NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 19-1853

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

CRAIG DEVLIN,

 Appellant 

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On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 1-18-cr-00081-001)

District Judge: Hon. Christopher C. Conner

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Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

January 13, 2020

Before: JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: January 16, 2020)

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OPINION

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 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 

does not constitute binding precedent.
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JORDAN, Circuit Judge.

Craig Devlin appeals from the revocation of his supervised release and the 

imposition of a term of imprisonment and further period of supervised release. His 

attorney has moved to withdraw as counsel, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Because there are no nonfrivolous issues to 

appeal, we will grant the motion to withdraw and will affirm the judgment of the District 

Court.

I. BACKGROUND

In 2011, Devlin pled guilty in the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland to conspiring to distribute and to possess heroin with intent to distribute. He 

was sentenced to 70 months in prison, followed by a 4-year term of supervised release. 

In March of 2018, the United States District Court for the Middle District of 

Pennsylvania accepted jurisdiction over Devlin’s supervised release. Soon after, he was 

in trouble: he used illegal drugs, failed to submit to drug testing, and lied to his probation 

officer. He admitted to those violations and was subsequently sentenced to 6 months 

imprisonment and a further term of supervised release of 24 months.

Devlin completed his term of imprisonment without incident. But, once outside of 

prison, he again violated the terms of his supervised release. He failed to report to the 

probation office within 72 hours of his release from custody, and he subsequently tested 

positive for using drugs. A couple of months later, he once again failed to report to the 

probation office and failed to inform them of a change in his employment status. The 

probation office accordingly petitioned the District Court for a bench warrant. [App. at 
3

39.] Instead, the Court issued a summons. When Devlin failed to appear in court on 

March 1, 2019, a warrant was issued for his arrest. In addition to the other violations 

cited in the summons, on March 26 2019, before appearing in court, Devlin admitted to 

recent drug use, which was confirmed by a drug test. 

Appearing before the District Court, Devlin confirmed that he understood the 

charges against him and that he was entitled to a hearing on them. He then waived his 

right to a full hearing. He admitted to Grade C violations of the terms of his supervised 

release and requested a sentence of 8 months in prison with no subsequent period of 

supervision. The Court correctly identified the imprisonment range under the Sentencing 

Guidelines as 6 to 12 months. The Court imposed the 8-month sentence of imprisonment 

that Devlin asked for but also imposed 12 months of supervised release, with 90 days of 

that period to be served in a halfway house. The Court reasoned that the additional 

period of supervised release was necessary in light of Devlin’s repeated relapses and 

struggle with drug addiction. 

Devlin now appeals.

II. DISCUSSION1

Counsel may seek to withdraw from the representation of a criminal defendant

when there are no nonfrivolous issues to appeal. Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. When counsel 

thus invokes Anders we first determine whether the requirements of our Local Appellate 

 

1 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). The 

District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(e) and 3605.
4

Rule 109.2(a) have been fulfilled.

2 Second, we examine “whether an independent review 

of the record presents any nonfrivolous issues.”3 United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 

300 (3d Cir. 2001). “We exercise plenary review to determine whether there are any 

such issues.” Simon v. Gov’t of the V.I., 679 F.3d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Penson 

v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80-83 & n.6 (1988)). And when an Anders brief is adequate on its 

face, our review of the record is guided by the brief itself. United States v. Coleman, 575 

F.3d 316, 321 (3d Cir. 2009). 

 The Anders Brief Is Adequate

The first step of our review reveals that counsel’s Anders brief contains an 

adequate examination of the record and of issues that arguably might support an appeal. 

 

2 The Third Circuit Local Appellate Rule 109.2(a) states:

Where, upon review of the district court record, counsel is persuaded that 

the appeal presents no issue of even arguable merit, counsel may file a 

motion to withdraw and supporting brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 

386 U.S. 738 (1967), which must be served upon the appellant and the 

United States. The United States must file a brief in response. Appellant 

may also file a brief in response pro se. After all briefs have been filed, the 

clerk will refer the case to a merits panel. If the panel agrees that the appeal 

is without merit, it will grant counsel’s Anders motion, and dispose of the 

appeal without appointing new counsel. If the panel finds arguable merit to 

the appeal, or that the Anders brief is inadequate to assist the court in its 

review, it will appoint substitute counsel, order supplemental briefing and 

restore the case to the calendar. The panel will also determine whether to 

continue the appointment of current counsel or to direct the clerk to 

discharge current counsel and appoint new counsel.

3 Whether an issue is frivolous is a question informed by the standard of review 

for each potential claim raised. See United States v. Schuh, 289 F.3d 968, 974-76 (7th 

Cir. 2002) (determining that the issue on appeal would be frivolous when reviewed for 

plain error).
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Counsel represents that he has reviewed Devlin’s case, and that he has not been able to 

identify any viable issues to appeal. Specifically, he concludes that 1) the District Court 

had jurisdiction; 2) Devlin’s waiver of a hearing and admissions relating to the 

supervised release violations were valid and voluntary; and 3) the sentence imposed by 

the District Court was both legal and reasonable. Our independent review of the record 

confirms each of those conclusions.

 Our Independent Review Reveals No Nonfrivolous Issues

None of the potential issues identified by counsel has any merit, and Devlin has 

declined to file a pro se brief. 

1. The District Court Had Jurisdiction

The District Court had the authority to terminate, extend, or revoke Devlin’s term 

of supervised release. 18 U.S.C § 3583(e)(1)-(3). No one disputes, or reasonably could 

dispute, that the Court had subject matter jurisdiction. As for personal jurisdiction, 

although Devlin was originally convicted in Maryland, the Middle District of 

Pennsylvania accepted jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3605. The Court thus properly 

exercised jurisdiction over Devlin.

2. Devlin’s Admissions Were Voluntary

When revoking a defendant’s supervised release, a district court must ordinarily 

find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated the terms of his 

release. Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 700 (2000). But when a defendant 

admits to the charged violations, the court’s duty is simply to ensure that the admission 
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was counseled and voluntary. United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989). And 

here, there is no basis to conclude that it was not.

Devlin was represented by counsel at the hearing. His lawyer at the time 

represented to the Court that she had explained to him his right to a full revocation 

hearing. The Court also addressed Devlin to make sure he understood his rights and the 

accusations against him. Devlin responded that he wished to admit to the Grade C 

violations for which he was ultimately sentenced. His admission was accordingly both 

counseled and voluntary. 

3. The Sentence Imposed by the Court Was Reasonable

To determine whether a sentence is reasonable, we examine “whether the record 

as a whole reflects rational and meaningful consideration of the factors enumerated in 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571 (3d Cir. 2007). If the 

record demonstrates that the District Court did consider those factors, we then examine 

whether the Court reasonably applied them. United States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 543 

(3d Cir. 2007). In the present record, there is nothing to suggest that the District Court’s 

sentence was unreasonable.

Both Devlin and the Government agreed that the relevant guidelines range was 6

to 12 months. And the Court ultimately imposed the 8-month sentence that Devlin 

himself requested. The only contested portions of the sentence are the further 12-month 

term of supervised release and the 90-day period in a halfway house. The District Court 

had the authority to impose both conditions, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), (h), and it gave 

reasoned consideration to the relevant factors in imposing the sentence. The Court was 
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specifically concerned that Devlin “suffer[ed] from a long term addiction problem” and 

that, “because of the dangers of continued drug use,” it was necessary to have “an 

additional term of supervision[.]” (App. at 47.) The sentence the Court imposed was 

clearly reasonable, both procedurally and substantively. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we will grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm 

the judgment of the District Court.