United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 97-2660

 

United States of America, *

*

 Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United

States

v. * District Court for the

* Southern District of Iowa.

Donald E. Harrison, *

*

Appellant. *

 

Submitted: November 18, 1997

 Filed: January 14, 1998

 

Before BEAM, HEANEY, and JOHN R. GIBSON.

 

HEANEY, Circuit Judge.

On March 6, 1997, a jury convicted Donald Harrison on

one count of managing and controlling a building for the

purpose of unlawfully manufacturing methamphetamines in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2). On June 6, 1997, the

district court sentenced Harrison to a thirty-month term

of imprisonment, a $100.00 assessment, and a three-year

term of supervised release. Under § 856(a)(2), it is

unlawful to “manage or control any building, room, or

enclosure, either as an owner, lessee, agent, employee,

or mortgagee, and knowingly and intentionally rent,
2

lease, or make available for use, with or without

compensation, the building, room, or enclosure
3

for the purpose of unlawfully manufacturing, storing,

distributing, or using a controlled substance.” 21

U.S.C. § 856(a)(2). Harrison’s sole contention on appeal

is that the government failed to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that he knowingly and intentionally

rented or made the property available for the manufacture

of methamphetamine. After a careful review of the

record, we conclude that substantial evidence supports

Harrison’s conviction. 

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence for a

criminal conviction, “we look at the evidence in the

light most favorable to the verdict and accept as

established all reasonable inferences supporting the

verdict. We then uphold the conviction only if it is

supported by substantial evidence.” United States v.

Black Cloud, 101 F.3d 1258, 1263 (8th Cir. 1996)

(citations omitted). For evidence to be substantial, it

“need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of

innocence, but simply be sufficient to convince the jury

beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty.”

United States v. McGuire, 45 F.3d 1177, 1186 (8th Cir.

1995) (citation omitted). Because circumstantial

evidence is as inherently probative as direct evidence,

Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954), the

same standard applies to verdicts based entirely or

partly on circumstantial evidence. United States v.

Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1360 (8th Cir. 1976).

Harrison owned property at 1412 S.E. 37th Street in

Des Moines, Iowa. He lived in a trailer immediately to

the north of a Quonset building which housed his

business, Harrison Trenching Company. Roy Chapman and
4

Michelle Robertson also lived on the property. Chapman

paid Harrison $150.00 per month to keep his trailer on

Harrison’s property. 

At trial, Chapman provided extensive testimony

regarding Harrison’s involvement in and knowledge of

methamphetamine production on Harrison’s property using

Harrison’s equipment. For example, Chapman testified

that on January 30, 1996, he brought a coffee filter and

pitcher from Harrison’s property to Detective Terri
5

Sweeney at the Polk County Sheriff’s Office. Chapman had

witnessed a liquid being poured through the filter and

into the pitcher and believed that this was a step in the

manufacture of methamphetamines. Detective Sweeney’s

testimony confirmed that she received the coffee filter

and pitcher from Chapman. These items were submitted for

chemical analysis which revealed methamphetamine residue

in both. Subsequently, the police searched Harrison’s

property on February 24, 1996 and June 4, 1996.

Government witnesses provided testimony regarding the two

searches of Harrison’s property. During the searches,

the police took pictures of the methamphetamine process

and seized items showing traces of methamphetamine.

After the February 24, 1996 search, Harrison was provided

with an inventory of the items seized.

Chapman testified that he had witnessed Harrison

present on at least ten occasions during the manufacture

of methamphetamines on Harrison’s property with

Harrison’s equipment. Using photographs taken of

Harrison’s property, Chapman described the

methamphetamine production process he had observed.

Chapman also testified that he had witnessed several

people, including Harrison, sniffing a powder that they

had referred to as methamphetamine.

In a separate proceeding, Robertson pleaded guilty to

a gun charge and conspiracy to distribute

methamphetamine. Pursuant to a plea agreement with the

government, she testified at Harrison’s trial that she

obtained methamphetamine for Harrison; that she was

present when methamphetamine was being made in the

Quonset building on Harrison’s property while he was on
6

the premises; and how the methamphetamines were

manufactured on Harrison’s property.

After hearing the evidence, the jury was instructed

that:

[T]he government is not required to prove

Donald E. Harrison intended to use the building

for the prohibited purpose. Rather, you may

find Donald E. Harrison guilty . . . if you

find, beyond a reasonable doubt,
7

that the proscribed activity manufacturing

methamphetamine was present and that the defendant knew

of and intentionally allowed the activity to continue,

with or without compensation.

(Instruction No. 21.) With regard to intent and

knowledge, the jury was instructed that:

Intent or knowledge may be proved like

anything else. You may consider any statements

made and acts done by the defendant, and all the

facts and circumstances in evidence which may

aid in a determination of defendant’s knowledge

or intent.

You may, but are not required to, infer that

a person intends the natural and probable

consequences of acts knowingly done or knowingly

omitted.

(Instruction No. 17.) The jury was also instructed that:

“An act is done knowingly if the defendant realized what

he was doing and did not act through ignorance, mistake

or accident. You may consider the evidence of the

defendant’s acts and words, along with all the other

evidence, in deciding whether the defendant acted

knowingly.” (Instruction No. 18.)

Harrison does not suggest, nor do we conclude, that

the jury instructions misstate the law. After hearing

the evidence, the jury concluded that the government

proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Harrison knowingly

and intentionally rented or made his property available

for the manufacture of methamphetamine. After a careful

review of the record, we agree that substantial evidence

supports Harrison’s conviction. Accordingly, we affirm.

A true copy.
8

Attest.

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.