United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

REBUILDING IRAQ

Status of Competition 

for Iraq 

Reconstruction 

Contracts 

October 2006 

 

GAO-07-40 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

October 2006

REBUILDING IRAQ

Status of Competition for Iraq 

Highlights of GAO-07-40, a report to Reconstruction Contracts 

Congressional Committees 

Since 2003, Congress has 

appropriated more than $20 billion 

through the Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) to 

support Iraq rebuilding efforts. The 

majority of these efforts are being

carried out through contracts 

awarded by the Departments of

Defense (DOD) and State and the

U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID). When 

awarding IRRF-funded contracts 

for $5 million or more 

noncompetitively, agencies are 

required by statute to provide 

notification and justification to 

Congress. 

In June 2004, GAO found that

agencies generally complied with

laws and regulations governing

competition to award new 

contracts, but did not always 

comply with competition 

requirements when issuing task

orders under existing contracts.

As mandated by Congress, this 

report (1) describes the extent of

competition in Iraq reconstruction 

contracts awarded by DOD, USAID, 

and State since October 1, 2003, 

based on available data, and (2) 

assesses whether these agencies

followed applicable documentation 

and congressional notification 

requirements regarding 

competition for 51 judgmentally

selected Iraq reconstruction

contract actions. 

In written comments, State and 

USAID concurred with the report 

findings. DOD provided a technical 

comment. 

While no single, comprehensive system currently tracks governmentwide 

Iraq reconstruction contract data, available data showed that from 

October 1, 2003, through March 31, 2006, DOD, USAID, and State collectively 

awarded the majority of Iraq reconstruction contracts competitively. Based 

on competition information we obtained on $10 billion of the total $11.6 

billion in IRRF obligations by these agencies during the period of our review, 

we found that about $9.1 billion—or 91 percent—was for competitively 

awarded contracts. While our ability to obtain complete competition data for 

all DOD Iraq reconstruction contract actions was limited because not all 

DOD components consistently tracked or fully reported this information, we 

obtained information on approximately $7 billion, or 82 percent, of DOD’s 

total Iraq reconstruction contract obligations, and of this, we found that 

competition occurred for nearly all of the obligations. Additionally, based on 

complete data for the period of our review we found that USAID

competitively awarded contract actions for 99 percent of its obligations, 

while State awarded contract actions competitively for only 10 percent of its

obligations. 

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

DOD USAID State

2,248

20 73

688

1,533

6,826

189

Source: GAO analysis.

Not reviewed/not available Not competed Competed

Dollars in millions

GAO reviewed the files for 51 contract actions totaling $1.55 billion—22 of 

which were awarded noncompetitively and 29 of which were awarded 

competitively—almost all of which contained proper documentation. One 

contract file—for a noncompetitively awarded task order issued by State—

did not contain justifications or other required documentation. DOD was 

also unable to provide documentation for 4 of the competitively awarded 

contract actions. Of the 22 noncompeted contract actions in GAO’s review, 

State should have notified Congress of 2 actions awarded using other than 

full and open competition in accordance with notification requirements but 

did not. State officials told GAO that they have taken steps to address the 

problem. GAO did not identify any DOD or USAID contract actions within 

the sample that required notification. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-40.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact John Hutton at 

(202) 512-4841 or huttonj@gao.gov. 
Contents 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 3

Background 5

Vast Majority of Reported Contract Obligations Were for 

Competitive Awards 6 

Agencies Generally Provided Necessary Documentation but Did 

Not Always Comply with Congressional Notification 

Requirements 10

Agency Comments 13 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 15 

Appendix II Iraq Reconstruction Contract Actions and Obligations 

Reviewed 18 

Appendix III Actions Taken in Response to GAO-04-605, Rebuilding 

Iraq Fiscal Year 2003 Contract Award Procedures 

and Management Challenges 21 

Appendix IV Comments from the Department of State 23 

Appendix V Comments from the U.S. Agency for International 

Development 25 

Appendix VI GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments 26 

Figure 

Figure 1: Obligations for Competitive and Noncompetitive Contract 

Actions by Agency 7 

Page i GAO-07-40 Competition in Iraq Reconstruction Contracting
Abbreviations 

AIDAR Agency for International Development Acquisition 

 Regulation

CEFMS Corps of Engineers Financial Management System 

CICA Competition in Contracting Act 

DCC-W Defense Contracting Command-Washington 

DFARS Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 

DOD Department of Defense 

DOSAR Department of State Acquisition Regulation 

FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation 

FPDS-NG Federal Procurement Data Systems-Next Generation 

IDIQ Indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity

IRRF Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund

JCC-I/A Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan 

LOGCAP Logistics Civil Augmentation Program 

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to 

reproduce this material separately. 

Page ii GAO-07-40 Competition in Iraq Reconstruction Contracting
United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

October 6, 2006 

The Honorable John Warner 

Chairman 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter 

Chairman 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Ranking Minority Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

Since 2003, Congress has appropriated more than $20 billion through the 

Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) to support Iraq rebuilding 

efforts, such as repairing oil facilities, increasing electricity capacity, and 

restoring water treatment plants. The majority of these efforts are being 

carried out by the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State (State) and 

the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) through contracts

with private sector companies. Widespread congressional interest in 

ensuring competition when awarding contracts for Iraq has been evident 

since the war in Iraq began. Specifically, in the fiscal year 2004

supplemental appropriation for Iraq, concerns about competition in Iraq 

reconstruction contracting led Congress to require that notification and 

justification be sent to multiple congressional committees when other than 

full and open competition is used to award contracts for $5 million or 

more.1

In June 2004, GAO reported on contract award procedures for contracts 

and task orders to help rebuild Iraq in fiscal year 2003.

2

 That report found 

agencies generally complied with applicable laws and regulations 

 1

 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of 

Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004 § 2202 (Pub. L. No. 108-106, Nov. 6, 2003). 

2

 GAO, Rebuilding Iraq: Fiscal Year 2003 Contract Award Procedures and Management

Challenges, GAO-04-605 (Washington, D.C.: June 1, 2004). 

Page 1 GAO-07-40 Competition in Iraq Reconstruction Contracting
governing competition to award new reconstruction contracts. However, 

the report also identified several instances in which task orders issued 

under existing contracts did not comply with applicable competition 

requirements.3

 Appendix III describes actions taken in response to 

recommendations made in that report. 

The fiscal year 2006 National Defense Authorization Act conference report 

required that GAO update its 2004 report on competition in Iraq 

reconstruction contracting.4

 In response, this report (1) describes the 

extent of competition in Iraq reconstruction contracts awarded by DOD, 

USAID, and State since October 1, 2003, based on available data, and (2) 

assesses whether these agencies followed applicable documentation and

congressional notification requirements regarding competition for 

selected Iraq reconstruction contract actions. 

To address these objectives, we focused our review on three agencies, the 

Departments of Defense and State and USAID. These three agencies are 

responsible for 98 percent of the total obligations made with IRRF.5

 For 

the first objective, we obtained data from DOD, USAID, and State on IRRFfunded reconstruction contract actions, including contracts awarded, task 

orders issued, and applicable modifications, from October 1, 2003, through 

 3

 A task order means an order for services placed against an established contract or with 

Government sources. Task orders are deemed by law to satisfy competition requirements if

they are within the scope of the work, period of performance, or maximum value of a

properly awarded underlying contract. The scope, period, or maximum value may be

increased only by modification of the contract and competitive procedures are required to

be used for any such increase unless an authorized exception applies. If more than one

contractor was awarded the same underlying task order contract, this is referred to as a 

multiple award indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contract. Generally, in issuing

a task order under such a contract, a contracting officer is required to provide each

awardee a “fair opportunity” to be considered for each order exceeding $2,500 unless a 

statutory exception applies. Special competition requirements apply to certain orders for 

services by or on behalf of DOD under section 803 of the National Defense Authorization 

Act of Fiscal Year 2002 (Pub. L. No.107-107).

4

 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 109-360, at page 765 (2005). 

5

 This report focuses on reconstruction contract actions awarded using IRRF funds. Funds

from the first IRRF appropriation were available to the Department of State, the United 

States Agency for International Development, the Department of the Treasury, the

Department of Defense, and the Department of Health and Human Services; funds from the

second IRRF appropriation were available to the same five agencies, as well as the 

Coalition Provisional Authority. Other sources of U.S. funding for Iraq military,

reconstruction and stabilization efforts, such as the Iraq Security Forces Fund, were not

included in our review. 

Page 2 GAO-07-40 Competition in Iraq Reconstruction Contracting
March 31, 2006, with obligations of $1 million or more.6

 For the second 

objective, we judgmentally selected 51 contract actions—22 indicated as 

noncompeted and 29 indicated as competed—to determine compliance 

with competition documentation and congressional notification 

requirements as prescribed in statute, regulations, and other guidance. Our 

findings regarding documentation and notification are specific to these 

selected contract actions and are not projectable to the agencies’ total 

contract action universe.

We also reviewed statutory requirements, the Federal Acquisition 

Regulation (FAR) and applicable agency supplements, and agency policies 

and procedures related to competition in contracting. We interviewed 

contracting officers and other procurement officials and reviewed 

contract files in Washington, D.C.; Virginia; and Iraq. We did not evaluate

the acquisition strategy used to award the contract actions, whether 

justifications for issuing awards noncompetitively were adequate, or 

whether task orders were within the scope of the underlying contract.7

While GAO and other audit agencies have identified problems in contract 

implementation and administration, we did not address these issues within 

our review. Appendix I contains the details of our scope and methodology. 

We conducted our review from April 2006 through August 2006 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

While no single, comprehensive system currently tracks governmentwide 

Iraq reconstruction contract data, we obtained competition information on 

$10 billion of the total $11.6 billion in obligations for Iraq reconstruction 

contracts collectively awarded by DOD, USAID, and State from October 1, 

2003, through March 31, 2006, and found that about $9.1 billion, or 91 

percent, of the obligations were for competitive awards. Several DOD 

systems track contract or competition data. However, not all DOD 

Results in Brief 

 6

 For purposes of this report, the terms “contract action” and “award” refer not only to the 

award of a new contract, but also to a modification to an existing contract treated as a noncompetitive award (i.e., increases the contract’s scope, period of performance, or

maximum value), as well as to the issuance of a task order under a multiple-award IDIQ

contract. 

7

 For purposes of this report, “noncompetitive” procedures shall include the use of other 

than full and open competition procedures authorized under FAR subpart 6.3 (2005), the

use of statutory exceptions to the “fair opportunity” ordering procedures for multiple 

award IDIQ contracts under FAR § 16.505(b)(2), and State and USAID use of other 

statutory exceptions, specifically 40 U.S.C. § 113(e) (Supp. III 2003). 

Page 3 GAO-07-40 Competition in Iraq Reconstruction Contracting
components consistently tracked or reported this information; therefore 

we cannot draw any conclusions on the extent of competition for all DOD 

Iraq reconstruction contracts. For example, we were not able to obtain 

complete competition data on DOD’s Joint Contracting CommandIraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A) and those of its predecessor organizations for 

the period of our review. Despite this, we obtained competition data for 

approximately 82 percent of DOD’s contract obligations for Iraq 

reconstruction, the vast majority of which indicated that competition 

generally occurred since October 1, 2003. Additionally, based on complete

data provided for the period of our review, 99 percent of USAID’s Iraq 

reconstruction contract obligations were for competitive awards, while

only 10 percent of State’s obligations were for competitive awards. 

For the contract actions we reviewed, the agencies generally followed the 

FAR and the applicable agency supplements regarding documentation 

requirements when awarding Iraq reconstruction contract actions but did 

not always comply with congressional notification requirements. We 

reviewed contract files for 51 contract actions totaling $1.55 billion, 22 of

which were awarded noncompetitively and 29 of which were awarded 

competitively. For the 22 noncompetitively awarded contract actions, 

agencies generally provided proper contract file documentation, including

justification for using other than full and open competition. Only 1 

contract file—for a task order issued by the State Department—did not 

contain justifications or other documentation as required in the FAR or 

agency supplements. For the 29 competitively awarded contract actions,

agencies generally provided contract file documentation. However, in 4 

cases DOD was unable to provide documentation that competition 

occurred, such as evidence of bidders or price negotiation memos. 

Additionally, of the 22 noncompeted contract actions, State should have 

notified Congress of 2 actions it awarded using other than full and open

competition in accordance with the notification requirement in section 

2202 of Public Law 108-106.8

 While State failed to provide the required 

notifications, it has taken steps to address the problem for future awards. 

Within our sample, we did not find any additional instances where DOD, 

USAID, and State should have notified Congress of a noncompeted award

but did not.

 8

 Pub. L. No. 108-106, Nov. 6, 2003. 

Page 4 GAO-07-40 Competition in Iraq Reconstruction Contracting
We requested comments from DOD, USAID, and State on a draft of this 

report. In written comments, USAID and State agreed with our findings. 

State also provided additional information regarding steps taken to 

address the section 2202 reporting requirement. DOD provided a technical 

comment, which was incorporated into the report. Comments from State 

and USAID appear in appendixes IV and V. 

The United States, along with its coalition partners and various 

international organizations and donors, has embarked on a significant 

effort to rebuild Iraq following multiple wars and years of neglect. In April

2003, Congress passed the Emergency Wartime Supplemental 

Appropriations Act, which created the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction 

Fund and appropriated approximately $2.48 billion for reconstruction 

activities.9

 These funds—referred to as IRRF I—were to be used by USAID, 

State, DOD, Treasury, and Health and Human Services for a broad range of 

humanitarian and reconstruction efforts. In November 2003, Congress 

enacted an additional emergency supplemental appropriations act, which 

provided approximately $18.4 billion for reconstruction activities in Iraq.10

This appropriation—referred to as IRRF II—focused on security and 

infrastructure, and the funding was allocated across multiple sectors.11

Additionally, the November 2003 act required that full and open 

competition be used to enter into contracts using IRRF funds unless the 

use of an authorized statutory exception was properly documented and

approved, and the specified congressional committees notified.12 As of 

August 29, 2006, about 94 percent, or approximately $20 billion, of all IRRF

funds had been obligated by all agencies. 

Background 

 9

 Pub. L. No. 108-11, Apr. 16, 2003. 

10 Pub. L. No. 108-106. 

11 These sectors are Security and Law Enforcement; Electricity; Oil Infrastructure; Justice, 

Public Safety and Civil Society; Education, Refugees, Human Rights, Governance; Roads, 

Bridges, and Construction; Health Care; Transportation and Communications; Water 

Resources and Sanitation; and Private Sector Development. 

12 The statutory exception had to be properly documented and approved by the head of the 

contracting agency and the Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority. 

Page 5 GAO-07-40 Competition in Iraq Reconstruction Contracting
The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA) generally requires that

federal contracts be awarded on the basis of full and open competition.13

This process is intended to permit the government to rely on competitive 

market forces to obtain needed goods and services at fair and reasonable 

prices. However, the law and implementing regulations recognize that 

there may be circumstances under which full and open competition would 

be impracticable, such as when contracts need to be awarded quickly to 

respond to urgent needs or when there is only one source for the required 

product or service. In such cases, agencies are given authority by law to 

award contracts without providing for full and open competition (e.g., 

using limited competition or on a sole-source basis), provided that the 

proposed approach is appropriately justified, approved, and documented. 

Additionally, regarding task orders issued under an existing contract, the 

competition law does not require competition beyond that obtained for the 

initial contract award, provided the task order does not increase the scope 

of the work, period of performance, or maximum value of the contract 

under which the order is issued.14

While no single, comprehensive system currently tracks governmentwide 

Iraq reconstruction contract data, we obtained competition information on 

$10 billion of the total $11.6 billion in obligations for Iraq reconstruction 

contracts collectively awarded by DOD, USAID, and State from October 1, 

2003, through March 31, 2006, and found that about $9.1 billion, or 91 

percent, of the obligations was for competitive awards. We obtained 

information on approximately $7 billion of the $8.55 billion DOD obligated 

and found that competition occurred for nearly all of the obligations. Both 

USAID and State provided information on all of their IRRF obligations 

made during the period of our review. However, where USAID information 

showed that almost all of its Iraq reconstruction contract obligations were 

for competitive awards, State information showed that few of its contract 

Vast Majority of 

Reported Contract 

Obligations Were for 

Competitive Awards 

 13 CICA, as enacted in 10 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (1) (2000) (applicable to DOD) and codified at 41

U.S.C. § 253(a) (1) (2000) (applicable to other executive agencies discussed in this report);

41 U.S.C. § 403(6) (2000) (definition of “full and open competition”). CICA’s competition

requirements are implemented in the FAR, 48 C.F.R. part 6 and corresponding agency

supplements. 

14 The scope, period of performance, or maximum value may be increased only by 

modification of the contract, and competitive procedures are required to be used for any

such increase unless an authorized exception applies. For multiple award IDIQ contracts, 

all of the contractors are required to be provided a fair opportunity to be considered for the 

task order. Special competition requirements apply to certain orders for services by or on

behalf of DOD.

Page 6 GAO-07-40 Competition in Iraq Reconstruction Contracting
action obligations were for competitive awards. Figure 1 shows a 

breakdown of the three agencies’ competed and noncompeted contract 

actions based on available data. 

Figure 1: Obligations for Competitive and Noncompetitive Contract Actions by

Agency 

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

DOD USAID State

2,248

20 73

688

1,533

6,826

189

Source: GAO analysis.

Not reviewed/not available Not competed Competed

Dollars in millions

Most DOD Obligations

Were for Competitively 

Awarded Contract Actions 

Based on available data, we found that the majority of DOD’s IRRF 

contract obligations incurred during the period we reviewed were for 

competitive awards. Competition information was available for 

approximately 82 percent of DOD’s total $8.55 billion in Iraq 

reconstruction contract obligations. Of this, we found that DOD 

competitively awarded about $6.83 billion, and noncompetitively awarded 

Page 7 GAO-07-40 Competition in Iraq Reconstruction Contracting
about $189 million.15 Most of the DOD offices we spoke with reported that, 

when possible, contract actions were competed.

JCC-I/A—the office performing the majority of Iraq contracting for the 

DOD offices we reviewed—and its predecessor organizations, including 

the Project and Contracting Office and Program Management Office, 

obligated $3.82 billion, of which $3.81 billion was obligated for competitive 

awards. Additionally, the other DOD offices we reviewed, including the 

Army Corps of Engineers’ Gulf Region Division and Transatlantic 

Programs Center; the Army’s TACOM Life Cycle Management Command; 

and the Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence obligated 

approximately $2.25 billion, and of these obligations, approximately $2.08 

billion were for competitive awards and $177 million for noncompetitive 

awards. Furthermore, the Army Corps of Engineers’ Southwestern 

Division competitively awarded two contracts to rebuild Iraqi oil 

infrastructure with obligations totaling $941 million. 

Complete information on DOD’s contract actions and competition type for 

the period of our review was not available, in part because not all offices 

consistently tracked or reported this information. Currently, DOD is 

transitioning its contract-writing systems to interface with the Federal 

Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG).16 Until this 

transition is completed, the majority of DOD components are expected to 

use DD Form 350s to report contract actions. However, we found that 

while the DD 350 system tracks competition information by contract, not 

all offices report their contracts to the system. For example, the JCC-I/A 

and its predecessor organizations did not fully input detailed, individual 

contract action information into DOD-wide systems including DD 350, 

which would provide information on competition. Furthermore, according 

to JCC-I/A officials, JCC-I/A did not track competition information until 

after May 2005. Consequently, we relied on multiple sources in order to 

 15 On December 5, 2003, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued a Determination and 

Findings limiting competition for 26 construction and services contracts to firms from the 

United States, Iraq, Coalition partners, and force contributing nations. While competition 

was limited to firms from these countries, DOD components used competitive procedures

required by the FAR to award these contracts. These contract award obligations represent 

approximately $2.69 billion in competitive actions of the $7.02 billion in DOD IRRF 

contract obligations included in our review. 

16 The FPDS was implemented in 1978 to collect information about federal procurement

contracts. Congress, GAO, executive branch agencies, and the public rely on FPDS data for 

information on agency contracting actions, governmentwide procurement trends, and

achievement of small business goals. 

Page 8 GAO-07-40 Competition in Iraq Reconstruction Contracting
obtain competition information for the DOD components within our 

review. 

USAID provided competition information for 100 percent of the $2.27 

billion in IRRF contract obligations that the agency reported incurring 

between October 1, 2003, and March 31, 2006. These data indicated that 

USAID competitively awarded contract actions for about $2.25 billion, or 

99 percent, of the approximately $2.27 billion it obligated; approximately 

$20.4 million, or about 1 percent, of these obligations were 

noncompetitively awarded. Agency contracting staff reported that USAID 

has pursued competition with very few exceptions when awarding 

contracts and issuing task orders for Iraq reconstruction. 

During our contract file review, we identified three instances in which the 

competition information provided by USAID was inaccurate. In two cases, 

USAID reported contracts as being awarded competitively when they were 

actually awarded under limited competition.17 In the third case, USAID 

reported a contract as “not competed,” when it was actually awarded 

competitively. In each of these instances, we used corrected competition 

information for our analysis. 

State obligated the smallest portion of IRRF funding among the three 

agencies, however, it incurred most if its obligations for noncompetitive 

awards. State provided competition information for 100 percent of the 

$762 million in IRRF contract obligations that the agency reported 

incurring between October 1, 2003, and March 31, 2006. These data 

indicated that State incurred obligations of approximately $73 million in 

competitive awards, or approximately 10 percent, of the approximate $762 

million it obligated for IRRF contract actions; approximately $688 million, 

or about 90 percent, of these obligations were incurred under 

noncompetitive awards. In several of these cases, State cited urgency as 

the reason for awarding the contract actions noncompetitively. 

Specifically, justifications in two of the contract files we reviewed cited 

FAR § 6.302-2, unusual and compelling urgency, as the basis for using 

other than full and open competitive procedures. Additionally, one task 

Almost All USAID Contract 

Obligations Were for 

Competitive Awards 

Only Small Percentage of 

State Contract Obligations 

Were for Competitive 

Awards

 17 USAID is authorized under statute to limit competition when full and open competition 

would impair the administration of a foreign aid program. 40 U.S.C. § 113(e) (Supp. III

2003) (formerly 40 U.S.C. § 474); 48 C.F.R. § 706.302-70 (2005). 

Page 9 GAO-07-40 Competition in Iraq Reconstruction Contracting
order we reviewed was an unauthorized commitment that had to be 

ratified by State.18 The ratification amounted to the issuance of a 

noncompetitive task order to the contractor. 

During our contract file review, we identified three instances in which the 

competition information provided by State was inaccurate. In two of these 

cases, we found that contracts that were reported as awarded 

competitively were actually awarded noncompetitively. In the third case, 

State misclassified the competition type reported for a contract that was 

awarded competitively. In each of these instances, we used corrected 

competition information for our analysis. 

We reviewed 51 contract actions totaling $1.55 billion—35 at DOD, 11 at 

USAID, and 5 at State. We found that the agencies generally followed the 

FAR and the applicable agency supplements regarding documentation 

requirements for contract actions but did not always comply with 

congressional notification requirements. Of the 51 contract actions that we 

reviewed, 22 were awarded noncompetitively, while 29 were awarded 

competitively. Only 1 of the 22 noncompetitive contract action files did 

not contain justifications or other documentation as required in the FAR 

or agency supplements. Of the 29 competed contract actions, DOD was 

unable to provide documentation that competition had occurred, such as 

evidence of bidders or price negotiation memos, in 4 cases. Additionally, 

of the 22 noncompeted contract actions, State should have notified 

Congress of 2 actions it awarded using other than full and open 

competition in accordance with the notification requirements. While State 

failed to provide the required notifications, State officials told us that they

have taken steps to address the problem for future awards. Within our 

sample, we did not find any additional instances where DOD, USAID, and 

State should have notified Congress of a noncompeted award but did not.

Of the 35 DOD IRRF contract actions we reviewed, 15 were indicated as

noncompeted and 20 indicated as competed. The files for the 15 

noncompeted contract actions contained documentation required by the 

FAR, Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement and the Army 

Agencies Generally 

Provided Necessary 

Documentation but 

Did Not Always

Comply with 

Congressional 

Notification 

Requirements 

Contract Action Files 

Generally Contained 

Required Documentation 

 18 Ratification is the act of approving an unauthorized commitment by an official who has 

the authority to do so. The unauthorized commitment is not binding solely because the

Government representative who made it lacked the authority to enter into the agreement 

on behalf of the Government. 

Page 10 GAO-07-40 Competition in Iraq Reconstruction Contracting
Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement. Of the 15 noncompeted 

actions, 4 were sole source contract awards; 4 were awarded using limited 

competition; 3 were noncompeted task orders under a multiple award 

IDIQ contract; 3 were sole source awards under the 8(a) program;19 and 1 

was an out of scope modification. Based on our review, all of the contract 

actions that were awarded non-competitively had justification and 

approval documentation citing the reason for either limiting competition 

or using a sole source award when required. For example, JCC-I/A 

partially terminated an IDIQ contract used to rebuild hospitals in Iraq.20 In 

order to complete the remaining work, JCC-I/A awarded a series of sole 

source contracts to the remaining Iraqi subcontractors to complete the 

work. In another example, the Project and Contracting Office awarded a 

series of contracts using limited competition to pave roads in 13 

governorates in Iraq, citing unusual and compelling urgent circumstances 

due to security concerns and limited manpower to evaluate all 

submissions from Iraqi firms. For the 20 competed DOD contract actions, 

16 files included documentation that competition occurred, such as 

evidence of bidders or price negotiation memos when required. However, 

DOD was unable to provide supporting evidence for the remaining 4 

contract actions that were indicated as competed. 

Of the 11 USAID contract actions we reviewed, 3 were indicated as 

noncompeted and 8 indicated as competed. The files for all 3 

noncompeted actions included the documentation required by the FAR 

and the Agency for International Development Acquisition Regulation 

(AIDAR) regarding competition. Two of these contracts were awarded 

under limited competition—one for catering services and one for armored 

vehicles—providing an opportunity for multiple vendors to submit bids. 

For both of these contracts, USAID used a blanket waiver authority 

 19 The 8(a) Business Development program refers to section 8(a) of the Small Business Act, 

which establishes a program authorizing the Small Business Administration to enter into 

contracts with other agencies and let subcontracts for performing those contracts to firms 

eligible for program participation (small disadvantaged business concerns). In some cases, 

such as for DOD, the Small Business Adminisration has delegated its 8(a) program contract

execution function authority to the agency. Per FAR 6.203, separate justification or

determination and findings are not required to set aside a contract for small business 

concerns. FAR 6.203(b) (Jan. 2006). 

20 The termination clause in Government contracts provides for the complete or partial 

termination of contracts for the convenience of the Government or default of the 

contractor. The authority to terminate contracts resides in the contracting officer and shall 

only be used, whether for default or convenience, when it is in the Government’s interest. 

FAR Part 49, Termination of Contracts (Jan. 2006). 

Page 11 GAO-07-40 Competition in Iraq Reconstruction Contracting
provided by the USAID Administrator pursuant to section 706.302-

70(b)(3)(ii) of the AIDAR.21 This waiver was originally signed in January of 

2003, later renewed in June 2004, and again in August 2005, and the agency 

is currently working on a 2006 version. The third noncompeted action was 

a modification extending the performance period and increasing the total 

award amount for a contract for facility security. The files for the 8 

competed USAID contract actions included documentation that 

competition occurred, such as evidence of bidders or price negotiation 

memos. 

Finally, of the 5 State contract actions we reviewed, 4 were indicated as 

noncompeted and 1 indicated as competed. Of the 4 noncompeted actions, 

2 were single-award contracts for protective services, and 2 were task 

orders for police and guard services off of 1 IDIQ contract. The files for 

the 2 single-award contracts and one of the task orders included all of the 

documentation required by the FAR and the Department of State 

Acquisition Regulation (DOSAR) regarding competition. However, the file

for one of the task orders for construction of a police training facility did 

not include documentation regarding the basis for using an exception to 

the fair opportunity process, as required in FAR § 16.505.

22 The file for the 

1 competed contract action included documentation that competition 

occurred, such as evidence of bidders or price negotiation memos. 

State Did Not Always 

Provide Required 

Congressional 

Notifications 

Of the 22 noncompeted contract actions in our review, State should have 

notified Congress of 2 actions it awarded using other than full and open

competition in accordance with the congressional notification requirement 

in section 2202 of Public Law 108-106 but did not. 

State failed to notify Congress when awarding 2 letter contracts for 

personal protective services noncompetitively.23 State indicated that the 

 21 The Federal Property and Administrative Services Act permitted waiver of competitive 

contracting procedures that would impair foreign aid programs. This authority, previously 

codified at 40 U.S.C. § 474 (2000), was recently recodified and enacted into positive law, 40

U.S.C. § 113(e) (Supp. III 2003), by Pub. L. No. 107-217, § 1, 116 Stat. 1062, 1066 (2002). This 

authority is implemented in section 706.302-70 of the AIDAR. 

22 FAR 16.505(b)(1) (Jan. 2006). 

23 A letter contract is a written preliminary contractual instrument that authorizes the 

contractor to begin immediately manufacturing supplies or performing services. It is used

when the Government’s interests demand that the contractor be given a binding 

commitment so that work can start immediately and negotiating a definitive contract is not

possible in sufficient time to meet the requirement. 

Page 12 GAO-07-40 Competition in Iraq Reconstruction Contracting
department failed to comply with the notification requirement in these two 

cases because the Office of Acquisitions Management, which is 

responsible for awarding and administering contracts at State, was not 

notified that IRRF funds were applied to these contracts by the relevant 

program office. State officials told us they have coordinated with program 

office staff to ensure that they communicate funding types to contracting 

staff in the future. We did not identify any USAID or DOD contract actions

within our sample that required congressional notification. 24

We requested comments from DOD, USAID, and State on a draft of this 

report. DOD provided only one technical comment, which was 

incorporated into the report. USAID reviewed the report and found it to be 

factually correct. State acknowledged our findings and provided 

additional information regarding steps taken to address the section 2202 

reporting requirement. Comments from State and USAID appear in 

appendixes IV and V. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense and 

State; the Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development; and

the Commanding General and Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers. We will make copies available to others on request. In addition, 

this report will be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

Agency Comments 

 24 We found that DOD, USAID, and State each provided one notification to Congress for 

IRRF-funded actions not included in our 51 selected contract actions. 

Page 13 GAO-07-40 Competition in Iraq Reconstruction Contracting
The major contributors to this report are listed in appendix VI. Contact 

points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may 

be found on the last page of this report. If you have any questions about 

this report, please contact me at (202)-512-4841.

John P. Hutton 

Acting Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

Page 14 GAO-07-40 Competition in Iraq Reconstruction Contracting
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

The fiscal year 2006 National Defense Authorization Act conference report 

required that GAO update its 2004 report on the extent of competition for 

Iraq reconstruction contracts. In response, we focused our review on 

reconstruction contract actions funded solely with the Iraq Relief and

Reconstruction Fund (IRRF). IRRF represents the largest amount of U.S. 

appropriated funds for reconstruction purposes. Other sources of U.S. 

funding for Iraq military, reconstruction, and stabilization efforts that are 

not included in our review are the Iraq Security Forces Fund, the 

Commander’s Emergency Response Program, and the Commander’s 

Humanitarian Relief and Reconstruction Program. Additionally, the 

congressional notification requirement in section 2202 of Public Law 108-

106 that was included in our review applies only to contract awards 

funded with IRRF. 

We included the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State (State) and the 

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), as these agencies are 

responsible for 98 percent of the total obligations made with IRRF through 

June 2006. Additionally, within DOD, we used the Corps of Engineers 

Financial Management System (CEFMS) data to select individual 

components to include in our review that were responsible for the 

majority of IRRF II contracting during the time period of our review. The 

components we selected included the Joint Contracting CommandIraq/Afghanistan, Army Corps of Engineers’ Gulf Region Division and 

Transatlantic Programs Center, Army’s TACOM Life Cycle Management 

Command, and the Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence. 

To determine the approximate number of reconstruction contract actions,

the types of actions, the funding sources, and the competition type of such

actions, we found that no single source of information contained suitable 

amounts of both contracting actions issued using IRRF monies and 

competition information. Therefore, to obtain DOD data, CEFMS was 

selected as the basis for DOD’s IRRF contract universe due to the fact that

it is the payment system for most of the major offices performing DOD 

contracting and presented the most complete contract action list. Using 

CEFMS, we identified DOD components based on the Department of 

Defense Activity Address Code, and selected offices to include in our 

review based on total obligations under IRRF II. Since CEFMS does not 

capture competition information, however, we attempted to crossreference contracts found in CEFMS with DOD’s DD Form 350 Individual 

Contracting Action Report database. However, at the time of our review, 

we found that DD 350 did not include fiscal year 2006 data and not all DOD 

components fully reported contract actions to DD 350. As a result, we 

contacted the individual DOD components selected for inclusion in our 

Page 15 GAO-07-40 Competition in Iraq Reconstruction Contracting
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

review and requested competition information for the offices’ contracting

actions funded with IRRF monies. 

To obtain IRRF-funded contract actions from USAID and State, we relied 

on agency-provided data, since the Federal Procurement Data SystemNext Generation (FPDS-NG) did not contain any of USAID’s contracting 

actions at the time we began our review. Although State’s contracting 

actions were contained within FPDS-NG, the system did not indicate 

which actions were funded using IRRF money and other criteria needed 

for our review. 

We judgmentally selected 51 contract actions for further review to 

determine compliance with documentation requirements as prescribed in

statutes, regulations, and other guidance, such as justification and 

approval documentation for noncompeted actions, and synopses of 

proposed contract actions, price negotiation memos, and evidence of

bidder’s lists for competed actions. To determine the applicable 

documentation requirements and policies governing competition when 

awarding contract actions, we reviewed the requirements of the 

Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 and the Federal Acquisition 

Regulation, and additional agency regulations including the Defense 

Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, Army Federal Acquisitions 

Regulation Supplement, Agency for International Development Acquisition 

Regulation, Department of State Acquisition Regulation, and other 

guidance. The contract actions were selected based on the following 

criteria: 

• reconstruction contract actions funded with IRRF monies; 

• actions awarded from October 1, 2003, through March 31, 2006; 

• current obligations of $1 million or more; 

• represented both competed and noncompeted actions; 

• selected more actions from DOD than USAID and State based on 

volume of contract actions obtained; 

• included a variety of contracts, task orders, and modifications; and 

• included a variety of goods and services provided. 

Our findings regarding documentation are specific to these selected 

contract actions and are not projectable to the agencies’ total contract 

action universe. Of the 51 contract actions selected, 22 were indicated as 

awarded noncompetitively and 29 were indicated as awarded 

competitively. We included competitively awarded actions in our review to 

verify the accuracy of reported actions and confirm evidence of 

competition. In the few cases noted where actions were incorrectly 

Page 16 GAO-07-40 Competition in Iraq Reconstruction Contracting
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

reported as competed or noncompeted by USAID and State, we corrected 

the errors as appropriate for use in our analysis. Given that our actions to

corroborate the data contained within agency systems or provided by the 

agencies identified only a few errors, which we corrected, we believe the 

data to be sufficiently reliable for our purposes. 

To determine whether agencies complied with the congressional 

notification requirement contained in section 2202 of Public Law 108-106,

we reviewed agency contract data within our selected contract actions to 

identify instances where the reporting requirement would apply and 

followed up with officials where appropriate. 

In order to review and understand the contract files selected, we 

interviewed DOD, USAID, and State contracting officers and other 

procurement officials in Washington, D.C.; Virginia; and Iraq. Where 

possible, we obtained electronic documentation from agency officials. 

Appendix II lists the Iraq reconstruction contract actions we reviewed. 

We conducted our work between April 2006 and August 2006 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Page 17 GAO-07-40 Competition in Iraq Reconstruction Contracting
Appendix II: Iraq Reconstruction Contract Appendix II: Iraq Reconstruction Contract Actions and Obligations Reviewed 

Actions and Obligations Reviewed 

Contracting agency/ 

contractor

a

Purpose 

Contract 

action type

Amount 

obligated

Department of Defense

U.S. Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence

Environmental Chemical Corporation Convert Iraqi fort to prison Task order $6,901,165.00

Shaw Environmental, Inc. Army base renovation Task order $45,492,214.00

Tetra Tech FW, Inc Facility construction and renovation Task order $41,361,224.00

Washington Group International, Inc. School repairs Task order $11,409,173.00

Weston Solutions, Inc. Airport construction and improvements Task order $4,700,826.00

Laguna Construction Company, Inc. Commando satellite construction Task order $20,555,941.00

U.S. Army TACOM Life Cycle Management Command

Conley & Associates, Inc. New equipment training Contract $2,163,582.54

Conley & Associates, Inc. New equipment training Contract $2,417,967.80

MAC International FZE Police truck Contract $67,210,440.00

U.S. Army Transatlantic Programs Center

Odebrecht-Austin (JV) Gas power plant maintenance Task order $38,663,252.20

Shaw Centcom Services LLD Transmission line and substation rehabilitation Task order $15,423,515.00

Washington International/Black & Veatch 

Joint Venture 

Generator Rehabilitation Task order 

$64,296,158.00

Joint Contracting Command – Iraq/Afghanistan

ASRC Airfield and Range Services, Inc. Facility construction and training Contract $59,522,329.00

Eurest Support Services, Inc. Base camp support services Contract $48,844,954.00

SBIG Technical Services, Ltd. Base support services Contract $22,915,216.50

FluorAMEC LLC Electric generation power plant construction Task order $4,500,000.00

PAE Government Systems, Inc. Firefighter training program Contract $15,514,713.00

Iraqi Company A Road construction Contract $1,353,700.00

Iraqi Company B Road construction Contract $1,185,547.90

Iraqi Company B Road construction Contract $1,119,476.00

Iraqi Company C Road construction Contract $1,409,515.00

Raytheon Systems Development Company Purchase and install communication systems Contract $1,900,000.00

BLP Civil intervention force class Contract $9,340,912.38

U.S. Investigative Service Training, force protection and life support 

services 

Contract 

$42,197,992.13

Iraqi Company D Renovate, repair, and upgrade hospital Contract $2,919,752.90

iComPort Install and test underground feeders Modification $1,113,690.00

Iraqi Company E Rehabilitate children's hospital Contract $1,288,000.00

Comet Company LTD Rehabilitate water pumping station Contract $4,222,549.00

Page 18 GAO-07-40 Competition in Iraq Reconstruction Contracting
Appendix II: Iraq Reconstruction Contract 

Actions and Obligations Reviewed 

Contracting agency/ 

contractor

a

Purpose 

Contract 

action type

Amount 

obligated

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers - Gulf Region Division

Iraqi Company F Water facility construction Contract $3,500,000.00

IAP World Wide Services Sewer and water networks Task order $26,982,350.00

First Kuwaiti Contracting Emergency response unit bureau dignitary 

protection training site construction 

Task order 

$14,078,995.00

KEC-OZDIL JV Design and reconstruct transmission line Contract $23,865,426.00

Iraqi Company G MNSTC-I logistical warehouse complex Contract $2,099,556.00

Iraqi Company H Iraqi National Guard battalion garrison Task order $7,891,300.00

Iraqi Company I Electrical complex construction Contract $2,837,290.00

Total, Department of Defense $621,198,723.35

U.S. Agency for International Development

Al Gosaibi Services Catering services Contract $1,360,094

America’s Development Foundation Civil society Contract $42,880,157 

Daimler Chrysler AG Armored vehicles Contract $4,261,182 

Development Alternatives, Inc. Grant support Task order $348,039,843

Development Alternatives, Inc. Agriculture Contract $101,352,912 

Gulf Catering Company Catering services Purchase order $1,139,320

International Business & Technical

Consultants, Inc. 

Monitoring and evaluation Contract 

$7,938,544 

Kroll Government Services International, Inc. Facility security Modification $3,368,311

The Louis Berger Group Private sector growth and employment 

generation 

Contract 

$95,000,000 

The Partnership for Child Health Care, Inc. Child health Task order $2,000,000 

Research Triangle Institute Local Governance Contract $85,000,000 

Total, U.S. Agency for International Development $692,340,363

Department of State

Dyncorp International LLC Construction and training at police training 

facility 

Task order 

$44,817,427.36 

Dyncorp International LLC Construction of police training facility Task order $71,543,529.00

Triple Canopy, Inc. Local guard services Contract $73,344,007.29

Triple Canopy, Inc. Personal protective services Contract $20,800,000.00

Page 19 GAO-07-40 Competition in Iraq Reconstruction Contracting
Appendix II: Iraq Reconstruction Contract 

Actions and Obligations Reviewed 

Contracting Agency/ 

Contractor Purpose 

Contract 

Action Type

Amount 

Obligated

Blackwater Security Consultants, Inc. Personal protective services Contract $24,360,000.00

Total, Department of State $234,864,963.65b

Grand Total $1,548,404,050.00

Source: GAO.

a

Names of Iraqi firms not listed. 

b

The two State contracts for personal protective services were only partially funded with IRRF. 

Obligations totals listed for these contracts represent only those obligations made with IRRF funds. 

Page 20 GAO-07-40 Competition in Iraq Reconstruction Contracting
Appendix III: Actions Taken in Response to

HTGAO-04-605TH, Rebuilding Iraq: Fiscal

Year 2003 Contract Award Procedures and 

Management Challenges 

GAO recommendations from GAO-04-605 

Iraq reconstruction contracting Actions taken according to DOD officials 

To ensure that task orders issued to rebuild Iraq comply with 

applicable requirements, and to maximize incentives for the 

contractors to ensure effective cost control, the Secretary of

the Army should review the out-of-scope task orders for Iraqi

media and subject matter experts issued by the Defense 

Contracting Command-Washington (DCC-W) and take any 

necessary remedial actions. 

DCC-W agreed with the GAO findings concerning out-of-scope work 

for the orders awarded to SAIC for the Iraqi Media Network and the 

subject matter experts. Contracting officers ordering the out-of-scope 

work have been made aware that their actions were improper. DCCW has instituted agencywide training in a number of topics, including 

the need to carefully review the scope of work of a contract to 

determine what may be legitimately ordered from that contract. This 

training will be periodically repeated. In addition, its postaward 

reviews will include an assessment of whether requiring work is within 

the scope of the basic contract. 

GAO and DOD consider this recommendation closed. 

To ensure that task orders issued to rebuild Iraq comply with 

applicable requirements, and to maximize incentives for the 

contractors to ensure effective cost control, the Secretary of

the Army should ensure that any future task orders under the 

Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contract for 

Iraq reconstruction activities are within the scope of that 

contract. 

According to DOD, the Procuring Contracting Officer for the LOGCAP 

contract reviews each proposed scope of work that will result in a 

task order and makes a determination whether the action is within the 

scope of the contract and obtains appropriate legal advice as

necessary. 

GAO and DOD consider this recommendation closed. 

To ensure that task orders issued to rebuild Iraq comply with 

applicable requirements, and to maximize incentives for the 

contractors to ensure effective cost control, the Secretary of

the Army should address and resolve all outstanding issues in 

connection with the pending Justifications and Approvals for 

the contracts and related task orders used by the Army Corps 

of Engineers to restore Iraq’s electricity infrastructure. 

As of June 2006, the justifications and approvals were being

processed for Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, 

Logistics and Technology, approval. 

GAO considers this recommendation open, though Defense

Procurement and Acquisition Policy has indicated that this 

recommendation will be closed in the near term. 

To ensure that task orders issued to rebuild Iraq comply with 

applicable requirements, and to maximize incentives for the 

contractors to ensure effective cost control, the Secretary of

the Army should direct the Commanding General, Army Field 

Support Command, and the Commanding General and Chief 

of Engineers, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, to definitize 

outstanding contracts and task orders as soon as possible. 

DOD has definitized, or reached agreement on key terms and 

conditions for, all of the six contract actions identified in our June 

2004 report. We noted in our March 2005 report entitled, High-Level 

DOD Coordination is Needed to Further Improve the Management of 

the Army’s LOGCAP Contract (GAO-05-328), that the Army had 

made improvements in definitizing task orders issued under the 

LOGCAP contract. 

GAO and DOD consider this recommendation closed. 

Appendix III: Actions Taken in Response to 

GAO-04-605, Rebuilding Iraq: Fiscal Year 

2003 Contract Award Procedures and 

Management Challenges

Page 21 GAO-07-40 Competition in Iraq Reconstruction Contracting
Appendix III: Actions Taken in Response to

HTGAO-04-605TH, Rebuilding Iraq: Fiscal

Year 2003 Contract Award Procedures and 

Management Challenges 

GAO recommendations from GAO-04-605 

Iraq reconstruction contracting Actions taken according to DOD officials 

To improve the delivery of acquisition support in future 

operations, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the 

Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development, 

should evaluate the lessons learned in Iraq and develop a 

strategy for ensuring that adequate acquisition staff and other 

resources can be made available in a timely manner. 

In November 2005, DOD issued directive 3000.05, Military Support 

for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations, 

which, in part, required that DOD ensure proper oversight of contracts 

in stability operations and ensure U.S. commanders deployed in 

foreign countries are able to secure contract support rapidly. DOD is 

also working on developing joint contingency contracting policy and 

doctrine and assessing DOD’s contract administration services 

capability for theater support contracts. The estimated completion 

data of the ongoing actions is fall 2006. 

GAO considers this recommendation open. 

Source: GAO.

Page 22 GAO-07-40 Competition in Iraq Reconstruction Contracting
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department Appendix IV of State : Comments from the 

Department of State 

Page 23 GAO-07-40 Competition in Iraq Reconstruction Contracting
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of State 

Page 24 GAO-07-40 Competition in Iraq Reconstruction Contracting
Appendix V: Comments from the U.S. Agency

Appendix V for International Development : Comments from the U.S. Agency 

for International Development 

Page 25 GAO-07-40 Competition in Iraq Reconstruction Contracting
Appendix VI: 

A

GAO Contacts and 

cknowledgments 

Page 26 GAO-07-40 

Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and 

Acknowledgments 

John Hutton, (202) 512-4841 

Major contributors to this report were John Neumann, Daniel Chen, Kate 

France, Julia Kennon, John Krump, Art James, Shannon Simpson, Karen 

Sloan, Adam Vodraska, and Aaron Young. 

Competition in Iraq Reconstruction Contracting

GAO Contacts 

Acknowledgments 

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