NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 08a0749n.06 F iled: Dec em ber 9, 2008 No. 07-2195 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
AU RE US H OLD ING S, LT D. and D ON AL D S CH UL TZ, P lai nt iffs- App e lla nt s,
v. DETROIT CIT Y and JAMES DOCKERY, De fend ant s- App e lle e s, and DE TR OIT P OLI CE DE P AR TM EN T, Defendan t. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L F ROM THE UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT FO R T H E E AS TERN DISTRICT OF MICHIG AN

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

BEF OR E: RO G ER S, SU TTON and M c KEA G UE , C ir c uitJudg e s. McK EAGU E, Circuit Judge. This c ase stems from something of a f eud betwe en Aur eus Holdings, L td., a scra

p metal proce ssor operating in the City of Detroit, and De troit Pol ice Of fice r J ames Doc kery , actingin his capac ity as Environmenta l Enforc ement Of fice r. Ag g rieve d by

various actions take n by

Offic er D ocker

y , plaintiffs Aure u s and Dona ld Schultz , an Aur eus employ ee, broug ht suit i n the Easter

n District of Michig an, asser ting various fede ral a

nd state ca

uses of a ction. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt g ra

nte d de fe nd ants ’ mot ion fo r su mma ry jud g me nt i n p art , d ism iss inga ll c la ims
a g a i n s tt h e C i t y, an d

c o n d u c t e d a f i v e - d ay j u r

y t r i a l o nA u r e u s ’ s r e m a i n i n g c l a i m s a g a i n s tD o c k e r y.No. 07-2195

Au re us Ho ldi ng

s v . D e tro it City

- 2 - I n trial, the di strict court awarde d Docke ry judgme nt as a matter of la w on some cla ims and the jury returned a v er dict in Docker y ’s favor on all re maining c laims. The cour t subsequently

denied Aure us’s motion for new trial. On appeal, we find no err or in the proc eeding s below and the ref ore
a ff ir m th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s jud g me nt. I Plaintiffs Aureus a

nd Schultz raise se vera l claims of er ror. We addr ess them in the orde r prese nted. The f

irst asser ted er ror r elates to Schultz’s Count I Iclaim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that h i s F o u rt h A m e n d m e n tr i g h tt o f r e e d o m f r o m u n r e a s o n a

b l e s e i z u r e s w a s v i o l a t e d w h e nD o c k e r

y, without probable c ause, te mporarily seized his shotgun from the Aure us scra p y ard of fice on or about September12, 2001. Schultz contends the jury ’s ver dict is ag ainst the clea r we ight of

the evidenc e and that the district cour

t erre d by denying his motion for new t rial. The district c ourt denied r elief beca use the evidenc e of the circ umstances surr ounding the seizure of the shotg un was c ontroverte d and the jury

was e ntitled to acc ept Dockery ’s version of the eve nts rather than Schultz’s. The court thus ruled that Schultz had failed to establis h b y a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e that the se izure violated his Fourth Ame ndment rig hts. We r e v ie w th e d is tr ic t c o u rt’ s d e n ia l o f n e w tr ia l f o r a b u s e o f d is c r e ti o n . T

aylor v. Tec o Barge Line, Inc

. , 517 F.3d 372, 383 (6th Cir. 2008). The trial court will be dee med to have a bused its dis c re tio n if

the c ha lle ng e d v e rd ic t is so c on tr ary to th e cl e ar w e ig ht o f t

he e vid e nc e that a
rea sonable juror

could not have r eac hed it. Id. Sc hu ltz ma int a ins tha

t e ve n a c c e pti ngDo c kery ’s ve rs ion of the e ve nts , p ro ba

ble c a us e to seize the shotgun was not established. Schultz argues t hat even assuming he t old Docke ry he wa sNo. 07-2195

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For the same r easons, we find no abuse of discretion in the district c ourt’s ref usal to instruct 1 the jury on awa rding punitive damag es for this claim. See Taylor , 517 F.3d at 387 (district court’s re fu sa l to g ive re qu e ste d ins tr uc tio n re vie we d fo r a

bu se of dis c re tio n) . T he re c or d d oe s n ot c on ta in e v i d e n c e e v e ns u g g e s t i n g t h a tD o c k e r y, i n t e mp o r ar i l y r e m o v i n g t h e s h o t g u n , a c t e d s o m a l i c i o u s l y, wantonly or oppre ssively

as to justify awa

rd of punitive dama g es. Se e Me mp his Cm ty . S c ho ol D ist
. v . S tac hu ra , 477 U.S. 299, 307 n. 9 (1986) (punitive damag es ar e ava ilable in § 1983 case only for acts “ maliciously , or wa

ntonly , or oppre ssively

done”) . Moreove r, eve n if t h e refusal to g ive a punit ive dama g e s in str

uc tio n w e re i n error, it w a s h arm le ss i na smu c h a s th e jur y ’s ve rd ic t w a s in f a v o r o f D o c k e r y. - 3 - not in charg e, and told Doc kery that he owne d the shotg un observe d in pla in vie w in the office but ref used to produce persona l identification, this does not amount to probable ca use to believe an of fe ns e ha d been comm itt e d ju sti fy ingse izur e . Y e t, D oc ke ry e xpla ine d th a t in a smu c h a s Sc hu ltz
was unc ooperative, claimed owne rship of a shotg un display ed in the office of a busi ness he c laimed not to be in

c h ar g e o f

, an d r e f u s e d to p r o d u c e p e r s o n a l I D o r

p r o o f o f o w n e r s h ip , h e w a s n ot comforta ble, from a public safe ty perspe ctive, leavingthe loaded shotgun there . Docke ry testified that he ther efor e invited Schultz t o fol l o w h i m t o the police station whe re ow nership could be
v e r i f i e d an d t h e s h o t g u n c o u l d b e r e tu r n e d t o h i m . S c h u l t z d i d

s o an d , u p o np r o d u c i n g p e r s o n a l ID
a nda d m i t t i n g t h a t h e w a s i n f a c t t h e m an a g e r o f t h e A u r e u s f a c i l i t y , t h e s h o t g u n w a s r e tur ne d to him. I n light of this testimony , the jury , having been pr operly instructed on the law , was e ntitled to conclude that this t empora ry seizure was not so unreasonable as t o violate Schultz’s constit utional rig hts. The j ury ’s verdict was not plainly unrea sonable and the di strict court’s denial of the motion for ne w trial wa s not an abuse of discretion. 1No. 07-2195

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- 4 - II I n the se c on d c la im of e rr or , Aure us and Sc hu ltz c ha lle ng e the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de nia l of the ir motion for new tria l on the Count I I Iclaim for ma licious prosecution. Ag ain, they contend the jur y ’s verdic t in favor of

Docke ry was a g ainst the clea

r weight of the evidence. The district court tre ated the claim as a

state law c laim (and so instructed the jury ) and dete rmined that plaintiffs’ pr oofs fa iled to satisfy two essential ele ments of the claim. The c ourt noted that plaintiffs had to pr ove they wer e subject to prosec ution without probable ca use, which pr osecution terminate d i n t h ei r favor
. See Matthews v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan , 5 72 N. W.2 d 6 03 , 6 09 -1 0 ( Mic h. 19 98 ). Ye t,
o f t h e n u m er o u s ci t at i o n s i s s u edt o Au re u s an d S ch u l t z
— fo r d i s p o s al o f w as t e o i l , d u mp i n g, operating without a c ertifica te of oc cupanc y , etc.—the c ourt found evide n ce o f t h e dispositi on of only n i n e. These nine wer e dismissed without prejudice pur suant to a stipulation that required Aure us t o i n s t al l storag e tanks for the disposal of wa ste products. Rea soning that the jury was entitled to view this as evidenc e that the c itations were issued w ith probable c ause a nd that the proce eding s were not terminated in plaintiffs’ f avor, the court c oncluded that the jur y ’s verdic t was not shown to be unrea sonable. See P eterson Novelties, Inc . v. City of Berkle y , 672 N.W.2d 351, 363-64 (M i ch
. App. 2003) (w here termination results from c ompromise or settlement, ther e is no “fa vorable termination” for

purposes of ma licious prosecution cla im). On appe al, Aure us and Schultz do not e ven addre ss the district court’s re asoning . I nstead, they reha sh their litany

of g rieva nces over p et t y h arassments inflicted on them during this period. They do not identify

a sing le prosec ution, criminal or civil, that terminated in the ir favor
. We areNo. 07-2195

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- 5 - not persuade d that the district court a bused its discretion in denying the motion for new t rial on the Count I I Imalicious prosec ution claim. III I n Count I V of the c omplaint, Aureus asse rts a cla im ag ainst Docke ry for tortious i nte r f

e r ence with advantag eous business re lationship or expectancy . This claim is pr emised in part on the c losure of the Aur eus scra

p y ard operation f

rom May 17, 2001 to June 13, 2001. Docke ry issued a citation
and or de re d th e bu sin e ss c los e d wh e n h e le arn e d o n M ay 17 , 2 00 1, that A ur e us did no t ha ve a va lid license to ope rate . Aure us applied for a license later on Ma y 17 and wa s directe d by

the Depa rtment of Consumer Af

fairs to stay

closed pending approval of the l icense application. I t is undisputed that Aure us was without a valid license during this twe nty -six -day period. Concluding that the closure was due to the undisputed lack of a license, not to any tortious interfer ence by Docke ry , the district court, duringtrial, prec luded Aure us from see king da mag es for profits lost during this per iod. Aure us c on te nd s th e dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d a s a

ma tte r o f l aw. Ci ti ng th e Ci ty of De tr oit Ordinanc e, Aur eus conte nds the City was obli gat ed to (“shall”) issue the license as soon as the application fe e wa s paid, on May 17
. S i n ce the City

was leg ally

obligated to issue the license on May 17, Au re u s argue s Docke ry lacke d leg al authority

to enforc e the c losure af ter May 17. Do c ke ry ’s c on tin

ue d e nf or c e me nt o f t

he c los ur e wi tho ut l e g a l a uth or ity is th us sa id t o c on sti tut e tortious interfer ence with Aureus’ s business relations. Even if we wer e to a cce pt Aureus’ s questionable construction of the ordina nce, its ar g ument
wo uld sti ll f a ll s ho rt . E ve n if

the De pa rtme nt o f C on su me rs Af

fa ir s o ug ht t o h a ve iss ue d A ur e us a lic e ns e on May 17 , th e fa c t is that it

did no t do so . Th e De pa

rtme nt o f C on su me r A ff

a ir s to ok a lmo stNo. 07-2195

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- 6 - fo ur we e ks to p ro c e ss the a

pp lic a tio n be fo re iss uin g the lic e ns e . A lth ou g h th e c los ur e un do ub te dly visited hardship on Aure us, the City ’s allege d nonfea sance and Aur eus’s re sultant loss cannot be attributed to Docke ry

under a tortious interfer ence theory . To make out a valid cla im for tortious interfe renc e un d er M ichig an law, Aureus wa s require d to show that Docke ry acte d without lega l justification and

with malice. Se e Mino v . Cl io S c ho ol D ist
. , 661 N.W.2d 586, 597 (Mich. App. 2003); BPS Clinical L abs. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan , 552 N.W.2d 919, 925 (Mich. App. 1996). The fac t that Aureus wa s actua lly without a license dur ing t h e p er i od of closure by express order

o f the Depa

rtment of Consumer Af fairs pr eclude d a finding that Docke ry ’s enfor ceme nt of the closure was with m alice. We there fore find no err or i n the di strict court’s or der lim iti ngthe sc op e of

Aure us ’s c la im f

or tor tio us int e rf

e re nc e dama g e s. IV I nsofar as the c omplaint set forth a c laim under 42 U.S.C. § 1 9 8 3 fo r d en i al of equal protec tion, the district court awa rded judgme nt to Docke ry as a matter of law for lack of evidenc e t h a t A u re u s an d

S ch u l t z we re t re at edd i ff er en t l y fr o m o t h er s s i m i l ar l y

s i tu at ed , ci t i n g V

il lage of W illow brook v. O lech , 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). Ag ain, pl ai n t iffs’ a ppellate a rg uments are unresponsive to this identified def iciency . They

failed to a lleg e or show that they wer e discriminated ag ainst beca

use of their

membership in any

suspect cla ss and t hey have not pointed to evidence that they wer e tre ated less favor ably than ot hers sim ilarly situated, such as would support a “cla ss of one” equal pr otection claim. Se e TriH e alt h, In c . v . B oa rd

of C om ’r s, Ha mi lto n Co un ty

, O hio , 430 F.3d 783, 788 (6th C i r. 2 0 0 5 ). According ly , we f ind no error

in the district court’s rulingon the equa l protec tion claim.No. 07-2195

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- 7 - V Counts V and VI of the complaint state claims ag ainst Docke ry for intentional and neg lige nt inf lic tio n o f e mot ion a l di str e ss. Duri ngtr ia l, t he dis tr ic t c ourt award ed D oc ke ry jud g me nt a s a
ma tte r of l aw o nth e s e c l a i m s a s w e l l
. T h e c o u rtf o u n d t h e e v i d e n c e o f

D o c k e r y ’ s c o n d u c t, “whatever

the shortfa lls,” cer

tainly insufficient to satisfy the “e x treme a

nd outrag eous” e lement of t h e i n t e n t i o n a l i n f

l i c t i o nc l a i m . F u rt h e r , t h e c o u rt f o u n d t h e e v i d e n c e i n s u f

f i c i e n tt o j u s t i f

y a
rea sonable jury

finding that Docke ry ’s enf orce ment excesses were the product of gr oss neg lige nce, as would have been r equire d to avoid the g o v er n m en t al immunity Docke ry enjoy ed under

Mich. Comp. L aws § 691.1407(2)
. On appe al, Schultz i nsists t here was e noug h evidenc e to cr ea t e a jury question. Under Michig an law, i t is ge nera lly the trial cour

t’s duty to determine in the f

irst instance whe ther a de fe nd ant’ s c on du c t may re a so na bly be re g ard e d a s “ so ou tr a g e ou s in c ha ra c te r and so e xtre me in de g re e , a s to go be y on d all po ssi ble bo un ds of de c e nc y , a

nd to b e re g ard e d a s atr oc iou s and utt e rl y intolerable in a civili zed community .” Lewis v. LeGrow , 670 N.W.2d 675, 689 ( Mich. App. 2003) (q u o t i n g Grah am v . F

or d , 6 04 N. W.2 d 7 13 , 71 6 (M ic h. Ap p. 19 99 ))
. Th e tr ia l c ourt ans we re d th is question in the neg ative af ter he aringSchultz ’s entire testimony
. I t a pp e ars Do c ke ry may have pe rf or me d his d uti e s w ithe xce ss ze a l on

oc c a sio n. Ye t, w hil e Schultz experience d anxiety as a r esult, he did not seek medical or menta l health treatment, such as might support a f

inding that Doc kery ’s conduct was truly extreme, atroc ious and int olera ble. Nor does the e vidence sug g est that Dockery ’s conduc t could be fa irly char acte rized as “r eckle ss” orNo. 07-2195

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- 8 - “g rossly neg lige nt.” In sum, Schultz has, in his appellate a rg uments, simply failed to draw our attention to any

evidenc e that per suades us the district c ourt err ed in this respec t. VI F ina lly , A ur e us c on te nd s th e dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d, in i ts s umm ary

jud g me nt r

uli ng , w he n it dismiss ed all cla ims asserted a g ainst the City of De troit. Aureus doe s not quarre l with the district
c o u rt ’ s c o n c l u s i o nt h a tt h e o n l y c l a i m p r o p e r l y a s s e rt e d a g a i n s t t h e C i t y i s c o n t a i n e d i nC o u n tV II, which alleg es, under

42 U.S.C. § 1983, that Aure us’s business license w as conf iscated on D ece mber 20, 2002 without due proce ss. Howeve r, the distri ct cour t construed the c laim ag ainst the City as logic ally flawe d. I ndeed, Aureus a lleg es that Doc kery and other s participate d in the confiscation of the license in a manner

violative of the City ’s own policies. Yet, as the district c ourt noted, citing Mo ne ll v . D e

p’ t of So c ial Se rv s. , 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978), to impose liabilit y on the City

under § 1983, Aure us must establish that C ity officia ls were acti n g p u rs u an t t o a City custom or policy
. We review t h e o rd er g ranting summary judgme nt de novo. Johnson v. Karnes , 398 F.3d 868, 873 (6th Cir. 2005). Summary judgme nt “should be re ndere d if the plea dings, the discovery and disclosure materia ls on file, an d an y af fi davits show that there is no ge nuine issue as to any materia l fac t and that the movant is e ntitled to a judgme nt a s a matter of law.” Fe d. R. Civ. P . 56(c)
. Th e c ourt mus t vie w the e vid e nc e in t he lig ht m os t f

a vo ra ble to t he no n- mov ingpa

rt y and dr aw a ll
rea sonable infe renc es in its favor. Johnson , 3 98 F .3 d at 87 3. No t jus t any a lle g e d f a c tua l di sp ute betwee n the parties will defeat an otherw ise proper ly supported motion for summary judgme nt; the dispute must pre sent a genuine issue of material fac t. Leadbetter v. G illey , 385 F.3d 683, 689-90 (6 th Ci r . 2 0 0 5 )
. A d is p u te is “ g e n u in e ” o n ly if b a s e d o n e v id e n c e u p o n w h ic h a rea sonable juryNo. 07-2195

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s v . D e tro it City

- 9 - could return a verdic t in favor of the non-moving party
. He dr ic k v . W . Rese rv e Car e Sy

s. , 355 F.3d 444, 451 (6th Cir. 2004). A fa ctual dispute conc erns a “mater ial” f

act only if its resolution might aff ect the outc ome of the suit under the g overningsubstantive law. Id
. Aure us acknow ledg es its burden to demonstrate that the alleg ed conf iscat i o n and nonrene wal of its license wer e ac complished pursuant to City policy . To satisfy

this burden, Aure us argues that, notwithstanding the City ’s offic ial policies, which we re a lleg edly ignor ed in this case,

“ the City , thro ug h it s D e pa rtme nt o f C onsu mer Affa ir s, ins tit ute d a de fa c to p oli c y

of de lib e rate ind if fe re nc e in i g no ri ngpr e sc ri be d p ro c e dure in conf isc a tin g , th e n f

a ili ngto r e ne w, the bu sin e ss license of Aure us without due proce ss of the law.” Gr ante d, Aure us may e sta bli shmun ic ipa l li a

bil ity un de r § 19 83 up on

a sh ow ingthat th e City had “a custom of tolera

nce or acquie s ce n ce o f fede ral rig hts violations.” Thomas v. City of Chattanooga , 398 F .3 d 426 , 429 (6 th Cir . 200 5)
. To pr e va il o n s uc h a the or y , h ow e ve r, Aure us mus t demonstra t e, by

a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e, that: there was a clea r and pe rsistent pattern of illega l activity ; the City had notice of it; the City tacitly approve d the unconstitutional activity such that its deliberate indiff

ere nce a mounts to an official policy of inac tion; and this cu s t o m or policy of i naction was the moving f orce behind the constitutional deprivation. Id. Yet, as the district court
o b s e r v e d , A u r e u s h a s m e r e l y argued t h e e x i s t e n c e o f s u c h a p o l i c y o f i n a c t i o n o r “ d e f

a c t o p o l i c y” and has a dduced no evide nce of a patte rn of sim ila r a c tiv ity . Su c h b a ld a ll eg a tio ns are c le arl y insufficient to for estall summary judgme nt. We therefor e find no error in the di strict court’s a war d of summary

judgme nt in favor of

the City
.No. 07-2195

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- 10 - VI I For the f oreg oing r easons, we deny all of appe llants’ claims of er ror a nd AF F IRM the district
c ourt ’s jud g me nt i n a ll r e sp e c ts.