Wrecked marina, 

Ocean Springs, MS

Sun Herald photo
303

Lack of Situational Awareness

Federal Situational Awareness

Having an ability to “connect the dots” was a main goal during the creation of the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Th e Homeland Security Operations 

Center (HSOC) is a key element, designed to be “the nation’s nerve center for 

information sharing and domestic incident management.”1

 Hurricane Katrina was the 

HSOC’s fi rst major, public test, and it failed. At the federal level, there was a startling lack of 

situational awareness as Katrina came ashore. On the day of landfall, DHS ignored, disregarded, or simply failed to obtain readily available reports that would have – and should 

have – led to an understanding of the increasingly dire situation in New Orleans and the 

remainder of the Gulf Coast. 

DHS witnesses have off ered essentially two explanations for the lack of situational awareness on Monday, August 29. First, they fault Federal Emergency Management Agency’s 

(FEMA) former Director Michael Brown and his agency for failing to provide the HSOC 

with crucial information. Second, they invoke the “fog of war” metaphor and assert that 

confl icting reports rendered the HSOC unable to develop any sense of the “ground truth.”

Th ese are at best only partial explanations for the HSOC’s failure to understand the scope 

of the unfolding disaster. Brown did fail to forward critical information in his possession, 

which is inexcusable. However, the HSOC’s failure to obtain reports of breaches and massive fl ooding issued by the National Weather Service (NWS), the Army Corps of Engineers, 

and the media, was unrelated to anything Brown or FEMA did or did not do. Indeed, 

throughout the day of landfall the HSOC received reports – including from two DHS 

Protective Security Advisors (PSAs)2

 stationed in the region – that uniformly refl ected a 

growing catastrophe. To the extent these reports “confl icted,” it was only about the scope of 

the catastrophe described, not the existence of the catastrophe itself.

Th e failure to “connect the dots” is best captured by the situation report (“sitrep”) issued by 

the HSOC at 5 p.m. Central Time (all subsequent times Central) on Monday, August 29. 

During hurricanes and other signifi cant incidents, the HSOC issues sitreps at 5 a.m. and 5 

p.m. to many customers, including DHS leadership and the White House.3

 In crucial areas 

this sitrep was both incorrect and incomplete. It was incorrect in stating that “preliminary 

reports indicate the levees in New Orleans have not been breached; however, an assessment 

is still pending.”4

 In fact, most preliminary reports stated just the opposite. It was incomplete 

in stating generically that “fl ooding is reported in New Orleans,”5

 but failing to provide any 

detail about the widely reported scope of the fl ooding or the devastating results – for example, that residents were seeking refuge from rising water in their attics and on rooft ops.

In a dynamic situation such as Katrina, time was of the essence, as people were in desperate 

circumstances. It may never be known for certain how the lack of awareness contributed to 

the overall failure of the federal government to respond adequately in a timely manner. It is 

known, however, that the 5 p.m. sitrep was the last report DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff 

received on the day of landfall,6

 and he went to bed Monday night with the incorrect belief 

that the levees had not been breached and that Katrina had not done the worst that had 

been predicted.7

 Th is incorrect sitrep was also forwarded to the White House. Several days 

later President Bush later remarked that “I myself, thought we had dodged a bullet.”8

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304

Analysis of the Failure

Th e HSOC’s failure to maintain situational awareness during Katrina grew out of a lack of 

planning and fl awed analysis. Th ough plans for obtaining situational awareness are developed for events like the Superbowl and national political conventions, HSOC Director 

Matthew Broderick acknowledged that “there was no plan developed” for maintaining situational awareness during Katrina.9

Th is lack of planning led to numerous failings. Neither HSOC Director Broderick nor 

HSOC Deputy Director Frank DiFalco knew that DHS had a representative in New Orleans 

and another in the Louisiana State Police Emergency Operations Center in Baton Rouge 

sending reports to the HSOC. Indeed, on the day of landfall, the HSOC failed to recognize, 

or disregarded as unconfi rmed, many of the reports that it did receive. Th e HSOC similarly 

failed to obtain reports and information that it should have obtained. As the week progressed, situational awareness improved little if at all, evidenced most pointedly by DHS’s 

belated awareness of the thousands of people gathering at the Convention Center.

Th ere were also structural fl aws in the way the HSOC obtained information from other federal agencies and other sources. Th e twice-a-day HSOC sitreps contained information that, 

in most cases, was at least three and, oft en, fi ve or more hours old. During Katrina, FEMA 

input to the HSOC sitrep was due three hours before a sitrep was issued.10 FEMA’s internal 

deadline for submissions to the HSOC was, in turn, two hours earlier.11 Th us, by design a 

5 p.m. sitrep refl ected information that was at least fi ve hours old. 

Between sitreps, HSOC issued “Spot Reports” on breaking news. Starting at approximately 

6:35 p.m., the HSOC generated numerous Spot Reports accurately detailing the devastation 

in New Orleans. However, many of those who were on the e-mail distribution list for these 

Spot Reports, issued late into the night on Monday, appear not to have read them when they 

were received. Witnesses also explained that, as a general matter, they viewed the sitreps as 

more authoritative than the Spot Reports. Th ey testifi ed almost universally that they were not 

aware of the inundation of New Orleans until aft er the 5 a.m. sitrep Tuesday morning – 12 

or more hours aft er the HSOC began issuing the grave Spot Reports detailed below.

During the Day of Landfall, a Litany of Reports Stated that Levees 

Had Failed, and Detailed the Increasingly Severe Flooding

Prior to issuing the fl awed 5 p.m. sitrep, the HSOC issued two Spot Reports during the 

morning of landfall. One, at 8:25 a.m., was based on a press conference by New Orleans 

Mayor Ray Nagin and stated in part that water was coming over the levees in the Ninth 

Ward. Almost two hours later, at 10:22 a.m., the HSOC issued another Spot Report, including reports that water was rising at the National Guard’s Jackson Barracks in the Ninth 

Ward, adding that it was unknown whether this was the result of breaching or overtopping. 

It also stated that the 911 call centers in St. Bernard and Orleans Parishes had been shut 

down and evacuated. Ten minutes later, the information in this second Spot Report was 

also distributed in an e-mail to, among others, DHS Chief of Staff John Wood and Deputy 

Secretary Michael Jackson.

Th e Committee has discovered no other communications out of the HSOC prior to the 

5 p.m. sitrep. Both before and aft er the two morning Spot Reports, however, the HSOC 

received reports of levee breaches, levee overtopping, fl ooding, and people trapped on roofs. 

Equally troubling are the reports the HSOC apparently never received. As discussed below, 

some of this information was received by FEMA, but not forwarded in a timely way to the 

HSOC. However, the majority of this information was available from other sources, includ-
Lack of Situational Awareness

305

ing government agencies that have desks within the HSOC, and major media outlets. Th ese 

reports are described below, with the ones that the HSOC received highlighted in bold:

12

• At 8:14 a.m., the New Orleans National Weather Service offi ce reported a 

levee breach along the Industrial Canal.13

• At 9 a.m. on the morning of landfall, the HSOC received an e-mail from 

Louis Dabdoub, the PSA on the ground in New Orleans. Dabdoub’s report 

stated in part: “It is getting bad. Major fl ooding in some parts of the city. 

People are calling in for rescue saying they are trapped in attics, etc. Th at 

means water is 10 feet high there already. Trees are blowing down. Flooding 

is worsening every minute. ... Th e bad part has not hit here yet.”14

• At 9 a.m., the New Orleans NWS offi ce reported overtopping in Orleans and 

St. Bernard Parishes and “Extensive and life threatening storm surge fl ooding 

occurring along the Louisiana and Mississippi coast.”15

• At 9:36 a.m., Dabdoub sent another e-mail to the HSOC, reporting that 

“Th e lower parishes of La [Louisiana], Plaq[uemines] and St Bernard parish’s 

[sic] are under water.”16

• At 10:13 a.m., the White House Homeland Security Council issued a spot 

report – which appears not to have been sent to the HSOC – reporting that 

“fl ooding is signifi cant throughout the region and a levee in New Orleans has 

reportedly been breached sending 6-8 feet of water throughout the 9th Ward 

area of the city. Per the Governor, water is rising at 1 foot per hour and the New 

Orleans Mayor reports problems with a pumping station, causing fl ooding.”17

• At 10:17 a.m., PSA David Hunter, who was in the Louisiana State Police 

Emergency Operations Center (EOC), reported “continued heavy fl ooding 

in area of New Orleans just east of the Industrial Canal (9th Ward). ... Calls 

coming into state EOC from citizens trapped in their houses, some in the attics or on the roof. State National Guard HQs at Jackson Barracks has 5 feet 

of water in some of its buildings.”18

• At 10:41 a.m., the HSOC received a copy of an 8 a.m. “Katrina Brief” created by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), which stated, in 

part, that “the National Weather Service has reported that a levee broke on 

the Industrial Canal near the St. Bernard-Orleans Parish line, and 3 to 8 feet 

of fl ooding was possible. ... In the uptown area of New Orleans on the south 

shore of Lake Pontchartrain, fl oodwaters by [sic] have already intruded on the 

fi rst stories of some houses and some roads are impassable. ... Th ere is heavy 

street fl ooding throughout Orleans, St. Bernard, and Jeff erson parishes.”19

• At 11 a.m., the Louisiana State Police Emergency Operations Center issued a 

situation report which reported a breach of the levee on 17th Street Canal.20

• At 11:40 a.m., the New Orleans NWS offi ce issued one of the most stark 

warnings of the day: “Widespread fl ooding will continue across the parishes 

along the south shore of Lake Pontchartrain in the greater New Orleans area. 

... Th is continues to be an extremely life threatening situation. ... Th ose seeking refuge in attics and roof-tops are strongly urged to take the necessary tools 

for survival. For example ... those going into attics should try to take an axe 

or hatchet with them so they can cut their way onto the roof to avoid drowning 

should rising fl ood waters continue to rise into the attic.” (emphasis added).21
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306

• At 12:51 p.m., the HSOC received a Coast Guard “Status Update” which reported a “levee in New Orleans has been breached sending 3 to 8 feet of water 

into the 9th Ward area of the city.”22

• At 1:14 p.m., a PSA reported a “levee breach on the 17th St. Canal (the 

border between Orleans and Jeff erson Parishes) reported by the New Orleans 

Fire Dept.”23

• At 3:05 p.m., and then again at 3:10, 4:20, and 8:13, the New Orleans NWS 

offi ce issued a report stating that “extensive and life threatening storm surge 

fl ooding remains in progress at this time ... especially in the New Orleans area. 

... Widespread fl ooding has occurred and storm water runoff will exacerbate 

the problem.”24

• A 4 p.m. Situation Report issued by the NWS Southern Region Headquarters 

stating that “Very widespread and signifi cant fl ooding has occurred throughout the city of New Orleans ... Industrial Canal at Tennessee Street: levee has 

been breached ... 17th Street at Canal Blvd: levee has been breached – breach 

extends several 100 meters in length[;] Much of downtown and east New Orleans is underwater; depth unknown at this time.”25

• At 4 p.m., LOHSEP issued a situation report detailing three levee breaches: 

“St. Bernard & 9th Ward Levee breach (reported by Sewage & Water Board). 

... Haynes Blvd Pump Station Levee Breach (reported by Jackson Barracks) ... 

17th Street Canal levee breach, fl ooding Lakeview area.”26

• During the 4 p.m. hour, Fox News interviewed Ivor van Heerden, Director, 

Louisiana State University’s Center For the Study of Public Health Impacts 

of Hurricanes, who said that “the National Weather Service [is] reporting 

that one of the levees was breached, and obviously, as the reporters have said, 

there’s very, very signifi cant areas of New Orleans that did fl ood from the levee 

overtopping. In some areas we have about 11 feet of standing water. People 

have been forced out onto the roofs of their homes.”27

In addition to these reports, at 11 a.m., Brown, FEMA’s Acting Deputy Director Patrick 

Rhode, Secretary Chertoff , Deputy Secretary Jackson, White House Deputy Chief of Staff 

Joe Hagin, representatives of the aff ected states, and individuals from numerous federal 

agencies attended the video teleconference (VTC) that FEMA hosted daily during Katrina. 

During this call, which was monitored by a Senior Watch Offi cer at the HSOC, a National 

Hurricane Center hydrologist said “We have signifi cant fl ooding occurring right now, 

beyond the storm surge fl ooding.”28 “We are truly experiencing some devastation here,” 

Colonel Jeff Smith, Acting Deputy Director of the Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security 

and Emergency Preparedness, said. William Lokey, FEMA’s Federal Coordinating Offi cer 

(FCO), then the lead federal offi cial in Louisiana, echoed this: 

To give you an idea of what’s going on down there, there is eight to ten feet of 

water in St. Bernard Parish. In New Orleans Parish, we have got water in the 

eastern part. And down in the Ninth Ward that borders St. Bernard Parish, 

we’re going to have serious search and rescue eff orts that are going to need to 

take place once we can get back in. ... We are pretty much inundated right now, 

and our next priorities are going to be search and rescue and saving lives.29

During the call, Hagin asked about the status of the levees. Louisiana Governor Kathleen 

Blanco responded:
Lack of Situational Awareness

307

We keep getting reports in some places that maybe water is coming over the 

levees. We heard a report unconfi rmed. I think we have not breached the levee. 

We have not breached the levee at this point in time. Th at could change, but in 

some places we have fl oodwaters coming in New Orleans East and the line St. 

Bernard parish where we have waters that are eight to ten feet deep, and we have 

people swimming in there, that’s got a considerable amount of water itself.30

Governor Blanco also reported “maybe as many as 30 or more calls from people who are 

trapped.”31 It appears that neither Mayor Nagin nor anyone else in New Orleans was on 

this call.

It is diffi cult to understand why the 5 p.m. sitrep refl ected few of the facts – and none of the 

urgency – conveyed by these reports. It is inexcusable that it included no mention of the reports of levee breaches that the HSOC received. On the contrary, the sitrep conveyed a false 

impression that there were multiple and uncontradicted reports that the levees had held. 

In fact, extensive investigation has uncovered nothing beyond Governor Blanco’s qualifi ed 

statement on the noon VTC stating that the levees had held. All other reports received by 

the HSOC pointed to the contrary. 

The HSOC Failed Either to Obtain or to Recognize Crucial Reports

Th e apparent failure to obtain the NWS reports issued by the local offi ces is a particularly 

troubling example of how the HSOC’s failure to plan for Katrina manifested itself. Th ese 

reports contained some of the earliest indications of levee breaches and catastrophic fl ooding 

and were readily available – NWS’s parent agency, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration (NOAA), maintains a desk in the HSOC.32 When asked about these reports, 

Broderick suggested that they may not have been obtained because they were issued by local 

Caught in rising waters, 

New Orleans

Photo © 2005 The Times-Picayune 

Publishing Co., all rights reserved. Used 

with permission of the Times-Picayune
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NWS stations. He did not know whether anyone at the HSOC was responsible for monitoring local weather stations during a major weather event. Common-sense steps such as 

identifying and monitoring local sources of information – particularly ones run by the federal government – would seem an obvious course of action for the HSOC in the days before 

landfall. And yet, no one within the HSOC appears to have given this any thought.

It is equally troubling that both Broderick and the HSOC Deputy Director DiFalco did not 

know of the reports of breaches and massive fl ooding that did come in during the day. Neither knew that two PSAs were on the ground submitting reports, nor were they aware of the 

Transportation Security Administration and the Coast Guard reports received. Th e 4 p.m. 

sitrep issued by the NWS Southern Region Headquarters, which included details of two major breaches, is similarly noteworthy. Th ough it was received in the HSOC – and forwarded 

from the Department of Defense desk in HSOC to senior Pentagon offi cials at 5:25 p.m. on 

the day of landfall33 – it apparently went unnoticed by HSOC leadership that night. Both 

the importance and the perceived reliability of this report are underscored by the fact that 

the HSOC’s Tuesday morning (5 a.m.) sitrep included verbatim reports of levee breaches 

and fl ooding from this then-13-hour-old 4 p.m. report. Th is NWS sitrep makes all the more 

inexplicable the HSOC’s inaccurate 5 p.m. sitrep.

Th e attitude of the HSOC and DHS leadership toward media reports was, at best, contradictory. On one hand, HSOC witnesses expressed an understandable reluctance to rely on 

media reports, which oft en carry outdated or preliminary information during an evolving 

event.34 On the other hand, Broderick relied on media reports in concluding that the situation in New Orleans was not catastrophic on Monday night: “Th e only one data point that 

I really had, personally, visually, was the celebration in the streets of New Orleans of people 

drinking beer and partying.”35 It is diffi cult to understand why DHS offi cials would fi nd the 

credibility of alarming news reports suspect, but have no such hesitation taking comfort in 

media stories that, superfi cially at least, suggested that the situation was stable. 

After the 5 p.m. Sitrep, the HSOC Issued Three Reports Refl ecting 

the Growing Catastrophe, But DHS Leadership Did Not Read or Did 

Not Understand Them

Aft er the 5 p.m. sitrep, reports of the increasingly dire situation in New Orleans continued. 

Many were received by the HSOC, and, indeed, the HSOC issued three Spot Reports that 

detailed levee breaches and extensive fl ooding. Th ese reports included:

• At 5:08 p.m., an American Red Cross Situation Report received by the HSOC 

stated in part, “Reports of fl ooding vary based on region with some levees in 

new Orleans reportedly breeched [sic]. Extensive fl ooding in the Lower 9th 

Board [sic] and St. Bernard Parish may be a result of water going over the tops 

of the levees.”36

• At 6 p.m., CNN’s Jeanne Meserve reported “a scene of utter devastation. In 

an entire neighborhood, water has come up to the eaves of the houses and [I] 

am told this is not the worst of it. Th at beyond this, part of the upper Ninth 

Ward, I'm told the main part of the ward further down is even worse. Th e water is over the houses. Th is is a life and death situation. I think by the end of the 

night we're going to fi nd a lot more death than we ever imagined.”37

• A 6:35 p.m. Spot Report issued by the HSOC was based on information 

received at some earlier time from the Corps of Engineers. It stated, in part, “A 

small breach reported at 17 Street Canal by local fi remen. ... Report that Dun-
Lack of Situational Awareness

309

can Pumping Station and Bonnebelle Pumping Station suff ered roof damage, 

inundation of pumps, and are not operating at this time. Reported overtoppings of levee near Arabi and Inner Harbor Navigation Canal. Some level of 

widespread fl ooding has occurred. Report there has been a breach of the levee 

in the east of Harvey Canal, west bank area.”38

• A Situation Report issued at 7:34 p.m. by the Corps of Engineers described 

major fl ooding in New Orleans and stated, “All Jeff erson and Orleans Parish 

Pumping Stations are inoperable as of 29 Aug.”39

• At 8 p.m. on CNN’s Larry King Live, Brown said, “Th is is a catastrophic disaster. I’ve just started getting reconnaissance reports from my folks in the fi eld 

and I’m anticipating now that I’m going to have to prepare for housing at least 

tens of thousands of victims that are going to be without homes for literally 

months on end. ... FEMA folks who have been with the agency for, you know, 

15 or 20 years, ... call in and talk about how this is the worst fl ooding they’ve 

ever seen in their entire lives and talking about just neighborhoods aft er neighborhoods gone.”40

• At 8:30 p.m., PSA Hunter reported “widespread fl ooding, and some suspected fatalities (bodies spotted fl oating in water) in an area of town near the Industrial Canal. Th e fl ooding cannot be alleviated due to the large water pumps 

which normally keep the city dry being out of service.”41

• A 9:30 p.m. Spot Report based on two overfl ights of New Orleans by Marty 

Bahamonde, the only FEMA offi cial in the city, said in part, “Th ere is a quarter-mile breech [sic] in the levee near the 17th Street Canal about 200 yards 

from Lake Pontchartrain allowing water to fl ow into the City. ... Only one of 

the main pumps is reported to still be working but cannot keep up with the 

demand and its longevity is doubtful ... an estimated 2/3 to 75% of the city is 

under water. ... Hundreds of people were observed on the balconies and roofs 

of a major apartment complex in the city. ... A few bodies were seen fl oating in 

the water and Coast Guard pilots also reported seeing bodies but there are no 

details on locations or numbers.”42

• At 10 p.m., MSNBC interviewed Lieutenant Kevin Cowan, Louisiana Offi ce of Emergency Preparedness, who said, “Th ere’s a lot of heavy rain. Th ere 

was some breaching of the levee system that pushed the water into St. Bernard 

Parish and into New Orleans proper itself, fl ooding neighborhoods. Streets 

are completely fl ooded. ... Th ere were some breaches where water was pushed 

over the top. I am sure there were areas that the levee did fail. We haven’t gotten complete reports.”43

• At 10:47 p.m., a Spot Report reporting that “According to Remote Sensing 

Imagery and available Census data, approximately 136,000 housing units in 

New Orleans have been impacted by fl ooding.”44

Th ough the three Spot Reports listed above were widely distributed by e-mail,45 few DHS 

witnesses recalled seeing them. Despite the fact that it was late at night and that Secretary 

Chertoff did not use e-mail, the HSOC made no eff ort to ensure that DHS leadership or 

the White House actually reviewed and understood the messages, or that they received this 

critical information in another form.46
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Nearly all DHS witnesses, including those who were on the distribution list for the Spot 

Reports, testifi ed that they did not know that the levees failed or that New Orleans was suffering catastrophic fl ooding until Tuesday morning. Many still did not know that the levees 

had breached and the city fl ooded on Monday as Katrina came ashore.47 When shown these 

three Spot Reports, DHS witnesses consistently attempted to minimize their import, claiming that they were unconfi rmed, confl icting, or unreliable.48

Th e attitude of DHS witnesses toward reports of fl ooding was also surprising. From the 

time Friday aft ernoon when forecasts put New Orleans in the bull’s-eye of the storm, every 

indication was that Katrina could cause horrifi c devastation.49 Yet time and again, DHS 

witnesses suggested that the reports of fl ooding received during the day were “typical,” 

“expected,” “standard,” and the “normal, typical hurricane background stuff .”50 While such 

a reaction might be understandable in a “typical” hurricane, in light of all that was known 

about Katrina’s power and the risks peculiar to New Orleans, these reports warranted a 

greater level of concern.

Moreover, in addition to these widely distributed reports, on Monday evening, FEMA Acting Deputy Director Patrick Rhode spoke with Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson to update 

The Superdome, cut off

AP/Wide World photo
Lack of Situational Awareness

311

him on the deteriorating situation.51 Later that night, both Wood and Jackson received emails about Bahamonde’s overfl ight of New Orleans. At 8:29 p.m., Wood received an e-mail 

from a DHS public-aff airs offi cial, which related that “the fi rst (unconfi rmed) reports they 

are getting from aerial surveys in New Orleans are far more serious than media reports are 

currently refl ecting. Finding extensive fl ooding and more stranded people than they had 

originally thought – also a number of fi res.”52

At 10:05 p.m., Jackson received an e-mail from Rhode summarizing many of the same 

observations from Bahamonde’s overfl ight that had already been reported to the HSOC, 

including that there was a 200-yard-long failure of one levee and that most of the city was 

fl ooded. Neither recalled seeing the e-mails that night. In sum, there is no evidence that 

overnight Monday into Tuesday any senior DHS offi cial saw the reports that would have 

informed them that Katrina was a catastrophe of unprecedented dimensions.

Continued Failure of Situational Awareness – 

the Convention Center

In many regards, DHS’s situational awareness did not improve as the week went on. Th e 

situation at the Convention Center in New Orleans provided the most striking illustration 

of this. Despite media reports on Wednesday night and video Th ursday morning of thousands of people at the Convention Center53 – and no later than shortly aft er noon, images of 

two dead bodies54 – HSOC reports do not even mention the situation until Friday morning. Secretary Chertoff himself learned about the Convention Center from an NPR reporter 

at 1 p.m. on Th ursday.55 During that interview, the Secretary initially tried to dismiss the 

reporter’s questions about the Convention Center as “a rumor or you get someone’s anecdotal version of something.”56

Witnesses have off ered no satisfactory explanation of how this breakdown occurred. 

Broderick testifi ed fi rst hearing reports of thousands at the Convention Center on Wednesday evening. However, “We actually and initially were confusing the Superdome with the 

Convention Center. We didn’t realize that it was a separate entity. Even on Th ursday, we 

were sorting it out.”57 On Th ursday, he dispatched Wendell Shingler, the Director of the 

Federal Protective Services (FPS), to investigate. Broderick testifi ed that Shingler arrived 

that evening and reported that there were approximately a thousand people gathered at the 

Convention Center, that food and water was available, and that New Orleans police were 

present. Broderick believes that Shingler failed to appreciate the true size of the Convention 

Center. Because media reports persisted, Broderick sent Shingler back Friday morning, at 

which point the accurate report of thousands stranded came back.58

Th e failure of DHS, and the HSOC in particular, to take note of ubiquitous media reports 

of the situation at the Convention Center is disturbing. Skepticism toward media reports in 

a crisis situation makes sense, but these were backed up by video, and media-based reports 

to DHS leadership and the White House could have included appropriate caveats. Instead, 

DHS and the HSOC did not forward media reports, which left the country’s leadership woefully uninformed.

FEMA Failed to Forward Information to the HSOC on a Timely Basis

DHS witnesses were uniform in their criticism of FEMA, and Brown in particular, for failing to provide crucial information to DHS and the HSOC on a timely basis. Th is criticism, 

while warranted, does not completely account for HSOC’s inadequate situational awareness. While Brown and FEMA should have kept the HSOC better informed of develop-
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ments on the ground, the HSOC never should have depended exclusively on FEMA for 

information. Moreover, as detailed above, it did not. Reports were actually arriving, and 

others were available, from plenty of other credible sources.

Nevertheless, the FEMA leadership appears to have failed to send critical information to 

DHS and the HSOC. Th ough Brown testifi ed that he provided reports to the White House 

at several points during the day of landfall, he did not call Secretary Chertoff because in 

his view, “It would have wasted my time.”59 He appears not to have communicated with 

the HSOC at all about conditions on the ground. It appears also that several signifi cant 

e-mails were not forwarded to the HSOC.60 Th ese included a series of e-mails between 8:36 

and 9:19 a.m. containing reports: from a member of FEMA’s liaison team at the National 

Hurricane Center, that the Industrial Canal levee had failed; a summary of a report from 

Marty Bahamonde, the FEMA offi cial, that detailed severe fl ooding, people trapped in attics, 

and failing pumps;61 and a 10:51 a.m. e-mail to FEMA’s Deputy Director of Response with 

Bahamonde’s news that the New Orleans Fire Department was reporting a 20-foot-wide 

breach in the 17th Street levee.62

Brown’s testimony made clear that he purposely refused to provide updates to the HSOC 

and to Secretary Chertoff . Th ough Broderick testifi ed that he believed that FEMA intentionally limited its reports,63 investigation found no independent evidence to support this, and 

it does not appear that Lokey, Rhode, or others in FEMA did so. To the contrary, Lokey 

testifi ed that “Michael Brown did not tell me to [in] any way, shape, or form stop any fl ow 

of information” and that he was not aware of any other limitation on the transmission of 

information to the HSOC.64 Rhode sent several e-mails to, and had at least one phone conversation with, Jackson on Monday. Finally, nine of the Spot Reports issued by the HSOC 

on Monday were ascribed to FEMA, a clear indication that there was a steady information 

fl ow from FEMA’s National Response Coordination Center into the HSOC.

Conclusion

Th e HSOC did not devise and implement a system to ensure access to all signifi cant, 

relevant information that became available as Katrina neared and then landed on the 

Gulf Coast. Compounding the problem, even though the HSOC had enough information 

by late Monday aft ernoon to conclude that the levees had failed, it issued a key situation 

report that refl ected and propagated incorrectly optimistic information about conditions 

in New Orleans. 

Situational Awareness of Louisiana State Offi cials

Louisiana should have had a much easier time maintaining situational awareness than the 

federal government. In contrast to DHS, which was operating out of Washington, D.C., 

Louisiana’s Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was in Baton Rouge, close to the primary 

hurricane impact area, and there were thousands of National Guard troops and other state 

and local offi cials on the ground in southeast Louisiana before, during, and aft er landfall to 

feed information. Nonetheless, while Louisiana avoided some of the obvious failures of the 

federal government, its record of maintaining situational awareness was mixed, at best.

Th e Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP) 

addressed situational awareness in its Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). Th e SOP 

identifi ed guiding principles for information handling, including, “Th e prompt capture, 

assessment and rapid dissemination of information within the EOC contributes markedly 

to quick response and eff ective decision making during an emergency.”65 It also required 
Lack of Situational Awareness

313

“all personnel involved in the emergency” to “aggressively seek the status of these items as 

quickly as possible ... before, during and aft er an event” and to report it to the EOC.66

In fact, fi rst responders and others in the area aff ected by Katrina needed little encouragement to pass on information to the state EOC, since they relied heavily on the EOC to 

process their requests for assistance. But information came from numerous other sources as 

well, including National Guard on-the ground and fl y-over reports,67 Louisiana State Police 

reports,68 and media coverage.69 Some information even came from callers in other states. 

LOHSEP compiled the data fl ow into situation reports that were updated several times a 

day.70 Topics included weather, status and staffi ng of the emergency operations center, data 

on injuries and fatalities, shelter populations, status of nursing homes and hospitals, road 

closures, utility and communications outages, and status of response missions. Naturally, 

the length of these sitreps grew dramatically as the response progressed. For example, 

a LOHSEP sitrep at 10 a.m. on Sunday, the day before landfall, ran just nine pages; by 

Wednesday evening, the report was 75 pages.71 Senior offi cials at LOHSEP did not have to 

rely solely on sitreps, as they also received a steady stream of information from emergencymanagement offi cials on the ground.

72

LOHSEP was not alone in having an information-gathering strategy in the state. Th e Louisiana National Guard, which supplied information to LOHSEP, also had an information 

network to meet its own needs. Th e senior Guard offi cial in Louisiana, Major General Bennett Landreneau, was stationed with the Governor in the LOHSEP command room.73 As 

the hurricane approached, the command staff directed 10 air-squadron operations-support 

teams and troops on the ground to report to the Joint Operations Command at the Superdome every two hours.74 In addition, they stationed liaison offi cers with radio equipment 

at local parish offi ces, and held their own series of conference calls with parish emergencysupport offi cials throughout the night before landfall to monitor the hurricane’s eff ects.75

However, these elaborate information-gathering systems did not prevent serious breakdowns in the state’s situational awareness. One notable example was Governor Blanco 

herself, who evidently was unaware of earlier reports of levee breaches when she made her 

statement to state and federal offi cials in the noon video teleconference on the day before 

landfall that “We have not breached the levee at this point in time.”76 Th is was a particularly 

unfortunate misstatement, as it may have contributed to the federal government’s confusion 

about the status of the levees. Th e record does not indicate when she learned her statement 

was inaccurate, or whether she made any attempt to inform the state and federal offi cials on 

the video teleconference, including the White House deputy chief of staff , of her mistake. 

Th e state’s response was also hampered by a lack of information about the locations of 

people in distress. For example, the state was slow to learn about people brought by searchand-rescue teams to the major highway intersection in west New Orleans known as the 

Cloverleaf.77 Similarly, LOHSEP did not learn about people assembling at the Convention 

Center until well aft er crowds amassed there. Mayor Nagin bears some of the blame for the 

delay, as he apparently failed to inform other offi cials when he decided, on Tuesday, August 

30, to open the Convention Center as a shelter when the Superdome became overcrowded.78

Just the same, it was striking to hear the LOHSEP operations manager, Colonel William 

Doran, testify that his information on that situation was limited to what he saw on TV and 

occasional reports from security offi cers.79

Th e National Guard, which took charge of the Convention Center on Friday, September 2, 

learned about the situation there inadvertently. Brigadier General Gary Jones of Louisiana, 

Joint Force Commander of all National Guard troops involved in the Katrina operation, 

said, “We had no knowledge of [the people there] until we sent out reconnaissance patrols 
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[on August 31], and those reconnaissance patrols came back and said, ‘Oh, by the way, it 

looks like you’ve got another group of about 15,000 sitting over there.’”80

Lack of situational awareness contributed to problems in Louisiana in distributing food, 

water, and other commodities. In particular, logistics managers expressed frustration at not 

knowing when commodities were shipped or when they arrived.81 (See Chapter 23, Logistics.)

While lack of incoming information left LOHSEP unaware of important developments, in 

some cases the fault lay with LOHSEP’s inability to process the information it did receive. 

As Lt. Col. Doran testifi ed, LOHSEP was simply not equipped for the volume of information it needed to assess:

It may have been just for the fact that we were, again, rapidly overwhelmed to 

be able to target what information is good, what is not, the amount of information coming in. It’s just like in intelligence, you get an amount of information 

and then you have to sift through to fi nd out what’s good information, what’s 

bad, and what is factual, what’s not. Th en you have to prioritize.82

Th e state also lacked systems to organize incoming information in a manner that was useful for emergency response, making it necessary in some cases to improvise those systems 

on the fl y. A notable example was information about the location of the large numbers of 

people calling in on 911 lines. Assuming the many 911 calls it received were requests for 

rescue, LOHSEP, with no plans for managing the callers’ information, transferred them to 

the Louisiana Department of Wildlife & Fisheries (W&F) representative on staff . With help 

from the Louisiana Geological Survey, a research institution within Louisiana State University, a W&F representative named Robbie Duthu developed a system to plot incoming calls 

on a map that was forwarded to search-and-rescue personnel daily.83

1 On its Web site, DHS says the HSOC “serves as the nation’s nerve center for information sharing and domestic 

incident management. ... Th e HSOC is in constant communication with the White House, acting as the situational 

awareness conduit for the White House Situation Room by providing information needed to make decisions and 

defi ne courses of action.” U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Fact Sheet: Homeland Security Operations Center 

(HSOC),” press release, July 8, 2004. http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/press_release/press_release_0456.xml. 

Accessed on Mar. 8, 2006.

2 PSAs are within the Infrastructure Protection Offi ce at DHS, and there are approximately 68 spread around the country. 

DHS’s Web site describes PSAs as “Homeland security experts identifi ed in major metropolitan communities across the 

country to serve as liaisons between the Department and other partners on issues of critical infrastructure protection.” U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security, “Fact Sheet: Key Priorities Update March 1, 2004 – March 1, 2005,” press release, Mar. 

2004. http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=43&content=4279&pring=true. Accessed on Apr. 12, 2006.

3 Th e morning sitreps are included in the DHS Secretary’s briefi ng book.

4 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), National Situation Report, Aug. 29, 2005, 6 p.m., p. 1. Provided to 

Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS 0001181.

5 FEMA, National Situation Report, Aug. 29, 2005, 6 p.m., p. 13. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS 

0001193.

6 In his answer to one of Senator Lieberman’s Questions for the Record submitted aft er Secretary Chertoff ’s appearance 

before the Committee on Feb. 15, 2006, the Secretary wrote, “Th e last report I received on Monday evening from the 

HSOC stated that preliminary reports had indicated the levees had not been breached, and that the situation was still being assessed.” Th is is almost a direct quote from the 6 p.m. sitrep. Questions for the Record of Sec. Michael Chertoff , U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security, for the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, 

hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Homeland Security Department’s Preparation and Response, Feb. 15, 2006, p. 51.

7 Testimony of Sec. Michael Chertoff , U.S. Department of Homeland Security, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on 

Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Homeland Security Department’s 

Preparation and Response, Feb. 15, 2006.

8 President George W. Bush, “President, Lieutenant General Honoré Discuss Hurricane Relief in Louisiana,” press 
Lack of Situational Awareness

315

release, Sept. 12, 2005. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/20050912.html. Accessed on Mar. 8, 2006.

9 Committee staff interview of Brig. Gen. Matthew Broderick, Director, Homeland Security Operations Center, U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security, conducted on Jan. 19, 2006, transcript pp. 81-82. 

10 Brig. Gen. Broderick interview, Jan. 19, 2006, p. 37.

11 Committee staff interview of Richard Gray, Team Leader, Information and Assessment Team and Team Leader, 

National Response Coordination Center, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 20, 2006, transcript p. 85.

12 DHS produced to the Committee documents from the Senior Watch Offi cer (SWO) at the HSOC on the day of 

landfall but did not produce documents from the individual desk offi cers at the HSOC. Because of this refusal – and 

because all but one of the bolded reports listed below was found somewhere other than in the SWO e-mails – the Committee does not, and cannot, represent that these bolded reports are the entirety of those received by the HSOC on the 

day of landfall. Th ere are numerous other reports that the Committee believes may have reached the HSOC, but absent 

complete production, there was no way to determine if in fact they were received.

13 National Weather Service, New Orleans-Baton Rouge, LA Offi ce, Flash Flood Warning, Aug. 29, 2005, 8:14 a.m. CT. 

Provided to Committee.

14 Louis Dabdoub, e-mail to Michael Waters and others, Aug. 29, 2005, 9 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 

DHS-INFP-0003-0001768.

15 National Weather Service, New Orleans-Baton Rouge, LA Offi ce, Hurricane Katrina Local Statement, Aug. 29, 2005, 9 

a.m. CT. Provided to Committee. 

16 Louis Dabdoub, e-mail to Michael Waters and others, Aug. 29, 2005, 9:36 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

no. DHS-INFP-0003-0001768.

17 Daniel Kaniewski, e-mail to Dan Bartlett and others, Aug. 29, 2005, 11:13 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

no. 004795. Elsewhere this document cites the HSOC as reporting that “due to the rising water in the 9th Ward, residents are in their attics and on their roofs.”

18 Francis Patno, e-mail to Ira Stern and others, Sept. 1, 2005, 9:54 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHSINFP-0003-0001497, 0001499.

19 Darryl Mahoney, e-mail to HSOC.HSIN and others, Aug. 29, 2005, 11:41 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

no. DHS-HSOC-0002-0000186.

20 Louisiana State Police, Emergency Operations Center, Hurricane Katrina Situation Report, Aug. 29, 2005, 11 a.m. 

Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. 000001 through 000004.

21 National Weather Service, New Orleans-Baton Rouge, LA Offi ce, issued by Mobile, AL Offi ce, Flash Flood Warning, 

Aug. 29, 2005, 11:40 a.m. CT. Provided to Committee. 

22 Lt. Robert Walls, e-mail to LANTHMHLS Watch and others, Aug. 29, 2005, 1:51 p.m. Provided to Committee.

23 Francis Patno, e-mail to Ira Stern and others, Sept. 1, 2005, 9:54 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHSINFP-0003-0001497, 0001500.

24 National Weather Service, New Orleans-Baton Rouge, LA Offi ce, Hurricane Katrina Local Statement, Aug. 29, 2005, 

3:05 p.m. CT. Provided to Committee; National Weather Service, New Orleans – Baton Rouge, LA Offi ce, Hurricane 

Katrina Local Statement, Aug. 29, 2005, 3:10 p.m. CT. Provided to Committee; National Weather Service, New Orleans 

– Baton Rouge, LA Offi ce, issued by Mobile, AL Offi ce, Hurricane Katrina Local Statement, Aug. 29, 2005, 4:20 p.m. CT. 

Provided to Committee; National Weather Service, New Orleans – Baton Rouge, LA Offi ce, issued by Mobile, AL Offi ce, 

Hurricane Katrina Local Statement, Aug. 29, 2005, 8:13 p.m. CT. Provided to Committee.

25 Anthony Capra, e-mail to DoD.DomesticIncidentManagement, Aug. 29, 2005, 5:25 p.m. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as MMTF 00418-05. Th e receiver of this e-mail was redacted. In an e-mail to investigators, Col. Dave Rhodes states 

that the prior e-mail was sent to the above e-mail distribution list. Col. Dave Rhodes, e-mail to Tom Eldridge, Dan 

Berkovitz, and Eric Andersen, Senate Committee staff members, Apr. 19, 2006, 10:36 a.m. 

26 Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (LOHSEP), Sitrep, Executive Summary, Hurricane Katrina, Aug. 29, 2005, 4 p.m. CT. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS-FEMA-0028-0001109, 0001138

27 Ivor van Heerden, Live Event, Fox News Network, “Special Coverage: Hurricane Katrina Pounds New Orleans,” Aug. 

29, 2005, 5 p.m. ET. Transcript accessed on LexisNexis.

28 John Schmidt, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 29, 2005, transcript pp. 9-10. Provided to Committee.

29 William Lokey, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 29, 2005, transcript pp. 17-18. Provided to Committee. 

30 Gov. Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 29, 2006, transcript pp. 20-21. Provided to 

Committee. In his responses to the Committee’s Questions for the Record, Secretary Chertoff repeatedly references Governor Blanco’s statement regarding the levees. Questions for the Record of Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 

15, 2006, pp. 9, 15, 47, 48, 51, 81. As we now know, this statement was incorrect when it was made – reports coming into 

both the Louisiana State Emergency Operations Center and the HSOC detailed that the levees had breached. Moreover, 

this noon statement does not somehow contradict the many later reports of breaches that came in from varied sources.

31 Robert Latham, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 29, 2005, transcript. 22. Provided to Committee. Reports 

from Mississippi during the VTC were no less ominous. Max Mayfi eld accurately stated that the storm surge in the 
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Biloxi area would be “very, very devastating.” Source: Mayfi eld, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 29, 2005, 

transcript p. 5. Latham, Director of the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency, stated “It certainly looks like it is a 

catastrophic event that we all expected” and reported that the Hancock County Emergency Operations Center collapsed 

while the Jackson County Emergency Operations Center was fl ooded. Source: Latham, VTC, Aug. 29, 2005, pp. 22-23. 

He also reported calls from “citizens who are trapped in the second fl oor of their homes, in the attics of their homes and 

roofs, and we cannot get to them.” Source: Latham, VTC, Aug. 29, 2005, pp. 22-23. Th e historic scope of the unfolding 

disaster was clear to him: “I suspect that the history books, that this event will replace Camille as far as Mississippi is 

concerned.” Source: Latham, VTC, Aug. 29, 2005, p. 24.

32 Brig. Gen. Broderick interview, Jan. 19, 2006, p. 84. Th ough this investigation uncovered no evidence of anyone at 

the HSOC or DHS being aware of these NWS reports, it is possible that these reports were received or reviewed by the 

NOAA desk at the HSOC. However, because DHS refused to produce e-mails from this desk we were unable to determine if in fact this happened. Th us, we consider these to be reports that HSOC failed to obtain. However, if in fact the 

HSOC did obtain these reports, they would simply be added to the long list of reports that the HSOC received but failed 

to understand or appreciate. 

33 Anthony Capra, e-mail to DoD.DomesticIncidentManagement distribution list, Aug. 29, 2005, 5:25 p.m. Provided to 

Committee; fi led as MMTF00418-05. Th e receiver of this e-mail was redacted. In an e-mail to investigators, Col. Dave 

Rhodes states that the prior e-mail was sent to the above e-mail distribution list. Source: Col. Dave Rhodes, e-mail to 

Tom Eldridge, Senate Committee staff member, and others, Apr. 19, 2006, 10:36 a.m.; Anthony Capra, e-mail to Paul 

McHale, Aug. 29, 2005, 5:25 p.m. ET. Provided to Committee.

34 While media reports are oft en not the most reliable, during interviews some witnesses went to illogical lengths in 

trying to explain why the media was not to be trusted. For instance, when shown the front page of the August 30, 2005, 

New Orleans Times-Picayune (posted online at 2:43 a.m. CT) – which showed an elderly man being rescued from his 

home in chest-deep water – Broderick said, “You know, this could be one house fl ooded, and the houses around it aren’t 

even touched.” Brig. Gen. Broderick interview, Jan. 19, 2006, pp. 166-167.

35 Brig. Gen. Broderick interview, Jan. 19, 2006, pp. 130-131.

36 Eric Jones, e-mail to Eric Jones and others, Aug. 29, 2005, 6:08 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. WHK06494 through 06499.

37 Jean Meserve, Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees, CNN, “Hurricane Katrina Slams Gulf Coast,” Aug. 29, 2005, 7 p.m. ET. 

Transcript accessed on LexisNexis.

38 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, HSOC Spot Report #7, Aug. 29, 2005, 7:35 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led 

as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0055-0007575. 

39 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Situation Report #3, Aug. 30, 2006, 0034 Z. Provided to Committee.

40 Michael Brown, Larry King Live, CNN, “Tracking Hurricane Katrina,” Aug. 29, 2005, 9 p.m. ET. Transcript accessed 

on LexisNexis.

41 Francis Patno, e-mail to Ira Stern and others, Sept. 1, 2005, 9:54 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHSINFP-0003-0001497, 0001502.

42 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, HSOC Spot Report #13, Aug. 29, 2005, 10:30 p.m. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates nos. DHS-HSOC-0004-0005521 through 0005522. 

43 Lt. Kevin Cowen, Th e Situation with Tucker Carlson, MSNBC, “Th e Situation for August 29, 2005,” Aug. 29, 2005, 11 

p.m. ET. Transcript accessed on LexisNexis.

44 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, HSOC Spot Report #12, Aug. 29, 2005, 11:47 p.m. Provided to Committee; 

fi led as Bates no. DHS-FEMA-0055-0007581.

45 All reports appear to have gone to multiple desks in the HSOC as well as to Secretary Chertoff ’s briefi ng staff . Beyond 

this group, distribution lists for reports added diff erent offi cials. For example, the Spot Report detailing Marty Bahamonde’s overfl ight went to, among others, Deputy Secretary Jackson, Chief of Staff Wood, Secretary Chertoff ’s military 

aide, Broderick, Stephan, and the White House Situation Room and individuals within the White House Homeland 

Security Council.

46 In response to one of Senator Collins’ Questions for the Record submitted aft er Secretary Chertoff ’s appearance 

before the Committee on February 15, 2006, the Secretary was critical of just such a reliance on e-mails to communicate important information. Specifi cally, he criticized FEMA Acting Deputy Director Patrick Rhode for using e-mail to 

provide a report of the Bahamonde overfl ight to Deputy Secretary Jackson: “E-mails are not the most appropriate way of 

conveying urgent or important information, especially late at night. Instead, the right course would have been to notify 

the HSOC, which reaches both the Deputy Secretary and me by telephone at any time of day or night.” Source: Questions 

for the Record of Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 2006, p. 10; See also: Questions for the Record of Sec. 

Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 2006, p. 50 (“Th e best means of communicating important information 

with high-ranking offi cials was by telephone call to the HSOC, who could reach me any time of the day or night, not via 

e-mail.”). In fact, in the case of the Rhode e-mail, the HSOC had already been informed of the Bahamonde overfl ight, 

evidenced by the HSOC Spot Report detailing the report that is time-stamped 10:30 p.m., 35 minutes before the Rhode 

e-mail. Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, HSOC Spot Report #13, Aug. 29, 2005, 10:30 p.m. Provided to 

Committee; fi led as Bates no. DHS-HSOC-0004-0005521 through 0005522. However, the same is not true of the three 

Spot Reports (Spot Report numbers 7, 13, and 12 issued at 6:35, 9:30, and 10:47 CT respectively.) – no eff orts were made 

by HSOC offi cials to call or otherwise ensure that senior offi cials received these critical reports. Source: Brig. Gen. Brod-
Lack of Situational Awareness

317

erick interview, Jan. 19, 2006, pp. 168-169. 

47 Committee staff interview of Robert Stephan, Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for Infrastructure Protection, 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, conducted on Jan. 13, 2006, transcript pp. 115-116 (“I still am not convinced 

that it was a known fact that there were widespread levee breaches or gaps or massive fl ooding happening some time 

on Monday.”); Brig. Gen. Broderick interview, Jan. 19, 2006, pp. 129-130 (“But the doomsday scenario of New Orleans, 

the levees breaking and tons of water going in and washing people away did not happen, and the people of New Orleans 

and the State and everyone else kind of breathed a sigh of relief. Th at later on, those failures started occurring at greater 

lengths on that levee system, and that’s when the preponderance of water, as I understand it, started coming in was 

in the middle of the night.”); Committee staff interview of Frank DiFalco, then-Deputy Director, Homeland Security 

Operations Center, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, conducted on Jan. 13, 2006, transcript p. 121 (“Q: Do you 

know now that the levees breached on Monday? A: I don’t know if they breached Monday.”).

48 Brig. Gen. Broderick interview, Jan. 19, 2006, p. 163 (Describing the spot report of the Bahamonde overfl ight as “not 

an excitable report to me. It’s of interest, and if I had received it, I’d go back and drill down and ask for some more 

clarity.”); Brig. Gen. Broderick interview, Jan. 19, 2006, pp. 159-160 (stating that because the 6 p.m. sitrep reported no 

breaches, the 7:35 p.m. Spot Report “wouldn’t have gotten me excited”); Brig. Gen. Broderick interview, Jan. 19, 2006, 

pp. 165-166 (questioning the 11:47 spot report which stated that 136,000 homes had been aff ected by fl ooding: “I mean, 

who says 136,000 houses. Did someone count all of them, or is that someone’s wild guess?”); Stephan interview, Jan. 13, 

2006, p. 35 (stating, aft er reviewing the spot report of the Bahamonde overfl ight, “[I did] not know what a breach on 

this particular section of New Orleans means to the overall, you know, picture”); Stephan interview, Jan. 13, 2006, p. 39 

(even aft er the spot report of the Bahamonde overfl ight was issued, there was still no “confi rmed information that we 

had massive breaching and fl ooding occurring”); DiFalco interview, Jan. 13, 2006, p. 107 (saying that the Bahamonde 

overfl ight did not merit a call to the Secretary or other senior staff to ensure that it was received, and stating “It says it’s 

from Public Aff airs. So, again, we’re back to the issue of, okay, that’s fi ne, Public Aff airs is saying this is what’s going on, 

what’s the engineers saying?”); Question for the Record of Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 2006, p. 

51 (the Secretary dismissed the 7:35 p.m. spot report as “uncontrovertibly tentative, and giv[ing] no indication that the 

‘small breach’ could not be repaired.”). It is diffi cult to understand how the report of a breach of the crucial levee on the 

17th Street Canal could be minimized because it did not state that the breach could not be repaired. Indeed, in the face of 

the dire predictions before landfall and the myriad reports of fl ooding aft er landfall, the presumption should have been 

to take the report any breach seriously absent some statement to contrary. Finally, this spot report, which refl ected an 

earlier Army Corps of Engineers report, also described a second levee breach, failing pumps, widespread fl ooding, and 

overtopping.

49 In response to one of Senator Collins’ Questions for the Record submitted aft er Secretary Chertoff ’s appearance before the Committee on February 15, 2006, the Secretary said, “We knew that this storm had the potential to wreak havoc 

on the Gulf Coast and could cause enormous damage to entire region.” Questions for the Record of Sec. Chertoff , Senate 

Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 2006, p. 6.

50 Stephan interview, Jan. 13, 2006, p. 59 (“typical” and “expected”); Committee staff interview of John Wood, Chief of 

Staff , U.S. Department of Homeland Security, conducted on Jan. 27, 2006, transcript p. 64 (“expected”); Brig. Gen. Broderick interview, Jan. 19, 2006, p. 164 (“standard”); Brig. Gen. Broderick interview, Jan. 19, 2006, p. 105 (“normal, typical 

hurricane background stuff ”); Brig. Gen. Broderick interview, Jan. 19, 2006, p. 131 (“Th ere’s always fl ooding aft er a 

hurricane”); Brig. Gen. Broderick interview, Jan. 19, 2006, p. 146 (“Every time there’s a hurricane, there’s a fl ood. So, you 

know, to say there is fl ooding in a particular part of town is a normal expectation of what’s happening in a hurricane.”). 

In addition, in response to one of Senator Akaka’s Questions for the Record submitted aft er Secretary Chertoff ’s appearance before the Committee on February 15, 2006, the Secretary said, “Flooding is an incident of almost all hurricanes.” 

Questions for the Record of Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, Feb. 15, 2006, p. 74.

51 Committee staff interview of Patrick Rhode, Acting Deputy Director, FEMA, conducted on Jan. 4, 2006, transcript p. 

50.

52 When shown this e-mail during a staff interview, Wood minimized its importance: “I do not equate extensive fl ooding necessarily with the type of fl ooding that we had due to the levee breach.” Source: Wood interview, Jan. 27, 2006, 

p. 74. In response to one of Senator Akaka’s Questions for the Record submitted aft er Secretary Chertoff ’s appearance 

before the Committee on February 15, 2006, the Secretary said “Th e e-mail to my chief of staff does not mention levee 

breaches. Th ere is a critical distinction between fl ooding and breach of a levee. Flooding is an incident of almost all hurricanes. Levee breach is extraordinary.” Source: Questions for the Record of Sec. Chertoff , Senate Committee hearing, 

Feb. 15, 2006, p. 74.

53 During the 8 o’clock hour on Wednesday, August 31, reporter Chris Lawrence told Paula Zahn on CNN that “Th ere 

are literally thousands of people lined up at this convention center wandering aimlessly, I mean, mothers with their 

babies, little kids, walking through this putrid water. And there’s this dead body that is just sitting there. And I asked 

one of police offi cers and he said, we can’t – we can barely control the situation as it is. We can’t even worry about 

dead right now.” Source: Chris Lawrence, Paula Zahn Show, CNN, “President Bush Promises Massive Hurricane Relief 

Eff ort; Th ousands Feared Dead in New Orleans,” Aug. 31, 2005, 8 p.m. ET. Transcript accessed on LexisNexis. During 

the 10 p.m. broadcast of Scarborough Country on MSNBC, Michelle Hofl and reported that “We are hearing some really 

frightening stories tonight down at the convention center. ... Well, we are told that down there, at that convention 

center, it is absolute chaos. We haven’t been down there, Joe, because we are told that it’s just not a safe place to be. So, 

you have families with children and everything down at that convention center. Cars are being carjacked. And there’s 

no one there, we are told, to take care of the thousands of people who are there.” Source: Michelle Hofl and, Scarborough 

Country, MSNBC, “Scarborough Country For August 31, 2005,” Aug. 31, 2005, 10 p.m. ET. Transcript accessed on 
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318

LexisNexis. Th e next morning, in the 7 a.m. ET hour, Chris Lawrence reported “I mean right here at the convention 

center, which is just a couple of blocks away from us, as we were driving in, there were thousands, thousands of people 

just sleeping on the streets of New Orleans. I mean mothers with their children, entire families have nowhere to go. You 

walk by and people don’t have water. Th ey’re running out of food.” Source: Chris Lawrence, American Morning, CNN, 

“Massive Evacuation from New Orleans to Houston Coming to Sudden Halt; Looting and Lawlessness Continue to 

Escalate,” Sept. 1, 2005, 7 a.m. ET. Transcript accessed on LexisNexis. In the 10 a.m. hour, CNN Producer Jim Spellman 

reported that “Th e convention center was the secondary place where people were to go. Th e fi rst being the Superdome. 

And thousands of people are there. Th ey slept outside. Th e inside of the convention center is just crammed.” Source: Jim 

Spellman, CNN Live Today, CNN, “Chaos and Catastrophe in New Orleans; FEMA Briefi ng,” Sept. 1, 2005, 10 a.m. ET. 

Transcript accessed on LexisNexis.

54 Video shown on CNN’s 1 p.m. ET “Live From ... ” broadcast showed at least two bodies next to the convention 

center. Chris Lawrence, Live From ... , CNN, “Rescue Operations Suspended Due to Security Issues; Stranded Hurricane 

Victims Dying in New Orleans; Offi cials Face Chaos, Lack of Communication,” Sept. 1, 2005, 1 p.m. ET. Transcript accessed on LexisNexis. 

55 Evan Th omas, “Michael Chertoff : ‘What the Hell is Going on?’” Newsweek, Jan. 2, 2006. http://www.msnbc.msn.

com/id/10511927/site/newsweek/. Accessed on Mar. 10, 2006.

56 Sec. Michael Chertoff , All Th ings Considered, NPR, “Michael Chertoff discusses US aid eff ort being criticized in New 

Orleans,” Sept. 1, 2005, 8 a.m. ET. Transcript accessed on LexisNexis.

57 Brig. Gen. Broderick interview, Jan. 19, 2006, pp. 171-172.

58 Brig. Gen. Broderick interview, Jan. 19, 2006, pp. 173-174. Committee staff interviewed Federal Protective Service 

Director Shingler, but his recollection was inconsistent with that of other witnesses and with the documents obtained. 

Committee staff interview of Wendell Shingler, Director, Offi ce of Federal Protective Service, Border and Transportation 

Security, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, conducted on Feb. 14, 2006, transcript pp. 15-17. 

59 Testimony of Michael Brown, former Director, FEMA, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina, Th e Roles of DHS and FEMA Leadership, Feb. 10, 2006. Brown 

testifi ed that he believed that he could accomplish things more quickly by calling the White House directly.

60 Th e Committee cannot be certain that these e-mails were not sent to DHS, because DHS never produced e-mails from 

the FEMA desk in the HSOC that would have been the most likely recipient of these reports.

61 Patrick Rhode, e-mail to Michael Health, Aug. 29, 2005, 10:19 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. DHS 

0005684 through 0005685.

62 Michael Heath, e-mail to Michael Lowder, Aug. 29, 2005, 11:51 a.m., pp. 1-2. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates 

nos. DHS-FEMA-0029-0002959 through 0002960.

63 Testimony of Brig. Gen. Matthew Broderick, former Director, Homeland Security Operations Center, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs, hearing on Hurricane Katrina: Th e Roles of DHS and FEMA Leadership, Feb. 10, 2006.

64 Committee staff interview of William Lokey, Federal Coordinating Offi cer for Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, 

FEMA, conducted on Jan. 20, 2006, transcript p. 175.

65 LOHSEP, Standard Operation Procedures, Section 5.a.(1). Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. 000008 through 

000009.

66 LOHSEP, SOP Level I Activation, Sec. KK. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates no. 000055. 

67 Committee staff interview of Col. David Aycock, Operations Offi cer, Louisiana National Guard, conducted on Jan. 4, 

2006, transcript p. 212; Committee staff interview of Col. Jeff Smith, Jr., Louisiana National Guard (Ret.), Acting Deputy 

Director, Emergency Management, Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, conducted on 

Jan. 13, 2005, transcript p. 141; Committee staff interview of Brig. Gen. Gary Jones, Commander, Joint Force Pelican, 

Louisiana Army National Guard, conducted on Dec. 7, 2005, transcript p. 96.

68 Committee staff interview of Lt. Col. William Doran, Louisiana Air National Guard, Chief, Operations Division, 

Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, conducted on Dec. 2, 2005, transcript p. 73.

69 Lt. Col. Doran interview, Dec. 2, 2005, p. 115.

70 Col. Smith interview, Jan. 13, 2006, pp. 144-145. 

71 Compare LOHSEP, Sitrep, Aug. 28, 2005, 11 a.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. 000001 through 000009, 

with LOHSEP, Sitrep, Aug. 31, 2005, 10 p.m. Provided to Committee; fi led as Bates nos. 000001 through 0000075.

72 Col. Smith interview, Jan. 13, 2006, pp. 232-233.

73 Col. Aycock interview, Jan. 4, 2006, p. 212.

74 Committee staff interview of Lt. Col. Th ibodeaux, Joint Director of Military Support to Civilian Authorities, Louisiana National Guard, conducted on Dec. 6, 2005, transcript pp. 146-147.

75 Lt. Col. Th ibodeaux interview, Dec. 6, 2005, p. 149.

76 Gov. Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, FEMA Daily Video Teleconference, Aug. 29, 2005, transcript pp. 20-21. Provided to 

Committee.
Lack of Situational Awareness

319

77 Lt. Col. Doran interview, Dec. 2, 2005, p. 146; Committee staff interview of Brig. Gen. Brod Veillon, Assistant Adjutant General, Louisiana National Guard, conducted on Nov. 29, 2005, transcript p. 45.

78 See Chapter 23, p. 11. 

79 Lt. Col. Doran interview, Dec. 2, 2005, pp. 133-134.

80 Brig. Gen. Jones interview, Dec. 7, 2005, p. 96.

81 Committee staff interview of Col. Jadwin Mayeaux, Deputy Director, Homeland Security, Louisiana Offi ce of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, conducted on Nov. 29, 2005, transcript pp. 34-35.

82 Lt. Col. Doran interview, Dec. 2, 2005, p. 160.

83 Committee staff interview of Robert Duthu, Liaison to Louisiana State Emergency Operations Center, Louisiana 

Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, conducted on Dec. 8, 2005, transcript pp. 271-276.