THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Supreme Court

The State, Respondent,

v.

Walter M. Bash, Petitioner.

Appellate Case No. 2015-001582

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT O F APPEALS

Appeal from Berkeley County Stephanie P. McDonald , Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 27692 Heard September 7, 2016 – Filed December 21, 2016

REVERSED

Appellate Defender Susan Bar ber Hackett, of Columbia,
for Petitioner.

Attorney General Alan McC rory Wilson and Assistant Attorney General Mark Re ynolds Farthing, both of Columbia; and Solicitor Scarlett Anne Wilson, of Charleston; for Respondent.

JUSTICE FEW: Walter Bash was indicted for tra fficking in cocaine and cocaine
base. The circuit court found officers conducted an illegal se arch, and suppressed

18the drugs. The State appealed. T he court of appeals reversed the circuit court's suppression order and remanded fo r trial. We issued a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision. We now reverse the court of ap peals and reinstate
the circuit court's order suppressing the evidence.

I. Facts and Procedural History

The Berkeley County Sheriff's O ffice drug enforcement unit rece ived an anonymous tip that "drug activity" was occurring at a home on N elson Ferry Road
near Moncks Corner. An unnamed o fficer in the drug enforcement unit relayed the tip to Sergeant Lee Holbrook, who was patrolling the area with Sergeant Kimberly Milks. Sergeant Holbrook testified, "We were in the Moncks Cor ner area . . . , and one of the agents . . . received . . . a phone call stating tha t there was drug activity at a particular residence, and we . . . drove over there and ha ndled it."

He explained that as they located the house they noticed some m en "behind the house in a grassy area." To get to the grassy area, Sergeant H olbrook turned his vehicle off Nelson Ferry Road ont o a public dirt road called Sh ine Bash Lane that ran along the side of the propert y where the house was located. Sergeant Holbrook testified, "As we travelled down . . . Shine Bash, there were s everal [men] standing . . . by this little shed, and ther e was a pickup truck pulled in onto the grass area." The "small utility shed" was just outside a fence surrounding t he home. Sergeant
Milks testified "as we go down Shine Bash Lane, there's a tree that you can see through [into] the yard" where sh e saw a pickup truck and three men. The officers pulled off of Shine Bash Lane o nto the property, approximately twenty feet from the grassy area where the men were standing.

The officers exited the car to talk to the men. Sergeant Milks testified there were two men by a grill and a third man at the back of the truck. Sergeant Holbrook testified one of the men "thr[e w] down . . . what appeared to b e cocaine," and "almost instantly" afterward, a fourth man opened the passenger door of the truck and ran into the nearby woods. Ser geant Milks and several othe r officers chased the man while Sergeant Holbrook detained the men remaining in t he grassy area. This group included Bash, who got out of the driver's side of the truck. After detaining the men, Sergeant Holbrook looked through the window of Bash's truck to see "if there [were] other i ndividuals in that truck hiding." He saw "in plain view what appeared to be cocaine weighing scales" and "cocaine base." Sergeant Holbrook arrested Bash. A grand jury subsequently indicted him for trafficking

19"four hundred grams or more" of cocaine in violation of subsect ion 44-53

- 370(e)(2)(e) of the South Carolin a Code (Supp. 2016), and traff icking "ten grams or more, but less than twenty-ei ght grams" of cocaine base in v iolation of subsection 44-53-375(C)(1) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 20 16).

Prior to trial, Bash moved to s uppress the drugs. He argued th e police violated the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution by entering the curtilage of
the home without a warrant to c onduct a search. The circuit co urt granted Bash's motion. The court of appeals re versed the circuit court's deci sion to suppress the
evidence. State v. Bash , 412 S.C. 420, 772 S.E.2d 537 (Ct. App. 2015). We granted Bash's petition for certiorari.

II. Fourth Amendment

The people's right under the Four th Amendment to "be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures," U.S.

C ONST . amend. IV, "extends . . . to . . . the curtilage of the home, " State v. Herring

, 387 S.C. 201, 209, 692 S.E. 2d 490, 494 (2009) (citing United States v. Dunn, 480

U.S. 294, 107 S. Ct. 1134, 94 L. Ed. 2d 326 (1987) and Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 287 (4th Cir. 2001)). "Warrantless searches and seiz ures are unreasonable absent a recognized e xception to the warrant requi rement." State v. Wright , 391 S.C. 436, 442, 706 S.E. 2d 324, 327 (2011) (citing Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390, 98 S.Ct. 2408 , 2412, 57 L.Ed.2d 290, 298-99 (1978)).

"On appeals from a motion to supp ress based on Fourth Amendment grounds, . . . this Court reviews questions of law de novo." State v. Adams , 409 S.C. 641, 647, 763 S.E.2d 341, 344 (2014). As to a circuit court's finding of fact, we must affirm "if there is any evidence to suppor t it," and "may reverse only for clear error."

State v. Brown , 401 S.C. 82, 87, 736 S. E.2d 263, 265 (2012).

III. Curtilage

The circuit court ruled the gra ssy area where Bash and the othe r men were standing when the officers approached the m was part of the curtilage of the home. 1 The

1 The court of appeals stated "it is unclear whether the circuit court ruled on whether the grassy area at issu e was part of the curtilage." 4 12 S.C. at 425 n.4, 772 S.E.2d at 540 n.4. We disagree th at the ruling is unclear. Pr eliminary to its ruling,

20curtilage of a home is "the la nd immediately surrounding and as sociated with the home" and is "part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purp oses." Oliver v.

United States , 466 U.S. 170, 180, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1742, 80 L. Ed. 2d 214, 2 25 (1984). As we have stated, cur tilage can include "outbuildings , yard around dwelling, garden." State v. Wiggins , 330 S.C. 538, 548 n.15, 500 S.E.2d 489, 494

n.15 (1998) (discussing curtilage in the context of the duty to retreat under the law of self-defense (citing 40 Am. Jur. 2d Homicide § 168 (1968))); see also 79 C.J.S.

Searches § 34 (2006) ("The curtilage is defined by reference to the fac tors that
determine whether an individual r easonably may expect that an a rea immediately adjacent to the home will remain private. It is the area to wh ich extends the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a person's ho me and the privacies of life. The primary focus is wh ether the area harbors those i ntimate activities associated with domestic life and the privacies of the home." (footnotes omitted)).

We find there is evidence in the record to support the circuit court's determination that the grassy area was within the curtilage of the home. Fir st, both Sergeant Holbrook and Sergeant Milks descri bed the grassy area as part of the "backyard" or "yard area." The grassy area i ncluded a grill, and Sergeant Milks testified that when she got out of the vehicle she "saw the two [men] over by the grill." The use of a grill is an activity closely associated with the use of a home. 2 The area also included a shed, and the area was located only a few feet from a fence surrounding
the home. In the short distance between the fence and the grassy area, there was a

the circuit court engaged in e xtensive discussion with counsel about the legal concept of curtilage and the facts in the record relating to th ose principles. Then, explaining its ruling, the cir cuit court stated the officers "s uited up and went into the curtilage of this . . . hous e based on an anonymous tip alo ne."

2 See United States v. Burston , 806 F.3d 1123, 1127 (8th C ir. 2015) (finding the presence of a cooking grill indicat ed the resident "made person al use of the area," and thus the grill was one fact supporting a determination the area was part of the curtilage); Hardesty v. Hamburg Twp. , 461 F.3d 646, 652 (6th Cir. 2006) (noting the fact the defendants "freque ntly kept a grill" on their porc h as supporting the
existence of the area as part of the curtilage).

21clothes line. 3 Additionally, Shine Bash Lane—t hough a public road—is a short dirt road that reaches only a fe w residences. It runs very clo se to the home and comes to a dead end on the proper ty where the home sits. Large trees line the side
of the road between Shine Bash La ne and the home. These trees continue past the shed and partially block sight from the road to the grassy area where the men were standing. Sergeant Milks testif ied she had to look through a t ree to see into the yard from Shine Bash Lane. 4 Finally, the circuit cour t had before it numerous photographs showing the house, the yard, and the extent to whic h the grassy area was connected to the home and concealed from public view.

The State points out the Suprem e Court of the United States has identified four
factors courts should consider i n deciding whether an area is p art of the curtilage of a home, citing Dunn , 480 U.S. at 301, 107 S. Ct. at 1139, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 334-35.
The Dunn court stated:

Drawing upon the Court's ow n cases and the cumulative experience of the lower cour ts that have grappled with the task of defining the exte nt of a home's curtilage, we believe that curtilage questio ns should be resolved with particular reference to four f actors: the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage t o the home, whether the area
is included within an encl osure surrounding the home,
the nature of the uses to wh ich the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by.

Id. The State argues "the circuit court judge did not appear to h ave considered any of the factors." However, the r ecord indicates the circuit cou rt was aware of and
did consider Dunn . Near the end of the hearing, the State cited Dunn and offered

3 See United States v. Jenkins , 124 F.3d 768, 773 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding the defendants using the area "for such things as hanging their wet laundry on a clothesline to dry" was one fac t supporting a finding the area was curtilage).

4 See United States v. Johnson , 256 F.3d 895, 902 (9th C ir. 2001) ("[I]n rural pieces of property . . . , natural boundaries such as thick tre es or shrubberies may also indicate an area 'to which the activity of home life exten ds.'" (citation omitted)).

22to provide a copy of it to the court. The circuit court immediately responded, "I
have it."

In Dunn , the Supreme Court stated "thes e factors are useful analytical tools only to the degree that, in any given case, they bear upon the centrally relevant
consideration—whether the area i n question is so intimately tied to the home itself that it should be placed under th e home's 'umbrella' of Fourth Amendment protection." 480 U.S. at 301, 107 S. Ct. at 1140, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 335; see also
United States v. Jackson , 728 F.3d 367, 373-74 (4th Cir. 2013) (stating the Supreme Court "cautioned" for the limited use of the Dunn factors). While the circuit court should have made findings as to the Dunn factors, 5 we find the court's analysis was properly focused on the "centrally relevant consid eration" the Supreme Court identified in Dunn

.

We find the circuit court correc tly applied the applicable prin ciples of law regarding curtilage, and the evidence supports the court's fact ual finding that the grassy area in the backyard was sufficiently tied to the home t o be within the curtilage. Therefore, we affirm the circuit court's finding th e area where the
officers encountered Bash was w ithin the curtilage of the home.

IV. Search

A law enforcement officer must ha ve a warrant to enter a home for the purpose of conducting a search, see State v. Counts , 413 S.C. 153, 163 , 776 S.E.2d 59, 65 (2015) (stating "the Fourth Amendment requires the police to ha ve a warrant in order to conduct a search"), unl ess an exception applies, see State v. Brown , 401
S.C. 82, 89, 736 S.E.2d 263, 266 (2012) (listing exceptions to the warrant requirement). See generally State v. Robinson , 410 S.C. 519, 526, 765 S.E.2d 564, 568 (2014) (stating "warrantless searches and seizures inside a man's home are

5 After reciting the four factors, the Dunn Court engaged in an extensive analysis of them. 480 U.S. at 302-03, 107 S. Ct. at 1140, 94 L. Ed. 2d at 335-36. In this case, however, the State never r equested the circuit court to m ake findings as to the

Dunn factors, and the State did not object to the circuit court's f ailure to do so. Thus, we question whether any e rror in the lack of findings on the Dunn factors is preserved for our review. See State v. Dunbar , 356 S.C. 138, 142, 587 S.E.2d 691, 693 (2003) ("In order for an issu e to be preserved for appellat e review, it must
have been raised to and rule d upon by the trial judge.").

23presumptively unreasonable absent a recognized exception to the warrant requirement"). This protection "extends . . . to . . . the cur tilage of the home." Herring , 387 S.C. at 209, 692 S.E.2d at 494; see also Covey v. Assessor of Ohio Cty. , 777 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2015) ("The Fourth Amendment prot ects homes and the 'land immediately surro unding and associated' with home s, known as curtilage . . . ." (quoting Oliver , 466 U.S. at 180, 104 S. Ct. at 1742, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 225). The circuit court determin ed the officers in this case e ntered the curtilage for the purpose of conducting a search , and thus violated the Fourt h Amendment because they did not have a wa rrant and no exception applied.

When officers "physically occup[y] private property for the pur pose of obtaining information," a search has occurred. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. ___, ___, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949, 181 L. Ed. 2d 911, 918 (2012). The majori ty in Jones explained:

Whatever new methods of inve stigation may be devised, our task, at a minimum, is to decide whether the action in question would have constitute d a "search" within the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Where, as here, the Government obtains information by physically intruding on a constitutionally protected area, such a search has undoubtedly occurred.

565 U.S. at ___ n.3, 132 S. Ct. a t 950–951 n.3, 181 L. Ed. 2d a t 919 n.3; see also 565 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 954, 181 L. Ed. 2d at 923 (Sotom ayor, J., concurring) ("I join the Court's opinion because I agree that a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurs, at a minimum, '[w]here, as here, the
Government obtains information by physically intruding on a constitutionally protected area.'"); United States v. DE L'Isle , 825 F.3d 426, 431 (8th Cir. 2016) ("It is clear that a physical intrusion or trespass by a government official constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."); United States v. PereaRey , 680 F.3d 1179, 1185 (9th Cir. 2012) ("Warrantless trespasses by the government into the home or its curtilage are Fourth Amendment searches."). Cf.
Jackson , 728 F.3d at 373 (affirming "the district court's conclusion t hat the officers'
actions did not involve an unli censed physical intrusion of a c onstitutionally protected area" and thus was not " an illegal search or seizure" and noting "if [the officers] breached the curtilage of Cox's apartment . . . , it would be fairly clear that their actions . . . would implicat e the protections of the Four th Amendment").

24In this case, after receiving an anonymous tip indicating illeg al activity was occurring at the home, the officer s "drove over there and handl ed it." Sergeant Holbrook told Sergeant Milks, " Hey, let's go . . . we need to c heck out this drug tip that we got." On their way, they radioed other officers to meet them there, and they arrived at the home with o ther officers in cars behind the m. Sergeant Milks testified that on their way, "We put on our vests, our hat . . . that we wear that says 'Sheriff' on it; a vest that says 'Sheriff' on it." Later, whe n applying for a warrant to search the home, Sergeant Milks signed an affidavit stating, "M embers of the Berkeley County drug enforcement unit were investigating a susp icious complaint at . . . Nelson Ferry R oad . . . ." When Ser geant Holbrook was asked, "What was your reason for pulling on to the grass?" he responded,

I . . . received a tip that th ere was some type of active drug activity going on at that time. As I approached the house, I didn't see anybody ar ound it, and that just caught my attention. So, I just simply drove back there, and that activity was supposed to be happening in the . . . rear of the property, so that was my reasoning . . . I just didn't feel the need to actually m ake contact with the actual house. I just went down Shine Bash Lane.

Based on this evidence, the circuit court found the officers conducted a search.
The court stated the Fourth Amen dment does not "allow you to ro ll up in somebody's backyard when your sol e purpose for going there is t o search it." The
court then ruled:

[The officers] roll[ed] up in the backyard solely to search for drugs. And there's no reasona ble interpretation of the officers' testimony other than that's why they were there. They were not there to politely ask the homeowner, Hey, are you selling drugs out of yo ur house? They were there to see if they could find any.

The State contends that the o fficers did not conduct a search, but entered the property simply to conduct a "knoc k and talk." The court of ap peals accepted the State's argument. Bash , 412 S.C. at 428, 772 S.E.2d at 541. A knock and talk
"occurs when a law enforcemen t officer . . . approaches a resid ence by a route

25available to the general public , knocks on the front door of th e residence, and speaks with an occupant of the residence who responds to the kn ocking." 68 Am.
Jur. 2d Searches and Seizures § 21 (2010). 6 A knock and talk i s not a search under
the Fourth Amendment. State v. Counts , 413 S.C. 153, 164-65 , 776 S.E.2d 59, 66 (2015) (discussing the knock-and-talk procedure in detail); see also United States

v. Walker , 799 F.3d 1361, 1364 n. 1 (11th Cir. 2015) (stating "a warrantl ess . . . knock and talk . . . is not considered a search"); Rogers v. Pendleton , 249 F.3d 279, 289–90 (4th Cir. 2001) ("[P]oli ce officers do not need a warrant to do what any private citizen may legitimately do—approach a home to speak to the inhabitants.").

We agree with the circuit court the officers conducted a search of the grassy area, not a knock and talk. First, Serg eant Holbrook testified, "So instead of actually approaching the house and conduc ting a knock and talk investigation, we just simply drove toward the backya rd." Second, and more importantl y, all of the circumstances surrounding the officers' entry into the grassy a rea objectively demonstrate their purpose was to conduct a search of the grassy area, not to speak to the homeowner. Sergeants Milks and Holbrook (1) radioed oth er officers to meet them at the home, (2) put on gear indicating they were with the sheriff's office, (3) arrived at the home with other officers in cars beh ind them, and (4) bypassed the front of the home. F urther—in their testimony andin Milks' affidavit—Sergeants Milks and Ho lbrook gave no indication they were approaching the home in order to speak to the homeowner.

In finding the officers conducted a search—not a knock and talk —the circuit court relied in part on Florida v. Jardines , ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 185 L. Ed. 2d 495 (2013). The issue in Jardines was "whether using a dr ug-sniffing dog on a homeowner's porch to investigate the contents of the home is a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. " ___ U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1413, 185 L. Ed. 2d at 499; see also ___ U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. a t 1414, 185 L. Ed. 2d at 500 ("We granted certiorari, limited to the question of whether the officers' behavior was a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."). Qu oting Jones , the

6 See also Bash , 412 S.C. at 424-25 n.2, 772 S.E. 2d at 539 n.2 ("A knock and t alk ... is a procedure used by police officers to investigate a com plaint where there is no probable cause for a search w arrant. The police officers kn ock on the door, try to make contact with persons ins ide, and talk to them about the subject of the complaints." (quoting State v. Dorsey, 762 S.E.2d 584, 588 n. 6 (W. Va. 2014))).

26Supreme Court set forth what it called the "simple baseline" of Fourth Amendment protections: "When 'the Governme nt obtains information by physi cally intruding' on persons, houses, papers, or eff ects, 'a "search" within the original meaning of
the Fourth Amendment' has 'undou btedly occurred.'" ___ U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1414, 185 L. Ed. 2d at 500. Afte r finding "the officers' investigation took place in a constitutionally protected ar ea"—the curtilage—the Supreme Co urt "turn[ed] to the question of whether [the inve stigation] was accomplished th rough an unlicensed physical intrusion." ___ U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1415, 185 L. Ed. 2d

at 501-02.

In answering that question, the S upreme Court discussed the imp lied license any person holds to approach the fr ont door of a home, and knock, a nd talk.

"A license may be implied from the habits of the country," . . . . We have accordingly recognized that "the
knocker on the front door is treated as an invitation or license to attempt an entry, justifying ingress to the home by solicitors, hawkers and peddlers of all kinds." This implicit license typically permits the visitor to approach the home by the front path, knock promptly, wait briefly to be received, and then (ab sent invitation to linger longer) leave. Complying with the terms of that
traditional invitation does not r equire fine-grained legal knowledge; it is generally m anaged without incident by the Nation's Girl Scouts and trick-or-treaters. Thus, a police officer not armed with a warrant may approach a home and knock, precisely because that is "no more than any private citizen might do."

___ U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1 415-16, 185 L. Ed. 2d at 502 (f ootnote omitted) (first quoting McKee v. Gratz, 260 U.S. 127, 136, 43 S. Ct. 16, 17, 67 L. Ed. 167, 170 (1922); then quoting Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 626, 71 S. Ct. 920, 924, 95 L. Ed. 1233, 1239 ( 1951); and then quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 469, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1862, 179 L. Ed. 2d 865, 881 (2011))

.

The Supreme Court then referred back to "the question before th e court"— "whether the officers' conduct was [a] . . . search"—and stated :

27As we have described, that depends upon whether the officers had an implied license to enter the porch, which in turn depends upon the purpose for which they entered. Here, their behavior objectiv ely reveals a purpose to conduct a search, which is not what anyone would think
he had license to do.

___ U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1 416-17, 185 L. Ed. 2d at 503.

Relying on this reasoning from Jardines , the circuit court in this case found the officers' behavior revealed a p urpose to conduct a search. The court specifically found, "They were not there to [ talk to] the homeowner." Going to the front door of a home for the purpose of speaking to the homeowner is not a n "intrusion" because of the implied license t o do what any private citizen might do. See Rogers , 249 F.3d at 289–90 (stating "police officers do not need a wa rrant to do what any private citizen may leg itimately do—approach a home to speak to the inhabitants"); Wright , 391 S.C. at 444, 706 S.E.2d at 328 (stating, "A policeman may lawfully go to a person's home" and "go up to the door"). Rather, the circuit
court found the officers were the re "to see if they could find any [drugs]," a mission no homeowner licenses a police officer to enter their p rivate property to
undertake. See Jardines , ___ U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. a t 1416, 185 L. Ed. 2d at 502

- 03. Thus, the circuit court fo und the officers in this case ha d no license to enter the grassy area, and therefore when t hey did so they physically int ruded onto private property to conduct a search—not a knock and talk. Because no exception to the warrant requirement applied and there was no warrant, the offic ers violated the
Fourth Amendment.

As Jardines makes clear, the circuit court was correct to focus on the pur pose of
the officers' actions. As we ha ve explained, the officers' beh avior in this case demonstrates objectively the pur pose of searching for drugs. We also note the officers' subjective intent is consistent with their objective purpose. Sergeant Holbrook testified that "instead of actually approaching the house and conducting a knock and talk investigation, we j ust simply drove toward the b ackyard." Sergeant Milks said the same thing in her affidavit, they "were investig ating a suspicious complaint," not looking for the homeowner.

The court of appeals found the ci rcuit court erre d by relying o n the officers' intent.

See Bash , 412 S.C. at 430-31,772 S.E.2d at 542-43 ("We conclude the cir cuit

28court's injection of the officers' subjective intent into its analysis was an error of law."). We find the circuit court did not err. While even this court has made
statements to the effect that th e subjective intent of the offi cer is irrelevant, 7 that principle of law does not a pply to the question of whether officers conducted a search. The Supreme Court explained in Jardines :

The State points to our decisions holding that the subjective intent of the officer is irrelevant. But those cases merely hold that a stop or search that is objectively

reasonable is not vitiated by the fact that the officer's real reason for making the stop or search has nothing to do with the validating reason.

___ U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1416, 185 L. Ed. 2d at 503.

Thus, when an officer's actions are objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the officer's subjective intent to the contrary will not invalidate the officer's actions. Here, the offi cers' subjective intent to co nduct a search for drugs
is consistent with the circuit co urt's finding regarding their objective purpose.

The court of appeals also relied on Wright to support its conclusion the officers in this case did not conduct a search. Quoting Wright , the court of appeals stated, "A police officer without a warrant i s privileged to enter private property to investigate a complaint or a report of an ongoing crime." Bash , 412 S.C. at 426– 27, 772 S.E.2d at 540 (quoting Wright , 391 S.C. at 444, 706 S.E.2d at 328). The quoted statement from Wright —applicable there—is not applicable here. The key
distinction between this case and Wright is the officers in Wright had probable
cause to believe a cri me was in progress before they departed their path to the front door, and immediately thereafter, t hey observed exigent circums tances to excuse

7 See, e.g.

, State v. Moore , 415 S.C. 245, 252, 781 S.E.2d 897, 901 (2016) (regarding an officer's justification for extending a traffic s top); State v. Provet

, 405 S.C. 101, 108, 747 S.E.2d 453 , 457 (2013) (regarding the ex istence of reasonable suspicion); Wright , 391 S.C. at 444, 706 S.E. 2d at 328 (regarding the existence of exigent circumstances); State v. Banda , 371 S.C. 245, 252 n.3, 639 S.E.2d 36, 40 n.3 (2006) (regarding the existence of reasonable suspicion or probable cause); State v. Freiburger , 366 S.C. 125, 133 , 620 S.E.2d 737, 741 (2005) (regarding the validity o f a search incident to arrest).

29the warrant requirement. From a public road, the officers in Wright "observed a large number of vehicles . . . and saw spotlights." 391 S.C. a t 445, 706 S.E.2d at

328. The officers then turned dow n the private dirt road on th eir way to the front
door. Id. We explained:

The deputies' observations as they drove down the dirt road corroborated the anonymous tip and gave them ample reason to believe dogf ighting was in progress. Exigent circumstances deve loped when the suspects started fleeing. Moreover, the presence of dogs created a potential danger to the deputie s. Hence, the deputies had the authority to perform a protective sweep of the premises.

391 S.C. at 445, 706 S.E.2d at 328.

The officers in Wright , therefore, observed facts that gave rise to probable cause to believe a crime was in progress—before they "physically intrud[ ed]" onto private property—and the exigent circum stances exception to the warrant requirement permitted them to procee d without a warrant. See Herring , 387 S.C. at 210, 692 S.E.2d at 494 ("A fairly perceive d need to act on the spot may justify entry and search under the exigent circum stances exception to the warrant requirement."). In this case, on the other hand, Ser geants Holbrook and Milks obse rved nothing incriminating—and therefore di d not have probable cause for a s earch—until after they drove onto the grassy area and saw one of the men throw do wn what appeared
to be cocaine.

The court of appeals also stated "the Fourth Circuit has adopted the position police may bypass the front door of a resi dence and proceed to the bac kyard or other entrance for a knock and talk pr ovided they have reason to beli eve the person they are attempting to cont act will be found there." Bash , 412 S.C. at 428, 772 S.E.2d at 541. For this statement, the court of appeals cited Alvarez v. Montgomery County , 147 F.3d 354 (4th Cir. 1998). Id. However, Alvarez does not support the court of appeals' conclusion the officers in this case acted wi thin the Fourth
Amendment. The facts of Alvarez —quite different from the facts of this case—led
the Fourth Circuit to this basi c conclusion: "the officers in this case had a 'legitimate reason' for entering the Alvarezes' property 'uncon nected with a search of such premises.'" 147 F.3d at 358. Those facts included (1) the officers "were

30responding to a 911 call;" (2) "a bout an underage drinking party;" (3) where the
officers found "alcohol containers and . . . awkwardly parked c ars;" (4) which caused them to "believe[] t hey had found the party." Id. Also unlike this case, the officers actually approached the front door of the Alvarezes' h ome. 147 F.3d at

357. When they did so, they obse rved a sign that read "Party I n Back" with "an arrow pointing toward the backyard." Id. Following the sign's directive, the officers "entered the backyard." Id. The Fourth Circuit specifically found the officers did not enter the backya rd for the purpose of conducting a search, but rather, "They entered the Alvare zes' property simply to notify the homeowner or the party's host about the compl aint and to ask that no one dri ve while intoxicated."
147 F.3d at 358.

The circuit court in this case found that Sergeants Holbrook an d Milks and an
unknown number of other officers en tered the grassy area behind this home not simply to speak with the homeowner about the complaint, but rat her for the purpose of searching for drugs. In making these findings, the circuit court correctly applied the applicable p rinciples of law. As to the circuit court's factual findings, there is ample evidence in the record to support them . Therefore, the court of appeals erred in rever sing the circuit court's finding that a search occurred.

V. Conclusion

The officers entered the curtila ge of this home for the purpose of conducting a search for drugs. These actions implicate the Fourth Amendment . Because the officers did not have a warrant for the search and no exception to the warrant requirement was applicable, the officers violated the Fourth Am endment 's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. For th is reason, we

REVERSE the court of appeals, 8 and we reinstate the c ircuit court's order suppressing the drugs.

PLEICONES, C.J., BEATTY, KITTR EDGE, JJ., and Acting Justice DeAndrea Benjamin, concur.

8 We also granted certiorari to d etermine whether the police vio lated article I, section 10 of the South Carolina Constitution by entering the b ackyard of the
home. We need not reach this i ssue because we affirm the circu it court's ruling suppressing the evidence unde r the Fourth Amendment. State v. Gamble , 405 S.C. 409, 420, 747 S.E.2d 784, 789 (2013).

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