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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

February 23, 2016 

v No. 323736 

Oakland Circuit Court 

DONALD RAY HOLLOWAY, LC No. 2014-250369-FH 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: CAVANAGH, P.J., and RIORDAN and GADOLA, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial conviction of false pretenses of $1,000 or more 

but less than $20,000, MCL 750.218(4)(a). Defendant was sentenced as a fourth habitual 

offender, MCL 769.12, to 20 months’ to 20 years’ imprisonment. We affirm. 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

 On July 24, 2013, Shari Secor left two Cartier watches requiring repairs at Saks Fifth 

Avenue (“Saks”) at Somerset Mall in Troy, Michigan, with Terri Gorgis, the Cartier Brand 

Ambassador for Saks. Only one of the watches is at issue in this case. Gorgis completed a 

repair ticket that delineated Secor’s personal information and the requested repair. For the repair 

to be completed, the watch needed to be shipped to New York so that it could be opened by a 

certified Cartier watchmaker. Gorgis informed Secor that she would contact her after the watch 

was returned to Saks in a few weeks. 

 On September 16, 2013, defendant went to Saks, allegedly to retrieve a piece of jewelry 

that his fiancé, Shelley Barnes, had bought for him but left at the store for an adjustment.

Defendant told the Saks sales clerk, Carolyn Pudlo, that he was picking up a repair item. 

According to defendant, when Pudlo asked for the name under which the item was listed, he 

said, “Shelley.” However, Pudlo testified that defendant responded “Shari Secor,” explaining 

that he was Secor’s husband. Pudlo then retrieved a unisex Cartier watch, valued at $4,950, 

which belonged to Shari Secor. Defendant presented his driver’s license as requested, and Pudlo 

listed “Donald R. Holloway” and defendant’s driver’s license number on the repair ticket in 

order to document who had retrieved the watch. Defendant tried on the watch and asked Pudlo 

to adjust the sizing of the watch. Pudlo then asked Gorgis to help defendant, at which time 
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defendant again stated, this time to Gorgis, that Secor was out of town and he was her husband. 

Defendant then left Saks wearing the watch. 

Defendant testified at trial that he returned to Saks the next day to return the watch. 

However, because Pudlo was not working that day, he decided to keep the watch until the matter 

could be resolved. 

 On September 26, 2013, Secor called Saks to see if her watch repairs had been 

completed. Pudlo told Secor that her husband had already picked up one of the watches, at 

which time Secor indicated that she was unmarried. 

 Troy Police Detective Ryan Whiteside investigated the incident. He ultimately 

determined that it was defendant who picked up Secor’s watch, and the detective called 

defendant to ask him about the watch. Defendant agreed to return the watch, and he brought it to 

the police station the next day. Defendant told Whiteside that his brother’s friend Troy had 

given him a name and instructed him to pick up a watch from Saks, but he could not recall the 

name that he was given. Defendant also admitted that he had altered his driver’s license number 

on the repair ticket.1

 At trial, however, defendant testified that he fabricated the story regarding 

Troy because he was confined in a police interrogation room and “felt threatened.” He also 

claimed that he lied in a statement that he wrote at the police station, writing down information 

that he thought Whiteside wanted to hear instead of the truth because he wished to go to work 

and avoid arrest. 

II. ADMISSION OF PREVIOUS CONVICTION AND PRIOR BAD ACTS 

 Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his past 

conviction of larceny in a building and various prior bad acts because the evidence was unfairly 

prejudicial and violated his right to a fair trial. We disagree. 

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

We “review[] for an abuse of discretion the trial court’s decision to admit or exclude 

evidence,” People v Lane, 308 Mich App 38, 51; 862 NW2d 446 (2014), as well a trial court’s 

decision regarding “whether a prior conviction involving a theft component may be used to 

impeach a defendant,” People v Meshell, 265 Mich App 616, 634; 696 NW2d 754 (2005). “[A] 

trial court abuses its discretion when its decision falls outside the range of principled outcomes or 

when it erroneously interprets or applies the law.” Lane, 308 Mich App at 51 (footnotes omitted). 

We review de novo “the preliminary questions of law surrounding the admission of evidence, such as 

whether a rule of evidence bars admitting it.” Id.

B. LARCENY IN A BUILDING CONVICTION 

Defendant first contests the trial court’s admission of his 2013 larceny in a building 

 

1

 This alteration was corroborated by surveillance video. 
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conviction for impeachment purposes under MRE 609.2

 We reject defendant’s claim. 

MRE 609 provides that “evidence that [a] witness has been convicted of a crime shall not 

be admitted” “[f]or the purpose of attacking the credibility of [the] witness” unless the offense 

fulfills several requirements. Evidence of a prior conviction may be admissible during crossexamination if the crime (1) contained an element of dishonesty or false statement, or (2) 

contained an element of theft, was punishable by imprisonment in excess of one year, “has 

significant probative value on the issue of credibility,” and, if the defendant is the witness, “the 

probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect.” MRE 609(a)(1), (2). 

There is no dispute that defendant’s 2013 larceny in a building conviction contains an 

element of theft, see MCL 750.360; People v Sykes, 229 Mich App 254, 278; 582 NW2d 197 

(1998), and was punishable by imprisonment of more than one year, see People v Snyder, 301 

Mich App 99, 106 n 1; 835 NW2d 608 (2013). However, defendant asserts that the prior 

conviction was not significantly probative on the issue of credibility, and the prejudicial effect of 

the conviction outweighed its probative value. 

To determine the probative value of a conviction, the trial “court shall consider only the 

age of the conviction and the degree to which a conviction of the crime is indicative of veracity.” 

MRE 609(b). We have recognized that, in general, theft crimes are only minimally probative of 

a defendant’s credibility and moderately probative of a defendant’s veracity, but we have also 

recognized that recent convictions are more probative than older convictions. Snyder, 301 Mich 

App at 106. Here, defendant’s larceny in a building conviction occurred in the same year as the 

false pretenses charge at issue, and only 18 months prior to trial, which gives the conviction 

significant probative value under the circumstances of this case. See id. at 108. 

Defendant argues that even if the conviction was moderately probative of his credibility 

or veracity, “its probative value was far outweighed by its prejudicial effect on [his] trial.” To 

determine prejudicial effect, “the court shall consider only the conviction’s similarity to the 

charged offense and the possible effects on the decisional process if admitting the evidence 

causes the defendant to elect not to testify.” MRE 609(b). Contrary to defendant’s claims, his 

larceny in a building conviction was not strikingly similar to the false pretenses charge at issue in 

this case. Although larceny in a building, MCL 750.360, and false pretenses, MCL 

750.218(4)(a), include some common components, the offenses also include distinctively 

different elements. Compare Sykes, 229 Mich App at 278 (delineating the elements of larceny in 

a building), with People v Lueth, 253 Mich App 670, 680-681; 660 NW2d 322 (2002) 

(delineating the elements of larceny by false pretenses). Further, the circumstances of 

defendant’s larceny in a building conviction were not explained at trial, so the prejudicial effect 

of the prior conviction was not increased by the admission of evidence that would have made the 

offenses appear especially similar to the jury.3

 Moreover, there is no indication that the second 

 

2

 Defendant does not contest on appeal the trial court’s admission of his prior false pretenses 

convictions under MRE 609. 

3

 Defendant contends that the circumstances of his prior conviction for larceny in a building were 

nearly identical to the facts of the instant case, such that admission of the prior conviction was 
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factor, i.e., “the possible effects on the decisional process if admitting the evidence causes the 

defendant to elect not to testify,” MRE 609(b), is implicated here, or that the evidence was 

particularly prejudicial in light of its effect on defendant, because defendant did, in fact, testify. 

Stated differently, there was no effect on the decisional process in this regard because the prior 

conviction did not prompt defendant to refrain from testifying. 

Thus, the probative value of defendant’s prior conviction outweighed its prejudicial 

effect, and the trial court’s decision to admit the prior conviction pursuant to MRE 609(a) was 

not outside the range of principled outcomes. See People v Johnson, 474 Mich 96, 103; 712 

NW2d 703 (2006) (finding admission pursuant to MRE 609 proper in analogous circumstances). 

Defendant also argues that the trial court failed to properly consider on the record the 

factors identified in MRE 609. “[T]he trial court’s failure to articulate on the record its analysis 

of the[] factors [under MRE 609] does not require reversal if the trial court was aware of the 

pertinent factors and of its discretion.” Meshell, 265 Mich App at 638. The record reveals that 

the court considered the requirements of MRE 609(b) by addressing the age of the crime, the 

extent to which the crime was indicative of veracity, and the similarity of the prior conviction to 

the instant offense. Although the trial court did not analyze the impact that the admission of the 

prior conviction could have on defendant’s decision to testify, it did state that it was aware that 

defendant may not testify. Accordingly, it is logical to infer that the court realized that its 

decision might affect defendant’s decision. Further, the trial court’s ruling demonstrated that it 

knew that the admission of the past conviction was discretionary and was aware of the factors 

necessary for admission. 

Therefore, any deficiency in the trial court’s articulation of the factors under MRE 609 

does not warrant reversal.4

 See id. 

C. PRIOR BAD ACTS 

unfairly prejudicial pursuant to MRE 609(b). Although the prosecutor asked numerous questions 

regarding defendant’s prior bad acts involving stolen layaway receipts in Sears stores, the 

circumstances of defendant’s previous larceny in a building conviction were not specifically 

described at trial or clarified anywhere in the lower court record. Notably, in making this 

argument on appeal, defendant provides no citation to the lower court record and instead 

proffers, as an exhibit on appeal, a police report allegedly related to the incident giving rise to his 

larceny in a building conviction. The police report is not present in the lower court record 

received on appeal, and we decline to consider it. “[I]t is impermissible to expand the record on 

appeal.” People v Powell, 235 Mich App 557, 561 n 4; 599 NW2d 499 (1999). 

4

 To the extent that defendant asserts that the trial court’s reasoning on the record improperly 

conflated the requirements of MRE 609 and MRE 404(b), we note that the parties concurrently 

presented their arguments regarding the admission of defendant’s prior convictions under MRE 

609 and prior bad acts under MRE 404(b). As such, it is apparent that (1) the trial court’s ruling 

was in response to, and a product of, the simultaneous arguments of the parties, and (2) it 

addressed the admission of the evidence under both rules, even though it only expressly 

mentioned MRE 609. 
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Defendant also objects to the admission of prior act evidence regarding incidents 

involving stolen layaway receipts that defendant returned to Sears for cash. Under MRE 404(b), 

evidence regarding other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible if (1) it is offered for a proper 

purpose, (2) it is relevant to a factual issue of consequence at trial, and (3) the probative value of 

the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice under MRE 

403.5 People v Sabin (After Remand), 463 Mich 43, 55-56; 614 NW2d 888 (2000), citing MRE 

104(b), MRE 402, MRE 403, and MRE 404(b). Defendant does not contest whether the prior act 

evidence was offered for a proper purpose, or whether the evidence was relevant to a material 

factual issue. Rather, he only asserts that the evidence was unfairly prejudicial and should have 

been excluded by the trial court pursuant to MRE 403. 

Under MRE 403, “[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . .” To determine whether unfair 

prejudice exists for purposes of MRE 404(b), a court must consider “whether the danger of 

undue prejudice [substantially] outweighs the probative value of the evidence in view of the 

availability of other means of proof and other facts appropriate for making decision[s] of this 

kind under Rule 403.” Sabin, 463 Mich at 55-56 (alteration in original). 

In People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 398; 582 NW2d 785 (1998), the Michigan 

Supreme Court explained: 

Evidence is unfairly prejudicial when there exists a danger that marginally 

probative evidence will be given undue or preemptive weight by the jury. In the 

context of prior bad acts, that danger is prevalent. When a juror learns that a 

defendant has previously committed the same crime as that for which he is on 

trial, the risk is severe that the juror will use the evidence precisely for the 

purpose that it may not be considered, that is, as suggesting that the defendant is a 

bad person, a convicted criminal, and that if he did it before he probably did it 

again. Because prior acts evidence carries with it a high risk of confusion and 

misuse, there is a heightened need for the careful application of the principles set 

forth in MRE 403. [Quotation marks and citations omitted.] 

See also People v McGhee, 268 Mich App 600, 614; 709 NW2d 595 (2005) (“This unfair 

prejudice refers to the tendency of the proposed evidence to adversely affect the objecting party’s 

position by injecting considerations extraneous to the merits of the lawsuit, e.g., the jury’s bias, 

sympathy, anger, or shock.” [Quotation marks and citation omitted.]). 

Here, the prior acts evidence was tremendously probative in light of defendant’s claim 

that he acquired the watch by mistake. Additionally, defendant never acknowledged that he 

committed any of the prior bad acts referenced by the prosecution. Instead, he either responded 

that he did not remember whether the incidents occurred or denied the incidents all together. 

Even though this line of questioning presented a danger of prejudice, there is no indication that 

 

5

 In addition, “the trial court, upon request, may provide a limiting instruction under MRE 105.” 

People v Sabin, 463 Mich 43, 56; 614 NW2d 888 (2000). 
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the jury attributed undue or preemptive weight to the prosecution’s questions regarding 

defendant’s prior bad acts. Additionally, to the extent that there was a risk that the jury 

presumed that the prior bad acts occurred solely from the prosecution’s questions, this risk was 

alleviated by the trial court’s instructions that the jury may only consider properly admitted 

evidence in deciding the case, and that the lawyers’ questions are not evidence. “[J]urors are 

presumed to follow their instructions.” People v Unger, 278 Mich App 210, 235; 749 NW2d 

272 (2008). 

Moreover, even if the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the prior bad acts 

under MRE 404(b)—or if the prosecutor’s questions and defendant’s noncommittal answers 

arose, on their own, to a level of unfair prejudice under MRE 403—such an error would be 

harmless. “[A] preserved, nonconstitutional error is not a ground for reversal unless after an 

examination of the entire cause, it shall affirmatively appear that it is more probable than not that 

the error was outcome determinative.” People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 495-496; 596 NW2d 607 

(1999) (quotation marks omitted). In light of the overwhelming evidence supporting the jury’s 

verdict, it does not affirmatively appear more probable than not that the admission of defendant’s 

prior bad acts affected the trial’s outcome. 

 Finally, defendant’s claim related to the trial court’s failure to expressly weigh the 

prejudicial nature of the evidence on the record also fails. Even though it did not explicitly 

weigh the prejudicial impact of the evidence on the record, the trial court expressly considered 

the evidence’s probative value, the similarity of the prior acts to the charged offense, and the 

proper purpose of the evidence. In People v Gaines, 306 Mich App 289, 302 n 8; 856 NW2d 

222 (2014), we rejected the same argument that defendant raises here, stating, “Defendant claims 

the trial court failed to conduct its balancing of prejudicial effect and probative value under MRE 

403 on the record, but a trial court need not state on the record how it balanced the prejudicial 

effect and probative value.” Furthermore, when a trial court fails to state on the record its 

reasons for admitting evidence, we will affirm the evidentiary ruling if the right result was 

reached. People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 582; 629 NW2d 411 (2001). 

 Thus, we reject defendant’s evidentiary claims. 

III. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 

 Defendant also argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial 

counsel failed to request M Crim JI 4.11, an instruction that would have limited the jury’s 

consideration of his prior criminal acts to a particular purpose, and M Crim JI 5.1, an instruction 

that would have limited the jury’s consideration of his prior conviction for impeachment 

purposes only. We disagree. 

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW 

Because a Ginther6

 hearing was not held in the trial court, our review of defendant’s 

 

6 People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). 
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ineffective assistance of counsel claim is limited to mistakes apparent from the record. People v 

Jordan, 275 Mich App 659, 667; 739 NW2d 706 (2007). “A claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel is a mixed question of law and fact. A trial court’s findings of fact, if any, are reviewed 

for clear error, and this Court reviews the ultimate constitutional issue arising from an ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim de novo.” People v Petri, 279 Mich App 407, 410; 760 NW2d 882 

(2008), citing People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246 (2002). 

In order to prove that counsel provided ineffective assistance, a defendant must 

demonstrate that (1) “ ‘counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness,’ ” and (2) defendant was prejudiced, i.e., “that ‘there is a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.’ ” People v Vaughn, 491 Mich 642, 669-671; 821 NW2d 288 (2012), quoting 

Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 688, 694; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984). “A 

defendant must also show that the result that did occur was fundamentally unfair or unreliable.” 

People v Lockett, 295 Mich App 165, 187; 814 NW2d 295 (2012). “Effective assistance of 

counsel is presumed,” and a defendant bears a heavy burden of proving otherwise. Petri, 279 

Mich App at 410. 

B. ANALYSIS 

 Defendant has failed to rebut the strong presumption that defense counsel’s performance 

constituted sound trial strategy. See Petri, 279 Mich App at 410. During his closing argument, 

defense counsel argued that the jury should not consider defendant’s prior criminal acts at all. 

This argument was more stringent than the limitations in both M Crim JI 4.11 and M Crim 5.1, 

as both instructions permit the jury to consider prior bad acts or prior convictions for one or more 

limited purposes. Accordingly, defense counsel’s failure to request a limiting instruction was 

consistent with his clear strategy to downplay defendant’s prior criminal acts and minimize the 

purposes for which the jury was permitted to consider the evidence. See, e.g., People v Rice, 235 

Mich App 429, 444-445; 597 NW2d 843 (1999). Whether to request a particular jury instruction 

is a matter of trial strategy, see People v Gonzalez, 468 Mich 636, 645; 664 NW2d 159 (2003); 

People v Barker, 161 Mich App 296, 304; 409 NW2d 813 (1987), and we will not second-guess 

counsel on matters of trial strategy, nor assess defense counsel’s performance with the benefit of 

hindsight, People v Russell, 297 Mich App 707, 716; 825 NW2d 623 (2012). Thus, it was not 

unreasonable for counsel to refrain from requesting a limiting instruction so that he could 

advance such an argument, without a contradictory instruction from the court. Accordingly, 

defendant has failed to establish that defense counsel’s performance fell below an objective 

standard of reasonableness. See Vaughn, 491 Mich at 669-671. 

 Moreover, even if we assume, arguendo, that defendant established the first prong of the 

test, defendant has failed to show that he was prejudiced by defense counsel’s performance. The 

prosecutor’s statements during his closing and rebuttal arguments concerning the purposes for 

which the jury should consider defendant’s prior conviction and prior bad acts presented, in 

effect, the same instructions as those in M Crim JI 4.11 and M Crim JI 5.1. Even though the trial 

court properly instructed the jury that the court, not the attorneys, is responsible for instructing 

the jury on the law, it is significant that the party utilizing the evidence expressly advocated the 

restricted use of that evidence for proper purposes. Further, given the magnitude of the evidence 

against defendant, we cannot conclude that there is a reasonable probability that defense 
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counsel’s failure to request a limiting instruction affected the outcome of the proceedings. See 

Vaughn, 491 Mich at 669-671. 

IV. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 

 Next, defendant alleges several instances of prosecutorial misconduct. We reject 

defendant’s claims. 

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW 

“In order to preserve an issue of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must 

contemporaneously object and request a curative instruction.” People v Bennett, 290 Mich App 

465, 475; 802 NW2d 627 (2010). Except as indicated below, all of defendant’s claims of 

prosecutorial misconduct are unpreserved. “Review of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is 

precluded unless the defendant timely and specifically objects, except when an objection could 

not have cured the error, or a failure to review the issue would result in a miscarriage of justice.” 

Unger, 278 Mich App at 234-235. 

When a claim of prosecutorial misconduct is preserved, we review the issue de novo “to 

determine whether the defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial.” Bennett, 290 Mich App 

at 475. However, we review unpreserved issues of prosecutorial misconduct for plain error 

affecting substantial rights. Id. at 475-476, citing People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763; 597 

NW2d 130 (1999). To demonstrate such an error, the defendant must show that (1) an error 

occurred, (2) the error was clear or obvious, and (3) “the plain error affected [the defendant’s] 

substantial rights,” which “generally requires a showing of prejudice, i.e., that the error affected 

the outcome of the lower court proceedings.” Carines, 460 Mich at 763. “Reversal is warranted 

only when plain error resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or seriously 

affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Further, [this Court] 

cannot find error requiring reversal where a curative instruction could have alleviated any 

prejudicial effect.” Bennett, 290 Mich App at 476 (quotation marks and citations omitted; 

alteration in original). 

We review prosecutorial misconduct claims on a case-by-case basis, examining the 

prosecutor’s remarks in context. People v Mann, 288 Mich App 114, 119; 792 NW2d 53 (2010); 

People v Dobek, 274 Mich App 58, 63-64; 732 NW2d 546 (2007). “A prosecutor’s good-faith 

effort to admit evidence does not constitute misconduct.” Dobek, 274 Mich App at 70. 

B. ELICITATION OF IMPROPER WITNESS TESTIMONY 

 Defendant first argues that the prosecutor improperly questioned Secor regarding her 

feelings about the incident. The record reveals that Secor only responded, at this point in her 

testimony, that she was angry at and frustrated with Saks, not defendant. Accordingly, there is 

no indication that this question denied defendant a fair trial or seriously affected the fairness, 

integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See Bennett, 290 Mich App at 465. 

 Next, defendant argues that the prosecutor improperly questioned Secor regarding 

whether she conspired with defendant “in order to get a better watch out of Saks,” which elicited 

Secor’s reply that “[she] can afford [her] own watches, so no.” Defendant argues that the 
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prosecutor’s question prompted improper testimony that raised an impermissible inference 

between defendant’s financial status and guilt or innocence. See People v Johnson, 393 Mich 

488, 496-497; 227 NW2d 523 (1975). However, it is apparent from the context of this question 

that the prosecutor intended to establish that Secor was not involved in a conspiracy to defraud 

Saks for the price of the watch. There is absolutely no indication that this exchange was 

designed to cause, or actually caused, the jury to draw a connection between defendant’s 

financial circumstances and the instant offense, as Secor’s statement did not, in fact, provide any 

information regarding defendant’s financial status. Likewise, Secor’s unresponsive answer 

regarding her own ability to afford watches is not a basis for finding prosecutorial misconduct. 

“Unresponsive answers from witnesses are generally not prosecutorial error,” and there is no 

indication that the prosecutor knew in advance that Secor would provide this answer. People v 

Jackson, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2015) (Docket No. 322350); slip op at 8. 

 Defendant also challenges the prosecutor’s question regarding whether the watch had 

sentimental value, to which Secor responded: “Yes, it did. I’m trying very hard to contain 

myself right now. Yes, I can’t stand thieves. So yes I’m very upset right now.” It appears from 

the record that the prosecutor asked this question to explain why Secor was emotional during her 

testimony. “[A]sking witnesses about how they are feeling while testifying can be relevant to 

their credibility.” People v Bailey, 310 Mich App 703, 722; ___ NW2d ___ (2015), citing MRE 

401 and MRE 607. Further, we find no basis for concluding that Secor’s unresponsive statement 

that she “can’t stand thieves”—which defendant characterizes as an opinion regarding his guilt 

or innocence—was prosecutorial error. See Jackson, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 8. 

 Lastly, defendant raises a preserved claim that the prosecutor committed misconduct 

when, on re-direct examination, he asked Secor if she was frustrated and annoyed with 

defendant, which elicited the following responses: “Absolutely. I mean it’s bad enough to be a 

thief, but you got to be a liar too,” and, “I’m annoyed that my watch has been stolen, yes. I 

mean[,] I’m the victim here.” Defendant asserts that Secor’s emotions were irrelevant and that 

her statements constituted impermissible opinions regarding defendant’s guilt and credibility. 

However, when the questions are viewed in context, the record reveals that Secor 

exhibited an increasingly frustrated, annoyed, and hostile demeanor throughout her testimony, 

especially in response to defense counsel’s cross-examination questions. As such, it is clear that 

the prosecutor’s questioning was designed to elicit an explanation for Secor’s demeanor, which 

was relevant to her credibility. See Bailey, 310 Mich App at 722. The relevance of this line of 

questioning is especially evident given defense counsel’s contentions regarding Secor’s 

credibility, arising from her demeanor on cross-examination, during his closing argument. 

Moreover, Secor’s additional comments were unresponsive to the prosecutor’s questions, and 

there is no indication of prosecutorial misconduct based on Secor’s unresponsive answers. See 

Jackson, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 8. 

 In sum, there is no indication that the prosecutor’s questioning of Secor violated 

defendant’s right to a fair trial, Bennett, 290 Mich App at 475, and it is apparent that a curative 

instruction could have alleviated any prejudicial effect arising from the portions of Secor’s 

testimony, elicited by the prosecution, that defendant contests on appeal. If a curative instruction 

could have alleviated any prejudicial effect, we cannot find an error requiring reversal. Id. at 

476. 
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C. REBUTTAL ARGUMENT 

 Next, defendant raises a preserved claim that statements made by the prosecutor during 

his rebuttal argument, which indicated that the testimony of Gorgis was sufficient to establish the 

value of the watch, invaded the province of the jury. Defendant’s claim has no merit. 

To prove the value element of false pretenses, $1,000 or more but less than $20,000, the 

prosecutor had to prove that the watch was worth at least $1,000. See MCL 750.218(4)(a); 

Lueth, 253 Mich App at 680-681. During his closing argument, defense counsel argued that the 

prosecutor had not proven the value of the watch, emphasizing that neither the watch itself, a 

receipt, expert testimony on the watch’s value, nor an appraisal of the watch had been admitted 

at trial. During his rebuttal argument, the prosecutor stated: 

 Counsel raises the value. . . . There is not one single requirement in the 

law that says that an expert must be provided to establish the value. It’s sufficient 

that a person with knowledge testified to the value. 

 There’s not a jury instruction and the law does not require that an 

appraiser be qualified in order to establish the value. 

 Direct testimony from the Cartier ambassador is sufficient to establish that 

value. 

In context, it is apparent that the prosecutor addressed the issue of value in order to refute 

defense counsel’s argument that the value of the watch had not been established. “A 

prosecutor’s comments are to be evaluated in light of defense arguments and the relationship the 

comments bear to the evidence admitted at trial. Otherwise improper prosecutorial conduct or 

remarks might not require reversal if they address issues raised by defense counsel.” Dobek, 274 

Mich App at 64. Accordingly, given defense counsel’s statements, the prosecutor’s comments 

did not constitute misconduct. Moreover, “[p]rosecutors are typically afforded great latitude 

regarding their arguments and conduct at trial. They are generally free to argue the evidence and 

all reasonable inferences from the evidence as it relates to their theory of the case.” Unger, 278 

Mich App at 236 (citation omitted). As such, especially in light of the trial court’s jury 

instructions, there is no indication that the prosecutor’s statements invaded the province of the 

jury or improperly prejudiced defendant. See People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 636-637; 576 

NW2d 129 (1998). 

 Therefore, the prosecutor’s statements did not violate defendant’s right to a fair and 

impartial trial. See Bennett, 290 Mich App at 475. 

D. WITNESS VOUCHING 

 Lastly, defendant argues that the prosecutor impermissibility vouched for Whiteside’s 

credibility during his closing argument, at which time the prosecutor indicated that Whiteside 

had no reason to lie, fabricate, or exaggerate in order to make a better case against defendant. 

We disagree. 

“A prosecutor may argue from the facts that a witness is credible or that a witness is not 

worthy of belief.” Unger, 278 Mich App at 240; see also id. (“[P]rosecutorial arguments 

regarding credibility are not improper when based on the evidence, even if couched in terms of 
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belief or disbelief.”). Although “a prosecutor may not vouch for the credibility of his witnesses 

by implying that he has some special knowledge of their truthfulness[,] . . . a prosecutor may 

comment on his own witnesses’ credibility during closing argument, especially when there is 

conflicting evidence and the question of the defendant’s guilt depends on which witnesses the 

jury believes.” People v Thomas, 260 Mich App 450, 455; 678 NW2d 631 (2004) (citations 

omitted). 

Because the prosecutor did not claim that he had special knowledge regarding 

Whiteside’s credibility, his comment was not improper vouching. See id. Moreover, when 

viewed in context, the prosecutor’s remark was a proper response to defendant’s testimony that 

he did not alter his driver’s license number on the repair ticket, which directly contradicted 

Whiteside’s testimony. See Thomas, 260 Mich App at 455. Additionally, even if the comment 

constituted improper vouching, there is no indication that the outcome of the case was affected 

by the prosecution’s statement, as defendant’s testimony and theory of defense diminished the 

significance of Whiteside’s testimony regarding defendant’s admissions, as defendant testified 

that he lied to the detective. See Carines, 460 Mich at 763; Bennett, 290 Mich App at 476. 

Finally, a timely objection and curative instruction would have alleviated any prejudicial effect 

of the prosecutor’s statements, Bennett, 290 Mich App at 476, and the trial court did, in fact, 

instruct the jury both at the beginning and the end of trial that the jury was the sole judge of the 

witnesses’ credibility, and that the lawyers’ statements and arguments were not evidence, thereby 

curing the alleged error, see People v Wood, 307 Mich App 485, 506; 862 NW2d 7 (2014), 

vacated in part on other grounds 871 NW2d 154 (2015). 

Therefore, we reject all of defendant’s claims of prosecutorial misconduct. 

V. CUMULATIVE ERROR 

 Defendant argues that the cumulative effect of the aforementioned errors deprived him of 

his right to a fair trial. Because defendant has failed to establish any error, there is no possible 

cumulative effect warranting reversal. See Gaines, 306 Mich App at 310 (“[O]nly ‘actual errors’ 

are aggregated when reviewing a cumulative-error argument.”); People v Mayhew, 236 Mich 

App 112, 128; 600 NW2d 370 (1999) (“Because no errors were found with regard to any of the 

above issues, a cumulative effect of errors is incapable of being found.”). 

VI. STANDARD 4 BRIEF 

 Finally, defendant alleges six issues in a supplemental brief filed in propria persona 

pursuant to Administrative Order 2004–6, Standard 4. Defendant’s arguments are interrelated 

and essentially assert that (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction over him, which rendered his 

conviction void, due to multiple deficiencies in the lower court record, and (2) defense counsel 

was ineffective in failing to raise these jurisdictional issues below. We disagree. 

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Because defendant failed to preserve these claims in the trial court, his claim is reviewed 

for plain error affecting his substantial rights. Carines, 460 Mich at 763-764. As stated supra, 

because no Ginther hearing was held, our review of defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel 

claim is limited to mistakes apparent from the record. Jordan, 275 Mich App at 667. 
-12- 

B. ANALYSIS 

 In his brief, defendant cites Michigan and federal cases, constitutional provisions, court 

rules, and statutes, but he fails to provide any explanation regarding how the cited law applies to, 

or supports, his claims. A defendant abandons his claims when he fails to make a meaningful 

argument in support of his position. See MCR 7.212(C)(7); People v Payne, 285 Mich App 181, 

188; 774 NW2d 714 (2009). Therefore, because defendant has failed to adequately brief these 

arguments on appeal, we deem the issues abandoned.7 

 Furthermore, the lower court record received on appeal includes a complaint; a general 

information; a warrant; a district court register of actions; a statement of bindover to the circuit 

court; a preliminary examination transcript; a waiver of arraignment and election to stand mute 

or enter a not guilty plea; and a transcript from a plea hearing on June 5, 2014. We discern no 

legal deficiencies in any of these records and, as a result, have not found an error affecting 

defendant’s substantial rights. See Carines, 460 Mich at 763-764. Moreover, even if we had 

found a deficiency, reversal is not warranted, as defendant has not demonstrated that the alleged 

errors “resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or . . . seriously affect[ed] the 

fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings independent of the defendant’s 

innocence.” Id. at 763-764 (quotation marks and citation omitted; second alteration in original). 

VII. CONCLUSION 

Defendant has failed to establish that any of the claims of error raised in his brief on 

appeal and Standard 4 brief warrant relief. 

Affirmed. 

/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh 

/s/ Michael J. Riordan 

/s/ Michael F. Gadola 

 

7

 Defendant has also abandoned his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, as he failed to state 

this issue in his statement of questions presented. See MCR 7.212(C)(5); People v McMiller, 

202 Mich App 82, 83 n 1; 507 NW2d 812 (1993). Nevertheless, there is no indication that 

defense counsel’s failure to raise these claims in the trial court fell below an objective standard 

of reasonableness or prejudiced defendant. See Vaughn, 491 Mich at 669-671.