In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 13-3826

TROY MARTIN,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 13 C 1997 — Rebecca R. Pallmeyer, Judge.

ARGUED MAY 20, 2015 — DECIDED JUNE 12, 2015

Before BAUER, FLAUM, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

BAUER, Circuit Judge. Troy Martin was sentenced to life

imprisonment after a jury found him guilty of a large-scale

drug distribution conspiracy. He appealed his conviction and

we affirmed, but remanded for the limited purpose of considering, in light of Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007),

whether the district court would be inclined to impose a lesser

sentence. United States v. Martin, 618 F.3d 705 (7th Cir. 2010).

The district court declined to alter Martin’s sentence on
2 No. 13-3826

remand, and we subsequently affirmed. Martin then filed a

petition for collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, contending

that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective with

respect to the plea bargaining process. The district court denied

his petition without holding an evidentiary hearing, but

granted a certificate of appealability on the question of whether

Martin’s conclusory assertion that he would have accepted a

plea agreement, standing alone, is sufficient to trigger the need

for such a hearing. Given the record in this case, we hold that

the district court did not need to conduct an evidentiary

hearing. Accordingly, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

The facts giving rise to this petition show that Martin

founded a street gang known as the “Mafia Insane Vice Lords”

or “Mafia Insanes,” while serving a twenty-year stint behind

bars in state prison for murder. After he was released on parole

in 1998, Martin returned to the streets. Known as “King Troy”

to his subordinates within the Mafia Insanes, Martin coordinated and directed a sprawling narcotics distribution network

on the west side of Chicago, Illinois. Eventually, the government began using the procedures described in Title III of the

Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, see 18

U.S.C. §§ 2510–22, to intercept wire communications of Mafia

Insanes members believed to be involved in the drug trafficking network. Martin’s phone was targeted from February 2003

to September 2003.

On September 8, 2004, a grand jury returned an indictment

charging Martin, along with other high-ranking Mafia Insanes

members, with conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine in
No. 13-3826 3

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. The indictment also charged

Martin with eighteen counts of using a telephone to facilitate

the narcotics conspiracy in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b).

Martin proceeded to trial on the charges.

At trial, 160 incriminating recordings of calls from Martin’s

wiretapped phone, and transcripts of these calls, were admitted into evidence. Martin’s defense at trial was that, although

he may have been the leader of the Mafia Insanes, he was not

the leader of a narcotics conspiracy, he had forbidden gang

members from trafficking drugs, and that the government’s

evidence to the contrary was too unreliable to support a

conviction. At the end of trial, the jury found Martin guilty,

and the district court sentenced him to life imprisonment.

Martin filed a petition for collateral relief under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255, contending that his trial counsel was constitutionally

ineffective on a number of grounds. Since the only ground

relevant to this appeal concerns counsel’s assistance during the

plea negotiations process, we focus our attention there. In his

memorandum in support of his § 2255 petition, Martin states

that “[c]ounsel’s failure to investigate the facts and relevant

law in [his] case caused counsel to give [him] extremely bad

and prejudicial advice regarding a thirty (30) year plea offer by

the [g]overnment.” Had he been “better informed with regard

to the facts and law relevant to his case,” Martin claims that

“he would have accepted the [g]overnment’s 30-year plea offer

instead of risking a trial in which he was found guilty and,

ultimately, being sentenced to LIFE imprisonment.” According

to Martin, “he was prepared to accept the 30-year plea agreement when offered,” but “ultimately rejected the plea on the

basis of counsel’s flawed advice.”
4 No. 13-3826

Based on the foregoing statements, the district court held

that Martin had not presented evidence that his attorney was

ineffective with respect to the plea negotiation process. In so

holding, the court determined that “nothing in the record,

apart from Martin’s assertions, supports a finding that the

government offered him a 30-year plea deal,” and even

“assuming that such an offer was made at some point, Martin

has not established that his attorney was ineffective in allegedly

advising him to reject it.” Nevertheless, the district court

granted a certificate of appealability on the question of whether

Martin’s conclusory assertion that he would have accepted a

plea agreement, standing alone, is sufficient to trigger the need

for an evidentiary hearing on the issue.

II. DISCUSSION

When reviewing the denial of a federal prisoner’s § 2255

petition, we review the district court’s legal conclusions

de novo, its factual findings for clear error, and its decision to

forgo holding an evidentiary hearing for abuse of discretion.

Osagiede v. United States, 543 F.3d 399, 408 (7th Cir. 2008).

Because an error of law is, by definition, an abuse of discretion,

United States v. Beltran, 457 F.3d 695, 702 (7th Cir. 2006), any

error of law in dismissing Martin’s petition without an

evidentiary hearing would constitute an abuse of discretion.

It is well-established that a district court need not grant an

evidentiary hearing in all § 2255 cases. Such a hearing is not

required if “the motion and the files and records of the case

conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” 28

U.S.C. § 2255; see also Menzer v. United States, 200 F.3d 1000,

1006 (7th Cir. 2000). In addition, a hearing is not necessary if
No. 13-3826 5

the petitioner makes allegations that are “vague, conclusory, or

palpably incredible,” rather than “detailed and specific.” Kafo

v. United States, 467 F.3d 1063, 1067 (7th Cir. 2006). A district

court, however, must grant an evidentiary hearing if the

petitioner “alleges facts that, if proven, would entitle him to

relief.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Stoia

v. United States, 22 F.3d 766, 768 (7th Cir. 1994). 

Martin alleges that trial counsel’s failure to investigate the

facts and law relevant to his case caused counsel to give him

“extremely bad and prejudicial advice” regarding a 30-year

plea offer by the government. But for counsel’s “flawed

advice,” Martin alleges that he would have accepted the

government’s offer. On appeal, Martin contends that these

allegations are sufficient, as a matter of law, to require the

district court to hold an evidentiary hearing.

The Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of

counsel extends to the plea bargaining process. Lafler v. Cooper,

132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012). To prevail on an ineffective

assistance of counsel claim, Martin must satisfy the familiar

two-part test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668 (1984). First, Martin “must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,”

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, and second, that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,

the result of the proceeding would have been different,” id. at

694. As we shall see, we need not reach Strickland’s two-part

test because Martin’s petition suffers from a preliminary

infirmity that is fatal to his appeal.
6 No. 13-3826

As the district court noted, Martin’s case presents circumstances nearly identical to those that we considered in GalloVasquez v. United States, 402 F.3d 793 (7th Cir. 2005). In GalloVasquez, we held that the district court did not err in dismissing

the petitioner’s § 2255 petition without conducting a hearing

where, “aside from the allegation contained in [petitioner’s]

motion, there [was] no evidence that the government offered

petitioner a deal.” Id. at 798. In the case at bar, as in GalloVasquez, nothing in the record, apart from Martin’s assertions,

supports a finding that the government offered him a plea

agreement. Martin “does not attach a copy of the proposed

agreement, state when or by whom the offer was made, or give

any details other than to assert that it contemplated a [more

favorable] sentence” than the sentence he ultimately received

after risking trial. Id. Standing alone, Martin’s conclusory

reference to the “[g]overnment’s 30-year plea offer” does not

satisfy his burden of providing detailed and specific factual

allegations. See id. 

Martin attempts to distinguish Gallo-Vasquez, contending it

did not turn on the petitioner’s failure to present evidence

indicating that the government offered a plea agreement.

According to Martin, Gallo-Vasquez was decided solely on

Strickland’s prejudice prong. For this assertion he relies on our

statement in Gallo-Vasquez that “[e]ven if [petitioner] could

show that he was offered a bargain and advised to reject it, the

record reflects that he would not have been prejudiced by the

advice.” Id. We do not agree with Martin’s limited reading of

Gallo-Vasquez. Rather, in Gallo-Vasquez we articulated alternative holdings, each of which constituted an adequate and

independent ground for affirming the district court’s denial of
No. 13-3826 7

petitioner’s § 2255 petition without holding an evidentiary

hearing.

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to

the plea negotiation process presupposes the existence of a

plea agreement. Before requiring the district court to reopen a

petitioner’s case, Gallo-Vasquez sensibly requires some threshold

showing of the evidentiary basis, beyond mere conclusory

allegations, that supports a finding that the government in fact

offered a plea deal. This preliminary burden is not meant to be

onerous. It may be satisfied in a number of ways—a copy of

the proposed agreement, correspondence concerning the plea,

an affidavit from counsel, a statement as to when or by whom

the offer was made, a detailed account of the material terms of

the plea agreement, an entry on the docket setting a date for

change of plea, etc. Because Martin has failed to present any

evidence, apart from his vague and conclusory allegations,

showing that the government in fact offered a 30-year plea

agreement, we hold that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in summarily dismissing his petition.

 Lastly, going forward, we beseech the government to state

on the record, prior to trial, whether or not a plea agreement has

been extended to a defendant. This practice would readily clear

up uncertainties that may arise later in post-conviction

proceedings, such as this one.

III. CONCLUSION

For all of the aforementioned reasons, the district court’s

dismissal of Martin’s petition for collateral relief is AFFIRMED.