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Special Report 181 January 2007

United States Institute of Peace

Special Report

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions .

Contents 

Introduction 2

What Is at Stake for the Parties and the Polity? 2

Origins of the Secular and Islamist Divide 4

Justice Denied 4

Contesting Islam’s Role in Political Life 5

Worrying Signs Thus Far 6

Response of Civil Society and the Opposition 6

Securing the 2007 Election and Bangladesh’s Future 7

Conclusion 9

About the Report

Since the serial bombings of August 17, 2005, the attention 

of policymakers and analysts in Washington and beyond 

has focused on Bangladesh. In light of the growing publicpolicy import of this often-overlooked but critical South 

Asian Muslim country, the United States Institute of Peace 

launched a sustained critical inquiry on Dhaka’s internal and 

external policies and their varied domestic and international 

ramifications. The authors carried out field work in 

Bangladesh for this report in June 2006 under the auspices of 

the Institute’s Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention.

A.Tariq Karim is a former Bangladesh ambassador to the 

United States and a diplomat with more than three decades’ 

experience. He is now Harrison Fellow in the Department of 

Government and Politics at the University of Maryland. 

C. Christine Fair is a senior research associate at the 

Institute’s Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention. She 

specializes in South Asian political and military affairs and 

has written numerous articles and monographs on the politics 

and security of the region. With Ali Riaz she is overseeing 

a multiauthor book project on Bangladesh’s internal and 

external security.

A. Tariq Karim and C. Christine Fair 

Bangladesh at the 

Crossroads

Summary

•	 Although Bangladesh is generally considered to be a secular democracy, recent years 

have seen a steady erosion of the important principles underlying it.

•	 Bangladesh’s political system is mired in conflict as the two mainstream parties battle 

for control of the country and its resources. With neither party able to win a majority, both have sought alliances of convenience to secure power. Neither party has 

addressed pervasive corruption and systemic failure to provide good governance and 

law and order. 

•	 The choices Bangladeshis make—or, more critically, are permitted to make—in the 

coming months will have great import for the country’s future. Because politics in 

Bangladesh has become a zero-sum game with no meaningful political role for the 

opposition, the stakes are high for both the opposition Awami League (AL) and the 

ruling Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). 

•	 Increasingly, Islamist parties have emerged as political kingmakers with newfound 

legitimacy. In the 2001 elections the BNP came to power because of its alliance with 

key Islamist parties, even though the latter commanded few votes on their own.

•	 Since the late 1990s, Islamist militancy has spread throughout the country, raising 

questions about Bangladesh’s internal security and the consequences for South Asian 

regional security. The serial bombings of August 2006 shocked most observers, even 

though the massive attack killed only two persons. 

•	 The upcoming January 2007 elections are in many ways a referendum on the two 

parties’ competing visions of Bangladesh and the role of Islam in the public and 

private spheres. Unfortunately, a number of irregularities in the election preparations 

call into question their freeness and fairness, threatening civil unrest.

•	 The attention and dedicated involvement of the international community is paramount to ensure free and fair elections in Bangladesh.
Introduction

A predominantly Muslim country of 142 million people, Bangladesh is an important 

developing nation struggling to establish, preserve, and consolidate its young and fragile 

democracy under numerous domestic and regional pressures that threaten to undermine 

these efforts. Until recently the international community considered Bangladesh as a 

model for developing Muslim nations because of its presumed commitment to secular democracy and its ostensibly inclusive practice of Islam. In recent years, however, 

Bangladesh’s secular system has come under fierce assault by Islamist militancy. Although 

political violence has a long history in Bangladesh, Islamist violence does not. Its spread 

to this strategically located country disquiets citizens and analysts, both inside and outside Bangladesh. 

In great measure the fate of Bangladesh as a secular and tolerant Muslim state, and 

its ability to address issues related to good governance, transparency, accountability, and 

development, rests upon the upcoming elections, scheduled to take place in late January 

2007. Because the two mainstream parties embody contradictory visions of the role of 

Islam in Bangladesh’s past and future, these elections will be a referendum on the parties’ 

competing visions. 

What is at stake in these elections, and why should the international community watch 

them closely? 

What Is at Stake for the Parties and the Polity?

Today Bangladesh is overshadowed by the specter of rising Islamist extremism while its 

mainstream parties remain preoccupied with their mutual antagonism and the pursuit of 

power. None of the extant major parties that have been in power since Bangladesh’s birth 

has acted decisively to address the nation’s pressing problems and needs, especially the 

provision of governance, justice, and rule of law. Despite its ethnic and largely sectarian 

homogeneity, Bangladesh is mired in a struggle between competing visions of the future 

that retard its economic growth and progress and exacerbate the malaise of poor governance and widespread corruption. The confrontation between government and opposition 

plays out on the streets through frequent hartals (general strikes), which often result in 

political violence.

This contestation manifests itself in two interrelated ways. First, there is the struggle 

between defining the Bangladeshi citizen first and foremost as an ethnic Bengali or, 

alternatively, first and foremost as a Muslim. At the same time Bangladeshis are struggling to decide which version of Islam the country and its polity should embrace as part 

of a newly reconstructed, Islamist national project. At its heart is the fate of Bangladesh’s 

traditional observance of heterodox Sufi Islamic practice, which has recently given way to 

more orthodox, Wahhabi and Deobandi interpretations of Islam.

These twin debates over Bangladesh’s identity (Bengali vs. Muslim) and Islam 

(heterodox vs. orthodox) came into focus in the years following Bangladesh’s independence in 1971 and continue to permeate national politics. The upcoming 2007 elections 

will be an important occasion for this contestation. Will Bangladesh continue on the path 

of secular democracy, or will it embrace political Islam with increasingly apparent Wahhabi 

and Deobandi overtones as the foundation of the state? 

Having held four elections since Bangladeshis wrested democracy from the clutches of 

the military in November 1990, the country is now gearing up for its third general election 

under the unique, nonparty caretaker government (NCG) system. 

After Gen. Hussain Ershad’s downfall in 1990, the participants in the movement 

against the military set up an interim administration to function as a neutral caretaker 

government. This body—headed by the then-chief justice with the assistance of a cabinet 

of neutral, well-respected, and nonpartisan advisers chosen from among nominees put 

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, 

nonpartisan institution established and funded by 

Congress. Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent 

conflicts, promote post-conflict peacebuilding, and increase 

conflict-management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital 

worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others 

with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Board of Directors

J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, D.C. • María Otero (Vice Chair), President, ACCION 

International, Boston, Mass. • Betty F. Bumpers, Founder 

and former President, Peace Links, Washington, D.C. 

• Holly J. Burkhalter, Vice President of Government Affairs, 

International Justice Mission, Washington, D.C. • Chester A. 

Crocker, James R. Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies, 

School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University • Laurie S. 

Fulton, Partner, Williams and Connolly, Washington, D.C. • 

Charles Horner, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute, Washington, 

D.C. • Seymour Martin Lipset, Hazel Professor of Public 

Policy, George Mason University • Mora L. McLean, President, 

Africa-America Institute, New York, N.Y. • Barbara W. 

Snelling, former State Senator and former Lieutenant 

Governor, Shelburne, Vt. 

Members ex officio

Barry F. Lowenkron, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor • Peter W. Rodman, Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs 

• Richard H. Solomon, President, United States Institute of 

Peace (nonvoting) • Frances C. Wilson, Lieutenant General, 

U.S. Marine Corps; President, National Defense University 
forward by the major parties—was to hold the first election under the new democratic 

dispensation within ninety days. 

This interim government became the model for the NCG, subsequently promulgated in 

the thirteenth amendment to the constitution by the short-lived parliament elected in 

February 1996. Although this was a victory for the opposition parties in alliance against 

the BNP government then in power, it did not diminish the deep antagonism between the 

AL and the BNP. On the contrary, the polarization increased and persists, as exemplified 

by the outbreak of street violence across the country with the departure of the BNP-led 

government on October 27, 2006, and subsequent unrest. 

In the 2001 election the BNP came to power in alliance with the Jatiya Party (Naziur 

faction, or JP-N),1 the Jamaat Islami Bangladesh (JIB), and the Islamic Oikyo Jote (IOJ). 

Of the latter two, the JIB is the more important Islamist party, while the IOJ is a united 

front of several small parties that would command few votes on their own. Constitutionally the five-year term of the present parliament, and consequently the present government, ended October 27, 2006, when a NCG should have stepped in to conduct elections 

within ninety days of taking over the government. 

However, alleged BNP efforts to manipulate the existing institutions during its term 

in office inspired a breach of confidence about the institutional neutrality and viability 

of this NCG system, and these BNP actions have compromised the legitimate handover 

of power. First, a crisis erupted over who should head the fourth NCG. In the end, the 

president assumed this role, blurring the separation between the presidency and the 

head of government. Second, controversy has raged about perceived acts of commission 

and omission by the chief election commissioner (CEC) and his principal associates in 

the Election Commission (EC). This breakdown in confidence has put the integrity of the 

forthcoming elections in peril and encouraged a spate of violence since September 2006. 

The situation has gained the attention of the international community, which is increasingly focusing on Bangladesh’s elections and domestic stability. 

Today Bangladesh finds itself at yet another crossroads. The choices its people make—

or, more critically, are permitted to make—in coming months will have a great effect on 

Bangladesh’s future. Because politics in Bangladesh has become a zero-sum game with no 

meaningful political role for the opposition, the stakes are high for both the AL and the 

BNP. Both these legacy parties view a victory in the elections as absolutely necessary for 

their continuing survival generally and their present leadership in particular. For the AL—

which spearheaded the movement for Bangladesh’s independence under the leadership of 

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and is now led by his daughter, Sheikh Hasina Wazed—losing in 

2007 would constitute a second consecutive defeat and call into question the credibility 

and survival of its leaders. A defeat in 2007 might even precipitate breakup of the party. 

Few in the AL, or even outside the party (including pro-BNP elements in society), doubt 

that the BNP’s return to power, with whatever final coalition it would cobble together, 

would result in significant efforts to vitiate the AL. During the past five years the BNP-led 

alliance government oversaw what many, particularly the AL, perceived as a systematic 

war of attrition on the AL to decimate the latter’s leadership and organizational structure. 

Whether such fears are justifiable is not as important as the fact that this perception is 

deeply entrenched. 

For the BNP, victory and retaining power are necessary at all costs. The BNP fears 

that a defeat might subject its politicians and party workers to AL retribution. Again, it 

is immaterial whether the AL would actually resort to such action, but this perception 

is deep-rooted and encourages the BNP and its partners to take risks. The BNP’s defeat 

probably would trigger a power struggle within the party leadership and fragmentation of 

the party. Significant desertions already have been observed. The new Liberal Democratic 

Party (LDP) formed on October 26, 2006, with more than a dozen former BNP senior leaders and some 100 defecting workers constituting its core.

The JIB (the largest among the Islamist parties in Bangladesh) has greater cause for 

concern should it emerge as a loser in the elections. The BNP’s latest bargaining with 

Controversy has raged about perceived 

acts of commission and omission by 

the chief election commissioner and 

his principal associates.

For the BNP, victory and retaining 

power are necessary at all costs.
Gen. Ershad’s Jatiya Party (JP) is part of its effort to retain control over the electorate, 

but its main coalition partner at present, the JIB, deeply resents this move. Whether Gen. 

Ershad will join the BNP as a coalition partner is a wide-open question, and at the time 

of writing he has cast his lot, for the time being at least, against the BNP-led alliance 

and joined the movement for Election Commission reform. 

Unfortunately, this consuming struggle between competing visions of how Bangladeshis should define themselves has distracted successive governments and their 

respective leaders from paying closer attention to good governance, service delivery, and 

Bangladesh’s pervasive corruption. Despite these problems, Bangladesh has managed its 

macroeconomy fairly well, with a sustained growth rate of 5 percent over the past decade. 

However, the World Bank contends that without “poor economic and political governance, 

criminalized law and order, institutionalized corruption, weak financial institutions, and 

poorly managed infrastructure,” Bangladesh easily could have achieved a growth rate of 

2 to 5 percent higher.2 Resolving the political conundrum satisfactorily and restoring the 

neutrality and credibility of key institutions of the state therefore may be important to 

securing Bangladesh’s future economic development and prosperity.

Origins of the Secular and Islamist Divide

Bengali Muslims participated in, and contributed seminally to, the creation of Pakistan 

as a separate state in South Asia for the Muslims of British India. Their continued commitment to the idea of Pakistan was critical because the Bengali Muslims of East Pakistan 

constituted a majority of the entire population of the nascent state of Pakistan. However, 

although the majority of East Pakistanis were Muslims, they held steadfast to their cultural identity as ethnic Bengalis. This adherence to Bengali culture and language was not 

received well by the Punjabis, who predominated among the Pakistani ruling elite in West 

Pakistan. After years of perceived negligence, discrimination, and, ultimately, disenfranchisement by West Pakistan, the Bengalis of East Pakistan declared independence. With 

the assistance of India and after a deadly civil war, East Pakistan became independent 

Bangladesh in 1971. 

The Bangladesh independence movement was a triumph of Bengali ethnicity over the 

organizing logic of Islam. Since the Islamist parties were collaborators (commonly called 

razakars by the Bangladeshis) with the Pakistani state in resisting the independence 

movement, political Islam was delegitimized for several years after 1971. Since then, 

however, Islam, and political Islam in particular, has reasserted itself. Arguably, there 

are two main reasons for this resurgence. The first stems from the persistent failure to 

redress the atrocities perpetrated in Bangladesh’s liberation struggle. The second relates 

to evolving efforts to redefine Islam in Bangladesh’s domestic political scene. Both factors have contributed significantly to the ever-expanding room for political maneuver for 

the country’s Islamist forces.

Justice Denied 

During the 1971 war for Bangladeshi independence, the “occupation” forces of the 

Pakistani army, as well as collaborating elements among Bengali or non-Bengali residents 

of East Pakistan, committed atrocities, frequently described as genocidal in scope, against 

the Bengalis of East Pakistan. The collaborators mostly belonged or owed allegiance to 

the JIB and other right-wing groups that actively opposed the idea of Bangladesh. As 

Fakhruddin Ahmed, twice Bangladesh’s foreign secretary (1974–76, 1986–87) and later 

adviser for foreign affairs (foreign minister) in the interim government of 1990–91, has 

documented in his memoirs, the Bengali victors in the liberation struggle against Pakistan demanded that a war crimes tribunal be set up to try those responsible for these 

crimes. 

Bangladesh has managed its 

macroeconomy fairly well, with 

a sustained growth rate of 5 

percent over the past decade. 

Islam, and political Islam in 

particular, has reasserted itself.
The military coup that overthrew the first elected government of Bangladesh and 

built the foundation of prolonged military or quasi-military rule (1975–1990) gradually permitted most of the collaborators to return to Bangladesh and even rehabilitated 

some notables among them. They did so despite outcry from a significant section of 

the population, particularly the secular-oriented sectors. These collaborators have never 

faced any consequences for the violence they perpetrated and, indeed, remain integrated 

into Bangladeshi society. This persistent situation antagonizes the survivors of the war 

and their families. The culture of impunity has served to intensify the contestation for 

national identity and laid the foundation for the mutual political distrust and animosity 

that defines the relationship between the various parties and civil society organizations. 

Contesting Islam’s Role in Political Life

Bangladesh may be uniquely homogeneous as a South Asian nation state, with 98 percent of its population ethnic Bengalis and more than 88 percent Sunni Muslims (with a 

negligible number of Shias). Even so, its transition to democratization has been compromised by a counterproductive culture of zero-sum oppositional politics between its 

major political parties. The reintroduction of Islamism as an important personal identifier 

since 1971 has created a conflict over national identity: Are Bangladeshis Bengalis first 

or Muslims first? Both Islamism and Bengali ethnonationalism have offered Bangladeshi 

citizens and parties competing visions for Bangladesh’s future. Each change of regime 

further pollutes the atmosphere and imperils Bangladesh’s future as a secular, inclusive, 

and secure democratic state. 

This struggle has been further complicated by yet another level of contestation over 

the kind of Islam to be embraced: heterodox Sufi tradition or more orthodox Deobandi 

and Wahhabi versions. 

During the military era the influence of the less tolerant and more orthodox types of 

Islam (Gulf-backed Wahhabism and Salafism and Pakistan-backed versions of Deobandism) began making steady inroads among Bangladeshis, who traditionally have embraced 

Sufi traditions. Saudi and Gulf money poured into mosques, charities, social organizations, 

and madrassahs that promoted Wahhabist and Salafist Islam. Both mainstream parties 

and their respective leaderships increasingly permitted the expansion of the Gulf-backed 

Islamist agenda. In their bid to counter the secular AL, as well as each other, the BNP 

and subsequently Ershad’s JP courted the rightist Islamist parties to redefine themselves, 

not taking into account the long-term consequences of their narrower agenda. 

This process of forcibly realigning the polity to the right has taken place within the 

framework and dynamics of pluralist democracy. In this context the 2007 elections assume 

critical importance. Whichever alliance wins—the BNP (or what remains of it after recent 

defections) and its Islamist allies, or the AL and defecting elements from the BNP—may 

well determine whether Bangladesh will witness further consolidation of the Islamist 

agenda or a reversion to the politics of the ideological center. This conflict raises the 

stakes of the zero-sum game to new heights and has brought the opposing forces to the 

brink of a “war” for survival, with each trying to maximize the means at its disposal to 

neutralize the other.

The zero-sum culture is further exacerbated by the constitutional provision that prohibits party members from voicing dissent against their own party, either in parliament or 

in public. Crossing the floor is punished by loss of the parliamentary seat and its accompanying privileges and benefits. Outside the parliament, it invites the full wrath of the 

party’s “enforcement” machinery of coercion and physical intimidation that has become 

so integral a part of the culture of violence. This constitutional provision precludes moderates of both mainstream parties from forging and promoting consensus positions and is a 

structural factor that reinforces the zero-sum political culture in Bangladesh.

The culture of impunity has laid 

the foundation for mutual political 

distrust and animosity. 

Are Bangladeshis Bengalis first 

or Muslims first?

This conflict has brought the 

opposing forces to the brink of a 

“war” for survival.
Worrying Signs Thus Far

No party has a clean record with respect to seeking to manipulate the elections. The AL 

government had sought to place the person of its choice in the presidency (in 1996) and 

the NCG (in 2001) and to populate the administration with hand-picked loyalists. All 

these efforts largely failed.

Ahead of the fourth general elections under the caretaker system, the BNP-led alliance 

also sought to manipulate the institutions that matter in the election process: the presidency, the NCG, the Election Commission and the bureaucracy. Their efforts to force the 

president to resign and elect a successor of their choosing failed in the face of mounting 

public pressure. BNP attempts to put its own candidate at the top of the NCG by manipulating the retirement age of judges also failed, because of the opposition’s mobilization 

and because its choice, Justice K.M. Hasan, declined the dubious distinction. To avert a 

constitutional crisis that portended violence and public chaos, the president became head 

of the fourth NCG, although this move has not been free of controversy. 

Perhaps the most contested act of the outgoing BNP-led coalition government was its 

appointment of personnel to the Election Commission, in an alleged effort to stack the 

commission in the BNP’s favor. The most provocative step taken by the unpopular and 

suspect CEC was the development of a new voters’ list. At the end of 2006 this controversy had not been resolved. The new list indicates that 90 million people are eligible 

to vote, some 10 million more than credible demographic estimates. Despite High Court 

and Supreme Court injunctions directing the EC to revise and update the 2001 list, recent 

reports suggest that EC’s “revised” list is still bloated by 10 million. Various electoral 

manipulations have prompted public and private criticism by the international community, 

notably the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, and Australia.

Last but not least, widely publicized reports say the BNP-led alliance government has 

arbitrarily selected and, against the rules, placed hand-picked bureaucrats and police who 

will be directly involved in the election process in key positions in the civil administration. These actions were interpreted as evidence of the BNP-led alliance government’s bad 

faith in heavily politicizing the administrative machinery. The opposition has continued 

to demand sweeping changes and remains dissatisfied with the cosmetic changes the NCG 

has made. 

The first acts of the past three NCGs have been to undo almost all measures put in place 

by the outgoing government. The fourth NCG is also expected to take sweeping actions. 

Since 1991 successive presidents have sought to be nonpartisan despite their election 

by the parliament, reflecting the preferences of the ruling party. It remains to be seen 

whether this time these institutions will reassert their neutrality and essential integrity, 

thus reassuring all parties, or whether the changes effected earlier will favor the BNP and 

its allies. The president’s initial actions as head of the NCG have served to cast considerable doubt on his remaining totally nonpartisan. At the time of writing this report, it was 

unclear if his subsequent actions would move him closer to neutrality, if not nonpartisanship, and thus redeem his tarnished image.

Response of Civil Society and the Opposition

An important element in the ongoing political drama that is vital to Bangladesh’s transition to democracy is its fairly vociferous civil society. Numerous civil society organizations 

have been demanding that the two parties undertake a dialogue and arrive at a consensus 

for addressing the ills that plague the nation, not least among them the lack of good 

governance, endemic corruption, neglect of the public welfare, and the looming danger of 

terrorism. Realizing that the outcome of the next elections will be critical in determining 

the future course of the country, various groups and the independent media have called 

for resolving the lingering crisis surrounding the composition of the NCG, completely 

Various electoral manipulations have 

prompted public and private criticism 

by the international community.

An important element vital 

to Bangladesh’s transition to 

democracy is its fairly vociferous 

civil society.
revamping the Election Commission, and removing partisans from the administrative 

machinery. All these proposals were designed to exert moral pressure on the BNP-led 

alliance government to relent and set the stage for truly free and fair elections, as well as 

on the opposition groups to be reasonable in their demands. 

The collective voice of civil society’s numerous organizations, specifically addressing 

problems related to good governance and free and fair elections, unexpectedly gained 

critical traction when the founder and head of the Grameen Bank, Dr. Mohammed Yunus, 

was awarded the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize. For some time Yunus has been one of the leading 

voices in civil society calling for free and fair election practices, selection of honest candidates with clean records by all the parties, and public discernment in electing leaders. 

Faced with spiraling violence that broke out following the political impasse over the 

formation of the NCG before the president stepped in to take charge, these organizations 

continued to call for restoration of sanity and peace. However, as long as the two mainstream parties are locked in brinksmanship, the situation will remain volatile. The real test 

for civil society will be if the antagonists heed civil society’s collective voice and step 

back from the precipice, enabling Bangladeshis to find a solution that will avert further 

civil strife. 

Securing the 2007 Election and Bangladesh’s Future

What needs to be done to secure the next election in the short run and Bangladesh’s 

future as a stable, moderate, and progressive democracy in the long term?

Securing the next elections 

Ensuring that the elections are held freely and fairly is obviously the first priority. Compromised elections would jeopardize peaceful democratic transition in Bangladesh and 

result in continuing political violence and social turmoil. Such a scenario would give 

even greater political space to Islamist extremists, militants, and criminals, with serious 

consequences for Bangladesh’s continued economic development, as well as its domestic 

stability and the security of the entire South Asian region. To secure the forthcoming elections, Bangladeshis must address the following issues immediately, and the international 

community must support them in achieving these goals:

•	 Ensuring the neutrality of the NCG. All sectors of society must perceive this body 

as incontrovertibly neutral and a fair and trustworthy umpire in the forthcoming elections. The president’s assumption of the role of NCG chief adviser and his subsequent 

actions have heightened suspicions that he values BNP party loyalty over the country’s 

overall interests. Because the NCG is respected and has behaved generally with some 

measure of bipartisanship and neutrality, this institution may be critical in salvaging 

the public’s confidence in the EC. The president must consult with it more transparently in decision making and delegate more meaningful authority and responsibilities 

to it than he has thus far. Despite these handicaps, the advisers have played a very 

commendable role in trying to resolve thorny issues related to the reconstitution of 

the Election Commission.

•	 Restoring the credibility of the Election Commission. As constituted during the 

time of the BNP-led regime, the EC lacked credibility as a result of some suspect 

actions by the CEC. To perform its functions and duties as enjoined by the constitution, the EC must regain credibility with the public. The CEC’s departure is only the 

first step in the process. Consensus has to be forged on the issues of his succession, reconstitution of the body and its secretariat, and the controversial voters’ 

list. This may mean postponing the elections to permit the EC to complete its work 

satisfactorily. 

As long as the two mainstream 

parties are locked in brinksmanship, 

the situation will remain volatile.

Compromised elections would 

result in continuing political 

violence and social turmoil.
•	 Diminishing politicization of government bureaucracies. The systematic politicization of the bureaucracy has been widely reported in the media. Administrative personnel involved in the elections must act with neutrality and nonpartisanship. 

•	 Broadening and enlarging the international community’s role. The international 

community must sustain its efforts to encourage all parties to forge a broad-based 

consensus on contentious election issues. It also must consider expanding and 

improving upon previous efforts to ensure maximally free and fair elections. In past 

elections coordination among domestic and international monitoring missions was 

inadequate. In this election it is critical for the various organizations to coordinate 

their activities and field a substantially larger number of observers than in previous 

years. 

•	 Encouraging earlier-than-usual arrival of international election observers. Observers should arrive earlier than they have in the past and attend detailed coordination 

sessions with local partners. If feasible, more local civil society organizations need to 

be mobilized for election monitoring. Organizations that are monitoring the elections 

should, in concert, devise a list of vulnerable constituencies (particularly minorities 

and other disadvantaged groups that have been disenfranchised in past elections) and 

put into a place a systematic plan for watching these constituencies more closely than 

before. In many cases, they have already been identified by international organizations like the National Democratic Institute and International Republican Institute, as 

well as by local organizations. 

•	 Ensuring more resources and technical support. During the elections, the government will shut down all cell phones and ban all satellite phones. These actions will 

compel election monitors to rely upon undependable land lines that may not be 

available near polling stations. Observers, both local and foreign, will need access 

to adequate resources and to technical and logistical support for quick and effective 

mobility. They will also need reliable communications to instantly report any observed 

breach of the rules.

Securing the future

Over the past fifteen years it has become clear that contentious zero-sum politics have 

become intensely polarized, preventing political parties from arriving at consensus on 

fundamental measures required to stabilize core state institutions and shield them from 

partisan contention. Unless these issues are addressed, simply securing the 2007 elections 

cannot ensure Bangladesh’s future as a moderate, secular democracy. 

Given this zero-sum mentality, Bangladesh’s political system and culture require 

reform to ensure the state’s long-term stability. Is this perhaps the time for the new 

institution of the NCG to assume a more proactive role as umpire to the nation’s polity? 

This provocative question is motivated by the inescapable truth that successive 

governments, notwithstanding their repeated commitments before every election, have 

failed to strengthen the core institutions of the state. Unless the political culture changes 

dramatically, Bangladeshis may seek alternatives to the mainstream political parties for 

meaningful change. 

Public opinion in Bangladesh overwhelmingly supported the three caretaker governments since 1990. Despite the controversial circumstances under which the fourth NCG 

formed, initial reports suggested that its members enjoyed a modicum of respect and confidence across society and were seen as honorable and neutral, if not entirely nonpartisan. 

However, some of its members’ actions or statements may have diminished that perception of neutrality. Nevertheless, with some herculean efforts to credibly reconstitute the 

Election Commission, prospects for a reasonably free and fair election might improve.

If the present NCG can restore and sustain its image of neutrality, it may consider 

making some important policy decisions to strengthen the most important institutions of 



The international community 

must consider expanding and 

improving upon previous efforts 

to ensure maximally free and 

fair elections.

Simply securing the 2007 elections 

cannot ensure Bangladesh’s future as 

a moderate, secular democracy.
the state. If the NCG agrees to a more proactive role, then the following might be the 

most important steps to secure Bangladesh’s democratic peace, political stability, and 

economic security.

1. Separation of the judiciary from the executive to ensure independence of the 

former institution. The third NCG sought to separate the judiciary from the executive but ultimately failed to do so, despite repeated calls by the Supreme Court. 

2. Depoliticization of the bureaucracy and restoration of its professionalism.

3. Depoliticization of the Anti-Corruption Commission to ensure its independence 

and efficacy.

4. Adoption of a freedom of information law to lend transparency to governance.

5. Establishment of a truth and reconciliation body with moral rather than judicial 

jurisdiction, to examine crimes against humanity committed during the war of 

liberation. The deep-rooted animosity between fighters for an independent Bangladesh and those who fought against Bangladesh remains imbedded in politics, 

exacerbating the zero-sum game (Jahan, 2005: 80). The collective resolution of 

the events of 1971 would enable the nation and its people to move forward with 

nation building and state consolidation.

6. Restoration to individual parliament members the right to vote on issues 

according to their conscience. Even if such votes were to go against their 

party’s official line, members should not fear recrimination or loss of their seats. 

Bangladesh can hope to consolidate its democracy only if the respective parties 

adopt a transparent, democratic internal process. 

All these issues are critically important for securing the nation’s long-term future. 

Enough time has been lost to internal feuding and procrastinating; the issues must be 

addressed immediately. If the political parties will not address them, the NCG is the only 

other body constitutionally authorized to take them up. In fact, the constitution’s thirteenth amendment includes a doctrine of necessity, which permits the NCG to pursue its 

own policies if it deems such actions necessary for the well-being of the state. The NCG 

also represents a national consensus by virtue of the manner in which it is constituted. 

In light of the culture that impels each party to viscerally oppose whatever the other 

proposes to undertake, NCG action would liberate politics from the constraints that prevent the parties from executing their well-intentioned but often unfulfilled promises. It 

also would enable them to focus on delivery of good governance and the essential public 

goods and services craved by the citizens but in such short supply. 

Conclusion 

Bangladeshis’ ability to address these governance issues and resolve the current crisis will 

largely determine whether Bangladesh makes the transition to a viable democracy. The 

mainstream parties must transcend their brinksmanship and instead demonstrate leadership and willingness to tackle the most pressing matters confronting the Bangladeshi 

state and people. Failure to address these important issues of governance and democracy 

may cede further space to extremist forces, with potentially grave ramifications for the 

security and stability of the nation, the region, and the world.

The collective resolution of the 

events of 1971 would enable 

the nation and its people to 

move forward.

The mainstream parties must demonstrate willingness to tackle the 

most pressing matters confronting 

the Bangladeshi state and people.
10

Notes

1. A breakaway faction of the original party founded by Gen. Ershad. Earlier in 1999 he had forged 

a coalition with the BNP, but when he decided to break from this coalition, his party splintered. The 

Naziur faction remained a part of the electoral alliance with the BNP and has been part of the BNP-led, 

four-party alliance government since 2001. 

2. Statement by Christine I. Wallich, chair, Local Consultative Group, and World Bank country director 

for Bangladesh, May 8, 2004, in Dhaka. 

Bibliography

Ahmed, A.F. Salahuddin. Bengali Nationalism and the Emergence of Bangladesh. Dhaka: International Center for 

Bengal Studies, 1994.

. and Bazlul Mobin Chowdhury, eds. Bangladesh—National Culture and Heritage. Dhaka: Independent 

University, 2004.

Ahmed, Fakhruddin. Critical Times—Memoirs of a Diplomat. Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1994.

. The Caretakers, A First-Hand Account of the Interim Government of Bangladesh 

(1990–91). Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1998.

Grare, Frederic. Political Islam in the Indian Subcontinent—The Jamaat-i-Islami. Manohar: Centre de sciences 

humaines, 2001.

Hasanuzzaman, Al Masud. Role of Opposition in Bangladesh Politics. Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1998.

Islam, Sirajul, ed. Banglapedia: National Encyclopedia of Bangladesh, 10 vols. Dhaka: Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, 2003. www.Banglapedia.org. 

Jahan, Rounaq. Bangladesh Politics—Problems and Issues. Dhaka: University Press Limited, 2005.

Joshi, Pooja. Jamaat-i-Islami. Delhi: Kalinga Publications, 2003.

Karim, S.A. Sheikh Mujib, Triumph and Tragedy. Dhaka: University Press Limited, 2005.

Khan, Akbar Ali. Discovery of Bangladesh: Explorations into Dynamics of a Hidden Nation. Dhaka: University 

Press Limited, 2001.

Muhith, A.M.A. Bangladesh, Emergence of a Nation. Dhaka: University Press Limited, 1992.

Riaz, Ali. God Willing: The Politics of Islamism in Bangladesh. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004.

United Nations Development Program. Beyond Hartals: Towards Democratic Dialogue in Bangladesh. Dhaka: 

United Nations Development Program, 2005. www.un-bd.org/undp.

Wallich, Christine I. “Statement at Bangladesh Development Forum: Statement on Behalf of the Local Consultative Group,” May 8, 2004. www.web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/contentMDK:20200590~menu

PK:34472~pagePK:34370~piPK:34424~theSitePK:4607,00.html.

Zaheer, Hasan. The Separation of East Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1994.

Of Related Interest

A number of other publications from the United States Institute of Peace examine issues 

related to Bangladesh.

Recent Institute reports include

•	 The Rise of Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh, by Sumit Ganguly (Special Report, August 

2006)

•	 Bangladesh: Human Rights and the Rule of Law in Crisis, by C. Christine Fair and Kerem 

Levitas (USIPeace Briefing, May 2005) 

To obtain an Institute report (available free of charge), write United States Institute of 

Peace, 1200 17th Street NW, Suite 200, Washington DC 20036-3011; call (202) 429-6063; 

or e-mail usip_requests@usip.org.

United States 

Institute of Peace

1200 17th Street NW

Washington, DC 20036

www.usip.org

An online edition of this and related 

reports can be found on our Web site 

(www.usip.org), together with additional 

information on the subject.