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*********************************************** 
A BETTER WAY WHOLESALE AUTOS, INC.

v. KIARA RODRIGUEZ ET AL.

(AC 38839)

Mullins, Beach and Harper, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff sought to vacate an arbitration award rendered in favor of the

defendant R and the defendant finance company in connection with the

plaintiff’s sale of a used vehicle to R, who had initiated the arbitration

process seeking rescission of her purchase and sale agreement, as well

as her financing agreement, for an alleged warranty violation. During

the pendency of the arbitration process, R settled with the finance

company, which subsequently brought cross claims against the plaintiff

for, inter alia, alleged violations of their dealer agreement. The arbitrator

entered an award in favor of the defendants, ordering, inter alia, that

the finance company return the vehicle to the plaintiff. Thereafter, the

trial court denied the plaintiff’s application to vacate the arbitration

award and granted the defendants’ motions to confirm the award. From

the judgment rendered thereon, the plaintiff appealed to this court. The

plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the parties’ submission to the arbitrator

was restricted, and that because title to the vehicle was never at issue,

the arbitrator exceeded his authority in ordering the finance company

to return the vehicle to it. Held:

1. The trial court properly denied the plaintiff’s application to vacate the

arbitration award: given the plain language of the arbitration agreement,

which provided that any claim or dispute between R and the plaintiff

arising out of the purchase or condition of the vehicle was to be settled

by way of binding arbitration, and given that arbitration was commenced

pursuant to that agreement, which contained no restrictions on the

issues that could be decided by the arbitrator, the submission to the

arbitrator was unrestricted and, thus, possession and title to the vehicle

was at issue from the onset of the arbitration and was within the scope

of the submission; moreover, the arbitrator, by ordering the return of

the vehicle to the plaintiff, did not exceed his power by rendering an

award that was beyond the scope of the unrestricted submission, as

the submission permitted the arbitrator to decide any claim or dispute

between R and the plaintiff arising out of the purchase or condition of

the vehicle, or arising out of the contract or resulting relationship, R

specifically requested on the form submitted demanding the arbitration

that the contract be cancelled and that the purchase of the vehicle be

revoked, and, therefore, it would be nonsensical to conclude that the

arbitrator had the authority to cancel the contract and to revoke the

purchase but that he did not have the authority to decide what happened

to the vehicle that was the subject of the purchase and the contract.

2. The plaintiff’s claim that the trial court improperly ordered it to pay

the attorney’s fees and costs of the finance company in defending the

arbitrator’s award was not reviewable, the plaintiff having failed to brief

the claim adequately.

Argued April 17—officially released September 12, 2017

Procedural History

Application to vacate an arbitration award, brought to

the Superior Court in the judicial district of Waterbury,

where the matter was removed to the United States

District Court for the District of Connecticut; thereafter,

the matter was remanded to state court, where the

defendants filed separate motions to confirm the award;

subsequently, the matter was tried to the court, M.

Taylor, J.; judgment granting the motions to confirm

and denying the application to vacate, from which the

plaintiff appealed to this court. Thereafter, the court
granted the named defendant’s motion for attorney’s

fees. Affirmed.

Kenneth A. Votre, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Daniel S. Blinn, for the appellee (named defendant).

Proloy K. Das, with whom was Melissa A. Federico,

for the appellee (defendant American Credit Acceptance, LLC).
Opinion

MULLINS, J. The plaintiff, A Better Way Wholesale

Autos, Inc. (A Better Way), appeals from the judgment

of the trial court denying its application to vacate an

arbitration award and granting the motions to confirm

the arbitration award filed by the defendants, Kiara

Rodriguez and American Credit Acceptance, LLC

(finance company). A Better Way also appeals from the

court’s judgment modifying the arbitration award to

include attorney’s fees and costs to the finance company for its defense of the award in the Superior Court.

On appeal, A Better Way claims that the trial court

erred in (1) denying its application to vacate the award

on the ground that the arbitrator’s decision was beyond

the scope of the parties’ submission, and (2) ordering

A Better Way to pay the attorney’s fees and costs of

the finance company in defending the arbitrator’s award

in the Superior Court.1 We affirm the judgment of the

trial court.

The following facts, as set forth by the trial court

in its January 14, 2016 memorandum of decision and

procedural history inform our review. ‘‘The underlying

arbitration between the parties arises from the sale of

a used 2006 Toyota Scion [vehicle] by A Better Way to

. . . Rodriguez. In this dispute, Rodriguez included [the

finance company] as a defendant in its role as the

assignee of the financing agreement in her retail installment sales contract with A Better Way.

‘‘Rodriguez initiated the arbitration process by a written demand, dated June 4, 2014, for damages and the

rescission of her purchase and sale agreement with A

Better Way, as well as her financing agreement with

[the finance company]. In the demand letter, she [stated

that she] ‘revokes her acceptance of the vehicle,’

asserting, inter alia, a warranty violation. Importantly,

the vehicle was left in the possession of A Better Way.

She previously had written to A Better Way on March

21, 2014, stating that ‘[i]f you are unable to fix my car,

then I would like to cancel the sale . . . .’ [Rodriguez’]

letters were submitted, along with her demand for arbitration, to the American Arbitration Association on June

27, 2014. . . . In accordance with the agreement of the

parties, the arbitration was conducted by the American

Arbitration Association, with Attorney John R. Downey

serving as arbitrator.’’ (Citation omitted.)

‘‘Rodriguez made her submission to arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause with A Better Way which,

in relevant part, provides: ‘Any claim or dispute,

whether in contract, tort, statute or otherwise (including the interpretation and scope of this . . . clause,

and the arbitrability of the claim or dispute), between

you and us or our employees, agents, successors or

assigns, which arises out of or relates to your credit

application, purchase or condition of this vehicle, this
contract or any resulting transaction or relationship

(including any such relationship with third parties who

do not sign this contract) shall, at your or our election,

be resolved by neutral, binding arbitration and not by

a court action.’ . . . Although the arbitration submission was made by Rodriguez pursuant to her retail

installment sales contract with A Better Way, she

included [the finance company] as a defendant because

it was specifically identified in her contract as the

assignee of the financing agreement.’’2

(Citation

omitted.)

‘‘During the pendency of the arbitration process,

Rodriguez settled with [the finance company] and,

based upon alleged violations of their Dealer

Agreement, [the finance company] brought cross claims

against A Better Way.3

. . . In its proposed findings

and orders filed after the conclusion of the arbitration

hearing, [the finance company] proposed the return of

the [vehicle] to A Better Way. . . .

‘‘On May 12, 2015, Attorney Downey entered an

Award of Arbitrator in favor of Rodriguez and [the

finance company]. . . . The award provides for the following payments to Rodriguez: (1) [Truth in Lending

Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (TILA)] statutory damages

of $1000; (2) [Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act,

General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. (CUTPA)] damages of

$1000; (3) punitive damages of $2000; and (4) attorney’s

fees of $12,500. The award also provides for the following [as to the finance company]: (1) arbitration costs

of $3700; (2) legal fees of $25,000; and (3) [the finance

company’s] return of the [vehicle] to A Better Way.’’

(Citations omitted; footnotes altered.)

A Better Way, specifically pursuant to General Statutes § 52-418,4

filed an application to vacate the portion

of the award that ordered the finance company to return

the vehicle to A Better Way on the grounds that ‘‘[t]he

parties to the arbitration did not state that possession

of the vehicle was at issue in any of the pleadings before

the arbitrator . . . [and] the submission did not

include a determination of the ownership of the vehicle.’’ A Better Way contended that the arbitrator, therefore, had exceeded his powers in determining

ownership of the vehicle.5 Rodriguez and the finance

company each filed a motion to confirm the award;

the finance company moved pursuant to the Federal

Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 9, and Rodriguez moved pursuant to General Statutes § 52-417. The finance company also requested that it be reimbursed $28,245.92

for the legal fees and costs it incurred in defending the

award in the Superior Court in light of A Better Way’s

application to vacate. At the time of the hearing, the

finance company also argued that it anticipated incurring an additional $3840 in fees and costs for the

hearing.

In a January 14, 2016 memorandum of decision, the
court granted the motions to confirm the award, and

it denied the application to vacate. Specifically, the

court determined that title and possession of the vehicle

always were at issue, and that this was evidenced by

Rodriguez’ original letter in which she sought to rescind

the entire agreement. The court, therefore, found no

basis upon which to vacate the award. As to the finance

company’s request for the payment of the attorney’s

fees it incurred in defending the award, the court found

that, pursuant to section 25 of the dealer agreement

and General Statutes § 52-419 (b),6

the finance company

was entitled to such reimbursement. The court then

ordered that A Better Way reimburse the finance company $621.92 in costs and expenses and $20,000 in attorney’s fees within thirty days. This appeal followed.7

Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

I

A Better Way claims that the trial court erred in

denying its application to vacate the award on the

ground that the arbitrator’s decision was beyond the

scope of the parties’ submission in that the title to

the vehicle was not within that submission. It further

contends that the award should be considered in a way

similar to the mosaic rule8

in a family matter and that

it must be vacated in its entirety because the order that

the finance company return the vehicle to A Better

Way was outside the scope of the parties’ submission.

Accordingly, A Better Way argues, the court improperly

denied its application to vacate the award. The finance

company and Rodriguez argue that the court made a

proper determination that the submission was

unrestricted and that possession and title to the vehicle

always was at issue, and, therefore, the arbitrator acted

within his authority in determining who should take

possession of the vehicle.9 We agree that the court properly denied A Better Way’s application to vacate the

award of the arbitrator.

We set forth the standard of review. ‘‘Arbitration is

a creature of contract and the parties themselves, by

the terms of their submission, define the powers of

the arbitrators. . . . The authority of an arbitrator to

adjudicate the controversy is limited only if the

agreement contains express language restricting the

breadth of issues, reserving explicit rights, or conditioning the award on court review. In the absence of any

such qualifications, an agreement is unrestricted.’’

(Citation omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation

marks omitted.) LaFrance v. Lodmell, 322 Conn. 828,

850–51, 144 A.3d 373 (2016).

‘‘When the scope of the submission is unrestricted,

the resulting award is not subject to de novo review

even for errors of law so long as the award conforms

to the submission. . . . Because we favor arbitration

as a means of settling private disputes, we undertake

judicial review of arbitration awards in a manner
designed to minimize interference with an efficient and

economical system of alternative dispute resolution.

. . . Garrity v. McCaskey, 223 Conn. 1, 4–5, 612 A.2d

742 (1992). Accordingly, the factual findings of the arbitrator . . . are not subject to judicial review. Burr

Road Operating Co. II, LLC v. New England Health

Care Employees Union, District 1199, 316 Conn. 618,

638, 114 A.3d 144 (2015); see also Harty v. Cantor

Fitzgerald & Co., 275 Conn. 72, 80, 881 A.2d 139 (2005)

([u]nder an unrestricted submission, the arbitrators’

decision is considered final and binding; thus the courts

will not review the evidence considered by the arbitrators nor will they review the award for errors of law

or fact . . .).’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Norwalk Police Union, Local 1727, Council 15, AFSCME,

AFL-CIO v. Norwalk, 324 Conn. 618, 628–29, 153 A.3d

1280 (2017).

‘‘The resulting award can be reviewed, however, to

determine if the award conforms to the submission.

. . . Garrity v. McCaskey, supra, 223 Conn. 4. Such a

limited scope of judicial review is warranted given the

fact that the parties voluntarily bargained for the decision of the arbitrator and, as such, the parties are presumed to have assumed the risks of and waived

objections to that decision. . . . It is clear that a party

cannot object to an award which accomplishes precisely what the [arbitrator was] authorized to do merely

because that party dislikes the results. . . . American

Universal Ins. Co. v. DelGreco, [205 Conn. 178, 186–87,

530 A.2d 171 (1987)]. The significance, therefore, of a

determination that an arbitration submission was

unrestricted or restricted is not to determine what [the

arbitrator is] obligated to do, but to determine the scope

of judicial review of what [he or she has] done. Put

another way, the submission tells [the arbitrator] what

[he or she is] obligated to decide. The determination

by a court of whether the submission was restricted or

unrestricted tells the court what its scope of review

is regarding the [arbitrator’s] decision.’’ (Emphasis in

original; internal quotation marks omitted.) LaFrance

v. Lodmell, supra, 322 Conn. 851–52.

Here, A Better Way asserts that the parties’ submission to the arbitrator was restricted. It argues that, in

the case of the finance company and A Better Way,

there was no submission at all. It further argues that

Rodriguez, in her submission, also never requested that

the vehicle be ordered returned to A Better Way. We

conclude that the parties’ submission was unrestricted

and that the title to the vehicle was at play from the

onset, with Rodriguez’ request that the purchase be cancelled.

The arbitration clause in the finance agreement

between Rodriguez and A Better Way, which was

assigned from A Better Way to the finance company,

provided in relevant part: ‘‘Any claim or dispute,
whether in contract, tort, statute or otherwise (including the interpretation and scope of this Arbitration

Clause, and the arbitrability of the claim or dispute),

between you and us or our employees, agents, successors or assigns, which arises out of or relates to your

credit application, purchase or condition of this vehicle,

this contract or any resulting transaction or relationship

. . . shall, at your or our election, be resolved by neutral, binding arbitration and not by a court action. . . .

‘‘The arbitrator shall apply governing substantive law

in making an award. The arbitration hearing shall be

conducted in the federal district in which you reside

unless the Creditor-Seller is a party to the claim or

dispute, in which case the hearing will be held in the

federal district where this contract was executed. . . .

Each party shall be responsible for its own attorney,

expert and other fees, unless awarded by the arbitrator

under applicable law. . . .

‘‘You and we retain any rights to self-help remedies,

such as repossession. You and we retain the right to

seek remedies in small claims court for disputes or

claims within that court’s jurisdiction, unless such

action is transferred, removed or appealed to a different

court. Neither you nor we waive the right to arbitrate

by using self-help remedies or filing suit. Any court

having jurisdiction may enter judgment on the arbitrator’s award. This Arbitration Clause shall survive any

termination, payoff or transfer of this contract.’’

(Emphasis added.)

Under the plain language of the arbitration

agreement, any claim or dispute between Rodriguez

and A Better Way (and its assigns) arising out of the

purchase or condition of the vehicle, or arising out of

the contract or a resulting relationship, was to be settled by binding arbitration, if elected. The parties commenced arbitration pursuant to this agreement, which

clearly contains no restrictions on the issues that could

be decided by the arbitrator. Therefore, the submission

in this case was unrestricted. We next consider whether

the portion of the arbitrator’s award, ordering the

finance company to return the vehicle to A Better Way,

was beyond the unrestricted submission of the parties.

‘‘Even in the case of an unrestricted submission, we

have . . . recognized three grounds for vacating an

award: (1) the award rules on the constitutionality of

a statute . . . (2) the award violates clear public policy

. . . [and] (3) the award contravenes one or more of

the statutory proscriptions of § 52-418. . . . [Section]

52-418 (a) (4) provides that an arbitration award shall

be vacated if the arbitrators have exceeded their powers

or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final

and definite award upon the subject matter submitted

was not made. In our construction of § 52-418 (a) (4),

we have, as a general matter, looked to a comparison

of the award with the submission to determine whether
the arbitrators have exceeded their powers.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Comprehensive Orthopaedics & Musculoskeletal Care, LLC v. Axtmayer, 293

Conn. 748, 754, 980 A.2d 297 (2009).

A Better Way asserts that the arbitrator exceeded his

power in ordering the finance company to return the

vehicle to it because title to the vehicle was never at

issue, and, therefore, the award was beyond the scope

of the submission. We disagree.

After purchasing the vehicle from A Better Way, experiencing many difficulties with it, and leaving the vehicle

in the possession of A Better Way, Rodriguez filed a

claim for arbitration with the American Arbitration

Association, specifically requesting ‘‘[r]evocation of

acceptance of the vehicle, cancellation of the contract

and deletion of trade line reporting.’’ She named both

A Better Way and the finance company in her claim.

Thereafter, the finance company filed cross claims

against A Better Way for contractual indemnification,

indemnification and contribution, unjust enrichment,

and two counts of breach of contract, namely, the

dealer agreement.

The arbitrator found that Rodriguez had sent a letter

to A Better Way stating that if it could not fix her vehicle,

she wanted to cancel the sale and get her money back.

A Better Way threw away that letter, and, after Rodriguez was informed, she mailed another copy to A Better

Way. The arbitrator further found that A Better Way

had required Rodriguez to purchase a service contract

as a condition of her financing without proper disclosure, and that A Better Way previously had required

other customers to do the same. The arbitrator found

the conduct of A Better Way to be ‘‘deceptive and unethical and [in] violat[ion of] CUTPA . . . [and] TILA.’’

The arbitrator also found A Better Way to be in breach

of the dealer agreement with the finance company. As

part of his award, the arbitrator ordered that the finance

company ‘‘cause [the vehicle] to be returned to [A Better Way].’’

The unrestricted submission here permitted the arbitrator to decide any claim or dispute between Rodriguez

and A Better Way, and its assigns, arising out of the

purchase or condition of the vehicle, or arising out

of the contract or a resulting relationship. Rodriguez

specifically requested on the face of the form that she

submitted demanding the arbitration in this case that

the contract be cancelled and that the purchase of the

vehicle be revoked. We conclude that it would be nonsensical to conclude that the arbitrator had the authority to cancel the contract and to revoke the purchase

but that he did not have the authority to decide what

happened to the vehicle that was the subject of the

purchase and the contract. Certainly, that could not be

the case. We agree with the trial court that the title to

the vehicle was at issue from the onset of this arbitration
and that the arbitrator did not exceed his power by

rendering an award that was beyond the scope of the

submission.

II

A Better Way also claims that the trial court improperly ordered it to pay the attorney’s fees and costs of the

finance company in defending the arbitrator’s award.

Specifically, it sets forth two separate claims in its

appellate brief regarding the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees to the finance company: (1) ‘‘The trial court

erred in concluding that the dealer agreement between

[A Better Way and the finance company] provided for

attorney’s fees and costs incurred by [the finance company]’’10; and (2) ‘‘The trial court erred in concluding

that [A Better Way] shall pay for attorney’s fees and

costs to [the finance company].’’ A Better Way also

argues that the arbitration provision in the dealer

agreement, specifically section 25 of the dealer

agreement, which contains a fee shifting provision; see

footnote 3 of this opinion; was ‘‘never invoked’’ during

this arbitration.11 We decline to review these claims

and arguments.

First, A Better Way fails to set forth any standard of

review for these claims. See Practice Book § 67-4 (d)

(‘‘[t]he argument on each point shall include a separate,

brief statement of the standard of review the appellant

believes should be applied’’); Thompson v. Rhodes, 125

Conn. App. 649, 651, 10 A.3d 537 (2010) (concluding

claim inadequately briefed when plaintiff failed, inter

alia, to provide standard of review); In re Adelina G.,

56 Conn. App. 40, 43, 740 A.2d 920 (1999) (declining to

review claim when respondent failed to provide standard of review and cited to legal authority that undermined argument).

Second, A Better Way provides a citation to only one

case, Steiger v. J.S. Builders, Inc., 39 Conn. App. 32,

38–39, 663 A.2d 432 (1995), for the proposition that

Steiger sets forth the factors that a court should consider in assessing the reasonableness of an award of

attorney’s fees, despite its claims that there was no

basis for the trial court to award any fees whatsoever

for the finance company’s defense of the arbitration

award.12

In light of the foregoing, we decline to review these

claims on the basis of inadequate briefing. See Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Gilmore, 289 Conn. 88, 124–

25, 956 A.2d 1145 (2008) (defendant’s claim deemed

abandoned, through inadequate briefing, because she

devoted little more than one page to discussion of claim,

and single case on which defendant relied for precedent

was not relevant to claim on appeal).

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 Specifically, A Better Way briefs six claims and subclaims on appeal,
many of which overlap. It claims that the trial court erred: (1) ‘‘in concluding

that the arbitrator’s award was not ‘so imperfectly executed’ and that a

mutual, final, and definite award was made by the arbitrator’’; (1) (a) ‘‘the

arbitrator’s ruling on the repossession of the automobile is outside the scope

of the submission’’; (1) (b) ‘‘there is no applicable arbitration clause between

plaintiff [A Better Way] and [the] defendant [finance company]’’; (2) ‘‘as a

matter of law in concluding that the return of . . . [the] vehicle was implicit

in [Rodriquez’] demands on [A Better Way]’’; (3) ‘‘as a matter of law in

concluding that the arbitrator’s decision regarding [the] disposition of the

vehicle was within the parties’ submission agreement’’; (3) (a) ‘‘the submission in this case is not unrestricted and may be reviewed for errors of law

and the arbitrator made errors of law and the trial court adopted them’’;

(3) (b) ‘‘the award must be vacated under [General Statutes §] 52-418’’; (4)

‘‘in finding that the arbitrator’s order to return [Rodriguez’] vehicle to [A

Better Way] was a rational disposition of the property as it was outside the

scope of the submission’’; (5) ‘‘in finding that the dealer agreement between

[A Better Way] and [the finance company] provided for attorney’s fees and

costs incurred by [the finance company]’’; and (6) ‘‘in concluding that [A

Better Way] shall pay [attorney’s] fees and costs to [the finance company].’’

To avoid duplicative analysis, we have combined these claims.

2 The arbitration clause in A Better Way’s agreement with Rodriguez also

provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any arbitration under this Arbitration Clause

shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) and

not by any state law concerning arbitration. . . . Any court having jurisdiction may enter judgment on the arbitrator’s award.’’

The choice of law provision in the agreement provides that the agreement

shall be governed by federal and Connecticut law.

3 The arbitration clause of the dealer agreement between A Better Way

and the finance company, specifically section 25 of that agreement, provides

in relevant part: ‘‘The parties agree that . . . if any dispute . . . occurs

arising out of . . . this Agreement, at the request of a party, the parties

shall resolve such dispute by binding arbitration administered and conducted

under the then current Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association and Title 9 of the United States Code. The parties agree

that once one party has elected to arbitrate, binding arbitration is the exclusive method for resolving any and all disputes and that by agreeing to

this arbitration provision and entering into this Agreement, the parties are

waiving their right to a jury trial. . . . The arbitrator shall apply and be

bound by governing state or federal law when making an award. . . . A

party may enter judgment on the award in any court of competent jurisdiction. . . . The prevailing party in any arbitration proceeding, or judicial

action to enforce an arbitration determination or award, shall be entitled

to reimbursement from the other party for costs, filing fees, reasonable

pretrial, trial and appellate attorney’s fees . . . . The parties acknowledge

and agree that the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) shall govern

any arbitration under this arbitration provision and Agreement. All arbitration hearings shall take place in Spartanburg, South Carolina, unless the

parties mutually agree in writing on a different location to hold any such

arbitration hearing.’’

The choice of law provision in the dealer agreement provides that the

agreement shall be governed by the law of South Carolina.

4 We note that the arbitration clause in the dealer agreement and in A

Better Way’s agreement with Rodriguez each specify that any arbitration

proceeding shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1

et seq. Rodriguez’ agreement also specifically states that ‘‘[a]ny arbitration

under this Arbitration Clause shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration

Act (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) and not by any state law concerning arbitration.’’

On appeal, A Better Way continues to argue the merits of its § 52-418

application to vacate an arbitration award specifically under Connecticut

law, without reference to the Federal Arbitration Act or any federal case

law. It also does not rely on the law of South Carolina in any of its claims

or arguments. See footnote 3 of this opinion. Furthermore, it makes no

claim of error concerning the trial court’s application of Connecticut law

in this case. Accordingly, we assume, without deciding, that Connecticut

law applies to this matter. Any claim to the contrary has been waived by

A Better Way.

5

In its application to vacate the award, A Better Way specifically requested:

‘‘Wherefore, [A Better Way] respectfully requests the court to vacate the

arbitration award due to the arbitrator exceeding his powers in awarding

title of the subject vehicle to American Credit Acceptance.’’ (Emphasis
added.) This appears to be a clerical error, which the parties and the court

apparently chose to disregard.

6 Section 52-419 provides: ‘‘(a) Upon the application of any party to an

arbitration, the superior court for the judicial district in which one of the

parties resides or, in a controversy concerning land, for the judicial district

in which the land is situated, or, when the court is not in session, any judge

thereof, shall make an order modifying or correcting the award if it finds

any of the following defects: (1) If there has been an evident material

miscalculation of figures or an evident material mistake in the description

of any person, thing or property referred to in the award; (2) if the arbitrators

have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them unless it is a matter

not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matters submitted; or (3)

if the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of

the controversy.

‘‘(b) The order shall modify and correct the award, so as to effect the

intent thereof and promote justice between the parties.’’

7 After A Better Way filed its appeal, Rodriguez filed a motion for counsel

fees, which the court granted in the amount of $6500. A Better Way has not

amended its appeal to include a challenge to this award.

8 See Marshall v. Marshall, 119 Conn. App. 120, 135–36, 988 A.2d 314

(2010) (explaining the mosaic rule).

9 The finance company also argues that we should dismiss the challenge

to the portion of the award regarding the return of the vehicle because A

Better Way is not aggrieved by it; it actually inures to A Better Way’s benefit.

During oral argument before this court, the finance company also stated

that, if A Better Way does not want to accept title to the vehicle, it is willing

to keep the vehicle and that it has no objection to the vehicle being returned

to the finance company.

‘‘Two broad yet distinct categories of aggrievement exist, classical and

statutory. . . . Classical aggrievement requires a two part showing. First,

a party must demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest in the subject

matter of the decision, as opposed to a general interest that all members

of the community share. . . . Second, the party must also show that the

. . . decision has specially and injuriously affected that specific personal

or legal interest. . . . Aggrievement does not demand certainty, only the

possibility of an adverse effect on a legally protected interest. . . .

‘‘Statutory aggrievement exists by legislative fiat, not by judicial analysis

of the particular facts of the case. In other words, in cases of statutory

aggrievement, particular legislation grants standing to those who claim injury

to an interest protected by that legislation.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mayer v. Historic District Commission, 325 Conn. 765, 772–73, 160

A.3d 333 (2017).

We conclude that A Better Way has standing to appeal. Section 52-418

provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) Upon the application of any party to an

arbitration, the superior court for the judicial district in which one of the

parties resides or, in a controversy concerning land, for the judicial district

in which the land is situated or, when the court is not in session, any judge

thereof, shall make an order vacating the award if it finds any of the following

defects: . . . (4) if the arbitrators have exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject

matter submitted was not made.’’ (Emphasis added.)

There can be no dispute that A Better Way was a party to the arbitration

and that it applied to vacate the award on the ground that the arbitrator

exceeded his powers. Additionally, A Better Way argues that taking possession of the car is a burden on it, which, arguably, establishes ‘‘the possibility

of an adverse effect on a legally protected interest’’ required for classical

aggrievement. Mayer v. Historic District Commission, supra, 325 Conn.

773. Accordingly, A Better Way has standing to raise this issue on appeal.

10 Insofar as this claim could be read as challenging the trial court’s confirmation of the arbitrator’s award of attorney’s fees to the finance company,

a review of the pleadings reveals that A Better Way did not seek to vacate

the award on that ground. Rather, the only ground alleged in the application

to vacate was that the award was beyond the scope of the parties’ submission

because the arbitrator ordered that the finance company return the vehicle

to A Better Way. There also was nothing concerning the arbitrator’s award

of attorney fees to A Better Way in A Better Way’s memorandum in support

of its application to vacate. Furthermore, a thorough review of the trial

court’s decision reveals that it did not consider the propriety of the arbitrator’s award of fees to costs to the finance company in its decision. Accordingly, we consider any such claim waived.
11 On this issue, the finance company argues that A Better Way never

objected to its cross claims during arbitration, which clearly claimed a breach

of the dealer agreement and damages thereunder. During oral argument it

also argued that if A Better Way had objections to the cross claims and

their arbitrability, it could have filed an action in the Superior Court to

enjoin the arbitration of the cross claims or it could have raised an objection

before the arbitrator; A Better Way did neither. Therefore, the finance company argues, A Better Way waived any claim that the dealer agreement,

including section 25, did not apply. A Better Way responds that section 25

of the dealer agreement is severable from the rest of the dealer agreement

and that without specifically invoking that provision and undertaking the

specific arbitration procedures applicable under that provision, the parties

had proceeded with arbitration only under the finance agreement.

The arbitrator, although specifically finding that A Better Way had

breached the dealer agreement, did not mention section 25 in his written

award. The trial court concluded that the dealer agreement, including section

25, had been invoked by the finance company’s filing of cross claims at the

arbitration. The court awarded attorney’s fees and costs to the finance

company for its defense of the arbitration award through a modification of

the arbitration award specifically pursuant to § 52-419 (b). A Better Way

neither discusses nor mentions § 52-419 in its appellate brief or in its

reply brief.

12 Additionally, throughout these claims, A Better Way, although fully

acknowledging that section 17 of the dealer agreement specifically provides

that the ‘‘[d]ealer shall defend, indemnify, and hold Finance Company . . .

harmless from and against any and all, claims, losses, liabilities, damages,

injuries, costs, expenses, outside attorneys’ fees, court costs and other

amounts arising out of or resulting from (i) Dealer’s breach of this

Agreement,’’ asserts that it ‘‘did not breach any term of its contract with

[the finance company] and was therefore not liable for the reimbursement

of attorney’s fees under the dealer agreement, and the trial court erred in

awarding such attorney’s fees.’’ The contention that it ‘‘did not breach any

term of its contract,’’ in addition to being inadequately briefed, simply is

untenable in light of the specific unchallenged findings of the arbitrator.

Here, the arbitrator specifically found that the finance company prevailed

on its cross claim for breach of the dealer agreement, specifically section

9 (K) and section 17 (A) of the dealer agreement.

Section 9 (K) of the dealer agreement provides in relevant part: ‘‘In the

event a Buyer attempts to return or surrender the Vehicle to Dealer (e.g., a

voluntary repossession), Dealer shall immediately notify Finance Company,

which in no event shall exceed one (1) business day.’’