U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Schomburg Plaza Fire

New York City (Harlem)

USFA-TR-004/March 1987

Homeland

Security

U.S. Fire Administration Fire Investigations Program

T

he U.S. Fire Administration develops reports on selected major fires throughout the country. 

The fires usually involve multiple deaths or a large loss of property. But the primary criterion 

for deciding to do a report is whether it will result in significant “lessons learned.” In some 

cases these lessons bring to light new knowledge about fire--the effect of building construction or 

contents, human behavior in fire, etc. In other cases, the lessons are not new but are serious enough 

to highlight once again, with yet another fire tragedy report. In some cases, special reports are developed to discuss events, drills, or new technologies which are of interest to the fire service.

The reports are sent to fire magazines and are distributed at National and Regional fire meetings. The 

International Association of Fire Chiefs assists the USFA in disseminating the findings throughout the 

fire service. On a continuing basis the reports are available on request from the USFA; announcements of their availability are published widely in fire journals and newsletters.

This body of work provides detailed information on the nature of the fire problem for policymakers 

who must decide on allocations of resources between fire and other pressing problems, and within 

the fire service to improve codes and code enforcement, training, public fire education, building 

technology, and other related areas.

The Fire Administration, which has no regulatory authority, sends an experienced fire investigator 

into a community after a major incident only after having conferred with the local fire authorities 

to insure that the assistance and presence of the USFA would be supportive and would in no way 

interfere with any review of the incident they are themselves conducting. The intent is not to arrive 

during the event or even immediately after, but rather after the dust settles, so that a complete and 

objective review of all the important aspects of the incident can be made. Local authorities review 

the USFA’s report while it is in draft. The USFA investigator or team is available to local authorities 

should they wish to request technical assistance for their own investigation.

For additional copies of this report write to the U.S. Fire Administration, 16825 South Seton Avenue, 

Emmitsburg, Maryland 21727. The report is available on the Administration’s Web site at http://

www.usfa.dhs.gov/

Schomburg Plaza Fire

New York City (Harlem)

Investigated by: Philip Schaenman

This is Report 004 of the Major Fires Investigation Project conducted

by TriData Corporation under contract EMW-86-C-2277 to the United

States Fire Administration, Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Homeland

Security

Department of Homeland Security

United States Fire Administration

National Fire Data Center

U.S. Fire Administration

Mission Statement

As an entity of the Department of Homeland 

Security, the mission of the USFA is to reduce life and economic losses due to fire 

and related emergencies, through leadership, advocacy, coordination, and support. 

We serve the Nation independently, in coordination with other Federal agencies, 

and in partnership with fire protection and 

emergency service communities. With a 

commitment to excellence, we provide public education, training, technology, and data 

initiatives.

Homeland

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Table of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

LESSONS LEARNED. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Code Enforcement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Fireground Perceptions and Communication. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Fire Dispatchers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

After the Fire: Department Critiques and Employee Assistance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Public Education. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Attachments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

1. Fire Department of the City of New York Board of Inquiry report on the fire.. . . . . . . . . . . 9

2. FDNY press release on the Board of Inquiry’s findings – July 27, 1987.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

3. Photographs.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

1

Schomburg Plaza Fire

New York City (Harlem)

March 22, 1987

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A fire originating in the compactor chute of a 35-story high-rise apartment building in the Harlem 

area of New York City caused the deaths of seven building residents. Several code enforcement and 

fire department operational problems may have contributed to the loss.

The U.S. Fire Administration had planned to investigate this fire because of its many important lessons 

but would only do so with the express permission of appropriate authority. The Fire Department of 

New York (FDNY) requested that the investigation be delayed until a preliminary internal investigation was completed.

When the preliminary FDNY report was issued, the Fire Administration found it to be of such high 

quality and candor that an additional investigation did not seem likely to add much to the lessons of 

interest nationally.

This report summarizes some of the lessons learned on the FDNY report and discussions with members of the investigation team. The FDNY preliminary report is attached.

The U.S. Fire Administration commends FDNY for their outstanding post-mortem investigation conducted under technically difficult and politically embarrassing circumstances. The fire was tragic and 

the losses could have been prevented. By their investigation the FDNY has done much to help prevent 

similar losses in the future. The investigation also may serve as a model for other post-mortems.
2

SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES

ISSUES COMMENTS

Cause of Fire Trash ignited in compactor chute.

Sprinkler Systems

Compactor Chute Systems:

  13th to 35th floors

  1st to 12th floors

Head at basement compactor unit

Failed to operate; heads clogged.

Open pipe connection; inoperable.

Valve closed.

Fire Department Notification Tenants at first misinterpreted fire to be common trash fire and did not call.

Structural Problems Compactor chute walls were 2-5/8 inch, not the 3 inch that had been approved.

Spaces left in construction of chutes and wire chases.

Chute hopper door missing.

Fire Inspections Did not detect major sprinkler problems or unapproved construction features.

Inspection results not recorded.

Fire Department Communications Dispatchers failed to notify the fireground commander of the large number of calls

received from upper floor tenants.

Incident Command System Fireground commander failed to identify severity of situation until late; crews on roof did 

not communicate adequately with commander on the ground and vice versa.

INTRODUCTION

A 7 a.m. daylight fire at the Schomburg Plaza highrise apartment building in the Harlem area of 

New York City on March 22, 1987, took the lives of seven residents. The fire was thought to have 

started in trash stuck in a chute between the 27th and 29th floors. It then spread upward through 

the chute, an adjacent pipechase, construction openings, and ultimately through the interior walls 

of apartments adjacent to the chute. A misperception by the fire department that the only fire was 

a fire in the basement trash compactor led to a delay in rescue and extinguishment efforts on the 

upper floors.

The fire is described in the preliminary report (attached), which was issued by the Board of Inquiry, 

that the FDNY convened to investigate the history of the building, the cause and spread of the fire, 

and fire department operations in connection with the fire. Included with the report is the press 

release announcing the report, which has additional background and technical information. Note 

in particular the two excellent diagrams showing a top view of the garbage chute and wire chase (in 

the report) and a side view (in the press release).

Based on the fire department’s press release, discussions with a chief on the Board of Inquiry, and 

other sources relating to the fire, a number of lessons can be drawn on preventing such mishaps in 

the future.

Almost one-quarter of the population of the United States lives in multi-family dwellings. Many 

of these are high-rises. There are thus tens of millions of people who may be exposed to similar 

problems if the lessons from such fires are not heeded.
USFA-TR-004/March 1987 3

LESSONS LEARNED

Code Enforcement

1. Those charged with inspecting life safety systems of multi-family dwellings must be trained to 

detect problems in the systems. Familiarity with sprinkler systems should be high on the list. 

Inspections of Schomburg Plaza after construction and during occupancy did not recognize 

that the compactor chute sprinkler system in the lower floors of the building had never been 

connected or tested, and the system on floors 13 through 35 had clogged heads. Also, the 

valve which controlled water to the sprinkler head over the compactor in the basement was not 

open.

2. Buildings built to code can curtail damage and provide the time to save lives. New York City 

has more high-rise buildings than any other city in the Nation. They have stringent codes 

and an excellent high-rise safety record. The Schomburg Plaza building was built to the less 

severe 1964 State building construction code because it was a Federally-funded project, but the 

requirements of even that code were not met in this building, as noted below.

3. Approved building plans are not necessarily followed in construction. The walls of the compactor chute had been approved in plans at 3 inch thickness but they were constructed 2 5/8 

inches. Critical spaces were left open in constructing the pipe chase. These problems did not 

come to light until the fire. Inspections during construction of multiple occupancy buildings 

are critical to long term fire safety and must be carried out knowledgeably and diligently.

4. Records must be kept of each inspection to provide a basis for compliance and maintain a history of problems. There was no checklist completed for the latest inspection of Schomburg 

Plaza, which was conducted less than two months prior to the fire. This was contrary to FDNY 

regulations but found to be a not uncommon shortcut in paperwork.

Fireground Perceptions and Communication

5. Firefighters, as do most humans, learn to expect certain types of problems in certain situations. 

It is easy to fall into a mental rut and interpret information as you expect it to be rather than 

as it is. The buildings in Schomburg Plaza had had many minor compactor chute fires that 

were easily extinguished, as did many other buildings of that type. When a totally different 

compactor chute fire occurred – where the fire was not in the basement but high up in the 

chute, and breaking out into the apartments, it was still perceived to be a basement garbage fire. 

This perception was reinforced by an actual fire in the basement compactor at the same time. 

Firefighters must keep alert and cannot assume that “this one” is like the ones before.

6. Firefighters discovering hazardous conditions or fire spread should not assume that others know 

of it. Unless specifically aware that fire extension is known, it must be immediately reported to 

the company or Incident Commander. One firefighter took an elevator to a floor thought to be 

safe, found heavy smoke, but assumed his chief knew and did not report it. That information 

can be critical to saving lives.

7. The fire department needs to be absolutely certain that fire or smoke has not extended before 

relaxing their guard. It took 16 minutes after arrival at the scene to discover the fire on the 

upper floors. This was nine minutes after the rescue unit was released to return to quarters 

because it was thought the fire in the compactor chute was out.
4

Fire Dispatchers

8. Building residents made many calls to fire dispatchers only to be told that everything was being 

handled, when, in fact, the severity of the fire had gone unrecognized. It was assumed that the 

repeated calls were for the basement fire and odor of smoke. Callers were not adequately questioned as to their circumstances – did they see heavy smoke, feel heat, etc. Dispatchers must be 

trained to take calls seriously and not assume they know the situation, especially when there are 

multiple calls from different people on different floors of a building.

9. Fire dispatchers must be courteous and considerate in dealing with the public, including individuals under stress. They must take them seriously and be polite. Their conversations are 

recorded. A fire department’s reputation can be tarnished by one ill-mannered or inadequately 

trained dispatcher whose handling of a call is given attention by the media, as was the case in 

this fire.

10. Dispatchers should help keep the fireground commander informed of special situations, such as 

the quantity of calls being received. The dispatch office did not notify the battalion chief on the 

scene of 21 telephone calls received from occupants of the 15th-33rd floors in the ten minutes 

before the chief decided (at 8:07 a.m.) that the fire was out and started returning companies to 

quarters. While the calls could have been due to smells of smoke from a minor fire, one cannot 

make that assumption when the risk of being wrong can lead to a disaster.

After the Fire: Department Critiques and Employee Assistance

11. Fire departments need to undertake candid, detailed critiques after a tragedy. They must not shy 

away even if they made errors. That is needed to avoid the same problems in the future. The 

New York critique in this case was extraordinarily thorough, and can serve as an example of the 

level of detail and candor needed to remedy problems in any good organization.

12. Fire personnel who are the target of criticism after a tragedy should be given emotional counseling and support especially where errors occurred. Reprimands or stronger actions may be 

needed for some, and training for others, but most will feel great anguish and may need professional help in mitigating feelings of guilt. No one wants one tragedy to lead to another. The 

department’s morale should not be destroyed by the media and city political leaders, who can be 

very tough on the department in such circumstances. The leadership must bolster the department morale at such times, and put the incident in perspective while taking actions to prevent 

something similar from happening in the future and holding people accountable who did not 

perform their job well.

Public Education

13. Residents of high-rises should be alerted to their common risk from fire and asked to report 

suspected fires. They should not assume such fires are minor or that others have reported them. 

Several residents smelled smoke early in this fire but did not report it because odors of smoke 

from the garbage compactor were common. The first smell of smoke was subsequently found 

to be about 7 a.m., but the first two calls from residents to 9-1-1 came at 7:57 a.m., almost an 

hour later. The residents made the same error that the fire department did – assuming that only 

minor fires were likely.
USFA-TR-004/March 1987 5

14. Fires in the compactor chute are almost always the result of residents throwing in lit cigarettes 

or hot ashes. There seemed to be little attention to trying to find out who might have started 

the fire. It is possible that the start of the fire was accidental and totally unrecognized by the 

person who started it. Residents need to be taught that through such careless behavior they 

not only endanger their own households and lives but the property and people throughout 

the building. The Schomburg Plaza fire can serve as an example of the danger of such seemingly minor fires.

7

Attachments

1.	 Fire Department of the City of NewYork Board of

Inquiry report on the fire.

2.	 FDNY press release on the Board of Inquiry’s findings

– July 27, 1987.

3.	 Photographs.

9

BOARD OF INQUIRY

INTO THE MARCH 22, 1987

SCHOMBURG PLAZA FIRE

PRELIMINARY REPORT

June 11, 1987

INTRODUCTION

On March 22, 1987, a fire originated in the compactor chute at 1295 Fifth Avenue, Manhattan. At 

07:57 hours, the fire department received a telephone call for an odor of smoke on the 29th floor. 

Due to an additional telephone call received from an individual complaining of smoke, a full first 

alarm assignment consisting of three engine companies, two ladder companies and a battalion chief 

was dispatched.

The building is a thirty-five story, 100 x 100 ft octagon shaped multiple dwelling of non-combustible construction. The building is part of the three building Schomburg Plaza complex which was 

developed by the New York State Urban Development Corporation in conformity with the 1964 New 

York State Construction Code. Urban Development Corporation officials were required by law to 

insure that the complex was built to code. As a routine matter, fire prevention inspections were also 

conducted by New York City Fire Department personnel.

When the first fire department units arrived at 08:00 hours, they were informed by maintenance 

personnel that there was a small fire in the cellar waste compactor room and that it was being 

extinguished.

As units continued their operations, heavily advanced fires were discovered on the 23rd, 33rd, 34th 

and 35th floors. As a result of the fire conditions which extended to apartments 33-H and 34-H, 

seven residents lost their lives.

The tragic loss of life and the unusual nature of the fire prompted Fire Commissioner Joseph E. 

Spinnato to convene a Board of Inquiry. The Board was formed on March 24, 1987, and was given 

full subpoena power. It was directed to investigate the building’s construction and history, fire prevention procedures, the applicable codes, fire cause, origin, and spread, as well as operations during 

the fire.

The Board of Inquiry has been meeting several times a week since its inception. Under its direction, 

approximately 350 civilians and 50 firefighter interviews have been conducted. Each fire department unit that fought the fire was walked through the fire operation at 1295 Fifth Avenue under the 

Board’s supervision. Communication tapes and computer printouts from the fire department, the 

police department, and emergency medical services have been gathered. Media videotapes filmed 

during the operation have been provided to the Board. A painstaking physical examination of the 

compactor shaft, including the removal of walls, has been conducted. The sprinkler systems have 

been dismantled, studied, and vouchered as evidence. Hundreds of photographs of the shaft have 
10 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

been taken. Physical evidence has been sent to a private laboratory and to the police laboratory for 

scientific tests. Architectural plans and construction records have been assembled. New York State 

and city records have been obtained. The relevant codes and related laws have been gathered. The 

Board has also subpoenaed and taken sworn testimony from many key witnesses.

In addition to digesting and analyzing those materials already gathered, much work remains to be 

done. However, the following general areas of concern and preliminary findings have emerged from 

the Board’s work.

CODE

Schomburg Plaza was constructed in the early 1970s under the auspices of the New York State Urban 

Development Corporation (UDC). As with other UDC projects, Schomburg was built in conformity 

with the 1964 Building Construction Code of the State of New York, rather than the 1968 New York 

City Building Code.

Each code specifies a fire-resistance rating of two (2) hours for shaft enclosures in all non-combustible construction. While there is no specific section in either the State or city code dealing 

exclusively with compactor shaft enclosures, both codes contain general sections which indicate 

that shaft enclosures must be an approved assembly tested for a two-hour fire-resistance rating. The 

Board of Inquiry has determined that the “as built” plans for Schomburg Plaza specify three (3) inch 

enclosure walls for the compactor shaft. Such a design, if properly constructed, would comply with 

both State and city codes.

However, examination of the shaft discloses that it was not built according to plan. The wall assembly was two and five-eights inches (2 5/8 inch) thick, not the three inches (3 inch) called for in the 

“as built” plans. The Board has been unable to find any test which indicates that a two and five eights 

inch (2 5/8 inch) assembly has a two-hour fire-resistance rating. The Board is continuing its analysis 

of code requirements and approved assemblies as they relate to shaft enclosures and compactors and 

will make further comments in its final report.

Both the city and State codes require sprinklers inside the compactor chute.

February 3, 1987 Inspection

On February 3, 1987, Engine Company 91, conducted a regularly-scheduled yearly inspection of the 

three buildings of Schomburg Plaza. The inspection was conducted by a covering lieutenant and five 

firefighters from Engine Company 91. The inspection took approximately 40 minutes.

Regulations require that a checklist be completed for each building. The checklist notes types of 

items that the firefighters are to inspect. The checklist contains a section dealing with sprinklers and 

their associated control valves (OS and Y valves) but does not specifically deal with sprinklers inside 

compactor chutes (see attached blank checklist). No checklist was completed for any of the three 

buildings during the February 3, 1987, inspection.

The Board of Inquiry has determined that, at the time of the fire, the compactor sprinkler system 

did not work and that neither of the two OS and Y valves which controlled the sprinkler system were 

open at the time of the inspection. While one of the firefighters believed that he bad inspected an 

OS and Y valve for the compactor sprinkler system at 1295 Fifth Avenue, he had mistaken an open 

OS and Y valve which controlled the supply of domestic fresh water to the building for the sprinkler 

valve. The valve was located in the basement next to the compactor.
USFA-TR-004/March 1987 11

The Board of Inquiry has also determined that, as a matter of practice, required checklists for these 

types of inspections were rarely completed prior to the Schomburg Plaza fire. Corrective actions 

have been implemented by the fire department to ensure that the checklists are completed. The 

Board will complete an analysis of the department’s inspectional procedures and may make further 

recommendations to the Commissioner.

FIRE ORIGIN

Based on the fire scene examination and subsequent investigation, it was determined that the fire 

originated in combustible material (household rubbish) within the confines of the metal compactor 

rubbish chute as the result of an obstruction within the compactor chute in an area between the 27th 

and the 29th floors. The manner of ignition is unknown but the most likely cause was the careless 

disposal of something similar to a lit cigarette.

Because the compactor chute sprinkler system was not working, the original fire was not extinguished and extended vertically within the compactor chute. This vertical extension resulted from 

the burning of the original combustible material and the ignition of the flammable residue which 

had accumulated on the interior surface of the chute. This unchecked fire condition caused a highheat buildup within the compactor chute at the upper floors.

The examination and investigation indicated that the fire further extended as follows:

1. To and throughout the compactor closet on the 29th floor via the missing chute hopper door 

and into the public hallway on the 29th floor via the open compactor closet door;

2. Into the kitchen areas of apartments 23-H, 33-H, and 34-H via convection and radiation transferred through construction openings, and via conduction through various metal pipe support 

brackets and chute anchors, and thereafter extended to and throughout the above apartments via 

flame spread; and,

3. Into apartment 35-H by auto-exposure via the windows from apartment 34-H.

The extension of the fire into apartments 33-H and 34-H was the proximate cause of the seven fire 

fatalities.

COMPACTOR CHUTE AND COMPACTOR SPRINKLER

The compactor chute investigation disclosed that the heat buildup from the fire within the chute 

was transferred to the metal chute itself. The heated metal chute radiated heat into the drywall chute 

enclosure and the adjoining pipe chase voids, which are adjacent to the “H” bank apartments. The 

heat buildup in the shaft enclosure compartment traveled horizontally into the adjoining pipe chase 

void via a one and one-eighths inch (1-1/8") opening at the bottom of the partition wall between 

the shaft enclosure and the pipe chase void. This opening was created as a result of the two inch (2") 

drywall wall resting on top of various pipe brackets and chute anchors rather than being secured to 

the concrete floor. (See attached diagram.) In addition, it was found that the chute penetrated each 

floor through a concrete opening of a slightly larger diameter; thereby, creating a space between the 

outside of the chute and the concrete opening which varied from floor to floor. These openings 

allowed for vertical heat transfer from floor to floor within the shaft. Examination found additional 

openings in the drywall construction of the walls which divided the compactor chute enclosure and 

the pipe chase void from the kitchen and living rooms of the “H” bank apartments. These openings 
12 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

allowed heat transfer from the chute enclosure and the pipe chase void into the “H” bank apartments. 

Further, the above mentioned metal pipe brackets extended from the pipe chase void into and under 

the kitchen broom closet, making contact with the combustible components of the broom closet. 

The compactor chute sprinkler investigation disclosed that the system was comprised of two separate and distinct systems. The lower system was designed to extinguish fires below the 13th floor. 

The upper system was designed to extinguish fires occurring between the 13th and 35th floors.

Examination of the lower system revealed an open pipe connection between the sprinkler head and 

the related piping. This opening in the system proved that the lower sprinkler system was not operable at the time of the fire.

Investigation of the upper sprinkler system during the initial fire investigation revealed that sprinkler 

heads were clogged with rust and silt at various floors. Additionally, the evaluation of the extensive 

fire damage on the upper floors indicated that the upper sprinkler system failed to operate at the 

time of the fire.

Examination of the single sprinkler head located at the compactor unit in the basement revealed that 

this head was controlled by a shut-off valve which additionally controlled a cold water hoseline. 

Investigation revealed an absence of water flow at this hoseline and sprinkler head at the time of the 

fire, indicating that the valve was closed.

The Board has concluded that the original fire started in combustible rubbish confined within the 

compactor chute which intensified due to the lack of a properly operating sprinkler system. The 

fire was able to connect and extend into various apartments due to the previously described metal 

brackets, opening, and voids.

FIRE OPERATION

The first indication of the fire was an odor of smoke which several residents have since reported 

smelling sometime after 7 a.m. Initially, no one was concerned because odors of smoke from compactor fires were not uncommon at 1295 Fifth Avenue.

Maintenance employees investigated, found, and proceeded to extinguish with a garden hose, a 

fire burning in the compactor in the basement. At the same time, security guards employed at 

Schomburg Plaza investigated internal reports of smoke on the upper floors. It was not until 07:57 

hours that two phone calls were received by 9-1-1. The first call was from a tenant in apartment 

29-H complaining of smoke in the hallway, the second from a security guard reporting smoke on 

the twenty-fourth floor.

At 07:57 hours, because of these phone calls, a full first alarm assignment of three engines and 

two ladders was dispatched. Automatically, a computer-generated message was received by these 

companies via teletype and by the fire department dispatchers on computer screens. The message 

specified that 1295 Fifth Avenue was a multiple dwelling of 34 stories measuring 100 feet by 100 

feet and further specified “compactor fires may require additional ladder company for severe smoke 

condition on upper floors.”

On arrival in the lobby at 08:00, after a three minute response time, the fire department was informed 

by maintenance personnel that the fire was in the compactor room and was being extinguished. A 

hoseline was stretched to the compactor chute on the first floor. An examination of the compactor 

in the basement disclosed a rubbish fire being extinguished by maintenance personnel. At the same 
USFA-TR-004/March 1987 13

time, two firefighters were sent to the roof to perform ventilation work and to begin a survey of the 

upper floors.

At 08:07, the battalion chief’s aide transmitted a radio message indicating a compactor fire in the 

basement. He stated that the fire had been extinguished and he was using one engine company and 

two ladder companies due to a heavy smoke condition on the upper floors. Because it was believed 

the fire was out the rescue company was returned. Two engine companies stood by. The battalion 

chief was not told and was unaware that between 07:57 and 08:07 hours the Dispatch Office had 

received more than twenty-one telephone calls from tenants on the fifteenth through the thirty-third 

floors reporting large amounts of smoke in hallways and apartments. Some of these calls were from 

occupants describing extremely heavy smoke conditions.

The two firefighters arrived on the roof at approximately 08:06 and began venting and examining 

the roof. A second team consisting of two firefighters arrived on the roof at approximately 08:10 

and also engaged in examination and venting work.

At approximately 08:11 one of the four roof men descended to the upper floors. At approximately 

08:16 this roof man discovered the fire in apartment 34-H and transmitted an urgent report of the 

fire. Units immediately began taking hoselines to the upper floors to extinguish the fire. A few 

seconds later, three members of the Jenkins’ family jumped from apartment 33-H. The firefighters 

reacted quickly and began applying water to the fire in apartment 33-H at 08:22 hours. Operations 

were initially hampered by low water pressure. During the course of extinguishment and control, 

four additional victims were discovered in apartments 33-H and 34-H. Additional units were dispatched to the scene at 08:17, 08:21, and 08:25 hours. At 08:35, a second alarm was transmitted. 

The fire was declared under control at 09:45 hours.

The Board is concerned with the approximately sixteen (16) minutes between the arrival of the 

first unit and the discovery of the fire on the upper floors. It was made a preliminary determination 

that because of the conditions visible on arrival and the belief that this was a routine compactor 

fire, similar to many previous compactor fires at Schomburg Plaza, neither the firefighters nor the 

dispatchers recognized significant information indicating that this was not a normal compactor fire. 

The Board is also concerned with some operational decisions made after 08:16 hours, but it is clear 

that by 08:16 hours nothing could have been done to limit the fire fatalities.
14 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series
USFA-TR-004/March 1987 15
16 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series
USFA-TR-004/March 1987 17
18 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series
19

Photographs from

the Fire Department of the City of New York

Bureau of Fire Investigations

The photos listed below are representative of construction and maintenance practices throughout 

the entire Schomburg Plaza building.

1. Exterior of fire building with water and burn patterns.

2. Compactor unit in the fire building (morning of fire).

3. Kitchen area, Apartment 23, adjoining compactor and pipe chase.

4. Overall view of relationship between kitchen area and pipe void and compactor chute.

5. Heat buildup in compactor closet.

6. Typical compactor closet, from public hall.

7. Opened wall in compactor closet to view chute interior.

8. Visual inspection. (Typical of all floors)

9. Opening of apartment walls for interior examinations.

10. Sprinkler system in disrepair. Located at top of chute hopper.

11. Pipe bracket extending into kitchen from pipe void compromising firewall between void and 

living area.

12. Void between chute and structure floor allowing for passage of heat from floor to floor.

13. Interior of chute with opening at seam.

14. Clogged sprinkler head.

15. Horizontal piping with solidified silt and rust.

16. Evidence voucher. (Sample)

17. Sprinkler shut off valve in dayroom, first floor.

18. Sprinkler shut off valve in closet (compactor) on 35th floor at ceiling.
20 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Photo 1
USFA-TR-004/March 1987 21

Photo 2
22 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Photo 3
USFA-TR-004/March 1987 23Photo 4
24 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Photo 5
USFA-TR-004/March 1987 25

Photo 6
26 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Photo 7
USFA-TR-004/March 1987 27

Photo 8
28 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Photo 9
USFA-TR-004/March 1987 29Photo 10
30 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Photo 11
USFA-TR-004/March 1987 31Photo 12
32 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Photo 13
USFA-TR-004/March 1987 33

Photo 14
34 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Photo 15
USFA-TR-004/March 1987 35Photo 16
36 U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series

Photo 17
USFA-TR-004/March 1987 37Photo 18