1. A prisoner who is allowed to proceed in forma pauperis in this court will have his complaint screened in 1

accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). This screening procedure requires the court to

dismiss a prisoner’s civil action prior to service of process if it determines that the complaint is frivolous,

malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary damages from a defendant

who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

SONJA WHITLOW, )

)

 Plaintiff, )

)

 v . ) CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:06-CV-773-WKW

) [WO]

JUDGE JOHN DENSON, et al., )

)

 Defendants. )

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, Sonja Whitlow [“Whitlow”], an indigent inmate,

challenges the constitutionality of convictions and a sentence entered against her by the

Circuit Court of Lee County, Alabama for trespassing and possession of drug paraphernalia.

Whitlow seeks release from incarceration and monetary damages. 

Upon review of the complaint, the court concludes that dismissal of this case prior to

service of process is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

1

DISCUSSION

Whitlow complains that the named defendants vioilated her constitutional rights

because (i) her convictions violate double jeopardy, (ii) counsel provided ineffective

assistance at the criminal proceedings, (iii) the evidence was insufficient to support the

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convictions, and (iv) the sentence imposed constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. The

aforementioned claims go to the fundamental legality of Whitlow’s convictions and resulting

sentence. Consequently, these claims provide no basis for relief at this time. Edwards v.

Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646 (1997); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); Preiser v.

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). 

In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a claim for damages challenging the legality of

a prisoner’s conviction or confinement is not cognizable in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action “unless

and until the conviction or sentence is reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned by the

grant of a writ of habeas corpus” and complaints containing such claims must therefore be

dismissed. 512 U.S. at 483-489. Under Heck, the relevant inquiry is “whether a judgment

in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.”

512 U.S. at 487. The Court emphasized that “habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a

. . . prisoner who challenges” a conviction or sentence, “even though such a claim may come

within the literal terms of § 1983” and, based on the foregoing, concluded that Heck’s

complaint was due to be dismissed as no cause of action existed under section 1983. 512

U.S. at 481. In so doing, the Court rejected the lower court's reasoning that a section 1983

action should be construed as a habeas corpus action. In Balisok, the Court concluded that

a state prisoner's “claim[s] for declaratory [and injunctive] relief and money damages, . . .

that necessarily imply the invalidity of the punishment imposed, is not cognizable under §

1983 . . .” unless the prisoner can demonstrate that the challenged action has previously been

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3

invalidated. 520 U.S. at 648. Moreover, the Court determined that this is true not only when

a prisoner challenges the judgment as a substantive matter but also when “the nature of the

challenge to the procedures could be such as necessarily to imply the invalidity of the

judgment.” Id. at 645. The Supreme Court reiterated its position taken in Heck that the “sole

remedy in federal court” for a prisoner challenging the constitutionality of a conviction or

sentence is a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Balisok, 520 U.S. at 645. Additionally, the

Court “reemphasize[d] . . . that a claim either is cognizable under § 1983 and should

immediately go forward, or is not cognizable and should be dismissed.” Id. at 649. 

The claims presented in the instant complaint challenge the constitutionality of

convictions and a sentence imposed upon Whitlow by the Circuit Court of Lee County,

Alabama. A judgment in favor of Whitlow on these claims would necessarily imply the

invalidity of these convictions and sentence. It is clear from the complaint that the

convictions and sentence about which Whitlow complains have not been invalidated in an

appropriate proceeding. Consequently, the instant collateral attack on the judgment of the

state court is prohibited and subject to summary dismissal by this court in accordance with the

directivess of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Balisok, 520 U.S. at 645; Heck, 512 U.S. at 481;

Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488-490 (1973). 

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that this case be

dismissed without prejudice pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

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It is further 

ORDERED that on or before September 12, 2006 the parties may file objections to this

Recommendation. Any objections filed must clearly identify the findings in the Magistrate

Judge's Recommendation to which the party is objecting. Frivolous, conclusive or general

objections will not be considered by the District Court. The parties are advised that this

Recommendation is not a final order of the court and, therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and advisements in the

Magistrate Judge's Recommendation shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the

District Court of issues covered in the Recommendation and shall bar the party from

attacking on appeal factual findings in the Recommendation accepted or adopted by the

District Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v.

Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d

33 (11th Cir. 1982). See also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981, en

banc), adopting as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed 

down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.

Done this 30 day of August, 2006. th

 /s/Charles S. Coody 

CHARLES S. COODY

CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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