Exem ption No. 10507

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

WASHINGTON, DC 20591

In the matter of the petition of

PHI, INC. Regulatory Docket No. 2011-1039 for an exemption from § 91.9(a)

of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations

GRANT OF EXEMPTION

By letter dated Septem ber 20, 2011, Mr. Michael C. Hurst, Chief Pilot, PHI, Inc. (PHI), P.O. Box 90808, Lafayette, LA 70509, petitioned the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on behalf of PHI for an exemption from § 91.9( a) of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR). The proposed exemption, if granted, would allow PHI to operate Sikorsky S-92A (S-92A) helicopters with limited exposure to engine failure during takeoff and landing while carrying up to 19 passengers between land-based and offshore facilities or when operating between two offshore facilities, day, night, visual flight rules, and instrument flight rules.

The petitioner requests relief from the following regulation:

Section 91.9(a) prescribes, in pertinent part, that no person may operate a civil aircraft without complying with the operating limitations specified in the approved Rotorcraft Flight Manual.

The petitioner supports its request with the following information:

The petitioner states that the petition for exemption is for operations conducted in its Sikorsky S-92A aircraft when operating between land-based and offshore facilities or when operating

between two offshore facilities.

AFS-11-466-E PHI states that its S-92As were certificated under part 29, am endment 47 relating to safety and ditching equipment, which provides the highest level of safety today. The petitioner states its S-92As are equipped with aircraft flot ation gear and are certified for ditching in up2

to sea state 4. Additionally, when operating over water, each S-92A occupant is provided, and wears, personal flotation equipment. Also, the S-92A is equipped with life rafts that can be deployed from inside or outside the aircraft.

PHI states that European operators, using the same aircraft, operate them in accordance with Joint Aviation Requirement-OPS-3 which already permits similar operations with limited exposure to engine failure. In addition, petitioner states that it has operated its S-92As under operations specification (OpSpec) H100 since 2003. The petitioner requests that this exemption extend to its operations “conducted outside the United States.”

The petitioner believes that the requested exemption will continue to provide the same level of safety that is currently in place for offshore operations. PHI states that collected data related to the engine reliability reflects that the in-flight shutdown rate is less than 1 per 100,000 flight hours.

PHI has operated under OpSpec H100 in the United States since 2003 which authorized operations similar to International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Performance Class 2 with limited exposure. During this period, no S-92A accidents have been caused by power loss due to engine failure during takeoff or landing.

PHI has instituted operational controls through its general operations manual, training program, and management surveillance. PHI will conduct operations in such a manner as to minimize the time spent exposed to engine failure. This will be accomplished by following the manufacturer’s recommended takeoff and landing procedures whenever feasible. Operations will not be conducted unless the curre nt aircraft weight, altitude, and temperature ensure 100 feet per minute climb at 1,000 feet above the takeoff surface with one engine inoperative and the remaining engine at maximum continuous one engine inoperative (OEI)

power.

PHI states that it further mitigates exposure by: (1) Conducting flight operations to and from helidecks and shore based heliports that meet or exceed size and weight requirements appropriate to the aircraft configuration; (2) Training its crews in a Level D, FFS (Full Flight Simulator) initially and annually, ensuring the highest levels of proficiency and competency; (3) Conducting route checks to confirm that its crews remain procedurally compliant and use crew resource management principles during all flight operations; and (4) Using PHI's Flight Data Monitoring Program (known as LAMP) to en sure flight profiles are in accordance with Performance Class 2 procedures.

The petitioner understands that the FAA is considering the rescission of OpSpec H-100. PHI notes that it has accumulated over 60,000 hours of operational experience in this make/model all in accordance with OpSpec H-100 and Performance Class 2 profiles. This experience demonstrates that when takeoff and landing techniques are used to minimize exposure to forced landing due to engine failure, that this aircraft can be operated at an equivalent level of safety to Category A. Additionally, if the rescission occurred without this relief, the S-92A3

would become economically unfeasible which likely would result in their removal from service. The outcome would be a reversion to smaller, older, less sophisticated aircraft that do not provide the same level of safety. This would result in an overall degradation of safety and not serve the most important stakeholder, the passenger.

A summary of the petition was published in the Federal Register on October 12, 2011 (76 FR 63342). No comments were received.

The FAA's analysis is as follows:

The FAA has considered the petitioner’s request and supporting materials and finds that, subject to the conditions and limitations below, a grant of exemption would be in the public interest and would provide a level of safety equivalent to that provided by the current regulations.

The FAA finds that PHI provides transportation under contract to employees of various oil companies from land based facilities to offshore facilities within the Gulf of Mexico. Aviation operations within the U.S. are conducted under the provisions of part 135.

Operations to offshore facilities present a unique operating environment which requires special consideration in operations, training, a nd standardization. Based on the drawings and photographs contained in the petition, “offshore facilities” include an overwater elevated

helideck.

The FAA recognizes that there may be instances in which a safe forced landing may not be possible due to environmental or other factor s. The FAA notes that regulatory agencies worldwide have already applied risk management and permitted variations to specific operations, such as operations to helidecks where exposure to an engine failure is present without a safe forced landing area. Risk assessment is used to determine whether to permit these variations. When operations without suitable areas for safe forced landings are being

considered, all relevant factors should be evaluated. These factors include the likelihood of the event, the possible consequences, and any mitigating measures weighed against the potential benefits of the operation. Accident history and other relevant safety data and analysis are crucial to making the operational determination.

The FAA notes the petitioner states that it has operated since 2003 under the provisions of OpSpec H100. That operations specification prohi bits operations unless the current aircraft weight, altitude and temperature would ensure the ability to climb 150 feet per minute at 1,000 feet above the takeoff surface with one engine inoperative and the remaining engine at maximum continuous OEI power. These specifications are also similar to those characteristics of operations under ICAO Performance Class 2. The ICAO standard for Performance Class 2 with limited exposure to engine failure is to have that exposure period be less than 9 seconds. The petitioner’s operations meet or exceed this standard. However, the FAA notes a discrepancy in the petitioner’s application where it states that its operations4

would not be conducted unless the climb rate was at least 100 feet per minute. This would not meet the current requirements of H100. Condition and limitation number 7 below reflects the 150 feet per minute climb rate currently required by H100.

The petitioner has proposed operational controls consistent with those in OpSpec H100. The FAA is considering the rescission of that ope rations specification. A grant of exemption would provide for continuity of operations de monstrated since PHI began S-92A operations in 2003. The FAA believes the limitations contained in OpSpec H100 have been effective

and therefore would continue them in limitati ons associated with a grant of exemption.

Granting this petition is in the public interest because these S-92A aircraft replaced older designs which do not offer the safety advancements, and are not required to meet the more stringent performance requirements imposed on the S-92A and other similar aircraft. The FAA concurs with the petitioner that permitting the use of the S-92A provides those passengers with the safe transportation, while maintaining an efficient transportation system for the oil and gas industry.

The FAA’s Decision

In consideration of the foregoing, I find that a grant of exem ption is in the public interest. Therefore, pursuant to the authority contained in 49 U.S.C. §§ 40113 and 44701, delegated to me by the Administrator, PHI, Inc., is granted an exemption from 14 CFR § 91.9(a) to the extent necessary to allow PHI to conduct arrivals and departures to and from offshore facilities using approach and departure profiles similar to Performance Class 2 with limited exposure to engine failure operations within the United States and in international airspace. This exemption is subject to the conditions and limitations listed below.

Conditions and Limitations

1. This exem ption is limited to operations conducted in PHI’s S-92A helicopters.

2. This exemption is limited to operations conducted between land-based airports and offshore heliports, or operations conducted between two offshore heliports.

3. This exemption is not valid for operations in foreign airspace without the prior authorization of the Civil Aviation Authority with jurisdiction over that airspace.

4. Occupants of flights conducted under this exemption must wear personal floatation equipment whenever the aircraft is over water and the aircraft must be equipped with

floats, accessible rafts, and a 406 MHz beacon.

5. PHI must make available and provide access, upon request by the FAA, to its engine reliability historical data for the S-92As in its fleet in order to provide ongoing surveillance of engine reliability.5

6. Computations regarding the determination of the approach and departure profiles must not exceed the ICAO standard of 9 seconds of exposure to engine failure related to Performance Class 2 with limited exposure to engine failure.

7. Operations will not be conducted unless the current aircraft weight, altitude and temperature, as provided in the S-92A Rotorcraft Flight Manual, ensure the ability to climb 150 feet per minute at 1,000 feet above the takeoff surface with one engine inoperative and the remaining engine at maximum continuous one-engine inoperative (OEI) power.

8. PHI must comply with, in addition to other routine preflight computations, the procedures cited in the S-92A Rotorcraft Flight Manual, Part 2, Section III, Supplemental Performance Data, page III-1-50, contained in the paragraphs titled “Elevated Helideck Takeoff and Landing –Limited Exposure – (At Figure 3-22 WAT)” and the paragraph following titled “Vertical Takeoff – Elevated Helideck.”

9. Operations under the provisions of this exemption must be flown by 2 pilot crews that are qualified and current in the operation of the S-92A.

10. PHI’s approved training program must include provisions for training of appropriate crews on the profiles associated with a Performance Class 2 with limited exposure takeoff and arrival, including performance planning. PHI must document the conduct and completion of that training for appropriate flight crewmembers.

11. Proficiency in the use of the profiles described in condition and limitation number 10 must be demonstrated satisfactorily during recurrent evaluations required by

§§135.293 or 135.299.

12. PHI must establish parameters for takeoff and arrival at helidecks for its flight data monitoring program and provide ongoing surveillance of those operations.

13. PHI must advise all S-92A flight crewmembers of the provisions of this exemption,

and document that notification.6

14. A copy of this exemption must be carried onboard each S-92A utilizing these provisions.

This exemption terminates on April 30, 2014, unless sooner superseded or rescinded.

Issued in Washington, D.C., on April 18, 2012.

/s/

John S. Duncan Deputy Director, Flight Standards

Service .