reasons for not doing so.” Rose v. State, 675 

So. 2d 567, 571 (Fla. 1996).

“It is unquestioned that under the prevailing professional norms 

. . . counsel ha[s] an ‘obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of 

the defendant’s background.’ ” Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 39

(2009) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000)); see 

also Hannon v. State, 941 So. 2d 1109, 1124 (Fla. 2006) (“Pursuant to 

Strickland, trial counsel has an obligation to conduct a reasonable 

investigation into mitigation.”). Moreover, counsel must not ignore 

pertinent avenues for investigation of which he or she should have 

been aware. See Porter, 558 U.S. at 40. “[I]t is axiomatic that 

‘counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a 

reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.’

” Hurst v. State, 18 So. 3d 975, 1008 (Fla. 2009) (quoting Strickland,

466 U.S. at 691). However, “[c]ounsel’s decision not to present 

mitigation evidence may be a tactical decision properly within 

counsel’s discretion.” Hannon, 941 So. 2d at 1124. This Court has 

found counsel’s performance deficient where counsel “never 

attempted to meaningfully investigate mitigation” although substantial 

mitigation could have been presented. Asay v. State, 769 So. 2d 974, 

985 (Fla. 2000).

. . . .

“Penalty phase prejudice under the Strickland standard is measured by 

whether the error of trial counsel undermines this Court’s confidence 

in the sentence of death when viewed in the context of the penalty 

phase evidence and the mitigators and aggravators found by the trial 

court.” Hurst, 18 So. 3d at 1013. That standard does not “require a 

defendant to show ‘that counsel’s deficient conduct more likely than 

not altered the outcome’ of his penalty proceeding, but rather that he 

establish ‘a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in [that] 

outcome.’ ” Porter, 558 U.S. at 44 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

693-94). “To assess that probability, [the Court] consider[s] ‘the 

totality of the available mitigation evidence . . .’ and ‘reweig[hs] it 

against the evidence in aggravation.’ ” Id. at 41 (quoting Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. [at 397-98].

121 So. 3d at 453-56.
- 39 -

Failure to Adequately Investigate or Present Mitigation

With regard to the penalty phase, Wright first contends that his trial counsel 

were ineffective in failing to adequately present evidence of mitigating 

circumstances. Although Wright may not be intellectually disabled for purposes of 

the categorical prohibition against execution under the Eighth Amendment, he can 

potentially demonstrate that his low IQ and mental health are mitigating 

circumstances sufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstances. As a result, 

Wright contends that his penalty phase counsel were ineffective because they 

failed to: (1) acquire documents; (2) present lay witnesses; and (3) present expert 

witnesses demonstrating his low IQ and mental health as mitigating circumstances. 

We conclude that these claims are without merit.

Failure to Acquire Documents

During the postconviction evidentiary hearing, Wright’s postconviction 

counsel presented Wright’s complete school records, which included records from 

both Florida and New York. The records indicated that Wright had several 

Independent Education plans and that Wright was both emotionally handicapped 

and specific learning disabled. In addition, the records contained two school 

psychological reports that contained IQ scores. Wright contends that his penalty 

phase counsel were ineffective for relying on a family member for Wright’s 
- 40 -

educational documents in lieu of acquiring all of the school records directly from 

the schools. We disagree.

Notwithstanding any deficiency, competent, substantial evidence supports 

the postconviction court’s findings that Wright cannot establish Strickland

prejudice.

8

 To establish prejudice, Wright must demonstrate a reasonable 

probability that he would have received a life sentence but for the deficiencies of 

counsel. See Gaskin v. State, 822 So. 2d 1243, 1250 (Fla. 2002). Wright has not 

carried his burden because the documents would have merely been cumulative to 

the information that was presented during the penalty phase. See Diaz, 132 So. 3d 

at 111-12 (“A defendant is not prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to present 

cumulative evidence.” (citing Farina, 937 So. 2d at 624)). Dr. Sesta testified 

during the penalty phase that he reviewed school records indicating that Wright 

took classes for emotionally handicapped students and had a learning disability. 

Wright’s family members who testified during the penalty phase corroborated that 

information as well. They also added that Wright’s mother was receiving social 

security benefits for Wright’s disability. Therefore, Wright has not alleged any 

 

8. Both parties appear to have conceded that the failure to acquire all of 

Wright’s school documents constituted deficient performance. The postconviction 

court did not address deficiency in its order. Notably, however, penalty phase 

counsel testified that he believed that the school records demonstrated that Wright 

was not intellectually disabled, but merely a misbehaving student.
- 41 -

new information contained in the documents that was not previously presented. 

See id. at 111 (affirming postconviction court’s finding of no prejudice for failure 

to acquire documents where the defendant “[did] not identify any specific facts 

contained in the documents that should have been brought to the attention of the 

judge . . . .”). Thus, Wright cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the 

failure to acquire documents, and this claim fails. See Evans v. State, 946 So. 2d 

1, 12 (Fla. 2006) (“[B]ecause the Strickland standard requires establishment of 

both [deficient performance and prejudice] prongs, when a defendant fails to make 

a showing as to one prong, it is not necessary to delve into whether he has made a 

showing as to the other prong.” (quoting Whitfield v. State, 923 So. 2d 375, 384 

(Fla. 2005))).

Presentation of Expert Witnesses

Wright contends that his penalty phase counsel were ineffective for failing to 

present expert witnesses to discuss the Flynn effect, the practice effect, and Fetal 

Alcohol Syndrome as each relates to his IQ scores and intellectual disability.9 We 

disagree.

 

9. Wright also contends that his penalty phase counsel were ineffective for 

failing to retain Dr. Sesta as a confidential consultant and presenting him as an 

expert witness. However, this claim was not raised in Wright’s amended 3.851 

motion and the postconviction court did not address it in its order. Wright appears 

to have raised it for the first time on appeal and, as such, it is not preserved for 

appeal. See Deparvine, 146 So. 3d at 1103.
- 42 -

As an initial matter, Wright has failed to establish deficiency. This Court 

has repeatedly held that penalty phase counsel is not deficient for relying on 

qualified mental health experts, even where postconviction counsel retains an 

expert with a more favorable opinion. See generally Diaz, 132 So. 3d at 93; 

Bowles v. State, 979 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 2008); Asay, 769 So. 2d at 986; Jones v. 

State, 732 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 1999). Wright’s penalty phase counsel pursued the 

presentation of evidence of mitigating circumstances diligently and ultimately 

retained five expert witnesses. Indeed, trial counsel testified that they specifically 

retained Dr. Waldman and Dr. Sesta after the original experts did not find that 

Wright was intellectually disabled. Dr. Waldman was the first expert to conclude 

that Wright was intellectually disabled. Furthermore, as discussed above, the 

record reflects that Wright’s trial counsel at times believed that Wright was bright, 

a conclusion that was reasonable in light of Wright’s input with regard to 

objections across the three trials and his extensive testimony. Thus, Wright has not 

demonstrated deficiency, and this claim fails.

This claim further fails because Wright cannot demonstrate Strickland

prejudice. As noted in the discussion pertaining to Wright’s renewed motion for 

intellectual disability, the expert testimony indicated that Wright’s first IQ score 

was his most accurate and that all of his subsequent IQ scores fell in the range 

derived from his first IQ score after adjusting for the SEM, notwithstanding any 
- 43 -

practice effect or Flynn effect concerns. Furthermore, there was testimony that 

Wright’s IQ examinations were far enough apart in time that they would not have 

been affected by the practice effect. Moreover, during the penalty phase Dr. 

Waldman testified that Wright was profoundly impaired and he also testified 

extensively about Wright’s Fetal Alcohol Syndrome, as well as Wright’s low IQ. 

In addition, Wright has failed to demonstrate that any expert testimony 

would have changed the composition of the mitigating circumstances found. For 

instance, the trial court found the existence of two statutory mental health 

mitigating circumstances: (1) that Wright committed the offense while under the 

influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, and (2) that Wright’s 

capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to 

the requirements of law was substantially impaired. It assigned those two statutory 

factors some weight. The trial court also found one more statutory mitigating 

circumstance, that Wright was nineteen years old (some weight), as well as nine 

nonstatutory mitigating circumstances: that Wright (1) suffered emotional 

deprivation during his upbringing (some weight); (2) had a low IQ, which affected 

his judgment and perceptions (some weight); (3) suffered from neurological 

impairments, which affected his impulse control and reasoning ability (some 

weight); (4) suffered from low self-esteem (little weight); (5) lacked the capacity to 

maintain healthy, mature relationships (little weight); (6) was frustrated by his 
- 44 -

learning disability (little weight); (7) lacked mature coping skills (some weight); 

(8) displayed appropriate courtroom behavior (little weight); and (9) suffered from 

substance abuse during his adolescent and adult life (little weight).

Furthermore, the evidence of aggravating circumstances was significant. 

Two of the aggravating circumstances found, CCP and prior violent felony for the 

contemporaneous murders, are among the weightiest of aggravating circumstances. 

See Deparvine v. State, 995 So. 2d 351, 381 (Fla. 2008) (“CCP[] is among the 

most serious aggravators set out in the statutory sentencing scheme.”); Sireci v. 

Moore, 825 So. 2d 882, 887 (Fla. 2002) (stating that prior violent felony conviction 

is among the weightiest aggravating circumstances in Florida’s capital sentencing 

scheme). The trial court also found a third aggravating circumstance: that the 

murders were committed for the purpose of avoiding arrest. All three aggravating 

circumstances were assigned great weight. As a result, Wright has failed to 

demonstrate any reason that any expert testimony would have led to a different 

assignment of weight to the mental health mitigating circumstances and that a 

reweighing of the aggravating circumstances and mitigating circumstances would 

result in a life sentence. Thus, Wright cannot establish prejudice. 

We therefore conclude that Wright has failed to establish Strickland

ineffective assistance of counsel.

Failure to Present Lay Witness Testimony
- 45 -

Wright contends that his penalty phase counsel were ineffective for failing to 

present lay witness testimony from fellow inmates who characterized Wright as a 

follower, an outcast, intellectually slow, and pugnacious.10 The postconviction 

court found that Wright did not establish either deficient performance or prejudice 

with regard to this claim. We agree.

With regard to prejudice, Wright has failed to demonstrate that the evidence 

elicited during the postconviction evidentiary hearing would not have been merely 

cumulative to the penalty phase testimony of his aunt and cousin. See Diaz, 132 

So. 3d at 111-12 (“A defendant is not prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to 

present cumulative evidence.” (citing Farina, 937 So. 2d at 624)). His aunt and 

cousin specifically testified that Wright was a follower, was slow, had low selfesteem, performed poorly in school, and was enrolled in special classes. They also 

testified that Wright’s father was in a mental institution and that Wright was 

bullied by other children. As a result, Wright has failed to demonstrate that any 

new mitigating circumstance would be found or that the existing mitigating 

 

10. Wright mentioned other lay witnesses in his postconviction motion, but 

he never presented them as witnesses during the postconviction evidentiary 

hearing. Therefore, any claims concerning them are waived. Ferrell v. State, 918 

So. 2d 163, 174 (Fla. 2005). Some of them were eventually called during the 

evidentiary hearing for Wright’s renewed motion for determination of intellectual 

disability, but only after the postconviction court denied Wright’s claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel. 
- 46 -

circumstances would have been assigned more weight. Therefore, this claim fails. 

See Evans, 946 So. 2d at 12.

11

Failure to Challenge Evidence of Aggravation

Wright claims that his counsel were ineffective for failing to present 

witnesses to rebut or elaborate on evidence of Wright’s prior convictions for 

batteries that occurred while he was in prison during the pendency of his trial. 

This claim is meritless. Competent, substantial evidence supports the 

postconviction court’s findings. 

First, Wright has failed to establish prejudice. None of the evidence 

presented during the postconviction evidentiary hearing negates the fact that 

Wright had previous convictions for battery. Furthermore, even if those prior 

convictions were omitted, the trial court still considered Wright’s 

contemporaneous convictions for first-degree murder of the other victim, 

carjacking, kidnapping, and robbery with a firearm in finding the prior violent 

felony conviction aggravating circumstance. As the postconviction court noted, 

the contemporaneous convictions were arguably more serious than the convictions 

Wright claims were not properly rebutted. As explained above, two of the three 

 

11. With regard to deficiency, the decision to limit the presentation of lay 

witness testimony appears in part to have been strategic based on Wright’s penalty 

phase counsel’s assessment of the inmate witnesses’ credibility, which is a valid 

strategic reason for foregoing presentation of certain witnesses.
- 47 -

aggravating circumstances found below are among the weightiest aggravating 

circumstances. See Sireci, 825 So. 2d at 887; Deparvine, 995 So. 2d at 381-82. In 

addition, the previously undiscovered evidence concerning the attack on Cassada 

would have been merely cumulative to the concessions elicited from Cassada 

during penalty phase cross-examination and the evidence presented by Wright’s 

trial counsel. Specifically, evidence was introduced that one other person was 

convicted in connection with the attack on Cassada, and Cassada conceded that 

perhaps five individuals attacked him and he did not know whether Wright actually 

struck him. Thus, because Wright has failed to establish prejudice, we affirm the

postconviction court’s denial of this claim. See Evans, 946 So. 2d at 12.

Moreover, the record reflects that Wright’s trial counsel made a tactical 

decision to not present the testimony of other inmates concerning Connelly’s 

alleged provocation of Wright. Wright’s trial counsel testified that he did not 

consider the provocation sufficient justification for Wright to attack Connelly, and 

even if it were, presentation of such evidence would not have changed the fact that 

Wright was convicted for the attack. Furthermore, Wright’s trial counsel 

represented Wright in the case concerning his attack on Connelly and presented 

those witnesses in that case. Thus, Wright’s penalty phase counsel were well 

aware of the inmates’ testimony when they elected to not present the inmates as 

penalty phase witnesses. In addition, Wright’s lead penalty phase counsel testified 
- 48 -

that he did not consider the inmate witnesses to be good witnesses. The decision to 

not present rebuttal witnesses concerning the prior conviction for attacking 

Connelly was a reasonable tactical decision. Therefore, the postconviction court’s 

findings that Wright’s counsel were not ineffective for failing to present additional 

witnesses concerning Wright’s prior battery convictions are supported by 

competent, substantial evidence.

Guilt Phase Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims

Wright first contends that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance of 

counsel by failing to present witnesses to testify as to the credibility of two 

jailhouse informants who testified during trial that Wright confessed to the 

murders. We disagree.

This Court has observed that mere disagreement by a defendant’s 

subsequent counsel with a strategic decision of a predecessor does not

automatically result in deficient performance. See Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 

1037, 1048 (Fla. 2000). Indeed, reasonable trial strategy appears in a myriad of 

forms. One example is a trial counsel’s decision to not call certain witnesses to 

testify. See Johnston v. State, 63 So. 3d 730, 741 (Fla. 2011). Although the 

“sandwich” rule has been repealed since Wright’s trial, this Court has held that a 

valid basis for deciding against calling witnesses to testify is the decision to 

preserve opening and closing remarks pursuant to the sandwich rule. See Van 
- 49 -

Poyck v. State, 694 So. 2d 686, 697 (Fla. 1997). In addition, this Court has 

concluded that trial counsel’s strategy of relying on cross-examination of a 

witness—in lieu of calling additional witnesses—was sound trial strategy. See

Occhicone, 768 So. 2d at 1048. Moreover, a failure to present cumulative 

evidence—even by mere omission rather than decision—does not constitute 

deficient performance. See Beasley v. State, 18 So. 3d 473, 484 (Fla. 2009) (citing 

Darling, 966 So. 2d at 378). These examples of reasonable strategy reflect this 

Court’s observation that “[m]ore [evidence] is not necessarily better.” Woods v. 

State, 531 So. 2d 79, 82 (Fla. 1988).

Furthermore, notwithstanding the deficient performance of counsel, 

Strickland prejudice does not arise when a defendant’s trial counsel fails to present 

evidence that would have been merely cumulative to evidence that was previously 

elicited during trial. See Sochor, 883 So. 2d at 784. In the postconviction context, 

evidence presented during an evidentiary hearing is cumulative where the same 

evidence was previously elicited during trial through cross-examination. See

Ponticelli v. State, 941 So. 2d 1073, 1085 (Fla. 2006). Moreover, as discussed 

above, the omission of any noncumulative evidence must undermine confidence in 

the verdict.

Failure to Present Impeachment Witnesses
- 50 -

Competent, substantial evidence supports the postconviction court’s findings 

that Wright has not established deficiency with regard to the decision to not present 

witnesses to impeach the credibility of Durant or Robinson. Rather, the record 

reflects that the decision was the product of reasonable trial strategy. For instance, 

trial counsel testified that he felt “Durant was such an easy target and so 

incredible” that he was not going to look for any witnesses to impeach him. The 

record further reflects that trial counsel extensively and successfully crossexamined Durant with the goal of discounting his credibility. In addition, trial 

counsel testified that they rejected the presentation of additional witnesses, with 

Wright’s approval, to preserve opening and closing remarks. Moreover, trial 

counsel testified that he did not consider inmates to be strong witnesses and that he 

did not consider their testimony sufficient to justify sacrificing the retention of 

opening and closing remarks. 

Wright also did not suffer prejudice. As an initial matter, Wright testified 

that he never confessed to either Durant or Robinson. Therefore, any testimony 

concerning the credibility of Durant or Robinson with regard to Wright’s alleged 

confession would have been merely cumulative to Wright’s testimony. Wright’s 

attorneys extensively cross-examined each of them and even if their testimony was 

completely discredited, there were still other non-prisoner witnesses who testified 

that Wright confessed to them. Furthermore, this Court has previously concluded 
- 51 -

that prejudice was not established for failure to object to improper guilt phase 

prosecutorial comments when the evidence of guilt was strong. See Jones v. State, 

949 So. 2d 1021, 1032 (Fla. 2006) (“Given the strong evidence of Jones’ guilt, 

including his confession to the murder and his possession of McRae’s vehicle and 

ATM card, our confidence in the guilty verdict is not undermined by the 

prosecutor’s guilt phase comment [that the murder was committed in a heinous, 

atrocious, and cruel manner.]”). Here, the remaining evidence of guilt was strong 

because, among other evidence, Wright’s fingerprints were found on the car, he 

possessed the murder weapon, and blood attributed to one of the victims was found 

on a shoe attributed to Wright. Thus, this claim fails. 

Failure to Object to Prosecutor’s Closing Remarks

As a second claim against his counsel, Wright contends that his counsel 

were ineffective for failing to object to comments made by the State during guilt 

phase closing remarks. We disagree. 

The comments at issue are the following:

He used the gun on Friday. He shot a man with it. He certain[ly] 

doesn’t have any problems shooting people. He shot Carlos Coney.

When you have a carjacking and a murder like this that’s 

senseless, it’s an irrational act, and you cannot for the life of you 

understand why that happened. You’ll never understand why T.J. 

Wright chose to shoot Carlos Coney or chose to shoot Felker and 

Green. It’s—it’s an irrational thing to do.
- 52 -

Carlos Coney and Bennie Joiner both know the guy. He shoots 

them, a man that he knows. The man—the police come, he goes, 

“Yeah, who shot you?”

“T.J. Wright shot me.”

. . . .

You know, you can’t believe T.J. This guy wants you to 

believe that somebody that he has an acrimonious relationship with, 

they don’t get along, he’s driving by, sees the guy, has a gun in his 

car, and tells his buddy turn around and go back, I want to talk to him.

Bull crap. He wanted to shoot him. That’s why he told [the 

driver] to turn around. That’s exactly what he did. He shot him.

. . . .

But the second time, when you look at this map, after he 

dumped that car on Bolender Road and went and carjacked the 

Mexicans, he comes up to right there, and that’s where he flees. 

That’s where he shoots at Mr. Mendoza and the owner of the car 

who’s since died in a car accident. That’s where he shoots at him.

Wright, 19 So. 3d at 294 n.18 (emphasis in original). On direct appeal, we 

admonished the State for those comments: “We caution the State that some of the 

arguments appear to have crossed the line into asserting that Wright’s propensity 

for violence proved that he committed the murders.” Id. at 294. Ultimately, 

however, we reviewed the comments for fundamental error. We concluded that 

the comments did not rise to fundamental error.

Despite the distinctions between the fundamental error standard and the 

Strickland prejudice standard, this Court has held that a previous finding upon 
- 53 -

appeal that statements by a prosecutor failed to rise to fundamental error precludes 

a determination of prejudice in the Strickland context. See Chandler v. State, 848 

So. 2d 1031, 1046 (Fla. 2003) (“Because Chandler could not show the comments 

were fundamental error on direct appeal, he likewise cannot show that trial 

counsel’s failure to object to the comments resulted in prejudice sufficient to 

undermine the outcome of the case under the prejudice prong of the Strickland

test.”); Sheppard v. State, 62 So. 3d 14 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (applying Chandler in 

a similar context); c.f. Clarke v. State, 102 So. 3d 763 (Fla. 2012) (distinguishing 

Chandler because the Court had affirmed the direct appeal without a written 

opinion and therefore did not reveal whether it had found that no fundamental error 

occurred). Here, as noted above, this Court determined in a written opinion that 

the comments at issue did not rise to fundamental error. Therefore, Wright cannot 

now assert, a second time, that he was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s failure to 

object to those comments. 

We nevertheless briefly address the merits because Wright takes issue with 

this Court’s previous conclusion that no fundamental error occurred. Wright 

believes that a concession by appellate counsel was self-serving because his 

counsel on direct appeal was his trial counsel and, consequently, his appellate 

counsel did not have an interest in admitting that he rendered ineffective assistance 

of counsel. However, we conclude that competent, substantial evidence supports 
- 54 -

the postconviction court’s finding that Wright cannot establish Strickland

prejudice. Here, the record supports the postconviction court’s findings that there 

was strong evidence of Wright’s guilt, including testimony of multiple confessions, 

the recovery of his fingerprints at the crime scene, and the recovery of blood of one 

of the victims from a shoe connected to Wright. As a result, even if we were to 

agree that Wright’s counsel were deficient for failing to object, our confidence in 

the verdict is not undermined by the comments in this case when they are placed in 

context of the overwhelming evidence of guilt. See Jones, 949 So. 2d at 1032. 

Thus, this claim fails. 

Cumulative Error

This Court has recognized under unique circumstances that “[w]here 

multiple errors are found, even if deemed harmless individually, ‘the cumulative 

effect of such errors’ may ‘deny to [the] defendant the fair and impartial trial that is 

the inalienable right of all litigants.’ ” See Hurst, 18 So. 3d at 1015 (citing Brooks 

v. State, 918 So. 2d 181, 202 (Fla. 2005) (quoting Jackson v. State, 575 So. 2d 181, 

189 (Fla. 1991))); see also McDuffie v. State, 970 So. 2d 312, 328 (Fla. 2007). 

However, this Court has repeatedly held that “where the individual claims of error 

alleged are either procedurally barred or without merit, the claim of cumulative 

error also necessarily fails.” Israel v. State, 985 So. 2d 510, 520 (Fla. 2008)

(quoting Parker v. State, 904 So. 2d 370, 380 (Fla. 2005)); see also Griffin v. State, 
- 55 -

866 So. 2d 1, 22 (Fla. 2003). In addition, individual claims that fail to meet the 

Strickland standard for ineffective assistance of counsel are also insufficient to 

establish cumulative error. See Israel, 985 So. 2d at 520. Moreover, claims of 

error that have previously been presented to this Court on direct appeal or in 

postconviction and subsequently rejected cannot form the basis for a valid claim of 

cumulative error. See Rogers v. State, 957 So. 2d 538, 555-56 (Fla. 2007) (citing 

Morris v. State, 931 So. 2d 821, 837 n.14 (Fla. 2006); Melendez v. State, 718 So. 

2d 746, 749 (Fla. 1998)). 

We affirm the postconviction court’s findings that Wright has not 

established that he was deprived of a fair trial due to cumulative errors. As 

discussed above, with regard to every claim, Wright has failed to demonstrate that 

the postconviction court erred in finding no Strickland error occurred. As a result, 

he has not alleged a basis for cumulative error. 

CONCLUSION

We affirm the postconviction court’s denial of Wright’s renewed motion for 

determination of intellectual disability and the postconviction court’s order 

denying Wright’s rule 3.851 motion. We also determine that Wright is not entitled 

to relief pursuant to Hurst v. Florida.

It is so ordered.

LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, and PERRY, JJ., concur.

CANADY and POLSTON, JJ., concur in result.
- 56 -

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 

IF FILED, DETERMINED.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Polk County, 

Donald G. Jacobsen, Chief Judge - Case No. 532000CF002727A0XXXX

James Vincent Viggiano, Jr., Capital Collateral Regional Counsel-Middle Region, 

and Maria Christine Perinetti, Raheela Ahmed, and Donna Ellen Venable, 

Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel-Middle Region, Temple Terrace, 

Florida,

for Appellant

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; and Stephen D. Ake, 

Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida,

for Appellee