Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

Jones v. Department of Healthcare & Family Services, 2016 IL App (4th) 140942

Appellate Court 

Caption

TORIA N. JONES, Plaintiff-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. THE 

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTHCARE AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Defendant-Appellant and Cross-Appellee, and THE CIVIL SERVICE 

COMMISSION; CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION, CHRIS 

KOLKER; COMMISSIONER ANITA M. CUMMINGS; 

COMMISSIONER ARES G. DALIANAS; COMMISSIONER 

SUSAN KREY; and COMMISSIONER GARRET P. FITZGERALD,

Defendants.

District & No. Fourth District

Docket No. 4-14-0942

Rule 23 order filed

Rule 23 order

withdrawn

Opinion filed

December 22, 2105

February 17, 2016

February 17, 2016

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Sangamon County, No. 12-MR-968; 

the Hon. John P. Schmidt, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Circuit court judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.

The Commission’s initial order is reinstated.

Counsel on

Appeal

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Carolyn E. Shapiro, 

Solicitor General, and Frank Bieszczat (argued), Assistant Attorney 

General, of counsel), for appellant.

Carl R. Draper (argued), of Feldman Wasser, of Springfield, for 

appellee.
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Panel JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE delivered the judgment of the court, with 

opinion.

Presiding Justice Knecht and Justice Turner concurred in the judgment 

and opinion.

 OPINION 

¶ 1 From April 2001 to December 2009, plaintiff, Toria N. Jones, was employed by the State 

of Illinois in the Department of Human Services (Human Services). In January 2010, she 

accepted a position with defendant, the Department of Healthcare and Family Services 

(Department). In March 2012, the Department terminated Jones’ employment after receiving 

the results of an investigation that found Jones committed numerous policy violations 

throughout 2008 while employed with Human Services. 

¶ 2 Later that month, Jones filed a written request for a hearing before the Civil Service 

Commission (Commission) (Civil Service Commission case No. DA-46-12). The Commission 

adopted the findings of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) and determined Jones committed 

multiple acts of misconduct that warranted termination. In November 2012, Jones filed a 

complaint for administrative review in the circuit court of Sangamon County. The court upheld 

the Commission’s finding of misconduct but determined termination was too severe and 

remanded the case to the Commission for imposition of a lesser sanction. In July 2014, the 

Commission issued Jones a 90-day suspension, which the court upheld in September 2014. 

¶ 3 The Department appeals, asserting the Commission properly discharged Jones. Jones 

cross-appeals, arguing (1) the Department’s claim should be barred by the doctrine of laches, 

(2) insufficient evidence existed to support the Commission’s findings of misconduct, and (3) 

the findings of misconduct were inadequate to support just cause to discharge her from 

employment. We note the Commission and its commissioners are not parties to this appeal. For 

the following reasons, we (1) reverse the circuit court’s order remanding the case to the 

Commission for imposition of a lesser sanction, (2) vacate the Commission’s subsequent 

90-day suspension sanction, and (3) affirm the Commission’s original order discharging Jones.

¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND 

¶ 5 In April 2001, Jones began working for Human Services. Her responsibilities included 

determining whether clients qualified for Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) 

benefits and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) benefits. If authorized, the 

State releases funds onto a Link card provided to the client. SNAP benefits are used to pay for 

specific food-related items. TANF benefits, on the other hand, are unrestricted cash benefits 

placed on a Link card as a form of reimbursement, such as for transportation or childcare costs. 

While working with Human Services, in 2006, Jones provided an emergency-contact form 

listing Charlene Poindexter as a friend and Betty Bridges as her aunt. Jones explained she had 

no other family in Illinois to serve as her emergency contacts and had no real personal 

connection with either contact. 

¶ 6 Jones remained in Human Services through December 2009, at which time she transferred 

to the Department. Jones testified she sought a position with the Department due to ongoing 
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issues with Human Services’ local office administrator, Gayle Strickland, against whom Jones 

had filed several complaints. While with the Department, Jones was responsible for 

coordinating interstate child-support orders, which consisted of her transmitting court orders to 

the appropriate out-of-state courts for enforcement. 

¶ 7 At the time Jones transferred from Human Services to the Department, the Illinois State 

Police and the Office of the Executive Inspector General were investigating whether Jones 

engaged in misconduct while employed by Human Services. In September 2011, the 

Department learned of the investigation into Jones’ alleged misconduct at Human Services. 

Based on the investigative report, the Department filed a statement of discipline containing the 

following allegations of misconduct in violation of Human Services’ policies.

¶ 8 A. Statement of Discipline 

¶ 9 1. Charges

 1. Jones improperly authorized benefits for friends and/or relatives. She also, after 

improperly authorizing those benefits, admitted using the Link cards of those friends or 

relatives for personal use. Specifically, the charge alleged, she improperly authorized 

benefits for relatives of Charlene Poindexter and Betty Bridges, whom she listed as her 

emergency contacts. 

 2. Jones used and accepted a friend’s or relative’s Link card.

 3. Jones authorized benefits for Jacqueline Bridges, a relative. 

 3(a). In September 2008, Jones improperly authorized $426 in monthly SNAP 

benefits for Antoinette Burts, Charlene’s daughter.

 3(b). In May 2008, Jones improperly authorized $109 in SNAP supplemental 

benefits for Kiewann Poindexter, Charlene’s daughter and Jones’ former coworker 

from Kohl’s Department Store.

 3(c). In March 2008, Jones improperly authorized $378 in SNAP benefits and $353 

monthly SNAP benefits for Danita Phillips, Charlene’s friend and former coworker.

 3(d). In September 2008, Jones improperly authorized $241 in supplemental SNAP 

benefits for Jacqueline Bridges, Betty’s daughter.

 3(e). In August 2008, Jones improperly authorized $136 in supplemental SNAP 

benefits for Edwin McGee, the father of Betty’s great-granddaughter. 

 3(f). In September 2008, Jones improperly authorized $215 in supplemental 

payment benefits for Jeanell Gaston. 

 3(g). In November 2008, Jones improperly authorized (1) TANF cash benefits, (2) 

$410 in TANF transportation benefits, (3) $638 in TANF childcare benefits, (4) $442 

in supplemental TANF childcare benefits, and (5) $335 in SNAP benefits for Frances 

Williams, Jones’ high school classmate. 

 3(h). In October 2008, Jones improperly authorized $565 in disaster SNAP benefits 

for Dennis Tisdale, her son’s paternal uncle.

4. Jones violated Human Services’ policies “by engaging in conduct that 

constituted a conflict of interest when she authorized assistance, benefits, and/or 

services for individuals [with] whom she had a personal connection, that were not 

eligible to receive the benefits given.”
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5. Jones violated Human Services’ policies and failed to follow instructions “when 

she failed to seek supervisory approval to authorize benefits to individuals [with] 

whom she had a personal and/or family connection.”

6. Jones “failed to document many transactions and she failed to explain the 

reasons why she made decisions to authorize benefits which were improperly 

approved.”

¶ 10 2. Policies Violated

¶ 11 Below the list of charges, the Department outlined the Human Services’ policies and 

procedures Jones allegedly violated. Those relevant to this appeal include: 

 1. The Medical Policy Manual (Manual) section 01-04-00, which requires 

caseworkers to “[k]eep an up-to-date case record for each person who applies for or 

receives benefits.” These case notes must include “a record of all actions taken 

concerning each application [and] the reason(s) for approval or denial of the 

application.”

 2. Manual section 21-05-02, which requires caseworkers to obtain supervisory 

approval before authorizing TANF transportation payments. 

 3. Manual section 21-05-01, which requires caseworkers to obtain supervisory 

approval before authorizing TANF childcare payments. 

 4. Human Services’ Workers’ Action Guide (Guide) section 01-04-03, which 

requires caseworkers to “record any action taken or information (including client 

contacts) received for each active case and each action affecting the amount of payment 

or eligibility.”

 5. Human Services’ Employee Handbook (Handbook) section V, subsection 

entitled Performance of Duties, which requires caseworkers to follow Human Services’ 

rules and regulations in the performance of duties. 

 6. Handbook section V, subsection entitled Employee Interaction with Clients, 

which prohibits employees from accepting gifts–any item having monetary value–from 

a client or client’s relative for personal use.

 7. Handbook section V, subsection entitled Employee Personal Conduct, which 

prohibits employee from authorizing assistance, benefits, or services to relatives, or 

from redetermining eligibility for services for relatives. 

¶ 12 The statement of discipline also noted Jones had received counseling in October 2011 for 

excessive tardiness and corrective action in November 2011 due to poor job performance. 

¶ 13 3. Predisciplinary Proceedings

¶ 14 The Department provided Jones with the charges in January 2012 and held a 

predisciplinary hearing later that month. After determining Jones’ evidence was insufficient to 

rebut the charges, the Department discharged Jones effective March 1, 2012. 

¶ 15 B. Administrative Proceedings 

¶ 16 In March 2012, Jones filed a written request for a hearing. Later that month, the ALJ began 

hearing evidence. The Commission ultimately determined charges 3(e), 3(f), and 3(h), which 
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alleged Jones improperly authorized benefits for McGee, Gaston, and Tisdale, were not 

proved; thus, we will not discuss the evidence as it relates to those individuals. Moreover, 

under charge 3 and its subsections, the Commission determined the Department failed to prove 

Jones committed wrongdoing with respect to the amounts authorized for each individual. That 

issue has not been raised on appeal, and we will not address it. 

¶ 17 According to Jones, in May or June 2009, Strickland called Jones into her office where 

Illinois State Police officers read Jones her rights. Jones immediately requested an attorney and 

was not provided with any information regarding potential charges against her. In May 2010, 

after transferring to the Department, Jones was interviewed by Reginald Spears and Tiffany 

Pryor-Williams from the Office of the Executive Inspector General. During the course of the 

investigation, Spears interviewed Jones and Strickland numerous times. He did not interview 

any of the individuals who allegedly received improper benefits. 

¶ 18 Terri Shawgo, the Bureau Chief over the Office of Labor Relations and the Bureau of 

Training for the Department, testified she drafted the charges against Jones as part of her 

responsibilities. She said it was uncommon, but not unheard of, to discharge an employee 

based on misconduct in another State department. In this instance, Shawgo noted the 

Department was unaware of Jones’ misconduct at Human Services when the Department hired 

her. In reaching her recommendation for discharge, Shawgo stated she did not blindly accept 

the recommendations of the Office of the Inspector General but reached her own conclusions 

after considering the documentation provided by the inspectors, Jones, and other individuals 

involved. 

¶ 19 The ALJ questioned Shawgo extensively over the charges, noting some were vague or 

redundant. Shawgo explained charge 3 and its subparts related to improper authorizations of 

benefits, whereas charge 4 related to conflicts of interest, charge 5 related to lack of 

supervisory approval, and charge 6 was for failing to provide the proper case notes. Shawgo 

also acknowledged the vague language in charges 4, 5, and 6 related to the recipients discussed 

in charge 3 and its subparts. When the ALJ asked if Jones understood the line of inquiry, Jones 

stated she did. 

¶ 20 C. Evidence During Administrative Proceedings 

¶ 21 1. Concerns Over Delay

¶ 22 The charges contained in the statement of discipline reflect ongoing allegations of 

misconduct throughout 2008. Strickland testified she provided information to the inspectors 

and the Illinois State Police in late 2008. The Illinois State Police investigated the case until 

January 2010, at which time the Office of the Executive Inspector General began its own 

investigation. Spears testified he could not begin his investigation until the Illinois State Police 

investigation ended because the investigations might lead to conflict between the 

organizations. Spears then disclosed his report to the Department in September 2011, which 

conducted its own investigation and terminated Jones’ employment in March 2012.

¶ 23 In some instances, witnesses, particularly Strickland and the investigators, had difficulty 

recalling statements made during the pendency of the investigation without referring to various 

notes to refresh their recollections. Similarly, Jones, at times, stated the lengthy delay impacted 

her ability to remember certain details or to access documentation to aid in her defense. 
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¶ 24 Jones also asserted Strickland manufactured the delay due to her bias against Jones. Jones 

testified this stemmed from Jones, along with other coworkers, filing a grievance in November 

2009 for overtime pay, which was resolved in the employees’ favor. She also testified 

regarding a January 2009 incident in which she filed a complaint against Strickland for 

screaming at her. Spears’ investigation found no evidence of bias on behalf of Strickland.

¶ 25 2. Charges 1 and 2

¶ 26 a. The Evidence 

¶ 27 Shawgo explained charge 1 served primarily to summarize the charges against Jones. 

Charges 2 through 6 provided more specific charges. As to charge 2, which alleged Jones 

improperly used a friend’s or relative’s Link card, the evidence arose from two separate 

incidents. The first incident involved the purchase of large cookie cakes for an office party. 

¶ 28 On February 15, 2008, Human Services had an office party at noon, and Strickland 

specifically recalled Jones bringing two cookie cakes to the party. After the party, Strickland 

testified an employee brought her a receipt discovered in an employee-only area of Human 

Services. The receipt showed a Link card had been used to purchase two cookie cakes at 11:55 

a.m. that day. Upon further investigation of the Link card number on the receipt, Strickland 

determined the cookie cakes had been purchased on a Link card belonging to Adrean Burts. 

Human Services’ records revealed Adrean dropped off an application for benefits that same 

day. Based on this information, Strickland suspected Jones used Adrean’s Link card to 

purchase the cookie cakes. After receiving the receipt, Strickland sent an e-mail to Jones 

inquiring when Jones purchased the cookie cakes. Jones responded, stating she purchased 

them the evening before the party. 

¶ 29 On cross-examination, Jones asked Strickland how a person could have purchased the 

cookie cakes at 11:55 a.m. at a store located 20 minutes away, yet still arrive on time for the 

office party at noon. Though Strickland could not recall any other facts about the party, 

including her own contribution, she said she specifically remembered Jones being the only 

person who brought cookie cakes to the party and that Jones arrived 15 to 20 minutes late. 

¶ 30 During Jones’ first interview with Spears in May 2010, Spears stated Jones could not recall 

how she paid for the cookie cakes but acknowledged it was possible they were purchased on a 

Link card. Jones testified she initially acknowledged the possibility that Charlene purchased 

the cookie cakes on a Link card, but reviewing her e-mail exchange with Strickland refreshed 

her recollection that she purchased the cookie cakes the evening before. 

¶ 31 Jones denied using a Link card to purchase the cookie cakes. She also explained she would 

not have used Adrean’s Link card to purchase the cookie cakes. She described their 

relationship as being that of acquaintances and that he had visited her house only four times. 

However, in a verified petition for an order of protection (Will County case No. 07-OP-599) 

filed by Jones against Adrean, Jones described Adrean as an ex-boyfriend. She testified she 

believed that meant he was an ex-friend who happened to be male. The petition also stated 

Adrean resided with Jones. Jones stated that was a lie she told for the purposes of ensuring 

Adrean could not avoid service. In the petition, Jones stated, in April 2007, Adrean “came 

home intoxicated” and checked the caller identification on her phone, which was “very 

common” for him to do. He then proceeded to batter her. 
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¶ 32 As to the second incident, according to Spears, Jones admitted she had used a Link card 

provided to her by Charlene to buy a beverage for her son. Spears admitted he conducted no 

further investigation into whether or when Jones used another individual’s Link card. Though 

Spears had difficulty remembering many details of the interview without referring to his notes, 

he specifically recalled Jones admitting using another individual’s Link card to buy a beverage 

for her son. Similarly, Pryor-Wallace recalled Jones admitting using another’s Link card. She 

had no independent recollection of Jones admitting she used a Link card provided by Charlene 

without referencing her report. 

¶ 33 William Noble, Jones’ union steward and a child-support specialist with the Department, 

accompanied Jones on her interviews with Spears. He stated Jones emphatically denied using 

Adrean’s Link card to buy the cookie cakes. He also believed Jones’ statement regarding using 

a Link card to buy a beverage was taken out of context. His recollection was that Jones was 

standing near the register and agreed to “swipe” the Link card for the person in front of her in 

line; that person then gave Jones a beverage. 

¶ 34 Charlene testified she had never supplied Jones with a Link card or seen Jones use 

anyone’s Link card. She said she knew Jones from working with her at Kohl’s and Fashion 

Bug, but she did not consider her a “friend” with whom she socialized. Because of their limited 

association, Charlene was surprised Jones listed her as an emergency contact. She also stated 

Jones was not friends with any of Charlene’s children. Jones denied using another person’s 

Link card to purchase items for herself. 

¶ 35 b. The Commission’s Finding

¶ 36 As to charges 1 and 2, the Commission acknowledged Strickland’s pursuit of Jones was 

overzealous. However, Jones lacked credibility in her attempt to downplay her relationship 

with Charlene, Betty, and Adrean. In particular, the Commission found incredible Jones’ 

testimony that she did not have a relationship with Adrean because it was rebutted by her 

sworn petition for an order of protection stating Adrean was her ex-boyfriend who lived with 

her. Additionally, the Commission found Jones admitted using another person’s Link card, 

even if only for the purchase of a drink. This constituted fraud in violation of section V(1) of 

the Handbook. 

¶ 37 3. Charges 3 and 3(d)–Benefits for Jacqueline Bridges

¶ 38 a. The Evidence 

¶ 39 In a review Strickland provided to Spears, Strickland stated Jones failed to include any case 

notes explaining the reasons behind the authorization of SNAP benefits for Jacqueline, Betty’s 

daughter. The lack of a case note violated Guide section 01-04-03 and Manual section 

01-04-00, which required the employee to record all actions taken on an application, including 

an explanation as to why an application for benefits had been accepted or denied. Diane 

Sikorski, a former coworker of Jones’ from Human Services, testified she was unaware of 

anyone ever being disciplined for failing to enter a case note. Moreover, Strickland testified, by 

authorizing benefits for Jacqueline, Jones improperly acted under a conflict of interest. Jones 

admitted she authorized SNAP benefits for Jacqueline after an intake worker forgot to do so. 

She also admitted she failed to provide case notes when she approved those benefits. 
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¶ 40 b. The Commission’s Finding

¶ 41 The Commission found Jones committed misconduct with regard to charges 3 and 3(d) by 

authorizing benefits for Betty’s daughter, as she operated under a conflict of interest in 

violation of section V(3) of the Handbook. Jones’ failure to make a case note that she 

authorized benefits for her aunt’s daughter also violated Manual section 01-04-00 and Guide 

section 01-04-03. 

¶ 42 4. Charge 3(a)–Benefits for Antoinette Burts

¶ 43 a. The Evidence 

¶ 44 Strickland testified her records reflected Jones authorized SNAP benefits for Antoinette, 

Charlene’s daughter, which were later reduced prior to those benefits being paid. Jones 

admitted she approved benefits for Antoinette; however, not for the full amount alleged. 

¶ 45 b. The Commission’s Finding

¶ 46 The Commission determined the Department partially proved Charge 3(a) as a conflict of 

interest in violation of section V(3) of the Handbook for authorizing benefits for Charlene’s 

daughter. 

¶ 47 5. Charge 3(b)–Benefits for Kiewann Poindexter

¶ 48 a. The Evidence 

¶ 49 In a review Strickland provided to Spears, Strickland stated Jones failed to include any case 

notes explaining the reasons behind the authorization of SNAP benefits for Kiewann. The lack 

of a case note violated Guide section 01-04-03 and Manual section 01-04-00, which required 

the employee to record all actions taken on an application, including an explanation as to why 

an application for benefits had been accepted or denied. Jones admitted she approved benefits 

for Kiewann, who was Charlene’s daughter and Jones’ former coworker at Kohl’s. She also 

admitted she failed to provide case notes for the authorization of those benefits. 

¶ 50 b. The Commission’s Finding

¶ 51 The Commission found the Department proved Jones acted under a conflict of interest in 

violation of section V(3) of the Handbook for authorizing benefits for Kiewann, Charlene’s 

daughter. Jones’ failure to make a case note that she authorized benefits also violated Manual 

section 01-04-00 and Guide section 01-04-03. 

¶ 52 6. Evidence Regarding Charge 3(c)–Benefits for Danita Phillips

¶ 53 a. The Evidence 

¶ 54 In the review Strickland provided to Spears, Strickland stated Jones failed to include any 

case notes explaining the reasons behind the authorization of SNAP benefits for Danita. The 

lack of a case note violated Guide section 01-04-03 and Manual section 01-04-00, which 

required the employee to record all actions taken on an application, including an explanation as 

to why an application for benefits had been accepted or denied. Jones admitted she approved 

benefits for Danita and failed to create a case note explaining the reason for the authorization. 
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¶ 55 b. The Commission’s Finding

¶ 56 The Commission determined the Department proved Jones failed to make a case note 

regarding her involvement with Danita’s benefits.

¶ 57 7. Charge 3(g)–Benefits for Frances Williams

¶ 58 a. The Evidence 

¶ 59 In a review provided by Strickland to Spears, Strickland stated Jones failed to include any 

case notes explaining the reasons behind the authorization of SNAP and TANF benefits for 

Frances, a high school classmate. The lack of case notes violated Guide section 01-04-03 and 

Manual section 01-04-00, which required the employee to record all actions taken on an 

application, including an explanation as to why an application for benefits had been accepted 

or denied. Additionally, Strickland testified Jones failed to obtain supervisory approval prior to 

issuing the TANF transportation and childcare benefits, in violation of Manual sections 

21-05-02 and 21-05-01. Jones admitted she approved TANF transportation and childcare 

benefits for Frances. She did not recall obtaining supervisory authorization for those benefits. 

Jones also could not recall whether she made any case notes on Frances’ file due to the length 

of time that had elapsed. 

¶ 60 b. The Commission’s Finding

¶ 61 The Commission found Jones failed to obtain supervisory approval for authorizing TANF 

childcare and transportation benefits for Frances in violation of Manual sections 21-05-01 and 

21-05-02. 

¶ 62 8. Discharge

¶ 63 a. The Evidence 

¶ 64 Barb Radke, the senior public service administrator over customer service for the 

Department and Jones’ supervisor, testified she was “appalled” at the charges levied against 

Jones. Because the charges alleged the misuse of State funds, Radke was concerned Jones’ 

access to the child-support system at the Department could lead to similar abuse of State funds. 

Radke testified Jones had the ability to change payment obligations within the program, and 

such misconduct would not be easily discovered absent a case-by-case review. Also, because 

Jones held the highest paraprofessional title in the Department, she had free reign over the 

system. Accordingly, Radke felt discharge was appropriate given Jones’ position of public 

trust with confidential information. 

¶ 65 Kathy Segobiano, an executive level II for the Department, testified she trained 

child-support specialists regarding the processing of payments. According to Segobiano, 

child-support specialists are trained in processing child-support payments. However, as Jones 

was assigned to process intergovernmental payments, her responsibilities would extend to 

transferring documents, not payments. Thus, although Jones would have the ability to create 

and send out payments, she would not have the training to do so. The extent of her authority 

would be to increase or decrease child-support balances when transferring documentation to 

out-of-state courts and agencies. 
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¶ 66 b. The Commission’s Finding

¶ 67 In considering whether discharge was the appropriate sanction, the Commission expressed 

concern that Jones (1) was discharged in 2012 for misconduct occurring in 2008, (2) had no 

prior discipline while at Human Services, and (3) did not authorize state benefits in her 

position with the Department. Despite those concerns, the Commission found discharge was 

appropriate because, regardless of the department with which she was associated, Jones was, at 

all relevant times, an employee of the State of Illinois. Though each violation alone was 

insufficient to warrant discharge, the pattern of violations, wherein Jones fraudulently 

provided benefits to her friends, warranted discharge. The Commission found the outcome 

might have been different had Jones been honest about her associations with her friends and 

family. Instead of showing a temporary lapse of judgment, the Commission determined her 

dishonesty demonstrated she was “an intelligent individual willing to manipulate the system in 

violation of the rules to benefit herself and her friends.” Thus, the Commission found “Jones’ 

proven conduct amounts to a substantial shortcoming detrimental to the discipline and/or 

efficiency of the service and which sound public opinion recognizes as good cause for her 

discharge from her position at [the Department].”

¶ 68 D. Administrative Review in the Circuit Court 

¶ 69 In November 2012, Jones filed a complaint for administrative review in the Sangamon 

County circuit court. Therein, Jones asserted the Commission’s decision should be reversed as 

(1) contrary to law, (2) an abuse of discretion, (3) against the manifest weight of the evidence, 

and (4) improperly relying on written policies implemented after Jones’ alleged misconduct. In 

a supporting memorandum, Jones argued the evidence was insufficient to support the 

Commission’s finding of misconduct and, even if sufficient evidence existed, the 

Commission’s decision to uphold Jones’ discharge from the Department was arbitrary and 

unreasonable. In November 2013, the Department and members of the Commission filed a 

brief in support of the administrative decision. 

¶ 70 In March 2014, the circuit court upheld the Commission’s finding of misconduct but found 

no cause for Jones’ discharge. Accordingly, the court remanded the case to the Commission for 

imposition of a sanction other than discharge. In July 2014, the Department filed an objection 

to the Commission reducing Jones’ sanction to a 90-day suspension. In September 2014, the 

court found the 90-day suspension was in conformity with the law and not an abuse of 

discretion and ordered the parties to immediately comply with the court’s order.

¶ 71 This appeal followed. 

¶ 72 II. ANALYSIS 

¶ 73 On appeal, the Department asserts the Commission properly discharged Jones. Jones 

cross-appeals, arguing (1) the Department’s claim should be barred by the doctrine of laches, 

(2) insufficient evidence existed to support the Commission’s findings of misconduct, and (3) 

the findings of misconduct were inadequate to support just cause to discharge her from 

employment. We begin by addressing Jones’ cross-appeal. 
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¶ 74 A. Laches Defense 

¶ 75 Jones first argues the four-year gap between her alleged misconduct and her discharge 

prejudiced her ability to defend herself and therefore should be equitably estopped by the 

doctrine of laches. The Department, on the other hand, asserts the issue is forfeited because 

Jones failed to raise it during the administrative proceedings. See Gruwell v. Department of 

Financial & Professional Regulation, 406 Ill. App. 3d 283, 297, 943 N.E.2d 658, 671 (2010) 

(the failure to raise an issue during administrative proceedings results in procedural default). 

¶ 76 In this case, Jones did not specifically file an affirmative defense asserting a laches

defense, nor did she assert the entire proceeding should be barred under the doctrine of laches. 

To prove the equitable defense of laches, Jones would have the burden of showing (1) the 

Department demonstrated a lack of diligence in bringing the suit and (2) the Department’s 

delay prejudiced her. See Valdovinos v. Tomita, 394 Ill. App. 3d 14, 18, 914 N.E.2d 221, 226 

(2009). 

¶ 77 Generally, it is not our function to consider a defense not asserted during the administrative 

proceedings. Jones’ failure to raise this issue during the administrative proceedings deprived 

the Department of the opportunity to gather and present evidence to potentially overcome this 

defense. If we were to consider Jones’ laches defense, we would then have to speculate 

regarding the Department’s response to the laches defense. Because Jones failed to specifically 

raise a laches defense before the Commission, we conclude she forfeited the issue. 

¶ 78 B. Violation of Human Services Policies 

¶ 79 Jones next asserts insufficient evidence was presented to support the Commission’s finding 

that she violated any Human Services policies. 

¶ 80 In reviewing the Commission’s decision, we engage in a two-step analysis. Ehlers v. 

Jackson County Sheriff’s Merit Comm’n, 183 Ill. 2d 83, 89, 697 N.E.2d 717, 720 (1998). First, 

we must determine whether the finding of misconduct was contrary to the manifest weight of 

the evidence. Id. If not, we then determine whether the facts supported the Commission’s 

finding that cause existed to terminate Jones’ employment. See id. at 89, 697 N.E.2d at 721. 

Thus, we turn to each of the charges upon which the Commission found misconduct. “A 

factual finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence when the opposite conclusion is 

clearly evident or the finding is arbitrary, unreasonable, or not based in evidence.” Samour, 

Inc. v. Board of Election Commissioners, 224 Ill. 2d 530, 544, 866 N.E.2d 137, 145 (2007). 

¶ 81 1. Charges 1 and 2

¶ 82 Charges 1 and 2 were partially intertwined, and alleged Jones improperly authorized 

benefits for her friends and family, which she then utilized for her personal benefit. More 

specifically, these charges allege Jones engaged in the unauthorized use of another individual’s 

Link card. 

¶ 83 The allegations arose in two different instances. First, the Department alleged Jones used 

Adrean’s Link card to purchase two cookie cakes that were subsequently served at a Human 

Services office party. An employee later discovered a receipt for the two large cookies in an 

employee-only area, and the receipt shows those cookies were paid for with Adrean’s Link 

card. Jones testified the time on the receipt of 11:55 a.m., minutes before the beginning of the 

party at noon, demonstrated the recovered receipt was not for the cookie cakes she purchased, 
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because she could not have returned to the office in time for the party. Strickland, however, 

testified she recalled Jones arriving at the party approximately 15 or 20 minutes late with two 

cookies in hand. When Strickland later e-mailed Jones about the cookies, Jones replied she 

purchased them the evening before. Jones also provided differing stories regarding the 

cookies. Until reading the e-mail, she did not recall purchasing the cookies and thought 

perhaps Charlene had purchased them for her using a Link card. 

¶ 84 Though no witness personally witnessed Jones purchasing the cookie cakes with Adrean’s 

Link card, the circumstantial evidence was substantial. The receipt reflected the purchase of 

the two large cookie cakes on the day of the party. Notably, no other employees brought cookie 

cakes to the party. Strickland specifically remembered Jones carrying in the cookies. Human 

Services’ records also demonstrate Adrean left an application for benefits with the office that 

day. Additionally, Jones had a relationship of some nature with Adrean. Though she testified 

the extent of their relationship consisted of him visiting her house on four occasions, a verified 

petition for an order of protection she filed against him classified him as an ex-boyfriend who 

resided in her home. Jones acknowledged making misrepresentations on her verified petition 

for the order of protection to increase her chances of success before the trial court. 

¶ 85 From this evidence, the Commission could find Jones’ testimony regarding her 

relationship with Adrean incredible and reasonably infer Jones engaged in the unauthorized 

use of another’s Link card. This finding was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 86 Jones asserts the poor memories of the investigators and the Commission’s finding that 

Strickland was overzealous kept the Department from proving its case. However, the 

memories of the investigators were often refreshed from their investigative notes. Also, the 

credibility of Strickland versus Jones was for the Commission to determine. See Maun v. 

Department of Professional Regulation, 299 Ill. App. 3d 388, 401, 701 N.E.2d 791, 801 (1998) 

(“It is for the hearing officer, as the trier of fact, to evaluate all evidence, judge the credibility 

of witnesses, resolve any conflicts in the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences and 

conclusions from the facts.”). Because Jones’ credibility was significantly impeached by her 

prior misrepresentations to another court, the Commission’s rejection of her testimony and 

acceptance of Strickland’s testimony was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 87 Second, Jones allegedly admitted using a Link card Charlene provided her to buy a 

beverage. Both investigators from the Office of the Executive Inspector General testified they 

recalled Jones admitting she used a Link card Charlene provided her to purchase a beverage, 

and this recollection was independent from their investigative notes. Though Jones denied 

making this statement and her union steward believed the statement had been taken out of 

context, the Commission again considered the believability of the witnesses and the accuracy 

of their various notes. The Commission was also not required to believe Charlene’s testimony 

that she never provided Jones with a Link card. See id. Thus, the Commission’s finding of 

misconduct on this charge based on a violation of section V of the Handbook was not against 

the manifest weight of the evidence. 

¶ 88 2. Charges 3 and 3(d)

¶ 89 In charge 3 and its subparts, Jones was charged with improperly authorizing benefits for 

various individuals. In all of these incidents, the Commission determined the amounts she 

authorized were not improper, but either (1) her act of authorizing payments for a friend or 

relative was improper or (2) she failed to make the required case notes. Jones asserts the 
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Commission’s findings were not charged in charge 3 or its subparts, so the Commission erred 

in finding misconduct on those other grounds. Instead, those charges were contained in charges 

4, 5, and 6. However, Shawgo, who drafted the charges, clarified charges 4, 5, and 6 were 

redundant of charge 3. Moreover, the paperwork outlining the charges against Jones 

specifically listed the violations of the various guides and manuals related to conflicts of 

interest and the recording of case notes. The ALJ stated, “[c]harges 4, 5, and 6 do not 

specifically address the individuals who were authorized benefits in violation of [Human 

Services’] rules. In addition, these charges generally allege the same allegations covered by 

the previous three charges.” (Emphasis added.) This is consistent with the Commission 

entering its order with respect to charges 1, 2, and 3, but stating nothing as to charges 4, 5, and 

6.

¶ 90 As to charge 3, Jones does not specifically challenge the Commission’s finding of 

misconduct, which alleges she improperly authorized benefits for Jacqueline, a relative. On her 

emergency contacts, Jones listed Betty as her aunt. The Commission found incredible Jones’ 

attempt to downplay her relationship with Betty. Accordingly, Jones violated the 

conflict-of-interest provision of section V of the Handbook when she provided benefits to 

Betty’s daughter, Jacqueline. Her failure to make a case note on the case acknowledging that 

relationship and explaining the reasoning behind the authorization of benefits also violated 

Manual section 01-04-00 and Guide section 01-04-03. The Commission’s finding of 

misconduct as to this charge was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

¶ 91 Under charge 3(d), the Commission found Jones improperly authorized benefits for 

Jacqueline. This mimics charge 3. As Jacqueline was the daughter of the person she listed as 

her aunt, Jones had a conflict of interest that should have precluded her from authorizing any 

benefits on her behalf, particularly where she entered no case note outlining the connection. 

Thus, the Commission’s finding that she violated Manual section 01-04-00, Guide section 

01-04-03, and section V of the Manual was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

¶ 92 3. Charge 3(a)

¶ 93 Charge 3(a) alleged Jones improperly authorized SNAP benefits for Antoinette, the 

daughter of her friend, Charlene. The Commission found Jones violated section V(3) of the 

Handbook because she acted under a conflict of interest without receiving clearance from her 

supervisor to do so. Though the Commission found the authorized amount was not proved 

improper, the fact that Jones authorized, or attempted to authorize, any payments for the 

daughter of her friend was a conflict of interest. Given Jones shared a close enough 

relationship to Charlene to include her on her emergency-contact form, the Commission’s 

finding of misconduct was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

¶ 94 4. Charge 3(b)

¶ 95 Charge 3(b) alleged Jones improperly authorized SNAP benefits for Kiewann, Charlene’s 

daughter. As with Antoinette, the Commission determined Jones’ close relationship with 

Charlene prohibited Jones from authorizing benefits for Charlene’s family under section V of 

the Handbook. Jones also admitted working with Kiewann at Kohl’s prior to accepting a job 

with Human Services. Moreover, Jones admitted she did not have any case notes explaining 

her authorization of benefits in violation of Manual section 01-04-00 and Guide section 

01-04-03. Thus, the Commission’s finding of misconduct was not against the manifest weight 
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of the evidence. 

¶ 96 5. Charge 3(c)

¶ 97 Under charge 3(c), the Commission determined Jones failed to make the proper case notes 

when making SNAP benefit authorizations for Danita, in violation of Manual section 01-04-00 

and Guide section 01-04-03. Jones admitted she neglected to enter case notes for Danita; thus, 

the Commission’s finding was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

¶ 98 6. Charge 3(g)

¶ 99 Under charge 3(g), the Commission found Jones improperly authorized numerous benefits 

for Frances Williams, including TANF transportation and child-care benefits, in violation of 

Manual sections 21-05-01 and 21-05-02. Jones did not challenge this finding before the circuit 

court or on appeal. Thus, it is deemed forfeited. See People ex rel. Ballard v. Niekamp, 2011 IL 

App (4th) 100796, ¶ 40, 961 N.E.2d 288 (issues not raised before the circuit court are deemed 

forfeited on appeal). 

¶ 100 Having determined the Commission’s findings of misconduct were not against the 

manifest weight of the evidence, we next must determine whether cause existed to terminate 

Jones’ employment. Ehlers, 183 Ill. 2d at 89, 697 N.E.2d at 721. 

¶ 101 C. The Commission’s Decision to Terminate Jones’ Employment

¶ 102 The Department asserts the Commission properly found termination was an appropriate 

sanction for Jones’ misconduct. Jones, on the other hand, asserts the circuit court correctly 

reversed and remanded the decision for the imposition of a lesser sanction, ultimately a 90-day 

suspension. 

¶ 103 In determining whether cause existed to terminate employment, we define “cause” as 

“some substantial shortcoming which renders continuance in his office or employment in some 

way detrimental to the discipline and efficiency of the service and something which the law 

and a sound public opinion recognize as a good cause for his not longer occupying the place.” 

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. On review, we will not overturn an agency’s finding of 

just cause unless that finding is arbitrary and unreasonable or unrelated to the requirements of 

the employee’s current position. Id.

¶ 104 Jones argues only a few of the charges were proved and only partially proved at that. While 

technically true, as noted above, the Commission considered charges 4, 5, and 6 as redundant 

to charge 3 and therefore incorporated them under charge 3. According to Jones, the violations 

also constituted minor infractions not rising to the level of termination. In particular, Jones 

points out that, even after these violations occurred, she remained with Human Services for 

nearly two more years before transferring to the Department, where she received no discipline. 

¶ 105 Although the Commission noted Jones’ lack of disciplinary history at the department in 

deliberating on whether termination was the appropriate sanction, ultimately, the Commission 

found it to be the correct course of action. In issuing his written findings, the ALJ noted, 

“Maybe if Jones was more forthcoming about her involvement with a Link card(s) and 

more honest about her relationship with Charlene Poindexter and Betty Bridges, lesser 

discipline would be warranted, i.e., Jones’ conduct genuinely amounted to a 

momentary, yet understandable, lapse in judgment involving a Link card(s) on top of 
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simple neglect in making case notes. Instead, the evidence adduced at hearing revealed 

an intelligent individual willing to manipulate a system in violation of the rules to 

benefit herself and her friends. For these reasons, Jones’ proven conduct amounts to a 

substantial shortcoming detrimental to the discipline and/or efficiency of the service 

and which sound public opinion recognizes as good case for her discharge from her 

position at [the Department].”

Moreover, the ALJ reasoned, Jones was a state employee, irrespective of whether she worked 

for the Department or Human Services. Thus, if discharge from Human Services would have 

been appropriate, discharge from the Department for actions occurring while Jones worked at 

Human Services was also appropriate. 

¶ 106 Jones asserts her current position with the Department differed greatly from her position 

with Human Services because she was not able to authorize benefits with the Department. 

Rather, she simply reported child-court orders to intergovernmental jurisdictions. Jones’ 

supervisor, Radke, disagreed, noting Jones had the ability to transfer funds, just not the 

authority. Moreover, according to Segobiano, who provided training for the Department, Jones 

had the ability to easily change orders and mark certain orders paid. 

¶ 107 In light of the Commission’s credibility determinations, specifically its finding of Jones’ 

willingness “to manipulate a system in violation of the rules to benefit herself and her friends,” 

we conclude the Commission’s decision that discharge was an appropriate sanction was not 

arbitrary or unreasonable. Moreover, Jones’s willingness to violate departmental policies 

could easily transfer to her current position and, as Radke noted, remain undetected. Thus, we 

conclude the Commission’s finding was not arbitrary and unreasonable or unrelated to the 

requirements of the service. We therefore (1) reverse the circuit court’s order remanding the 

case back to the Commission for imposition of a lesser sanction, (2) vacate the Commission’s 

subsequent 90-day suspension sanction, and (3) reinstate the Commission’s decision to 

terminate Jones’ employment.

¶ 108 III. CONCLUSION 

¶ 109 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the circuit court’s judgment in part and reinstate the 

Commission’s original order discharging Jones. 

¶ 110 Circuit court judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. 

¶ 111 The Commission’s initial order is reinstated.