United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 20-30332

Justin Moore, 

Plaintiff—Appellant,

versus

Centralized Management Services, L.L.C.; Episode 

Solutions, L.L.C., 

Defendants—Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:19-cv-01592

Before Stewart, Higginson, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

A discharged employee sued his former employer alleging 

discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court 

granted the former employer’s motion for summary judgment. We 

AFFIRM.

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

February 4, 2021

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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I.

Justin Moore began working for Centralized Management Services, 

LLC and Episode Solutions, LLC in August 2017 (collectively, “CMS”).

1

 

CMS develops and manages payment structures for musculoskeletal care in 

partnership with doctors and hospitals. Hoping to expand into the New 

Orleans market, CMS hired Moore in a business-development role. Moore’s 

responsibility was to foster relationships with physicians and hospitals in the 

New Orleans area. 

From nearly its inception, Moore’s employment at CMS was rife with 

trouble. Angela Jones, Moore’s boss and CMS’s Vice President of Business 

Development, became increasingly frustrated by his performance and began 

keeping a list detailing Moore’s shortcomings. Jones memorialized her list

in an email Jones sent on September 22 to CMS’s HR consultant and Vail 

Willis, the Chief Operating Officer of CMS. According to Jones, Moore 

failed to complete assignments, respond to emails, communicate with his 

supervisors and clients, or generally help CMS expand into the New Orleans 

market. 

The record shows that on September 21 and 22, Moore failed to 

respond to emails from Jones and Willis. But Moore sent text messages on 

September 22 to CMS’s HR consultant asking whether his disclosure of a 

“health issue” would remain confidential. Despite his inquiry, Moore did 

not disclose to HR what health issue he was experiencing. 

The next day, Jones sent another email to Willis, recommending that 

Moore be terminated:

1 CMS is a wholly-owned affiliate of Episode. Because the distinction is not 

relevant here, we will not differentiate and refer to both as CMS.

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[Moore] basically did nothing last week.

I do not think [he] is a good fit for the role in New Orleans. We 

need a team player that can balance a sprint and process to get 

us to the end results we are looking for. [He] has shown no 

effort in this market since the beginning of his employment. 

You and I are both very understanding if indeed these were 

family issues, but in an employment role you have to 

communicate if you are not going to be available to attend work 

meetings and deadlines.

[Moore’s] actions were exactly in line with insubordination 

and should be reflective in a termination. 

When Jones sent this email, she was not aware that Moore had 

communicated with the HR consultant. In response to additional email 

inquiries from Jones and Willis, Moore said that the week had presented “a 

challenge.” Two days later, Willis sent Moore an email saying that it was 

necessary that they coordinate a phone call to discuss Moore’s lack of 

performance. Moore skipped the call. 

On September 26, Moore disclosed to HR that he was an alcoholic, 

had a relapse, and had checked himself into a facility. He then sent an email 

to Jones and Willis disclosing the same. Moore underwent inpatient 

treatment until October 27. Upon his return, Moore was terminated for poor 

performance. 

In February 2019, Moore filed this action against CMS, alleging a 

violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Moore asserted that he was 

terminated because of a protected disability, i.e., alcoholism and his effort to 

obtain treatment. CMS filed a motion for summary judgment contending 

that Moore failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The 

district court granted CMS’s motion, concluding: (1) Moore failed to show 

that his alcoholism constitutes a disability under the ADA; (2) CMS could 

(and did) terminate Moore for poor performance even if it was caused by his 

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alcoholism; and (3) Moore failed to show that his supervisors regarded him

as disabled. 

Moore then filed a motion for reconsideration, contending summary 

judgment was improper because the ruling was based on outdated law, the 

record contained genuine disputes of material fact, and the court failed to 

consider two sources of previously unavailable evidence. The court denied 

Moore’s motion, and this appeal followed. Before us, Moore challenges both 

rulings. 

II.

A. Summary judgment on ADA claim

Moore first challenges summary judgment on his ADA claim. We 

review a district court’s summary judgment de novo. EEOC v. LHC Grp., 

Inc., 773 F.3d 688, 694 (5th Cir. 2014). In doing so, we view the facts in the 

light most favorable to the non-moving party and apply the same standards 

as the district court. Id. Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant 

shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A 

genuine dispute of material fact exists if the “evidence is such that a 

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

The Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits discrimination against 

an employee “on the basis of disability in regard to . . . discharge of 

employees.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). To make a prima facie case of 

discriminatory termination, Moore must show: (1) he has a disability, or was 

regarded as disabled; (2) he was qualified for the job; and (3) he was subject 

to an adverse employment decision on account of his disability. Cannon v. 

Jacobs Fields Servs. N.A., Inc., 813 F.3d 586, 590 (5th Cir. 2016). If he makes 

this showing, a presumption of discrimination arises, which his employer can 

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rebut with a “legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the adverse 

employment action.” Id. If the employer does so, then the burden returns 

to Moore to show that this reason was pretextual. Id.

Here, the district court determined that Moore failed to establish the 

first and third elements of a prima facie case for discriminatory termination—

i.e., that Moore’s alcoholism constituted a disability under the ADA and that 

CMS terminated Moore on account of his alcoholism. We may affirm the 

district court “for any reason supported by the record[.]” Clarkson v. White, 

943 F.3d 988, 992 (5th Cir. 2019). Accordingly, “[w]e need not discuss each 

step in the shifting evidentiary presentation” and may affirm if Moore failed 

to meet his burden on any one of the elements in the burden-shifting 

framework. Kitchen v. BASF, 952 F.3d 247, 253 (5th Cir. 2020) (affirming 

dismissal of ADA claim because plaintiff “offered no evidence of a causal 

connection between his discharge and his alcoholism”). 

On appeal, most of Moore’s brief challenges the district court’s 

determination that Moore failed to show that his alcoholism constitutes a 

disability under the ADA. But, as stated supra, the district court also 

concluded that CMS terminated Moore for poor performance (and not on 

account of his alcoholism). Because we discern no error in the district court’s 

determination in this regard, we need not address whether Moore’s 

alcoholism constituted a disability under the ADA. Clarkson, 943 F.3d at 992. 

Moore contends that the district court erred in concluding that CMS 

terminated him for poor performance. According to Moore, the evidence 

does not support this conclusion, and the district court merely cited an 

argument from CMS’s memorandum in support of summary judgment. But 

the record shows otherwise. 

On September 22, CMS Vice President Jones, Moore’s immediate 

supervisor, sent COO Willis and HR a list of issues that had arisen with 

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Moore. This list included lack of communication, failure to respond to 

emails, and failure to provide required reports. On September 23, Jones 

recommended to Willis that Moore be terminated for his lack of effort and 

insubordination. These communications occurred before Jones and Willis 

were even aware of Moore’s alcoholism. 

Moore, on the other hand, offered no evidence genuinely to dispute

that CMS terminated him for poor performance. To be clear, Moore’s mere 

disagreement with CMS’s assessment of his performance is not enough. See 

Benjamin v. Felder Servs., LLC, 753 F. App’x 298, 302 (5th Cir. 2018) 

(“[E]ven an incorrect belief that an employee’s performance is inadequate 

constitutes a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason.” (quoting Little v. 

Republic Ref. Co., 924 F.2d 93, 97 (5th Cir. 1991)). Beyond that, Moore failed 

to present any evidence that CMS terminated him because of his alcoholism. 

In other words, the record is devoid of any evidence that Moore’s “discharge 

was based on any discriminatory animus against him as an alcoholic.” 

Kitchen, 952 F.3d at 253. Because Moore has not met the third element 

required to state a prima facie case of discriminatory termination, his ADA 

claim cannot pass muster. Cannon, 813 F.3d at 590. 

Assuming arguendo that Moore substantiated a prima facie case of 

discriminatory termination, CMS still provided a “legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action”—poor 

performance. Cannon, 813 F.3d at 590. Indeed, “[t]erminating an employee 

whose performance is unsatisfactory according to management’s business 

judgment is legitimate and nondiscriminatory as a matter of law.” LHC Grp., 

Inc., 773 F.3d at 701–02. And “[t]he ADA explicitly allows an employer to 

‘hold an employee who . . . is an alcoholic to the same . . . standards for . . .

job performance and behavior that such entity holds other employees, even 

if any unsatisfactory performance or behavior is related to the . . . alcoholism 

of such employee.’” Sullivan v. Neiman Marcus Grp., Inc., 358 F.3d 110, 115–

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16 (1st Cir. 2004) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)). In response, Moore failed 

to present any evidence to show that CMS’s legitimate, non-discriminatory 

reason for terminating him was pretextual. See Kitchen, 952 F.3d at 253 

(explaining pretext is shown “through evidence of disparate treatment or by 

showing [the employer’s] explanation was false or unbelievable”). For this 

reason as well, summary judgment as to Moore’s ADA claim was proper.

Moore did not show any genuine dispute of material fact as to at least 

the third element of a prima facie ADA claim for discriminatory termination. 

He likewise offered no evidence that CMS’s termination of Moore for poor 

performance was pretextual. For each of these reasons, summary judgment 

was warranted. 

B. Moore’s motion to reconsider

Next, Moore challenges the district court’s denial of his motion for 

reconsideration.2 We review the denial of a Rule 59(e) motion for 

reconsideration for abuse of discretion. In re Life Partners Holdings, Inc., 926 

F.3d 103, 128 (5th Cir. 2019). Moore contends that the district court abused 

its discretion in denying his motion by relying on Fifth Circuit caselaw that 

predated 2008 amendments to the ADA; refusing to consider medical 

records Moore had recently obtained, which he asserted established that his 

alcoholism constituted a disability; and granting summary judgment while a 

magistrate judge was reviewing in camera documents subject to a pending 

motion to compel. Motions for reconsideration based on newly-discovered 

evidence should not be granted unless: “(1) the facts discovered are of such 

a nature that they would probably change the outcome; (2) the facts alleged 

2 Moore titled his post-judgment motion as a “Motion for New Trial and/or 

Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment.” Regardless of the motion’s title, the district court 

was correct to review Moore’s motion as one to reconsider summary judgment under Rule 

59(e). See Piazza’s Seafood World, LLC v. Odom, 448 F.3d 744, 748 n.9 (5th Cir. 2006). 

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are actually newly discovered and could not have been discovered earlier by 

proper diligence; and (3) the facts are not merely cumulative or impeaching.” 

Ferraro v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 796 F.3d 529, 534 (5th Cir. 2015). 

As an initial matter, we do not express a view as to the first two points 

of Moore’s motion for reconsideration. Although those arguments were

relevant to the district court’s determination of whether Moore showed that 

his alcoholism constituted a disability, we decide this appeal without reaching 

that issue. Accordingly, we need not address those portions of Moore’s 

motion for reconsideration.

However, Moore’s third contention—that the district court abused 

its discretion by granting summary judgment while a magistrate judge was 

reviewing in camera documents subject to a pending motion to compel—

merits discussion. According to Moore, the district court erred in denying 

his motion for reconsideration because these communications “could [have] 

contain[ed] evidence” relevant to his claim. 

Contrary to Moore’s contention, we cannot say that the district court 

abused its discretion in determining that Moore failed diligently to pursue 

avenues to make these communications available before the court entered 

summary judgment. Indeed, despite making other discovery requests in 

September 2019, Moore did not seek discovery of the subject email 

communications until December 2019. CMS responded on January 22, 

2020, but withheld certain privileged communications, including the 

documents at issue. CMS provided its privilege log on January 29. Three 

weeks elapsed before Moore filed a motion to compel discovery of those 

communications on February 19, just two days before the close of discovery, 

and nine days before the district court granted CMS’s motion for summary 

judgment. 

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Although Moore sought an expedited ruling from the magistrate judge

on his motion to compel, Moore never requested that the district court delay 

ruling on summary judgment. And the district court later determined that 

Moore failed to pursue ways to make the communications available before 

summary judgment was rendered. The court explained that Moore’s 

“conclusory speculation” about the content of the documents was not 

enough to overcome his lack of diligence. 

On appeal, Moore does not explain why the district court was wrong 

in determining that Moore did not diligently seek the email communications. 

Nor can we discern any error. Moore did not ask for these communications 

in his September 2019 discovery requests, and instead waited until December 

2019 to do so. Moore obtained the privilege log on January 29, but he waited 

until February 19—two days before the close of discovery—to file his motion 

to compel. Furthermore, he never asked the district court to delay ruling on 

summary judgment during the pendency of the motion to compel. We are 

reminded that the “district court had ‘broad discretion in all discovery 

matters.’” Kelly v. Syria Shell Petroleum Dev. B.V., 213 F.3d 841, 855 (5th Cir. 

2000). Thus, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion 

in ruling that Moore was not diligent and denying Moore’s motion for 

reconsideration on that basis. 

For these reasons, the district court properly dismissed Moore’s ADA 

claim and did not err in denying his motion for reconsideration. 

AFFIRMED. 

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