What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-955.

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and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Paul L. Francis 

at (202) 512-4841 or francisp@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-06-955, a report to 

congressional committees 

September 2006

DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS 

Restructured JTRS Program Reduces 

Risk, but Significant Challenges Remain 

The proposed JTRS restructuring—a plan DOD approved in March 2006—

appears to address and reduce program risks that GAO and others have 

documented in recent years. While still meeting key requirements, including 

those related to DOD’s network centric transformation effort, the revised 

approach is expected to develop and field capabilities in increments rather 

than attempting to develop and field the capabilities all at once. Costly and 

non-transformational requirements will be deferred to later increments. 

Deferring these requirements will allow more time to mature critical 

technologies, integrate components, and test the radio system before 

committing to production. JTRS program management has also been 

strengthened through the establishment of a Joint Program Executive Office 

(JPEO). The more centralized management structure should help the 

program improve oversight and coordination of standards, system 

engineering, and development of the radios. 

The real test will be in execution, and, for that, several management and 

technical challenges remain. First, JPEO must finalize the details of the 

restructuring, including formal acquisition strategies, independent cost 

estimates, and test and evaluation plans. DOD also needs to develop 

migration and fielding plans for how JTRS networking capabilities will be 

used. Completing and obtaining DOD’s approval of these activities is needed 

to ensure the JTRS program is executable. There are also a number of 

longer-term technical challenges that the JTRS program must address. For 

example, the proposed interim solutions for enabling network 

interoperability among different JTRS variants have yet to be developed. In 

addition, integrating the radio’s hardware onto diverse platforms and 

meeting respective size, weight, and power limitations has also been a longstanding challenge that must be overcome. Furthermore, operating in a 

networked environment open to a large number of potential users has 

generated an unprecedented need for information assurance. This need has 

resulted in a lengthy, technically challenging, and still evolving certification 

process from the National Security Agency. At the same time, the program 

must address the need to obtain and sustain commitments and support from 

the military services and other stakeholders—a challenge that has often 

hampered joint development efforts in the past. The extent to which DOD 

overcomes these challenges will determine the extent to which the program 

manages cost, schedule, and performance risks and supports JTRSdependent military operations. 

In 1997, the Department of Defense 

(DOD) initiated the Joint Tactical 

Radio System (JTRS) program, a 

key element of its effort to 

transform military operations to be 

network centric. Using emerging 

software-defined radio technology, 

the JTRS program plans to develop 

and procure hundreds of thousands 

of radios that give warfighters the 

capability to access maps and other 

visual data, communicate via voice 

and video, and obtain information 

directly from battlefield sensors. 

The JTRS program has 

encountered a number of 

problems, resulting in significant 

delays and cost increases. The 

program is currently estimated to 

total about $37 billion. Given the 

criticality of JTRS to DOD’s force 

transformation, Congress directed 

GAO to continue its ongoing review 

of the JTRS program. This report 

(1) assesses whether a recent 

restructuring puts the program in a 

better position to succeed and (2) 

identifies any risks that challenge 

the successful fielding of JTRS. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making recommendations 

aimed at ensuring that the activities 

required for completing the JTRS 

restructuring reflect stable 

requirements, knowledge-based 

acquisition strategies, realistic 

costs, and comprehensive test 

plans, as well as to develop plans 

for fielding JTRS radios. In 

commenting on a draft of this 

report, DOD agreed with these 

recommendations. 

Page i GAO-06-955 Defense Acquisitions 

Letter 1

Results in Brief 2 

Background 4 

Program Restructuring Appears to Address Many Concerns with 

JTRS 14 

Program Uncertainties and Technical Risks Remain 19 

Conclusions 28 

Recommendations 28 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 29 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 30 

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 31 

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 34 

Tables 

Table 1: Comparison of Frequency Band, Nominal Channel 

Bandwidth, and Data Rates for Selected Legacy 

Waveforms and New Wideband Waveforms 5 

Table 2: Responsibilities of JTRS Program/Product Offices until 

2005 9 

Table 3: Three JTRS Development Options Presented in November 

2005 12 

Table 4: Responsibilities of JPEO JTRS Domains 13 

Table 5: Estimated Procurement Amounts Required for Other 

Radio Systems from 1998 through 2006 by Procuring 

Organization 14 

Table 6: Summary of JPEO-Initiated Changes to JTRS Program 15 

Figures 

Figure 1: JTRS Operational Overview 7 

Figure 2: Impact of Restructuring on Product Schedules 17 

Contents 
Page ii GAO-06-955 Defense Acquisitions 

Abbreviations 

DOD Department of Defense 

GAO Government Accountability Office 

JTRS Joint Tactical Radio System 

JPEO Joint Program Executive Office 

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Page 1 GAO-06-955 Defense Acquisitions 

September 11, 2006 

The Honorable Thad Cochran 

Chairman 

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Jerry Lewis 

Chairman 

The Honorable David Obey 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Appropriations 

House of Representatives 

Over the past decade, the Department of Defense (DOD) has undertaken a 

major transformation of its military operations—one that will rely on 

network centric communications to improve force information sharing, 

collaboration, and situational awareness and, thereby, enable more rapid 

and effective decision-making and speed of execution on the battlefield. 

The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) program, initiated in 1997, is a key 

effort in this transformation. By capitalizing on emerging software-defined 

radio technology, the program plans to develop and procure hundreds of 

thousands of JTRS radios, which are expected to interoperate with 

existing radio systems and provide the warfighter with additional 

communications capability to access maps and other visual data, 

communicate via voice and video with other units and levels of command, 

and obtain information directly from battlefield sensors. 

Although JTRS offers the potential to address key communications 

shortfalls and significantly improve military capabilities, the program has 

encountered a number of problems, including unstable requirements, 

immature technologies, and aggressive schedules, which have resulted in 

significant cost increases and delays. In August 2003, we reported that the 

lack of a strong, joint-management structure presented significant 

challenges to the program’s ability to control costs1

—currently estimated 

 1

GAO, Challenges and Risks Associated with the Joint Tactical Radio System Program, 

GAO-03-879R (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 11, 2003). 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 
Page 2 GAO-06-955 Defense Acquisitions 

to total about $37 billion. In response, Congress directed DOD to 

strengthen program management, and in February 2005, DOD established 

a Joint Program Executive Office (JPEO) to manage the JTRS program 

and its various components. Following JPEO’s assessment of the program, 

the Defense Acquisition Board directed JPEO to come up with a plan to 

restructure the JTRS development effort—a plan that DOD approved in 

March 2006. 

Given the criticality of JTRS to DOD’s force transformation, Congress 

directed GAO to continue its ongoing review of the JTRS program.2

 This 

report (1) assesses whether the recent restructuring puts the program in a 

better position to succeed and (2) identifies any risks that challenge the 

successful fielding of JTRS. 

We conducted our review from August 2005 to August 2006 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. To assess 

program progress and risks, we reviewed program restructuring data from 

the JTRS JPEO, including cost, schedule, and performance data. We also 

reviewed the fiscal year 2007 budget request and projected future year 

budget requests. We interviewed agency officials from various DOD and 

service organizations and reviewed reports produced by Defense 

organizations. More details about our scope and methodology are in 

appendix I. 

The recent restructuring of the JTRS program appears to put the program 

in a better position to succeed, by emphasizing an incremental, more 

moderate risk approach to developing and fielding capabilities. The 

incremental approach reflects the military services’ most urgent priorities 

for a mobile, flexible communications and networking capability and 

defers the development of some of the more challenging requirements to 

later increments. Deferring these requirements will allow more time to 

mature critical technologies, integrate components, and test the radio 

system before committing to production. DOD expects that JTRS program 

management through the JPEO and other structural changes will improve 

oversight and coordination of standards and development of the radios. 

The centralized management structure is also empowered to manage 

 2

Conference Report, Making Appropriations for the Department of Defense for the Fiscal 

Year Ending September 30, 2006, And For Other Purposes, House of Representatives 

Report 109-359, December 18, 2005 

Results in Brief 
Page 3 GAO-06-955 Defense Acquisitions 

development costs, which are expected to total $2.1 billion more than 

originally projected between fiscal years 2006 and 2011. In addition, the 

restructuring attempts to facilitate information-sharing and competition by 

ensuring government purpose rights3

 to contractor-developed products. 

While the restructuring appears to address many of the problems that 

affected JTRS in the past, several management and technical challenges 

still remain. JPEO must finalize the details of the restructuring, including 

test and evaluation plans and formal acquisition strategies. Estimated 

program costs also require independent review and validation and the 

services need to work out migration and fielding plans for the radios. 

Completing these activities and obtaining DOD’s approval of the 

completed JTRS program restructuring are essential to ensuring the JTRS 

program is executable. Over the longer term, the program faces several 

key management and technical challenges. For example, although the new 

joint management structure for JTRS is a significant improvement over the 

previous fragmented program management structure, joint development 

efforts in DOD have often been hampered by an inability to sustain 

requirements commitments and funding support from the military services 

and other department stakeholders. Regarding technical challenges, 

integrating the radio’s hardware onto diverse platforms and meeting 

respective size, weight, and power limitations has been a long-standing 

challenge and remains so. Operating in a networked environment—open 

to a large number of potential users—has also resulted in a lengthy, 

technically challenging, and still evolving information assurance 

certification process from the National Security Agency. Furthermore, the 

proposed interim technical solutions for enabling network interoperability 

among different JTRS variants have yet to be designed and developed. 

We are recommending the Secretary of Defense ensure that the activities 

required for completing the JTRS restructuring reflect stable requirements, 

knowledge-based acquisition strategies, and comprehensive test plans, as 

well as to develop plans for fielding JTRS radios. In commenting on a draft 

of this report, DOD agreed with our recommendations. 

 3

Government purpose rights means the rights to (1) use, modify, reproduce, release, 

perform, display, or disclose technical data or computer software (or computer software 

documentation) within the government without restriction and (2) to release or disclose 

technical data or computer software (or computer software documentation) outside the 

government and authorize persons to whom release or disclosure has been made to use, 

modify, reproduce, release, perform, display, or disclose the work for U.S. government 

purposes. 
Page 4 GAO-06-955 Defense Acquisitions 

The JTRS program was initiated to exploit advancements in softwaredefined radio technology and provide battlefield commanders with 

superior information capabilities. Since its initiation in 1997, the program 

has experienced cost and schedule overruns and performance shortfalls, 

due primarily to immature technologies, unstable requirements, and 

aggressive schedules. In an effort to address these problems, the program 

was restructured in March of this year. However, due to JTRS’ lengthy 

development path, DOD has had to continue buying other tactical radios—

currently estimated to cost $11 billion—to support its communication 

needs. 

Survivability and lethality in warfare are increasingly dependent on 

smaller, highly mobile, joint forces that rely on superior information and 

communication capabilities. The single function hardware design of DOD’s 

existing radio systems lack the functionality and flexibility necessary to 

achieve and maintain information superiority or to support the rapid 

mobility and interoperability required by today’s armed forces. To support 

new operational or mission requirements, DOD determined that the large 

number and diversity of legacy radios in use would require wholesale 

replacement or expensive modifications. 

Software-defined radios such as JTRS primarily use software rather than 

hardware to control how the radio works and, because they are 

programmable, JTRS offers significant flexibility to meet a wide variety of 

needs. Rather than developing radios that are built to different standards 

and operate on different fixed frequencies, as was the case in the past, 

JTRS is to be a single, interoperable family of radios based on a common 

set of standards and applications. The radios are expected to not only 

satisfy the requirements common to the military’s three operational 

domains—air, sea, and ground—but be able to communicate directly with 

many of DOD’s existing tactical radios. To facilitate interoperability, JTRS 

will develop a set of waveforms (software radio applications) designed 

with the same operating characteristics as many of DOD’s existing radios.4

 4

A waveform is the representation of a signal that includes the frequency, modulation type, 

message format, and/or transmission system. In general usage, the term waveform refers to 

a known set of characteristics, for example, frequency bands (VHF, HF, and UHF), 

modulation techniques (FM, AM), message standards, and transmission systems. In JTRS 

usage, the term waveform is used to describe the entire set of radio functions that occur 

from the user input to the RF output and vice versa. A JTRS waveform is implemented as a 

reusable, portable, executable software application that is independent of the JTRS 

operating system, middleware, and hardware. 

Background 

JTRS Was Initiated to 

Address Long-Term 

Military Communications 

Needs 
Page 5 GAO-06-955 Defense Acquisitions 

Depending on operational needs, different waveforms could be loaded 

onto a JTRS radio and used to communicate with a variety of other radios. 

In addition to supporting interoperability, JTRS is to contribute to DOD’s 

goal of network centric warfare operations by introducing new wideband 

networking waveforms that dramatically increase the amount of data and 

speed at which the data can be transmitted. As such, the waveforms would 

facilitate the use of maps, imagery, and video to support the decisionmaking of tactical commanders at all echelons. Table 1 compares the 

frequency band, nominal channel bandwidth, and data rates of selected 

legacy waveforms and new wideband waveforms. 

Table 1: Comparison of Frequency Band, Nominal Channel Bandwidth, and Data Rates for Selected Legacy Waveforms and 

New Wideband Waveforms 

Waveform 

Frequency band

(millions of Hertz (MHz))

Nominal channel bandwidth 

(thousands of Hertz (KHz)) 

Data rate (thousands of 

bits per second (Kbps))

Legacy 

Single Channel Ground and Airborne 

Radio System (SINCGARS) 30 - 88 25 

Voice: 16

Data: .075 - 16

Enhanced Position Location Reporting 

System (EPLRS) 420 - 450 3,000 

Data: 57 or 228

High Frequency 

2 - 30 3/6/12 

Voice and Data:

11 distinct data rates 

between

.075 – 9.6

Have Quick 

225 - 400 25 

Voice: 16

Data: .075 - 16

Tactical Data Information Link-Joint 

(TADIL-J) 960 - 1,215 3,000 

Voice: 2.4 and 16

Data: 28.8 – 1,137

Ultra High Frequency Satellite 

Communications Demand Assigned 

Multiple Access (UHF SATCOM DAMA) 225 – 400 5 and 25 

Voice and Data: .075 – 56, 

or 64

New 

Wideband Networkinga 2 - 2,000 25 – 30,000 Data: up to 5,000

Soldier Radioa 2 - 2,000 13,000 Data: up to 1,000

Joint Airborne Network – Tactical Edge 2 - 2,000 To be determined To be determined

Source: GAO analysis of April 2003 JTRS Operational Requirements Document, Annex E. 

a

The Wideband Networking Waveform and Soldier Radio Waveform are actually families of 

waveforms. The Wideband Networking Waveform family consists of four different waveforms and the 

Soldier Radio Waveform family consists of three different waveforms. 
Page 6 GAO-06-955 Defense Acquisitions 

In addition to providing new wideband waveforms, individual JTRS radios 

would have the capability to support multiple services (e.g., voice, data, 

and video) and operate on multiple channels simultaneously. For example, 

a four-channel JTRS radio set intended for a ground vehicle could be 

programmed to have channels dedicated to SINCGARS, Have Quick, the 

Wideband Networking Waveform, and the Soldier Radio Waveform. All 

four channels could be operating simultaneously. Data could also be 

transferred from one channel (or network) to another through a “gateway” 

device implemented with hardware and software. 

Figure 1 depicts the JTRS operational overview. 
Page 7 GAO-06-955 Defense Acquisitions 

Figure 1: JTRS Operational Overview 

Notes: 

IBS: Integrated Broadcast Service 

GPS: Global Positioning System 

UAV: Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 

EKMS: Electronic Key Management System 

IA: Information Assurance 

C4ISR: Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance 

Source: JTRS Operational Requirements Document, April 2003.
Page 8 GAO-06-955 Defense Acquisitions 

Developing JTRS is a significant challenge. Because JTRS is intended to 

operate on the battlefield where there is no fixed infrastructure of cell 

towers, fiber optic lines, and other network components such as routers 

and switches, the radios must be powerful enough to transmit and relay 

information wirelessly over long distances, maintain network linkages and 

quality of service while on the move, and ensure that communications and 

the network itself are secure. Development of the individual waveforms 

and their ability to function effectively on different JTRS sets is critical to 

the success of JTRS. The Wideband Networking Waveform, for example, 

will require complex software development and include over 1.6 million 

lines of software code. To ensure the waveforms perform as intended, they 

will go through a rigorous certification process—one that involves testing 

the functionality, portability,5

 interoperability, and security aspects of the 

waveforms when operating on production representative JTRS radios. 

To manage JTRS’ development, DOD established a Joint Program Office 

and service-led program/product offices in the late 1990s. Table 2 

summarizes the general management structure of JTRS until 2005, at 

which time it was changed. 

 5

Porting the waveform involves the transfer of the software from one operational 

environment (hardware, operating system, etc.) to another. 
Page 9 GAO-06-955 Defense Acquisitions 

Table 2: Responsibilities of JTRS Program/Product Offices until 2005 

Program/Product Office (lead 

service) Responsibilities Major milestones 

Joint Program Office • JTRS Software Communications Architecture 

• Waveform applications and associated 

cryptographic algorithms 

• Certifying compliance of hardware and 

software with the architecture 

• Ensuring overall joint interoperability 

• Development of Software 

Communications Architecture started in 

2000 

• Development of waveform applications 

and associated cryptographic algorithms 

started in 2002 

Cluster 1 (Army) • Radios for ground vehicles and helicopters • System development started in 2002 

Cluster 5 (Army) • Handheld and manpack radios 

• Radios for use in weight- and powerconstrained platforms, such as sensors and 

weapons systems 

• System development started in 2004 

Airborne, Maritime, Fixed-Site (Air 

Force/Navy) Cluster 

• Radios for aircraft 

• Radios for maritime platforms 

• Radios for fixed-site locations 

• Pre-system development started in 2004

Multifunctional Information 

Distribution System-JTRS (Navy) 

• Radios for selected airborne platforms 

equipped with Multifunctional Information 

Distribution System terminals 

• System development started in 2004 

Special Operations Command • Handheld radios for Special Operations Forces • System development started in 2002 

Source: GAO analysis of JTRS documents. 

Note: A JTRS cluster was the term used to describe a grouping of platforms with similar 

requirements. 

Achieving JTRS’ technical requirements has proven to be a significant 

challenge. In 2001, an independent assessment of the program identified 

numerous concerns, including the program’s aggressive acquisition 

approach and schedule, unstable requirements, and an ambiguous 

management decision chain.6

In our reviews, we have found similar problems. For example, the JTRS 

Cluster 1 program—which includes development of the Wideband 

Networking Waveform, the waveform intended to serve as the main 

 6

The independent assessment was requested through the Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense, Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics’ Tri-Service Assessment Initiative. The TriService Assessment Initiative was founded by the Office of the Secretary of Defense in 1998 

to address software acquisition issues. Subsequently, Independent Expert Program 

Reviews, which serve as the basis for the Defense Acquisition Program Support, were 

incorporated into the DOD acquisition regulation and became part of the Defense 

Acquisition Guidebook. 

JTRS Program 

Restructured to Address 

Cost, Schedule, and 

Performance Problems 
Page 10 GAO-06-955 Defense Acquisitions 

conduit of information among Army tactical units—began development 

with an aggressive schedule, immature technologies, and a lack of clearly 

defined and stable requirements. As a result, the program struggled to 

mature and integrate key technologies and was forced to make major 

design changes. These factors contributed to significant cost and schedule 

problems that led DOD to stop key development work and propose 

restructuring the program. Meeting requirements for JTRS Cluster 5 radios 

proved even more challenging, given the radios’ smaller size, weight, and 

power needs.7 Several programmatic changes and a contract award bid 

protest also slowed progress of the Cluster 5 program. 

Subsequent to our reporting that the JTRS program lacked a strong, jointmanagement structure for resolving requirements and funding differences 

among the services,8

 Congress directed DOD to develop a plan for 

managing JTRS’s development under a single joint program office. Under 

DOD’s plan, all JTRS programs were realigned under the authority of a 

single JTRS Joint Program Executive Officer, established within the Navy’s 

Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command. The JPEO’s assessment of 

the JTRS program revealed that 

• the program evolved from a legacy radio replacement program to a 

network centric radio program without a re-baselining of program 

impacts; 

• requirements significantly changed and never stabilized; 

• the complexity of information assurance/security problems were not 

anticipated; and 

• the program was executing at high technical, schedule, and cost risk. 

To get the program on track, JPEO was directed by DOD to come up with 

a proposal for JTRS that addressed the services’ priority requirements, 

was technically doable, and could be executed within a reasonable budget. 

In November 2005, JPEO presented three program options reflecting 

different sets of capabilities and development costs (see table 3). Each 

 7

The smallest Cluster 5 radio weighs only about 1 pound, compared with 84 pounds for 

Cluster 1. 

8

GAO, Challenges and Risks Associated with the Joint Tactical Radio System Program, 

GAO-03-879R (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 11, 2003). 
Page 11 GAO-06-955 Defense Acquisitions 

option included a specific mix of form factors9 and waveforms for each of 

the services. For example, under option 3, the Marine Corps would use 

4-channel vehicle radios, capable of operating two or three legacy 

waveforms and up to three new waveforms, as well as 2-channel manpack 

radios operating one or two legacy waveforms and one or two new 

waveforms. The Army would also use 4-channel vehicle radios, but with 

the capability to operate three or four legacy waveforms and two or three 

new waveforms, as well as 1-channel and 2-channel radios operating the 

Soldier Radio Waveform for its sensors and weapons systems. The Air 

Force would use a 4-channel Multifunctional Information Distribution 

System terminal form factor operating two legacy waveforms and one new 

waveform. The Navy would use the same form factor, operating one legacy 

and one new waveform, as well as a ship form factor operating one new 

waveform. 

 9

Form factors is a term used to describe the various types of radios used by the services. 

For example, there are radios that will be customized for ground vehicles, manpacks, 

aircraft, ships, and embedded in sensors and weapons systems. 
Page 12 GAO-06-955 Defense Acquisitions 

Table 3: Three JTRS Development Options Presented in November 2005 

Waveform 

Option 1: 

Execute program within 

existing budget profile 

Option 2: 

Transformational 

capability only 

Option 3: 

Transformational plus 

some legacy capabilities 

Legacy 

SINCGARS 9 9

EPLRS 9

High Frequency 9

Have Quick 9

TADIL-J (Link 16) 9 9 9

New 

Wideband Networking 9 9

Solider Radio 9 9 9

Joint Airborne Network-Tactical Edgea 9 9

Mobile User Objective Systemb (or UHF SATCOM 

DAMA) 

9 9

Additional fiscal year 2006–2011 development 

cost, in billions NA $1.8 $2.1 

Total fiscal year 2006–2011 development cost, 

in billions $1.9 $3.7 $4.0 

Prior development cost (through fiscal year 

2005), in billions $1.5 $1.5 $1.5 

Total development cost, in billions $3.4 $5.2 $5.5 

Source: GAO analysis of data provided by JPEO. 

a

A wideband waveform for airborne platforms. 

b

A waveform for a new satellite communication system that will provide low data rate voice and data 

communications capable of penetrating most weather, foliage, and manmade structures. 

Note: NA = Not applicable. 

DOD selected option 3, which establishes a priority for developing a 

networking capability mainly through the introduction of transformational 

wideband waveforms. Since future JTRS capabilities are still planned, 

option 3 also reflects an incremental approach to developing full JTRS 

capabilities. The initial option 3 increment is referred to as JTRS 

Increment 1.10

 10Subsequent to the selection of option 3, DOD determined that the Have Quick waveform 

was not a priority and thus would not be included in the Increment 1 development effort. 
Page 13 GAO-06-955 Defense Acquisitions 

To implement JTRS Increment 1, JPEO established a new organizational 

structure for JTRS that includes three domains and a program for “special 

radios.” Table 4 summarizes the general management structure of JTRS 

after the program restructuring. 

Table 4: Responsibilities of JPEO JTRS Domains 

Domain Responsibilities 

Ground Communications and networking capabilities for vehicles, dismounted soldiers, sensors, and 

weapons systems 

Airborne, Maritime, Fixed Site Communications and networking capabilities for aircraft, ships, and ground fixed site platforms 

A JTRS radio to replace the Multifunctional Information Distribution System terminals on selected 

platforms, including the F/A-18 aircraft 

Network Enterprise Waveforms, gateways, and common networking services solutions 

Special Radios JTRS Enhanced Multi-Band Intra-Team Radio used by Special Operations Forces 

Source: GAO analysis of data provided by JPEO. 

It is likely that the first users of operational JTRS radios will be Navy 

F/A-18 aircraft equipped with Multifunctional Information Distribution 

System-JTRS radios and Special Operations Forces using the JTRS 

Enhanced Multi-Band Intra-Team Radio. Initially, the radios will operate 

legacy waveforms only. 

From the start of JTRS development through the end of this year, DOD 

estimates that $11 billion has been required to buy other radio systems.11

Of this total amount, $1.3 billion has been used in fiscal years 2005 and 

2006 to procure SINCGARS radios to meet urgent operational needs in Iraq 

and Afghanistan. In addition, because of delays in the development of 

JTRS, several users depending on JTRS have had to make adjustments and 

procure interim radios to meet operational needs. For example, the Army 

 11In August 1998, shortly after the establishment of the JTRS program, the Office of the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence 

identified a need to stem the continuing efforts by the services to acquire unique radios and 

communications terminals. All component efforts to initiate any contracting activity related 

to the development and acquisition of any radio system were to be held in abeyance. 

However, service, command, or agency acquisition executives were allowed to submit 

requests for exceptions to the policy through the JTRS Joint Program Office. Eventually, 

the waiver process was suspended. As of May 2005, the services no longer had to request a 

JTRS waiver; they only had to notify the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and 

Information Integration of plans to acquire non-JTRS radios to meet current operational 

needs. 

Delay in JTRS 

Development Has 

Required Investments in 

Other Radio Systems 
Page 14 GAO-06-955 Defense Acquisitions 

is in the process of procuring radios for several of its existing helicopter 

platforms and a new development effort to outfit and equip individual 

ground soldiers. Since JTRS development will require at least several more 

years, it is likely that the estimated $11 billion investment in legacy radios 

will continue to grow. Table 5 shows the annual procurement amounts for 

radio systems other than JTRS from 1998 through 2006. 

Table 5: Estimated Procurement Amounts Required for Other Radio Systems from 1998 through 2006 by Procuring 

Organization 

Dollars in millions 

Year Army Air Force Marine Corps Navy

Combatant 

commands and 

agencies Total

1998 0 $7.74 0 0 0 $7.74

1999 $91.55 $19.25 $1.30 $1.28 $24.87 $138.25

2000 220.89 65.68 25.63 63.74 0.60 376.54

2001 142.72 4.00 0 72.79 1.52 221.03

2002 54.02 1.62 2.38 60.56 71.17 189.75

2003 199.99 78.66 51.07 49.94 0.30 379.96

2004 668.18 104.10 42.58 326.32 3.29 1,144.47

2005 1,564.52 2,289.17 314.43 368.79 0.75 4,537.66

2006 a a a a a 4,170.00

Total $2,941.87 $2,570.22 $437.39 $943.42 $102.50 $11,165.40

Source: GAO analysis of data provided by DOD. 

a

DOD provided only a total estimate for 2006. 

The proposed JTRS restructuring approach appears to address past 

concerns with the program that GAO and others have documented in 

recent years. While still meeting the needs of key users such as Future 

Combat Systems, the revised approach is expected to develop and field 

capabilities in increments rather than attempting to develop and field the 

capabilities all at once. Costly and non-transformational requirements will 

be deferred to later increments. In addition, through the establishment of 

the JPEO and other structural changes, JTRS program management has 

been strengthened and has become more centralized. The centralized 

management structure should help the program control development costs 

and improve oversight through the coordination of standards, system 

engineering, and development of the radios and waveforms. A new 

governance structure is also expected to help ensure appropriate oversight 

and establish clear lines of accountability while, according to JPEO 

officials, the establishment of an information repository is expected to 

Program 

Restructuring 

Appears to Address 

Many Concerns with 

JTRS 
Page 15 GAO-06-955 Defense Acquisitions 

help facilitate the delivery of waveform and operating system software to 

the radios’ hardware developers. These efforts, if carried out, should help 

the restructured JTRS program address previous cost, schedule and 

performance problems. Table 6 summarizes the significant changes to the 

JTRS program as a result of the restructuring. 

Table 6: Summary of JPEO-Initiated Changes to JTRS Program 

Parameter Pre-JPEO JPEO 

Management Structure Decentralized Centralized/Enterprise 

Requirements Approach Unconstrained (Big Bang) Constrained (Incremental) 

Program Milestones Compressed Expanded 

Waveform Deliveries Expansive Reduced 

JPEO Assessment of Program 

Risk 

High Moderate 

Source: GAO analysis. 

A central feature of the JTRS program restructuring is its evolutionary 

acquisition approach. The program plans to develop capabilities in 

increments rather than attempt to field a complete capability all at once, 

which was the previous approach. Specifically, the program plans to defer 

or reduce costly and non-transformational requirements to later 

increments. At the same time, the approach prioritizes the development of 

networking capabilities, primarily through the development of three 

networking waveforms, and the ability to interoperate with key legacy 

radios. These capabilities are critical to key dependent users such as the 

Army’s Future Combat Systems and the implementation of DOD’s vision of 

network centric operations warfare. Program officials noted several 

requirements that were reduced or deferred from the previous program to 

later increments: 

• Reduced number of waveforms: The number of waveforms to be delivered 

for the first increment has been reduced from 32 to 11. The waveforms 

deferred to later increments are all non-networking legacy waveforms. 

Reducing the number of waveforms allows the program to focus the initial 

JTRS increment on developing and testing the critical networking 

waveforms as well as some of the more commonly-used legacy 

waveforms. In addition, the smaller number of waveforms reduces porting 

efforts. 

• Reduced number of radio variants: The number of variants to be 

delivered for the first increment has been reduced from 26 to 13. For 

New Approach 

Emphasizes Developing 

Capabilities in Increments 

and Deferring Some 

Requirements 
Page 16 GAO-06-955 Defense Acquisitions 

example, only 9 of the 15 small form radios will be developed for the first 

increment. Reducing the number of variants provides relief in the 

hardware design and platform integration work, allowing the program to 

focus the initial JTRS increment on developing the variants most critical to 

key dependent users such as the Future Combat Systems. 

• Reduced number of waveform combinations per radio variant: The 

original intent of JTRS was that most waveforms would operate on most 

radio variants. However, DOD determined that porting 32 different 

waveforms onto 26 different variants would have been an immense and 

costly undertaking. In addition, operating numerous waveforms 

simultaneously on a JTRS radio would have substantially increased power 

demands. By reducing the number of waveform combinations per variant, 

program officials expect to both reduce porting efforts and more easily 

meet size, weight, and power requirements on some variants. In addition, 

program officials expect that reducing the number of waveforms operating 

on each radio will help to mitigate interference. 

• Interim solutions for network interoperability: To achieve DOD’s desired 

networking capabilities, the waveforms must be able to interoperate 

reliably and securely with each other. The optimal solution is to have this 

functionality performed inside JTRS radios as it reduces the overall 

footprint of the communication network. However, technologies and radio 

designs are not mature enough at this point to develop an interoperability 

capability that would function inside individual JTRS radios. Thus, for the 

initial increment, interoperability between the waveforms may be 

facilitated by developing gateway devices that reside outside of the JTRS 

radio. This should help developers mitigate integration challenges. 

While lesser capabilities will be delivered in the first increment, the 

program could still significantly enhance current communications and 

networking capabilities through the development of the networking 

waveforms and the ability to interoperate with the more commonly used 

legacy radios, such as SINCGARS. The incremental approach should also 

make the program more achievable by allowing more time to develop and 

test key technologies. Figure 2 shows the impact of the expanded schedule 

on Increment 1 product milestones. Despite the lengthened schedule, the 

program schedules are still intended to address the needs of key users 

depending on JTRS such as Future Combat Systems. 
Page 17 GAO-06-955 Defense Acquisitions 

Figure 2: Impact of Restructuring on Product Schedules 

With the creation of the JPEO, DOD has established a stronger, more 

centralized joint management structure. Under the new management 

structure, all JTRS domains—Ground; Airborne, Maritime, and Fixed Site; 

Special Radios, and Network Enterprise—report directly to the JPEO 

while the JPEO reports directly to the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. As such, the JPEO controls 

development funding and has full directive authority over standards, 

systems engineering, and developing radios and waveforms. Such a 

comprehensive authority did not exist in the previous structure where 

authority was fragmented and the domains reported to individual service 

executives. Also, to facilitate more effective management, the JPEO has 

realigned various components of JTRS. Cluster 1 and Cluster 5 are now 

combined under the new Ground domain while the waveform 

development was placed under the newly established Network Enterprise 

domain. Meanwhile, DOD removed the Army helicopter requirements from 

the JTRS Cluster 1 program and transferred them to the Airborne, 

Maritime, and Fixed Site domain. With the new strengthened management 

structure, the program is in a better position to manage requirements 

growth and control costs. 

A key feature of the new management structure is the new governance 

model which aims to streamline decision making and empower the 

oversight capacity of the JPEO. We previously reported that the existing 

JTRS Program 

Management 

Strengthened 

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Ground Mobile radios

Low-rate production decision

Multiservice operational test and evaluation

Handheld, Manpack and Small Form radios

Low-rate production decision

Full-rate production decision

Airborne, Maritime, and Fixed Site radios

System development and demonstration decision

Low-rate production decision

Source: GAO analyses of JTRS doment.

Original

New
Page 18 GAO-06-955 Defense Acquisitions 

management structure had been unable to get the services to reach 

agreement over new and changing requirements expeditiously.12 Under the 

prior structure, key decisions were made by consensus, which made it 

difficult to resolve interservice differences involving requirements and 

funding. This resulted in a lengthy decision-making process. Under the 

revised governance structure, stakeholder disagreements are elevated to 

and decided by a JTRS Executive Council and later by a JTRS Board of 

Directors, if necessary. The purpose is to make the acquisition process 

timelier, provide appropriate oversight, and establish clear lines of 

accountability. 

Another key feature of the new management structure, according to JPEO, 

is ensuring greater information sharing among JTRS components takes 

place to better facilitate the delivery of waveform and operating system 

software to the radios’ hardware developers. JTRS components depend on 

several software developers to deliver the required waveforms to their 

programs for integration onto their particular radios. This involves 

transfers of complex contractor-owned software code. Because 

waveforms are such an integral part of the radio’s functionality, delaying 

their integration onto the radio’s hardware could have a ripple effect on a 

radio’s overall development. To mitigate this risk, the JPEO has 

established an information repository where waveform developers would 

place their waveform software code for the purposes of information 

sharing.13 Operating system software code—critical to ensuring the 

development of a common software architecture—would also be placed in 

the repository. DOD intends to hold government-purpose rights to all of 

the software specifications in the repository, so that no single contractor 

will have complete control over JTRS software development. While the 

information repository is new and its usefulness is yet to be determined, it

remains to be seen whether and to what extent the contractors will be 

willing to share their software code. If successful, the JPEO expects that 

information sharing will not only make available software code to 

hardware developers more timely, but will also contribute to technology 

innovation as developers attempt to enhance existing software code. In 

 12GAO, Challenges and Risks Associated with the Joint Tactical Radio System Program, 

GAO-03-879R (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 11, 2003). 

13According to JPEO, while a library of completed waveforms was envisioned under the 

original JTRS management structure, the JPEO has implemented this concept by 

permitting incremental builds of software to be placed in the library. The library is now 

called the information repository. 
Page 19 GAO-06-955 Defense Acquisitions 

addition, because the software will be shared with many different vendors, 

the JPEO expects to enhance competition among hardware developers. 

Furthermore, it is hoped that by developers reusing the same software 

code in the information repository, waveforms will be more standardized, 

cutting down on development and integration costs. 

While the restructuring appears to place JTRS in a better position to 

succeed, several management and technical challenges remain. The JPEO 

must first finalize the details of the restructuring, including completing 

formal acquisition strategies, independent cost estimates, and test and 

evaluation plans. DOD also needs to revise the Concept of Operations so 

that it effectively describes how JTRS networking capabilities will be used. 

Completing and obtaining DOD’s approval of these activities is needed to 

ensure the program is executable. Over the longer term, the program faces 

key management and technical challenges that must be overcome. For 

example, although the new joint management structure for JTRS is a 

significant improvement over the previous fragmented program 

management structure, joint development efforts in DOD have often been 

hampered by an inability to obtain and sustain commitments and support 

from the military services and other stakeholders. Regarding technical 

challenges, developing waveforms and porting them to radio hardware is a 

complex and lengthy undertaking. The proposed interim technical 

solutions enabling network interoperability have also yet to be developed. 

In addition, operating in a networked environment open to a large number 

of potential users has generated an unprecedented need for information 

assurance. This need has resulted in a lengthy, technically challenging, and 

still evolving certification process from the National Security Agency. 

Moreover, integrating the radio’s hardware onto diverse platforms and 

meeting respective size, weight, and power limitations has been a longterm challenge and remains so. 

According to program officials, efforts to complete the restructuring have 

taken time and delays have occurred in gaining approval to go forward. As 

such, important details of the restructuring have yet to be finalized. This 

includes completing acquisition strategies, independent cost estimates, 

test plans, and obtaining final approval of an amended operational 

requirements document. These activities are currently in the process of 

being completed. However, until each of these activities is completed and 

DOD ensures that requirements are firm, acquisition strategies are 

knowledge-based, cost estimates are realistic, and test plans provide 

insight into the achievement of the networking capability priorities, there 

Program 

Uncertainties and 

Technical Risks 

Remain 

Details of the 

Restructuring yet to Be 

Finalized 
Page 20 GAO-06-955 Defense Acquisitions 

will be uncertainty as to whether the JTRS program, as restructured, is 

executable. 

• Operational Requirements Document: An Operational Requirements 

Document contains the requirements and operational parameters for a 

system. The most recent JTRS Operational Requirements Document was 

approved in April 2003. To reflect the restructured approach of achieving 

JTRS requirements incrementally, it was necessary to develop an 

amendment to the April 2003 Operational Requirements Document. The 

process to develop the amendment has been led by the Joint Staff and 

involved input from the requirements community, the services, and other 

stakeholders; the Joint Requirements Oversight Council has provided 

oversight of the process. Through the process of developing the 

Operational Requirements Document amendment, some ‘”gaps” in 

requirements have been identified by some stakeholders. In particular, the 

proposed amendment to the Operational Requirements Document 

includes a requirement for certain JTRS sets to be able to interface with a 

new satellite system called the Mobile User Objective System. Some 

stakeholders, however, have identified a need for the manpack and 

handheld radios to also have this capability. According to agency officials, 

if the capabilities are deferred to later increments, then the Mobile User 

Objective System will have to consider options other than JTRS to meet its 

terminal requirements. Also, according to agency officials, the amendment 

process is nearly complete. The amendment to the JTRS Operational 

Requirements Document is awaiting final approval from the Vice 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

• Acquisition strategies: Individual acquisition strategies need to be 

developed for each JTRS component. An acquisition strategy outlines the 

business and technical management approach to achieve program 

objectives within the constraints imposed by resources. A well–developed 

knowledge-based strategy minimizes the time and cost required to satisfy 

approved capability needs, and maximizes affordability throughout the 

program lifecycle.14 Until the acquisition strategies are complete, there is 

less assurance that a well-developed and executable approach is in place. 

This could affect program cost estimates, and fielding plans. Furthermore, 

an acquisition strategy serves as the basis for other important activities 

such as testing plans and contract negotiations. As such, any delay in the 

acquisition strategy could have a ripple effect and delay these activities. 

 14Our past work has shown that systems without sufficient knowledge—stable 

requirements, mature technologies, and the funding needed to meet requirements—will 

take longer and cost even more than promised and deliver fewer quantities and other 

capabilities than planned. 
Page 21 GAO-06-955 Defense Acquisitions 

• Test and evaluation plans: Plans for the overall structure and objectives 

of the test and evaluation program are also under development and need 

to be completed. Given the radio’s unprecedented performance 

capabilities and technical complexity, it is critical that a well-developed 

test and evaluation plan be developed. Not only is the testing of individual 

radio components important, but testing the network with sufficient scale 

is critical to demonstrating transformational capabilities. At this point, it is 

not clear how DOD plans to test the entire JTRS network including 

interoperability between all the networking waveforms. The Director of 

Operational Test and Evaluation recommended that the Army develop a 

test and evaluation strategy that supports an evaluation of network 

maturity as part of Future Combat Systems’ production. 

In addition to the activities that JPEO needs to accomplish to finalize the 

restructuring, DOD also needs to complete its revisions to the Concept of 

Operations and determine transition and fielding plans for JTRS. 

According to JPEO officials, when JTRS development was first initiated, 

DOD envisioned replacing virtually all legacy radios with JTRS sets. Since 

then, there has been an evolution of thinking in DOD about networked 

operations. Although the Concept of Operations for JTRS has gone 

through several iterations, according to JPEO the current version does not 

effectively provide a joint vision of how JTRS networking capabilities will 

be used. How JTRS radios will be used may also be affected by the large 

increase recently in fielding thousands of newer versions of legacy radios. 

The recent fielding of so many new legacy radios to the current force may 

call into question the affordability of replacing them prematurely with 

JTRS sets. If sufficient detail is not provided by the Concept of Operations, 

then JTRS development efforts may be inadequate and operational goals 

may be unfulfilled. Moreover, if migration and fielding plans are not driven 

by an effective Concept of Operations, the production costs and quantities 

for JTRS may need to be adjusted. 

DOD has historically had difficulty managing joint programs primarily 

because of inter-service differences involving funding and requirements. 

To succeed, the new JTRS management structure will have to meet those 

challenges. According to DOD officials, obtaining the necessary resources 

to execute JTRS development will be one such challenge. The proposed 

funding arrangement is for the services to individually request and secure 

development funding that then gets rolled into a centralized account under 

JPEO control. As currently proposed, each service will fund equal shares 

unless there are service-unique development efforts, which would be 

funded by the proponent services. The services will also be required to 

Untested Management 

Structure 
Page 22 GAO-06-955 Defense Acquisitions 

fund the integration of the radio into their respective platforms. Some 

agency officials expressed concern whether the services would have the 

budget capacity to fund integration once the radio sets were available for 

installation. Stakeholders also need to come to agreement on requirements 

by obtaining final approval of the amended Operational Requirements 

Document. If requirements are not thoroughly vetted through the various 

stakeholders and agreed upon, there is greater risk of future requirements 

growth or decreased stakeholder support for the program. 

Regarding JPEO’s new governance model, the decision-making model is 

untested. The JPEO expects the system development decision for the 

JTRS Airborne, Maritime, and Fixed Site product line to be decided 

through the new governance structure. 

While the program has reported making progress in maturing technologies 

and stabilizing system designs, several technical challenges must still be 

overcome to achieve program success. 

The development of waveforms—particularly the networking 

waveforms—remains a technically challenging and lengthy effort. This 

effort involves complex software development and integration work by 

contractors as well as oversight by the government through a series of 

rigorous tests and certifications from various authorities, including the 

JTRS Technology Laboratory, National Security Agency, and the Joint 

Interoperability Test Command. If waveforms are not available as planned, 

potential schedule delays or performance impacts could occur to key 

dependent users, particularly the Future Combat Systems. 

The JTRS program began with the assumption that the Wideband 

Networking Waveform would meet the networking waveform needs for all 

the services. However, the program underestimated the complexity of 

meeting the Wideband Networking Waveform requirements and the 

services’ needs within the size, weight, and power constraints of the 

various user platforms. As a result, DOD began developing two additional 

networking waveforms to address specialized capabilities. The Soldier 

Radio Waveform is being designed for radios with severe size, weight, and 

power constraints such as the handheld, manpack, and small form radios. 

The Joint Airborne Network-Tactical Edge waveform is being designed to 

better enable time critical airborne operations. The networking waveforms 

are the core of the JTRS networking capability and their availability is 

crucial to the program’s success. The three networking waveforms are in 

various stages of development: 

Program Continues to 

Face Significant Technical 

Risks 

Waveform Development and 

Portability 
Page 23 GAO-06-955 Defense Acquisitions 

• Wideband Networking Waveform: The Wideband Networking Waveform—

designed for JTRS ground vehicle radios—is the farthest along in 

development of the three networking waveforms. Nevertheless, while 

initial functionality has been demonstrated through a contractor 

demonstration held in the summer of 2005, some technical challenges 

remain. The demonstration showed that ground mobile radios operated in 

a network with the Wideband Networking Waveform and were able to 

connect to the network as well as reconnected when the network was 

disrupted. However, the Wideband Networking Waveform also 

experienced various performance problems including limited data 

throughput, latency, and start-up time.15 Program officials believe these 

performance problems have largely been corrected. Nonetheless, the 

demonstrated network linked only 4 users, far fewer than the required 

250. In addition, program officials noted that meeting the Wideband 

Networking Waveform requirement for voice communications over a 

mobile ad hoc network remains challenging. 

• Soldier Radio Waveform: The Soldier Radio Waveform is a low power, 

short range networking waveform optimized for radios with severe size, 

weight, and power constraints such as dismounted soldier radios and 

small form radios. Currently, the waveform is transitioning from a science 

and technology program.16 Program officials expect to award a sole source 

contract in fiscal year 2007 for further development of the waveform. 

While the Soldier Radio Waveform has demonstrated some functionality, 

program officials noted that it will take significant effort to transition the 

waveform from a science and technology project to meet full operational 

requirements. In particular, program officials are concerned about the 

waveform’s insufficient security architecture and how this may affect 

porting it onto a JTRS radio. Given these concerns, the waveform’s 

development schedule may be ambitious. Future Combat Systems is the 

driver of near-term Soldier Radio Waveform requirements. The success of 

the first spin-out of Future Combat Systems is dependent on the delivery 

of the certified waveform ported to selected JTRS small form radios. 

• Joint Airborne Network—Tactical Edge: The Joint Airborne Network—

Tactical Edge is an extremely low latency networking waveform optimized 

 15Latency refers to the amount of time it takes data to travel from source to destination. 

Together, latency and bandwidth define the speed and capacity of a network. 

16The Soldier Radio Waveform capability will leverage the Soldier Level Integrated 

Communications Environment program being developed as a science and technology 

project under the Army’s Communications-Electronics Research, and Development and 

Engineering Center. 
Page 24 GAO-06-955 Defense Acquisitions 

for airborne platforms. Like the Soldier Radio Waveform, the Joint 

Airborne Network—Tactical Edge is transitioning from a science and 

technology project and program officials expect to award a sole source 

contract in fiscal year 2006.17 For Increment 1, the waveform will initially 

operate on a Multifunctional Information Distribution System—JTRS radio 

and will have limited capabilities. Program officials expect that it will be 

upgraded to full networking functionality in subsequent increments. 

After waveforms are developed, they must be ported to radio hardware. 

According to agency officials, porting waveforms onto JTRS radios has 

been more technically challenging than originally expected. The intent of 

JTRS is that waveforms be highly portable meaning that waveforms can be 

transported and adapted to a variety of radio platforms at a cost lower 

than the cost of redeveloping the waveform again for a radio set with 

different hardware components. When waveforms are developed, the 

software code is designed to operate on a particular radio’s hardware 

architecture. When the same waveform is transported to different 

hardware, changes to the software code may be necessary to ensure 

proper integration of the waveform onto the new hardware. The more 

costly the integration effort is, the less portable the waveform. 

Although the JTRS Software Communications Architecture specifies 

design rules for waveform software to enhance portability across different 

hardware, the limited experience of porting waveforms thus far has shown 

significantly higher costs and longer schedules than anticipated. The JPEO 

noted that government direction and oversight as well as coordination 

between waveform, operating environment, and hardware developers 

needs improvement. Officials are also concerned about the porting of the 

networking waveforms being developed in science and technology 

programs to meet the full requirements for the Soldier Radio Waveform 

and the Joint Airborne Network-Tactical Edge waveform. To make this 

happen the waveforms will need to become compliant with the JTRS 

Software Communications Architecture, incorporate network 

management functions, and develop required security capabilities. Efforts 

to rework software to effectively transfer the waveforms, therefore, could 

result in cost and schedule problems. 

 17The Joint Airborne Network—Tactical Edge capability will leverage the Tactical 

Targeting Network Technology program being developed as a science and technology 

project under the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. 
Page 25 GAO-06-955 Defense Acquisitions 

The proposed interim technical solutions enabling network 

interoperability have yet to be developed. To achieve DOD’s desired 

networking capabilities, waveforms must be able to communicate and 

interoperate with each other. However, technologies and radio designs are 

not mature enough at this point to develop an interoperability capability 

that would function inside individual JTRS radios. As a result, the program 

plans to meet network interoperability requirements for the initial 

increment through the use of gateways. A gateway is a separate node 

within a network equipped to interoperate with another network that uses 

different protocols. As such, key functions facilitating interoperability 

between waveforms may be performed outside of the JTRS radio rather 

than inside. 

At this point, the JPEO is assessing different options to achieve the 

gateway function and anticipates that development will start in 2007. The 

JPEO expects that the development of the gateway will result in a separate 

acquisition decision but is uncertain as to whether it will be acquired 

through the forthcoming Airborne, Maritime, Fixed Site system 

development contract or through a separate contract. In addition, the 

JPEO is uncertain as to whether the gateway will be employed as a 

separate piece of hardware or whether it will leverage an existing radio in 

the network. According to JPEO officials, employing the gateway as a 

separate piece of hardware could result in additional size, weight, and 

power risks for some platforms. JPEO officials also noted that without a 

fully functioning gateway capability, users operating in separate networks 

will not be able to communicate directly with one another. For example, a 

ground soldier operating on a Soldier Radio Waveform with a handheld 

radio would not be able to call directly for fire support from an aircraft 

operating on the Joint Airborne Network—Tactical Edge Waveform with a 

Multifunctional Information Distribution System-JTRS radio. 

Integrating the radio’s hardware onto diverse platforms and meeting their 

respective size, weight and power limitations remains a challenge. To 

realize full networking capabilities, the radios require significant amounts 

of memory and processing power, which add to the size, weight, and 

power consumption of the radio. The added size and weight are the result 

of efforts to ensure electronic parts in the radio are not overheated. 

While progress has been made in meeting the size, weight, and power 

requirements for the ground mobile radios, developers still face some 

challenges. The JPEO has already delivered 30 partially functioning 

prototype radios—built on production assembly lines—to the Future 

Combat Systems program. However, until the ground mobile radios 

Interoperability of Networking 

Waveforms 

Hardware Integration/Size, 

Weight, and Power 
Page 26 GAO-06-955 Defense Acquisitions 

demonstrate greater Wideband Networking Waveform functionality—a 

key source of power consumption—using a fully functioning prototype, 

size, weight, and power concerns remain. The delivery of new power 

amplifiers that are currently being developed as part of a science and 

technology program by the Army’s Communications—Electronics 

Research, Development and Engineering Center could help address these 

concerns. According to center officials, the power amplifiers are 

approaching maturity and have demonstrated significantly higher power 

output and improved efficiency over the current amplifier used on the 

ground mobile radios. The JPEO expects to begin receiving the new power 

amplifiers this September. 

Meeting the requirements of the handheld, manpack, and small form 

radios continues to be the most challenging of all JTRS components 

because of their smaller size, weight, and power constraints. Program 

officials expect that the requirements relief provided through the 

restructuring should help to address size, weight, and power requirements. 

For example, the restructuring reduces the number of waveforms required 

to operate on each radio, which is expected to reduce power demands, 

thereby reducing the size and weight demands. In addition, like the ground 

mobile radios, the JTRS small form radios are also expected to benefit 

from the delivery of new wideband power amplifiers. However, these 

technologies are still maturing. Moreover, the handheld, manpack, and 

small form radio designs are not stable. 

The JTRS requirement to operate applications at multiple levels of security 

in a networked environment has resulted in significant information 

assurance challenges. Developers not only have to be concerned with 

traditional radio security issues but also must be prepared to implement 

the features required for computer and network security. One challenge is 

that military software defined radio technology capable of processing data 

at multiple security levels is immature. In addition, the requirement to 

operate in an open networked environment allows greater access to 

external networks increasing the number of potential users and the 

likelihood of threats to the network. These challenges will require the 

development of new technologies, obtaining certification through a 

rigorous process by the National Security Agency, and accommodating an 

expected growth in security requirements. 

The complexities and uncertainties involved with JTRS security 

certification were illustrated when the National Security Agency 

determined that the design for the Cluster 1 radio was not sufficient to 

meet newly identified operational requirements from the Office of the 

Security
Page 27 GAO-06-955 Defense Acquisitions 

Secretary of Defense to operate in a networked environment. This resulted 

in the need for additional security requirements and significant hardware 

design changes to the radio’s security architecture that ultimately resulted 

in significant cost increases. National Security Agency officials noted that 

one of the key lessons learned from the Cluster 1 experience was that 

security requirements need to be considered early in the development of 

the radio. As such, the JPEO has taken steps to better coordinate with the 

National Security Agency to meet security requirements. Specifically, the 

National Security Agency currently has a representative in each JTRS 

domain and participates in management reviews, design reviews, vendor 

technical exchanges, and weekly conference calls. The National Security 

Agency is also expected to be a member of the JTRS Executive Council 

and advisory member of the JTRS Board of Directors in the new JTRS 

governance structure. Both National Security Agency and JPEO officials 

noted that coordination and cooperation between the agencies has 

significantly improved since the JPEO was established. In addition, 

National Security Agency officials do not expect the other JTRS radios will 

encounter the same design problems experienced by the Cluster 1 radio as 

contractors now have a greater understanding of security requirements. 

Further, the restructured schedules for Ground domain radios appear to 

be sufficiently aligned to receive National Security Agency certification in 

time to meet the needs of Future Combat Systems. Nevertheless, because 

of the complex software encryption and networking requirements, 

security will continue to be a challenge for all JTRS components. 

JTRS radios will require considerable radio spectrum for effective 

operations especially when using the new networking waveforms that 

could operate within several different bands of radio spectrum. However, 

obtaining sufficient radio spectrum allocations is problematic because the 

program must compete with other military and civilian users. Radio 

spectrum in general is becoming more saturated and demand for spectrum 

is increasing. Efforts are underway by the JPEO to work through the 

required DOD spectrum certification processes; however, certification of 

software defined radios remains a challenge because, according to 

spectrum management officials, these processes were designed around 

hardware-based radios and may not fully support the certification of 

cutting edge technologies such as JTRS. DOD has recognized the 

shortcomings of the existing processes and has taken initial steps to 

address them. Most recently, DOD has worked with the National 

Telecommunications and Information Administration to stand up a 

permanent software defined radio working group that would study how to 

proceed. 

Spectrum Availability
Page 28 GAO-06-955 Defense Acquisitions 

U.S. military forces’ communications and networking systems currently 

lack the interoperability and capacity DOD believes are needed to access 

and share real-time information, identify and react quickly to threats, and 

operate effectively as a joint force. JTRS is critical to providing the 

capabilities to support DOD’s future vision of net-centric warfighting. Yet, 

since its inception, the JTRS development effort has struggled due to 

unrealistic cost, schedule, and performance expectations. As a 

consequence, DOD and the military services have had to make 

adjustments and acquire interim communications solutions to meet their 

near-term communications requirements. 

The restructuring approach developed by JPEO and approved by DOD 

holds promise for delivering much needed communications capability to 

the warfighters. However, given the program’s troubled development 

history, putting the approach into action will be a challenge and require 

strong and continuous oversight. Key details of the JTRS restructuring—

including assurance that there are stable operational requirements, 

knowledge-based acquisition strategies for each domain’s product lines, 

and effective test plans that reflect the priority of developing networking 

capabilities—must be finalized and approved by DOD. In addition, 

significant programmatic and technical risks—including further 

technology maturation, certification of waveforms and radios, and 

implementation of the new JTRS governance model—must still be 

overcome. Furthermore, detailed migration and fielding plans that are 

consistent with a well-developed concept of operations are needed to 

ensure an affordable and operationally effective use of JTRS radios in the 

future. Any manifestations of these risks will likely increase program 

costs, delay fielding, or reduce planned capabilities. To the extent JTRS 

delivers less capability than planned, future warfighting concepts may 

have to be altered as well as the design of weapons systems such as Future 

Combat Systems that are dependent on JTRS. 

To enhance the likelihood of success of the JTRS program, we recommend 

that the Secretary of Defense: 

• before approving the detailed program plans for each JTRS domain, 

ensure that they reflect stable and well-defined requirements; knowledgebased acquisition strategies; clear and meaningful test plans that address 

the need to not only test individual JTRS components but the overall 

networking capabilities of JTRS as well; and, funding commitments 

necessary to execute the program; and 

Conclusions 

Recommendations 
Page 29 GAO-06-955 Defense Acquisitions 

• develop JTRS migration and fielding plans that are consistent with a welldeveloped concept of operations for using JTRS networking capabilities 

and effectively balances recent investments in acquiring legacy radios with 

future needs. 

In its letter commenting on the draft of our report, DOD agreed with our 

recommendations. DOD’s letter is reprinted in appendix II. DOD noted 

that the report recommendations are consistent with the measures taken 

by the department to restructure the JTRS program, develop JTRS radios 

in an incremental manner, and effectively balance recent investments in 

legacy radios with future needs. While we acknowledge that DOD has 

taken measures to put the JTRS program in a better position to move 

forward, we continue to believe that additional measures, as outlined in 

our recommendations, are needed to ensure that the program will be 

successfully executed and achieve its intended objectives. 

DOD also provided detailed comments, which we incorporated where 

appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking 

Minority Members of other Senate and House committees and 

subcommittees that have jurisdiction and oversight responsibilities for 

DOD. We will also send copies to the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries 

of the Air Force, Army, and Navy; and the Director, Office of Management 

and Budget. Copies will also be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site 

at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this 

report, please contact me at (202) 512-4841, or Assistant Director John 

Oppenheim at (202) 512-4841. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix III. 

Paul L. Francis, Director 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 30 GAO-06-955 Defense Acquisitions 

To assess whether recent actions taken by DOD puts the JTRS program in 

a better position to succeed, we obtained briefings on restructuring 

assessments, plans, and decisions, analyzed documents describing 

Increment 1 requirements, and interviewed program and product officials 

from the Joint Program Executive Office, San Diego, California. To obtain 

the perspective of organizations that provide policy guidance, oversight, 

and technology support for the JTRS program, we interviewed officials 

from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics, Arlington, Virginia; Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, Arlington, Virginia; Assistant Secretary 

of Defense, Networks and Information Integration, Arlington, Virginia; 

Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, Arlington, 

Virginia; Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and 

Technology, Arlington, Virginia; and, the Army’s CommunicationsElectronics Research, Development and Engineering Center, Fort 

Monmouth, New Jersey. 

To identify the risks that might continue to undermine the successful 

fielding of JTRS, we obtained and analyzed briefings from the JTRS 

Domain, Program, and Product Managers, as well as the JTRS Technical 

Director, San Diego, California. We also reviewed Selected Acquisition 

Reports, budget requests, acquisition decision memorandums, and the 

JTRS governance structure. We interviewed officials from the National 

Security Agency, Fort Meade, Maryland; Joint Interoperability Test 

Command, Fort Huachuca, Arizona; Defense Contract Management 

Agency, Anaheim, California; Project Manager for Future Combat Systems 

Network Systems Integration, Fort Monmouth, New Jersey; and, JTRS 

contractors in Arlington, Virginia and Anaheim, California. 

Our review was conducted from August 2005 through August 2006 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 31 GAO-06-955 Defense Acquisitions 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 32 GAO-06-955 Defense Acquisitions 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 33 GAO-06-955 Defense Acquisitions 
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 

Page 34 GAO-06-955 Defense Acquisitions 

John Oppenheim, Assistant Director, (202) 512-4841 

In addition to the contact above, Katherine Bittinger, Ridge Bowman, 

Karen Sloan, Amy Sweet, James Tallon, Tristan To, Hai Tran, and Paul 

Williams made key contributions to this report. 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgment 

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