United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 20-1340

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United States of America

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Edgar Manuel Sierra-Serrano 

 Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Minnesota

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Submitted: December 15, 2020

 Filed: September 3, 2021 

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Before GRUENDER, ERICKSON, and KOBES, Circuit Judges. 

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KOBES, Circuit Judge.

During a safety inspection of a semi transporting three vehicles, an officer 

found about 40 pounds of meth in a Ford Explorer. Sierra-Serrano wants to suppress 

those drugs, arguing that the search violated the Fourth Amendment. But because 

Sierra did not prove that he owned the Ford, or that he was its sender or intended 

recipient, he had no reasonable expectation of privacy. We therefore affirm the 

district court’s denial of his motion to suppress.
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I. 

On February 17, 2019, Kansas State Trooper Cody Parr performed a routine 

traffic stop and safety inspection of a semi-truck. One of the vehicles being hauled, 

a 2004 Ford Explorer “Sport Trac,” caught Officer Parr’s eye. He performed a 

registration check and discovered that, despite being registered to someone named 

“A.L.” in California, the Ford had been sold to Alba Haydee Alatorre in 2018. 

Officer Parr also noticed that the license plate started with the number eight, which 

meant that it was new and could have been replaced to avoid law enforcement. He 

also noticed several air fresheners in the Ford.

Based on these facts, Officer Parr suspected that the Ford was being used to 

transport drugs. After receiving permission from the semi driver, Parr performed a 

series of “field tests.” When they didn’t dispel his suspicions, he called in a drug 

dog to sniff the vehicle. The dog indicated that there were drugs in the Ford’s rear 

cab. Officers then brought it to a body shop, did a full inspection, and discovered 

about 40 pounds of meth. 

To catch the drug dealers, officers replaced the real drugs with fake ones and

got a search warrant allowing them to install tracking equipment in the Ford. A few 

days later, the semi driver delivered it to a parking lot in Minneapolis. Sierra and 

Alatorre showed up, and Sierra drove away in the Ford. Officers followed. After

the drugs were unloaded at a house, police arrested Sierra, Alatorre (the listed owner 

of the Ford), and another co-conspirator. The three were charged with conspiring to 

distribute meth.

Sierra moved to suppress the drugs. At a hearing before a magistrate judge,

1

Sierra tried to prove he owned the Ford. The only evidence was two receipts for 

tires installed on his Dodge Charger on February 19—two days after police searched 

1

The Honorable Katherine M. Menendez, United States Magistrate Judge for 

the District of Minnesota.
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the Ford. He claimed that the new tires were part of a deal to trade his Dodge for 

the Ford. Based solely on this, he said he had a reasonable expectation of privacy to 

challenge the February 17 search. 

The magistrate judge recommended denying the motion to suppress. The 

magistrate did not discuss whether Sierra had Fourth Amendment standing, instead 

finding that the search was constitutional. The district court2 adopted the 

recommendation. 

Sierra conditionally pleaded guilty. He was sentenced to 200 months in 

prison, followed by 10 years of supervised release. This appeal followed. 

II. 

“An individual asserting Fourth Amendment rights must demonstrate that he 

personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched, and that his 

expectation is reasonable.” United States v. Russell, 847 F.3d 616, 618 (8th Cir. 

2017) (citation omitted). “The defendant moving to suppress bears the burden of 

proving he had a legitimate expectation of privacy that was violated by the 

challenged search.” Id. (citation omitted).

The main issue in this appeal is whether Sierra made an initial showing of a 

reasonable expectation of privacy in the Ford. He would have a privacy interest if 

he owned it, since “[o]ne who owns and possesses a car, like one who owns and 

possesses a house, almost always has a reasonable expectation of privacy in it.” Byrd 

v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1527 (2018). 

But Sierra didn’t prove he owned the Ford. He had no title, no bill of sale, 

and no registration. The only evidence he provided, proof of a tire change 

2

The Honorable Eric C. Tostrud, United States District Judge for the District 

of Minnesota. 
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supposedly done as part of a trade for the Ford, was dated February 19. The search 

of the Ford took place on February 17. So even if the tire change was enough to 

prove that Sierra owned the Ford, that wouldn’t prove he owned it at the time of the 

search. 

In a similar situation, the Fourth Circuit held that a defendant did not have 

standing to challenge a search of a car entrusted to a car hauler. United States v. 

Castellanos, 716 F.3d 828 (4th Cir. 2013). Despite the defendant claiming that he 

owned the car, he had no title, no bill of sale, no DMV registration, and no other 

indication that he was the owner. Id. at 834. His claim that he owned the car was 

“not substantiated in any way by the record.” Id. And even if he did eventually own 

the car, there was no evidence that “he did so prior to the search.” Id. The same 

goes for Sierra. 

Even if he wasn’t the owner, Sierra might have shown a reasonable privacy 

interest in the Ford if he proved he was its sender or intended recipient. See United 

States v. Jacobsen, 683 F.2d 296, 298 n.2 (8th Cir. 1982) (noting “[t]he sender and 

intended recipient of a package clearly have ‘an adequate possessory or proprietary 

interest in the . . . object searched’ to give them standing to question the propriety of 

its search or seizure”), rev’d on other grounds, 466 U.S. 109 (1984) (citation 

omitted). 

But Sierra didn’t prove that either. The name on the bill of lading was Ana 

Garcia. Sierra never claimed that Ana Garcia was his pseudonym. See Castellanos, 

716 F.3d at 834 (finding no standing because “Castellanos adduced no evidence at 

the suppression hearing demonstrating that the name ‘Wilmer Castenada’ was 

simply an alias”). In fact, according to the Presentence Investigation Report, officers 

later found out that Ana Garcia was Alatorre’s alias, not Sierra’s. Regardless, Sierra 

introduced no reliable evidence showing that he shipped the Ford or was the intended 

recipient. 
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Sierra suggests that because he picked up the Ford in Minneapolis, he must be 

its intended recipient. But that’s not enough. Sure, Sierra was clearly an intended 

recipient of the drugs in the Ford, but people don’t have a privacy interest in 

contraband. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005) (“[A]ny interest in 

possessing contraband cannot be deemed legitimate . . . .”) (citation omitted). 

As for the truck, simply receiving a package doesn’t make someone its

intended recipient. See 18 U.S.C. § 1702 (criminalizing opening a letter addressed 

to someone else). Someone who steals a package off a front porch doesn’t transform 

into its intended recipient. Plus, Sierra wasn’t alone in picking up the Ford—

Alatorre was there too. All told, Sierra just doesn’t provide enough evidence that he 

was the intended recipient of the Ford. 

Because Sierra did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the Ford

when it was searched, we do not reach the merits of his Fourth Amendment claim. 

See United States v. Liu, 180 F.3d 957, 960 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding it “unnecessary” 

to reach the merits of a Fourth Amendment argument where an individual lacks a 

reasonable expectation of privacy in the thing searched).

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III. 

The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 

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3

Because we find that Sierra did not make an initial showing necessary to 

establish a reasonable expectation of privacy, we do not address the next question—

whether giving the Ford to a vehicle hauler vitiated his privacy interest. See United 

States v. Crowder, 588 F.3d 929, 934–35 (7th Cir. 2009) (no Fourth Amendment 

standing because defendant gave keys to driver of the car hauler and bill of lading 

gave driver permission to enter); see also United States v. Covarrubias, 847 F.3d 

556, 558 (7th Cir. 2017) (same).