IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

April 14, 2011 Session

KENNETH W. TAYLOR v. LAWRENCE COUNTY, TENNESSEE

ELECTION COMMISSION ET AL.

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Lawrence County

No. 1500610 Robert Lee Holloway, Jr. , Judge

No. M2010-02406-COA-R3-CV - Filed May 23, 2011

Unsuccessful sheriff candidate sued to void the August 5, 2010 Lawrence County sheriff’s

election based on the ineligibility of one of the five candidates. The trial court found the

challenged candidate ineligible but declined to void the election. On appeal, we find the

plaintiff guilty of gross laches in waiting to file suit to the prejudice of the defendants.

Therefore, we reverse the trial court’s order.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Reversed

ANDY D. BENNETT, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which PATRICIA J. COTTRELL,

P.J., M.S., and FRANK G. CLEMENT, JR., J., joined.

John Russell Parkes and Charles McIver Molder, Columbia, Tennessee, for the appellant,

Kenneth W. Taylor.

John Christopher Williams, Lawrenceburg, Tennessee, for the appellees, Lawrence County,

Tennessee, Election Commission and June Davis.

Walter Charles Doerflinger, Lawrenceburg, Tennessee, for the appellee, Jimmy Brown.

OPINION

This matter arises from the Lawrence County sheriff’s election of 2010. The General

Assembly determines the qualifications for sheriffs. TENN.CONST., Art. VII, Sec. 1. Among

other things, in order to qualify for election to the office of sheriff, an individual must “[b]e

a qualified voter of the county.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-8-102(a)(3).
On January 20, 2010, Michael Risner applied to be a registered voter of Lawrence

County. Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-2-120(a) states:

The administrator of elections shall determine, from the registrant’s answers

to the questions on the permanent registration record and other questions, if

necessary, whether the registrant is entitled to register. If the administrator

determines that the registrant is entitled to register, the administrator shall

declare the registrant a registered voter.

In response to questions from Lawrence County Administrator of Elections June Davis,

Risner produced a Giles County driver’s license and a bill that had been mailed to him at his

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Lawrence County address. Risner signed the voter registration application and swore that

the Lawrence County address on the application was his legal residence and that he intended

to remain there. Davis took the additional step of calling the post office and verifying that

Risner received mail in Lawrence County. Davis allowed Risner to register to vote and to

pick up a petition to run for sheriff of Lawrence County. He soon filed his nominating

petition.

Not long after Risner filed his nominating petition, then-sheriff Kenneth Taylor

learned of Risner’s candidacy for sheriff. Taylor testified that he mentioned his concerns

about Risner’s residency to Davis twice and to the District Attorney once. Taylor said that

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he contacted the Peace Officer Standards and Training (“POST”) Commission and asked that

it verify whether Risner was “qualified to run for sheriff.” The POST Commission told

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Taylor to “take it up” with the Lawrence County Election Commission. Taylor never made

a formal complaint to the administrator of elections or the Lawrence County Election

Commission or even asked how to do so. Taylor testified that he did not have time during

the campaign to figure out how to file a formal complaint against Risner, yet he had time to

drive by the Lawrence County address where Risner claimed to live two or three times a

week to look for signs of residential activity. Taylor further testified that he raised the issue

of Risner’s residency during the campaign.

The driver’s license is produced for identification purposes. 1

Davis testified that she only remembered Taylor mentioning Risner’sresidency once and that it was 2

more of a remark.

Candidates for sheriff are required to file an affidavit and a certified confirmation of psychological 3

evaluation formwith the POST Commission. Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-8-102(b)(1)(A) & (B). The affidavit must

affirm that the candidate meets the requirements forserving as sheriff. Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-8-102(b)(1)(A). 

Those requirements include being “a qualified voter of the county.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-8-102(a)(3).

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During the campaign, Davis received some phone calls asking about Risner’s

residency. She stated that:

I was referring them to the DA, that I was satisfied with his registration and his

residency. But people were calling me, and I just referred them to the DA.

And, yes, I spoke with the election commission about it, my election

commission. And we discussed it and I just referred them to the DA because

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I did not have concerns.

When the election for sheriff was held, the results were as follows:

Jimmy Brown 3516 votes

Kenneth W. Taylor 3398 votes

Michael Risner 2497 votes

Lee England 332 votes

Pete Schrader 175 votes

Total 9918 votes

On August 20, 2010, Taylor filed an election contest pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §

2-17-101 et seq., alleging that Risner was not a qualified voter of Lawrence County and,

therefore, was not a proper candidate and should not have appeared on the ballot. He

subsequently filed an amended complaint and sought a temporary restraining order to prevent

Brown from taking the oath of office for sheriff of Lawrence County. The request for the

temporary restraining order was denied. A bench trial was held on October 8, 2010. On

November 15, 2010, the chancellor filed findings of fact and conclusions of law that found

Risner was not a qualifed voter of Lawrence County and, therefore, not a qualified candidate

for sheriff. However, the chancellor did not find sufficient proof of fraud or illegality to void

the election. Taylor appealed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court reviews the findings of fact of the trial court de novo with a presumption

of correctness unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). The trial

Although notraised by any party, we note that Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-2-120(c)(1)states that, “At least 4

quarterly at a regularly scheduled county election commission meeting, every new voter registration form

which has been filed since the last regularly scheduled meeting of the county election commission shall be

inspected by a county election commission member of the majority party and the minority party.” Thus,

Risner’s registration was presumably examined by members of the election commission in the late winter

or early spring of 2010. The record does not reflect any concern about the registration on the part of the

Lawrence County Election Commission or any action taken by that body regarding the registration.

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court's conclusions of law are reviewed de novo without a presumption of correctness. Union

Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993).

ANALYSIS

The defendants maintain that the doctrine of laches prevents Taylor from pursuing this

litigation. Laches “is an equitable defense which requires the finder of fact to determine

whether it would be inequitable or unjust to enforce the claimant’s rights.” Gleason v.

Gleason, 164 S.W.3d 588, 592 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). Laches is established when there has

been “neglect or omission to assert a right which, taken in conjunction with the lapse of time,

causes prejudice to the adverse party.” First Am. Bank of Nashville, N.A. v. Woods, 734

S.W.2d 622, 632 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987). “Laches is actually based on equitable estoppel and

is dependent upon the facts and the equities of each individual situation.” Clark v. Am. Nat'l

Bank & Trust Co. of Chattanooga, 531 S.W.2d 563, 572 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1974). The

doctrine of laches may apply even though a statute of limitations has not run if the plaintiff

is guilty of gross laches. Gleason, 164 S.W.3d at 592; Dennis Joslin Co., LLC v. Johnson,

138 S.W.3d 197, 201 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). Besides a lengthy and unreasonable delay,

gross laches requires serious prejudice to the defendant, such as loss of evidence or

significant financial cost. Finova Capital Corp. v. Regel, 195 S.W.3d 656, 660 (Tenn. Ct.

App. 2005); Dennis Joslin Co.,138 S.W.3d at 201.

Taylor knew of Risner’s candidacy not long after Risner filed his nominating petition

in late January, so Taylor had concerns about Risner’s residency for approximately six

months before the August 2010 election. He filed no formal complaint about Risner’s

residency with the Lawrence County administrator of elections, the Lawrence County

Election Commission, the District Attorney, the POST Commission or the Secretary of

State’s Division of Elections. He did not seek the advice of an attorney. Instead, he made

Risner’s residency a campaign issue.

All the while, the candidates were spending money on the election, citizens were

donating money and time to the candidates of their choice, presumably including Risner, and

Lawrence County was preparing for and, eventually, holding the election. Davis testified

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that holding a new election would require Lawrence County to spend over $30,000. That

amount does not include the money the candidates would have to raise and spend.

Based on Taylor’s months-long delay in filing suit and the resulting prejudice to the

county, the current sheriff, and others, we find that Taylor is guilty of gross laches and should

not be allowed to pursue this litigation.

Of course, elections for other county offices were held as well. 5

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The trial court’s order is reversed since it was not necessary to reach the issue of

Risner’s eligibility. Costs of appeal are assessed against the appellant, for which execution

may issue if necessary.

______________________________

ANDY D. BENNETT, JUDGE

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